January 11, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4025 4026 4027

Johnson's Russia List
#4026
11 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. BBC: Stephen Mulvey, Is Russia coming unstuck again?
2. Interfax: Saidullayev predicts change in Chechen operation.
3. Financial Times (UK): John Thornhill, Putin loosens links with Yeltsin era.
4. Stratfor Commmentary: How Russia's Future Is in the West's Hands.
5. Russia Today: Adell Karian, New Millennium, New Pandemonium In Russia. The Insider offers 10 predictions on Russia in 2000.
6. Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London): CHECHEN MUFTI ACCUSES MOSCOW OF COLLUDING WITH REBELS IN CHECHNYA, DAGESTAN.
7. the eXile: Lie2K!]

******

#1
BBC
10 January, 2000
Is Russia coming unstuck again? 
By Russia analyst Stephen Mulvey 

It is more than a month since Russian forces said they had fully surrounded 
the Chechen capital, Grozny, warning those inside the city to get out or face 
a deadly assault from the air. 

Thousands of bombs, shells and rockets later they have apparently made 
little advance inside the city. 

Russian units have probed deep towards the city centre, but have not 
established positions there. 

Occasionally these operations have resulted in disaster, as on 15 December 
when a reconnaissance column came under fire in the Minutka district, 
resulting in the loss of dozens of men and at least seven armoured vehicles. 

Outside Grozny, Russian progress has also been painfully slow - at least 
since the early hours of the invasion when the northern third of the 
breakaway republic was occupied in just four days. 

Rebel counter-attacks 

The latest counter-attacks in the three biggest population centres outside 
Grozny - Gudermes, Argun and Shali - show how shaky the Russian presence is 
in cities they have claim to control. 

Last week, the rebels launched daring raids on three villages to the 
southwest of Grozny, in which they claimed to have destroyed the headquarters 
of the then commander of the western front, General Vladimir Shamanov. 

And back in November, during their first counter-attack of the current 
campaign, the rebels briefly recaptured the town of Novogroznensky. 

Bunkers 

The Russian advance was never expected to sweep across all areas of Chechnya 
with equal ease. The north is flat, and ideally suited to the Russians' heavy 
armour. The population is also traditionally less militant than in the south 
of the country. 

It was clear that Moscow would need to exercise caution inside Grozny - where 
its forces suffered disastrous losses in the last war - and that any advance 
up the winding valleys and gorges of Chechnya's southern mountains would be 
laborious. 

But the events of the last week highlight another problem for the Russian 
forces. 

Their strategy for minimising casualties, as they have explained many times, 
is to rely as far as possible on aerial bombardment. 

But the Chechen guerrillas have shown that they can withstand this 
bombardment and emerge from their bunkers to fight Russian ground troops with 
deadly efficiency. 

The Russian strategy therefore appears to be a recipe for stalemate, and one 
that plays into the hands of the mobile guerrillas. 

Their ploy has been the same whenever they have fought the Russians over the 
last two centuries - repeatedly strike and withdraw. 

Disguise 

In Grozny they can move around in sewers and trenches, and in the mountains 
they have the cover of beech forests. 

Russian soldiers are hampered because they have trouble distinguishing 
ordinary civilians from rebel fighters. Recently, generals complained that a 
counter-attack had been carried out by men who had pretended to be refugees. 

In the last war the Chechens often fought in shifts, so that a man who was a 
civilian one day would become a fighter the next before going home again to 
recuperate. 

Chechen leaders have often remarked that the Russian army can control only 
the ground under its feet, and that the rest of the country belongs to them. 

There is some truth in this claim, as the recent burning down of a Russian 
field hospital in the town of Chervlennaya demonstrates. The town, 15 miles 
north of Grozny, has been in Russian hands since the first days of the 
conflict, but still it is not immune from sabotage. 

Unwinnable war 

>From the start of this conflict, many military experts have predicted another 
protracted and ultimately unwinnable guerrilla war. 

This is all the more likely to be the case as long as Russian forces shrink 
from close-quarters combat with Chechens. 

It may be that Russia is now preparing for a change of tactics, having 
replaced the two commanders that have led the eastern and western fronts to 
date. 

One of the new commanders, General Sergei Makarov, has said his forces had 
been given new "more complicated" instructions. 

However, if this means putting less reliance on long-distance methods of 
warfare, the Russian casualty rate, already rising, is likely to continue to 
increase. 

*******

#2
Saidullayev predicts change in Chechen operation

MOSCOW. Jan 10 (Interfax) - Head of the Chechen state council
formed in Moscow Malik Saidullayev has said the developments in Chechnya are
taking a turn unfavorable to the federal force. "The rebels are now using
the tactics tested in 1996. They seized the important towns of Argun,
Gudermes and Shali. I think the militants will keep them for a couple of
weeks tiring the military after which they will retreat to the mountains
with minimal losses," he told Interfax on Monday. "From the start I
became suspicious when troops easily advanced in Chechnya and the military
self-assuredly claimed that the problem of Chechnya could be resolved by
force. During the previous war militants also retreated inside Chechnya
and then hit the rear, recaptured villages, kept them and retreated
again," Saidullayev said.
In his opinion, in March rebels now resorting to guerilla warfare "are
most likely to begin an open offensive and then the situation in Chechnya
may change seriously which will undoubtedly affect the popularity rating of
Vladimir Putin." Saidullayev criticized the federal authorities relying
"on stooges from the team of Zavgayev and Gantamirov" who he said do not
enjoy influence in Chechnya. "A consolidating figure is needed acceptable
to both the rebels and the people of Chechnya and Moscow," he said.
Saidullayev suggested immediate talks with several Chechen field
commanders who are ready to lay down arms against security guarantees. He
said 27 field commanders controlling 4,000 men are in question.
"During my trip to Chechnya I managed to agree with them but they need
guarantees from the highest level. Meanwhile, the groups of these field
commanders are not actively involved in the hostilities," he said. 

******

#3
Financial Times (UK)
11 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Putin loosens links with Yeltsin era 
By John Thornhill in Moscow

Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister and acting president, began reshaping 
the government in his own image yesterday by promoting one young technocrat 
and demoting two ministers linked to the Yeltsin era.

Mikhail Kasyanov, finance minister, has been appointed sole deputy prime 
minister. He will act as the cabinet's "technical co-ordinator" in the run-up 
to the presidential elections on March 26.

Mr Kasyanov, 42, who is well respected by foreign investors, will in effect 
be reserve prime minister over the next three months, leaving Mr Putin free 
to concentrate on the elections and affairs of state.

The appointment of the market-minded, English-speaking Mr Kasyanov may ease 
negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, which has suspended 
lending to Russia pending the implementation of additional structural reforms.

Mr Putin streamlined his cabinet by stripping two other economic ministers, 
Victor Khristenko and Nikolai Aksyonenko, of their rank of first deputy prime 
ministers, though both ministers retain more junior jobs.

Mr Aksyonenko, a former railways minister, has been associated with "The 
Family", the shadowy group of oligarchs which clustered around Boris 
Yeltsin's administration.

Boris Makarenko, deputy director of the Centre for Political Technologies, a 
research institute, said Mr Putin was clearly trying to send a signal to 
Russia's voters by publicly distancing himself from Mr Yeltsin's entourage.

"Aksyonenko was a notorious figure who was a reserve candidate for the 
presidency and the treasurer of The Family. Putin is trying to show that the 
Russian political regime will be repaired rather than preserved," Mr 
Makarenko said.

To reinforce that impression, Mr Putin sacked Pavel Borodin as head of the 
president's administrative office. Mr Borodin, a close friend of the Yeltsin 
family, managed the lavish refurbishment of the Kremlin palace. He is under 
investigation by Russian prosecutors for allegedly accepting kickbacks from 
Mabetex, a Swiss construction company. Both Mr Borodin and Mabetex deny the 
accusations.

While Mr Yeltsin always tried to play one political faction off against 
another, observers suggest Mr Putin appears determined to build a more 
unified team. However, Mr Kasyanov is himself rumoured to be closely linked 
with several oligarchs.

Mr Putin suffered a setback yesterday when Boris Gromov, a former Soviet 
general, won the elections to become governor of the Moscow region.

*******

#4
Stratfor Commmentary
January 11, 2000
How Russia's Future Is in the West's Hands 

Acting President Vladimir Putin has initiated the economic element of his 
twofold plan for Russia's future by appointing Finance Minister Mikhail 
Kasyanov as first deputy prime minister on Jan. 10. Putin is in the process 
of implementing a dual but conflicting strategy. Having unified the country 
in the war for Chechnya, Putin must continue to satisfy the nationalist surge 
he has awakened -- while keeping Russia's door propped open to Western 
investment. 

Putin's first goal was to unify the fragmented and indifferent Russian 
population and gain its support for the Kremlin. The war against Islamic 
rebels in Chechnya has generated the needed nationalism, which has been 
channeled into support for Putin himself. Now that he has Russia's backing, 
however, he also needs to revive Russia's international reputation and get 
Western investment flowing again. 

In Putin's most recent government reshuffling, he strengthened his economic 
staff by promoting pro-reform, Western-oriented Kasynov to the highest post 
available. Putin demoted both of the first deputy prime ministers, Nikolai 
Aksyonenko and Viktor Khristenko, Jan. 10 and assigned Kasynov as the sole 
first deputy. Since Putin is temporarily serving as president, the first 
deputy prime minister will essentially act as the head of government until 
the March 26 elections. 

A look at Kasynov's background suggests that Putin intends to tackle 
Russia's immense foreign debt. The English-speaking minister has been a 
leading player in debt-restructuring talks between Russia and its foreign 
creditors. Kasynov, who was appointed finance minister last May, negotiated 
the rescheduling of Paris Club debts. His appointment signifies that Putin 
will follow a plan reminiscent of perestroika, in which he will centralize 
economic policy while addressing the importance of Western investment. 

Western powers fear that Putin's indifference to their concerns about 
Chechnya means that Putin plans to return Russia to a Soviet-style regime, 
with roots in isolated nationalism. Putin's appointment of Kasynov, however, 
suggests that he is not planning to recreate the Soviet Union. He needs 
continued nationalism for Russia's continued unity, but Putin values the West 
for its investment dollars and technology resources. 

Putin must avoid the dilemma of his predecessor: He must not be perceived as 
having sold Russia out to the West in return for economic aid. Now that he 
has called on Russian nationalism, he cannot afford for it to turn against 
him, as it surely will if he does not approach the Western issue carefully. 
In order to hold on to his popularity and his support base, Putin must 
continue to stand up to the West. However, Putin cannot afford to have the 
West see him as an enemy, or he will prevent the possibility of Western 
investment in Russia. Russia's foreign policy must remain nationalistic while 
its economic policy seeks out Western investment 

If Western leaders decide that they can overlook Russia's nationalism, they 
may encourage investment in Russia. However, if they demand that Putin rein 
in the nationalists and call off the Chechen campaign, then both sides will 
lose. Russia will not backtrack on Chechnya, and if the West does not accept 
that, Russia will lose its only source of economic help. Therefore, the West 
is in position to make the next decision concerning Russia';s economic
future. 

******

#5
Russia Today
January 10, 2000 
New Millennium, New Pandemonium In Russia 
By Adell Karian 
The Insider offers 10 predictions on Russia in 2000
(C) 2000 Norasco-Russia Journal

1. A new president and parliament won't yield much change. With luck, new 
faces will replace the old. But the same loathsome thievery and massive 
larceny that has characterized Russia since the end of the Soviet Union will 
continue.

Without luck, the same faces will continue to do the same. At least new faces 
would take a while to get up the robbery learning curve. But the old faces 
would, arguably, at least be less in a hurry to plunder and pillage, since 
they already have a decent little nest egg.

2. The new president will not be Vladimir Putin. Popularity is ephemeral. 
Putin peaked too fast. A few reverses in Chechnya, a domestic political 
misstep here or there, and Putin will face the ax. As soon as he loses his 
prime ministerial platform, he's finished - look at Yevgeny Primakov.

3. Political risk will decline (where else could it go?). Political stability 
can only increase at this point (barring a third term for Boris, or President 
Alexander Lukashenko). Russia risk will drop, even if new thieves will 
replace the old. And investors will be able to sleep better in the knowledge 
that the new thieves, and their systems of graft, will be in place for more 
than just a few months.

4. The IMF and Russia will kiss and make up. The reconciliation process will 
be accelerated if (a) the war in Chechnya ends soon and is quickly forgotten 
and (b) Russia makes noises about its inability to meet its debt obligations 
to the IMF. The IMF and Russia are locked in a death embrace: The IMF needs 
its largest debtor to not default; and, in the end, Russia will need 
financial help to avoid becoming a global capital market pariah once again, 
strong oil price notwithstanding.

5. The Russian stock market will go through the roof. Markets have a way of 
overcorrecting, and Russia's equity market is still compensating for its 
overdone decline between October 1997 and October 1998. When you start from a 
low base, outperformance is easy. With daily market volumes peaking out 
around $15 million a day, it only takes a little money to move the Russian 
market a lot. An improvement in Russia's risk profile won't hurt either.

6. Capital market lemmings will return to Russia. International investment 
banks piled into Russia months before the music stopped in August 1998 - at 
which point they left town en masse. A new president will be the all-clear 
signal. Look for them to return in strength before the year is out, although 
perhaps a bit more cautiously than last time. At least, that's what they'll 
say.

7. The oil price will fall. Barring a nice little war in the Middle East or 
more grouchiness from Iraq, historical precedents suggest the oil price is in 
for a dive, probably toward the middle of the year or so. Fortunately for 
Russia, gas prices usually increase with a several-month lag after oil prices 
(a trend that also holds on the downside), suggesting that the country's 
finances won't be completely in the dumpster for a while longer yet.

8. The Russian banking sector will remain stubbornly unrestructured. The 
Russian government will make noises about greater transparency (read: public 
relations fodder for the IMF) and about how ARCO is restructuring everything 
that moves. The EBRD might, in a typically idiotic flight of fancy, buy into 
the rhetoric by lending the Russian government a mountain of money to "assist 
with the restructuring process of the Russian banking sector."

9. LUKoil will continue to disappoint. The organization that at one point was 
Russia's best oil company has lost the script. Its financial results - which 
are fudged to include whatever subsidiaries the company feels like including 
- are poor; management is underperforming; and LUKoil is still indulging in 
dodgy deals to buy back its own shares. Five years of financials audited to 
international standards by May 2000 and a NYSE listing soon thereafter? Heard 
that one before.

10. Foreign investors and shareholders will be ripped off in a major way. Who 
will be next year's BP Amoco? Look for Russia to alienate some of the largest 
and/or most important and visible investors in the country. Possible 
candidates include Ruhrgas, Nestle, Ford and a few oil companies. Will new 
investors continue to arrive nevertheless? Of course. High levels of risk 
chase away risk-adverse investors - but if there's money to be made, they 
will come.

And that's the view from the inside ...

******

#6
BBC MONITORING
CHECHEN MUFTI ACCUSES MOSCOW OF COLLUDING WITH REBELS IN CHECHNYA, DAGESTAN
Source: `Al-Sharq al-Awsat', London, in Arabic 7 Jan 00 p 10

Chechen Mufti Akhmed-Khadzhi Kadyrov has accused Sergey Stepashin of secretly 
arming Islamist rebels in Dagestan while he was Russian prime minister. In an 
interview published in the London-based newspaper `Al-Sharq al-Awsat', 
Kadyrov, whom Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov is said to have called public 
enemy number one, said that the Chechen rebels have "a great deal of money" 
which he believed came from Middle East sources and that, "if Russia really 
wanted to, not a single foreigner could have infiltrated into Chechnya or 
extended a single dollar to it". Kadyrov also recalled an occasion where 
field commander Shamil Basayev acknowledged that he had been given 1m dollars 
by Russian tycoon Boris Berezovskiy, whom Basayev said gave him the money "to 
establish relations" with him. The mufti described Maskhadov's relations with 
prominent field commanders as ambiguous and said that, after three years of 
virtual Chechen independence, the people had lost confidence in the Chechen 
leadership. The following are excerpts from the interview, conducted by Sami 
'Amarah and published on 7th January. Subheadings have been inserted 
editorially.

[Sami 'Amarah] How do you assess the prospects for the current situation? How 
do the Chechen people view the new situation?

[Kadyrov] No-one can actually tell if the war will end tomorrow or the day 
after tomorrow. However, I believe that the war will not end soon... In fact, 
the Russian forces cannot end this campaign without the support of the 
Chechen people because the majority of those participating in the fighting 
are Chechens, including the ones who do not understand the meaning of this 
war.

Other people believe that, if Russia takes over, it will begin a series of 
repression and persecution. Some groups cannot lead a normal life again 
because they are criminals who took and killed hostages. In any case, the 
Chechens themselves will not let these criminals do as they please.

[Q] You know that anti-Russian feelings are growing everyday even among the 
refugees and those staying in the so-called "liberated lands".

Disappointment after 1994-96 war

[A] During the previous war in 1994-96, all the people unleashed an uprising 
and stood against the Russian forces. In my capacity as the mufti, I was one 
of those who urged the people to fight in that war. I also joined the 
fighters against the federal forces.

But today people are not engaged in an active fighting, nor are they 
supporting this war. It is not a matter of people not seeking independence 
any more. The people actually looked forward to a better life after the 
previous war ended in 1996. Regrettably, however, what actually happened was 
exactly the opposite.

In this regard, we should tell the truth. Indeed, armed gangs did show up, 
and they began to abduct Chechen individuals and foreigners. Some people link 
this thing to the special services in Russia or other countries and blame 
these services for the abductions. However, people have begun to say: given 
that we have state and security bodies, why do we allow others to come to our 
country? Why do we not protect ourselves from them? Hence, our own officials 
are held responsible. Perhaps, Russia would have started the war anyway after 
searching for pretexts other than the ones we ourselves provided.

Chechen President Maskhadov's ambiguity towards field commanders

[Q] What is the substance of your dispute with [Chechen] President [Aslan] 
Maskhadov, who issued a death sentence against you? How can his current bias 
towards the fighters be explained, knowing that, until recently, he was 
actually against them?

[A] Perhaps, he was actually against them. However, he, as president, did not 
do anything to stop them. When the ones calling themselves "the soldiers of 
God", led by [field commanders] Shamil Basayev and Khattab, stormed Dagestan, 
I opposed this thing and announced my position openly. I said: this is not 
jihad; it is rather deception. I announced this position through our central 
television service, which was operational at that time. I added: if Dagestan 
really wants jihad, its people have learned ulema [religious scholars] who 
can announce jihad there. If the Dagestani people rise against Russia, we can 
help them as brothers, just as they helped us in the previous war.

But what actually happened was the opposite. Dagestan's ulema did not 
announce jihad. We stormed their land, which is Russian territory, so I did 
not support this thing...

I do not rule out the possibility that Moscow has a hand in this issue. An 
agreement may have been reached with Moscow in this regard. Otherwise, these 
persons could not have come in or gone out so easily and freely. I openly 
said so during my first meeting with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in 
the presence of six northern Caucasian muftis. I frankly said that both 
Moscow and the Chechen side are held responsible. The Russians are now 
condemning us because we have bases for terrorists. However, fortresses for 
terrorists used to exist in Dagestan. Everyone knew that these fortresses 
existed in the villages of Karamakhi and Chaban Makhi.

Stepashin sent arms to Dagestani rebels when he was Russian premier

[Q] What did Putin say, knowing that he used to represent the intelligence 
and security bodies?

[A] He said: we actually made mistakes. But I openly said that former Prime 
Minister Sergey Stepashin - who was interior minister at that time, and is a 
non-Muslim and does not know what Islam is - visited these two villages and 
said about their residents: "They are good Muslims. They are not hardliners 
and should be helped." He sent two arms-laden trucks to these villages 
disguised as "consignments of medicines". I openly told Putin: instead of 
sending medicines or humanitarian aid, Stepashin sent them these arms. 
Therefore, these two villages fought against the Russian army for two or 
three weeks. Fighting for this period of time actually needs a great deal of 
arms.

[Q] Were there any Chechens among them?

[A] No. In fact, these were the two villages that announced a separate state 
inside another state. Moreover, they did not comply with the Russian 
constitution and laws, which was also seen by the leadership in Russia and 
Dagestan. However, they were not stopped because some parties wanted to use 
this thing as a pretext.

In fact, the sedition has divided the Muslims in Dagestan, Chechnya and 
Ingushetia. Under the Communist rule, we never experienced any kind of 
extremism, but when the Soviet Union collapsed, and also when it was possible 
to open religious schools and learn Islam freely, some ideas began to 
infiltrate into our country.

[Q] You accuse Russia of concocting these operations, whereas Russia accuses 
you of being responsible for them. What is the truth?

[A] The ones calling themselves "mujahidin" actually have a great deal of 
money. I believe this money comes from Middle East sources. There are known 
persons who receive this money, including Khattab for example. These persons 
have connections. I am not saying that this money is extended by certain 
countries or individuals. However, I told Putin that, if Russia really wanted 
to, not a single foreigner could have infiltrated into Chechnya or extended a 
single dollar to it, which means that this thing was deliberately planned.

On the other hand, if we were the masters of the situation in Chechnya and if 
we had a president, security bodies and other things, we would not have 
allowed such things to happen. We did not stop these persons at the 
appropriate time. Moreover, we now deny what happened, despite the fact that 
this denial is untrue. Thus, we are again revolving in a vicious circle. They 
actually provided a pretext to start a war, and it is easy to make various 
kinds of accusations against a mufti...

[Q] The siege around Groznyy is being tightened. How do you view the 
situation now?

[A] As a cleric and a Chechen, I oppose any war whether in Chechnya or 
elsewhere because war means killing. I also oppose the storming of this city 
because many peaceful residents could not leave it or do not want to leave it 
due to the presence of thieves. In addition, this city was already destroyed 
in the previous war, and nothing was reconstructed in it, so what is the 
reason for continuing its destruction? Therefore, I am against storming the 
city, and it is better to make other arrangements.

[Q] Some people raised the idea of transferring the capital city from Groznyy 
to your town; namely, Gudermes.

[A] I talked to the Russian officials on this issue and said that the people 
should decide it... I am pleased with Putin's remark that the issue will only 
be resolved by political means. After the military operation in Chechnya 
ends, I hope that we will hold a referendum there on the status of the 
Chechen Republic. We do not have another way out.

Chechen leaders lost people's confidence

[Q] What is your position on independence?

[A] I am with the people, and I will agree to whatever they say.

[Q] But you are an indicator of public opinion. What is this opinion?

[A] I think that, in the past three years, the leaders of Chechnya worked 
very well for losing the people's confidence. They allowed hard-line persons 
to control the religious courts. They also allowed the formation of illegal 
groups as well as the humiliation and killing of people. This included me, 
too, despite the fact that I am a religious personality.

However, I said: "There is no room for extremism in Chechnya." As a result, 
there were three assassination attempts against me. Five people were killed 
in the second attempt; they were in the escort car and were all my closest 
relatives, such as the sons of my brothers and sisters as well as my cousins. 
This attempt was extremely savage, and we had to bury four of them in one 
grave because their bodies were torn into pieces.

This incident was not investigated because such killings used to take place 
everyday. Various groups used to clash with each other everyday, killing from 
five to 10 people. In fact, we allowed this to happen. I really have the 
impression that they wanted things to reach a certain limit where we would 
demand returning to Russia and reject any other solution. However, I believe 
that, even if things actually reach this limit, the people should be 
consulted in order to know where they want to live and how. Otherwise, we 
will be held responsible for claiming the lives of hundreds of thousands of 
martyrs, whom we offered for the cause of independence.

[Q] Do you not think that the Chechen campaign was planned to serve Putin's 
preparations to run for president and, earlier, to serve the parliamentary 
elections?

[A] Even if we assume that this campaign was planned in the interest of 
Putin, we ourselves provided a pretext for it through our own president. When 
the fighters withdrew from Dagestan and the [Russian] forces began to 
encircle Chechnya, I met Maskhadov at his invitation. At that time, I was not 
in the habit of visiting him, so he sent one of his ministers to me, who 
requested me to announce jihad...

However, I told the minister that I did not agree to his request. I also 
asked him to announce his condemnation, even formally, of Basayev for going 
to Dagestan, especially since foreigners, led by Khattab, participated in 
that operation. I also told the minister that, if we did not do so, we would 
look like defenders of these persons. Given that we signed a peace treaty 
with Russia, we did not have the right to invade Dagestan...

Field commander Basayev acknowledged tycoon Berezovskiy gave him 1m dollars 
"to establish relations"

[Q] Perhaps, you heard about the reported relationship between the Jewish 
billionaire Boris Berezovskiy and some leaders of the fighters who used to 
receive millions of dollars from him.

[A] First of all, I would like to say that this is a smart man. Everyone 
makes accusations against him, but to no avail. Second, he really knows how 
to work. Perhaps, he is a Satan or a devil. I met him in Chechnya. I also 
talked to him at the home of [field commander] Salman Raduyev after the 
latter attacked a position in Dagestan, at which time Berezovskiy came in to 
hold negotiations. I do not know why Berezovskiy always came in such 
situations. I am not saying that he was representing a certain party; he 
rather came to Raduyev to have the captured soldiers released.

[Q] Are people aware of the suspect relationship between Berezovskiy and 
Basayev?

[A] This relationship actually exists. For example, when Basayev filed a 
lawsuit against Maskhadov before a religious court, I attended the first 
session accompanied by Maskhadov. Basayev sat in front of us, while I sat 
next to Maskhadov. The court's panel sat on the other side.

Basayev reviewed all his accusations against Maskhadov. [Magomed] Khambiyev, 
who is now Chechen defence minister but was commander of the National Guard 
at that time, was also sitting there. Addressing Basayev, Khambiyev said: you 
are making various accusations against Maskhadov. But tell us now why did 
Berezovskiy give you 2m dollars?

This took place in court. Basayev later acknowledged that Berezovskiy only 
gave him 1m dollars. But the judge asked Basayev: why did he give you 1m 
dollars. The answer was: to establish relations with me.

But I do not know why Berezovskiy needed to establish relations with Basayev 
and to give him 1m dollars. Perhaps, there was some business between them. 
This was the only thing I myself heard from Basayev in the presence of tens 
of witnesses in court. There were also Maskhadov, myself, Khambiyev, [Chechen 
State Security Minister Turpal-Ali] Atgiriyev and members of the Supreme 
Court. All this was recorded by a video camera. As for other things between 
the two men, they are sheer rumours which are hard to believe. In fact, I did 
not want to talk about rumours but rather about what I actually heard with my 
own ears...

[Q] What would you like to say to people in the Arab world?

[A] I would like to tell the Arab world and Muslims that the situation in 
Chechnya is very difficult now. Within a period of three years, the Chechens 
suffered from a second war, although they have not thus far removed the 
effects of the previous war. I hope that the Muslims will pray for the truth 
and for its triumph.

[Q] But former [Chechen] President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who is now in the 
Gulf, says otherwise.

[A] I know that he is now in the United Arab Emirates. However, he does not 
utter a single word in order to normalize the situation because he is one of 
those who ignited this war...

[Q] What do you consider to be the most ideal model for your Chechen people?

[A] The Arabs are Muslims. Egypt, for example, has deep-rooted Islamic 
traditions. Moreover, senior ulema and specialists in religious jurisprudence 
are in Egypt. But why do these ulema not raise their voices in Egypt as we 
are doing? For me, any formula of rule is acceptable provided that the 
religious duties, the Prophet Muhammad's sayings and doings, and religious 
education should not be banned.

In addition, we should demonstrate to the people the beauty of Islam rather 
than its harshness. Naturally, there are God-imposed limits, such as those 
related to fornication and alcoholic drinks. All these things are written and 
cannot be changed. We should have implemented what we can really implement...

******

#7
From: "eXile-office" <exile.taibbi@matrix.ru>
Subject: Lie2K
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2000 

These are the Russia-related
excerpts from our year-end issue's lead story, which rated the 50 biggest
lies of 1999. There are about five or six, I think...

Lie2K!
by the eXile

It was a combination of other people's nausea-inducing end-of-the-year top
100 lists, along with our own sense of dread at having to come up with a
bunch of competing nutty lists, that inspired this detour into the
bleeding, raw ulcers accumulated in this, the Year of the Accelerating Lie.
Like kids picking open their scabs to marvel at the pink and whitish meat
below, we've decided to relive all the big and little lies that have ground
us down into the humorless, crippled insomniacs that we've become. So come
along, take our hand and join us for a skip 'n a stroll down Bile Lane. 

50. POLLUTION AND UNSALEABLE INVENTORIES ARE GOOD FOR RUSSIA
No explanation, just a verbatim quote from a January 3 article by New York
Times correspondents Michael Gordon and Celestine Bohlen: "Nor is the
economic news all bad. Moscow's streets, barren 15 years ago, now are
jammed with traffic 18 hours a day; the number of autos has tripled in
seven years, and the pollution is horrific. Store shelves are no longer
bare, but stocked with foreign consumer goods, although they are often
beyond the means of many Russians."
ADDITIONAL IRRITANT: Tardy shipments of "emergency" U.S. grain aid this
summer undercut domestic grain prices, ruining many Russian farmers. 
PEASANT UPRISING FACTOR: 6-6.50

47. 'UNITY' IS A CENTRIST PARTY
Alexander "Headcrusher" Karelin, Yevgeny Nazdratenko, Sergei Shoigu, and a
cast of other nefarious characters banded together in a party without a
platform, united behind a beady-eyed ex-spook with a ten-year hole in his
biography who was waging a bloody and openly manufactured war with
Chechnya, and then unapologetically manipulated the news coverage to
assassinate their political enemies on the two state-run networks--and yet
still managed to have themselves described as "centrists" by organizations
like the AP, The Washington Post, and The New York Times, who all admitted,
after the elections, that they didn't know what "Unity" really stood for.
ADDITIONAL IRRITANT: Describing Karelin, yukster Dave Barry wrote, "I would
rather get into the ring with that thing that was always chasing Sigourney
Weaver around the spaceship in Alien."
POSTAL RAMPAGE FACTOR: 4.36

39. THE U.S. BLOCKED THE EX-IM LOAN TO TNK OUT OF CONCERN FOR SHAREHOLDERS
RIGHTS OR THE WAR IN CHECHNYA
Madeleine Albright personally intervened to convince Clinton to delay the
$500 million loan guarantees to Tyumen Oil Company (TNK) last week in a
highly unusual move that State Department spokesman James Foley explained
as follows: "Secretary Albright felt that it would be in our national
interests not to go forward with these transactions at this time, because
of the open issues related to the Sidanko bankruptcy proceeding and respect
for shareholder and creditor rights." After spending most of the decade
underwriting Chubais's grossly unfair expropriation of Russia's industry
with billions of dollars in aid, the United States suddenly found that it
was not in our interests to reward bad business practices because BP Amoco,
which wields incredible clout in Washington, got burned. The Ex-Im's $500
million loan guarantees would have benefited thousands of American workers,
but angered BP's British super-oligarch Sir John Browne. TNK, which is
Serbia to BP Amoco's NATO in terms of influence and power, had no choice
but to eventually capitulate over the Chernogorneft dispute and give it
back to Sidanko in a murky, backroom deal that the State Department, and
the Western press, praised. The New York Times put it most bluntly: "The
Clinton administration acted appropriately [:] Tyumen's main offense was
its alleged manipulation of bankruptcy proceedings to take over a Siberian
oil field previously owned by American and other foreign investors. [...]
The longer-term solution to problems of this kind is for Russia's new
parliament to strengthen legal protections for all investors, domestic and
foreign [!]." Someday, they're saying, they might find the time to wring
their hands over all the assets stolen from the impoverished Russian
masses; but for now, let's get Soros and Browne their money back, or it's
fuck you Russia, and fuck you employees of second-tier American oil service
companies!
ADDITIONAL IRRITANT: Clinton is pushing the Ex-Im to offer over $800
million in loan guarantees to BP Amoco for a proposed pipeline in
cooperation with feudal dictatorships Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, whose lone
virtue is that they play ball with Western plutocrats.
POSTAL FACTOR: 2.98; could rise as Putin practices his Judo

35. SORM-2 IS AN OUTRAGE
When news reports confirmed that the Russian secret service had set in
motion its notorious SORM-2 electronic surveillance program--whereby
Internet providers were forced to attach government surveillance equipment
to their networks--Western analysts scrambled to convince the public that
the Russian domestic spy system was somehow more sinister than America's
own Echelon program, which does essentially the same thing. "SORM-2 is
going farther than any other democratic country in controlling the design
of private-sector communications systems for surveillance," said Jim
Dempsey, director for the Center for Democracy and Technology in
Washington. "Echelon is not coercive. It does not rely upon
government-mandated surveillance features being built into telecom
systems." Meanwhile, the American Federal Communications Commission in
August upheld and even extended the design requirements for domestic
communications providers that were outlined in the 1994 Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA"), which required companies to
design Internet and other communications systems to meet FBI surveillance
requirements.
ADDITIONAL IRRITANT: When Congress asked the National Security Agency for
information on the Echelon program this fall, the NSA successfully refused
by invoking attorney-client privilege.
POSTAL RAMPAGE FACTOR: 7.3 and rising 

34. THE REMARKABLE THING ABOUT RUSSIA'S ELECTIONS WAS HOW UNREMARKABLE THEY
WERE
This was the "optimistic" line about the recent, totally flawed, un-free,
and unfair elections, pushed on an optimist-worshipping public by former
Frisbee-buff Michael McFaul, known as the Danny Ainge golden retriever of
the Russian analyst set. His description was considered so profound that it
was quoted reverentially by The Washington Post and subsequently parroted
by others. The argument goes something like this: Democracy has taken root
in Russia because its citizens have been paraded out to the ballot box for
ten years now. In fact, the only people who take Russian "democracy"
seriously are optimistic Western academics, European bureaucrats, and
foreign correspondents. The sad truth is that tomorrow, if voting was
abolished, Russians would care far less than the McFauls, because no matter
who they do or don't vote for, the whole game is so rigged that they're
fucked either way. 
ADDITIONAL IRRITANT: Michael McFaul wrote a piece recently blasting the
false paradigm between optimists and pessimists among Russia-watchers, even
though half of his Moscow Times Op-Ed pieces dating from before the August
1998 crash explicitly pit pro-reform optimists against gloom-and-doom
pessimists. He even labeled Yeltsin's 1996 victory "A Victory for
Optimists"!
POSTAL RAMPAGE FACTOR: 0. McFaul's star keeps rising in spite of his
persistent Lewis Carroll-esque inverted-truth analyses of Russia; democracy
will continue to be corrupted at home and praised by the West; and most
Russians will continue to pray that Putin might just put an end to it all
by squashing everyone against the wall with the sole of his boot. 

31. BORIS YELTSIN IS NEAR DEATH
He has spent more time in the hospital since his re-election in 1996 than
all of Russia's citizens combined. His first heart rumble was alleged to
have taken place in 1987 after he was dismissed from the Central Committee.
Subsequent heart problems plagued him in 1990, twice in 1991, 1993, and a
burst of vein-popping activity swelled from late 1995 up until his
triple-bypass in 1996. In the past few years alone, Yeltsin's inhuman body
has undergone nose surgery, double-pneumonia, liver damage due to his
famous drinking habit, respiratory infections, bronchitis, "unstable blood
pressure," an acute stomach ulcer, and something called "asthenia," which
basically means dying without ever actually being dead. He has also
reportedly suffered at least one stroke, has Parkinson's and Alzheimer's,
plus he had a few fingers blown off of his hand when he was a kid. He will
bury us all. 
ADDITIONAL IRRITANT: Reporters who describe Yeltsin as looking "puffy and
pale" 
POSTAL RAGE FACTOR: 1.42

12. CHECHEN TERRORISTS BLEW UP THOSE APARTMENT BUILDINGS
Logical-minded people around the world simultaneously sneered "Tchya!" when
Boris Yeltsin, without any evidence whatsoever, blamed two bombings of
Moscow apartment buildings on Chechen terrorists. "The criminals have
thrown down a sinister challenge," Yeltsin said in a televised address
following a blast on September 13. "They are trying to demoralize the
authorities, to act covertly like wild beasts who sneak out at night to
kill sleeping people without acknowledging their responsibility." New Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin added: "It is difficult even to call them animals.
If they are animals, then they are rabid." Left unanswered by Putin,
Yeltsin, emergencies Minister Sergei Shoigu and other Kremlin heavies
fingering the Chechens, were the following questions: If the Chechens did
it, why didn't they claim responsibility (they always had before)? Why
would the Chechens set off bombs before the Russians invaded Chechnya
proper and then not do so (as it subsequently turned out) afterwards, when
such attacks might have helped take the wind out of the Russian war effort?
What was Shamil Basayev doing meeting with Kremlin chief of Staff Alexander
Voloshin in Paris two weeks before the bombings? Why would the Chechens
kill ordinary Russians instead of blowing up a government building or an
object of military importance? In any case, the bombings gave the Kremlin
the excuse it needed to launch a popular war that eventually resulted in a
de facto victory for pro-government parties in the State Duma elections. In
fact, the whole course of Russian politics for the next several years was
altered enormously on the basis of this one extremely transparent lie--that
the Chechens were guilty of doing exactly what Boris Yeltsin needed them to
do to stay in power.
ADDITIONAL IRRITANT: A Moskovsky Komsomolets article that hit the
newsstands just hours before the second bombing on September 13 cited
intelligence sources claiming that the first bombing had been the work of
Russian secret services, and that a second big one was on the way.
POSTAL RAMPAGE FACTOR: 2.72, or about as high as a lie told by the Russian
government can still register 

8. THE BoNY MONEY LAUNDERING SCANDAL WAS A CASE OF A CLIQUE OF
RUSSIAN-JEWISH IMMIGRANTS ABUSING AN UNSUSPECTING, NAIVE AMERICAN BANK
When The New York Times first broke the money-laundering scandal, Natasha
Gurfinkel, Peter Berlin, and Lucy Edwards were seen merely as extras as law
enforcement agencies spoke of corruption at the highest levels of
international politics and commerce. The eXile reported on how one of the
central figures, BoNY-Geneva banker Bruce Rappaport, had been named by a
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee report as having been a likely CIA
bagman during the Iran-Contra scandal and a known golfing buddy of former
CIA director Bill Casey. Anyone who has done business in Russia knows that
BoNY, which mysteriously managed to secure a near-monopoly on wire
transfers and ADR issuance in Russia, was hardly blind to the nature of
"business," "asset-allocation," and the like in Russia. In September,
Interpol's British Secretary General, Raymond Kendall, said during a visit
to Geneva, "In dimension terms, it is the biggest affair we have seen up to
now... you seem to be dealing with corruption taking place at such high
levels, that the normal ways of cooperation you'd use are not necessarily
the valid ones." Everyone from Anatoly Chubais to Boris Yeltsin to Michel
Camdessus have been fingered in the scandal... and then, strangely enough,
like something out of Stalinist revisionism, all of the important players,
from BoNY Chairman Thomas Renyi (who claimed, incredibly, to have been
duped) to Chubais to Rappaport, were airbrushed out of the media's reports,
and all that remained were a few harmless indictments against Edwards,
Berlin, Svetlana Kudryatsev, and Alexei Volkov. The Times even ran an
incredible smear piece detailing allegations that two of the accused had
each been busted once for shoplifting, implying that shoplifting nose drops
is the first step in "duping" one of the world's top banks and a host of
political and law enforcement agencies into siphoning billions of dollars
out of Russia. Today, the issue is dead.
ADDITIONAL IRRITANT FACTOR: Nearly every New York Times article about the
scandal carefully described BoNY as "a conservative institution founded by
Alexander Hamilton." 
POSTAL RAGE FACTOR: 6.48 and falling as defeatism sets in

4. ELECTIONS ARE DEMOCRACY
The major premise underpinning cheery Western assessments of emerging
democracies is that so long as elections are being held, those nations are
bound to become more democratic over time. Nothing supports this
dopamine-drenched premise, unless you filter out all of recorded history
prior to the past thirty years' experience in Western Europe--which is
precisely what most Western journalists, analysts, and politicians do.
Already in America, voters have almost no say in running their government
except the right to add their grain of sand to the weight-scales contest
between two nearly identical tools. Voters rarely get to directly vote on
laws, except in ballot issues like the massive 1978 Proposition 13 tax cut,
term limits, auto insurance rate caps, and so on. Over the past decade,
however, the federal government has stomped on voter-approved issues,
overturning legalized medical marijuana initiatives, barring a
voter-approved law to slash benefits for illegal alien and bilingualism,
and most recently, federal courts overturned voter-approved initiatives to
limit bank fees on ATM transactions almost the day after they were voted
on. None of this has shaken Americans' cattle-like faith in elections. Not
like the Bulgarians and Albanians, both of whose citizens revolted and
overthrew their democratically elected leaders two years ago after they
lost faith in them. Most of the former Soviet republics hold elections, but
even by the very forgiving standards applied by OSCE to EU-friendly,
resource-rich countries, elections have ranged from the hugely flawed
(Russia, Ukraine) to the outright sham (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan). Furthermore, most countries of the former Soviet Union,
Russia included, have been steadily regressing from promising early
parliamentary elections in 1989-91 to today's pornographic electoral
manipulations. Back in 1995, the Russian State Duma and Ukrainian
presidential elections were not nearly as tainted as this year's. But since
the West values the act of elections over their intended result--which is
to close the gap between ruler and ruled and legitimize the rulers--the
ruling oligarchy rightly decided that they would offer up elections just
"free and fair" enough to allow the West to give its blessing. If there was
one great lesson in the recent Duma campaign, it is that democratically
elected leaders can produce effective propaganda on a par with totalitarian
leaders, achieving even better results--the appearance of legitimacy from
abroad. Amazingly enough, no U.S. observers of the Russian elections were
jolted into a moments' self-reflection as to the degree to which American
opinion has been manipulated and controlled. The lesson of the 1990s is
that elections are an increasingly flawed instrument for applying
democracy, and if anything, they've become the Trojan Horses for
increasingly sophisticated/subtle forms of totalitarian control. 
ADDITIONAL IRRITANT: The United States has only agreed to a partial lifting
of sanctions against Yugoslavia if Milosevic holds free and fair early
elections, the results of which the have already been determined by
Madeline Albright: "I find it really, really, really hard to believe that
Milosevic might win a free and fair election," she said. The normally
cautious New York Times explained, "Senior American officials said that if
an election was not free and fair -- essentially, one that the Milosevic
coalition won -- then the sanctions would not be lifted." But according to
the same article, reliable polls show that Milosevic WOULD win an early
free and fair election hands-down. Even the Clinton people don't respect
elections, because they know that Milosevic, so long as he's in power, can
engage in Putin-like manipulations of public opinion without ever having to
resort to stuffing ballot boxes or bumping off opponents.
ELECTION POLLING STATION SELF-IMMOLATION FACTOR: 9.38

tel/fax: 151-4688/6819
Krasnoarmeyskaya ul., 27
www.exile.ru

*******


Web page for CDI Russia Weekly:
http://www.cdi.org/russia