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Johnson's Russia List
 

 

December 23, 1999    
This Date's Issues:3704   3705  3706





Johnson's Russia List
#3706
23 December 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com


[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russia final election results and seats.
2. Obshchaya Gazeta: Alexei Pankin, RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED BY 
20 PERCENT OF ALL VOTERS.

3. Itar-Tass: Western Media Reports about Execution of Civilians Denied.
4. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Geoffrey York, A Chechen mother's 
terrifying dilemma. She had a choice: Hide and starve, or face the bombs.

5. New York Times: Martin Malia, Good News From Russia (Yes, It's True).
6. Viktor Kalashnikov: The Duma Voting.
7. Michael Kagalenko: Re: 3700-Dmitri Glinski Vassiliev on elections.
8. Financial Times (UK): Thomas Catan, Russian mafia link to US campaign 
funds.

9. Inter Press Service: Russia: Copyright Piracy Runs Rampant.
10. REMARKS BY PRIME MINISTER VLADIMIR PUTIN AT THE FEDERATION COUNCIL 
SESSION DECEMBER 22, 1999.

11. Washington Post obituary: Matthew Gallagher, CIA Soviet Specialist.
DJ: David Hoffman of the Washington Post continues his interesting news
selection. Yesterday he was beating a dead horse in "Communists Reject 
Arms Treaty Appeal." No way the Duma was going to ratify the START-2
treaty this week but a clever move to try to make a story out of it.
And today Hoffman ressurects Berezovsky in "Russia Vote Returns Tycoon to 
Spotlight" which manages to ignore most of the really bad news about
the "soft-spoken businessman."]


*******


#1
TABLE-Russia final election results and seats


MOSCOW, Dec 23 (Reuters) - Following are the final results
of the Russian parliamentary election announced on Thursday by
Central Electoral Commission head Alexander Veshnyakov.


Half the 450 seats in the State Duma lower house were
contested among 26 parties, the rest by individual candidates in
local constituencies. Since there was no election in Chechnya
only 449 seats were contested.


A party needed at least five percent of the vote to win
seats. Votes for parties which failed to pass the threshold were
divided between the winners. The share of seats for winning
parties is thus bigger than their percentage of votes.


Only six of the 26 parties won more than five percent.


Several independents elected to parliament are likely to
affiliate themselves with party factions. Others might form a
new group.


For parties which took part in the 1995 Duma election, the
result of their party-list voting is shown in brackets.


Turnout: 62 percent (minimum 25 pct)


PARTY LISTS INDIVIDUALS TOTAL


pct seats seats seats


1. Communist Party
(22.30 pct) 24.29 67 46 113


2. Unity (Yedinstvo) 23.24 64 8 72


3. Fatherland-All Russia 13.12 36 30 66


4. Union Of Right-Wing
Forces 8.6 24 5 29


5. Yabloko (6.89 pct) 5.98 17 4 21


6. Zhirinovsky bloc


(11.18 pct++) 6.40 17 0 17


7. Independents - - 122 122


TOTAL 81.63+++ 225 215 440+


A new vote will be held in nine constituencies where more
people voted ``against all'' than for any candidate.


In 1995 ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky stood for
parliament at the helm of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR).
This year the party was barred from the election on
technicalities and Zhirinovsky hastily set up another bloc but
consistently said it was just another name for LDPR.


The balance of the votes -- 18.37 percent -- was won by
parties which failed to cross the five percent threshold. The
votes were therefore distributed among the six parties that
crossed the threshold.


*****


#2
Obshchaya Gazeta
No. 51
[translation for personal use only from RIA Novosti]
RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED BY 20 PERCENT OF ALL VOTERS
Alexei PANKIN, Cand. Sc. (History) 

It is generally believed that Vladimir Putin's Government
has scored a land-slide victory in the course of the December
19 parliamentary elections.
All in all, about 25 percent of all Russian voters, who
came to the polls December 19, sided with the Unity bloc,
which is headed by a federal minister, and which is also
supported by the Prime Minister himself. The December 19 voter
turn-out was 62 percent. In other words, just under 15 percent
of all eligible voters favor Unity. Add to this approximately
5 percent of Russian adults, who voted for the Union of Right
Forces. Consequently, one can say that the Russian Cabinet is
supported by some 20 percent of this country's entire
electorate. Meanwhile 80 percent of all Russian voters were
either opposed to the nation's Government, which is waging a
seemingly popular and victorious war in Chechnya, or preferred
not to cast their ballots at all.

******


#3
Western Media Reports about Execution of Civilians Denied.


MOSCOW, December 23 (Itar-Tass) - Nikolai Koshman, a plenipotentiary 
representative of the Russian government in Chechnya, has denied western 
media reports alleging that tens of peaceful civilians have been executed in 
the Chechen settlement of Alkhan-Yurt. Koshman has dismissed such reports as 
"deliberate juggling with the facts." 


It is out of the question that residents of Alkhan-Yuri might have been 
either gunned down or executed, a source from the office of Nikolai Koshman 
said. 


An extent of plausibility of western media reports about the death of 
peaceful civilians in Alkhan-Yurt is being studied now. Last week, Nikolai 
Koshman visited Alkhan-Yurt. The military Prosecutor's office is conducting 
an investigation there at Koshman's request. 


Federal troops had held negotiations with local residents before Alkhan -Yurt 
had been brought under control, demanding that militants leave Alkhan-Yurt. 
However, in return, gunfire was opened at federal troops from houses and 
reinforced sites directly adjoining residential areas. As a result of the 
shelling federal troops have suffered losses and had to strike at militants' 
positions in retaliation. 


Last week, Alkhan-Yurt was visited by Itar-Tass journalist. The settlement 
has been badly destroyed, which shows that militants offered fierce 
resistance when the settlement was stormed. Russian military sources do not 
ruled out that peaceful civilians used by militants as a shield might have 
been killed by gunfire. 


******


#4
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
December 23, 1999
A Chechen mother's terrifying dilemma
She had a choice: Hide and starve, or face the bombs
By GEOFFREY YORK


Sleptsovsk, Russia -- After 40 days and 40 nights in a freezing cellar in the 
besieged city, Zura Elmurzayava faced a stark choice.


She could slowly starve to death in her basement in Grozny, next to the 
rotting corpses of those who had already perished. Or she could run the 
gauntlet of Russian bombs and rockets in a dash for freedom.


The food was almost gone. Each day she had only a few slices of bread and 
some water mixed with sugar. Her children were crying from hunger and thirst.


But whenever she dared to open the cellar door, she glimpsed a scene from 
hell: smoke, explosions, twisted hunks of shrapnel.


On Saturday, she made her decision. Gathering her four children, she waited 
for a brief lull in the bombing. Then she joined a small group of refugees in 
a nerve-racking race out of Chechnya's doomed capital.


For three days they walked through the suburbs and the outskirts of Grozny, 
hiding from the bombs and the Russian helicopters thundering so low overhead 
that the refugees felt they could not breathe.


They hitched a lift in a car, walked for another half a day, found a bus and 
finally reached the neighbouring region of Ingushetia yesterday, crossing 
five Russian army checkpoints along the way.


Mrs. Elmurzayava and her children are safe now. 
They are in an overcrowded tent in a muddy refugee camp near the Chechen 
border. But thousands of other civilians -- as many as 40,000 by some 
estimates -- are still trapped in Grozny's basements and bunkers.


"They told us to tell the world that civilians are still there," Mrs. 
Elmurzayava said yesterday.


"The Russians are lying when they say that only terrorists are left. Tell the 
whole world that civilians are dying in Grozny."


This is the second siege of Grozny in the past five years. The first Chechnya 
war, from 1994 to 1996, left Mrs. Elmurzayava a widow. Her husband was killed 
by a rocket from a Russian warplane. But this war, she says, is far more 
horrible than the first.


"In the first war, we knew where they were shooting and how to escape. This 
time, it comes at you from all sides -- you don't know where to run."


Ever since the military tightened its grip on Grozny in early November, about 
60 civilians -- mostly Chechens, but also Russians and Armenians -- have been 
huddled in terror in the small basement of her five-storey apartment building 
near the centre of Grozny. The ceiling is only about 1.2 metres high, and the 
adults must crouch low to move.


For six weeks, their food stocks have dwindled. They baked bread on bricks. 
Chechen rebel fighters brought them water, firewood and medicine (mostly 
painkillers), but it was never enough. The adults rationed their food, eating 
only one meal a day so that their children could have two meals.


In the last week of November, two men ventured out of the cellar. They were 
injured by shrapnel, and within a day they had bled to death. Their corpses 
remained in the basement because the bombing was too intense to allow a 
burial.


"I couldn't stand it," Mrs. Elmurzayava said. "It was better to die than to 
live like that. We didn't know whether it was day or night. Children were 
crying, asking to go outside. They were hungry, they were thirsty. It was 
better to die from bombing than from hunger."


She and her children were in a group of 18 refugees who fled from Grozny on 
the weekend. As far as she knows, about 40 people are still alive in that 
basement.


In their four-day journey through the Russian-controlled districts of 
Chechnya, the refugees saw strong evidence of looting by Russian troops, she 
said. They saw a military truck loaded with household furniture, including 
sofas, armchairs, carpets and televisions. They saw mattresses strapped to a 
tank, and they saw another tank pulling a cow on a rope, she said.


Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared yesterday that the 
"antiterrorist operation" in Chechnya will be completed soon. But the 
refugees are skeptical. After the strong performance by Mr. Putin's 
supporters in the parliamentary election on Sunday, the Kremlin will be 
encouraged to continue the war for as long as possible since it could boost 
Mr. Putin's campaign for the presidency. "This war will continue until 
Chechnya is destroyed," Mrs. Elmurzayava said.


Other newly arriving refugees from Grozny told similar stories of fear and 
despair. Markha Akhmatkhanova, a 36-year-old mother of two, survived for 26 
days in a nuclear-bomb shelter in Grozny with about 100 other civilians. 
Their main source of drinking water was a hole in a broken pipe.


"We didn't go outside and nobody came to us," she said yesterday at the 
refugee camp in Ingushetia. "I was too afraid to go outside. We had no idea 
what was happening outside."


The civilians in the bunker were rescued on Monday by a group of Chechen 
fighters who loaded them onto a convoy of trucks and cars.


Issa Kutuzov, 44, was hit by shrapnel from a Russian artillery shell on Dec. 
12 in a suburb of Grozny. He was recovering this week in a hospital near 
Ingushetia's border with Chechnya. Before he left the city, he saw signs of 
hunger spreading through the Chechen capital. "I took a friend into my house 
because he was dying of hunger," he said.


Dead civilians are buried hastily in makeshift graves in courtyards and 
school yards, he said. The survivors in his neighbourhood were walking two or 
three kilometres every day to collect water from a well, but this cannot 
continue, Mr. Kutuzov said. "It's too dangerous to get water from there."


******


#5
New York Times
December 23, 1999
[for personal use only]
Good News From Russia (Yes, It's True)
By MARTIN MALIA
Martin Malia, emeritus professor of history at the University of California, 
is author of "Russia Under Western Eyes." 


BERKELEY, Calif. -- The results of Russia's third post-Communist
parliamentary 
elections on Sunday augur an improvement -- yes, improvement -- in her 
prospects. There will at last be a centrist, reform-oriented Duma able to 
work with the president. The point bears emphasis, since Boris Yeltsin's 
Russia is currently presented by the news media as a disaster domestically 
and a revived menace internationally. All week, pundits have seen the evil 
twins of nationalism and corruption in the election results. 
This perception began with the financial crash of August 1998 -- for didn't 
it show that Russia's reformers had "failed"? It was aggravated by claims 
that those same reformers were guilty of money-laundering -- wasn't this 
proof that Americans who had supported Mr. Yeltsin had "lost" Russia? And it 
has now culminated with the second Chechnya war: doesn't this aggression 
demonstrate Russia's inveterately predatory nature? 


By election day, the rhetoric had reached a crescendo not heard since the 
cold war. The Economist magazine, in a lurid cover story on "bleak and bloody 
Russia," concluded that it "is a strange country, perhaps a uniquely strange 
country." A commentator on the Lehrer News Hour insinuated that the Yeltsin 
government had blown up Moscow apartments last September to justify the war 
in Chechnya. Against such a background, it is only natural that The Nation, 
reviving the old chimera of "socialism with a human face," wrote that Mr. 
Yeltsin destroyed the bright hope of a genuinely reformable Communism. 


On what are such pronouncements based? Alas, they implicitly assume that Mr. 
Yeltsin's rule began with his re-election in 1996, when he began to act 
erratically. Even worse, they assess his performance as if the Soviet Union 
had never existed: Russia's problems began, in this view, with his misguided 
reforms and America's misguided support. 


Let us put some historical context around this "disaster." 


Only 10 years ago, Soviet Russia was a military-industrial complex, whose 
obsolete heavy industry made up some 70 percent to 80 percent of gross 
national product. Though now significantly demilitarized, these factories 
produce little that is salable. 


With such a mastodon, a gradual transition to a free-market economy was not 
an option. The "shock therapy" pioneered by Poland after 1990 was the only 
viable course of reform. In Poland, the policy produced brilliant results. So 
why not the same in Russia? For the crucial reason that Communism had struck 
far deeper roots and hence put up major resistance to liberalization. By 
December 1992, for example, the ex-Soviet nomenklatura had forced President 
Yeltsin to appoint the chief of the old gas ministry, Viktor Chernomyrdin, as 
prime minister. He used his control of the state apparatus to transform the 
gas ministry into an extravagantly profitable private concern, and, at the 
same time, enrich a chosen few. This happened across many industries in the 
crucial 1991-92 transition: insiders bought commodities at fixed, low Soviet 
prices and sold them abroad at market prices to create the oligarchic 
fortunes now plaguing Russia. 


The reformers had to accept this compromise, however, because, unlike Poland, 
Russia received no significant Western aid to help with the transition. 


After 1994, Anatoly Chubais, the sole surviving reformer, gambled that 
privatizing industries quickly, selling them at fire-sale prices, would force 
rapid conversion of obsolete factories. This privatization is now blamed for 
Russia's troubles, although it is less important than the earlier 
bureaucratic enrichment through commodity trading. 


The culmination of the "disaster" was the financial collapse of 1998. In 
fact, this proved to be a good thing. It burst the speculative bubble, 
reducing the oligarchs' power. With the end of foreign credit, imports dried 
up, and Russia had to produce its own goods. Industry was given an incentive 
to modernize, and the economy is now improving for the first time since 1996. 
A middle class of young entrepreneurs is emerging. 


If the economy gets little Western respect, the political system gets almost 
none. Russia is now denied the august label "democracy," even though 
elections are accepted by all as the only road to power and freedom of 
expression is an ingrained habit. 


Yes, political clans around leaders substitute for real parties. And yes, 
campaigning is built on distortion, the media are blatantly biased and money 
is indispensable to victory. But these are just extreme manifestations of 
general democratic defects. Ultimately, victory and political power depend on 
a real vote. 


More serious is the lack of a decent judiciary. Then there is the omnipresent 
corruption, Russia's number one problem. Most poor countries, however, run on 
bribes, though we rarely make this comparison. Instead, we judge Russia by 
the venerable institutions of affluent America or Switzerland. 


Finally there is the war in Chechnya. It is indeed horrible, especially in 
its brutality toward civilians. Yet our revulsion at such barbarity should 
not lead us to hasty political conclusions. Remember that the issue in 
Chechnya is territorial integrity. Islamic zealots who want a regional war of 
liberation against Russia attacked first. And lawlessness and kidnappings 
continue to plague the breakaway republic. Last summer, had the Russia 
government failed to respond to an invasion of militants in neighboring 
Dagestan, its own credibilty would have been undermined. Surely, national 
"credibility" is a concern that Americans can well understand: it was the 
reason why, after having botched the Kosovo problem for months, NATO finally 
bombed its way to a still elusive solution. So what are Russia's prospects? 
It will continue as it has, although with the improvements introduced by last 
Sunday's elections. 



We don't have to worry about imperial aggressiveness in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia. What is most important: Whoever becomes president next June 
will be constrained by the weakness of the Russian state, the flagging 
economy (smaller than that of the Netherlands) and the decay of the military. 
Besides, the West already has its hands on the oil of the region's 
traditionally Russian territories. 


So perhaps the West should dampen its resurgent Russophobic reflexes, born of 
czarist and Communist memories, and think again, as in the early 1990's, 
about how to tie the bear to an increasingly interdependent world.


******


#6
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1999 
From: machinegun@glasnet.ru (Viktor Kalashnikov)
Subject: The Duma Voting


The actual issue about the recent Duma elections is the 
following: if Russians would, hopefully, never again commit 
their MONEY to Berezovsky (after 'AVVA' and similar mass-
robberies he'd arranged), why did they still commit their 
VOTES to him (as he is the master of the plot we've just 
witnessed - with all the OSCE observers on our side)? The 
most liable explanation goes: democratic mechanisms in 
Russia do not still constitute, for an ordinary citizen, a 
transparent link between voting-events and real life. 
Philosophers and culturologists are invited to put their 
judgement on it.


Berezovsky himself is, apparently, far ahead of many 
intellectuals in resolving that historic enigma. And as he 
spelled out: "The most profitable business in Russia is 
politics". He, admittedly, had failed with his plans to control 
financial transactions within the CIS (during his time as the 
head of that body when he attempted to set up a CIS bank). 
Zbigniew Brzhezinski's concepts together with 
NATO/CENTCOM efforts with regard to the Russia's 'near 
abroad' have obstructed those far-reaching visions of BAB. 


But now, after the Duma voting had been cast, he and his 
partners could, at least, dispose over several $billions they'll 
envisage to extract from the RF budget. The problem, 
immediately arising, is: would BAB's dead-rivals like 
Gasprom and most of the oil-companies (i.e. RF 
government's major benefactors) be still willing to grant 
THEIR money to him? Why should they, in fact? 


Yes, the BAB could now, better than before, dispose over all 
the eighteen or so armies subordinated directly to Kremlin. 
But what about the 25 000-strong private force commanded 
by Gasprom? What about satellites-equipped intelligence- 
and fighting units of Menatep/Yukos? If the latter had been 
able to launch a wave of sincere indignation against 
corrupted Tatjana in both Old and New worlds (by using 
experience and tools of the anti-Pershing-II campaigns) - 
why should they give in just in face of new voting statistics? 
One ought not to be of such low opinion about Russia's 
business elite.


Another issue is, of course, the authority over the ominous 
'red button'. According to the yesterday's interview with 
Helmut Schmidt for 'Die Zeit', 'Yeltsin is destroyed by 
alcohol to the extent that no of his own words ought to be 
taken seriously'. Would then the word like 'Ignition!' (after 
the 'three, two, one...') if uttered by Boris be taken 
'seriously' by the commanding general? Or would the latter 
just mutter 'hold the line, please ' to ask for a more relevant 
order through a parallel line? In the case Tatjana or BAB 
themselves would be just busy with purchasing of yet 
another castle in Bavaria at the moment - who would take 
the annoyance of giving the final approval? The SFC-people 
ought, indeed, to switch their partnerships to Russia's hidden 
facilities to the less remote spots - say, near Garmisch. Why 
not to suggest to set up a joint red-line terminal just at the 
picturesque Alpine slopes? 


As to the poor Vlad-Vlad, his fate seems to have been 
already sealed off far ahead of the recent NTV-show. As 
Gleb Pavlovsky - the Family's true servant, the designer of 
the Yedinstvo-campaign and the darling of so many 
foundations/endowments - put it :'The on-going Chechnya 
campaign was the Putin's PERSONAL DECISION, taken 
AGAINST STANDPOINTS OF ANYONE ELSE'. So, contrary to 
the 1994-96 Caucuses disasters, the 'family' BEARS NO 
RESPONSIBILITY this time. But why the hell did Putin - a 
KGB Lt.-Colonel with a practice in shadowing Soviet 
officials' wives at Dresden, anyway - allow to entangle him in 
that? The not so distant future would unveil the motives. They 
surely will appear the compelling ones.


******


#7
From: "Michael B. Kagalenko" <mkagalen@coe.neu.edu>
Subject: Re: 3700-Dmitri Glinski Vassiliev on elections; 
NPR "Connection" on the elections
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 


I would like an opportunity to comment on the results of
Sunday's election, as well as its coverage by the media. It seems
surprising to me that all commentators interpret the returns as
unquestioned defeat for the OVR and big victory for the Kremlin. To be
sure, the results are not particularly good for the opposition, when
compared with earlier expectations. But examining the preliminary table
of election returns (JRL 3697) shows that anti-Kremlin parties
(Communists and OVR) did significantly better in gaining seats on
individual basis. Thus, Communists and OVR gained respectively 39 % and
47 % of their total seats in individual seats, whereas "Unity" and
SPS gained respectively 13 % and 17 % of their total seats as
individuals. I have not seen any comment about this trend (except
in Stanislav Menshikov's article for "Moscow Tribune," which mentions
this interesting result in passing). When vote counting ends,
all parties will gain more seats on party lists due to the vote
that went to the parties that did not clear the 5% barrier. It would
be interesting to see the final table.


Dmitri Glinski Vassiliev wrote about the results of the election in JRL
# 3700 :
> The experience of the present generation in Russia is that political
> protest is simply counterproductive, in the absence of a well-organized and
> self-confident political force that would be able and willing to defend its
> followers. The ruling elite has formidable economic resources of retaliation
> against millions of people who vote and act the wrong way. In 1992-93, the
> intelligentsia and the masses behind it were severely punished for their
> attempts to "destabilize" the nomenklatura - savings were destroyed, state
> was dismembered and privatized, parliament was shelled, and the
> establishment's grip was strengthened. The "democrats", that is, the
> beneficiaries of the protest, were neither able nor willing to go to the
> streets, to rally Western opinion, to risk anything to protect their
> electorate. In August 1998, another group of disgruntled citizens, the
> so-called middle class, was again punished for its misbehavior vis-a-vis
> Yeltsin and Chubais: savings from financial speculation were devalued,
> domestic market for its services drastically reduced, Western funding and
> contacts much diminished. Albeit on a much smaller scale than in 1992, but
> quite a heavy blow for this strata.


The thesis of Mr.Glinsky-Vassiliev is certainly interesting, although
I am not convinced it can stand up to close scrutiny. It is telling
that Mr.Glinsky-Vassiliev does not specify what was the misbehavior
wrt oligarchs and Yeltsin's family that Russians were punished for in
1998. My recollection of the events is that the only malcontents of the
time were coal miners, who I would guess weren't affected nearly as
much as those put their faith in commercial banks and the ruble; those
who were firmly behind the Yeltsin's policies. I think that he got it
exactly backwards; the examination of factual record strongly suggests
that both in 1992-93 and 1998 Russians were punished for trusting
Yeltsin's system, and for giving it the political mandate.
Mr.Glinsky-Vassiliev ends his analysis with the colorful image
of the Russian Vlast (power) as a wild beast:
> The Duma vote seems to have confirmed the lesson drawn by many Russians
> from their first decade of democratic politics: the power gap between the
> ruling elite and the citizens is very large indeed. And it has grown larger
> over the past decade, when the elite has more or less successfully
> integrated itself with Western establishment while the rest of the nation
> rolled back into the Third World. In this position, it is just not sensible
> for Russians to infuriate the beast of Vlast by trying to unseat it. More
> sound strategy is to make it feel good and feed its better instincts. Stay
> quiet and vote right - until someone appears who will call the beast its
> name and show how the weak may suddenly become strong.


I do not have any first-hand experience taming the wild creatures.
However, what I have read leads me to believe that, upon finding
oneself in the cage with predators, the only way one can save his hide
is not to turn one's back to them, and show to the beasts the firm
leash and sturdy knout; and that appeasing the wild beast and letting
it have its way may postpone the catastrophe while making the ultimate
outcome progressively more grievous.


*******


#8
Financial Times (UK)
23 December 1999
[for personal use only]
Russian mafia link to US campaign funds 
By Thomas Catán in New York


Russian émigrés living in the US and believed by authorities to have links 
with organised crime have made campaign contributions to leading US 
candidates and political parties in what appears to be an effort to win 
political influence.


Through family members and businesses, Semyon (Sam) Kislin - identified in a 
1994 internal report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a member of a 
Russian crime syndicate - contributed $46,250 to the political campaign of 
New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani, a Republican, in 1993 and 1997, election 
records show.


The commodities trader also donated $8,000 to New York senator Charles 
Schumer, a Democrat, last year, and contributed to several other US political 
figures. The allegations against him were first publicised by the Center for 
Public Integrity, the Washington-based non-profit group, earlier this week. 
Mr Kislin has denied any links with organised crime.


It also emerged that Jacob Bogatin, an associate of Semyon Mogilevich, who is 
himself alleged by US and UK intelligence authorities to be the head of a 
Russian crime syndicate, made donations to the National Republican 
Congressional Committee between 1996 and 1998.


Mr Mogilevich has denied the allegations against him.


Election records show Mr Bogatin contributed at least $2,750 to the 
Republican campaign group - sometimes under the name of his company, YBM 
Magnex.


The Philadelphia-based magnet manufacturer, which was founded by Mr Bogatin 
with Mr Mogilevich, was raided and closed down by US authorities in May 1998. 
YBM Magnex pleaded guilty to securities fraud and was fined $3m in November 
1999.


These and other developments have prompted US investigators to start looking 
closely at Russian assets and investments in the country, particularly in the 
New York area, according to people close to the investigations.


Though the political contributions traced so far are not large, they will 
fuel concerns that money from Russian organised crime could be finding its 
way into the political system.


"When I was in the Department of State, from time to time we would hear of 
people associated with organised crime reaching out to members of the 
[Capitol] Hill," said Jonathan Winer, who until recently served as deputy 
secretary of state. "The administration briefed Hill members on more than one 
occasion."


Mr Winer noted that those briefed by the State Department came from both main 
political parties, and on all occasions dropped contact with the figures 
under suspicion.


In recent years, two Russian businessmen identified by US authorities as 
having links to Russian organised crime have turned up at Democratic 
fundraising events, despite being denied entry visas. Both have appeared in 
photographs with President Bill Clinton and Vice-President Al Gore.


Yesterday, the office of Senator Schumer said it had performed a background 
check on Mr Kislin and found nothing on him. "If any of these allegations 
prove true, we will absolutely return the money," a spokesman said. Mr 
Giuliani's office could not be reached for comment.


******


#9
Culture-Russia: Copyright Piracy Runs Rampant
Inter Press Service


MOSCOW, (Dec. 21) IPS - Russia's internationally acclaimed artists have been 
adversely affected not only by the country's economic downturn, but also by 
rampant copyright piracy. 


There is more demand for "cheaper" -- i.e., counterfeit -- products, concedes 
Andrei, a young vendor selling CD-Roms and compact disks in a small shop near 
the entrance to the subway under Pushkin square, in downtown Moscow. 


Similar copyright infringement plagues the music and film industries, and 
even books are often pirated in Russia. Foreign and domestic pressure groups 
have long been looking for ways to persuade Russian government to crack down 
on pirates. 


The Kremlin has promised to wage an all-out war against video piracy. Russian 
television recently featured anti-piracy promotion spots, and the police 
regularly raid street stalls and kiosks, confiscating counterfeit tapes and 
fining vendors. 


"We have been highlighting enforcement of copyright protection laws," said 
Gen. Eugeny Durnenkov, head of the investigation department at the Moscow tax 
police. 


"In 1999, piracy has somewhat subsided," he told IPS. 


Since the beginning of 1999, tax police conducted some 300 raids in Moscow 
and seized roughly 40,000 video tapes and 50,000 pirated CD-ROM disks. 


However, only 75 people were fined and just 10 criminal investigations have 
been initiated. 


In 1995, Russia completed a substantive copyright law reform and this year, a 
new criminal code took effect, making software piracy a crime along with 
other breaches of intellectual property rights. 


Since the beginning of last year, the Penal Code was amended to include 
prison sentences for offenders. But enforcement is weak, and software pirates 
are not deterred by fines which are dwarfed by their profits. 


A minor distributor of pirated products can earn up to $200,000 a year -- a 
considerable sum in post-crisis Russia. 


It is therefore little wonder that pirated videos, CDs, books, CD-Roms and 
other products are estimated to control up to 85 percent of Russian market. 


On Dec. 16, the Russian government said the country's Penal Code needs to be 
further amended so as to combat piracy more efficiently. 


According to the latest government's estimates, the patent holders and the 
state are losing up to $3 billion a year in unpaid royalties and taxes due to 
copyright infringement. 


Industry estimates of losses due to piracy for 1997 run to about $700 million 
for publishing, music and films, computer software and CD-Roms. 


Russia's potential as an intellectual property market is somewhat marred by 
its reputation as a haven for pirates. 


A stroll through Moscow's Mitino market reveals the extent of the problem. 
Stalls are stocked full of illegally translated instruction manuals, while 
pirated Hollywood blockbusters sit next to copies of computer software and 
CD-ROMs. 


CD-ROM "collections," including pirate versions of Microsoft's Windows 95, 
and dozens of other software products, are sold openly for just $3-$4 at this 
market, while licensed versions go for 30 times as much in computer stores. 


Audio CDs are available for about $2, and Hollywood movies, including latest 
releases, go for about $3 each. The vendors in Mitino, Moscow's northern 
suburb, obviously have enough buyers: the weekly compact disc market is 
packed full. 


Even Pyatnitskoe Highway is jammed on Saturdays, and it takes about 15 
minutes to drive the last kilometer to the market. 


Russia has been a poor market for the computer software industry, both 
because relatively few Russians can afford computers and because those who 
can afford them are likely to purchase pirated software. 


Some 90 percent of the software used in Russia has been pirated, according to 
the Business Software Alliance, an industry group that includes international 
giant Microsoft. 


The turnover of fake software in Moscow alone has reached about $1 million a 
month, the Alliance says, adding that about nine-tenth of Russian 
organizations had illegally copied software, violating intellectual property 
rights. 


Even publishing companies say they have every right to be worried. Apart from 
books, even monthly magazines are pirated in Russia. But according to Russian 
laws, the formal complaint against pirates must be filed where the offending 
company is registered. 


Thus, many pirated editions are sold in Moscow, but their publishers are 
registered in remote destinations thousands of kilometers from the Russian 
capital, which makes it difficult to prosecute offenders. 


The Russian Society of Authors (RSA) is participating in the settlement of 
hundreds of copyright conflicts every year, and the number is increasing. 
Furthermore, some of RSA's representatives have been threatened or even 
physically assaulted. 


Since early this year, Moscow's municipal authorities have started a process 
of licensing and registration of firms and entrepreneurs dealing with 
intellectual products, said Mikhail Ostrovsky, head of the media department 
at Moscow's municipal government. 


As a result, the availability of pirated products has dropped by some 20 
percent, he told IPS. 


The fight against piracy is not just a public relations exercise for the 
Russian authorities, as stamping out copyright infringements also constitutes 
an important condition for Russia to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). 


Some experts see light at the end of the tunnel, arguing that a police 
crackdown has finally become reality and the piracy rate is gradually going 
down. 


However, with a backdrop of deteriorating living standards and a widespread 
tendency to use cheap pirated products, stringent copyright protection in 
Russia still seems far off. 


*******


#10
REMARKS BY PRIME MINISTER VLADIMIR PUTIN AT THE
FEDERATION COUNCIL SESSION
DECEMBER 22, 1999
Source: Federal News Service
www.fednews.ru


Esteemed Yegor Semyonovich, esteemed members of the Federation
Council. In accordance with the Constitution of the Russian
Federation and on instruction of the President of Russia I am
submitting to you for ratification the Union Treaty on the creation
of the Union State of Byelorussia and Russia.


As you know, the treaty was almost unanimously ratified by
the State Duma. Approval by the upper house is necessary for it to
enter lawful force, to become an effective document that works for
the genuine drawing together of the two states.


With your permission I will briefly characterize the aims and
tasks of the Treaty and its significance for both countries. The
Treaty was drafted in accordance with the main provisions of the
Declaration on the Further Unification of Russia and Byelorussia
that was confirmed by the presidents of the two countries on
December 25, 1998. To put it in a nutshell, voluntariness and
gradualness of the unification -- such are the two principles of
the essence of the approach to the integration of our countries, as
they are outlined in the Declaration. 


The Treaty submitted to you for your consideration fully
accords with these principles. In what concretely is this
expressed? 


First. The signing of the treaty does not affect in any way,
does not limit the national sovereignty of the Russian Federation
and the Republic of Byelorussia. The independence and international
obligations of both countries are fully preserved. 


Second. The treaty provides for the preservation of the
internal arrangements of both states unchanged. Its entry into
force will not require immediate amendments in the constitutions of
the Russian Federation and Byelorussia. When this question arises
on the agenda in the course of the drawing together, this will be
done by way of the drafting and adoption in both countries of a
special constitutional act. 


I want to especially draw your attention to the fact that this
Treaty does not affect in any way the status of the subjects of the
Russian Federation. That is why the views that are sometimes
expressed that the inclusion of Byelorussia into Russia just as the
proposal to raise the status of some subjects of the Russian
Federation to that of Byelorussia are something that are outside of
the framework of the document that has been submitted to you for
your consideration. 


The Treaty does not provide any political or legal grounds for
raising such issues. On the contrary, it eliminates the very
possibility of the origination of such problems. 


Third. The Treaty clearly defines the brief and competence of
the union state. It will be directed mainly at the stage-by-stage
creation of a uniform legal and economic environment for Russia and
Byelorussia. The forming and perfection of this environment will
create real preconditions for further steps of integration. 


Fourth. The bodies of the union state reflect the competence
stated in the Treaty. These are the Supreme State Council where
decisions are adopted by the heads of the two states according to
the principle of one state - one vote. There will be a two-chamber
parliament with one of the chambers elected by popular vote. There
will be a Council of Ministers with substantial powers, a court and
a chamber of auditors. 


According to the Treaty, the decisions of the above bodies
within the limits of their competence will be mandatory on the
territory of both countries. 


Fifth. The Treaty is accompanied by an action program to
implement its provisions. This removes the danger of the treaty
becoming merely a declaration of intent. The action program sets
out the direction, the stages and timeframes of our joint steps in
the economic, legal, humanitarian, military and other fields.


The full implementation of the program will mean the
completion of the creation of the union state. In this connection
I would like to note that Russia and Byelorussia have a wealth of
experience of joint work in most diverse fields. It is out of this
experience of the two countries and peoples and not out of pure
theory that the idea of the drawing closer together and advance
towards a single state has grown. 


I want to remind you that in 1996 Russia and Byelorussia
formed a community and in 1997 formed the Union of Russia and
Byelorussia. Now it is the turn of the gradual creation of a union
state. And all this, and I want to emphasize this, is absolutely
voluntary.


Such are the main parameters of the document that is being
submitted to you for ratification today.


As you see, it is not directed at the full merging of Russia
and Byelorussia. It is directed at the creation of a voluntary
inter-state association of such a form and such a depth of
integration for which our countries are really prepared today. At
the same time, such a possibility in the future is not ruled out by
the mechanisms of drawing closer together that are built into the
Treaty. The decisive say, of course, will belong to the peoples of
the two countries.


Now, very briefly, I would like to say a few words about the
importance of the Treaty to Russia. Without any doubt, it meets our
cardinal national interests. First of all, economic ones, because
it provides for the gradual integration of the national economies
of the two countries. Of course, this will require a lot of hard
work but we are capable of fulfilling it. We have the necessary
positive experience. 


At the same time the world experience of integration processes
shows that they are successful only when the balance of the
national interests of all the participants in the integration is
ensured. Russia firmly intends to keep to this principle. The
Treaty also accords with our military-political interests. Recent
events reminded us once again that the time of a world idyll has
not yet set in and is not likely to set in in the foreseeable
future. 


The factor of military might, the factor of strength fully
retains its importance in international relations. By creating a
single state with Byelorussia, as it always happens in such
instances, we are not simply adding together but multiplying our
joint military-strategic potential. In the process Byelorussia
retains its non-nuclear status.


I believe that a successful implementation of the Treaty in
practice will have a positive influence on the state of affairs in
the CIS and encourage the Commonwealth to move along the road to
higher forms of cooperation.


Last but not least, the forming on the territory of the union
state of a single economic, transport and customs space, the
pursuance of a single trade and tariff policy, the adoption of a
single legislation on foreign investments will have a favorable
influence, as it seems to us, on the positions of both countries in
world economic ties and first of all, of course, in Europe. 


Concluding my brief analysis I would like to say that your
ratification of the Treaty is simultaneously the end and the
beginning of a very important stage in the life of Russia and
Byelorussia, the beginning of extensive and responsible work to
implement the Treaty. I believe that we will have here plenty of
work to do for all, for both the executive and legislative branches
of government. 


The priority tasks include the drafting and adoption of laws
on elections to the union parliament, on the citizenship of the
union state and some other legislation. It will be necessary to
jointly create an efficient apparatus of the bodies of the union
state. 


Esteemed members of the Federation Council, it seems to us and
the government hopes that you will regard with approval the Treaty
on the creation of the union state of Russia and Byelorussia that
has been submitted to you and will vote for its ratification.


I want to stress once again that in my opinion the most
important thing is to create a parliament and a good legal
framework for the future single state. I would like to particularly
stress again that all the stages planned by us will be traversed,
without any doubt whatsoever, with your direct participation. This
is the aim of the government and the presidential structures and
they will pursue their work in the area of integration exclusively
in the interests of Russia and its regions. There is nothing that
may cause apprehensions about an erosion of the role of regions or
about some special role of other subjects of the Federation as a
result of the processes of integration. Nothing of the sort will be
allowed to happen. In fact, nothing can be done without your
participation. Any next step that will require amendments in the
Constitution or some constitutional acts cannot be taken without
your participation. 


I thank you for your attention. 


Moderator: Thank you, Vladimir Vladimirovich. Will there be
any questions? 


Chorus of voices: No. 


Moderator: Fedotkin wants to put a question. 


Fedotkin: Vladimir Vladimirovich, the voters in Ryazan region
virtually unanimously support this Treaty. But one question arises.
Historically we developed and strengthened ties of friendship not
only with Byelorussia but with all the republics of the USSR.
Today these ties are severed and this hits hard at both families
and enterprises. 


I have one question in this connection. Is the government
doing anything and will it do anything to make sure that the
Russia-Byelorussia Treaty is not the last step in that direction,
so that perhaps a third state should join our Union next year? What
concrete steps is the government planning to take?


Putin: I think you are absolutely right when you speak about
severed economic ties and ties between people. In the post-Soviet
space we are cemented not only by the common past, but also by the
common present. Because many people are simply relatives of each
other, millions and tens millions of people.


Unfortunately, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the
divergence between the states proceeded faster than we could
expect. But this is what we are doing. Of course, we will
strengthen the Commonwealth of Independent States. The question is
by what means. I personally believe that our chances will be all
the greater if Russia is stronger, if it is attractive.


So, even within the framework of the treaty that has been
submitted for ratification to you today, the relations with our
partners must be based on the national interests of Russia. And we
should not allow a situation when our desire -- our common desire
and the desire of our people to integrate -- can be used to the
detriment of the Russian Federation, as a method to suck resources
out of it while their own economic and national interests in other
republics lie in a different direction. You see? This is something
we should not allow to happen in any case.


So, I drew your attention to the fact that the first step
should be to create a common legal space. We cannot say, for
example, within the Customs Union that it should include five
states if one of these states unilaterally join the WTO bringing
to naught all its customs tariffs without any consultations with us
-- and I mean Kirghizia. There can be no question of a Customs
Union with Russia in this case.


Of course, we should keep track of all these processes in the
post-Soviet space. But our quest for integration should be
accompanied by the strengthening of the Russian Federation. Then
they will come to us themselves. This is obvious.


Now about what is being done specifically. It is a movement on
several tracks. The first track is with Byelorussia. The second is
our multilateral relations within the Customs Union. These should
be bilateral and multilateral contacts in every area.


Today I can report to you -- I can't say it came as a
surprise, the event was probably expected, our relations with
Uzbekistan have taken a turn for the better. You know that in its
time Uzbekistan even withdrew from the collective security treaty.
And now we have signed a bilateral agreement with it which in its
depth and in terms of the unification processes is more significant
than the collective security treaty.


So, I think we should build our relations with our former
republics in a progressive and calm manner without any imperial
ambitions and my own recent experience shows that we may expect to
achieve a positive result.


******


#11
Washington Post
23 December 1999
Obituary
Matthew Gallagher
CIA Soviet Specialist


Matthew P. Gallagher Sr., 80, an author and retired Central Intelligence 
Agency branch chief specializing in Soviet military history and affairs, died 
of renal failure Nov. 26 at Inova Fairfax Hospital. He had lived in Falls 
Church since 1953.


Fluent in Russian and French, Dr. Gallagher worked at the CIA from 1953 to 
1984 and retired as branch chief for Russian internal affairs at the agency's 
foreign broadcasting information services division.


Since August, he had worked as a consultant to Raytheon Co.


Besides numerous articles on Soviet military policy, some of which appeared 
in The Washington Post, he wrote "The Soviet History of World War II: Myths, 
Memories and Realities," published in 1963 by Praeger Publishers. With 
co-author Karl Spielman Jr., Dr. Gallagher wrote "Soviet Decisions--Making 
for Defense," published in 1972 by Praeger.


In the 1980s, he was a visiting fellow at the Center for Defense Information, 
a Washington think tank, and taught history at the Institute for Learning in 
Retirement, a continuing education program, at George Mason University and 
American University.


He was a former staff member of the Institute for Defense Analysis.


Dr. Gallagher was born in Providence and graduated from Providence College in 
1937 with a bachelor's degree in history. At Harvard University, he received 
a master's degree in history in 1949 and a doctorate in Russian history in 
1960.


He served in the Navy during World War II.


In the early 1950s, he taught history at two Massachusetts schools, Wheaton 
College and Newton College of the Sacred Heart.


He was a member of St. James Catholic Church in Falls Church.


Survivors include his wife of 56 years, Roberta M. Tierney Gallagher of Falls 
Church; two sons, Matthew P. Jr., of Annandale, and Robert C., of Falls 
Church; a daughter, Paula M. Moore of Jessup; a brother; two sisters; and two 
grandchildren. 


*******
 

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