December 24, 1999    
This Date's Issues:• 3707  • 3708  

Johnson's Russia List
#3708
24 December 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: New Russian Duma faces leadership dilemma.
2. Toronto Sun: Matthew Fisher, Old Red habits die hard.
3. Segodnya: Primakov Was Deprived of All Russia.
AND OF THE PROSPECT TO BECOME DUMA SPEAKER.
4. Segodnya: Oleg Odnokolenko, PUTIN: DIFFICULT CHOICE BETWEEN FIRMNESS 
IN CHECHNYA AND REPUTATION IN THE WEST.
5. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Geoffrey York, Chechen refugees test 
wills against Russian officials. Those from towns deemed 'liberated'
must go home or have food rations cut off.
6. Trud: Alexei Kiva, WILL DUMA CENTRISTS FIND A COMMON LANGUAGE TO 
SPEAK?
7. AP: Russia Bristles at U.S. Pressure.
8. Itar-Tass: Preservation of Single Legal Field in Russia Urged.
9. Obshchaya Gazeta: Yelena Dikun, Kuzhuget Is Rich And Famous.
(Sergey Shoygu's Career Profiled)] 
*******


#1
New Russian Duma faces leadership dilemma
By Brian Killen

MOSCOW, Dec 24 (Reuters) - Russia's lower house of parliament is still 
struggling to agree on its new leadership because no single group enjoys an 
absolute majority, the outgoing speaker said on Friday. 


``This really is a headache for many factions,'' Gennady Seleznyov, chairman 
of the State Duma for the past four years, told a news conference ahead of 
the old Duma's final ceremonial session. 


Seleznyov said the choice of a new speaker and other key Duma posts would 
depend on the strength of the various factions after deputies elected in 
single-mandate constituencies had determined their loyalties. 


Half of the 450 seats in the new Duma, due to convene in mid-January, will be 
split between the six parties which won more than five percent of the vote in 
Sunday's election. The rest will be occupied by the winners of the 
constituency votes. 


Traditionally, the biggest Duma faction is awarded the post of speaker, while 
runners-up are made deputy speakers. But unlike the previous Duma, the 
Communists and their allies will no longer dominate the chamber. 


According to final results of the election, the Communist Party won a total 
of 113 seats, while the pro-government Unity (Yedinstvo) had 72. 


The centrist Fatherland-All Russia movement came third with 66 seats and the 
Union of Right-Wing Forces, another pro-government group, was fourth with 29 
seats. 


But the composition of the chamber remains uncertain as various alliances are 
being formed, creating pro-agrarian and other lobbying groups. Several 
independents are likely to affiliate themselves eventually with party 
factions. 


SELEZNYOV ACCEPTABLE AS SPEAKER BUT MAY BE UNAVAILABLE 


Kremlin sources said the presidential administration would accept Seleznyov, 
or another moderate Communist, as speaker. 


But it is not clear if Seleznyov will be available for the new Duma. He faces 
a run-off vote on January 9 against Afghan war hero General Boris Gromov in 
the race to become governor of the Moscow region. 


Other names touted as possible Duma speakers include former prime ministers 
Yevgeny Primakov and Sergei Stepashin. 


But Primakov, a leader of Fatherland-All Russia, would probably be 
unacceptable to the Kremlin because he plans to challenge President Boris 
Yeltsin's preferred successor, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, in next June's 
presidential election. 


The post of Duma speaker might give Primakov a powerful platform to launch an 
effective campaign, although opinion polls currently show Putin heading for a 
runaway victory. 


Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov said Stepashin, who teamed up with 
the liberal Yabloko party for the Duma election, would probably not win 
approval for the speaker's job. 


However, the Union of Right-Wing Forces (SPS), said it would support him. 
``The most likely candidate is Sergei Stepashin,'' SPS leader Sergei 
Kiriyenko said on Wednesday. 


Another candidate might be Unity leader Sergei Shoigu, who is supported by 
Putin, although it is not yet clear if he will take up his seat in the Duma 
or stay in his current post as Emergencies Minister. 


******


#2
Toronto Sun
December 24, 1999 
Old Red habits die hard
By MATTHEW FISHER (74511.357@CompuServe.com)
Sun's Columnist at Large
MOSCOW -- The Red Corner on the ground floor of a block of flats off 
Leninsky Prospekt still had a bust of Lenin and some red and gold Communist 
banners with empty slogans such as "Workers of the World Unite," when 
Muscovites used it as a polling station in 1996 when Boris Yeltsin was 
re-elected as president. 


The three policemen on duty during last Sunday's parliamentary elections 
still called the polling station the Red Corner. But the bust, the banners 
and the slogans are finally no longer part of the Leninsky Prospekt scene. 


It took nine years for the Communist party's treasured symbols to disappear. 
And it took just as long for the Communists and their allies, the Agrarian 
and Women's parties and the Stalinists, to lose their majority in the Duma or 
parliament. 


The Communists have been stuck at around 25% of the vote for three elections 
now, unable to grow beyond their base of aggrieved babushkas and dedushkas. 
But the Communists are in a more precarious state now than they were before 
last weekend's election because their partners are politically dead and 
because the Kremlin, which has almost always done what it pleases under 
Yeltsin, anyway, has become even stronger. 


Yeltsin will be the first beneficiary of this shift. But the constitution 
Yeltsin wrote and re-wrote for himself says he must finally quit next June. 
Among the long list of would-be successors, Yeltsin's fourth prime minister 
in two years, Vladimir Putin, looks as if he might be sitting on the right 
chair when the music stops in six months. 


"Putin is the strongest candidate," crowed Anatoli Chubais the other day. 
Chubais, Yeltsin's hugely unpopular and sometime financial Rasputin, 
described Putin, a former secret policeman boss who has never stood for 
office, as someone who "understands liberal values, democracy, the market and 
does not accept isolationism." 


The western media have slavishly adopted the same tone. They claimed in 
report after report this week that the election six days ago had been a 
victory for Russia's political centre, for the reform movement and for 
democracy. 


It was undoubtedly a great triumph for Yeltsin and for those around him such 
as Chubais and Putin. But considering how the Yeltsinites campaigned, and how 
Yeltsin's team has behaved for years, they are not centrists, economic 
reformers or democrats in any way that westerners might understand these 
words. 


Centrists do not wage war by telling civilians to get out or die as Putin's 
army has done in Chechnya. Economic reformers do not privatize the entire 
country into the hands of a few men as Chubais did, either. Nor do democrats 
encourage state-owned media to utterly destroy their opponents as the 
Yeltsinites did to such great effect and with so little regard for the law 
this fall. 


Yeltsin and his team are not Communists. That they're not Reds has somehow 
made them much more palatable to western journalists and diplomats. But as 
regards their views on war, state property and the media, old habits 
obviously die hard. 


What Putin seems to instinctively understand better than all the other 
Yeltsinites, except the father of the movement himself, is that Russians 
don't really crave centrist policies, economic reform or democracy. What 
Russians want is a strongman who will give their chaotic lives some order and 
purpose and restore a sense of national pride. 


Yeltsin's political instincts remain remarkable, but he is no longer 
physically capable of convincing anyone that he is a strongman. By taking a 
very hard line with the Chechens, Putin, who is in his 40s, is creating the 
same kind of dramatic public image as Yeltsin did by climbing on a tank 
during the abortive coup against Mikhail Gorbachev. 


Yeltsin cannot forget the Red Corner. Can Putin? 


******


#3
Russia Today press summaries
Segodnya
23 December 1999
Primakov Was Deprived of All Russia
AND OF THE PROSPECT TO BECOME DUMA SPEAKER


Summary
The Kremlin's special operation Fatherland minus All Russia and its attempt 
to deprive Yevgeniy Primakov of any chance to become the President of Russia, 
was a success.


Despite objections of leaders Yury Luzhkov and Yevgeniy Primakov, the 
coordination council of their bloc OVR decided to split the deputies, who 
were fronted by OVR, in the new Suma.


They will be divided into the faction, which will bear the bloc's name and 
two independent deputies groups. The two groups are supposed to represent the 
interests of Russian regions and of the agrarians.


This means the divorce of former allies, who came to the Duma on the backs of 
Yevgeniy Primakov and Yury Luzhkov. Having used the leaders' political and 
financial resources, their companions from "All Russia" are ready to swear 
allegiance to the new party of power.


The split cannot be justified by the idea that it would be profitable to have 
two more deputies groups at the Duma and thus, to have additional votes at 
the Council of Duma. Primakov's faction will hardly get any use of "allies" 
like these. The situation is similar to what happened with the Communists at 
the last Duma.


Then, the Agrarian faction, led by Mihail Lapshin, did not want to always 
vote as "the big brother KPRF" instructs it. And now, Mihail Lapshin, who 
made it to the Duma with the support of OVR, wants to split from Primakov. 
His justification of this is that "a deputy's duty before his voters is 
higher than any considerations to whom he should respond".


It is clear to whom Lapshin wants to respond - the new party in power, Unity. 
However, there is one force that may interfere with this - the KPRF party, 
which wants to form an agrarian faction under its own patronage.


The new Duma may include four deputies groups, apart from six factions, made 
from the political parties that won the elections. The four groups will be: 
the regional group, which split from OVR, the agrarian group (under KPRF or 
OVR), People's Power or Industrial group (under KPRF) and the pro-government 
group People's deputy (formed of independent deputies).


Primakov and his faction may simply be lost among these groups. 
*****


#4
Segodnya
24 December 1999
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
PUTIN: DIFFICULT CHOICE BETWEEN FIRMNESS IN CHECHNYA AND REPUTATION IN THE 
WEST
By Oleg ODNOKOLENKO

Vladimir Putin finds himself at a crossroads. On the one
hand, there is the Russian people who voted for his promise to
"spoil terrorists in the loo," while on the other, there is the
international community with all its tranches and human rights.
On the one hand, there is the army craving for revenge, on the
other, the influential Human Rights Watch organization which
demanded Wednesday that the UN investigate cases of human rights
violation by Russia in Chechnya. The international community in
fact has thus came real close to a kind of a psychological
barrier. Having once overstepped it, the West will no longer
recognize any difference between Russia and, say, Yugoslavia (or
Iraq). All that can follow is international sanctions and
high-precision bombing.
The Human Rights Watch activists build their accusations
upon the interview of the residents of the village of
Alkhan-Yurt, who allegedly have witnessed the execution of 17
civilians by the Russian forces. The official authorities
categorically disprove those allegations.
Unfortunately, it is mostly from Western sources that the
Russians learn about the less appealing instances of the Chechen
war, which is a tragic mistake of the Putin Cabinet. The premier
has gotten ensnared in his own trap. The Chechen campaign has
been hostage of the "party of war's" election success from the
start. But, even after a triumphant victory, even though the
Russians will not ever know the whole truth of the war, who will
vote for Vladimir the Blood-Stained? Only sparse information does
penetrate - for example, one report has it that in the five days
that followed the elections alone, the Russian army lost 100 men.
It is the number of the black plastic packs delivered to Mozdok.
Having ceded to the West the whole truth of the war, Putin
does not only subject himself to a risk. Also at stake is the
long and carefully created liberal image of the Right Forces
Union which has sworn allegiance to him on the Chechen war, let
alone the Unity bloc. The Premier risk losing the painfully built
trust and the pro-Moscow Chechens as well. Putin will hardly
venture to set the pro-war electorate against him, even in spite
of the West. But, this path leads straight into a financial
deadlock. In 2000 alone, the restorations in Chechnya (not
counting Grozny) will require about 20 billion roubles. The
federal budget earmarks only 585 million. Where to find the rest?
Will the "liberated" Chechnya still have trust in Moscow, if the
money is not provided? And sure enough, the West will not
contribute a sixpence now.

******


#5
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
Chechen refugees test wills against Russian officials
Those from towns deemed 'liberated'
must go home or have food rations cut off
GEOFFREY YORK
Sleptsovsk, Russia


For a Chechen refugee, it is a great humiliation to beg 
for food from another hungry refugee, and Alpato Mirzayeva did everything 
possible to avoid it.


For a full day she ate nothing, drinking only tea, hoping for a bowl of the 
hot soup that Russian authorities distribute daily to the 9,000 refugees at 
the Sputnik tent city near the Chechen border.


But in the evening, when the cauldrons of soup appeared, the camp 
administrators would not give her any. They reminded her of the Russian 
government's new edict: no food for refugees who refuse to return to their 
homes in "liberated" towns of Russian-controlled Chechnya.


By then, her four children were hungry, complaining of stomachaches. So she 
reluctantly asked for a portion of soup from a refugee family in a 
neighbouring tent.


"It was shameful for me to ask them for food," Mrs. Mirzayeva said yesterday, 
recalling the events of the day before.


"They don't have enough food for themselves. They gave it to me out of 
kindness and humanity."


At noon yesterday, Mrs. Mirzayeva still had not eaten anything. She had given 
the borrowed soup to her children. Yet despite her growing hunger, she will 
not obey the order to return to her town, Assinovskaya, in Chechnya.


"My house is in ruins," she said. "Even if I can find a place to live, I 
can't go back there. A lot of Russian soldiers are there, and they are 
shooting civilians. My children are afraid whenever they see Russian 
soldiers."


The Sputnik refugee camp, located on the eastern edge of Ingushetia, began 
enforcing the new rules this week. No food was given to refugees from 
Russian-controlled towns that are deemed to be safe. The policy has triggered 
shouting matches and confrontations between refugees and camp administrators.


Human-rights activists have condemned the Russian pressure tactics. "To 
forcibly repatriate people back to a war zone is a serious violation of their 
rights," said a statement from the international organization Human Rights 
Watch.


It said the Russian authorities are trying to get rid of the refugees to hide 
the evidence of their brutal war in Chechnya.


Yesterday it appeared that the Russian authorities had temporarily suspended 
the policy. Some refugees from "liberated" towns were told they can have food 
again, Human Rights Watch said. But the group said it is still concerned 
about the continuing Russian attempts to force refugees to go home.


In another pressure tactic, the Russian authorities hitched an engine to 37 
railway cars in the refugee camp on Saturday and unexpectedly began moving 
the cars back to Chechnya. Hundreds of refugees who were living in the 
railway cars were transported back to Sernovodsk involuntarily.


Last week, the refugee camp's administrators posted a list of "safe" towns 
and districts in Chechnya and announced they were cutting off food for 
refugees from these towns. "Why should we continue to feed them?" the head of 
the camp told the human-rights group. "If we continue to feed them, they'll 
never leave."


This week, the camp administrators denied that the policy existed. But 
refugees confirmed that food rations were halted to refugees from "safe" 
towns such as Sernovodsk, Samashki, Assinovskaya and Achkoi Martan.


"They told us we were on the list and we couldn't get food," said Rustam 
Khatiyev, a refugee from Grozny. His passport describes him as a resident of 
Sernovodsk, and he had to argue with the administrators to persuade them that 
his home was in Grozny.


Mrs. Mirzayeva didn't know what to tell her children when they asked for 
food. "It's very difficult to tell them that we can't get food because of a 
conflict with the administration."


She believes the Russian pressure tactics are an attempt to conceal the 
reality of the war. "They're trying to make it seem that people are living 
normally in Chechnya."


Most refugees from so-called "safe" towns are unwilling to return home. "Our 
house has been destroyed," said Alpato Islamov, a refugee from Sernovodsk. 
"The Russian soldiers have stolen everything from it."


Khikal Labazanova, a refugee from a northern district of Chechnya, said one 
of her relatives was killed by Russian soldiers in a cafe where she was 
serving the soldiers. The Russians said it was an accident. "I will go back 
home only when the Russian occupants have left my village," she said.


Tamara Mukhayeva, a refugee from Sernovodsk, returned to the town this week 
to visit her parents. She found evidence of food shortages in the town. "My 
parents asked me to bring them food, but I couldn't," she said.


At the edge of the refugee camp, where thousands of Chechens are sheltering 
in the railway cars, the refugees are determined to block any further 
attempts to move them back to Chechnya.


"If they try it again, we'll jump off the train and we'll put something on 
the railway tracks to block it," said Bilkas Satuyeva, a refugee from Urus 
Martan, as she stood in newly fallen snow on one of the coldest days of the 
year.


Other refugees, however, are less optimistic about the chances of blocking 
railway lines. They recall how Russian authorities summoned a special police 
unit to remove refugees trying to block a train last week. Police fired shots 
in the air to disperse the crowd.


*******


#6
Trud
December 24, 1999
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
WILL DUMA CENTRISTS FIND A COMMON LANGUAGE TO SPEAK?
By Alexei KIVA, political scientist

Some Russian and foreign analysts have hurried to announce
that the Centrists will be the dominating force in the new, 3rd
Duma, if the Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) deputies are counted in.
American professor and public figure Marshall Gold, who knows
Russian realities well, is one. 
Igor Shabdurasulov, first deputy chief of the Kremlin staff,
has described the results of the December 19 elections in
Bolshevist terms--"a revolution in Russia," a peaceful one,
thanks God. It seems he means that although the Communists are
still leading, they are no longer in the majority. 
Following PM Vladimir Putin's meeting with the top people of
the six blocs which have made it to the Duma, OVR leader Yevgeny
Primakov said nobody should rock the political boat of Russia; on
the contrary, the parliamentarians should pool efforts with the
government in order to tackle Russia's urgent problems in the
interests of all Russians. 
What if the people have the 'gut feeling' of what many
politicians and analysts are yet to appreciate?
Many have discerned an end of a period of turbulent and
chaotic 'revolutionary' events in Russia when many an initiative
which has been intended to serve the people, has been scrapped
'in passing.' It is equally clear that the country is passing
over (or, to put it in milder terms, trying to pass over) to a
new stage in its history, that of national renaissance. 
Thoughtless destruction, oft criminal plunder of the
national wealth, national nihilism and the overt subservience of
some ranking bureaucrats and a large part of the radical liberal
intellectuals to the West are yielding to something else.
The concern of both the people and the political elite over
the state's integrity, over the state of domestic production is
growing right in front of our eyes. The ideas of statehood and
patriotism, the two notions that have been appreciably devalued
of late and denigrated in the heat of thoughtless destruction,
yet have always been highly respected by the people, are being
filled with new content. The idea of spirituality, which has been
pushed into the backyard of public mentality by impudent
mercantilism, rather than noble pragmatism, is being restored in
its rights.
These days, even the extreme Right--with the possible
exception of Valeria Novodvorskaya and Konstantin Borovoi--do not
dare make the vulgar and misleading statement that "patriotism is
the last resort of scoundrels."
Incidentally, the Union of Right Forces has stolen quite a
few votes from Yabloko simply because it has armed itself, as
distinct from the 1995 election campaign, with the ideas of
patriotism and preservation of Russia's unity...
And while the federal forces' actions in Chechnya are seen
by many people in the West as well-nigh a pre-planned gimmick of
raising PM Putin's rating in order to make him the most promising
presidential contender, the majority of Russians think
differently. To be more precise, they see it as the beginning of
the central authorities's decisive combat against the destructive
separatism and for the instilment of elementary law and order in
the country and eventual attainment of political stability as the
most important condition of national renaissance.
By the way, Putin, and Unity standing behind him, have
always been treated loyally by OVR's leaders whose image thereby
suffered, from the viewpoint of tactics. Primakov, for one, has
always been speaking good of Putin, although he did point out
that the PM was yet to "show his worth" in the socio-economic
direction. 
The logic of election struggle suggested, meanwhile, that
the OVR leaders should expose Unity at every step as a creature
of Berezovsky and the Kremlin. Primakov would not do this,
because deep in his heart he approved the premier's actions and
decisiveness in combating terrorism, and continued to work 'for,'
rather than 'against,' being a responsible politician and a
decent person. 
But then, any government, formed by whatever political
force, would conduct approximately the same policy line both in
and outside Russia. This is in no way a paradox. In the past year
or eighteen months, the main parties and public political
movements, represented in the Duma, have come to hold not
dissimilar, if not identical, positions on the key foreign-policy
issues. The same trend is discernible in the domestic policy. 
I remember that on the eve of the 1995 parliamentary
elections, representatives of a variety of political parties met
for a conference to voice the idea that life would dictate the
same objective, whoever wins the elections and forms the
government. This prediction never materialised in reality. Here
is why. 
To start with, we knew nothing of the state of Boris
Yeltsin's health or the price the nation would have to pay for
his reelection with the most active help from the 'oligarchs'.
The rise of the mighty shadow force, the 'Family' was a
by-product of that victory. 
Secondly, we forgot that the division and redivision of
property had not been over yet. Today, it seems to be a thing of
the past, in the main.
There is no retreating without endangering the very
existence of Russia. But then, it is also impossible to conduct
the policy of national renaissance in the interests of the
'Liberals', the way it has been to date, alone or the Left, if
only theoretically, alone. 
What is needed today is a policy in the interests of a
majority, and it is the policy of Centrism alone, in our
circumstances. To remind: Centrism has not been the dominating
force in either the USSR in the last years of Gorbachev's rule or
the first reform years in Yeltsin's Russia. 
Alas, this is often the case in the conditions of fast
revolutionary transformations. Centrism comes to the fore after
the revolutionary barricades have been cleared away. It is a
Russian paradox that there may be bad troubles in relations
between our Centrists, in particular Fatherland-All Russia and
Unity. 
To start with, nobody knows the credentials of Duma members
elected on the Unity list. Nobody knows how 'manageable' they are
going to be. Or whether they would defect to other factions in
this or that situation. Or whether they would lobby the interests
of governors backing them.
Thus far, nobody knows who will head the Unity faction. Or
how flexible the Unity faction would be in the course of forming
Duma's leading bodies. If it will lean towards the Right and
OVR's interests will not be heeded, the latter would have to
align with the Communist Party. 
Nobody knows how large a room Putin has for manoeuvre. The
Kremlin is clearly seeing him as the protector of its interests.
But if the premier will live up to these expectations, his hands
will be tied in combating corruption, above all, and his
followers in the Duma would find it hard to explain. Putin's
relations with the parliamentary majority would be strained. 
In reality, Putin would only benefit in the eyes of Russians
if he will not heed the wishes and capriciousness of the Kremlin
administration. The administration will have to choose between
Putin and Primakov (or Zyuganov, which is less likely) to become
the next president...
The long overdue urgent problems of the real economy and
society's state are meanwhile loudly knocking on the doors of the
new Duma. Questions to be asked of the authorities are many and
complicated, and there is no putting them aside.

******


#7
Russia Bristles at U.S. Pressure
December 24, 1999
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV


MOSCOW (AP) - After a top U.S. diplomat harshly criticized Russia's campaign 
in Chechnya, the Foreign Ministry accused the United States today of letting 
domestic affairs influence its stance toward Russia. Still, it voiced hope 
that tensions between the two countries would ease.


``American policy in the last months has been increasingly driven by 
momentary domestic considerations,'' Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir 
Rakhmanin said, according to Russian news agencies.


``That has been displayed by Washington's intention to use economic levers of 
pressure against Russia, including sanctions under artificial pretexts.''


U.S.-Russian relations have emerged as an issue in the U.S. presidential 
campaign, with candidates calling for the administration to halt aid because 
of the Chechen conflict and alleged Russian money-laundering.


Bilateral ties are at a post-Cold War low, strained by U.S. criticism of 
Russia's military action in Chechnya, Moscow's rejection of Washington's plan 
to build anti-missile defenses and other disputes. However, both sides say 
they don't want a return to confrontation.


The ministry statement came a day after U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott, wrapping up a visit to Moscow, voiced harsh criticism of the Russian 
military's conduct in the breakaway republic. He accused Russian forces of 
indiscriminately killing Chechen civilians and violating international law.


Moscow has responded harshly to U.S. criticism over Chechnya, saying it 
amounted to meddling in Russian internal affairs. But Rakhmanin said the 
issue hadn't dominated Talbott's visit, and he chose conciliatory language to 
respond to the U.S. envoy's statement.


``While defending Russian interests and adequately reacting to anti-Russian 
attacks, we are still hoping for positive development of our mutually 
advantageous cooperation with the United States,'' Rakhmanin said.


``It was said that President Bill Clinton would like to leave a good legacy 
in Russian-American relations to his successor,'' he continued. ``We can only 
welcome such an approach and hope it is backed by practical steps.''


******


#8
Preservation of Single Legal Field in Russia Urged.


MOSCOW, December 24 (Itar-Tass) - Participants in a conference on problems of 
forming constitutional courts in subjects of the Russian Federation were 
urged to exert efforts "to preserve a single legal field". This call came on 
Friday from chief of the Russian president's administration Alexander 
Voloshin. The conference is held on the premises of the presidential 
administration. 


"It is talked a great deal of late about the need to strengthen powers," 
Voloshin said. This means consolidating the executive, the legislative and 
the judicial powers, he said. He noted that the consolidation of power should 
be manifested in a uniform, strong, noncontradictory, integral and complete 
legislation. 


"Constitutional justice plays a special role," Voloshin said. He believes the 
task is now complicated by the fact that the system of constitutional law is 
just being formed in Russia, and the ultimate aim of this work is to achieve 
harmony in relations between the Federation and its subjects in the area of 
law. On the one hand, everything must be based on supremacy of the Federal 
Constitution while, on the other, legislation of each subject of the 
Federation must be logical and streamlined and meeting the requirements of 
the given region. 


Voloshin said that the federal state is in for two dangers -- to slide to 
unitarianism, on one hand, or to split into parts, on the other. It is 
precisely constitutional courts that should play an important role in the 
quest "for a clear procedure in the exercise of law, coordination of the 
interests of the Federation and regions," the chief of the administration 
said. 


He noted that serious work is ahead to bring regulations and constitutions of 
subjects of the Federation in keeping with the country's Constitution. If 
constitutions and regulations contain "systemic irregularities," as he put 
it, they would be multiplied by means of constitutional courts of subjects of 
the Federation. This should not happen, he said. 


Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Marat Baglai 
urged participants in the conference to concentrate their attention on 
practical questions. He said the situation regarding the formation of courts 
in the country is paradoxical. 


Constitutional courts so far exist only in ten subjects of the Federation and 
somewhere, for instance, in Ingushetia, it is believed that the Supreme Court 
has a right to check the regulations' being in keeping with the Constitution. 
Another important problem is that at present there is no order in the 
coordination of Federal Constitutional Court and regional constitutional 
courts. 


******


#9
Sergey Shoygu's Career Profiled 


Obshchaya Gazeta 
16 December 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Yelena Dikun: "Kuzhuget Is Rich And Famous" 


Kuzhuget is rich and famous. A portrait of the minister without a 
golden frame. 


Other than Shoygu himself, few know which syllable to stress in his 
last name -- the "o" or the "u". Even his first name 
is not clear: it is Sergey in his passport, but for his family and 
friends it is Kuzhuget. 


His image also is equally doubled, in layers. There is a television 
version: the minister-unskilled laborer in a background of ruins and 
fires, face blackened with soot, eyes swollen from a lack of sleep, the 
tough tongue of a commander, and interviews of few words. Everyone hangs 
around gossiping, but he works. Some destroy, and he shovels it away. 


A tale in the spirit of an American myth is built up on a 
"romantic" picture -- a homeless youth who shows up in some 
unknown out-of-the-way place and works his way to the "very 
top."


But besides the television version, our hero has a real biography. In 
addition to the image, he has a face. They are similar, but nevertheless 
it is a different Shoygu. Not better, not worse; different. 


Changing Clothes on the Run 


Sergey Shoygu showed up in Moscow in 1990. This was the time when a 
new power was taking shape in "independent Russia." People who 
at the time were crowding in the reception room of Prime-Minister Silayev 
remember Shoygu by his tattered shoes and worn-out jacket. It seemed as 
if this young man had spent many days on dusty roads without food and 
drink. Silayev's secretariat was run by Alla Zakharova, a woman who had 
extraordinary influence in the selection and placing of personnel and who 
was favorably disposed toward the young provincial. This circumstance, 
according to talk, is the basis of the Moscow career of the unknown Tuvin 
youth. 


If the tattered shoes and worn-out jacket are not the fruit of 
collective imagination, then that means that Shoygu has great 
image-making talent -- he has succeeded in creating the image of a simple 
fellow from the back country! In any case, he came to Silayev's reception 
room not from the Tuvin backwoods, but from the Academy of Social Science 
of the CPSU Central Committee, which was the main forge of the Party's 
nomenklatura. And the road on which he traveled was smooth and clean like 
glass. 


For a beginning, it was enough that he came from a "good 
family" (his father was the deputy chairman of the Tuvin Council of 
Ministers). In the provinces the elite layer is thinner than in the 
capital; the local nobility lives more tightly, densely. When Sergey went 
to study at Krasnoyarsk Polytech, his roommate in the dormitory was the 
son of Oleg Shenin, first secretary of the Party's City Committee in 
Achinsk. After the institute Shoygu went to another in Achinsk and then 
ended up in the caring hands of Oleg Semenovich Shenin. Shenin went to 
Khakasia, and Shoygu followed him. Shenin went to Krasnoyarsk, and again 
Shoygu went there, too. At age 30, Shoygu managed two construction 
trusts, which was no easy matter. And then his patron transferred him to 
Party work, first in the Abakan gorkom and from there to the Krasnoyarsk 
kraykom. When Shenin was taken from Krasnoyarsk into the CPSU Central 
Committee, Shoygu followed him to Moscow. 


Were these different times, Sergey Kuzhugetovich would have had a 
brilliant party career. But democracy came knocking, and it was essential 
to immediately reorient oneself. The patron Shenin did not understand the 
dialectic of the times, joined the GKChP, ended up in 
"Lefortovo", and is now fruitlessly trying to restore the CPSU. 
His perceptive protégé changed his clothes, put on different shoes, and 
went to find new patrons. 


In the beginning the focus on redressing did not work out. When 
Silayev decided to appoint Shoygu chairman of the State Committee on 
Chernobyl and sent him to the Supreme Soviet for confirmation, the 
Khakass deputy Mikhail Mityukov recognized him. Being a democrat, he 
spoke ardently against soiling the new power with particrats. But the 
democratic ardor gradually passed, and the befallen nomenklatura 
recovered from fear and soon began to return to their accustomed places 
at the head of the marching columns. 


The Light of Great Stars 


Now everyone knows why they appointed Shoygu the builder to create the 
Russian rescue corps (thereafter the MChS [Ministry of Emergencies, 
Civil Defense, and Natural Disaster Recovery]). Once he organized young 
rescue detachments in Krasnoyarsk Kray. That is another myth. Five years 
ago, Sergey Kuzhugetovich said this to author: "I had absolutely no 
idea what this was, but the business sounded interesting, dynamic, and, 
in general, it would not be boring, so I agreed." 


Originally, it was proposed to create a small mobile detachment of 
rescuers who could react operationally to natural cataclysms and man-made 
disasters. But Shoygu is a man of passion. The rescue corps unnoticeably 
grew into a state committee for emergencies, and the state committee into 
a ministry. An organization modest in its functions turned into a large, 
power department over several years, having 70,000 persons "under 
arms" and requiring more than 8 billion rubles from the federal 
budget. 


The striving to expand his domain is natural for any ambitious leader 
-- the larger the ministry, the more important the minister. In the case 
of Shoygu, this striving often took on grotesque forms. Having swallowed 
up civil defense, he tried several times to bring under his subordination 
the fire-fighting service, Gosgortekhnadzor [State Mining Technology 
Commission], and Gosatomnadzor [State Nuclear Oversight Commission]. In 
1997 he requested 122 positions for rank of general (including the rank 
"army general") for the ministry. They are most favorably 
disposed toward Shoygu in the State Duma, but the deputies gasped at the 
request. 


In the middle of that same 1997, Shoygu sent a secret document to the 
President's administration entitled "On Prospects for the 
Development of the MChS" in which he insisted on creating an 
anti-terrorist center and a spetsnaz battalion within his department. 
They, he claimed, were indispensable "for ensuring the security of 
the existing constitutional structure." The Kremlin, in contrast to 
the State Duma, did not refuse the minister, so Shoygu started up a 
spetsnaz for himself. 


The militarization of the MChU, it should be noted, was not the 
strongest fixation of the young minister. According to its designation 
and type of operations, the rescue service is a wholly civilian 
department. So why do they need uniforms and weapons? 


According to the observations of people close to Shoygu, the romance 
of war is a secret, suppressed passion of Sergey Kuzugetovich. A white 
general, commander of the Wild Division, Baron Ungern, whom the Tuvin 
elders remember with holy terror, was an idol in his youth. The baron was 
desperately brave and an irresponsible cutthroat. A true fanatic of war. 
A different idol was placed before the youths of nomenklatura families, 
who were diligent komsomols and future party apparatchiks, but the young 
Shoygu was captivated by the wild baron -- you cannot order the heart. 


The passions of youth do not pass without a trace. Sergey 
Kuzhugetovich was an ardent hunter who collected cold weapons, who was 
not indifferent to great generals' stars and loved to get into hot spots. 
He is a brave man; everyone knows this. It is enough to recall that in 
May 1993, he led a convoy with humanitarian freight into the city of 
Tkvarcheli which was under siege by Georgian guerillas. The convoy came 
under strong fire on the edge of the city. Shoygu had the right to turn 
the trucks back, but he did not, and the convoy broke through into the 
blockaded city of Tkvarcheli. 


Sometimes, it is true, the suppressed militarism breaks out into 
spurts of unmotivated aggression. Usually even and restrained in his 
dealings with people, he can fall into a fury without any reason. In 
Stambul he became angry at a female journalist for one thing or another, 
who had asked him about his hunting passion. In Kazan at a recent meeting 
with voters, he threw himself on a mufti who asked an unpleasant 
question. Subordinates, of course, know about this weakness of their 
minister and try not to provoke him. 


The Rescue Budget 


People who work in the MChS understand that their minister is a 
businesslike person. And they cannot but value this. Despite the 
absolutely non-commercial character of its functions, the ministry has 
learned how to make good money. 


There are many methods. For example, the MChS has required industrial 
enterprises to file annual "safety declarations" that is, an 
ecological damage estimate which they can apply in case of any kind of 
catastrophe. In the beginning the directors were distraught; they did not 
know how this should be done. The MChS gladly came to their aid; it would 
compose the declarations without them, but only they had to pay for it. 
According to the estimates of experts, each year the ministry collects 
600 million rubles each from the industrialists. In addition, the 
enterprises must pay premiums to the Emergency Insurance Company and the 
MChS Aid Fund. This piece is even fatter -- 8-12 billion rubles a year. 


When a budget organization is absorbed with commercialism, it is 
always fraught. Many interesting things are said about MChS commercial 
activities. For example, how they made money in Germany from the purchase 
of BO105 helicopters, on the transport of shoddy prefabricated houses to 
the Kurils, and on the transport of caviar from the Far East on MChS 
aircraft. MChS procured 100 luxury "jeeps" from General Motors 
without customs clearances. The thankful Americans gave the wholesale 
buyer a small plant for repairing jeeps. The plant now stands in the 
property of the MChS's Academy of Civil Defense in the Moscow suburban 
village of Novogorsk, where it repairs other brands. MChS employees can 
guess for whose pockets the gift enterprise works, but they can only say 
it in whispers and in a dark place. 


The MChS is a quiet department, and noisy scandals will never surround 
it, even if ministerial secrets accidentally come to light. Thus, let's 
say, last year a military inspection by the president's administration 
was sorting out the interesting "apartment question." The MChS 
and its North-Caucasus Regional Center purchase apartments for its 
officers in Makhachkala. Military inspectors discovered that the cost of 
the housing was knowingly doubled; the ministry overpaid around 883.5 
million non-denominated rubles without basis. But the main thing was that 
the homeless officers never received the apartments. 


The conclusion of the commission: "45 percent of the allocated 
budget funds for financing housing construction in Makhachkala were by 
decision of Russian MChS officials not used in accordance with their 
designation." The military inspectorate's report lay on the desk of 
the then secretary of the Security Council, Nikolay Bordyuzhi. He 
redirected it to the Russian Federation chief military procurator, Yuriy 
Demin, who, giving it some thought, sent the papers down to the Dagestan 
military procurator from whom they were quickly returned to Moscow -- but 
not to the courts, but to the MChS. As a result, no one knows what became 
of the money used "not in accordance with its designation." 


This is nothing surprising -- it is customary to respect rich 
ministers, not inspect them. Ask any governor whether he respects Sergey 
Shoygu and he will confirm that he does. How can you not respect a 
minister who, in fact, by himself has at his disposal the fund for 
eliminating the consequences of emergency situations. Officially, the 
fund exists with the government, but indications of floods and droughts 
come to the MChS first, and that is where they decide who will be given 
material aid and who will have to manage. The volume of aid is based on 
the good will of the minister. In Penza Oblast, for example, they managed 
to build an airport with the left-over money which was allocated for 
flooding. But in Abakan, a bridge has been washed under for seven years 
in a row. Each time the MChS helps the victims, although the allocated 
money would be enough to build a subterranean tunnel. But one cannot 
refuse the people of Abakan, for Sergey Shoygu worked and lived in 
Abakan. 


The House of Good Measures 


Shoygu's career is an example of unique vitality. No one has managed 
to last in the Russian government for nine years except him. If President 
Yeltsin appointed and removed ministers based solely on being 
businesslike, then Shoygu's ministerial longevity could be explained by 
his exceptional businesslike qualities. But Chubays, they say, is also 
businesslike, and where is he? 


In contrast to others, the head of the MChS know how to correctly 
build relations. For a high official, this is an indicator of 
professionalism. He is equal with the others, but close to no one. He has 
never joined any groupings around the "court," always keeps to 
himself, and at the same time, no one will call him a lone wolf. No, he 
is wholly refined person, absolutely "his own man." He simply 
knows how to organize his relations. 


At one time he was friends with First Deputy Minister of Finance 
Vladimir Petrov and somehow gave him a hunting rifle for his birthday. 
Afterwards, Petrov ended up in the SIZO; his acquaintances were 
frightened; what if the unregistered weapon had "discharged." 
They rushed to Shoygu, "Tell us for sure, it was your gift, or get 
permission for it." Sergey Kuzhugetovich replied sharply "Don't 
entangle me in this. I didn't give him anything." 


The sixth floor of the MChS has been equipped with a cozy bar where 
the minister and his deputies and department chiefs like to spend their 
evenings. Formerly, the aide to the President on national security, Yuriy 
Baturin was a frequent guest. Everyone knew that there was no one to feed 
the bachelor Baturin, therefore they specially prepared something 
delicious for his appearances. When Baturin left the Kremlin, they 
stopped inviting him to the evening sittings at the MChS. 


In general, Shoygu is a hospitable host. Those who have been to the 
MChS's reception home on Davydkovskaya Street will confirm that there are 
no other such homes in Moscow. Usually on Wednesdays and Saturdays a 
company of solid men assemble there. At one time Oleg Soskovets, Yuriy 
Skokov, Sergey Stepashin, Andrey Kokoshin, and Igor Shabdurasulov were 
frequent visitors of the house. At first the guests warm their muscles on 
the tennis court, and then they head over to the field for mini-soccer. 
Three years ago the soccer duels took place with musical accompaniment. 
Shoygu had his own orchestra then and was very proud of it. The musicians 
were ordered, when the head of the MChS made a goal, to play a triumphal 
march, and if a score was made in the ministerial net, to play a funeral 
march. But once the orchestra director was not following the game, and 
when Shoygu scored on the opponents with a joyful shout, a sad melody was 
played. Since that time the matches are played without music. 


After the match, the flushed sportsmen head for the banya [Russian 
bathhouse], and from there, according to custom, to the table. According 
to those who have eaten there, the food is wonderful. Shoygu is a capable 
toastmaster and allows no one else to give the toast, but being clever 
himself, he drinks little -- takes a sip and sits it down. 


"The Bear Emerges From His Den." 


More than once they have tried to draw Sergey Shoygu into politics. 
But each time the minister inconspicuously moves to the side. Currently 
he has not succeeded at this. 


The head of the "Bear" bloc has put him in the service of 
the deputy head of the President's administration, Vladislav Surkov. It 
was rather difficult to refuse Surkov, for he has had long and 
functionally significant relations with Shoygu. They began back in 1992 
when Surkov worked in Menatep Bank and spent much time at the MChS 
reception room. At that time the commercial banks sent couriers to Shoygu 
without end in order to get the ministry account. Surkov turned out to be 
the most persistent and sat in the ministerial dressing room until 
victory. The MChS account went to Menatep, and from that time Shoygu and 
Surkov have been business partners. When Surkov went to Alfa Bank in 
1995, the MChS account went with him. This transferring of accounts 
aroused in ministerial corridors unfavorable false interpretations and 
ambiguous hints, but they had no relation to Shoygu's election campaign. 


However, Shoygu himself has a very remote attitude toward it. He is 
clearly unwilling to involve himself in this business. He does not like 
the hastily assembled bloc under him, does not like to go to the voters 
and to speak banalities about the unification of "all healthy 
forces." Prime-Minister Putin watched how his "emergency" 
minister was suffering and transferred Sergey Kuzhugetovich from party 
political work to a "hot spot" where he was more comfortable. 
There are others to work on the elections without him. First Vice-Premier 
Nikolay Aksenenko recently solemnly warned all ministers that their 
current work and further prospects would be evaluated on 20 December, 
based on the results of "Bear" in the elections. That is, those 
who want to remain in power should help their favorite bloc win. 


Essentially, it is not so important who forges the victory as who 
enjoys its fruits. Thus, coincidentally in agreeing to head the 
"presidential bloc," Shoygu received the star "Hero of 
Russia." Success in the elections also, apparently, will count. When 
Putin becomes president he will surely need a prime minister. It is also 
not to be excluded that the new premier might be needed earlier, for the 
current president. Of course, there could be any kind of deals, but 
Sergey Kuzhugetovich has nothing to worry about in the future -- with his 
experience and talent he will not be lost. 


******