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CDI Library > Johnson's Russia List
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Johnson's Russia List
#4002
1 January 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Clinton tells Putin ties "off to a good
start''
2. AP: Report: Russia To Conduct Nuke Tests.
4. The Guardian (UK): Jonathan Steele, Boris Yeltsin's
masterstroke - to boldly go. Putin's contrived TV image as a war leader is the
key to this ploy.
5. UPI: Gates: Yeltsin decision prompted by deal from
Putin.
6. Sunday Business (UK): James Hughes, War maketh the New
Man in the Kremlin.
7. Washington Post editorial: Mr. Yeltsin Bows Out.
8. Los Angeles Times editorial: New Era, Cautious Hope.
9. The Times (UK): Douglas Hurd, The dangerous legacy of
a Russian gambler.
10. The Times (UK: Richard Beeston, It could have been
much, much worse.
11. Tom Adshead: A summary of Putin's mission statement.]
******
Clinton tells Putin ties ``off to a good start''
WASHINGTON, Jan 1 (Reuters) - President Bill Clinton told Russia's Acting
President Vladimir Putin in a telephone call on Saturday that U.S.-Russia
relations under Putin's leadership were ``off to a good start,'' the White
House said.
White House spokesman Joe Lockhart told reporters that during a 10-minute
conversation both leaders also acknowledged differences over Chechnya and
other issues.
******
Report: Russia To Conduct Nuke Tests
1 January 2000
MOSCOW (AP) - Russia will conduct a series of sub-critical nuclear tests at
an Arctic testing range this year to check the safety of its nuclear arsenal,
a news report said Saturday.
Russia carries out an average of five sub-critical tests at the Novaya Zemlya
archipelago each year, and will continue the practice in 2000, the ITAR-Tass
news agency reported, citing the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry.
Such tests are not prohibited by the international Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty because the amount of radioactive plutonium used is not enough to
create a nuclear explosion. But critics warn that carrying out even limited
tests could encourage other countries to conduct full-scale nuclear tests.
Weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium are used during the tests, but
there is no discharge of nuclear energy.
The southern tip of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago is located above the Arctic
Circle, 1,178 miles north of Moscow, between the Barents and Kara Seas.
******
Putin Vows to Fight in Chechnya, Hints at Government Changes
Moscow, Jan. 1 (Bloomberg)
-- Vladimir Putin, in his first day as Russia's acting president, turned
to two tasks key to his bid to succeed Boris Yeltsin in the March
presidential election -- the military operation in Chechnya and the
consolidation of his power.
Putin shunned a New Year party in the Kremlin last night to fly to Chechnya
to boost the morale of troops who, according to generals, are losing 10
people a day as they fight Islamic militants in the breakaway republic.
The operation is needed ``not merely for restoration of the country's
prestige and dignity'' but ``to put an end to the breakup of Russia,'' Putin
told soldiers in a speech broadcast on Russian television.
Putin, 47, who assumed the acting presidency after Yeltsin stepped down
yesterday, is currently the country's most popular politician, with a 63
percent approval rating, earned mainly by his so far successful campaign in
Chechnya. Russian troops are now storming Grozny, the republic's capital.
Russia's new leader and his wife toasted the year 2000 in a military
helicopter flying over Chechnya at midnight, Russian news agencies reported.
To win the full presidency, Putin needs to maintain his popularity for the
next three months, not an easy task for a person who is now fully responsible
for presiding over the state, winning the war and running the government,
which he continues to chair.
Putin already indicated the government may be reshuffled.
``Any mechanism, any collective is in the process of constant perfection,''
Putin said, when asked whether he plans any personnel changes in the
government. Changes ``are possible.''
At the same time, Putin moved to reshuffle the presidential administration,
which analysts said has been under influence of some Russian industrialists
and bankers.
Putin reappointed Alexander Voloshin as the president's chief of staff and
appointed his two new deputies, Igor Sechin and Dmitry Medvedev. Until
yesterday, they were deputy heads of staff at the government and reported to
Putin through their immediate supervisor, Russian Internet newspaper Lenta.ru
said.
*****
The Guardian (UK)
1 January 2000
[for personal use only]
Boris Yeltsin's masterstroke - to boldly go
Putin's contrived TV image as a war leader is the key to this ploy
By Jonathan Steele
The bold gesture was always the hallmark of Boris Yeltsin's career, and in
the manner of his leaving Russia's presidency he has struck it once again.
His sudden retirement confounds the diplomatic wisdom. Most western embassies
in Moscow had been arguing that Yeltsin would serve out his time to the last
minute.
Partly to flatter him, and partly to forestall any temptation to cancel the
democratic process, they regularly argued that his great and final
achievement would be to serve out his time until the elections of summer 2000
and hand power peacefully to a successor on the constitutionally appointed
day.
But there was always another option - the "abrupt resignation"
theory. When I
first reported it last September, the date which Kremlin insiders were
hinting at was November 7.
They linked it mischievously to the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.
The aim, then as now, was the same. It would give Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin three months to serve as acting president and build up an image as a
powerful incumbent.
It would require an early presidential election and give opposition
candidates little time to get organised.
In those September days Putin was still an almost unknown figure who had only
just been plucked out of obscurity as Russia's domestic spy chief. So
Yeltsin's closest advisers, the men known as the "family", delayed
the abrupt
resignation while they developed a new card, war in Chechnya.
It was a gamble of enormous proportions, a typical Yeltsin masterstroke,
though this time it has to be assumed he was no longer the lone or leading
player. His frequent collapses in recent weeks show how much he now relies on
a team of cronies to help him.
Building on their tight control of television news and the Russian military's
apparent success in the northern Caucasus, Yeltsin and his allies managed to
launch Putin into orbit as a tough-talking war leader. Last month's Duma
elections showed he could be a powerful vote-winner, able to defeat every
faction except the communists.
Now they have clearly decided to exploit the momentum, secure in the
knowledge that in any head-to-head contest between Putin and the communist
candidate, the Kremlin's man will again have the advantage of television bias
and be sure to win.
Acting president Putin may not even have to issue an amnesty from criminal
sanctions for Yeltsin and his family. Once in power in the Kremlin, Putin
will be able to ensure that the prosecutors never take up any charges of
corruption against Yeltsin. The man who has so often seemed to be nose-diving
towards disaster will be safe again, and this time for ever.
Y eltsin's career has been marked by seven symbolic moments. His dramatic
resignation from the Soviet Communist party as he walked out of its Congress
in July 1990 fatally wounded its already shaky authority. In the glare of
publicity Yeltsin was throwing down the gauntlet and announcing that Mikhail
Gorbachev's hopes of reforming the party were over.
Six months later, as hardliners in the army, the KGB and the party leadership
mounted mini-coups in Latvia and Lithuania to try to block the Baltic
republic's drive for independence, Yeltsin called on Russian troops to mutiny
and flew to the region to show his solidarity with the Baltic leaders.
In August 1991, when the by now desperate hardliners launched a larger coup
in Moscow itself, it was Yeltsin's resistance which turned the tide.
These were moments of great radicalism. Yet, perhaps more than with any other
contemporary world politician, Yeltsin's actions were a mixture of personal
ambition and historic destiny. His primary motive was always his
determination to remove Gorbachev. If that meant destroying the Communist
party and the Soviet Union, so be it. The driving energy was power rather
than principle.
The big prize followed naturally when in December 1991 Yeltsin conspired with
the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus to pronounce the Soviet Union dead.
Gorbachev had no choice but to resign, and Yeltsin was supreme master of the
Kremlin.
Yet, once he was in command, his failings soon became apparent. By
temperament, instinct, and experience Yeltsin was a destroyer, not a builder.
He was a master tactician, but a miserable strategist. He failed the two
biggest tests of a democrat, the ability to compromise with opponents and the
need to take responsibility for decisions.
The three symbolic moments of his time in office were proof of that. In
September 1993 after months of resistance to his economic shock therapy when
the same MPs who had made him executive president now called for a slowdown
in privatisation, the maintenance of some form of regulation of the market,
and protection of the welfare system, Yeltsin broke the constitution and
suspended parliament.
Ten days later he ordered tanks to shell them out of the building. In August
1998 when his young prime minister's market mismanagement led to the rouble's
collapse and a default on Russia's debts, Yeltsin failed to take the blame.
He simply disappeared.
Now, finally, in his choice of early resignation the burly bruiser has shown
his spots again. His retirement is not an actual violation of the
constitution but it is a way of using it creatively for narrow personal
advantage.
It leaves two ironies. Yeltsin has gone peacefully, but not in peace. It took
a cynically conceived and brutally conducted war to create the platform for
him to feel safe enough to go. And he is not the first Russian in history to
hand power in calmness and dignity to a successor, since Gorbachev already
did that in December 1991.
Historians will long debate which of the two men did most to change Russia
over the past 15 years. Politically, the big strides towards a multi-party
system and the democratic freedoms came under Gorbachev. Yeltsin prodded and
provoked to make them faster, but Gorbachev was the one who did the lion's
share.
Economically, it was Yeltsin who made the biggest changes. But the sorry part
of Yeltsin's legacy is that so many Russians feel he took the fast and
corruptly low road to the market instead of finding the gradualism and
sensitivity which Russia in this now dead century has, sadly, never had.
*******
Gates: Yeltsin decision prompted by deal from Putin
By LEE MICHAEL KATZ, UPI International Editor
WASHINGTON, Dec. 31 (UPI) -- Russian president Boris Yeltsin's decision to
step down on Friday was prompted at least in part by a deal with his
hand-picked successor Vladimir Putin that protects him against prosecution
for corruption, according to ex-CIA Director Robert Gates.
Gates told United Press International that a significant factor in
Yeltsin's surprise decision to leave office six months before his term ends
is a belief that his former Prime Minister Putin would provide political
"protection" for both Yeltsin and his family from any legal
prosecution on
corruption charges. Putin on Friday issued a decree that appears to grant
Yeltsin blanket immunity against "criminal" and
"administrative" charges.
Although Yeltsin has long been plagued by health problems and declining
political popularity, Gates cited the Russian president's fear that
"somebody could send him to jail" as a reason for his resignation.
Yeltsin's
decision to give up the presidency leaves the politically popular Putin as
the favorite candidate to win the presidency in an election that has now
been moved up to just 90 days away.
"One of the factors is clearly wanting protection from Putin
against
prosecution and not just for him," Gates said in the interview. That
would
include not only Yeltsin, Gates pointed out, but "his family" as
well.
Yeltsin's family has reportedly been linked to probes into
allegations of
malfeasance in the Bank of New York money-laundering scandal. The ongoing
investigation involves charges that up to billions of dollars may have been
illegally spirited out of Russia and laundered through Western banks.
"I think he has been very worried...of possible persecution of
himself and
members of his family for corruption," Gates said.
There has been no legal action that conclusively links Yeltsin to the
scandal.
Both Russian officials and the U.S. Justice Department and F.B.I. are
investigating the Russian money-laundering scandal.
Yeltsin's wife, daughters and a son-in-law have all been cited as
persons
are receiving scrutiny in the probe. And Swiss officials also reportedly
have been investigating charges that Yeltsin and his family could be linked
to the money-laundering scandal.
At least in Russia, Putin's decree was clearly designed to absolve
Yeltsin
of any possible prosecution. The announcement evoked reminiscences of Gerald
Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon after Nixon resigned in the face of the
Watergate scandal, even though Yeltsin was not in any seeming immediate
political danger.
But the specificity of Putin's decree suggests how worried Yeltsin
might
have been about the possibility of prosecution. It also may shed light on
the guarantees that Yeltsin sought before deciding to leave office.
According to the Itar-Tass news agency, buried in the midst of Putin's
decree that offered Yeltsin a pension, country house and car for service to
Russia, the ex-president was given other "guarantees" that would
protect him
from prosecution.
"The former president enjoys the immunity and cannot be
brought to
criminal or administrative responsibility, detained, arrested, searched or
interrogated," Putin's decree said.
The decree even went into legalistic detail about Yeltsin's protection
from
the law.
"The immunity shall be valid for his apartment, office, vehicles,
communication means, documents, baggage and correspondence."
But given the uncertain political atmosphere in Russia, Putin's decree
could be overturned "in a heartbeat" by his successors, Gates said.
"Easy come, easy go," said Gates, who capped a long Central
Intelligence
Agency career by serving as the spy agency's director during the Bush
administration that ended in 1993.
"The law is flexible in Russia," Gates noted, adding that the
Russians
"have certainly a history of going after" deposed leaders.
Russia has only been a formal democracy since the 1991 break-up of the
Soviet Union and the road to democracy has been tinged with allegations of
financial corruption involving government and major Russian businesses and
financial tycoons.
Until Friday, Yeltsin had been Russia's only president under eight
years of
a democratic system. In his farewell address on Friday, he asked Russians
for "forgiveness" for the economic hardships endured in the jarring
attempt
to turn Russia from a communist to a capitalist system.
"Many of our hopes have not come true, because what we thought
would be
easy has turned out to be painfully difficult," Yeltsin declared. "I
ask to
forgive me for not fulfilling some hopes of those people who believed that
we would be able to jump from the gray, stagnating, totalitarian past into a
bright, rich and civilized future in one go."
The pervasiveness of financial corruption in Russia has complicated the
staunch U.S. support of Yeltsin's administration in recent years. Clinton
administration officials have long cited the fact that Yeltsin was Russia's
first and only democratically elected president.
But for President Clinton, the money-laundering issue clearly has
clouded a
U.S.-Russia relationship already strained by foreign policy differences in
recent months. In fact, during his Clinton's first meeting with Russia's
then-Prime Minister Putin in September, Clinton stressed the dangers posed
by the money-laundering scandal.
In that initial meeting, Clinton warned Putin that financial corruption
"could eat the heart out of Russian society."
******
From: "James Hughes" <J.Hughes@lse.ac.uk>
Subject: Putin
Date: Sat, 1 Jan 2000
Dear David,
this opinion piece will appear in Sunday Business (UK) 2 January 2000.
Jim
Sunday Business (UK) 2 January 2000
War maketh the New Man in the Kremlin
James Hughes
Senior Lecturer in Russian Politics
London School of Economics
Russia has just had one khaki election and, following Yeltsin's resignation,
will shortly have a second. For having served barely one hundred and forty
days in the post of prime minister, Russia's fifth in eighteen months,
forty-seven year old Vladimir Putin spent much of that time leading Russia's
bloody war against Chechnya. From what seemed the edge of political oblivion
in september, the Kremlin hastily organised a 'small victorious war' in
Chechnya and in the process used its control of the media to reinvent
Putin's image from that of a dull pen-pushing ex-spy to that of a
war-winning 'hawk'. His popularity among ordinary Russians soared
incrementally with the steady bombing of Chechen villages. The 'Putin
phenomenon' transformed the prospects of Kremlin-backed reformers during the
eight weeks prior to the December parliamentary elections, hauling them to
take second place to the communists, though leaving the Duma, much as
before, finely balanced between pro and anti-Kremlin parties.
Since appointing Putin as prime minister in August Boris Yeltsin has
repeatedly declared him to be his preferred successor as president. At
latest the presidential elections had to be held in June 2000. Yeltsin and
Putin could have carried on until then, consolidating on the political
success in the Duma elections. The consummate tactician to the end, Yeltsin
has timed his resignation to perfection by recognising that the combination
of the unexpectedly good performance of pro-Kremlin right-centrist parties
in the Duma elections with Putin's unprecedented 52% opinion poll rating has
opened a window of opportunity. The presidential elections will now be held
within three months, probably in late March.
Two main factors loom large in the timing of Yeltsin's resignation. The
first is the war in Chechnya. By copying the NATO tactics of wholescale
distance bombing demonstrated in Iraq and Kosovo Russia has had a large
measure of success so far. Chechnya has been depopulated, pillaged and
reduced to rubble, Chechen soldiers have been pushed back into the mountains
in the south and Grozny has been beseiged, all with a minimum of Russian
casualties. With the worst of winter approaching and Chechen forces in
disarray, it seems very likely that Grozny will fall to the Russian army.
This will provide an enormous psychological boost to the country and add
considerable impetus to Putin's election campaign. Were Yeltsin and Putin to
wait until June, however, this auspicious set of circumstances could well
change. The decision to opt for an early election in itself is an indication
that the Kremlin leadership is uncertain of how the war will progress by the
summer. By then Chechen forces could regroup and inflict more casualties on
the Russians, leading at worst to a collapse in morale and defeat as in the
1994-6 war, or at best a bloody drawn out war that will steadily erode
Putin's popularity. Putin's credibility may also be tested by more terrorist
outrages against Russian cities. Moreover, the war is damaging the Russian
economy, not only in the direct costs (an estimated $2 billion so far) but
also by the indirect sanctions being applied by the West, in particular by
the delay of the $640 million IMF tranche that fell due in December.
A second factor is that while the opposition has been temporarily stunned by
the results of the Duma elections, the resulting arithmetic of allegiances
is far from clear. The communist party increased its share of the vote
slightly to 24.3% but lost some 35 seats overall, while the main centrist
opposition, the Fatherland-All-Russia bloc (OVR) led by former prime
minister Yevgeny Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov polled a
surprisingly poor 13.3% and will have just 68 seats. Putin can count on the
support of the 73 seats of the pro-Kremlin Edinstvo (Unity) bloc led by
emergencies minister Sergei Shoigu, the 29 seats of the right-wing SPS, and
possibly most of the 87 independents and a significant number of wavering
OVR deputies. Had he continued as prime minister until June, however, Putin
would have become politically entangled in managing government relations
with a Duma that has a large cohort of deputies whose allegiances are
profoundly unpredictable. Many of these deputies are drawn from regional
elites who are engaged in an almost permanent re-appraisal of their support.
Furthermore, regional elites exercise an immense influence over elections in
Russia. By bringing the presidential election forward Putin aims to free
himself from the unpredictable Duma, capitalise on the media blitz that left
his opponents reeling in the December election, and force hesitant regional
elites to bow to his claim to the presidency.
Before the Duma elections it was widely expected that Putin would face two
principal challengers for the presidency, communist party leader Gennady
Zyuganov, and OVR leader Primakov. The disappointing performance of the OVR
in the Duma elections makes it very unlikely that Primakov will now run for
the presidency. While there will be the usual plethora of extremist and
eccentric candidates, essentially the coming election will be a two-horse
race between Putin and Zyuganov. This will be even more of a straight choice
between the 'old' and the 'new' Russia than the second round run-off between
Yeltsin and Zyuganov in July 1996. Although both Putin and Zyuganov are
equally dour and uninspiring candidates, Putin has the advantage of the
massive financial and media backing of Russia's oligarchs to sell his image
as the young dynamic victor over Chechnya. The economic indicators are also
good, as rising oil prices, which are the bulk of Russia's exports, have
given Russia a positive trade balance and growing GDP over the recent
months. But there can be no economic 'feelgood' factor in a country where a
third of the population are destitute. More importantly, we can expect more
of the same kind of dirty tricks electioneering from the Kremlin against
Zyuganov and Putin's other opponents that tarnished the December elections.
All of which may well be sufficient to give Putin victory in the first
round.
How quickly will Putin make a difference? It would be a mistake to view him
as a Yeltsin stooge. Yeltsin's powerful persona has dominated Russian
politics for the last decade but his era is literally in its terminal stage.
Yeltsin's desire to protect his family from prosecution was obviously one of
the key elements in his resignation, as one of Putin's first acts as Acting
President was to issue a decree of immunity for the Yeltsin family. Whether
Putin will extend that privilege to the wider Yeltsin circle is an open
question. Past practice in Russian politics suggests that the default policy
for a securocrat like Putin is the 'anti-corruption' campaign.
Putin claims to want a broadly based more consensual government, but he
believes that Russia's party system (and thus the Duma) is too weak and
fragmented to provide a sound basis for governing coalitions. Should he win
the presidency, however, he could well create a new 'Moscow consensus' by
drawing into government experienced leaders from the opposition, former
prime ministers Primakov and Stepashin for example. As a product of the
securocrat section of the government bureaucracy Putin's natural instincts
will be for more technocratic, more interventionist, and more assertive
leadership. Indeed, in his first major policy statement Putin announced that
his main credo was 'the restoration of a guiding and regulatory role of the
state' and he rejected Western economic liberalism as inappropriate for
'Russian realities'. The eclectic mix of statist populism, Russian
nationalism and increasingly vocal anti-West rhetoric that is the Putin
phenomenon is in many respects a logical continuum of the latter Yeltsin
years, devoid as it is of any coherent ideological programmatic drive or
respect for 'isms'. This is the key to its appeal in contemporary
Russia.
*******
Washington Post
1 January 2000
Editorial
Mr. Yeltsin Bows Out
IT WAS FITTING that Boris Yeltsin would end his political career with
dramatic surprise; flair was a consistent trademark. It was even more
fitting, given Mr. Yeltsin's complex legacy, that you could interpret his
premature departure yesterday in more than one way. On the one hand, as the
Clinton administration chose to emphasize, Mr. Yeltsin acted within the
constitution, paving the way for Russia's first-ever peaceful, lawful change
of power from one living leader to another. On the other, by ducking out a
half-year before his term expired and grabbing legal immunity from
prosecution on his way out the Kremlin door, Mr. Yeltsin injected the sour
odor of a cooked deal into democratic Russia's first transition. Partly
noble, partly rotten: an appropriate end to his tumultuous reign.
Mr. Yeltsin's accomplishments are beyond question. He helped dismantle an
oppressive Communist system, easing state control over people and property.
He defied widespread predictions, from U.S. experts and others, that Russia
would slide back toward dictatorship or forward toward anarchy, bread riots
and dissolution. Steadfastly Mr. Yeltsin defended Russians' freedom to
express themselves--including by attacking him more and more viciously as the
years went by--and to travel. He permitted fair elections for a parliament
that operated freely despite its determined opposition to Mr. Yeltsin's
policies. For the most part, he respected the integrity of fragile
neighboring states like Ukraine. For all this, there is no precedent in
Russian history.
But, as the president acknowledged in his forlorn departure speech today, he
fell short of his own goals. "What we thought would be easy turned out to
be
painfully difficult," he said. Eight years ago, Mr. Yeltsin promised his
people that the worst pain of transition would last six months; today, many
of them are poorer, and die younger, than ever. No one could have
"cured"
Russia in six months. It is in the midst of three revolutionary shifts at
once: from totalitarianism to democracy, from decaying socialism to a market
economy, from militarized society to one that is largely civilian. Under any
leader, these are transitions of years and decades, not months.
So history will fault Mr. Yeltsin for naivete, as he said; but for more than
that, too. He faltered in his devotion to reform; tolerated corruption on a
breathtaking scale; waged brutal war, not once but twice, against his own
citizens in Chechnya. Now he steps down early, very likely because his
handpicked successor, Vladimir Putin, the man who can best protect Mr.
Yeltsin from his enemies, is immensely popular, more assured of victory in a
special election in March than he would be in a regularly scheduled contest
three months later. Few Russians will mourn the passing of a man who has been
weakened by disease for years; but his calculated departure deprives Russia
of one more notch of normality as it attempts to live under predictable,
democratic rules.
Mr. Putin now promises to restore the strength of the Russian state, an
implicit rebuke of his predecessor. The goal is beyond reproach: A state so
weak that it cannot enforce its laws, pay its pensions or protect its army
recruits from sadistic hazing is a menace to everyone, and to the weakest
most of all. But will Acting President Putin look for strength in the
continued destruction of Chechnya and in the manipulation of media and
government agencies to promote his own election in March? Or will he seek to
extend the brighter strands of Mr. Yeltsin's legacy and find strength in true
democracy and rule of law? Those are questions for the new year.
******
Los Angeles Times
1 January 2000
Editorial
New Era, Cautious Hope
Boris N. Yeltsin has performed one last service for
Russia. His health
shattered, his mental state unpredictable, of late more a national
embarrassment than an effective leader, Yeltsin has resigned from the
presidency to which he was twice democratically elected.
Under the constitution, Prime Minister Vladimir V.
Putin becomes acting
president, with a new election required in three months. Yeltsin had already
named Putin as his preferred successor. With the chance now given him to
exercise power through March, and to end the war in Chechnya before mounting
Russian casualties turn public opinion against it, the already popular Putin
is a clear electoral favorite.
Putin's first act on taking office was to issue a
decree granting
immunity from prosecution and other guarantees to Yeltsin and his family.
Mounting evidence has implicated Yeltsin and certain relatives in large-scale
corruption and profiteering. Many believe it was fear of legal retribution
once he left office that kept the incapacitated president from stepping down
earlier. What remains to be seen is what happens now to what Russians call
the Family, the influential and very rich circle of oligarchs who benefited
enormously from Yeltsin's tenure and in turn took care of him and his
political friends.
A few years ago Yeltsin's resignation would have
shocked and even
alarmed Washington and its allies. The mood now is more one of relief. An
erratic and increasingly incoherent leader has given way to a younger
man--Putin is 47--who offers the chance for stable and decisive leadership.
Illness and chronic alcohol abuse had increasingly sapped Yeltsin's vitality
and ignited episodes of bizarre behavior. His unscripted public remarks,
including what recently seemed to be a war threat against the United States,
had sent his aides scurrying to issue clarifications and denials. With his
departure and with the recent election of a Duma in which power appears to
have passed to centrists, more effective and pragmatic governance could
become possible.
Until he posted a policy statement on an Internet
site a few days ago,
Putin's economic and political views were largely a mystery. Now they are
somewhat clearer. He favors a regulated, not unbridled, market economy. He
believes in a democracy based on "Russia's realities," apparently
meaning one
in which the state wields a strong hand. He defends post-Soviet economic
reforms, while acknowledging that many have suffered under them. Putin called
on Russians to embrace patriotism, loyalty to the state and a sense of
national power based on economic and technological strength, not military
force. This is overall the stuff of a campaign platform, and like all such
should be treated cautiously. But it's also a statement many Russians can
embrace.
Putin has said he wants better relations with the
West and endorsed
ratification of the long-stalled Start II nuclear weapons treaty. An early
concrete gesture to Washington would not be surprising. An obscure figure
until he was named prime minister five months ago, the former career
intelligence officer now bodes to become Russia's leader, perhaps through the
whole of the new decade. The change from Yeltsin appears positive.
In the longer view, however, Yeltsin's achievements
will be remembered,
and rightly so. He completed the transition that brought the Soviet Union to
an end, established a democratic rule that endured through the recent Duma
elections and instituted a form, however imperfect, of market economy. He
chose the path and now steps aside.
******
The Times (UK)
January 1 2000
[for personal use only]
OPINION
The dangerous legacy of a Russian gambler
By Douglas Hurd
Lord Hurd of Westwell was Home Secretary 1985-1989 and Foreign Secretary
1989-1995
Even at the moment of abandoning rule, Boris Yeltsin has shown the dramatic
quality which is characteristic of a Russian ruler. There has, indeed, been
no shortage of dramatic gestures by Yeltsin in these past years, but they
have seemed increasingly tawdry and ill-considered, driven by bad health and
corrupt advisers.
None seemed more futile than the sacking of the subtle Yevgeni Primakov as
Prime Minister and his replacement by the unknown Vladimir Putin. The second
Chechnya war has for the moment caused that gamble to prosper; so Yeltsin has
doubled the stakes. Not just the premiership but now the presidency, the
Kremlin itself, depends on that choice, a choice made without warranty or
consultation, but the exercise of absolute authority.
Yeltsin has always believed in the display of authority. When he was still
aspiring to power, he used to receive Western visitors in his office in the
White House in Moscow surrounded by a multitude of silent advisers, carefully
staged as in some Renaissance portrait of a Roman Emperor.
I remember a later audience with him in the Kremlin with a different
technique (only a private secretary present) but the same aim. A flunkey
entered carrying a folded parchment scroll. Yeltsin unfolded the scroll,
glanced at it, and appended a huge signature. He then apologised to me,
explaining that it was necessary to issue a ukase on the status of the
intellectuals in Russia. (He may not have known that we have no intellectuals
in Britain.) He wanted to show that, however intelligent and cultured a
Russian, his future depended on a flourish of the pen of the new Tsar.
The contrast with Mikhail Gorbachev was total. A talk with Gorbachev always
lasted longer than officials had scheduled. He came bustling into the room,
his eyes shining with satisfaction at his own intelligent energy. He reasoned
his way through whatever problem was on the agenda, demonstrating in argument
the rightness of his decisions.
Yeltsin, by contrast, arrived at his decisions by instinct. He announced
those decisions without seeing any particular reason to spend time arguing in
their favour. If they were challenged, he responded by announcing them
again,
this time perhaps with a bang on the table and a gathering scowl on his face.
But by paradox the authoritative instincts of Yeltsin have carried him
further towards reform and friendship with the West than reason ever carried
Gorbachev. Gorbachev, moved by reason and (I now believe) a strong moral
sense, hoped to reform both the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.
Yeltsin, by temperament a more ruthless apparatchik than Gorbachev, kept no
illusions about the system. His instincts led him to disband the Soviet Union
and abandon the Communist Party. He transformed himself into a nationalist
Russian leader, and in this guise has kept himself in power despite the
failure of his successive governments to build honest and solid economic or
political institutions. His personal courage, and instinct for the dramatic
gesture, established him as a formidable figure in the West, even at moments
of obvious weakness.
We need to think carefully about the circumstances in which Yeltsin is
leaving power. The nationalist Russian leader hands over to a chosen
nationalist successor at the climax of a nationalist war in Chechnya. The war
is popular so far, partly because the Chechens are identified with terrorism,
partly because the Russian people want to repair the insult their army
suffered at the hand of the Chechens five years ago. Grozny will fall, but it
is hard to see how stability could be restored throughout Chechnya. Indeed,
the whole Caucasus region is deeply unstable. If one had to identify today
one part of the world which might see a major conflict in the new century,
the Caucasus would look the most likely.
The danger of war involving the major powers is greatest when fatal decisions
are in the hands of smaller powers to whom the great powers are inextricably
linked. We are accustomed to think of the Balkans as a seething cauldron, and
are only just coming to terms with the depth and length of our new commitment
to all those small troubled Balkan countries. But there is no danger of a
major conflict in the Balkans. Neither the sentimental Russian affection for
the Serbs nor their disapproval of Western methods in Bosnia and Kosovo were
enough to range Russia effectively against Western intervention.
The Caucasus is a different matter, part of what used to be called in Moscow
"the near abroad". The rickety states of the Russian Federation
stretch south
towards the mountains and the newly independent republics. Russian diplomacy
and military power are active throughout the region. The traditional
rivalries of Turkey and Iran are now accentuated by the interests of the US
and Europe as the oil begins to flow and oil pipelines are routed for the
strategic reasons familiar to the builders of railways a century ago.
The legacy of Yeltsin is likely to be more troubled in the Caucasus than
anywhere in Northern Europe or the Balkans. We in Europe have hardly begun to
realise the implications or find the places on the map. But here, more
strongly perhaps than anywhere else, the argument for a concerted European
diplomacy as a partner with the United States becomes overpowering.
******
The Times (UK)
January 1 2000
[for personal use only]
It could have been much, much worse
BY RICHARD BEESTON
For many Russians the ten turbulent years of President Yeltsin's rule were
best summed up by Viktor Chernomyrdin, the longest serving of his short-lived
Prime Ministers, who joked: "We tried to make things better, but we
always
ended up back where we started."
To judge this period by international headlines, it has been an unqualified
disaster. The great hopes of a nation, throwing off centuries of
authoritarian rule, were crushed beneath a corrupt, inept and drunken
leadership.
Economic reforms led to the repeated collapse of the currency and the
emergence of an oligarchy of super-rich businessmen who pocketed the nation's
wealth. Early hopes of a strategic alliance with the West foundered and led
to a return of Cold War suspicions, after Nato's eastward expansion and its
repeated military intervention in the Balkans. Support for liberal values
evaporated, while nationalism was reignited. Finally, any hopes that the
bloody Russian century would end peacefully died on the battleground of
Chechnya.
The gloom-laden conclusion, however, does not tell the full Yeltsin story. A
visitor to Russia today will find a country with enormous energy, huge
resources and great talents. Despite official figures to the contrary, there
is widespread circumstantial evidence of wealth trickling down to an
embryonic middle class.
Pensioners, academics, scientists and the intelligentsia have emerged as
among the biggest losers. Although in the vanguard of the movement for
liberal reforms in the 1980s, their voice has been silenced. There is little
state assistance to stop the vulnerable falling through the net. Hundreds of
homeless people freeze to death every winter. The creaking state health care
system offers only the most basic treatment, with life expectancy falling
alarmingly to 57 years for the average male.
Arguably the greatest disappointment was the failure to establish a rule of
law. Power and influence still guarantee immunity from prosecution.
Successive foreign businessmen have seen their investments stolen by crooked
Russian partners. It is hard to succeed in business or politics without links
to organised crime.
Mr Yeltsin's record is far from perfect and there are probably more people
who would consider themselves losers rather than winners under his rule. But
as any elderly Russian who has survived the brutality of the twentieth
century will tell you, it could have been much, much worse.
*******
Date: Sat, 01 Jan 2000
Subject: A summary of Putin's mission statement
From: Tom Adshead <russianinsider@russianinsider.com>
Dear David,
Attached is my summary of Putin's mission statement for the government, as
published on their website (www.pravitelstvo.gov.ru).
This is my attempt to
capture the gist of what he wrote, rather than give an exact translation. I
have left out what I saw as rhetoric which didn't add anything to the
argument.
This was written before Yeltsin resigned, and apparently before he decided
to resign. Obviously there remains the question whether he means any of it.
But nonetheless, I hope that your readers find it interesting. We'll give
our clients a full analysis after the New Year break.
-------
The millennium coincides with a huge change in society, in particular the
shift towards a post industrial society. Physical production becomes less
important, to be seceded by secondary and tertiary goods.
This shift puts the emphasis on technological innovation, and new systems of
management. This puts the individual at the centre of progress, and
education and training become important factors. There are two key issues
here:
One: The new opportunities bring new problems. In particular, these are
ecological issues, organised crime, drug addiction, and the weakening of the
family.
Two: Not all countries enjoy the economic fruits of the new economy. There
is a "fortunate billion" who do, but this unequal distribution of
wealth is
likely to be maintained.
Russia is not one of the richer countries in the world. Its GDP halved
during the 1990s. Our GDP is one tenth that of the US, and one fifth that of
China. Our GDP per head is one fifth of the G7 average. This GDP is highly
reliant on the mineral sector 15% of GDP, 50% of industrial output, 70% of
exports.
The capital stock has been allowed to deteriorate over 70% of all cars and
equipment is over 10 years old. We have not invested in our own economy, and
foreign investment has lagged. Russia has attracted $11.5 bln, while China
has attracted $43 bln.
We have focussed too much on the military Russia produces only 1% of the
worlds high-tech consumer goods the US produces 36%, and Japan produces
30%.
The main culprit for Russia’s current economic problems is the Soviet
inheritance. Although some of the failures were avoidable, most of them were
not. They were inevitable results of trying to introduce market mechanisms
into an economy that had been built on incompatible foundations.
We are finishing our transition period, and are now starting down the same
road that the rest of mankind is following. The experience of other
countries shows that there is no alternative to this road as a means to
raising the living standards of our population. Given this, what do we do
next?
1. Russia lived under the Soviet system for three quarters of this past
century. Although it would be a mistake to ignore the achievements of this
era, it would be an even bigger mistake to ignore the cost of those
achievements. The most important lesson is that Soviet power did not make
Russian society dynamically evolving, nor were its people free. Russia was
left well behind the rest of the world.
2. Russia has had enough of radical change and cataclysms, whether they be
communist or radical liberal. The population is near breaking point, and
cannot take much more. We have to adopt a gradual approach to reform, which
takes all the positive results of economic and demographic reform.
3. The experience of the 1990s shows that simply importing abstract ideas
from the West is not going to be enough to renew Russia without significant
losses. We can only hope for a bright future if we combine the universal
principles of a market economy and democracy, with the realities of Russia.
These lessons will inform our long term strategy. And it does have to be
long term. Even if we can grow at 8% per year then it will take 15 years for
us to reach the level of Spain or Portugal. We have already started working
on a long term programme.
Our programme will include three basic concepts:
1. The Russian idea
2. A strong state
3. An efficient economy
The Russian idea
You cannot push a society forward if it is split. However it is not
acceptable to me to achieve civil accord using the same methods as under
Soviet power. This is not compatible with a democratic society. However, one
of the reasons for the slow pace of reform has been the absence of unity
behind common ideas, although some shifts in this direction can be observed.
People have come to take for granted such things as freedom of speech, and
of foreign travel. They are happy to have the right to own property, and to
undertake their own businesses.
Alongside this are traditional features of the Russian character, which are
likely to prevail:
- Patriotism. This word is starting to regain its positive sense. Stripped
of its imperialistic overtones, it is a source of strength. Without
patriotism, we lose our pride, our sense of ourselves as a people capable of
great things.
- Russia as a great power. This has always been part of the Russian mindset.
However, the definition has to be broadened to include not just military
strength, but also technological and economic power.
- Looking to the state. The state has always played an important role in the
lives of Russian citizens. We do not have the same liberal traditions as
England and the US. For us, a strong state is not something to be resisted
but a guarantee of order, and a force of change. Russians want democracy,
but they also have a sense that the state has lost its strength. Society
wants the return of the state in its regulatory role.
- Social solidarity. In Russia, a tendency towards collective forms of
action has always prevailed over individualism. There is also a strong
paternalistic streak in the Russian soul. A Russian does not rely solely on
himself to improve his wellbeing he expects help from the state, and from
society. This habit dies hard.
The issue is not whether these features are good or bad the important
thing is that they not only exist, they currently prevail. The new Russian
idea will be an alloy of the universal principles and these Russian values.
A strong state
Currently, even the best policies will fail, if the government cannot
implement them. This is not a call to build a totalitarian state. A state
can only be strong if it is democratic, legal, and effective. I see the
following ways of building such a state:
- A rational structure of power, increasing professionalism, discipline, and
responsibility of civil servants, and strengthening the fight against
corruption
- Changing personnel policy to ensure that the best people get promoted
- Create conditions to foster the creation of a civil society that will be a
counterweight and control on the executive
- Improve the role and authority of the judiciary
- Improve the federal structure, especially in its fiscal aspects
- A major anti-crime campaign
We do not plan to change the constitution. The real task is to make the
Constitution a real basis for action at all levels of society. In
particular, we need to bring much of the current legislation in line with
the Constitution. History has shown that the main threat to freedom and
human rights comes from the executive. This is why I think it is
particularly important to foster the relationship between the executive and
civil society, to develop the latter’s institutions and structure, to start
an active and severe battle against corruption.
An efficient economy
1. We need to have a clear goal and a long term strategy. Too much effort
has been wasted on putting out fires.
2. The state needs to play a greater role. This means more than just setting
the rules of the game, but less than interference in all parts of the
economy. Here the key principle is: "Government, where, and to the
extent,
it is unavoidable, freedom where, and to the extent, that it is needed."
3. We need a reform strategy, on the following lines:
3.1 Growth through investment. Investment will come through the market, as
well as from the state. At the same time, we have to accept that our road
will be long and hard without foreign investment. We have to do all we can
to attract foreign investors
3.2 Active industrial policy. Our country’s future depends on the
high-technology, science based industries. Our industrial policy will be
based on a priority for high tech sectors,. We will increase spending on
advanced technology and science especially that with export potential. We
will support non raw materials industry, which is oriented to internal
demand. We will help the raw materials industries to export. This will be
financed through loans, and tax breaks, and subsidies under government
guarantee.
3.3 We will aim for a balanced structural policy. There is room in the
economy for both large industrial groups, as well as small and medium sized
businesses. All of these must develop at the same pace. Here another issue
is the regulation of the natural monopolies.
3.4 Creating an efficient financial system. This involves:
- Improving budget efficiency
- Tax reform
- Low inflation and rouble stability
- Creating civilised financial and stock markets
- Restructuring the banking system
3.5 Legalising the grey economy, attacking organised crime in the economic
and financial sectors. To deal with the grey economy, as well as improving
the work of law enforcement bodies, we need to strengthen licensing,
taxation, hard currency, and export controls
3.6 Integrating the Russian economy into the world economy. We will create
an export agency that will provide guarantees for Russian exporters. We will
vigorously counter discrimination against Russia on world markets, and will
introduce anti-dumping legislation. Russia will join the WTO.
Russia’s renaissance is unthinkable without a renaissance in its
countryside. Our agricultural policy will blend state support and regulation
with market reforms, including reforms in land ownership.
Russia is in real danger of being relegated to second, or even third-rate
power, for the first time in its history. To avoid this, we have to do a lot
of work, and no one will do this for us. Everything depends on our ability
to realise the extent of the danger, and to set out on a long and difficult
journey.
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