January 13, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4031 4032 4033

Johnson's Russia List
#4032
13 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russia says has proof Chechnya rebels made bombs.
2. Moscow Times: Yevgenia Borisova, Poverty Still Widespread Despite Modest Growth.
3. The Nation: Wayne Merry, Coddling Dictators.
4. Kennan Institute meeting summary: Mikhail Gorbachev, After the New World Order.
5. Walt Uhler: Re:4027-Montgomery/Scary Side of Putin/FSB.
6. RFE/RL: Floriana Fossato, Putin's Reshuffle Indicates No Major Kremlin Shakeup.
7. Interfax: Analysis: Putin seems to think sum changes if items juggled around.
8. Cameron Sawyer: RE: 4025MT/Victory Unraveling.
9. Adam Bruski: Observations on JRL 4030/Chechen war.
10. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Alan Kasayev, YELTSIN TO BECOME THE "OTHER INDIVIDUAL"? Pavel Borodin's New Position Could be First Step in First Russian President's Promotion to Chairman of the Russia-Belarus Union Supreme Council.
11. Alexander Samoiloff: Insider Outlook on Strategic Points of the Development of Events in Russia in 2000.]

*******

#1
Russia says has proof Chechnya rebels made bombs
By Martin Nesirky
January 12, 2000

MOSCOW (Reuters) - A Kremlin official said Wednesday Russia had found the 
place in Chechnya where rebels made bombs which killed some 300 people in 
Russian cities last year, and he showed a video of the scene to make his 
case. 

Those bombings, along with a rebel incursion into the North Caucasus region 
of Dagestan, prompted Russia to launch its military campaign in Chechnya in 
October last year. The separatists deny involvement in the bombings. 

``Our intelligence services were aware from the beginning that explosives 
were prepared in the region and the main perpetrators came from Chechnya,'' 
Sergei Ivanov, secretary of the Kremlin's influential Security Council, told 
reporters. 

``You know that a base was discovered in Urus-Martan,'' he said, referring to 
a town south of the regional capital Grozny. Urus-Martan is now in Russian 
hands. 

``Now the opportunity presented itself to get there. Because of the vigorous 
actions of our army the militants didn't manage to take everything out of 
these bases,'' he said. ``They left behind explosives that were identical to 
the ones used in the explosions.'' 

DRAMATIC MUSIC ACCOMPANIES RUSSIAN VIDEO 

Ivanov took a break in his news conference at the government's Rosinform 
press center to show a five-minute video film, complete with dramatic, 
pounding background music. 

The film takes the viewer on a tour of Urus-Martan and what the narrator says 
are bomb factories, cells for slave laborers and execution sites. Sacks of 
chemicals, electronic alarm clock instructions and other items are shown on 
camera as well as unidentified bodies protruding from shallow graves. 

``This film proves the indisputable link of the explosions to Chechnya,'' 
Ivanov said. ``The reason I am stressing this is that over a certain period a 
number of Western and indeed Russian media have mooted the crazy suggestion 
that the explosions in Moscow were staged by Moscow itself.'' 

He said the bombers were not necessarily ethnic Chechens but were trained in 
Chechnya. Chechen officials and rebels have denied any involvement in the two 
bombings in Moscow and the attacks in the southern towns of Buinaksk and 
Volgodonsk. 

No one has been arrested and charged with the bombings, although Ivanov said 
Russian forces were searching for two suspects, one in Grozny and the other 
in Chechnya's southern mountains. 

An ingredient in the explosives, ammonium nitrate, was also used in an 
assassination attempt on President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan in Tashkent in 
1998, Ivanov said. 

He said Russia faced an ``information war'' in its campaign in Chechnya, with 
rebels spreading disinformation. The Chechens accuse Moscow of similar 
tactics. 

The Security Council plans to discuss information policy soon for the first 
time. Ivanov said one area of concern was that Russian media gave air time to 
Chechen spokesmen, but he said there was no plan to curb press freedom. 

``Along with the real fighting there is a virtual war under way, a media 
war,'' Ivanov said. ``The information war is at least as fierce as combat in 
the field.'' 

*******

#2
Moscow Times
January 13, 2000 
Poverty Still Widespread Despite Modest Growth 
By Yevgenia Borisova
Staff Writer

The economy may have posted modest growth last year but there were few signs 
of any trickle-down effect. Russia's citizens became poorer on average over 
the course of 1999, even as wage arrears and numbers below the poverty line 
edged downward, according to the Russian Statistics Agency. 

"The average level of Russians' real cash incomes - incomes adjusted to 
account for inflation - decreased 15 percent," said Yelena Frolova, head of 
the agency's department for tracking incomes. 

However, Frolova refused to release any concrete figures until a report set 
for release Jan. 24 on the socioeconomic situation in Russia is officially 
made public. 

"This figure - 15 percent - of course says that Russians became poorer, but 
to what extent I can't say because we are not able to register all sources of 
income." 

Nevertheless, some officials found cause for optimism, claiming that the 
decline in living standards had stabilized and was likely to be slowly 
reversed. 

"By the end of 1999 we see that incomes started to stabilize," said Marat 
Baigireyev, head of the Labor Ministry's personal incomes department. 

"Compared with the difference in incomes in 1997 and 1998, in 1999 the 
problem with the decrease of incomes is not so sharp. People have adapted to 
the new economic conditions. 

"The Russian Statistics Agency reported that in the last quarter of 1999, the 
number of people living below the poverty line decreased from about 50 
million people in the third quarter to about 41 million people. In the year 
2000 we expect that incomes will increase because the economy is on the rise 
and social allowances and pensions will also be raised." 

Meanwhile, the Russian Statistics Agency also released figures showing that 
average nominal monthly wages for economically active individuals - without 
adjustment for inflation and calculated in rubles - were up about 68 percent 
in November 1999 compared to November 1998. In dollar terms, wages were down 
4.1 percent. 

The statistics agency also reported that per capita incomes were up 65 
percent on a monthly basis in November, 4.7 percent down on per capita income 
a year earlier in dollar terms. 

Despite all the figures, Russian statisticians admit that they are only able 
to provide a rough guide to the state of the nation's economy. Much of the 
lack of clarity stems from difficulties in estimating - or guesstimating - 
hidden incomes derived from Russia's booming gray and black markets. 

"The quality and validity of the information base that we have is very low 
and we don't deny it," Frolova said. "We assume that hidden wages account for 
about 20 percent of Russians' total incomes." 

In order to try to fully estimate real cash incomes, her department bases its 
calculations on information collected on consumer spending, a figure which 
"can be easier measured and controlled," she added. 

Frolova's department therefore monitors all markets for goods, from major 
supermarkets to rynoks, or farmers' markets, and even sites where babushkas 
sell bread and cigarettes on street corners and outside metro entrances. 

However, the government decision to assume that consumption equals income 
further calls the state statistics into doubt, economists said. 

Such an approach is not totally correct because it does not take into account 
Russians' savings, said Georgy Pavlov, an economist with the Russian European 
Center for Economic policy. 

Meanwhile, Russia has also reportedly decreased its appalling wage arrears 
problems. 

"Wage arrears, especially those that depend on budgetary funding, are 
becoming smaller," said Natalya Antonova, deputy head of the Labor Ministry's 
department for personal incomes and living standards. 

Total wage arrears stood at 50.9 billion rubles (then worth $1.95 billion) - 
including 12.4 billion in state arrears - as of December 1999, down from 84.9 
billion rubles (then worth more than $4 billion) in December 1998, of which 
22 billion rubles were government arrears. 

The Labor Ministry's optimism is apparently shared by a growing share of the 
population, according to recent opinion polls. 

A survey conducted in late December by the Agency for Regional Political 
Investigations showed that 42 percent of those questioned believed 2000 will 
be a better year for them in economic terms. Just 10 percent of respondents 
said they expected their situation to worsen, while 28 percent expected no 
change and the remaining 20 percent found it hard to answer. 

ARPI polled 3,000 people in more than 220 towns and villages across all the 
regions of the Russian Federation. The survey was published on the 
organization's web site - www.monitoring.ru. 

Most of those told ARPI that 2000 will be a better year for residents of 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, northwest Russia and the Volga region. 

== 

On the breadline 

Average nominal monthly wages for economically active individuals 
(broken down by sector) 
Oct. 1997 Oct. 1998 Oct. 1999 
rubles $ rubles $ rubles $ 

Industry 1,195 203 1,348 85 2,128 83 
Agriculture 444 76 477 30 699 27 
Transport 1,479 252 1,625 102 2,530 99 
Finance 1,590 271 1,956 123 3,213 125 
Health 644 110 696 44 1,028 40 
Education 619 105 663 42 967 38 
Culture 586 100 646 41 957 37 
Science 935 159 1,050 66 1,848 72 
Government 1,447 246 1,447 91 2,029 79 
Average 1,006 171 1,123 71 1,717 67 

Monthly personal income per capita 
November 1997 November 1998 November 1999 
rubles $ rubles $ rubles $ 
939 159 1,127 69 1,719 65 

Wage arrears as of Dec. 1 (billions of rubles) 
1998 1999 
Total 84.9 50.9 

Budget Underfunding 22.1 12.4 
of which, by sector: 

Industry 1.7 19.8* 
Agriculture 0.2 8.6** 
Health 3.6 1.8 
Education 6.3 2.6 
Science 1.1 1.0 
Police 0.8 0.5 
* - 18.6 billion rubles was underpaid because of the absence of state 
enterprises' own, nonbudgetary funds. 
** - 8.4 billion rubles was underpaid because of the absence of state farms' 
own nonbudgetary funds. 

Sources: Russian Statistics Agency, MT 

*******

#3
The Nation
January 31, 2000
Coddling Dictators
By Wayne Merry
Wayne Merry is a former State Department and Pentagon official and now a
program director at the Atlantic Council of the United States.

As our own electoral process gears up, President Clinton and Vice President
Gore are sending clear signals to the former Soviet countries that
Washington will not be bothered with "soft" issues like democratic
institutions, legitimate elections and the rule of law. Worse, the
Administration openly accommodates regimes bent on eliminating what little
democracy their countries enjoyed in the early post-Soviet years.

In December the White House played host to the newly re-elected President
Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan,
both prime examples of the systemic political and economic corruption
plaguing the region. Kuchma's Soviet-style manipulation of the media and
open ballot stealing made later Russian elections look pristine by
comparison, while rampant corruption sanctioned from the top makes foreign
investors flee Ukraine. Nazarbayev is more shameless: He prohibited his
opponents from running in an electoral farce Western human rights
organizations refused to monitor. The Kazakh economy has been reduced to a
family-oligarchy kleptocracy similar to Suharto's in Indonesia. During the
Washington visits, media in both countries proclaimed US endorsement of
these leaders, their policies and their rigged elections.

Ukraine and Kazakhstan are important countries. Both inherited arsenals of
nuclear weapons from the Soviet collapse. In the early nineties
Washington's top concern was denuclearization, and we were willing to
overlook democratic deficiencies to move these countries to nonnuclear
status. However, this mission was accomplished years ago, and both regimes
benefited to the tune of billions of US taxpayer dollars.

It is now time-past time-to focus on the need for political and legal
reforms in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and elsewhere, but the White House prefers
to rely on its "personal ties" with corrupt leaders (as it did with Yeltsin
at the expense of broader democratic forces in Russia). Even a few years
ago, the White House would have waited a decent interval after stolen
elections before receiving the thieves in the Oval Office-but not now.

The story is the same elsewhere. At the Istanbul summit in November,
Clinton personally aligned this country with presidents Aliyev of
Azerbaijan, Niyazov of Turkmenistan and Karimov of Uzbekistan. What a crew.
Aliyev rules with the full panoply of a Soviet police state-his opponents
are exiled or repressed, ballot-box stuffing at elections is widespread and
his wastrel casino-hopping son is the anointed heir. Niyazov (the
self-proclaimed "Father of the Turkmen") recently held an election in which
a 99 percent turnout was proclaimed an hour before the polls even closed.

Not satisfied at gracing the Turkmen capital with a tower surmounted by a
massive rotating statue of himself, Niyazov ended the year being proclaimed
President for Life by his supine legislature. On January 9 the Uzbek leader
was elected to another term with a modest 92 percent of the vote, and there
are credible reports of gulag-style concentration camps for opponents.
Karimov openly dreams of dynastic domination of Central Asia under the name
Turkistan. All three men have been received with honors at the Clinton
White House, and their political blemishes are downplayed here and by our
embassies.

But aren't there important US oil and gas interests in these countries?
Yes, there are. Will basing our policy on a handful of aging and corrupt
megalomaniacs serve those interests? Remember the Shah-of-Shahs? What our
policy needs is the vision to look beyond this generation of Soviet
dictatorial retreads, because radical political change in these societies
is inevitable in the decades ahead. Instead, Washington concentrates on
Pentagon programs with the military and security forces of these countries,
much as we did in Iran, Indochina and Latin America.

In the former Soviet region only the Baltic republics and Moldova can boast
improving electoral democracy (sadly, Moldova has fair elections, but
dysfunctional postelectoral politics). Elsewhere, the democratic process
has either gone to hell or is on the road. True, some of the Central Asian
states never had much democracy to speak of (a senior State Department
official jocularly refers to them as "germinating democracies"), but the
integrity of elections in Armenia, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine was
significantly higher several years ago than it is today. Only of Belarus
does Washington speak the truth, because the stridently anti-American
President Lukashenko is an easy and cost-free target. About the others, we
get expedient half-truths or silence.

And what of electoral democracy in Russia, arguably still the best outside
the Baltic states, despite serious shortcomings? Does Washington care about
the process or only about who wins? Look at our record. The December 1993
election was a legitimate and valid expression of popular will, but Russian
voters overwhelmingly rejected the program of market "reform" and mafia
capitalism sponsored by the IMF and the US Treasury. What was the US
response? Vice President Gore was in Moscow the very next day advising
Yeltsin & Co. to ignore the voice of the people and to sidetrack the new
legislature (created at Yeltsin's direction). In 1995, the same. In the
1996 presidential election, Washington's only goal was that Yeltsin win;
even abrogating the outcome was not unthinkable.

What kind of leader Vladimir Putin will be remains to be seen, but his
ascendancy is anything but democratic. Pulled from obscurity for Yeltsin's
own purposes and empowered with a "virtual" political party, he was thrust
into the presidency by a well-timed resignation that was constitutional but
hardly democratic. What is Washington's reaction? It sees "new
opportunities" to restart Treasury/IMF policies marked by failure and
popular rejection. Does it really matter what the United States says or
does about electoral democracy in these countries? The political masters
throughout the region certainly care-note how quickly Kuchma and Nazarbayev
hustled over for our seal of approval. Genuine democrats in these
societies-and there are many millions of them-also care deeply, but
increasingly they feel betrayed by Washington. They should.

*******

#4
Kennan Institute meeting summary
Vol. XVII No. 8 2000
After the New World Order 

The following are excerpts from a speech given by Mikhail Gorbachev,
president of Green Cross International and the International Foundation for
Socio-Economic and Political Studies, former General Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and former President of the Soviet
Union, at a Wilson Center Director's Forum cosponsored by Green Cross
International* on 7 December 1999.

...In many parts of the world today, people are speaking in defense of
their history, of their culture, and of their national sovereignty. This is
a reaction to globalization. They're afraid that globalization will
steamroll everything, will oversimplify the world, [that] they'll have a
situation when there is one ...world built according to one standard.

If we agree that a world built according to one model is a utopia, if we
agree that [this] cannot be imposed on the world, then the question is:
what should we do, how should we act? And then the question is: what kind
of new world order?

I was asked what I think about the fact that the United States is
withholding its debt to the United Nations. What is my evaluation? I
believe this is a question of rather secondary importance. The most
important question is this: does the United States want to preserve the
United Nations, the U.N. Security Council, the European security system and
operation system, or ...does the United States dismiss all those
organizations?

My own view, maybe not the view of the Gorbachev Foundation, but my
personal view is that after the disappearance of the Soviet Union from the
global arena, many countries—including, unfortunately, the United States of
America—have found themselves tempted to play geopolitical games.

And it is obvious now, after Yugoslavia and after the military victory of
NATO, after the discrediting of the UN, of the Security Council, of the
European cooperation system, after Europe was cut down to size, after
Russia was intercepted [sic], and China and India's views were rejected, it
became quite clear, I think, to all of us that this is not what we need.

...Let me recall for you, when we ended the cold war, when we united
Germany, when we were preparing the Vienna agreements on arms control, we
said that NATO and the Warsaw Pact would become political rather than
military organizations.

And there were several important conferences. You remember the London
declaration of NATO. I will not now digest all of that for your benefit,
but that process was under way, ...initiated by the Soviet Union as the
summit meeting to end the cold war and to think about the future of the
world and of Europe. And fifty-four countries, including the Soviet Union
and the United States, signed the Charter of Paris, a political platform
for a new Europe and a new world.

When the Soviet Union disappeared, what happened? Geopolitical games. And
we are now paying the price for that.

I think it is good that...some people in Western countries reacted very
sharply to this. For example, Professor Samuel Huntington, a leading
international scholar from Harvard University, wrote in April that the
United States, having become the sole remaining superpower, without a
counterpart in the world, has been engaged in irresponsible politics....

Anyway, my friends, I think that we are now in a situation when we must
draw conclusions, and I am sure that no G-7, or G-8, or G-22, or G-34 can
solve the problem of global governments, the problem of ...balancing
interests.

We need a reformed United Nations, a reformed UN Security Council, and
other institutions that support processes in Europe, Asia, Africa,
everywhere, based on equality, based on mutual respect, rather then on the
imposition of the stronger....

And I've been encouraged recently when I saw initially how the Istanbul
summit was being prepared. The Istanbul summit was a very important meeting.

The initial idea was to record in the Istanbul documents some of the points
that NATO adopted in Washington, and that is that NATO is the leading
organization for maintaining security in Europe. Instead, in Istanbul, they
agreed that all European nations are responsible for European security,
that security systems in Europe will be all European, that the institutions
will be all European.

...Perhaps I am overemphasizing the importance of the Istanbul document,
but it's a good sign. It's something of a sign that we are coming back to
our senses, that after Yugoslavia and some other things we're beginning to
understand what needs to be done. Ten years after the Charter of Paris was
adopted, it is again now mentioned. It was mentioned in the Istanbul
declaration instead of becoming toilet paper, as some people wanted to make
it.

I think that the attitude taken in Istanbul toward Russia by the president
of the United States of America was a balanced attitude and I believe that
it deserves our attention. It means that something is changing for [the]
better. Perhaps it is a process of rethinking that is happening.

*Green Cross International was founded by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1993. Its
mission is to help create a sustainable future by promoting a significant
change in human values leading to greater respect and care for Earth's
community of life in all its diversity.

******

#5
From: WaltUhler@aol.com (Walt Uhler)
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 
Subject: Re:4027-Montgomery/Scary Side of Putin

Lori Montgomery's reporting of the heavy-handed behavior of Russia's 
Federal Security Service (FSB) properly addresses the latter's unwarranted 
attack on Russian environmentalists and correctly asserts that the acquittal 
of Alexander Nikitin was "an unprecedented slap at...the FSB." One might 
add, "well deserved."

What she failed to report, however, is the recent war being waged against 
military researchers over the past few months. My friend, Igor Sutyagin, is 
a victim of that war. He was arrested in late October and in early November 
charged with high treason under Article 275 of the Criminal Code. 
Questioning of others by the FSB indicates that Igor is suspected of passing 
nuclear secrets to the West. It does not appear to matter that the Director 
of the USA and Canada Institute in Moscow (Igor's employer) stated that none 
of his employees had access to secret documents. Nor does it appear to 
matter that the people who know Igor, including Pavel Podvig and Joshua 
Handler, have attested to his innocence. 

From my knowledge of him, which includes numerous e-mails and exchanges 
of books and articles over a period of fourteen months (from our first 
meeting in Moscow until his arrest), Igor seems incapable of commiting any 
crime other than the multiple one of being too scholarly about military 
matters in both Russia and America, especially on the subject of nuclear 
weapons, AND too friendly with Westerners having similar scholarly interests. 
Nevertheless, having seen Igor's anger over the expansion of NATO and read 
his blistering indictment of America's bombing of Yugoslavia, I know him to 
be a sincere Russian patriot. 

Although we have discussed many military issues, only once, in an e-mail 
message to me last September, did Igor mention his work on nuclear weapons. 
He noted, in passing, that he was hoping to return to "finishing a small book 
on the security system of Russian nukes." I'm sure the FSB also knows this 
to be true.

In addition to suspecting an unreconstructed KGB (FSB) for Igor's 
predicament, one might also consider that his arrest, and the investigation 
of other military researchers, would advance the Russian military's goal of 
regaining total control over military data and information. That was the 
personal, but unofficial, conclusion Professor Stephen Blank (of the Army War 
College) offered me in November, based upon his sources within the Russian 
military. If correct, it signifies an attempt to move backward to the Soviet 
military controls which flourished prior to Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost. 

Whatever the motives for Igor's persecution, let us hope that his day in 
court results in another unprecedented slap in the name of law and order. 
Given the results of the Nikitin case, we do have reason to hope.

Walter C. Uhler, chief of financial services for the Defense Contract 
Management Command in Philadelphia, writes about Russian and military history 
for many periodicals. Three of his reviews (including one on the KGB) have 
appeared in the Inquirer. 

******

#6
Russia: Putin's Reshuffle Indicates No Major Kremlin Shakeup
By Floriana Fossato

Russian acting President Vladimir Putin has reshuffled his government and 
removed a key Kremlin official implicated in a bribery scandal. RFE/RL 
correspondent Floriana Fossato reports it's not yet clear whether the changes 
signal a major change in Kremlin policy. 

London, 12 January 2000 (RFE/RL) -- Vladimir Putin has reshuffled top 
ministers in the Russian cabinet, giving a first look at how the acting 
president's administration will differ from that of his predecessor, Boris 
Yeltsin.

In changes announced yesterday, Putin elevated Finance Minister Mikhail 
Kasyanov to the post of first deputy prime minister. At the same time, he 
demoted Nikolai Aksenenko.

Kasyanov has won admiration both in Russia and abroad as the country's chief 
negotiator with international financial institutions, including the London 
Club of private creditors and the Paris Club of foreign governments. He has a 
reputation for being a competent and tough negotiator.

The appointment was immediately praised as a sign of Putin's determination to 
improve the economy and relations with foreign investors. Margot Jacobs, a 
financial analyst at United Financial Group in Moscow, told The New York 
Times: "It is important for Western investors to have somebody with a 
familiar face."

Arnab Das, an emerging markets debt strategist for the financial firm JP 
Morgan in London, told The Moscow Times that Kasyanov's appointment seems to 
be a sign Putin wants a government of technically proficient experts, rather 
than one filled with politically motivated appointees.

In another important move, Putin transferred the Kremlin's powerful property 
manager, Pavel Borodin, to the largely ceremonial post of state secretary of 
the Russia-Belarus Union. Borodin controlled the Kremlin property empire, 
worth many billions of dollars.

Borodin had gained notoriety as a key figure in an ongoing international 
bribery scandal involving both Swiss and Russian prosecutors. They are 
looking into allegations a Swiss construction company bribed Kremlin 
officials, including members of Yeltsin's family, to obtain lucrative Kremlin 
contracts. Borodin, the Kremlin and the Swiss company (Mabetex) have 
dismissed the allegations.

Borodin's dismissal follows the removal from power of Yeltsin's daughter, 
Tatyana Dyachenko, formerly a top presidential aide.

Both moves were greeted as a sign that Putin intends to have his own stamp in 
the Kremlin and may be taking tentative steps toward eliminating corruption 
in the Kremlin.

Our correspondent reports, however, that praise for the reshuffle may be 
premature.

Nikolai Petrov is a senior associate with the Carnegie Center in Moscow. He 
told RFE/RL's Russian service there is ample ground to believe the reshuffle 
is no more than a "game of musical chairs" so as not to alienate anyone ahead 
of the presidential election:

"I think what is happening now in the cabinet is, naturally, a political 
move. It's also a tactical move, associated with preparations for the 
upcoming presidential elections. The changes and are being carried out in 
such a way as to not to alienate a part of his wide-ranging electorate and 
those who are prepared to support him in the elections."

Petrov says, for one, the reshuffle should not be considered the beginning of 
a major fight against corruption in Russian state structures. He also says 
the real changes may come only after the election -- which Putin is highly 
favored to win. 

******

#7
Analysis: Putin seems to think sum changes if items juggled around
By Interfax analyst Igor Denisov 

MOSCOW. Jan 11 (Interfax) - While Boris Yeltsin is known to have stuck
to a system of "deterrents and counterweights," Vladimir Putin seems to be
trying to prove another rule: the sum changes if you juggle the items
around. On Monday, Putin, acting Russian president and prime minister,
carried out a government reshuffle that he assessed on the whole as
insignificant and provisional. The latter is indisputable. It is clear that
there will be a new government and new prime minister in Russia after the
early presidential elections on March 26, unless Putin, as Yeltsin did at
the start of his presidency, wants to combine the two positions in himself,
which is not very likely. In any case, under the Russian constitution the
government has to go when a new president is elected. And not even his
rivals in the presidential election race deny that Putin stands the
best chance of winning.
However, the claim that the reshuffle is insignificant is designed to
appease Russian society, big business, potential foreign investors and so
forth. Putin is saying, as it were: look, nothing extraordinary has
happened, everyone is still around, no one has been fired and the
Cabinet's course has remained unchanged, it's just the emphasis that has
been shifted. The reshuffle above all affected the government's
structure. The two first deputy prime ministers, Viktor Khristenko
and Nikolai Aksyonenko, were relieved of their duties, to be replaced by
only one first deputy premier, Mikhail Kasyanov, until then finance
minister. Putin appointed Kasyanov government coordinator.
Putin's motives for the decision appear quite simple. His opponents had
begun to criticize him for the absence of a clear economic program, and so
he made a move that suggested economics would be the prerogative of
professionals and the Cabinet's main concern. This is probably what
Putin's spokesman, Mikhail Kozhukhov, had in mind when he said it was too
early to see Kasyanov as the next prime minister. Kozhukhov said Putin
would like to entrust pre-election government to someone he trusts and about
whose efficiently he was "100% sure." The case of Aksyonenko, who was
almost considered a second head of Cabinet when Sergei Stepashin was prime
minister and who is reputed to be a protege of big businessman Boris
Berezovsky, is more or less clear. Fired as first deputy prime minister,
Aksyonenko was given back the railways ministry portfolio, thereby again
taking charge of one of Russia's biggest natural monopolies and
remaining in the club of oligarchs. It is not yet quite clear what
Khristenko, who until his dismissal was the chief economic official, will
do in his new capacity of "deputy prime minister, period." His duties will
undoubtedly be made public knowledge in due course, but Putin most likely
kept Khristenko, a former chief of Kasyanov's, as an unpoliticized
official who knows a thing or two about economics.
Putin possibly seeks to make clear by these appointments that he
prefers the Anatoly Chubais group to the rest of Yeltsin's former
entourage. It is no secret that both Khristenko and Alexei Kudrin, who,
as Kasyanov has told Interfax, will be de facto finance minister, are
considered proteges of the man who today heads the national electricity
company Unified Energy Systems and who previously ran Yeltsin's second
presidential election campaign and headed the president's chief of
staff. Hence the reshuffle is an absolutely clear, if cautious, signal for
the Russian political elite and Western investors of what kind of line
Putin will take if he is elected president and what people he will stake on.
Finally, another significant appointment: Emergency Situations
Minister Sergei Shoigu has become deputy premier simultaneously, which
Russia's political elite almost unanimously sees as a kind of reward for the
parliamentary election success of the pro-government Unity group he led.
His promotion obviously means that he will at least partially
supervise the military, security services and law-enforcement agencies.
This was, it must be admitted, quite an unexpected decision. Although
formally all such services are equal in status, it is no secret that the
Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service are
considered "more equal than others." For this reason, it cannot be ruled out
that some officials will be annoyed with their "younger brother's" rapid
promotion.
But all this will be off the agenda if Putin, as popularly elected
president, appoints Shoigu prime minister. The only question is whether
Putin will be willing to entrust the government to a military officer, who
has for a decade been professionally dealing with natural calamities and
various other emergencies. As the campaign in Chechnya makes clear,
armed force remains Putin's optimum election campaign tactic. But it is
obvious that the president will have to make constructive programs his
main job after March 26. For this reason, Putin will most likely need a
prime minister who knows more about economics and social issues than about
putting out fires.

******

#8
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000
From: "Cameron Sawyer" <cfsawyer@compuserve.com> 
Subject: RE: 4025MT/Victory Unraveling

I would never want to appear to defend the brutality of the various Russian
campaigns in and around Chechnya, particularly the callous treatment of
civilians and the callous treatment of the Russian Army of its own soliders,
but I think it is nevertheless important not to confuse the general
character of the war in Chechnya with either the Afghan war or the Vietnam
war. This is a fallacy which to my surprise even the Moscow Times, usually
so careful with facts, sinks as in the 11 January editorial ("Predictably,
'Victory' Is Unraveling ") recently reprinted in JRL.

The main difference, as I would think anyone could see, is that Chechnya is
an integral part of Russia, contained within Russia's historical borders,
and has been a part of Russia since the end of the Great Caucusus War of the
mid-19th century. The Chechens have less of a claim to nationhood than had
the Confederate States of America in 1861. Russia is a huge multicultural
nation, and Russia might really fly apart and descend into chaos if every
region got the idea that it might declare itself independent.

I suppose we might exert more effective influence on the Russians --
influence which ought to be used to encourage them to use more civilized
methods -- if we recognized the legitimacy of Russian territorial claims in
Chechnya, and the obvious legitimacy of the use of force in supressing an
armed insurrection within Russia's historical borders. Confusing
Chechnya -- supression of an armed rebellion within the borders of one
state, with no foreign intervention -- with Afghanistan or Vietnam -- both
interventions by powerful foreign countries into local conflicts in smaller
countries -- doesn't do anyone any good.

*******

#9
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 
From: "Adam Bruski" <abruski@umich.edu> 
Subject: Observations on JRL 4030/Chechen war

Two quick comments on the present Chechen war that came to mind while
reading JRL 4030:

The first is my continued amazement at the surprise being expressed by the
media and Russian military commanders about the "unexpected" rebel
resistance in Grozny and the southern highlands. I think it was obvious
from the beginning that the unimpaired early Russian advance was due to the
fact that the Chechens simply did not want to fight in the lowlands, but
instead were choosing the field of battle - Grozny and the highlands.
Places where they more that proved their ability to resist Russian forces in
the 1994-1996 war.

Secondly, it is further interesting that Security Council secretary Ivanov
said on Wednesday that Russia had obtained "new" evidence "conclusively"
proving the rebels were behind the apartment blasts. Keep in mind that this
comes only days after the Independent's claims to have a video confession
from a Russian member of the security services who claims the government is
responsible for the bombings. All this is speculation at this point of
course, but the timing of Moscow's evidentiary "discovery" is coincidental
at best and suspicious at worst.

******

#10
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
January 12, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
YELTSIN TO BECOME THE "OTHER INDIVIDUAL"?
Pavel Borodin's New Position Could be First Step in 
First Russian President's Promotion to 
Chairman of the Russia-Belarus Union Supreme Council
By Alan KASAYEV

It was still a few days to Boris Yeltsin's resignation,
which is still a world's sensation now, that Nezavisimaya Gazeta
attempted to predict what the first president of Russia might
choose to do if he does retire. One of the most probable
scenarios had to do with Yeltsin's chance to take the seat of the
chairman of the Russia-Belarus Union Supreme Council, with his
extensive experience. The thing is that, pursuant to the Union
Treaty already in force, the Supreme Council chairman can be
either one of the two presidents, or "another individual with
agreement of both sides." This strange-looking formula was never
explained by the document's authors, nor did the signatories
comment on it.
The day before yesterday's promotion of one of Boris
Yeltsin's most trusted persons, chief of the Kremlin business
administration Pavel Borodin to state secretary of the
Russia-Belarus Union might indicate that Yeltsin will become the
"other individual" to head Union government which is in the
process of forming. In this event, Borodin will not just be the
union government chief-of-staff, but in fact will chair the
cabinet comprised of all the key ministers of the two countries,
power ministers included. True, neither Boris Yeltsin, nor, of
course, Pavel Borodin will be real bosses for Vladimir Putin and
Alexander Lukashenko - in any case, not until national
referendums in Belarus and Russia approve the reunion idea and
the union parliament is elected. Maybe not even then; or maybe
they will...
The past decade history has shown, on the example of both
the defunct USSR and the present Russian Federation, how
unpredictable and dangerous diarchy may be. Diarchy is something
we might end up with after the just started long business of
creating the governance structure of the Union of the Two.
Especially if the plan to make Boris Yeltsin its head is
materialized.
What would HE need it for? First, to remain in big politics,
because he won't last long without it. Second, to obtain some
real, not mythical guarantees of immunity for himself and his
family - in the form of a law and just a little power, rather
than of promises and of Putin's decree which can be cancelled at
any time. Third, to go further than self-reproach or repentance -
to try and restore, to some extent, what he had destroyed, and
what brought him to power, having at the same time painfully hit
the 270,000,000 former compatriots. The former Russian president
could thus go in style ending his political career, to be
preserved in the public memory as a positive character and even a
great one.
Now does the current acting president, Vladimir Putin, need
this "superstructure," that is, Boris Yeltsin who only has
coordinating functions? Hardly. But Putin might be forced to
agree to Yeltsin's appointment - by his own entourage, who work
for themselves more than for Putin; by his partner in the Supreme
Council, Alexander Lukashenko, who can well support Yeltsin
because the latter is clearly oriented on and interested in
Russia alone, that is, this "superstructure" won't interfere with
the Belorussian component of the two; and by the West, which will
hardly be happy with the growing influence of either Putin or
Lukashenko, and will therefore consent to Yeltsin's appointment
and will support him to a certain point.
Naturally, no official source in the Kremlin and the White
House of Russia could confirm or disprove our version. Even Pavel
Borodin himself promised to tell "later," when time comes, but
not today. Still, the best informed source emphasized that no
such plans have been discussed. At the Supreme Council session on
January 26, the decision will be made to relieve Boris Yeltsin of
his powers in that body, "automatically," as the source put it.
Well, time will tell, but even today there is a feeling that
Yeltsin's political era is not yet over.

******

#11
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2000 
From: "Alexander Samoiloff" <tolmach@usa.net> 
Subject: Re 4026-Karian/10 Predictions, 

Insider Outlook on Strategic Points of the Development of Events in Russia
in 2000

In response to "The Insider offers 10 predictions on Russia in 2000, Russia
Today, January 10, 2000, by Adell Karian" we give our "Insider Outlook on
Strategic Points of the Development of Events in Russia in 2000".
Here we optimistically suppose that Putin and the people behind him have
serious intent and plans for re-organizing of Russia into a strong state,
and creation of foundation for the development of its economy and
international prestige. Also, we hope that they are realistic politicians
and understand that Russia can only destroy itself by isolating from the
global community.

Also, it may be hard to separate some tasks and moves, because they are
closely connected and must go together.

1. The primary strategic task of a new president is to establish state
control over Russian natural monopolies and funds of Yeltsin's Family elite,
i.e. this small group of people who today controls a majority of Russian
wealth at home and abroad.
This is the only way for the team of Putin to get funds and assets for
development of social-economic reforms.
Putin may use political intrigue, his presidential power and also law
enforcement bodies as the real executive instrument of power to break up the
resistance of Russian economic elite.
Considering negative attitude of many Russians to Yeltsin's elite, historic
traditions and national psychology Putin will find support of the majority
of population on this endeavor.

Putin understands that today Russian elite has strong economic levers and
control over mass media. As the first step he cautiously starts political
game of reshuffling close to elite people and gradual promotion to the
government of people adherent to him. This process will be getting its
momentum with increase of Putin's influence and power.
If Putin will hold state control over natural Russian monopolies and also
destroy Russian criminal raw material exporting system he may get sufficient
funds for social reforms and revival of economies.
For example, according to rough estimation of Japanese law enforcement
bodies Russian Far Eastern fishermen smuggle only to Japan marine products
to the sum of over US$ 1,5 billion per year.
As the first step on this road we see the Putin's new act threatening to
close exporting pipe to the oil companies which don't pay taxes.

2. After presidential elections and confirmation of his supreme power Putin
will move through State Duma few legal acts on restricting of immunity from
criminal persecution of its deputies. This will give him a legal base for
persecution of criminal top officials who today enjoy deputy immunity, than
to increase influence in Duma and to establish state control over funds and
assets of criminals. Russian criminal code allows confiscation by state of
assets and funds of the convicted criminals.
We already have noticed Putin's remark like: "Do American Senators enjoy
immunity from legal persecution?"

3. Another important task is war against crime and corruption, which today
highly infected Russian society.
To solve this problem Putin must make changes in Russian legislature and
attitude of state to organized crime and corruption.
This is very complicated task, because not only the top echelons but also
the all levels authorities and this disease infects many layers of Russian
society.
In 2000 Putin will concentrate efforts on the war against criminal
thieves-within-the-code and other top leaders of organized crime with a
purpose to behead the established criminal system.

Today already we see the beginning of reconsideration of the national
security concept, when struggle with organized crime and corruption are
related to important political tasks.
------------------------
We read:
< On January 06 the Secretary of the Security Council Sergei Ivanov told the
press after a meeting with Putin that work on these alterations began as
long ago as the present head of state was the secretary of the Security
Council.
The alterations are aimed to "more distinctly outline the definition of a
multi-polar world and the way Russia will work on safeguarding national
interests," Ivanov said.
"In an absolutely new way" the problem of terrorism is considered, the
secretary said, pointing out that the national security concept adopted in
1997 must be seriously revised in this sphere.
Besides this, the problem of organized crime is now "interpreted not as a
purely criminal, but political problem."
A number of other avenues of safeguarding national security in the spheres
of ecology, health-care etc., are also subject to alterations, as well as
proposals to neutralize threats to national security, the secretary of the
Security Council said >
-----------------------

4. Putin needs law-enforcement and army as the effective tool for
implementation of his domestic and international policies.
Yet today he has good ties and enjoys popularity in law-enforcement bodies
and army, but they also are infected by corruption and often have close ties
with organized crime.
In this way Putin must establish a new structure to control and cleanse
them.
-----------------------
We read:
<(Newspapers "Segondya" (Andrei Soldatov, January 12, 2000)
In Russia soon will be established a new special service. According to the
information received from law-enforcement bodies there are plans to include
into the new service all departments of self-security of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs together with some departments of FSB.
This new service will be subordinated directly to Russian President and will
be called the Federal Investigation and Struggle with Corruption Service
(FSRBK). Another task of this service will be practical protection of
witnesses.>

---------------------------
5. Russia will continue to participate in creation of the second pole to
counter-balance influence of USA and NATO. There we see active political
moves on establishing of closer ties with China, India, Iran, and other
countries. Very important are the countries of former USSR and its
traditional allies, like Cuba Latin American, African and Asian countries,
North Korea, Yugoslavia and few others.
We don't think that there are any reasons to talk about the old soviet
communist policies or Russian aggressive military expansion to Poland or
Baltic republics, but rather use of Russian economic and political levers
and incentives.
And as the natural behavior of governments of these countries will be more
and more use of two competing blocks contradictions to the benefit of their
own interests. Today they already use Russian threat to receive more
financial and political support, but only from USA and NATO.

6. Putin will balance between protection of Russian national interests and
closer relations with USA and NATO. We think that both sides will try to
promote their interests without real aggressive actions and direct military
collision. USA will be enforced to regard the interests of new establishing
second pole with Russian participation. The short periods of tension (like
Yugoslavia in June 2000) will be changed by the periods of relaxation.

7. At the same time Putin must work on creation of economic basis for
development of Russian economies by establishing better economic relations
and investment climate for attraction of modern technologies and funds.
Already today Western investment rating agencies recognize that such
important negative factor as political instability in Russia has gone. The
struggle with crime and corruption together with creation of better social
and legal climate will further improve image of Russia in the eyes of
serious foreign investors.
In its relations with Western businesses Putin's government will be leaded
by the standards of western national pragmatism, rather than Yeltsin's
intent to protect personal interests of the Family.

8. To lay the basis for revival of Russian economies and real democracy
Putin must create strong class of small businessmen and proprietors. In this
way, together with holding of state control over natural monopolies and
demonopolization of others, he must create better economic, political and
legal environment for the development of Russian small businesses. The
struggle against organized crime and corruption will also strongly promote
their development.
In such way Putin can solve many economic problems and involve big share of
Russians into activities on restoration of national economies.

9. I think that Chechen military campaign will be finished in February or
beginning of March, but the political solution of this problem can be found
only with improvement of social-economic situation in Russia itself.
In this way we expect that the main organized forces of field commanders
will be destroyed or pushed out from Russian territory, but separate
terrorist acts and raids from abroad for a long time will keep this problem
in focus of Russian internal politics.
We think that soon Chechen problem will be related by the West to the rank
of Russian internal problems, because USA will be more bothered by growth of
Russian influence on other countries.

Of cause, this is just a schematic optimistic outlook and development of
events will introduce corrections and bring up more problems, but we think
that today Putin has this primary importance targets on the way of Russian
restoration.
Alexander Samoiloff
tolmach@usa.net
Khabarovsk, Russia

*******


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