January 13, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4031 4032 4033

Johnson's Russia List
#4033
13 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. The Guardian (UK): Ian Traynor, Putin to beef up secret service.
2. The Times (UK): Alice Lagnado, Putin picks campaign team.
3. Reuters: Russia restricts movements of Chechen men.
4. AP: Chechen Leader Doesn't Want US Aid.
5. Moscow Times: Yevgeni Albats, Does a KGB Resume Make Putin a Stalin? 
6. The Times (UK): Alice Lagnado, Russian media condemn conduct of Chechen war.
7. Boston Globe: Brian Whitmore, Putin courts voters with call for pay raises, economic revival.
8. Stratfor Commentary: CIS Headed for Confrontational Summit.
9. Argumenty i Fakty: SIX REASONS WHY PUTIN MAY NOT BECOME PRESIDENT.
10. Moscow Times: Andrei Zolotov Jr., Yeltsin Wrestles With His New Role.
11. Segodnya: Natalya Kalashnikova and Alexei Makarkin, YOURS VERY TRULY. Professional Political 'Grave-Diggers' Rally Behind Putin.
12. Kennan Institute: Hilary Appel, The Role of Ideology in Privatization Programs.]

*******

#1
The Guardian (UK)
13 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Putin to beef up secret service 
Ian Traynor in Moscow 

Vladimir Putin, Russia's acting president, who has spent the bulk of his
professional life as a KGB spy, is planning sweeping reforms of Russia's
security services as part of his drive to restore the country to its
Soviet-era status as a great power, it emerged yesterday. 

Mr Putin, who led the FSB, the KGB's successor organisation, has issued a
decree making "radical" changes to Russia's national security strategy,
officials said yesterday. 

The daily newspaper Segodnya reported that the acting president intends to
establish a new "super special service" by merging departments of FSB
counter-intelligence with elite police departments. The new body, which
will combat widespread corruption in Russia, would be modelled on the
United States' FBI. 

"He'll certainly try to rationalise the security organs," said Dmitri
Trenin, a security analyst at Moscow's Carnegie Centre. "There's a real
need for law and order and fighting corruption." 

"Steps need to be taken ... in very sore areas - notably the fight against
corruption, banditry and strengthening the role of law," Anatoly Chubais,
an influential Kremlin insider, said yesterday. "The thing most needed is a
radical strengthening of the key state functions." 

Over the next couple of months' campaigning for the Russian presidency, Mr
Putin is expected to promise tough law and order policies which should
prove popular with a public fed up with rampant criminality and sleaze. 

In the few policy statements he has made in recent weeks, Mr Putin has
emphasised the need for a strong Russian state and its "guiding role". 

He is seen as a centraliser who will seek to rein in the country's 89
regions and concentrate power in Moscow. His spin doctors are keen to
highlight his reputed admiration for Lady Thatcher, triggering talk of the
"Iron Man" who learned from the "Iron Lady". 

In the communist era, the KGB and its predecessors were key instruments of
repression and power in Russia. Although the FSB is not nearly as powerful
as the old KGB, Mr Putin was described by the analyst Dmitri Furman as "a
post-communist Andropov; an Andropov without the remnants of communist
idealism". Yuri Andropov was the KGB chief who became Soviet president in
1982, a position he held until his death in 1984. 

Shortly before becoming acting president on New Year's Eve, Mr Putin went
to the Lubyanka, the notorious secret police headquarters in Moscow, to
deliver a paean to the FSB and its predecessors on the anniversary of the
establishment of the Cheka, the revolutionary secret police founded in 1917. 

"A few years ago we fell victim to the illusion that we have no enemies.
This cost us dearly. Russia has its national interests and we have to
defend them," he told an assembly of secret police officers. 

Mr Putin's decree on national security strategy, signed on Monday, stresses
the need to combat corruption and organised crime. 

His shift in emphasis will also affect foreign policy. Foreign states are
seeking to deny Russia influence in various parts of the world, the
document states. "A threat is also posed by strengthening political and
military alliances: first of all Nato's eastward expansion and the
possibility of foreign military bases and troops appearing close to
Russia's borders." 

Mr Putin spent 16 years in the KGB, working in what was then Leningrad (now
St Petersburg) and in the communist former East Germany, where he received
an award for services rendered from East Germany's powerful Stasi chief,
Erich Mielke. German reports this week claimed he also worked as a spy in
Bonn in West Germany in the 1970s. 

Mr Putin left the KGB as a colonel in 1990. But in July 1998 Boris Yeltsin
made Mr Putin the head of the FSB, a post he held until becoming prime
minister last August. At the FSB, he rapidly gained a reputation for
ruthless streamlining, abolishing three important FSB departments and
firing 2,000 employees. 

"Putin's arrival was marked by the promotion of [his] former colleagues to
top FSB posts," noted Alexei Mukhin, a Moscow analyst. 

Mr Yeltsin then made Mr Putin secretary of his advisory security council, a
Kremlin post now held by Sergei Ivanov, an old university friend of Mr
Putin's. Another key Putin associate, Nikolai Patrushev, now heads the FSB.
He joined the KGB in Leningrad in 1975. 

Mr Ivanov yesterday signalled that the security council was considering
placing curbs on the Russian media. 

*******

#2
The Times (UK)
January 13 2000 RUSSIA 
[for personal use only] 
Putin picks campaign team 
FROM ALICE LAGNADO IN MOSCOW

THE team of advisers recruited by Vladimir Putin, Russia's acting President, 
to run his presidential campaign are professional politicians united by 
motivations of money and ambition rather than a common ideology. 

Mr Putin has been careful to avoid recruiting former KGB men to work behind 
the scenes, where much of Russian politics happens. Instead he has chosen a 
combination of Kremlin old hands and aggressive new members of the inner 
circle. 

He has chosen people such as the glamorous Turkmen adviser Dzhokhan Polyeva, 
who wrote many of his recent speeches. Known as a "mastermind of intrigue", 
she has worked for the Kremlin since at least 1991 and had to manage 
potential public relations disasters in Yeltsin's last days. While invisible 
to the Russian public, her role cannot be underestimated. 

It is no surprise that Mr Putin has kept on some tried and tested Kremlin 
advisers. He has himself been part of the Kremlin inner circle for the past 
five years. 

"He knows the Kremlin better than any of his entourage, and these connections 
are more important than his KGB past, which was 12 years ago," a leading 
political commentator, Yevgeni Volk of the Heritage Foundation, said. 

Gleb Pavlovsky, a one-time dissident who, like hippies who became middle 
managers, moved from fighting the State to working for it, runs a think-tank 
and works on contract for commercial and political clients. His only sign of 
dissidence now is his refusal to wear suits and ties. Instead he has built an 
extremely lucrative career for himself. He advised President Yeltsin on how 
to run his re-election campaign in 1996. Now his task is to ensure that Mr 
Putin, who is paying him, stays top of the polls, whatever he thinks of his 
policies. 

The man in charge of managing the media is Mikhail Lesin who heads the Press 
Ministry. Another old hand in it for money more than ideals, he said that 
"protection of the State from the mass media is a very pressing issue". 

Aleksei Golovkov, an economist from Severomorsk, near Murmansk in the far 
north, was Chief of Staff for the government of Yegor Gaidar in the early 
1990s. In 1996 he brought Aleksandr Lebed, the maverick general, some success 
in the presidential elections by managing his campaign team. 

Dmitri Kozak, Mr Putin's Chief of Staff, is one of the St Petersburg circle. 
A sharply dressed heavy smoker, the young lawyer left his job as head of the 
St Petersburg government's legal department last year. 

Another aide from the St Petersburg camp, the ambitious German Gref, 
presented a blueprint for Russia's new ideology, including economic thinking, 
just before new year. 

Mr Putin is expected to rely on his present Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, 
for foreign policy advice since he lacks any experts outside the ministry. 

More of a headache is Defence, where internal quarrels and an increasingly 
disastrous and unpopular war in Chechnya could mean a new minister within 
months. 

These are the men Mr Putin is counting on to realise his dream of Russian 
greatness. "Our country Russia was a great, powerful, strong state, and it is 
clear that this is not possible if we do not have strong armed forces, 
powerful armed forces," Mr Putin said. "We will not achieve this if we do not 
solve a range of problems in the economic and social spheres." 

******

#3
Russia restricts movements of Chechen men
By Olga Petrova

SLEPTSOVSK, Russia, Jan 13 (Reuters) - Russian forces, caught off guard by
rebel strikes in Chechnya, are restricting the movements of all Chechen men
-- a step which a regional governor said on Thursday would only worsen the
situation. 

Among new measures, Russia has sealed off Chechnya's border to boys and men
between 10 and 60 years old. 

``They think we are all fighters,'' said Adam Kepsurkhayev, 24, after
border guards told him he could not cross back from the province of
Ingushetia, where more than 200,000 Chechens have sought shelter, to his
home town in Chechnya. 

``The soldiers told all the men between 10 and 60 to get off the bus.'' 

The moves came days after Russia's commander in the region, Viktor
Kazantsev, said the ``soft-heartedness'' of Russian forces was to blame for
recent military setbacks, and vowed thorough door-to-door checks of Chechen
towns under Russian control. 

Ingushetia's leader said in a television interview on Thursday that the
crackdown was a mistake. 

``I believe that this was not the most correct decision. I think one must
strictly observe human rights,'' he said. ``In fighting terrorism, you
cannot battle with the peaceful population.'' 

He also said the latest fighting was provoking a new wave of refugees
seeking to flee Chechnya, despite Russian claims that it has made areas
under its control safe enough to return. 

On Wednesday a spokesman for Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov said brutality
toward civilians was eroding the chances that eventual peace talks could
stop the fighting. 

Selim Abdumuslimov warned that the ``the situation (could) spin out of
control. Then no talks will be able to bring about an end to partisan war.'' 

``FLAWLESS'' CAMPAIGN RUNS AGROUND 

The Chechen campaign, which former President Boris Yeltsin described as
``flawless'' before resigning last month, has run aground since the new
year. Russian troops had taken the Chechen lowlands but failed to dislodge
rebels from the capital Grozny or mountain bases in the south. 

Over the weekend rebels launched raids on Russian-held lowland towns,
reviving the tactic of lightning strikes that won them victory in the
1994-96 war in the province. The raids have begun setting off alarm bells
in Russia's media. 

``It is increasingly obvious that the Kremlin and the Defence Ministry have
grossly miscalculated the campaign,'' defence analyst Pavel Felgenhauer
wrote in the English-language Moscow Times on Thursday. 

But Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo, on a visit to the region with
other officials, said news reports had exaggerated the extent of the
setbacks. 

``Reports in the media of a significant worsening in the situation are a
grotesque exaggeration,'' he said in televised comments at a Russian air
base. ``The situation is stable.'' 

NEW TACTICS PROMISED, FEW DETAILS 

Russian officials have promised new tactics, but have given few details
beyond tighter police checks on Chechen men. 

The military setbacks have provided a serious test for Acting President
Vladimir Putin, who owes his enormous popularity mainly to previous success
in Chechnya. 

But even a serious worsening of the situation in the rebel region may do
little to hurt his chances in a March presidential election, as he faces
little substantial opposition. 

``Putin's Chechen adventure seems to be in serious trouble. But this does
not mean the attitude of the Russian people will change,'' Felgenhauer wrote. 

``While the Russian media continues to portray the campaign as victorious,
public support for the war will also continue.'' 

*******

#4
Chechen Leader Doesn't Want US Aid
January 13, 2000
By DAVID BRISCOE

WASHINGTON (AP) - Chechnya does not want U.S. weapons and hopes for a
negotiated settlement with the Russian government to end the bloodshed in
the breakaway province, a Chechen official says. 

Ilyas Akhmadov, who serves under Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov in
Grozny, said he is not seeking American assistance or mediation of the
conflict but only understanding for the Chechens' desire to stop Russian
military attacks. 

The Clinton administration on Wednesday ruled out a U.S. role in mediation
between Russia and the rebels in its province of Chechnya, and suggested
Europeans could take on the job. 

But as Russian forces resumed an offensive in Chechnya on Wednesday, there
was no indication Moscow would heed Chechen appeals or U.S. advice that it
seek a political solution to the threatened secession. Accusing Chechen
rebels of terrorism elsewhere in Russia, the Kremlin repeatedly has said it
will not talk until the rebellion is wiped out. 

``We don't believe that the result of the use of force is going to be the
melting away of resistance,'' State Department spokesman James P. Rubin
said. ``We believe that the Russians are in a cul-de-sac, that they cannot
by their current strategy come to the end of road because there is no end
to this kind of fighting.'' 

Akhmadov, speaking at an academic institute Wednesday evening before
planned meetings with members of Congress and others today, also said
Russian soldiers continue to sell weapons to Chechen fighters and claimed
no knowledge of any terrorist activity by Chechens. 

He estimated 10,000 Chechen civilians and about 250 fighters have died in
the conflict, but he declined to estimate Russian casualties. 

``God forbid, I don't want the United States to bomb Russia or give us
weapons,'' Akhmadov said. His remarks were translated from Russian. 

``The only aim of our government is to stop the total destruction of our
people, and we are prepared to do anything,'' he said. ``We are prepared to
negotiate.'' 

He said Russia tends to lament its mistakes but only stops aggression
``when it is drowned in its own blood. It's a horrible thing.'' 

Meanwhile, the State Department is asking Russia for clarification of
reports that Chechen males between ages 10 and 60, would be detained to see
whether they had ties to rebel forces. 

``It is essential that Russia respect the fundamental human rights of
civilians in and around Chechnya, not endanger the lives of noncombatants,
and ensure freedom of movement for displaced persons,'' spokesman Rubin said. 

Akhmadov said he appreciated the American concern, but added, ``The issue
here is whether the State Department will be satisfied with the explanation
of the Russian government and what its reaction will be.'' 

*******

#5
Moscow Times
January 13, 2000 
POWER PLAY: Does a KGB Resume Make Putin a Stalin? 
By Yevgenia Albats 

The question on everyone's mind is who, in fact, is Vladimir Putin? Is he a 
democrat and a guarantor of civil liberties? Or is he a Chekist who, in the 
tradition of the KGB under the Soviet Union, doesn't give so much as lip 
service to personal freedoms? Will he sacrifice a ripening democracy to the 
notion of Russia's "greatness?" 

The answer is: We don't know yet. 

Yes, the savage war in Chechnya does nothing for Putin's image as a democrat. 
He should be criticized for it just like Boris Yeltsin was during the 
previous Chechen war. However, just because Putin was a KGB man in the past 
does not mean he will be the next Stalin. 

I have investigated and written extensively about the Soviet KGB and I know 
that only those with a deliberate ignorance of its bloody past could have 
made a career in the political police, including the intelligence branch 
where Putin served. 

I was a proponent of a bill in the early 90s that would have prevented career 
KGB officers and KGB snitches from taking high-ranking government positions 
or from holding elected office - the kind of laws passed in the Czech 
Republic and Germany. It was never passed in Russia. 

The years of Soviet rule saw from 10 percent to 30 percent of Soviet citizens 
collaborating to some degree with the KGB and comprising its enormous shadow 
staff. In the late '80s and early '90s, some of Russia's self-proclaimed 
democrats were part of that staff. 

That said, I cannot help noticing that much of the judgment heaped on Putin 
for his KGB past resembles much of the judgment that was heaped by the KGB 
itself on many Soviet citizens - myself included - back in the bad old days. 
People with "suspect" backgrounds - social or religious - or with no 
Communist Party card in their pocket were doomed to be branded as disloyal, 
bad citizens simply because they were different from the majority. 

By virtue of Putin's role within the Soviet Union's most criminal institution 
(I say it once and I'll say it again), and because he has never been a member 
of any democratic party - unlike many of his colleagues - he is denounced 
again and again as Russia's next evil. Is this reallyfair? Don't we know, for 
instance, that some of those with a dissident past turned out to be 
provocateurs? Shouldn't we try to make a better argument this time? 

Those who know Putin well almost universally describe him as an exceptionally 
honest man, modest in his private life and deeply religious. Not too much so 
for a man about to become president, and certainly not too little in a 
country where politics and the elite are so corrupt. 

People do change. People learn. People read books, travel, engage in new 
activities, think about their past and present. And they undertake change. 
Putin has had 10 long years to judge his past for himself. Everyone is 
entitled to presumption of innocence. Everyone has the right to be assessed 
not just by their affiliation, but by their deeds - past and present. 

Let's give Vladimir Putin a chance. Let's not relegate him to a corner where 
he'll have no reason to prove he can do better than many expect him to. Let's 
leave Russia some hope. 

Yevgenia Albats is an independent journalist and political analyst based in 
Moscow. 

******

#6
The Times (UK)
January 13 2000
[for personal use only] 
Russian media condemn conduct of Chechen war
BY ALICE LAGNADO AND OUR FOREIGN STAFF

A CONCERTED campaign has begun in the Russian media criticising the war in 
Chechnya, signalling potential disaster for the political ambitions of 
Vladimir Putin, the acting President. 

Moskovski Komsomolets, a patriotic tabloid, published a photograph of a 
Russian soldier covered in blood on its front page yesterday with an article 
questioning the body counts given by Russian officials and Western press 
reports. 

Another popular tabloid, Komsomolskaya Pravda, said Russian efforts to 
control Argun, east of Grozny, were failing, with no changes in tactics 
foreseen to catch the rebels. "The main question is: what next? How can we 
make these towns truly ours and not places where you can expect to be shot in 
the back at any moment?" it said. The newspaper alleged that commanders knew 
the town of Gudermes, northeast of Grozny, was to be attacked but did nothing 
to stop it. 

The previous day the broadsheet Segodnya ran comments by an army captain who 
said the campaign to take Grozny was going disastrously. 

"They let us enter the city and get bogged down. Now our losses, which have 
been large anyway - the official reports are a bluff - will mount with every 
passing day," he said. 

Crucially, there is a similar shift in mood in television. The private NTV 
Channel has disclosed the huge losses alleged in Western press reports based 
on interviews with Russian soldiers. This week it showed Russian and Chechen 
soldiers exchanging dead bodies wrapped in blankets, together with documents 
and medals, on a bridge across the River Sunzha in the outskirts of Grozny. 

A Russian military commander, Ivan Grudnev, was heard saying by telephone to 
a Chechen official: "War is war, but soldiers and mujahidin must be buried 
with dignity." 

Pro-Kremlin media such as Nezavisimaya Gazeta have also criticised the war, 
comparing it with that in 1994-96 and mocking Russian claims of successes. 

******

#7
Boston Globe
13 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Putin courts voters with call for pay raises, economic revival 
By Brian Whitmore

MOSCOW - With presidential elections looming and the war in Chechnya that
brought him to power sputtering, acting Kremlin leader Vladimir V. Putin
appears to have discovered the world's oldest political weapons: pork and
populism.

Putin, a steely former KGB spy who became Russia's acting president when
Boris Yeltsin abruptly resigned on New Year's Eve, has spent most of his
political career in the shadows. But in just over two months, he will face
Russia's surly voters in snap presidential elections that he is heavily
favored to win.

And if the past week is any indication, Putin is not planning on leaving
anything to chance. He appears to have made the transition from stealth
backroom operator to public politician with ease. With a series of populist
moves aimed at various constituencies, Putin has appeared as adept at
winning voters' hearts as he was at winning the bureaucratic battles that
landed him in the Kremlin.

Yesterday, Putin promised to raise the salaries of teachers and doctors,
who are among Russia's most underpaid state employees, earning about $40 a
month.

Putin also called on Russian industry to spearhead an economic revival by
exporting high-profit manufactured goods. Since the Soviet collapse,
Russia's main exports have been oil, gas and other natural resources, as
the country's manufactured goods have been unable to compete on world markets.

''We must develop our own industry,'' Putin said. ''We should not only
export raw materials. We need to find an approach oriented to the future,
not only the present with the aim of making quick money.''

Putin's comments came during a visit to the city of Petrozavodsk in
northwest Russia, which had all the trappings of a campaign swing. During a
visit to a local hospital, Russian television stations showed footage of
Putin, wearing a blue doctor's cap, surrounded by children.

In Moscow, meanwhile, a group of leading figures from Russia's political,
business and art worlds - including some who had previously backed
opposition candidates - formally nominated Putin for president.

The moves were just the latest in a series of gestures by Putin that
appeared tailored to appeal to Russia's voters, who will go to the polls to
choose a new president March 26. 

On Tuesday, Putin ordered his government to raise pensions every three
months, starting with a 20 percent increase in February, a move that is
sure to be popular with Russia's impoverished elderly voters. Also on
Tuesday, the acting Kremlin leader said there were too few women in
Russia's leadership. Putin added that he hoped the newly elected parliament
would elect a woman as its speaker.

''Putin has clearly started his presidential campaign,'' said Nikolai
Petrov, a political analyst with the Moscow Carnegie Center. ''He is using
these populist gestures to try to show voters that he will be decisive and
effective with the economy.''

He may also be trying to distract the public's attention from recent
military problems in Chechnya, where a series of attacks by separatist
guerillas have stalled Russia's attempt to regain control over the region.
Putin's popularity has soared because of his tough stance with the Chechen
separatists, but some analysts here have said his standing could suffer if
the military continues to suffer setbacks.

Some media here, previously supportive of the military campaign, have
recently become more critical. Some newspapers have begun comparing the
campaign to Russia's ill-fated 1994-96 war in Chechnya, which killed 80,000
people and resulted in a humiliating withdrawal for Moscow. And while
state-controlled television is still solidly behind the war, NTV, a popular
private television station, has recently been reporting heavy losses among
Russia's troops.

Moreover, Russia's shaky currency, the ruble, fell yesterday for the third
day in a row and has lost about 10 percent of its value since the New Year.
Should the ruble continue to fall, it could also dent Putin's popularity.

Nevertheless, Putin's political juggernaut got a big boost yesterday when
he was officially nominated for president by a group of 197 leaders of
Russia's political, business and artistic elite. The group included the
heads of Russia's powerful electricity and natural gas monopolies, as well
as actors, artists and 20 provincial governors.

Among them was Mintimer Shaimiyev, leader of the oil-rich republic of
Tatarstan, who had previously supported Putin's rival, former prime
minister Yevgeny Primakov, for president. ''Under Vladimir Putin, Russian
society is being consolidated,'' Shaimiyev said. 

Regional leaders like Shaimiyev are vital to any election campaign, as they
have enormous influence over how their provinces vote. 

Recent polls have shown Putin to be virtually unbeatable, with some 55
percent of Russian adults saying they would vote for him. His closest rival
among declared candidates is Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov with 13
percent support.

Primakov, should he choose to run, has about 6 percent support. 

******

#8
Stratfor Commentary
January 13, 2000
CIS Headed for Confrontational Summit 

Key members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are hurrying to 
solidify their affiliations before they convene in Moscow for a CIS summit on 
Jan. 24. Less than two weeks before acting President Vladimir Putin's first 
CIS summit, Georgia and Azerbaijan have become involved in meetings with 
Turkey to discuss issues such as the planned Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which 
routes oil around Russia to a Turkish port. Anticipating that Putin may call 
for a more united and Russian-oriented CIS, these states are bracing for a 
confrontational summit. 

Similar assertiveness by the members hindered joint CIS action in the most 
recent meeting, last April. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan withdrew from 
the CIS joint security pact. The summit, which was chaired by former 
president Boris Yeltsin, ended unsuccessfully when presidents of the 12 
countries could not come to an agreement on issuing a joint statement 
addressing the conflict in Yugoslavia. The same countries will be represented 
in the coming summit in January. They are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 

Putin will likely use his first international summit as president to rein in 
Russia's smaller neighboring states, some of which have sought alliances 
outside the commonwealth. Putin, unlike Yeltsin, will not put up with 
uncooperative, insubordinate former satellites – for example, Georgia,
which 
has refused to side with Russia against the Chechens. Putin will make it 
unmistakably clear that CIS members do not apply for NATO membership, support 
Chechen rebels or form alternate alliances among themselves, such as GUUAM, a 
grouping of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Putin needs 
a clear division between CIS members and outsiders, and he won't allow 
Georgia to continue playing both sides. 

Georgia and Azerbaijan have been the first states to pull away. For instance, 
Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze just announced his intention to 
attend the summit, but his decision was contingent on a bilateral meeting 
with Putin. This is a symptom of Georgia trying to seem like a member to 
avoid angering Russia, but insisting on being treated as an independent 
nation separate from the commonwealth. 

Georgia and Azerbaijan have also been meeting to discuss the Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline, which serves both functionally and symbolically as a reminder that 
Georgia and Azerbaijan are not dependent upon Russia. The U.S.-backed project 
is an explicit attempt to circumvent Russia. Azerbaijani President Heydar 
Aliev spent Jan. 9 and 10 in Turkey meeting with Turkish President Suleyman 
Demirel and other Turkish officials. They discussed the conflict over the 
Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, the situation in Chechnya and the 
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline plan, reported ITAR-TASS. On Jan. 14, Demirel will 
travel to Georgia to talk more about the pipeline. Then, immediately before 
the summit, Turkish, Azerbaijani and Georgian delegations will meet in 
Istanbul Jan. 21-22. 

The CIS states are splintering away from the Russian bloc and seeking support 
among each other as well as from the West. Turkey, taking advantage of 
geographic proximity, is doing what most Western countries cannot and is 
playing an ever stronger role in offering outside support. Georgia proclaims 
itself to be pro-Western and has even begun to seek NATO membership. 

Further illustrating the impending split, the three countries that dropped 
out of the CIS joint security pact joined with others to form GUUAM. This 
core group of CIS states is not even trying to keep up the appearance of 
valuing their membership in the commonwealth. Now that Putin is officially 
running Russia, the boldest CIS members are determining whether they can 
afford to make this confrontation formal and explicit. We can expect to see 
Georgia and Azerbaijan stand up to Putin and probably leave the CIS. 
Uzbekistan and Ukraine may follow. The upcoming CIS summit may witness the 
breakup of the original group. 

******

#9
Argumenty i Fakty
Nos. 1-2
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
SIX REASONS WHY PUTIN MAY NOT BECOME PRESIDENT
By Tatyana NETREBA and Vitaly TSEPLYAYEV

It seems that having showily vacated his throne in Vladimir
Putin's favour, Boris Yeltsin has left not the slightest chance
for the other probable contenders to the next presidency. No one
has called in question thus far that Putin will be the winner.
This should not be done. In the two and a half months that are
left till the election anything can happen in our unpredictable
Russia, casting gloom over Putin's final moving into the Kremlin,
if not thwarting it altogether.

Danger of Physical Extermination

It is quite real. Putin has made himself too available. He
is not afraid to go to Chechnya. Meanwhile, he has more than
enough of ill-wishers. No one can guarantee that Chechen
terrorists may try "to spoil him in the loo" if they have the
slightest chance. So, secret services should guard him like the
apple of their eye. Without Putin the country will plunge into
chaos and the times of trouble.

Danger of Failure in Chechnya

Having built up his popularity rating thanks to the war,
Putin risks to lose it for the same reason. The protraction of
the anti-terrorist operation can provoke irritation in the army,
while too active an offensive is fraught with another danger -
thousands of dead and wounded soldiers and displeasure of the
population of the country as a whole.
Putin's options are: to storm Grozny and the bases of
terrorists in the mountains to complete the mopping up of
Chechnya by March 26; to intensify propaganda in the state mass
media; to restrict access to the zone of hostilities for
journalists to prevent the public from knowing the exact number
of casualties and, at the same time, not to spoil relations with
the independent mass media.

Danger of Kompromat

At the peak of the scandal involving Yuri Skuratov, there
were rumours about the existence of a similar compromising video
tape showing a man who looked like the then FSB director Putin.
Shortly after Putin was appointed Prime Minister, some
Moscow-based papers accused him of alleged financial abuses
during his tenure as St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak's
deputy. Given the burning desire, Putin can be accused of the
involvement of the secret services under his control in the
blowing of blocks of flats in Russian cities. It is after these
explosions that the Chechen operation and the rise of the
Premier's political star began.
The election victory of a man who is unknown and unsuitable
for the West can become a pretext for scandalous publications in
the Western press. We should not wonder if any European or
American newspaper prints a sensational article about Putin's
activities as an agent of the Soviet KGB's foreign intelligence
department, claiming, for instance, that he was a KGB-CIA double
agent.
Counter-measures: It is common knowledge that the acting
President intends to meet with the leading mass media executives
to secure their support. It is rather improbable, however, that
the NTV and TVTs television channels, which are not controlled by
Putin, will dare to challenge the acting President, as this might
cost them their licenses.

Danger of Intrigues by Oligarchs

Oligarchs, including Boris Berezovsky, have been
demonstrating their support for the most promising presidential
hopeful thus far. However, Berezovsky, who often acts on impulse
can "stop loving" Putin and nominate his own candidate, using the
ORT television as the spin doctor.
Counter-measures: To convene the ORT board of directors and,
using the government's stake in that television company (51
percent), oust Berezovsky's people - Konstantin Ernst, Tatyana
Koshkareva and Rustam Narzikulov - from their posts and
re-install loyal Igor Shabdurasulov as the head of the company.
After all, ORT is half-government channel and is to work for the
regime, that is, Putin.

Danger That a Strong Rival May Surface

Gennady Zyuganov, Grigory Yavlinsky or Vladimir Zhirinovsky
is unlikely to become a serious obstacle in Putin's way to
victory next March. Judging by everything, Yevgeny Primakov will
not be able to compete with him on a par, either. However, it may
not be excluded that at the very last moment a new strong rival
will surface. It may be one of the active generals or Yuri
Luzhkov. The latter has been lying in ambush up to now, but he
can hurl himself into an attack at any time.
Counter-measures: To come to agreement with Luzhkov by
promising him the post of Prime Minister. If the runoff is
necessary, Putin can use the tactics which Yeltsin used in 1996
and offer his "Lebed," that is, the candidate who comes third in
the first round, a certain post in exchange for the votes of his
supporters.

Danger of Economic Collapse

Some American mass media predict a new banking crisis in 
Russia in February-March, which will provoke financial panic on a
worldwide scale. According to this forecast, the dollar will be
eventually depreciated and America will fall into a new Great
Depression, which will be followed by the collapse of the entire
global economy.
The West can brace itself and prevent such a horrible
cataclysm. However, it is a big question whether Putin's Cabinet
will be able to keep its financial system afloat. The
International Monetary Fund refuses to issue Russia its loans.
Meanwhile, we are to pay three billion dollars on our foreign
debts by March 26. If under such excessive pressure the ruble
takes a deep dive and prices jump up, popular love for the
Premier will disperse like smoke.
Counter-measures: It goes without saying that Putin is
unable to prevent a global cataclysm but he can take preventive
measures against the ruble's collapse. It is not a chance
coincidence that his government discusses the proposal concerning
the 100 percent mandatory sale of the currency earnings of
exporters at the exchange. As for pressure from the IMF, Putin
should not fear it very much. The more pressure is brought to
bear on him from abroad, the more respect voters will have for
him.
And lastly. Argumenty i Fakty experts say that Putin will be
able to cope with all these dangers. He has enough stamina and
self-control. By the way, we wrote about this back in August 1999
when we described the political portrait of the new Premier.
Judging by everything, many new details are yet to be added to
it.

******

#10
Moscow Times
January 13, 2000 
Yeltsin Wrestles With His New Role 
By Andrei Zolotov Jr.
Staff Writer

Boris Yeltsin's resignation on New Year's Eve was so sudden that even Yeltsin 
himself appears to be having a hard time reconciling himself with - and 
defining - his new role as former president. 

Will he become an honorary figure, or will he remain a real player in Russian 
politics? 

Yeltsin is to keep an office in the Kremlin, and a foundation is being set up 
for him somewhere along the lines of the Gorbachev Foundation and U.S. 
presidential libraries. But not quite. Former Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev, after all, had to do a television commercial for Pizza Hut to pay 
for a new building for his foundation; and former U.S. presidents don't get 
offices at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. 

Yeltsin spokesman Dmitry Yakushkin was quoted this week by the Trud newspaper 
as saying that the foundation "may have a library [holding] documents of the 
Yeltsin era. Maybe even a mini-museum." 

"But the foundation will not be just backward-looking," Yakushkin said. "It 
will also have a public and political character. I know that Boris 
Nikolayevich has been given working space in the Kremlin." 

Yakushkin also said that Yeltsin would like to travel the world, but he 
emphasized that it was too early for any "concrete" information on both the 
trips and the foundation. 

Yeltsin's personal future is linked to the future of his powerful entourage, 
known as "the family." When Putin ousted the powerful Kremlin property chief 
Pavel Borodin and demoted First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Aksyonenko this 
week, it was largely perceived in the press as a sign that Putin is 
distancing himself from those who brought him to power. 

Political analysts said Wednesday that although Yeltsin may want to maintain 
some control over Russian politics, he is no longer in a position to do so. 
Now, they said, Putin holds the cards and he will decide whether to use 
Yeltsin and how. 

During his Christmas trip to the Holy Land, Yeltsin, clearly overwhelmed by 
the journey and Jerusalem's spiritual atmosphere, made some puzzling 
statements when asked how he was finding retirement. 

"I have not been in retirement yet," he said. "Keep in mind - so far, I am a 
holy president!" 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper reported Tuesday that during a meeting with 
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Yeltsin said acting President Vladimir 
Putin was under his control. 

"Maybe Boris Nikolayevich would like to become another Deng Xiaoping?" 
editorialized the reporter, referring to the Chinese leader who ruled the 
country without holding an official post. "The only question is whether it 
fits in with the plans of those who have stayed as masters of the Kremlin." 

On Wednesday, the same newspaper, which is owned by Kremlin insider Boris 
Berezovsky, suggested that Borodin's proposed appointment as state secretary 
of the Russia-Belarus union - so far unconfirmed by Belarus President 
Alexander Lukashenko - may be a sign that Yeltsin would become chairman of 
the Higher Council governing the union. 

Further down the front-page story, Alan Kasayev wrote that it was just one 
"version," which was in fact denied by the paper's Kremlin sources. "There is 
no talk of these plans" in the Kremlin, Nezavisimaya's unnamed "most 
informed" source said. 

******

#11
Segodnya
January 13, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
YOURS VERY TRULY
Professional Political 'Grave-Diggers' Rally Behind Putin
By Natalya KALASHNIKOVA, Alexei MAKARKIN

An group of initiative citizens gathered yesterday in
Moscow's President Hotel to nominate Vladimir Putin for
president. 
These citizens intend to gather the needed 500,000
signatures in support of the premier and acting president within
ten days only. Which is hardly surprising: the group of 197
persons includes nearly fifty members of the Russian parliament's
upper house, the top executives of some natural monopolies, and
prominent figures of science, culture and sport.
There is data to indicate that they have had to go through
the mills of tough competition to join the 'presidential club'.
The ones who have joined it are the strongest and fittest,
including those who have managed to 'bury' several presidential
contenders with their 'national support'. 
Admittedly, there is a team of professional politicians in
Russia whose professionalism is limited to the ability to timely
swear allegiance to the 'party of power' and to defect in good
time to join a new one.
Neither Boris Berezovsky--who is said to have been pining to
be a member--nor Roman Abramovich have been allowed to join the
cream of the cream. Viktor Chernomyrdin has hastily announced the
forthcoming merger between his Our Home is Russia, or NDR, and
Unity, a.k.a. Medved, or Bear, but has not been admitted: his
initiative has come too late. 
But people from the provinces have been welcome. Of the more
noticeable governors, only Samara's dissenting Konstantin Titov
has been left on the shore. But nobody doubts that Titov (who has
ardently sworn allegiance first to Chernomyrdin and than to Yuri
Luzhkov) will join the 'Putin fan club' in a couple of weeks.
Other provincial bosses have been glad to hop on board. 
Mintimer Shaimiyev, Ivan Sklyarov and Murtaza Rakhimov have
to cleanse themselves after their hasty, and myopic, support of
alternative presidential contenders, first Luzhkov and later
Yevgeny Primakov. Moreover, Shaimiyev and Rakhimov have made sure
that Fatherland-All Russia would win landslide victories in their
respective regions. 
But there is a new favourite in the race and the two
republican presidents will now make sure that Putin wins no less
impressive victories. Otherwise, Shaimiyev's Tatneft oil company
may well run into a series of troubles. It would be silly to seek
the protection of Primakov, a notable scholar. 
Sklyarov's standing is even worse: his oblast is up to its
ears in debts and facing the prospect of default. 
Other governors have personal motives. Take Alexander
Rutskoi: an irreconcilable opponent of Boris Yeltsin in 1993 and
a true friend of the Communist Party's Gennady Zyuganov in 1996,
he is now one of the Bears and a convinced supporter of Putin.
Investigators let his two deputies leave the pen the other day,
but they can always be placed back behind the bars, together with
their boss...
There is a group of persons for whom support for Putin
spells a chance to get into the government. Not surprisingly,
promising Novgorod governor Mikhail Prusak (who did not want to
stand at the Bear's cradle) and Saratov governor Dmitry Ayatskov
(an escapee from Chernomyrdin who willingly danced to All
Russia's tune when Primakov's rating was at its peak) have been
among the first to join the group of initiative citizens. 
Lastly, some governors supporting Putin are facing the
painful prospect of election for a second term. The president's
backing would be more than welcome for them. St. Petersburg's
Vladimir Yakovlev, for one, has not joined the group but has
ardently supported Putin to thus effectively split Fatherland-All
Russia into its two initial components, Fatherland and All
Russia. In obvious expectation of Putin's favours, Yakovlev has
again raised the matter of bringing the gubernatorial elections
ahead. 
In short, Putin was nominated for president by professional
political 'grave-diggers', whose ranks are closed, indeed. They
have been the ones to 'bury' the presidential aspirations of
Chernomyrdin, Luzhkov and Primakov, having rendered them their
'support'. They are hoping to form Putin's 'team'. 
And if and when the acting president bites, he would invite
trouble. For should his rating slide--either because of Chechnya
or the rouble's plunge--and the group of citizens, not unlike
bees, would desert him for a bigger pot of honey. 
Such is our 'party of power'--migratory.

******

#12
Kennan Institute meeting summary
The Role of Ideology in Privatization Programs

"In order to understand the transformation of ownership in post-communist
states, ideology must be taken into account," stated Hilary Appel,
Assistant Professor of Political Science at Claremont McKenna College and a
Kennan Institute Title VIII-Supported Research Scholar at a Kennan
Institute lecture on 25 October 1999.

Using the experiences of Russia and the Czech Republic for comparison,
Appel set out to answer the question of why some governments and not others
included special privileges for industrial and regional groups in mass
privatization in order to explore more broadly the factors determining the
design of privatization programs and the evolution of property rights in
post-communist countries.

According to Appel, empirical studies of post- communist privatization tend
to emphasize the relative power of various interest groups in society to
explain the design of privatization in specific countries. Given this
logic, management and labor should have received equal privileges and
benefits in Russia and the Czech Republic since both states emerged from
similar property rights systems and industrial structures, in which one
could have expected managers and labor having, in principle, equivalent
material interests and prior claims to property. This was not the case,
Appel stipulated.

In the Czech mass privatization program, the government excluded special
privileges to employees and regional groups in society. However, in the
Russian mass privatization program, the government ultimately provided
enormous privileges for various groups, especially managerial employees.

Why did these two cases differ so radically in the extent of privileges
offered to certain groups? Appel argued that ideology—a coherent set of
ideas and beliefs shared by many—is the key variable needed to answer that
question.

Appel offered a four part argument outlining how ideology determines the
development of privatization programs and shapes property rights systems.
First, ideology shapes the choice by policy-makers to base the new property
system on private ownership. It is intuitive, Appel argued, that economic
ideas embedded in economic theory influence economic policy-making. 

Second, prevalent ideologies affect the economic interests and strength of
potential opponents to govern- ment programs. In the transformation of
property rights in post-communist states, the ideological context directly
shaped the legitimacy and thereby the authority of certain groups. In the
Czech case, both institutionalized and informal manifestations of
anti-communism served to discredit labor demands and made managers
reticent, thus preventing these two groups from shaping the design of
privatization. In Russia, however, anti- communism was less prevalent in
political discourse. As a result, the legitimacy and power of many groups
who benefitted from the past communist regime was strengthened (or at least
not weakened) which affected their ability to advance their claims to
property during the reformulation of the ownership regime.

Third, ideology shapes how leaders go about building support for their
programs. Appel argued that Russian property officials, in contrast to
those in the Czech Republic, tried to establish a system of property
relations without ideological reinforcement. Czech reformers linked the
creation of the new property regime to the founding of a post-communist
national identity. In Russia, a strong reliance on material incentives
during privatization and the absence of an ideological legitimating idea
hindered Russian liberals' attempts to implement and sustain the
privatization program, and ultimately led them to grant certain privileges
to certain groups in order to buy support and ensure compliance to the new
ownership regime.

Fourth, Appel argued that a lack of compatibility between the ideological
basis of a program and the ideas of elite and mass groups increases the
cost of political reinforcement. The incompatibility becomes important when
leaders lack the political skill to overcome the high costs of political
reinforcement and popular support.

Appel notes that in the Czech Republic, reformers promoted privatization
by portraying it as anti- communist, pro-European, and thus essentially
Czech. Such a strategy would have been more complicated in Russia due to
ideological incompatibilities. Appel noted that since the beginning of
market reforms, the rejection of the Soviet past in favor of a new Western
liberal orientation was often seen as a rejection of oneself and demeaning
to one's past. So even if reformers had been willing to promote such a
pro-Western private property legitimating campaign, rather than relying on
economic incentives, the process would have been extremely difficult.

Appel contended that although in Russia privatization officials refused on
principle to develop an ideological campaign for mass privatization, more
commonly, new leaders lacked the political skill to construct effective
ideological reinforcing mechanisms. Consequently, where there is no
immediate resonance between the ideas behind privatization and the ideas of
major groups in society, and when political entre- preneurs cannot
construct effective ideological rein- forcing mechanisms, the
incompatibility between the ideas of a program and the ideological context
has a generative effect on policy content by altering and hindering the
realization of a new property regime. —JK

*******

Web page for CDI Russia Weekly:
http://www.cdi.org/russia