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November
16, 1999
This Date's Issues: 3626 •3627
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Johnson's Russia List
#3627
16 November 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russia says Western aid welcome but little comes.
2. Reuters: Russia slams Western hypocrisy on Chechnya.
3. Reuters: Russian businessman offers Chechnya peace plan.
(Berezovsky)
4. Mikhail Ramendik: Re: G.Feifer/3625: Government gets a slide on Chechnya.
5. Reuters: OECD says Russian recovery fragile and uncertain.
6. Computerworld: U.S. execs not leaving Russia for Y2K rollover.
7. Itar-Tass: Russian TV Channels to Air Electoral Duels, or Hope So.
8. Bloomberg: Russia Says It Will Resist Pressure Over Chechnya.
9. Obshchaya Gazeta: Russian People's Support for Start-2 Assessed.
10. Obshchaya Gazeta: Putin Poll Ratings Assessed.
11. AP: Sexism After Communism Explored.
12. RFE/RL: Paul Goble, Overcoming Corruption.
13. New York Times: Jane Perlez, War in Chechnya Threatening U.S. Strategy
Goals.
14. Moscow Times: District Court Rules in Skuratov's Favor.]
********
#1
Russia says Western aid welcome but little comes
MOSCOW, Nov 16 (Reuters) - A Russian deputy prime minister accused Western
countries on Tuesday of failing to back their concern for the plight of
Chechen refugees with any substantial amount of humanitarian aid.
Nearly 200,000 people have fled Russia's seven-week-old offensive against
Islamic rebels in Chechnya. Most have found refuge in neighbouring
Ingushetia, an impoverished region whose meagre resources have been
severely overstretched by the influx.
``So far it is essentially promises of humanitarian aid that we hear,''
Valentina Matvienko, who oversees social issues in the government, told a
news conference.
She said Germany, the European Union and the United Nations had sent small
amounts of aid but it fell well short of what one could expect from leaders
worried about a ``humanitarian catastrophe'' in areas flooded with refugees.
Russia has been sensitive about the use of the term ``humanitarian
catastrophe'' by Western media and politicians to describe the Chechen
refugee crisis.
``The volume of aid is insignificant. It does not correspond with the
notion of humanitarian catastrophe as they (Western leaders) see it,'' she
said. Matvienko did not give figures.
Western nations have been increasingly critical of Moscow's handling of the
crisis.
Moscow has said Chechnya is an internal matter and it can deal with the
refugee problem. But Moscow has allowed several humanitarian missions to
visit the region and has welcomed foreign aid to ease the plight of refugees.
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata is scheduled to arrive in
Moscow on Tuesday. She will then fly to the North Caucasus to see first
hand the humanitarian situation in the region.
``We will accept (aid) with gratitude, but so far there have only been
insignificant, sporadic deliveries,'' Matvienko said.
*******
#2
Russia slams Western hypocrisy on Chechnya
LONDON, Nov 16 (Reuters) - Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on Tuesday
accused Western governments of hypocrisy in criticising Moscow's military
campaign in breakaway Chechnya and questioned whether NATO had grand
designs on central Asia.
As President Boris Yeltsin prepares to confront his critics at a summit of
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that starts
on Thursday in Turkey, Ivanov said Russia had worked hard to forge links
with the West.
``In their rush to criticise Russia, some countries have gone as far as to
claim that, in Istanbul, Russia will be called to account for its actions
in Chechnya,'' Ivanov wrote in the Financial Times.
``But the conveniently forgotten fact remains that the Russian leadership
is fighting international terrorism in Chechnya -- and all states have
undertaken to support each other in eradicating this evil.''
Ivanov said Russia was bringing several draft documents to the OSCE summit
to bolster relations with the West, including the European Security Charter
and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.
But he questioned whether NATO states were ready to comply with the
documents in light of the Western alliance's bombing of Yugoslavia earlier
this year.
``The question often raised in Moscow is whether Kosovo and Chechnya are
links in a chain towards the creation of a one-dimensional, NATO-centred
world,'' Ivanov wrote.
``Has the anti-Russian campaign over Chechnya been launched to force Russia
out of the Caucasus, and then out of central Asia?''
On Monday, Ivanov said there was no humanitarian crisis in Chechnya as
result of Russia's seven-week campaign against Moslem rebels which has
drawn international criticism, claimed civilian lives and forced 200,000
Chechens to flee their homes.
``I must emphasise there is no human catastrophe in Chechnya,'' he told the
BBC.
``This is not only the opinion of Russia, this is also the opinion of all
the international organisations who have had the opportunity of freely
visiting the area and have become acquainted with the camps of the
displaced people.''
He said that before Christmas the necessary conditions would be in place
for the majority of those displaced by the conflict to return to Chechnya.
Ivanov said the task of the Russian military operation was to establish the
``necessary conditions for a political settlement of the situation in the
republic.''
``Clearly in the part of the territory which is already under the control
of the federal agencies, normal life is being re-established,'' he said.
*******
#3
Russian businessman offers Chechnya peace plan
MOSCOW, Nov 16 (Reuters) - A prominent Russian businessman with close
contacts in Chechnya on Tuesday offered the draft of a seven-point
political deal to end Russia's offensive against the breakaway region.
Boris Berezovsky, the former secretary of Russia's advisory Security
Council, was quoted by Interfax news agency as outlining the plan on a trip
to Karachayevo-Cherkessiya, a North Caucasus region.
Berezovsky has maintained close ties with President Boris Yeltsin's
administration after his sacking from the Security Council last year and
played a key role in negotiating an end to the 1994-96 Chechen war.
It was not clear if he had formally proposed his plan to the Kremlin.
Berezovsky is now running for parliament as an independent candidate.
The following are the main points of Berezovsky's plan:
1. Russia remains undivided and Chechnya stays part of it.
2. Chechnya adheres to the Russian constitution.
3. Any political deal on Chechnya should be backed by the majority of the
population in the region.
4. A final political settlement to be reached only through talks.
5. To avoid further civilian casualties, rebel forces should voluntarily
lay down their arms. Rebel commanders who cannot accept the terms of the
peace plan should leave the country.
6. Suspected terrorists should face trial under international law.
7. The international community and Russia should accept the ruling at a
such a trial whatever it might be.
*******
#4
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 1999
From: "Mikhail Ramendik" <mikhram@dataforce.net>
Subject: Re: G.Feifer/3625: Government gets a slide on Chechnya
> But both channels, which present absolutely opposing views on the
> election campaigns, show similar reportage about Russia's war in
> Chechnya, which is largely portrayed as an honorable and successful
> fight against "terrorism."
I would not say so about NTV, which strives (or at least seems to strive) to
present more sides. While reports from the military perspective abound, the
refugee crisis is also extensively covered in their news programs, and they
do speak about bad conditions and shortages.
> Reasons abound for the almost complete politicization of Russia's press
> in Moscow. The chief one, as conventional wisdom has it, involves
> financing. More obscure are the many contradictions in Russian law. Even
> less clear is the media's response to NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia last
> spring.
>
> "The authorities tried to get the media on its side during the conflict
> in Yugoslavia," said the Glasnost Defense Fund's Oleg Panfilov. "And
> they succeeded in convincing the press that it should function not as a
> conveyor of information, but as another organ of power."
Again not true regarding NTV. During the Yugoslavia war NTV was one of the
most the most objective coverage I have ever seen - and I have watched, over
the Internet, CNN and BBC.
> Perhaps most surprising has been NTV's coverage of Russia's current
> hostilities in Chechnya. During the first Chechen conflict in 1994-1996,
> NTV was instrumental in contradicting official reports and statistics,
> and galvanizing public opinion against Moscow's campaign. This time
> around, NTV's journalists have joined colleagues from almost all other
> agencies in condemning Chechnya and supporting the government's actions.
Not always. Besides covering the refugee crisis in news, they have hosted
talk shows in which many people called for broader press coverage of the
Chechen side, for negotiations, and even for Chechen independence. While
they nearly do not cover the Chechen (Maskhadov) side themselves, it is
quite understandable after the kidnap of their correspondent Elena Masyuk,
and does not need to be attributed to "government propaganda".
> Similarly, last spring, NTV showed many minutes of Serb civilian
> casualties during NATO's bombing, while almost completely ignoring the
> plight of Kosovar Albanians.
This paragraph is plainly NOT TRUE. At the time of the war NTV did extensive
coverage of the plight of both Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. Reports from
Kosovar refugee camps were a part of every NTV news program.
> The chief reason for the bias in favor of the government is most likely
> financial. NTV, for one, has recently run into cash problems with
> state-controlled banks.
>
> NTV's parent company, Media-Most, is involved in a court battle with
> state-controlled Vnesheconombank over what the bank claims is a
> $42-million debt.
Except that the state owes Media-Most over $400 million.
> "NTV is now trying to ingratiate itself with the government," Panfilov
> said, adding that government support is especially desirable during the
> election season.
Yesterday (Nov 14) Kiselev lashed out at Putin in his popular "Itogi" news
program. If you call that "ingratiating"...
Yours, Mikhail Ramendik
Moscow, Russia
P.S. I do not work for NTV or Media-Most - this is only a personal opinion.
*******
#5
OECD says Russian recovery fragile and uncertain
PARIS, Nov 16 (Reuters) - Russia's economic outlook is slightly more
positive following a pickup in growth this year, but the upward trend
remains fragile and uncertain, the OECD said in its half-yearly economic
outlook on Tuesday.
Real GDP growth should decline to 1.0 percent in 2000 and 2001 from 2.0
percent in 1999, the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development projected.
``While there are signs of recovery, the macroeconomic situation remains
potentially rather fragile,'' it said.
The dual objectives of the central bank -- defending the rouble and
accumulating sufficient foreign currency for debt service -- presented a
potential challenge.
The political uncertainty surrounding upcoming parliamentary and
presidential elections has delayed structural reform efforts and made debt
restructuring negotiations difficult, it said.
``The impact of recent money laundering scandals on future foreign aid to
Russia is also a question,'' it observed.
While inflation was seen declining from 40 percent this year to 30 percent
in 2000 and 20 percent in 2001, the OECD said that upward pressure on
energy and transportation prices could eventually hit manufacturing.
A real appreciation of the rouble could add to the inflationary pressures,
it said.
``Indirect evidence also shows that small business activity, which is
difficult to measure statistically in Russia, may have been hit much harder
by the crisis than industry as a whole, indicating possible greater
weakness than revealed by official data,'' the OECD said.
The Russian population has suffered increasingly since the crisis, with
real incomes last June standing at only 77 percent of their June 1998
level, it said. An estimated 38 percent of the population were living in
poverty at the end of the first quarter of this year, up from 28 percent at
the same point in 1998.
*******
#6
Computerworld
November 15, 1999
U.S. execs not leaving Russia for Y2K rollover
By Patrick Thibodeau
WASHINGTON -- Unlike the U.S. State Department, U.S. businesses operating
in Russia aren't making plans to evacuate employees because of concerns
about potential year 2000-related disruptions, according to interviews with
officials in both countries.
The State Department recently authorized the "voluntary departure" of
embassy workers before New Year's in Russia and three other former Soviet
republics -- Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. U.S. officials aren't advising
American citizens in those countries to do the same but are urging people
to consider deferring travel to the countries until the extent of the Y2K
disruptions become clear.
"Those people who are already in Russia could take whatever actions they
think are appropriate to ensure their well being, including departure if
necessary," said Nyda Budig, a state department spokeswoman.
But Michael Forman, the country manager in Moscow for Galileo International
Inc., a Rosemont, Ill.-based company that provides electronic reservation
services for the travel industry, said he hasn't heard of U.S. workers in
Russia packing their bags because of Y2K.
"Many of my colleagues are going to be here -- I don't know anyone who is
running away," said Forman in a telephone interview from his Moscow office.
"I can't say I'm not worried about [Y2K], but I'm not panicking about it,"
said Forman. "I'm hoping for the best, but I know there can be potential
issues. But I am going to manage those for my company as best I can."
Forman, however, said that many key infrastructure systems such as power in
Russia rely on mechanical controls and aren't date sensitive.
That view is backed by the International Y2K Cooperation Center, which has
been meeting with Russian officials in an effort to assess the readiness of
that country. Because of the widespread use of systems that aren't date
sensitive, Y2K is only likely to cause "minor disruptions," said Lisa
Pellegrin, a spokeswoman for the center.
Many Americans living in Russia head back to the U.S. for the holidays. One
person at the American Chamber in Commerce in Russia, who didn't want to be
identified, said she was unaware of people making plans to leave the
country because of Y2K. "People are leaving for Christmas as usual," she
said.
The CIA, however, recently warned Congress that it was expecting
"significant" Y2K failures in Russia and Ukraine.
*******
#7
Russian TV Channels to Air Electoral Duels, or Hope So.
MOSCOW, November 16 (Itar-Tass) - Russian television channels are arraying
for hosting debates of leaders of electoral blocs on the airwaves.
With elections to the State Duma, or parliament's lower houses, set for
December 19, pre-election campaigns will start off a month before the
voting, on November 19.
In the previous parliamentary and presidential elections, television
journalists were numbed by the abundance of "talking heads" of candidates
on the air droning their slates on and on.
The media called for face-to-face televised debates of bloc leaders, even
for the boon of additional air time, vainly.
Some accords on televised debates were made, but their participants balked
at the last minute.
A new law on State Duma elections gives a third of the total air time free.
Candidates who refuse to debate with their contenders will not have the air
time compensated.
ORT, RTR and TVTs televisions, which provide free slots, are finishing
their studio arrangements to host candidates.
Lots were drawn on November 9 for sequence of candidates' appearance on the
air. To determine their number is up to television channels.
Central Election Commission chairman Alexander Vessnyakov told reporters
that the commission would not regiment debate formats. The sole ban is on
calls for violence and inctigation of ethnic hatreds.
Television channels have listed their anchors for televised debates. The
host of debates in ORT's Utro (Morning) programme will be Larisa Krivtsova.
Pre-recorded debates will be aired on workdays from 7.40 a.m. to 8.00 a.m.
ORT told Itar-Tass that television appearances of candidates would be
broadcast in a live mode and without any editing.
The host of debates in Russian Ttelevision's Vesti programme will be Yelena
Sokolova.
The TVTs channel's anchors will be Vladislav Flyarkovsky, Dmitry Kiselyov,
Pavel Gorelov and Alexei Pushkov.
The new election law stipulates that candidates who are on federal lists
and simultaneously run in single-mandate districts have bo right to free
slots on pan-Russian television channels.
Veshnyakov said such candidates make a significant number. Some of
pretenders who are to chose between running in single-mandate constituencie
and having the free air are Sergei Stepashin of Yabloko, Viktor
Chernomyrdin and Vladimir Ryzhkov of NDR, or Our Home Is Russia, Irina
Khakamada and Boris Nemtsov of the Union of Right Forces, Ivan Rybkin of
the Socialist Party of Russian, Vladimnri Bryntsalov of the Russian
Socialist Party.
*******
#8
Russia Says It Will Resist Pressure Over Chechnya: Comment
Moscow, Nov. 16 (Bloomberg) -- Russia's Foreign Ministry said Russia will
resist pressure over its military operation to fight Islamic terrorists in
the southern republic of Chechnya if the West decides to criticize it
during tomorrow's summit in Istanbul. Below are comments from Vladimir
Rakhmanin, spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry who spoke at a press
conference in Moscow.
``We are going to Istanbul to discuss very important strategic issues of
the 21st century. These issues are European and world security, cooperation
between Russia and the West in the 21st century. This is not a summit
devoted to Chechnya. And this should be quite clear. And no pressure on
Russia will help much to guarantee the success of this summit.
``We are partners with the West and we should act as partners. It is very
important to understand the situation in which Russia is operating. For
five years, Chechnya was out of control of federal forces, and what we
have now are enclaves of terrorists and bandits. The people who are living
there, civilian people, are under terrible pressure from terrorists. This
is a big problem.
``The whole story started when terrorists, considering that it is not
enough to stay in Chechnya, started an offense against Dagestan and then
blew up two apartment buildings in Moscow. So, there should be a response,
maybe it is a response of federal authorities that comes a little bit late,
it should have come earlier, but now we want to fulfill the whole
operation. . . we are quite prepared, we are ready if the West wants to get
information about Chechnya, we are ready to provide this information and we
have enough information to show. . .''
``Russia and Russian federal forces are not the ones who just want to get
revenge in Chechnya. This is a completely wrong stereotype in the Western
media sometimes that Russia wants revenge. This is not the issue. And
Russians are not cold blooded soldiers who are pushing the Chechen people
out of Chechnya. There is also a stereotype that Russia is fighting Chechen
people. This is completely incorrect.
``What we are trying to do is to bring civilian life to Chechnya. We are
not seeking any kind of revenge. We are not seeking any kind of small
military victory. This is too serious an issue for Russia. This is also the
issue of Russian territorial integrity. This is a big issue and we should
resolve this issue as soon as possible and with as few victims as possible.
``There is a problem in Russia. We are facing all sorts of pressures.
Pressures that we don't believe are just and are made on very quick
decisions. We are trying to build constructive relations with the West. We
are trying as much as possible. But the West should be responsive to that.
And not only stick to easy black and white stereotypes in dealing with
Russia, which have raised a lot of pressure here among public opinion. We
are not just building a wall between West and Russia. We want to explain
and we are explaining. But is should be like an explanation between
partners, not like between a teacher and a pupil. Russia is not a pupil.''
******
#9
Russian People's Support for Start-2 Assessed
Obshchaya Gazeta
11 November 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Viktor Litovkin report: "Russians Are More Sober-Minded Than Some
People Imagined"
What is the Russian public's view of the problem of nuclear
disarmament and a reduction in strategic offensive arms? Deputies of the
State Duma who decline to ratify the START II Treaty refer here to the
interests of their constituents, although no one has ever asked people
about this.
Staff of the Moscow PIR-Center, the Center for Political Research of
Russia, set about eliminating this lacuna. With the help of the Public
Opinion Foundation they conducted a poll on this subject of the
population of 56 cities and townships in 29 oblasts, krays, and republics
of the country. Some 1,500 respondents took part in the poll. What was
learned?
Primarily the fact that nuclear weapons are our citizens' least
concern. To the question "Would the world be more stable were more
countries to possess nuclear weapons than currently," 75 percent of
those polled did not know how to respond. Only 14 percent were opposed to
an expansion of the participants in the "nuclear club".
True, 57 percent of those polled voted for such weapons to be
destroyed everywhere. But 34 percent were opposed to this. Seventyeight
percent of people advocated Russia never transferring nuclear technology
and weapons to anyone under any circumstances.
More than half of those polled--54 percent--had never heard anything
about the US Administration's plans to develop a system of national
antimissile defenses, to flagrantly violate the 1972 ABM Treaty between
the United States and Russia, that is. Twentyfive percent had heard
something about this, but did not know what precisely. Although 47
percent of those polled propose in response to the Americans' violation
of this treaty the creation of our own ABM system. Thirtytwo percent
consider it essential to obtain concessions from Washington on this
matter diplomatically, 8 percent consider it necessary to increase the
number of our nuclear warheads. Fiftyfive percent of the participants in
the poll here (attention State Duma deputies!) vote for the ratification
of the START II Treaty. Only 25 of society is opposed, and 20 percent are
indifferent to this problem.
The overall result of the study shows, as Vladimir Orlov, director of
the PIR-Center, told your Obshchaya Gazeta military correspondent, that
the population of our country has a far more sober view of the problems
of nuclear disarmament than some politicians. Particularly in the
campaign period.
Should the START II Treaty be ratified? No, 25 percent. Yes, 55
percent. Could not say, 20 percent.
******
#10
Putin Poll Ratings Assessed
Obshchaya Gazeta
11 November 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Leontiy Byzov and Vladimir Petukhov: "All Ratings Start
>From the Same Point"
Vladimir Putin is repeating the path of his predecessors.
Vladimir Putin's rapidly rising rating is an example of how easy it is
in present-day Russia to "wake up famous." A man whose
appointment as prime minister was greeted with extreme coolness by
society has managed in two months to become a leader of public opinion,
heading the list of candidates for the presidential post. How did he
manage to do this?
It is customary to believe that the decisive actions in Chechnya
brought Putin popularity. Although this explanation, as they say, lies
on the surface, it does not seem indisputable. First, a "Chechen
settlement" is not among the acute problems which disturb Russia's
population. Second, Putin's predecessors, Yevgeniy Primakov and Sergey
Stepashin, did not touch Chechnya when they were premiers, but their
popularity rose almost as rapidly.
The experience of the last three prime ministers, incidentally,
exhibits a very curious pattern. Primakov accepted the government right
after the August collapse; he came into the ruins, one might say, and
that ensured him a certain level of support in advance. Stepashin was
another matter: he replaced a very popular premier and the population was
openly dissatisfied with this replacement; but before even three months
had gone by, the unwanted Stepashin became one of the people's favorites.
After him the same pattern is being repeated once again: for no apparent
reason, the capricious president puts the completely unknown Putin in to
replace the popular Stepashin, and society "does not accept"
him; but nonetheless in just a month, the new prime minister begins to
rapidly get stronger. How should this paradox be understood?
It is obvious that the ratings of our prime ministers must not be
considered a proper evaluation of their personal characteristics or the
results of their governments' work. This is not so much an index of
popularity as an indicator expressing the social demand for effective,
competent government.
In its present form, this demand was formed under the impact of the
events of August 1998, which in terms of effect on mass sentiments are
altogether comparable with the "August revolution" of 1991.
Devaluation did not just depreciate deposits and wages--citizens who used
to believe in Chernmyrdin's "stabilization" and had gradually
lost the habit of making their future dependent on the condition and
behavior of the government, increasingly relying on their own initiative,
suddenly discovered to what degree they were still not free of the state.
The crisis "passed through" all groups and strata of society,
putting an overwhelming majority of the country's population into a state
where hopes for changes for the better are almost universally linked with
the actions of state institutions. Since the president has not inspired
any illusions for a long time now and the parliament is not considered a
real power, the "prize of public hopes" naturally goes to the
head of the government. Yevgeniy Primakov was imprinted in sociological
polls as the man who eliminated the mass expectations of complete
paralysis of the state organism. Vladimir Putin is apparently being
given a similar role as deliverer from fear, but now presentiments of
alarm are linked with the coming change in government, which may provoke
not only a political but even a social crisis. In any case, such fears
exist and more than half of Russia's citizens share them.
Let us mention a few other consequences of August 1998 that are
important to our topic. For example, the reduced level of social
expectations. In other words, it is becoming increasingly easy to please
people. All three of the "post-August" governments tried to
pay pension arrears, and all three of the prime ministers earned a large
number of points that way.
The crisis "evened out" society in property terms: today the
differences in the level of per-capita income among average income
strata, low-income persons, and those living under the poverty level is
often no more than $30-$50. And that in turn has changed the nature of
political differentiation of society. It is no longer so polarized as it
was in the early 1990s, and the boundaries between the
"rightists," the "leftists," and various
modifications of "centrism" are becoming increasingly arbitrary
and eroded. Thus, the results of the latest studies show that if the
CPRF did not participate in the Duma elections, its supporters would be
much more willing to support Fatherland and even Yabloko than to support
Communist groupings of a more radical slant than the CPRF.
Strange as it may seem, after the August upheavals which put a large
part of the population on the brink of physical survival, protest
sentiments (and, accordingly, protest forms of behavior) not only did not
intensify, but got substantially weaker. This is quite difficult to
explain, but those are the facts. And it was no accident that after
"black August," not one candidate from the opposition managed
to win a gubernatorial election.
All these circumstances taken together are for the most part
paradoxical and produced a greater social demand for politicians who
personify the "center," meaning not only a particular set of
values but also the "center of power" in the literal sense of
the word. It is customary to say of Yevgeniy Primakov's electorate that it
represents a virtual "cross-section of society." Vladimir
Putin's body of supporters is just taking shape and sociologists have not
yet had time to examine it in all its details, but one can already see
that its basic parameters are close to Primakov's.
According to the information from our survey, Putin's potential voters
are younger than Zyuganov's supporters but older than those who
sympathize with Zhirinovskiy and Kiriyenko. In terms of property status,
the prime minister's electorate virtually copies the social structure of
the population of the country as a whole. Among those who are prepared
to vote for Putin as a candidate for president, 23 percent are relatively
well-off people, 60 percent live "from payday to payday", and
21 percent live below the "poverty line." (Among the
supporters of Yuriy Luzhkov and Sergey Kiriyenko, the proportion of
well-to-do citizens is much greater, and among Zyuganov's voters, it is
50 percent lower. In terms of values, Putin sympathizers are also typical
"centrists." Predominant are advocates of a strong state (25
percent) and ideologically neutral voters (21 percent), and in the third
position are people for whom the values of democracy and human rights are
priorities (13 percent). (Luzhkov's electorate is "slightly to the
right," while Primakov's is a bit "to the left."
By entering the public struggle, Putin in practice forced his
predecessor Stepashin as well as Aleksandr Lebed out of the presidential
race and weakened the positions of Luzhkov and Yavlinskiy. But the rapid
growth in Putin's ratings had almost no effect on the level of trust in
Primakov. Judging from everything, public opinion does not consider
these politicians as antagonists, finding their co-existence in one and
the same centrist niche perfectly justified. And for Putin's supporters
Primakov is a more acceptable figure than Putin is for Primakov's
electorate. So if the OVR [Fatherland-All Russia] leader for some reason
does not take part in the presidential election, his electorate would be
divided largely among Luzhkov (18.2 percent), Zyuganov (13.7 percent),
and Putin (13.4 percent). And if Putin does not prove to be a candidate
for president, his votes would go primarily to Primakov--25.8 percent,
while Zyuganov and Luzhkov would get only 5 percent each of Putin's
electorate.
That means that both politicians meet contemporary social demand,
expressing somewhat different features of it. It is characteristic that
Putin's election prospects are in no way linked with the fate of
"Yeltsin's regime." The fact that the present premier is the
president's official "successor" and comes from the Yeltsin
circle has virtually no effect on attitudes toward him. That is more
evidence that the "Putin phenomenon" is merely to a small
extent the phenomenon of a man named Putin. The premier's rating is
derived from the "post-August" expectations of society, which
will either be realized or not.
The RNIS i NP [Russian Independent Institute of Social and National
Problems] Center for Sociopolitical Analysis
*******
#11
Sexism After Communism Explored
November 15, 1999
WASHINGTON (AP) - Working women in Russia and Eastern Europe have endured
``rampant sex bias'' as their formerly communist nations move to free-market
economies, a human rights group said Monday.
A survey of some 900 companies and interviews with more than 500 women found
that workplace discrimination has become common in Bulgaria, Poland, Ukraine
and Russia, said Women, Law & Development International in a study funded by
the U.S. Agency for International Development.
``In nearly every situation, in every country studied, there is rampant sex
bias in the workplace,'' said Anne Zollner of the Washington-based human
rights group. ``Women disproportionately endure the negative consequences of
privatization and the transition to a free-market system.''
That includes unfair layoffs, chronic unemployment, discrimination in hiring
and sexual harassment, she said in a statement.
Organizations that assisted in the study were the Institute of Urban
Economics in Russia, the Women's Rights Center in Poland, Kharkov's Center
for Women's Studies in Ukraine and the Bulgarian Gender Research Foundation.
The study found:
As privatization brought layoffs, women were discharged at a much higher rate
than men. In downsizing in the Ukraine, for instance, 80 percent of jobs lost
from 1994 to 1998 were held by women.
Despite sometimes higher levels of education, women face discrimination in
hiring and routinely are asked about marriage and childbearing plans.
Women in Poland are paid 82 percent of men's salary in private companies; in
Russia they're paid 65 percent of men's salary in civil engineering, and 82
percent to 90 percent in clothing and footwear industries.
Sexual harassment is becoming commonplace.
Results of the study mirror a U.N. Children's Fund report released in
September which said decades of communist rule brought improvements such as
better education for women, good health care, high employment and state
childcare - but failed to dislodge traditional sexist attitude.
*******
#12
East: Analysis From Washington -- Overcoming Corruption
By Paul Goble
Washington, 15 November 1999 (RFE/RL) -- Macroeconomic reforms alone -- such
as privatization, price liberalization and making national currencies
convertible -- are not sufficient to overcome the corruption now holding back
many post-communist countries, according to the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.
In its annual report on transition economies released last week, the EBRD
argues that such reforms have not had the effects on either the relationship
between the state and the economy and hence on the level of corruption that
both that bank and most other advocates of reform had hoped and expected.
And it concludes that post-communist governments must do more to promote fair
and transparent laws, strong regulatory agencies, and efficient and effective
court systems if they are to bring corruption under control, something the
bank said few of these countries had yet been able to do.
In short, the solutions to the multifaceted problems of corruption are more
often to be found in politics rather than economics.
In the past, the EBRD, like other international lenders, generally has shied
away from discussing corruption in these countries, typically treating it as
a transitional problem certain to be cured by the kind of free market reforms
it and other Western institutions have advocated.
But as the bank's report acknowledges, both the high levels of corruption in
these countries and even more the real sources of it have prompted the EBRD
to change its approach.
The level of corruption in many of these countries is staggering. According
to the report, officials in Georgia extract in the form of bribes some 8.1
percent of the annual revenues of companies operating there. In Ukraine, it
is 6.5 percent. And in the Commonwealth of Independent States as a whole, it
is 5.7 percent.
By adding to the costs of doing business, bribery by itself keeps many firms
from making a profit and thus dooms them to an early end. And at the same
time, demands for bribes discourage new investors from both within the
countries involved and abroad.
Indeed, the EBRD found that newly formed companies in these countries had to
pay almost twice as much of their revenues in bribes as did more established
concerns -- 5.4 percent as opposed to 2.8 percent. And thus bribes serve as
yet another barrier to the establishment of new businesses.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the EBRD's annual "Transition Report"
this year, however, was its focus on what macroeconomic reforms by themselves
cannot achieve. The bank noted that most post-communist countries have
privatized many firms and reduced direct state intervention in the economy.
But those macroeconomic steps have not necessarily reduced "the overall level
of intervention or the informal tax imposed on firms in the form of bribes
and time spent dealing with government officials."
Indeed, the EBRD found that state-owned firms and privatized ones of the same
size were forced to pay approximately the same percentage in bribes, an
indication that privatization by itself has not had the impact on corruption
that many had expected.
Sometimes this appears to be because the new owners are the former
communist-era managers who have a special relationship with government
officials. Sometimes it is because the firms or the government agencies with
which they must deal have one or another kind of monopoly power, something
privatization has done little to change.
Because economic changes alone have failed to overcome corruption, the EBRD
argued that these countries must turn to political means instead. Indeed, in
releasing the report, the bank's president, Horst Koehler, said: "I underline
this twice. Weak institutions are the main obstacle to economic growth in a
number of transition countries."
But in contrast to some analysts who have written off any chance for
improvement in these societies, the EBRD notes that the fight against
corruption can be won by leaders and governments willing to take the
political risks involved in breaking with the past and building institutions
capable of managing a modern, free market economy.
******
#13
New York Times
November 15, 1999
[for personal use only]
NEWS ANALYSIS
War in Chechnya Threatening U.S. Strategy Goals
By JANE PERLEZ
WASHINGTON -- When President Clinton's foreign policy team gathered in the
White House to discuss Chechnya recently, briefers from the Central
Intelligence Agency explained the Russian military strategy in detail.
It boiled down to this: continued artillery and aerial bombardment of the
breakaway republic; the destruction of the capital, Grozny, in an effort to
flush out rebels, and the creation of even more civilian casualties and
refugees, who are already spreading chaos through the Caucasus.
The session was held early this month after Clinton failed to win any
concrete concessions on Chechnya from Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin of
Russia at a meeting in Oslo. The session broke up, officials said, without
any recipe for how to persuade Russia to modify its military tactics.
For the Clinton administration, the war in Chechnya has become an issue of
how to balance Washington's strategic concerns about arms control and
spreading of nuclear weapons with issues of human rights. Over all, the White
House is trying to prevent the crisis in Chechnya from turning already cool
relations with Moscow into a deep chill.
An administration official said the White House was wary of becoming too
shrill in public about what are commonly called in private "reprehensible"
Russian actions for fear of sacrificing Clinton's ambitious strategic agenda
with Moscow. The administration has dismissed the idea of sanctions,
officials say, though it has ratcheted up its complaints, and on Friday the
State Department called Russia's "indiscriminate bombing" inconsistent with
international standards.
In the most immediate sense, the Chechnya war is likely to cast a shadow for
Clinton and European leaders as they gather for what was to be a harmonious
summit meeting starting on Thursday in Istanbul. Two agreements -- one on
human rights and another limiting military deployments in Europe -- are
supposed to be signed at a moment when Russia has thousands of soldiers in
the Caucasus carrying out a tireless assault in civilian areas.
"The more tension there is between the reality happening in the northern
Caucasus and the principles of the documents being negotiated in Istanbul,
the harder it will be to have a meaningful summit," said the deputy secretary
of state, Strobe Talbott.
A more far-reaching consideration, according to senior administration
officials, is the uphill negotiation with Russia on the amendment of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that would allow Clinton to push ahead with his
proposal of a limited missile defense system. Also at stake, administration
officials said, is the passage in the Russian parliament of the Start III
treaty, which requires cuts in Moscow's nuclear arsenal.
The Russian defense minister, Igor Sergeyev, harshly criticized Washington on
Friday and accused the United States of supporting the Chechen rebels. "The
United States national interests require that the military conflict in the
north Caucasus, fanned from the outside, keeps constantly smoldering,"
Sergeyev said. He told an audience of Russian generals that Washington
wanted to "weaken" Russian control of the Caucasus.
Such suspicions have been fueled in Russia by American attempts to persuade
former Soviet republics in the region to build an oil pipeline that would
skirt Russia and Iran. James P. Rubin, the State Department spokesman,
dismissed Sergeyev's remarks as "baseless."
The Chechnya war presents other difficult problems for the administration.
The Russians argue that in the aftermath of war against Serbia, a traditional
Russian ally, American complaints about human suffering are hypocritical and
that Washington is applying a double standard over the use of military force.
The problem extends beyond Russia's leadership, as the Kosovo war fed a deep
feeling of anti-Americanism in the Russian population.
In addition, in the State Department, there is considerable unease -- a
feeling of "impotence," one official said -- that the United States is
standing by on Chechnya at the very moment that it is developing a policy to
use military force on humanitarian grounds. Instead, the administration has
subordinated that new policy to other interests, like arms control and
preserving relations with Moscow.
The high point of the summit meeting of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe this week was to be the signing of a revamped Charter
for European Security, which says the human rights record of one member
nation is the business of other members.
The charter does not carry the legal obligations of a treaty, but the signing
of such a document while the Russians are clearly in violation of it is a
situation the administration would like to avoid.
Similarly, the Americans and Russians hope to sign a revision of the treaty
on conventional forces in Europe, which sets permissible levels of weaponry.
Even though the updated treaty allows Russia to keep more weaponry in the
Caucasus, Moscow acknowledges that it is over the new limits because of the
war in Chechnya and promises to comply once it secures its objectives there.
Putin, whose popularity has soared among ordinary Russians because of his
tough treatment of the Chechen rebels, has announced that he will be in
Istanbul. The Russian media reported this weekend that Putin was likely to be
intransigent at the summit meeting because of his electoral aspirations. It
is not clear whether the ailing Russian president, Boris N. Yeltsin, will
show up at all.
Almost daily, the administration has complained to Russian leaders -- and
most powerfully in Clinton's meeting with Putin -- about the indiscriminate
pounding of Chechnya. Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain sent Putin a
letter on Nov. 9 along similar lines, British officials said.
At the same time, Washington has said it understands when the Russians insist
that they are fighting to protect their sovereignty against terrorists, who
Moscow says are garnering support from groups abroad.
And officials here do not disagree that Russia was provoked into combat by
Chechen fighters who staged military raids into the neighboring Russian
republic of Dagestan. Moscow also maintains that those militants were
involved in the bombing of several apartment buildings in Russian cities,
killing 292 civilians.
But the Russians bristle, officials said, when the administration argues that
heavy-handed tactics are causing unnecessary suffering.
It is not unusual, administration officials said, for Russian diplomats to
throw back at the Americans a parallel with Kosovo, where Russian entreaties
against NATO's use of force were ignored. "They say that when you hurt
civilians in Kosovo, it was called collateral damage and when we do that, you
call it a violation of human rights," said an official describing the
conversations. "And they add you were doing it in a foreign country and we
are defending our own borders."
The administration counters that NATO was careful in trying to avoid civilian
deaths in the bombing of Yugoslavia and that when they happened, they were
made public. Further, the administration argues that the NATO campaign in
Yugoslavia was aimed at the assets of a particular leader, Slobodan
Milosevic.
In Oslo, Clinton urged Putin to start negotiations with moderate Chechen
leaders, though he did not identify whom he had in mind, a senior
administration official said. Moscow has turned down suggestions that the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe be used as an
intermediary.
"We don't have any easy answer here," a senior administration official said.
"This is not like NATO expansion and Kosovo. In both cases, we thought we
knew what the Russians ought to do, and by the way, they did it. Here we have
a quite clear idea of what, for their own sake, they ought not to be doing."
Some mid-level administration officials as well as critics of the current
policy have argued that Washington should punish Moscow by imposing financial
sanctions. But this idea is regarded as a nonstarter, officials said.
They point out that the current loans from International Monetary Fund to
Moscow, the next installment of which is expected to be some $4.5 billion,
are intended to help Russia pay back the fund. Further, the administration is
not about to create more financial troubles in Russia as parliamentary and
presidential elections approach, a senior official said.
Moreover, the vast bulk of American financial aid is devoted to helping the
Russians dismantle their nuclear arsenal, a project that Washington does not
want to stop.
The State Department has drawn up proposals to encourage the Russian
government to provide shelter and sustenance to an estimated 200,000 refugees
who have fled the fighting in Chechnya for the neighboring republic of
Ingushetia, where many of them are living in tents or rail cars in freezing
temperatures.
Until last week, when Moscow allowed a European team into the region to
assess the needs of the refugees, it had refused to grant Western aid workers
access to the area.
The State Department has also increased money to the United Nations refugee
agency and to the International Committee of the Red Cross for assisting the
refugees. But the Russians remained resistant to foreigners working in the
area, officials said.
*******
#14
Moscow Times
November 16, 1999
District Court Rules in Skuratov's Favor
Moscow's Tverskoi district court on Monday found that the searches of the
office and private residences of suspended Prosecutor General Yury Skuratov
were illegal and unfounded.
In its ruling, the court upheld the complaint filed by Skuratov against the
actions by the Prosecutor General's Office, which on Sept. 9 and 14 conducted
searches of Skuratov's apartment, office and country house.
The searches were conducted as part of an investigation into allegations that
Skuratov accepted the services of prostitutes in exchange for dropping
criminal investigations. President Boris Yeltsin attempted to use the
allegations to fire Skuratov in March.
Skuratov has claimed that the real reason for his subsequent suspension was
his probe into corruption allegations involving Yeltsin and Kremlin
officials.
After the Monday ruling was announced, Skuratov's lawyer said the
investigation team must now return to Skuratov the documents and belongings
seized during the searches.
********
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