January 8, 2000    
This Date's Issues: 4019 4020

Johnson's Russia List
#4020
8 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AFP: Putin was expelled from West Germany for espionage: report.
2. AP: Anna Dolgov, Troops: Russia Understating Deaths.
3. BBC MONITORING: RUSSIAN EX-MINISTER PREDICTS LONG WAR IN CHECHNYA (Anatoliy Kulikov)
4. Jonathan Weiler: Russia and IMF.
5. Financial Times (UK): John Thornhill, Putin puts faith in Christian ideals.
6. World Socialist Web Site: Peter Schwarz, The transfer of power in Moscow: what it means for Russia's political trajectory.
7. BBC MONITORING: RUSSIAN COMMUNIST LEADER BELIEVES MALPRACTICE ROBBED HIS PARTY OF VOTES. (Interview with Zyuganov on Ekho Moskvy radio)
8. Gideon Remez: Putin's article (Re: Prof. Malia's article/4013.]

*******

#1
Putin was expelled from West Germany for espionage: report

BERLIN, Jan 8 (AFP) - 
Russia's interim president, Vladimir Putin, was expelled from West Germany at 
the end of the 1970s for suspected espionage, the German newspaper 
Saechsische Zeitung claimed Saturday.

Quoting German intelligence sources, the report said Putin had arrived in 
Bonn in 1975 officially as a correspondent of TASS, the official Soviet news 
agency.

Meanwhile, an official dealing with archives on former East Germany said the 
communist East German government had decorated Putin in 1988 for services as 
a KGB agent. 

Johann Legner, spokesman of the Gauck Commission, a special panel 
investigating East German secret police files, confirmed reports that Putin 
had been decorated for his KGB work in the East German city of Dresden.

Der Spiegel magazine also reported Saturday that spies once recruited by 
Putin while a KGB agent could still be in the West providing information for 
Moscow.

Der Spiegel said KGB activities in Dresden had consisted mainly in recruiting 
West German businessmen and East Germans hoping to emigrate, and using them 
as plants in the West.

The magazine quoted German counter-intelligence sources as saying they were 
convinced some of the agents were still providing Moscow with information.

A spokeswoman of Germany's Federal Intelligence Service, (BND) said this week 
that Putin had been resident mainly in Dresden between 1984 and 1990 where he 
had occupied an "important post in the external services of the KGB."

"It's very difficult to say exactly what he did," the official said.

Another German magazine, Focus, quoted former East German security minister 
Erich Mielke, head of the Stasi, as saying the decoration given to Putin had 
been "in recognition of considerable services to the ministry."

However Der Spiegel reported that Putin had only received a bronze medal from 
the East Germans as a "typical representative of second-rank agents."

Johann Legner of the Gauck Commission said the medal award to Putin "was not 
entirely routine, but it does not indicate that Mr. Putin was involved in any 
exceptional activities."

Extracts from Monday's editions of Der Spiegel and Focus were made available 
in advance.

*******

#2
Troops: Russia Understating Deaths
January 8, 2000
By ANNA DOLGOV

SLEPTSOVSKAYA, Russia (AP) - Russian soldiers said Saturday that the military 
is understating casualties in Chechnya, hushing up the deaths of scores of 
men to avoid a public backlash against the increasingly bloody war. 

In a series of interviews, Russian soldiers in Chechnya and the adjoining 
region of Ingushetia claimed their units had suffered numerous casualties 
that have not been reported. It was not possible to obtain overall figures, 
but soldiers in some units said more than half the men in their detachments 
had been killed or wounded in recent weeks. 

At the Kavkaz checkpoint near Sleptsovskaya, Interior Ministry soldiers said 
Saturday that they see trucks coming from Chechnya every day with dead and 
wounded personnel despite official claims of very few casualties. 

``They would announce that two or three people have been killed, but the 
actual number is two or three times higher,'' said one of the soldiers at the 
checkpoint, who identified himself only by his first name, Sergei. 

``We can see that because all the corpses go through us.'' 

Ever since its Chechen offensive began in September, the military has 
stressed that casualties have been low, hoping to avoid public opposition of 
the kind provoked by heavy Russian losses in the 1994-96 Chechen war. The 
military's strategy is based on heavy air and artillery bombardment of rebel 
positions, followed by mopping-up operations. 

The most recent official casualty figures, released Thursday, say 465 Defense 
and Interior Ministry troops have been killed and 1,583 have been wounded in 
Chechnya since fighting began in September. The numbers do not include any 
figures for soldiers missing in action or those whose bodies are too badly 
disfigured to allow identification. 

Independent analysts and soldiers' rights groups have disputed the numbers 
for months, saying the toll is much higher. Accounts by soldiers on the 
ground support the claims. 

Of the 115 men who have been guarding a stretch of road in the Grozny 
neighborhood of Chernorechye since September, only 58 are left. Some were 
wounded, but most were killed, members of the unit said. 

``The company is gone already. And they (the military) keep saying there are 
no casualties,'' said Pyotr, a young conscript who refused to give his last 
name. He said that another 115-strong company was stationed nearby on Dec. 
11, and that only 17 men were left when it was redeployed on Jan. 2. 

Russian troops faced little resistance as they took control of Chechnya's 
lowlands in the autumn, but they have been stalled in their two-week push to 
seize Grozny and penetrate into the rebel-held southern mountains. 

The Grozny area was mostly quiet Saturday, one day after Russian commanders 
declared that the bombardment of the shattered capital would be reduced. 
Weather also appeared to be a factor in the letup in air and artillery raids, 
with the capital shrouded in heavy fog. 

The military command said the pause in bombardment was announced in part to 
allow thousands of civilians who have been trapped in Grozny to escape. 
However, no large movements of civilians were reported Saturday. 

The military may be using the lull to prepare for a major new drive to take 
Grozny, although Russian commanders refused to say anything about their 
plans. 

There was scattered fighting outside Grozny on Saturday, with the military 
claiming it had trapped a group of rebels near the town of Argun, nine miles 
east of Grozny, and surrounded more rebels in the southern rebel stronghold 
of Vedeno. 

The military said 40 militants had been killed in airstrikes on rebel bases, 
and that only one Russian soldier was killed in the fighting, the ITAR-Tass 
news agency reported. 

More clashes were reported in Russian-controlled northern Chechnya. A rebel 
band attacked Russian police forces in Gudermes on Friday, wounding one 
policeman, and another clash broke out near the nearby village of Dzhalka, 
police commander Boris Ostankov said. 

The Russian government on Saturday tried to play down its decision to replace 
the two top combat generals in Chechnya. Lt. Gen. Gennady Troshev and Maj. 
Gen. Vladimir Shamanov were returned Friday to the posts they occupied before 
the war, and their deputies took their places. 

Removing combat commanders at the height of the military campaign in Chechnya 
suggested government displeasure with their failure to take Grozny or deal a 
decisive blow against the rebels. 

But acting President Vladimir Putin, emerging from an Orthodox Christmas mass 
Saturday, said the issue was a technical one. 

``Russia doesn't throw away such generals as Troshev and Shamanov. There has 
been no replacement and no replacement has been planned. It is a technical 
question,'' he said, giving no further details. 

Putin, who built much of his political popularity on tough handling of the 
war, is thought to want to wrap up the fighting before presidential elections 
March 26. 

*******

#3
BBC MONITORING
RUSSIAN EX-MINISTER PREDICTS LONG WAR IN CHECHNYA
Source: NTV, Moscow, in Russian 1600 gmt 8 Jan 00

[Correspondent] [Acting President] Vladimir Putin was the only person able to 
explain the unexpected decisions on Chechnya [reported replacement of Russian 
generals in command of the operation]...

The professionals who are experts on the Chechen problem say that all this is 
natural.

[Anatoliy Kulikov, former interior minister and commander of the Russian 
joint task force in Chechnya in 1995] In actual fact, normal work is going 
on. This is military service, combat work. The only thing I would say is 
that, in my opinion, front commanders should not be replaced at the final 
stage of an operation, of course, if we really are at the final stage.

[Correspondent] Meanwhile, Kulikov says that it is too early to speak of 
victory.

[Kulikov] I think that a direct armed confrontation will stop in the 
forthcoming six or eight months. I mean that bullets will not be fired so 
intensively as they are now. As for complete stabilization and peace, more 
than one president will change in Russia and in Chechnya before it takes 
place...

*******

#4
Date: Fri, 07 Jan 2000 
From: Jonathan Weiler <jweiler@bowdoin.edu> 
Subject: Russia and IMF

RFE/RL newsline ran a story on January 4, in which it noted that Russia
had received $640 million in aid from the IMF in 1999, while it paid out
to the IMF $4.4 billion in debt servicing. Can someone out there explain
to me who gets the money that Russia pays to the IMF. Is it the fund
itself? Private banks? Is this gap typical of the post-Soviet era, or was
1999 unique for some reason? Also, why is the discussion of Western aid to
Russia framed in terms of charity, given the above figures? I believe John
Helmer has commented on this issue, but I don't recall seeing it discussed
elsewhere.

Jonathan Weiler
Bowdoin College

*******

#5
Financial Times (UK)
8 January 2000
[for personal use only]
RUSSIA: Putin puts faith in Christian ideals 
By John Thornhill in Moscow

They came and came, crossing themselves as they entered the Cathedral of 
Christ the Saviour, bathed in the soft afternoon sunlight.

Inside, crowds of worshippers prayed in front of candle-lit golden icons, 
marking the Orthodox Christmas in a church which was blown up by Stalin in 
the 1930s, and then rebuilt in the 1990s by Yuri Luzhkov, the city's mayor.

Mikhail Urmanov, a pensioner who was baptised in the Communist era but was 
never able to observe his faith openly during those times, said it was 
wonderful that he and his fellow believers could celebrate the 2,000th 
anniversary of Christ's birth unimpeded by the state.

And he acknowledged the role played by Boris Yeltsin, Russia's first 
post-Soviet president, in helping to secure freedom of conscience after 
decades of religious persecution.

But, like many Russians, Mr Urmanov expressed deep ambivalence about the 
achievements of Mr Yeltsin, who resigned on New Year's Eve.

"What we have gained in heaven, we have lost on earth," Mr Urmanov said. 
"Life in Soviet times was predictable but now I possess only what I am 
standing up in. We have gained a lot under Yeltsin but we have also lost a 
lot."

For the first time since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, a Christmas service 
was held in St Isaac's Cathedral, in the Tsarist capital of St Petersburg, 
which was converted into a museum of religion and atheism in Soviet times.

Hundreds of other churches, which were expropriated by the Communists, are 
being steadily reclaimed for their original purpose.

The worshippers at the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow said they 
were not worried that religious freedoms would be threatened in Russia - even 
though the country is now run by Vladimir Putin, a former officer in the KGB, 
which played the central role in suppressing religion under Communism.

Times change and so do individuals' consciences, they said.

In his first statement as acting president on New Year's Eve, Mr Putin 
emphasised he would uphold all democratic freedoms, including the freedom of 
conscience.

And, before attending a church service on Friday, Mr Putin reinforced that 
message saying the Orthodox Church could help mould a new sense of Russian 
nationhood.

Mr Putin said the ideals of Christianity "will allow us to strengthen mutual 
understanding and concord within our society and will support the spiritual 
and moral revival of the Fatherland".

*******

#6
World Socialist Web Site
www.wsws.org
The transfer of power in Moscow: what it means for Russia's political 
trajectory
By Peter Schwarz
8 January 2000

What does Putin stand for? This is the question that has dominated newspaper 
columns since the surprise resignation of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, 
who transferred power to his self-appointed successor Vladimir Putin on New 
Year's Eve.

Although Putin has led the government for the past five months, his political 
aims and intentions remain generally unknown. It is known merely that he 
obtained his professional and political training in the ranks of the Soviet 
secret service, the KGB; that he unconditionally supported President Yeltsin 
when the latter held the reins of power and that, upon being appointed prime 
minister, he waged a ruthless campaign against the civilian population of 
Chechnya in the course of the current war.

Putin was born in 1952 in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), studied law and 
immediately after completing his studies (1975) began working for the KGB. He 
was a leading member of the KGB's foreign department, working in East 
Germany, where he was stationed in Dresden for over 10 years. The exact 
character of his work as a KGB agent occupies an unfilled place in his 
biography.

Putin first made himself known on the political stage in the turbulent years 
of 1990-91, as a follower of the radical capitalist market “reformers” 
Anatoli Sobchak and Anatoli Chubais. He worked as an advisor and eventually 
as a deputy to Sobchak, the mayor of St. Petersburg. Although he remained in 
the background and was infrequently seen in public, Putin was regarded as an 
"eminence grise" in the city administration. At that time St. Petersburg had 
acquired a reputation as a city of corruption and scandal, where contract 
killings were a normal component of business life.

In 1996 Chubais brought Putin to Moscow to join the administration in the 
Kremlin. Within a short period of time he had risen to the rank of deputy of 
the Kremlin staff. In 1998 Yeltsin appointed him head of domestic 
intelligence forces, the FSB (successor to the KGB), and in March 1999 Putin 
was appointed secretary of the National Security Council.

In these posts Putin acted to protect Yeltsin against a plague of scandals. 
One incident was especially notorious. State Attorney Yuri Skuratov dared to 
undertake an investigation into the financial practices of the Yeltsin family 
and their principal backer, Boris Beresovski. The FSB came up with a video 
showing Skuratov in an incriminating situation with prostitutes. The case was 
wrapped up and Skuratov was forced out.

Against this background the change in office at the Kremlin appears to be a 
clever move on the part of Yeltsin to secure for five more years the 
influence and privileges of his family and his entourage, made up of 
extremely rich oligarchs. As a result of Yeltsin's resignation, elections for 
the presidency, planned for June, will be held three months earlier on March 
26.

At this point in time an election victory for Putin is regarded as assured, 
all the more so under conditions where he can use the advantages arising from 
his post as acting president. The German Suddeutsche Zeitung likened the 
transfer of power in Moscow to "establishing a line of succession in the 
manner of the tsars".

The first official act of Putin as president supports such an interpretation. 
He signed a decree guaranteeing Yeltsin life-long freedom from prosecution 
and granted him a number of material privileges.

Nevertheless, following Yeltsin's withdrawal from the political stage, the 
question remains: what does Putin himself stand for? Is the change of 
presidency merely a change of figures, or is it bound up with the 
introduction of a new political line?

A preliminary answer is provided by a paper which appeared on the 
government's web site under Putin's name. One theme runs like a red thread 
through the paper: the call for a strong, authoritarian state.

Putin begins by drawing a devastating balance sheet of economic development 
under his predecessor. In the course of the 1990s Russian Gross Domestic 
Product nearly halved, Gross National Product stands at one-tenth of the 
equivalent American figure and one-fifth of the Chinese total. With the 
exception of raw materials and the energy sector, productivity in Russia is 
20 to 24 percent of America's.

Equipment and machinery, vital to the quality of production, are hopelessly 
outdated. Just 5 percent of current Russian machinery is less than five years 
old, compared with 29 percent 10 years ago. The total amount of direct 
investment from abroad totals $11.5 billion, compared to $43 billion for 
China. There is almost no investment in Russian research and development.

Real incomes have sunk continuously since the start of pro-capitalist 
reforms. The entire monetary income of the population is less than 10 percent 
of the comparable American total. Health and average life expectancy have 
declined in an equally dramatic manner.

Although the figures cited by Putin are all drawn from the so-called reform 
period, i.e., since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, he describes the 
current economic and social situation in the country as "the price which we 
have to pay for the economy we inherited from the Soviet Union". He concedes 
that, due to miscalculations and inexperience, errors were made in the reform 
period. He concludes, however, that there is "no alternative" to market 
economy reform.

He rejects any nostalgia with regard to the former Soviet Union, speaking of 
"the outrageous price our country and its people had to pay for that 
Bolshevist experiment". He calls Soviet "communism" a blind alley, "remote 
from the mainstream of civilisation".

On this basis, Putin argues for a correction of the current economic and 
political course. Russia, he writes, has exceeded its "limit for political 
and socio-economic upheavals, cataclysms and radical reforms." He continues: 
"Our people and our country will not withstand a new radical break-up, be it 
under communist, national-patriotic or radical-liberal slogans". What is 
needed are "evolutionary, gradual and prudent methods".

According to Putin, the experience of the 1990s vividly demonstrates "that 
the genuine renewal of our country cannot be assured by a mere 
experimentation in Russian conditions with abstract models and schemes taken 
from foreign textbooks." Russia "has to search for its own way to renewal 
... combining the universal principles of a market economy and democracy with 
Russian realities".

What this means in concrete terms is made clear on the following pages. 
Putin's outlook is that of a power-monger from the intelligence service for 
whom the greatest abomination is any genuine democratic strivings on the part 
of the broad masses. The two most important prerequisites for his aim of 
implementing a liberal economic programme are a powerful state and a strong 
and highly nationalist ideology.

Very much in the style of a budding Bonaparte, he complains that, at the 
moment, far too much energy is wasted in "political squabbling ... instead of 
tackling the concrete tasks of Russia's renewal".

He invokes "traditional Russian values" as the basis for "the unity of 
Russian society". Included amongst such values are "patriotism", "belief in 
the greatness of Russia, "a strong state" and "social solidarity". On the 
need for a strong state, he writes: "For Russians a strong state is not an 
anomaly which should be gotten rid of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a 
source and guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving force of any 
change".

The next chapter bears the headline "Strong State". Again it emphasises, 
"Russia needs a strong state power and must have it."

The paper concludes with a chapter entitled "Efficient Economy", which pays 
homage to the traditional postulates of economic liberalism: an improved 
climate for foreign investment, a more effective tax and finance system, 
integration of the Russian economy into world economy. Above all, however, 
the chapter calls for the active intervention of the state in economic 
affairs. Russia, the paper declares, "needs to form a wholesome system of 
state regulation of the economy and social sphere".

When one considers Putin's rise in light of this paper, it becomes clear that 
what has taken place following Yeltsin's resignation is not just a change of 
faces. Yeltsin's task, at least in his early years in office, consisted in 
dismantling the state institutions inherited from the Soviet Union and making 
possible the rape of society and economy which has gone down in history as 
"privatisation". This was the purpose of the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in December 1991 as well as the bombardment of the Russian parliament in 
October 1993.

The unparalleled economic and social decline which followed, together with 
the aggressive advances of the US and NATO into the former Eastern block 
countries and to the south of the Soviet Union, now threatens the basis of 
the Russian Federation itself. Once again powerful state institutions are 
necessary in order to defend the interests of the new ruling clique both at 
home and abroad.

It is noteworthy that in his paper Putin continually refers not only to 
America, but also to China. The Stalinist bureaucracy in China has taken the 
path of capitalist restoration with as much determination as the 
ex-Stalinists of the Kremlin. But China has maintained its old repressive 
state apparatus, including its Communist Party, army and secret police, and 
has encountered fewer problems than Russia. Putin's paper indicates an 
accommodation on the part of Moscow to the "Chinese way".

The general orientation outlined by Putin sheds light on the war in Chechnya, 
which first opened the way for Putin's precipitous rise to prominence. In 
terms of foreign policy, the war serves to make clear the claims on the part 
of the Russian ruling clique to the Caucasus and the Caspian regions which 
have increasingly been subject to western influence. Domestically, the war 
serves as a lever for propagating the patriotism necessary for the 
construction of Putin's strong state. The enormous brutality with which the 
Russian army has proceeded against the local population in Chechnya is just a 
foretaste of what awaits all those who object to Putin's recipe for national 
unity or protests against the social devastation inside Russia itself.

Nevertheless, the war has not been won. Large-scale losses by the Russians, 
or a military defeat such as that experienced by Russia in the first Chechnya 
war, could lead to a very dramatic decline in Putin's popularity.

In the Frankfurter Rundschau Karl Grobe described Putin as "the personified 
expression of the transfer of power to the military-secret police complex and 
its unification with the predatory oligarchy". This is a fitting 
characterisation.

Nevertheless, one should not loose sight of the fact that this transfer of 
power has taken place against a background of profound social crisis and 
growing dissatisfaction on the part of broad masses. Up until now this 
dissatisfaction has failed to take a politically articulate form. This has 
made it possible for Putin to temporarily cloak his plans for a stronger 
state with pseudo-democratic phrases. But that will change to the extent that 
open class confrontations develop.

Generally, Western governments have expressed the wish for close 
collaboration and good relations with Putin. Up until now none of them has 
expressed objections to his domestic plans. Only a few individual voices have 
warned that Putin could prove to be a more difficult negotiating partner than 
his predecessor.

******

#7
BBC MONITORING
RUSSIAN COMMUNIST LEADER BELIEVES MALPRACTICE ROBBED HIS PARTY OF VOTES
Source: Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in Russian 1235 gmt 7 Jan 00

At least 7 per cent of votes have been "stolen" from the Communist party 
during Russia's recent parliamentary elections, communist leader Gennadiy 
Zyuganov told Ekho Moskvy radio. He said presidential ratings were forged and 
predicted the forthcoming election would go into a second round. He said he 
would stand for president and outlined his own campaign. Text of his 
interview for Russian Ekho Moskvy radio on 7th January follows. Subheadings 
have been inserted editorially.

[Aleksandr Klimov] Let me welcome our guest today, Gennadiy Andreyevich 
Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Hello. 
Happy New Year, Happy Christmas and best wishes to you in person on the start 
of your election campaign.

[Zyuganov] Hello. I would also like to wish all your listeners a Happy 
Christmas, a Happy New Year and to wish them health, success and good luck.

[Q] And so, to the elections. We've only had a short breathing-space. The 
election campaign has virtually begun and we already know the first names: 
apart from Vladimir Putin, they are you, [Kemerovo Region governor] Aman 
Tuleyev, [Chairman of the Trade Union of Communication Workers and leader of 
the Russian Party of the Unemployed] Anatoliy Nazeykin and [leader of 
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. At least 
initiative groups have already made it known that these figures should stand 
as candidates in the early presidential elections. On this score I would like 
to clarify straightaway whether Gennadiy Andreyevich Zyuganov is going to 
stand on behalf of the CPRF or the people's Patriotic Forces of Russia? 
Because, as far as I am aware it was the latter's initiative group that 
nominated you.

Agrees to stand for president as single leader of patriotic alliance

[A] Yes, I was campaigning yesterday in Svetlogorsk in Moscow Region in 
connection with [former Duma speaker Gennadiy] Seleznev's election as head of 
administration and I held a large meeting in Konakovo, I mean our 
representative, (?Buynov) is also standing for head of administration in 
Tver. While I was there, I heard the news that the initiative group had held 
a meeting here and nominated me as candidate for president. This initiative 
group is from the people's patriotic forces of our For Victory movement. The 
meeting included students, veterans, women's movements and the Communist 
Party, representatives of agrarians, industrialist circles, entrepreneurs and 
business people. It is a very broad association. This association drew up all 
the documents, voted yesterday and I agreed to my nomination as the single 
leader of the people's patriotic forces.

I believe that we have every basis for doing this. We have taken part in all 
the elections of recent years, from the Duma elections to the elections of 
heads of administrations and governors and we have won fairly confidently in 
most districts and regions, including in the December [1999] elections. We 
have the full moral and political right to put forward our candidacy. But I 
support the idea of there being not just a candidate from our movement, but a 
team. So I am now consulting everyone: recently I met governors, I had 
meetings with [Yevgeniy] Primakov and [Moscow mayor Yuriy] Luzhkov, and with 
others as well in order to combine the efforts of all state-minded, patriotic 
forces and to go into the elections as a powerful team made up of a candidate 
for president, a candidate for prime minister and candidates for deputy prime 
ministers and key ministers and with a realistic programme.

We have a programme. We have tested it out. This is a programme for revival 
through creation, a programme originated by highly talented, clever 
economists, financiers, industrialists, entrepreneurs and business circles. 
We tested out this programme virtually everywhere during the State Duma 
elections. It gained very broad support as did the 15 urgent measures which 
must be carried out to stabilize the situation in the country, to ensure 
economic revival, the recreation of a normal system of government, the 
organization of control over power and the guaranteeing of a proper life for 
everyone.

[Q] Gennadiy Andreyevich, which congress will confirm your candidature - that 
of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation or of the people's patriotic 
forces?

[A] Our movement - For Victory - comprises over 200 organizations at present. 
There are various organizations, and they all held their meetings and 
consultations, congresses and conferences during the Duma election campaign. 
They discussed our programme and our list and voiced their opinions. We have 
agreed that, in response to the appeal issued by the campaign group 
yesterday, all 89 constituent parts of the Russian Federation will hold 
meetings of representatives of the patriotic forces who will give their 
opinions of our initiative and put forward their proposals and demands to the 
presidential candidate, and the election programme will be formulated 
shortly. I have already held a whole series of meetings earlier today, and 
within the next three or four days there will be a detailed report in which I 
will outline my view of the processes currently taking place in the country 
and discuss how to find a way out of the very difficult situation into which 
it has been dragged by Yeltsin's team, by his entourage.

[Q] I am sure you will, but I don't think I understand what movement is 
nominating you.

[A] For Victory, which is an alliance of people's patriotic forces, all major 
parties, organizations and movements. It comprises representatives of a 
movement of doctors, the [Russian surgeon] Pirogov Congress, representatives 
of the artistic elite, creative workers, the Union of Writers, the Union of 
Composers and many businessmen.

[Q] I see. The CPRF will not hold a congress, then?

[A] Oh yes, it will. The congress is most likely to take place on the 15th. 
We shall have a plenary session on the 14th, and then on the 15th-

[Q] Of January?

[A] Yes, January. The third stage of the congress will take place on 15th 
January. We did not end our congress because of the serious situation in the 
country. We held our congress during the Duma election campaign, and we did 
not end that congress. The congress can be legally held on any day, and it 
will not take too long to convene it.

[Q] The CPRF will not confine itself to a congress?

[A] No, incidentally, it is not just the congress of the CPRF-

[Q] I am interested in your spectrum .

[A] A broad alliance of patriotic forces.

[Q] Is anything known or surmised about your election headquarters and the 
identity of the person who is going to be in charge?

[A] We have not dissolved our headquarters following the elections. We regard 
the presidential elections as a two-stage process, consisting of the 
elections to the State Duma and, subsequently the presidential elections. Way 
back in October I told a news conference that presidential elections would be 
held either at the end of March or at the beginning of April.

On the eve of the new year, two weeks before the new year, whilst summing up 
the results, and all journalists attended the news conference, I re-affirmed 
this viewpoint again.

That is why all our propaganda and pre-election machinery, all headquarters 
at all levels, all organizational and technical services, all our information 
people have been working without respite.

[Q] Who is going to head your headquarters? Who is heading it now and who is 
going to head it?

Describes his election headquarters

[A] Well, the headquarters consists of several structures. There is a 
screening group which examines all problems. It works on a regular basis of 
two or three meetings a week. There is a supervisory group, in charge of the 
operational work. There are groups active in each party, movement and 
organization. They coordinate their efforts by way of holding a weekly 
council meeting which examines and sums up the results and issues current 
directives.

We have a communications system. Yesterday we passed a decision and today all 
89 Republics, Territories and Regions have a directive, or the headquarters' 
decision on what must be done in the nearest future. It contains a timetable 
of work for the next two weeks.

[Q] You said you were already holding consultations with other parties and 
movements. The surname of [Moscow mayor Yuriy] Luzhkov was mentioned. Do you 
count on Luzhkov's support during the presidential elections?

[A] We are serious people and our view is that in the current situation, at 
the end of a decade of unparalleled plunder and destruction of the country, 
all who hold peace in our superpower state dear, all who would like to 
extricate our country from its difficult condition in a peaceful and 
democratic way ought to hold urgent consultations. That is why I actively 
carry out consultations with everyone, starting with our allies and ending 
with everyone who currently has prestige and influence in the Russian 
Federation.

I have held consultations and meetings with the prime minister, Luzhkov, 
[former Prime Minister Yevgeniy] Primakov, [Chairman of the Federation 
Council Yegor] Stroyev, heads of administrations, governors, leaders of all 
parties and movements. Their views on most questions are quite clear to me 
now.

[Q] Does this mean that their position and your position are on the same 
platform, that you can and are entitled to count on their support?

[A] No, it does not mean that, but I stated bluntly during my meeting with 
[acting Russian President Vladimir] Putin that we have had a policy of 
confrontation for 10 years now. The country was raped thrice. Instead of 
reforms, unheard of destruction, maraudery, thievery, drunkenness, drug 
addiction and humiliation were foisted on it. This epoch must recede into 
history.

There are two options now. One option is to formulate eight or 10 key and 
fundamental principles which could underpin the country's restoration. We 
will then have a normal dialogue among various political forces, instead of 
confrontation imposed by Yeltsin and his entire closest retinue. We will then 
have a normal information policy, instead of the ugly and dirty brawl and, 
forgive me for saying this, the filth organized by two TV channels in the 
course of the elections to the State Duma, which have stolen from the country 
its opportunity normally to discuss the problems of great concern to the 
citizens.

[A] We took a very tough stance as far as this question is concerned because 
if this point of view is to prevail during the presidential elections, then 
there will be no normal life or normal work in the country.

[Q] Very briefly, one last question before the news. Do you predict one round 
or two?

[A] I think there will be two rounds in these elections. All these forged 
ratings are nothing else, but a myth. If you analyse things carefully -

[Q] Excuse me, are you talking about Putin?

Complains skulduggery robbed his party of votes

[A] I am talking about everyone. By the way, if you look at the [Duma] 
elections forecasts, only our party's results were as predicted, but even so, 
I believe that at least 5-7 per cent [of votes] were stolen from us. We sent 
someone for two days to Dagestan to investigate, accompanied by two 
bodyguards, and he brought back 130,000 votes which were then added to our 
results. We must send someone to Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Samara, Saratov 
and Kursk, and I think they will bring back at least another 800,000 or even 
1m votes. As far as other parties' ratings are concerned, they were all 
wrong, they fell through. We had our own service which gave a realistic 
rating, and our experts made fewer mistakes than others.

[Q] We talked about the forthcoming presidential elections before the news. 
This was prompted by the fact that a campaign group has nominated Gennadiy 
Zyuganov as a candidate for the post of president.

[A] I was nominated by the movement of people's patriotic forces and by now 
you must know this by heart.

[Q] Yes, okay, although I am still not clear which movement's congress will 
approve your candidature [laughs]

[A] I This is a campaign group, and then I will be supported by congresses of 
organizations and movements, by constituent parts and so forth.

[Q] Let's talk about current problems. Today is the last day when it is 
allowed to talk about the second round of the gubernatorial elections in 
Moscow Region. As is known, one of the hopefuls who will stay in the second 
round is Gennadiy Seleznev.

Praises communist candidate for post of Moscow Region governor

[A] I personally visited 17 Districts in Moscow Region. I know the area very 
well, I have been working with the Region for many years. It is one of the 
largest Regions, the leading one. It has over 7m people. It has at least 28 
research centres. The economy is quite well-developed. Forgive me for saying 
so, but [former Moscow Region governor Anatoliy] Tyazhlov is only half-educ, 
I mean he has left half of the Region to its own devices and that is why the 
results of voting for him are obvious. As far Tyazhlov's rival [former Soviet 
commander in Afghanistan Col-Gen Boris] Gromov is concerned, the military are 
not good at civilian work. I respect the military greatly, but they cannot 
cope. Neither [Kursk Regional governor Aleksandr] Rutskoy, nor [Krasnoyarsk 
Territory governor Aleksandr] Lebed, or for instance take this conflict in 
Karachay-Cherkessia.

[Q] Can politicians cope with managerial work, then?

[A] What do you mean politicians? Gennadiy [Seleznev] managed several big 
teams, with major industrial units, involving production, and politics and 
management. It is the person's outlook and his skills to unite people to 
tackle major common problems that matter. Seleznev has served for four years 
in a very difficult State Duma where he managed to organize the work in a 
very efficient way that enabled the Duma to pass many important, timely and 
useful laws. It is another matter that the executive power is not willing to 
abide by these laws. I am convinced that Seleznev's prospects are good. I 
personally held meetings, and I am pleased that workers, peasants, the 
intelligentsia, teachers, scientists and heads of administrations are all in 
favour of Seleznev. This is real.

[Q] What can you say about rumours that Seleznev is allegedly the Kremlin's 
man?

[A] This is nonsense. This is rubbish. The matter is not in Seleznev being 
the Kremlin's man. The matter is in the fact that one always has to make his 
choice. In the Great Patriotic War, [Russian poet] Bunin, who was against the 
Communists, spoke in favour of the Soviet power. When White Guard General 
Denikin against whom Stalin fought near Tsaritsyn was approached by Hitler's 
officer suggesting that Denikin should head an army of volunteers, Denikin 
said he would defend the Soviet power together with Stalin against whom he 
fought in the Civil War. Some interests are of top priority. If you want a 
region or a republic to develop in a stable and normal way, you must choose a 
stable politician, a predictable, knowledgeable, experienced and 
well-respected person who is known not only in the Russian Federation, but in 
all the parliaments of the world.

Moscow Region is the Region around the capital. This status and this position 
is very important for it. On the other hand, I am absolutely sure that 
Seleznev will work competently with all Moscow leaders starting from the 
Districts and ending with the mayor's office. I am absolutely sure of this. 
When I heard [former leader of Derzhava movement and an aide to Moscow mayor 
Konstantin] Zatulin and [deputy speaker of the previous Duma Sergey] Baburin 
yesterday trying to frighten people about what would happen-

[Q] On Centre TV?

[A] Yes, but excuse me, I was ashamed to listen to all of that. For the sake 
of some purely short-term political issues they are trying to create 
dissension between the city of Moscow and the surrounding Region. Moscow city 
cannot manage without its surrounding Region. You can go into any workforce 
in Moscow and you will find the 1.5m workers from Moscow Region. Moscow 
Region has provided Moscow with a vast abundance of foodstuffs, raw materials 
and many other things. So let us cooperate to overcome unemployment and not 
look at the colour of anyone's party card.

Describes strength of Communist parliamentary party in new Duma

[Q] Thank you. Here is another question about the third convocation of the 
Duma. Some time has now passed and I think that for some time there has been 
no comment forthcoming from you or other leaders about the distribution of 
forces. Of course, there is the central part of the list, the number of seats 
in it has been determined and there have been consultations with the winners 
in the single-seat constituencies. What is the state of play today and what 
is the current size, the potential size of the CPRF [Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation] faction?

[A] We have 140 people. We obtained one third of the deputies seats in 
single-seat constituencies. Some people said that we would not be able. But 
we won one third. This is our true rating. Thirty-three to thirty-five per 
cent voted for us. Those who voted against us were those who were striving 
for power, the mafia, all the services, whole television and radio channels. 
For a period of two months we were not allowed on the air on the first and 
second channels. But all the same, nothing can be done about that. One must 
proceed on this basis. That is the first thing. Secondly we won one third. 
They will determine-

[Q] You are now speaking about the CPRF?

[A] I am now speaking about the CPRF. We have 140.

[Q] Is that the present number, or is that the final total?

[A] No, 140 of us [Communists] have got in. On top of that, there are 30 or 
40 whom we energetically supported when we did not put forward our own 
candidates.

[Q] Have they already agreed?

[A] Well, at least we are working with them. They are very attentively 
looking at neighbouring groups. An Agrarians' group will be set up. There are 
many of them among us. Almost 20 people. Many have already come from other 
units. They are interested in reaching an accommodation because the Agrarians 
group is not simply a group it is a whole way of life. It is a special way of 
working on the land and much else.

I expect that three groups will determine in the main the political face of 
the present composition of the Duma. A great deal will depend on their 
accords and consultations. There is a temptation for us. We had a similar 
temptation last time.

We have increased our vote, almost 1.5m more people voted for us, they said 
just old people voted for us. Not at all. People aged from 25 years to 55 
years voted for us, the majority were the most active working section. And 
the majority of veterans stood firm and gave us very active support.

Last time we had the temptation to share with some others and divide all 
seats in the Duma. But I reckoned that this would not work in a stable 
manner. It is very important to take account of various groups and factions 
and to vote in packages. I am a supporter of such an approach today too. But 
there is one special feature.

Today it is people who are right of centre who are in power and in the 
government. The acting prime minister has accumulated great powers. If they 
are tempted to push their man in the Duma then people who represent the 
interests of at best 20-24 per cent will accumulate all the levers of power. 
This will be bad for everyone, for themselves, for the country and for 
coordinated work in the State Duma. This will be an attempt to impose on the 
country one point of view which at present prevails on just a few television 
channels. This will mean the destruction of elementary accord in society. It 
will mean total confrontation. It will mean the absence of elementary 
coordinated normal work in the Duma.

Suggests candidacies for Duma speaker

It seems to me there are some quite clever people there who understand this. 
The Duma should really balance one thing against another. Therefore, 
centre-left people have an opportunity to nominate our own candidate for the 
post of Duma chairman.

[Q] Who?

[A, after a pause] Seleznev was a quite interesting candidate. I am sure that 
Muscovites will back him. He needs to grow and develop. As for our latest 
candidate, we have proposed several candidates. For example, Ivan Ivanovich 
Melnikov, the chairman of the Duma's Committee on Science and Education, a 
well-educated person, a doctor of mathematical sciences, educated at Moscow 
State University. He is also the head of the science and high technologies 
committee in the Council of Europe. When I was talking to European 
parliamentarians, proposing him for the post several years ago, many of them 
were in doubt then and had to think about it. And in the end he received a 
standing ovation and was elected unanimously. I think that Melnikov is a very 
worthy candidate. Some also name [Viktor] Zorkaltsev, a very experienced 
leader, the chairman of the [Duma] Committee on Public Associations and 
Religious Organizations. He has done a lot of work to ensure that several 
important laws protecting citizens' interests have been adopted, laws 
ensuring that people can get back their savings and laws stabilizing the 
political situation. He is quite an experienced person. They also name 
[Sergey] Glazyev, an experienced, strong and educated man. He does not belong 
to any party. Or, for example, there is doctor of economic sciences 
(?Semigin). He is only 35. He does not belong to any party either. They also 
name about five other names. We should discuss them. However, I would like to 
say that in our group, in our movement, there are many capable and talented 
people who can be nominated for the post. Such an individual must be a 
prominent figure, with experience of production. The Duma is a body with 
unique procedures, its own procedures, its own laws and so on. It is very 
important to have a balance of interests in the leadership. Last time they 
proposed that there should be a chairman and one or two deputies. For 
example, if the chairman goes to attend a Security Council meeting, one 
deputy falls ill and the other one receives a delegation - then there is 
no-one in charge. That's why, the chairman should have several deputies, 
preferably from various factions so that interests can be coordinated even 
during the drawing up of the agenda and problems can be resolved quickly. It 
is very important that the distribution of the main committees takes into 
account the Duma's continuity and the professional training of those who will 
head them. If you are an expert in the economy, you can head the economics 
committee.

[Q] Now my last question to you. We have just a minute left. Perhaps, the 
time is not quite right for my question because it is yet again about 
presidential elections. We already know that [Kemerovo Region governor] Aman 
Tuleyev has been nominated. In connection with this we immediately recall the 
previous presidential elections during which Aman Tuleyev withdrew his 
candidacy in your favour almost straightaway. And later they kept telling us 
for quite some time that he was a kind of reserve candidate from the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation. What is the situation at present?

[A] I have decided on my approach to the presidential elections a long time 
ago. It is necessary to have a strong team. The team may absorb any talented 
head of administration, governor or economist-

[Q] Is he going to run on his own or as a reserve candidate?

[A] He has been put forward by his campaign group. I do not yet know whether 
he agreed. I would like to say that no-one will get through on his own, his 
efforts will be in vain and his money will be wasted. And someone else will 
have his votes. Last time, everybody built their own combinations. 
[Krasnoyarsk Region governor Aleksandr] Lebed helped [Boris Yeltsin], who was 
on a drip, by giving him his votes. Everyone knows this today. And [leader of 
the Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir] Zhirinovskiy kept on shouting but did 
the same in the end. And [Yabloko leader Grigoriy] Yavlinskiy, too. The 
present situation is qualitatively different. I am confident that it is 
possible to build a strong and very influential team from among members of 
the people's patriotic forces and take into account the talents and the 
possibilities of every major governor, head of administration, economist, 
manager, professional military man, member of special services and so on. 
Such a team will be able to cope, relying on the wide support of the people 
and its own programme. We have already made our programme public. You can 
have a look at it. We propose to everyone to unite efforts under the banner 
of the people's patriotic union.

[Q] Thank you.

[A] Thank you.

[Q] Best wishes for New Year and the forthcoming election campaign.

[A] First, New Year. Thank you.

*******

#8
Date: Sat, 08 Jan 2000 
From: Gideon Remez <remgin@mail.netvision.net.il> 
Subject: Putin's article (Re: Prof. Malia's article, JRL #4013

Many thanks to Prof. Malia for drawing attention to
www.praviteltsvo.gov.ru, which according to its homepage was established
December 29 -- just in time to have its first item, Putin's manifesto,
on the Web in time for the millenium (or, perhaps, for his accession to
the acting presidency; the article contains a plea for preserving the
present constitution with its strong presidential powers).

The website -- and probably Putin himself -- have helped us cut through
the verbiage of the full document, which includes quite a few cogent
points along with some sections that read like old five-year plans. It
provides, on the homepage, a one-paragraph synopsis which is taken from
the closing statement of the article. The operative sentences of this
paragraph are:

For the first time in the past 200-300 years,
[Russia] is facing a real threat of sliding to the second, and
possibly even third, echelon
of world states. We are running [out] of time
left for removing this threat.
We must strain all intellectual, physical and
moral forces of the nation.

This, then, should be seen as Putin's declared attitude and first
priority, rather than any principles which he proposes as means for
attaining this objective. As Prof. Malia points out, it is a perfectly
legitimate objective for a Russian leader, and there is no reason to
doubt Putin's sincerity in stating it even if he has other motives also;
enough has been written of his own vested interests in the corruption of
the "Family" and other ills which he now proposes to combat. Whether
pursuit of this objective guarantees or even promises reform, democracy
and especially co-operation with the West is a different matter.
I wouldn't hold my breath.

******


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