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CDI Library > Johnson's Russia List

Johnson's Russia List
 

 

August 24, 1999   
This Date's Issues: 3460 • 3461 • 

Johnson's Russia List
#3461
24 August 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note rom David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Young Russian reformers join forces for election.
2. AFP: IMF team pores over Russian books amid massive fraud charges.
3. Moscow Times: Leonid Bershidsky, Aksyonenko A Devotee of Krishnamurti.
4. RFE/RL: Sophie Lambroschini, Russia: Left Likely To Split.
5. Los Angeles Times: Richard Paddock, Ex-Soviet State Dares to Dream. 
Estonia has made the most economic progress among the former republics. 
A border town is grateful that it didn't reunite with Russia--and end up in
as dismal a situation as its neighbor. 

6. Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy: Interview with Dmitriy Yakushkin, President
Boris Yeltsin's press secretary.]


********

#1
Young Russian reformers join forces for election
By Adam Tanner

MOSCOW, Aug 24 (Reuters) - Several of Russia's better-known young reformers
agreed on Tuesday to join forces for December's parliamentary election,
going at least some of the way towards healing the rifts that hobble their
camp. 

Former premier Sergei Kiriyenko announced that ex-minister Boris Nemtsov's
Young Russia party was joining an alliance he had established with the
Russia's Choice party of Anatoly Chubais, once the government's
privatisation supremo. 

The merged party, as yet unnamed, will be formally founded at a congress on
Saturday. 

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia's young reformers, who
stand for various degrees of economic liberalisation, have repeatedly
splintered, undermining their credibility as an alternative to the far-left
Communists who now dominate parliament. 

In recent weeks, all four prime ministers who have been dismissed by
President Boris Yeltsin in the last year and a half have announced
intentions to run separately from each other. 

``As you have seen, work on forming a right-wing bloc turned out to be
difficult,'' Kiriyenko told reporters. ``Yes, without a doubt we would have
liked the bloc to be wider.'' 

Most damaging for the liberal reformers, Kiriyenko failed to reach
agreement with either Sergei Stepashin or Viktor Chernomyrdin, former
premiers whose respective backgrounds in the security services and the gas
industry could have strengthened the reformers' chances at the polls. 

Shaping up as the big new power in Russian politics, meanwhile, is the
centre-left alliance between Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland party,
Yevgeny Primakov, the fourth recent premier, and local leaders grouped in
the All-Russia party. 

A generation older than the liberals, with leaders seasoned in
Communist-era politics and more pragmatic than reformist, the
Fatherland-All Russia alliance brings the power of incumbency and a wide
network of connections to influence voters. 

The liberals, by contrast, are out of power and mostly unpopular because of
their perceived responsibility for the hardship of reforms, the inequity of
the privatisation process and the corruption that has corroded post-Soviet
society. 

Men like Chubais may possess superior political firepower to almost all
their adversaries, but their style often seems arrogant and distant to
Russians trying to survive a drab daily existence across the world's
largest country. 

Their prospects have also been badly damaged by Yeltsin's successive firing
of a stream of cabinets, which has helped to discredit many of the
best-known reformers. 

Earlier this month he appointed ex-KGB spy Vladimir Putin as prime minister
and endorsed him as his favoured candidate for the summer 2000 presidential
election. 

Meanwhile other reformist liberals with political standing such as Grigory
Yavlinsky refuse to cooperate with like-minded politicians, further denting
the reform cause. 

Kiriyenko and Nemtsov were on Tuesday at least able to claim Irina
Khakamada, a member of parliament and one of the more prominent women in
Russian politics, for their alliance. 

But with splinter parties that fail to get five percent of the vote
excluded from parliament, the reform camp appears doomed to struggle in
December against Fatherland-All Russia and the other major force, the
Communists. 

Veterans of 80 years in power, the Communists can still boast a degree of
unity, a well established campaigning network and the best-known brand on
the ever-changing political scene. 

********

#2
IMF team pores over Russian books amid massive fraud charges

MOSCOW, Aug 24 (AFP) - A top IMF team was to descend on Moscow on Tuesday
to pore over Russia's finance books amid reports that hundreds of millions
of dollars in earlier loans were illegally shipped out of the country.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Russian point-man Gerard Belanger was to
meet Central Bank and finance ministry officials on Wednesday as his
delegation ponders whether Moscow merits a new tranche of a recently agreed
4.5-billion-dollar 18-month loan.

The 630-million-dollar payment is eagerly expected here by October as
Russia seeks to side-step a potentially-devastating default on repayment of
old loans back to the Fund.

Moscow's IMF envoy Mikhail Zadornov told NTV television that negotiations,
scheduled to last here until September 1, will concentrate on the 2000
budget parameters and Russia's compliance with a tight fiscal policy agreed
with the IMF over the summer.

The Fund wants Russia to aim for a four-percent of gross domestic product
primary budget surplus next year -- a figure which excludes Russia's
foreign debt payments.

However Moscow ministers want the IMF to lower its sights, stressing that
chronically poor revenue collection should improve next year enough only to
meet a three percent surplus.

The loan disbursement negotiations according to economists here are likely
to be complicated by US media reports that Russia illegally shipped some
200 million dollars of IMF money to private bank accounts in the Bank of
New York.

Officials here have so far stayed mum over the Wall Street Journal
publication. The New York Times in a separate article said up to 10 billion
dollars had been laundered through the bank's accounts.

"Given the recent change in government and the simmering scandal over Wall
Street Journal allegations that 200 million dollars of IMF funds went
missing, it would be surprising if there were no hiccups," the MFK
Renaissance investment bank remarked in a research note.

The IMF has lent Russia some 20 billion dollars since 1992. 

*******

#3
Moscow Times
August 24, 1999 
FIFTH COLUMN: Aksyonenko A Devotee of Krishnamurti 
By Leonid Bershidsky 

The government has always boasted one or two internal emigrĪs. The early 
reformist Cabinet of Yegor Gaidar was chock-full of them. Even the later, 
compromise-based governments included English-speaking, smooth, well-groomed 
ministers whose primary purpose was to wangle money from Western creditors. 

First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Aksyonenko is not one of them. Indeed, 
his halting speech and rough-hewn features would have disqualified him for 
the first Gaidar Cabinet regardless of his business qualities. Yet in a 
recent public appearance he gave himself away completely as a veritable 
easthead, a Russian whose thoughts are far to the southeast of the land 
where, not long ago, he ran the railroad monopoly. 

A reporter asked Aksyonenko in St. Petersburg last week why he was so calm in 
the face of the latest government crisis. Was he sure he would keep his post? 
The former railroad minister and No. 2 man in Sergei Stepashin's government 
gave a reply that startled everyone present. 

"I live by Krishnamurti," he said. "Read his books, and you will understand 
everything." 

Apparently, he then checked himself just in time, remembering that it would 
not be a good time to ask for a donation on behalf of, say, the Krishnamurti 
Foundation of America. 

Jiddu Krishnamurti was born in 1895 in Madanapalle, India, into a respectable 
brahman family. His father was a member of the Theosophic Society, run by 
English mystic Annie Besant. She noticed the boy when he was 14, finding his 
capacity for meditative ecstasy quite remarkable. 

Besant adopted young Krishnamurti, took him to London and gave him an 
education. In 1912, he was declared by the Theosophists the new Messiah and 
put at the head of a newly formed Order of the Star of the East. He was given 
large amounts of money and real estate to run the mystic order. 

But in 1929, Krishnamurti gave all that away, quit the order and declared 
that "truth is a pathless land, and you cannot approach it by any path 
whatsoever, by any religion, by any sect. ... Truth, being borderless, cannot 
be organized." 

He lived to be 91, spreading his teaching throughout the world. He wrote 200 
books. "I want to see man free, joyful like a bird in the clear sky, 
unburdened and independent," he said. 

This is the philosophy Aksyonenko professes to live by. Never mind all the 
malicious press about him being a puppet of the Yeltsin family and tycoon 
Boris Berezovsky. Never mind the slight contradiction between working in a 
highly organized structure such as the government and following 
Krishnamurti's teaching of absolute freedom. 

Meet Aksyonenko, unburdened and independent, and thus unconcerned with 
whether he would be reappointed. Forget Aksyonenko the Berezovsky protĪgĪ who 
would keep his job in any Cabinet while the family runs the Kremlin. 

One of Aksyonenko's predecessors in the Cabinet, former Deputy Prime Minister 
Oleg Lobov, was also fond of oriental culture. It was he who helped the 
notorious Aum Shinrikyo sect get into Russia. 

Generally, it makes more sense to track the Russian government's tradition of 
oriental mysticism than to accuse it of corruption. Accusations fall on deaf 
ears, while a discussion of philosophical preferences is as stimulating as a 
cup of Japanese tea. 

*******

#4
Russia: Left Likely To Split
By Sophie Lambroschini

The Russian Communist Party and its allies are going through a crisis that 
may end, according to experts, in a split. This could undermine the left's 
chances in December parliamentary elections.

Moscow 23 August 1999 (RFE/RL) -- Three years ago the communists under 
Gennady Zyuganov seemed such a powerful force that the fear of a leftist 
come-back contributed to President Boris Yeltsin's reelection. Today, the 
loose "People's Patriotic Forces" coalition grouping the Communist Party and 
its allies has been hit by divisions that cast doubt on Zyuganov's continued 
leadership.

Zyuganov is trying to unite the left around a bloc called "For Victory." 
However, during the last two weeks, Communist deputies seemed in a rush to 
distance themselves from their official leader. The Agrarian Party announced 
it was leaving the communist coalition altogether to join Yevgeny Primakov's 
and Yuri Luzhkov's bloc "Fatherland-All Russia."

There are many other signs of division.

The organizer of the communists' presidential election campaign in 1996, 
Alexei Podberyozkin, was excluded from the party for "anti-communist" 
opinions.

A well known hard-line communist deputy, Viktor Ilyukhin, is considering 
running independently, with his "Movement in support of the Army."

Two radical leftist coalitions held founding congresses over the weekend. One 
adopted the name "Stalin bloc -- for the USSR."

Some communists like Ilyukhin deny that the emergence of several blocs 
reflects growing rifts. They say that the left's possible break-up into 
several blocs is an electoral tactic, aimed at winning more seats.

Members of the "Stalin bloc," one of the new radical alliances, are more 
outspoken. Daria Mitina, a Duma deputy from the communist faction and member 
of a Communist youth league, is joining the bloc. She told RFE/RL that she is 
dissatisfied with Zyuganov's Communist Party which, in her words, does not 
"live with its times" and is ideologically too willing to compromise with 
reform efforts. She hopes that the Stalin bloc will manage to unite many 
people with socialist views who do not currently back the Communist Party.

"I think that in Stalin, the Stalin bloc found a favorable symbol. Even those 
who under no circumstances would vote for Zyuganov and his Communist Party 
would vote for Stalin. He stopped being an exclusively communist ideological 
figure. He is the symbol of order, the symbol of discipline exclusively, the 
symbol of the country's economic growth." 

Mitina says the creation of a separate bloc is normal, because Zyuganov is 
trying to keep all the future Duma seats for the members of his party, 
excluding more radical, or critical, candidates. She says other parties must 
run on their own, to have a chance of getting into the Duma. She also 
criticizes the fact that Zyuganov holds all the leading posts, from first 
secretary to presidential candidate.

"We shouldn't limit ourselves to the sole figure of Zyuganov. For example 
[Duma speaker Gennady] Seleznev is perceived by a significant majority as a 
more adequate candidate for head of state. And Zyuganov can just head the 
party."

Although officially denying any ideological divergence with the party, Viktor 
Ilyukhin also hinted that he may distance himself from communist ideology 
ahead of elections. He told our correspondent that his "Movement in Support 
of the Army" should defend a "patriotic platform" and leave "the communist 
ideology to the Communist Party." 

Yevgeny Volk, an expert with the Moscow-based "Heritage Fund", tells RFE/RL 
that a split on the left was quite foreseeable. He said that Zyuganov's 
Communist Party "compromised itself in the eyes of its electorate by failing 
to play its role as an opposition party." On many occasions, Volk says, 
Zyuganov complied with the Kremlin's will.

Vladimir Semago, a leftist deputy who left the communist faction last year, 
tells RFE/RL that these compromises have damaged the Communist Party. He says 
the party is always late with its decisions and only reacts to events.

"The Communist Party failed to become a leading political force [for the 
left]. It only bounces off on the Kremlin's political initiatives. Like 
tennis. A good player plays against a partner. A bad one plays against a 
wall. Well, the [Russian Communist Party] is the wall against which the 
Kremlin is playing."

According to Volk, the proximity of parliamentary elections makes it 
increasingly difficult for Zyuganov to pursue what Volk describes as a 
"conciliatory policy" toward the Kremlin. 

Volk says the People's Patriotic Union includes very different leftist 
currents and "they all want to be heard." He describes Ilyukhin as a 
fundamentalist with a nationalist streak and the Agrarian Party as more 
moderate. Volk says that therefore, "the risk of a schism has been simmering 
for a long time." He says the Communist Party is under the pressure of 
diminishing popularity and that it may well end up with fewer seats in the 
next Duma.

However, Semago says that the split in the ranks of the communists does not 
reflect any real ideological difference. He says caustically that the "left 
doesn't have any ideological divergences because it doesn't have any ideas" 
or any real program. Semago says that reported divisions between so-called 
extremists or fundamentalists and so-called social-democrats or moderates can 
not be defined by different policies. He says the real division centers on 
the "level of loyalty to the Kremlin." 

*******

#5
Los Angeles Times 
August 24, 1999 
[for personal use only]
COLUMN ONE 
Ex-Soviet State Dares to Dream 
Estonia has made the most economic progress among the former republics. A
border town is grateful that it didn't reunite with Russia--and end up in
as dismal a situation as its neighbor. 
By RICHARD C. PADDOCK, Times Staff Writer

NARVA, Estonia--A few months after Estonia won independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991, the people of this historic border town held a referendum to
secede from their new country and reunite with Russia. 
Fortunately for the town, the attempt failed, and today residents are
trying to forget it ever happened. As Narva's prosperity rises with the
rest of capitalist Estonia, the townsfolk can look across the Narva River
to the seedy Russian town of Ivangorod and see the dismal life they escaped. 
In Narva, new private businesses have sprung up. Tidy rows of flowers
are planted along the main streets. People drive cars made in Western
Europe and shop at a modern supermarket that could just as easily be in
Santa Monica. 
"If that referendum were held today, people would never want to join
Russia," said Narva town council member Svetlana Legkodym. "The West is
open for us now. The East is practically closed." 
Across the border in Ivangorod, dilapidated Soviet-era buildings are
set among weeds and potholed streets. Apartments have no hot water; some
have no water at all. Too poor to process its sewage, the town dumps it
untreated into the river. At the local outdoor market, desperate pensioners
try to make a few rubles by selling cabbage and carrots from their gardens. 
These days, it is Ivangorod's turn to dream of a different future.
Last year, the town sent a petition to President Boris N. Yeltsin seeking
to secede from Russia and become part of Estonia, where ethnic Russians
make up a third of the population. Yeltsin ignored the request. 
"I wish I could hang myself," said Alexander Lipski, a 64-year-old
Ivangorod engineer who gets a monthly pension worth $15 and picks wild
chervil to sell at the market. "Thirty-eight years of work, and this is all
I have." 
Over the past eight years, Russia and Estonia have both claimed to
have enacted "reforms," but only Estonia has succeeded in transforming its
economy and markedly improving the lives of its people. 
After winning its independence, the tiny Baltic nation set out to
erase the legacy of Soviet occupation by adopting a radical sink-or-swim
economic program. Drawing inspiration from the likes of conservative former
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and U.S. free-market economist
Milton Friedman, the government eliminated trade tariffs, embraced foreign
investment, adopted a flat income tax, privatized most state holdings and
boldly tied its currency to the German mark. 
Estonia also created a free-trade zone where its own factories were
forced to compete on the world market without the benefit of government
subsidies. Today, Estonia--smaller than San Bernardino County--is the most
successful of the 15 countries that once made up the Soviet Union. 
"Compared to Russia, Estonia is like an Eskimo's kayak," Estonian
President Lennart Meri likes to say. "A supertanker needs 16 nautical miles
to reverse course. An Eskimo can do it on the spot." 
Occupying a strategic position on the Baltic Sea, Estonia has been at
the center of conflict between East and West for much of the past
millennium. Danes, Teutonic Knights, Swedes, Russians and Germans have all
fought to control it. 
Conquered by Peter the Great in 1710, Estonia declared independence
from Russia in 1918. Overrun by both the Nazis and the Communists during
World War II, it finally ended up under Soviet control in 1944. 

Country Hopes to Join EU, NATO 
Today, government policy is driven by the fear that sooner or later
Russia will grow strong enough to seize it again. Recognizing that it has
little chance of surviving on its own, the country of 1.4 million people
has sought to integrate its economy with Western Europe and enter the
European Union. It also hopes to secure its protection by winning admission
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Estonia shares a similar history of occupation with its neighboring
Baltic republics, Latvia and Lithuania. The other two nations have trailed
Estonia in their efforts at economic reconstruction but also have staked
their future on joining the European Union and NATO. 
Turning its back on Russia, Estonia has attracted $1.5 billion in
Western foreign investment--much of it to convert factories to make goods
for the European market. Since 1992, the share of products Estonia exports
to Russia has plummeted from 85% to 8%. 
While Russia perennially begs for more foreign loans, Estonia stunned
the World Bank in 1997 by offering to start repaying its loans before they
were due. While Russia's national debt equals nearly 90% of its gross
domestic product, Estonia's debt is just 4% of its GDP. 
One of Estonia's most visible successes is the Old Town of Tallinn,
the nation's capital, where renovated historic buildings, cobblestone
streets and shops brimming with goods attract millions of tourists a year.
Despite the ravages of war and Soviet occupation, it is one of the
best-preserved medieval city centers in Europe. 

Tiny Baltic Nation Becoming Wired 
Modern technology has arrived in a rush, and Estonia boasts higher
rates of mobile phone and Internet use than many other European countries.
The government has launched a drive to connect every classroom to the
Internet by 2000; already, 64% of Estonia's schools are online. Prime
Minister Mart Laar also has begun creating what he calls a "virtual
government" to provide information and services through the Internet. 
"There is one advantage in starting late," said Laar, 39, who is
credited with spearheading the economic transformation of the early 1990s.
"You can see the mistakes of what was done before you. If your economy was
destroyed, you can have a very modern economy like what we are building now." 
Even so, Estonia's efforts to detach itself from its giant neighbor
were not enough to shield it from the effects of Russia's economic collapse
a year ago. 
Food products--one of the last big export items to Russia--dropped
sharply with Moscow's devaluation of the ruble. Tallinn bankers suffered
significant losses, and some of the biggest banks were forced to merge. The
combination triggered a recession. The economy, which grew 11% in 1997,
began shrinking at the end of 1998 and has yet to recover. The government
was forced to cut its budget by more than 5% and is still running a deficit. 
Analysts, however, predict that Estonia will start pulling out of its
slump by the end of the year. 
"Technically, we have a recession in growth," President Meri said. "Of
course, this is nothing to be happy about, but it is not a crisis. The gut
feeling of most businessmen is that we have passed that point and the
economy is picking up." 
With the end of the Soviet Union, Estonians reasserted their national
identity at the expense of the country's Russian-speaking minority. Viewing
ethnic Russians as part of a Soviet occupation force, the government denied
citizenship even to those born in Estonia after 1940 unless they could pass
a civics test in Estonian--a difficult language most ethnic Russians never
bothered to learn. 
Ethnic Russians also were hit hard by the restructuring of the
economy. Under communism, they often had the best jobs and the best
apartments. But now, without state subsidies, the factories where they
worked have shut down. Many complain that the government discriminates
against them. 
Russia has been highly critical of Estonia's treatment of Russians,
and Moscow's policies have widened the gulf between the two countries.
Russia, for example, has imposed a double tariff on all imports from Estonia. 
Russia also has never acknowledged the Soviet occupation of
Estonia--instead maintaining the old line that the Communists were
assisting the fraternal peoples of the Baltics. Precious symbols of
Estonian independence--a gold medal and sash worn by Estonia's president
that were seized by Soviet soldiers in 1940--still sit on display in a
Kremlin museum. Russia has no plans to return them. 
Estonians, who once crossed the border freely, now must get a visa to
enter Russia. Few make the trip, and young Estonians form their view of
Russia from American movies. Youngsters refuse to learn Russian, and
English is increasingly becoming Estonia's second language. 

Relatives Live Across River in Russia 
At Estonia's northeastern border, the two countries are separated by
the Narva River, a historic dividing line between East and West. Two
fortresses face each other across the river: one begun by Czar Ivan III in
1492 in the town that bears his name, and the other in Narva in the 13th
century by Danes trying to hold back the Russians. 
During Soviet times, Ivangorod and Narva functioned as one town and
shared municipal services. Most residents came from Russia and other Soviet
republics such as Belarus and Ukraine. Today, only 6% of Narva's 75,000
residents are Estonian, and many have relatives living on the other side of
the river. 
Across the river, life is bleak for Ivangorod's 12,000 residents. 
"People don't have anything," said Irina Voltchek, 35, the mayor's
press secretary. "They don't receive wages--even late. There are no jobs,
no work. Almost no one believes in the future." 
Voltchek said the heart of the town's business activity is its
market--a dismal collection of wooden stalls with a small assortment of
food, cheap imported goods and pirated videos for sale. 
Pensioners can rent a stall for 1 ruble--about 4 cents--and sell
vegetables from their gardens. The more ambitious cross into Narva and
bring back European products to sell. 
"Everything is dead in Ivangorod," said Lyubov Vykhodina, 45, a former
librarian who sells inexpensive soap and packaged food she buys in Narva.
"This market is the only living place." 
At a nearby stall, Bronislava Eremitskaya, 65, was trying to
supplement her $16.50 monthly pension by selling the three cabbages, four
squash and seven carrots she had grown. Asked how life was in Ivangorod,
she started to cry. "If life was good," she said, "I wouldn't be here." 
In Narva, the recession has been harsher than elsewhere in Estonia.
Unemployment is 16%--triple the national rate. Pensioners line up for hours
at the border to cross into Ivangorod and buy Russian foodstuffs at prices
made much cheaper by the ruble's devaluation. 
Despite the hardships, however, Narva's ethnic Russians know they are
lucky to be living in Estonia. For one, wages and pensions are many times
higher in Narva--and they are paid on time. 
"We are better off here," construction worker Vladimir Orlov, 47, said
as he looked across the river at Ivangorod. "There is order here. The city
is clean. You feel sure about your future." 

*******

#6
Excerpt
Russian Radio Interviews Yakushkin 

Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy
21 August 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Interview with Dmitriy Yakushkin, Russian President Boris Yeltsin's 
press secretary; live -- from the "Passazh" program 

[Presenter] Good day once again. This is the 
Passazh programme, and my and Aleksey Venediktov's guest on this Saturday 
[21 August] is Dmitriy Yakushkin, the Russian Federation president's 
press secretary. Hello, Dima. 
[Yakushkin] Good day. 
[Presenter] So let's start off straight away with a question about
August. This 
is a summer that we'll remember. We've heard it all on the television and 
I think that politically, this August will long be remembered. Everyone 
is saying that the relationship between the Kremlin, government and Duma 
has changed - has it? Can we use the word configuration here? What does 
the new configuration consist of? 
[Yakushkin] There are two parts to your question. First about August. It's 
traditionally said it would be criminal or at least unprofessional to 
leave Russia in August. That's what the foreign media community say - as 
soon as they leave things start happening. And August this year has been 
no exception, with some truly major events. And of course our August in 
Russia differs from that in Central Europe, when everyone goes off on 
holiday and politics dies down. This has not happened in Russia and 
despite the fact that the political season usually begins in early 
September it has actually already started for us now. August gave us an 
advance glimpse of what lies ahead in the coming four months up to 19th 
December and the elections to the State Duma. We can already see the 
political battle lines being drawn up and judging from what is happening 
now it will be an extremely tough political fight. 
Your second question was about the relationship, yes... 
[Question, interrupting] I'll clarify that a little. When Stepashin went
and 
Putin came in, we saw that there was virtually no change to the 
composition of the government. Except for the prime minister. But 
everyone is saying that the relationship between the Kremlin and White 
House has been altered. The president himself has been talking of a 
single team. What does that mean? 
[Answer] I don't want to anticipate events because a lot will depend on how 
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin performs in his new job. The president has a 
high regard for his determination and his professional qualities. But 
everyone is waiting for real events and real decisions and real solutions 
for a range of situations. With some justification - even public opinion 
agrees with this. The North Caucasus is one of the first and real tests, 
subjectively and objectively. This applies to any prime minister but for 
Putin it's an additional trial. 
Getting slightly ahead, I can say that this is the principal issue which 
worries the president. He is dealing with this problem on a daily basis, 
the same way as he did during the Kosovo conflict. He is regularly 
briefed by people who monitor different areas and aspects of the problem 
and he keeps his communication lines open - first of all, with our power 
structures. He considers this a serious threat to Russia's integrity and, 
accordingly, thinks that the measures which must be taken to deal with 
this threat have to be exceptionally harsh and resolute. The president 
believes that every possible effort must be made to stop terrorist 
actions being committed against the state by armed gangs in Afghanistan 
[as received, presumably, Dagestan] with all possible care being taken to 
reduce human casualties on the Russian side to the minimum. 
[Q] Do you want to say... 
[A, interrupting] You see, this would be every statesman's 
responsibility in a military conflict, but in this case the president 
specifically stresses the importance of dealing with the problem in this 
particular way. 
[Q] While we are on the subject of Dagestan, do you think that the 
president's position as you know it - the emphasis on using heavy 
artillery and air raids to avoid deploying soldiers on the ground as was 
in Chechnya - is based on specific orders and is the result of the 
Supreme [commander's] conscious decision? 
[A] Yes, yes. 
[Q] They are now saying that the military campaign in Dagestan will be 
dragging on for months and winter has already been mentioned. Why this is 
so? Because the first operation has failed? 
[A] I'm not a military man so I can't comment on the military component 
of this conflict, but I do think that we cannot expect quick fixes. On 
the other hand, reports now reaching the president say that the main 
rebel concentrations have been suppressed. But there is always the danger 
that it might reoccur and we have to fight this as well. A kind of 
destabilizing factor, like Chechnya, could be left behind. But as of 
today there is some positive progress in the situation, although of 
course it remains extremely difficult. 
[Q] A lot of people are talking of the possibility of a state of 
emergency being declared, although both the president have said that at 
the moment it won't be. But can we say that the threat of a state of 
emergency is receding now that the main rebel concentrations have been 
beaten? 
[A] Your question assumes that it was decided to bring in a state of 
emergency. 
[Q] But under the constitution it is a possibility. In theory. 
[A] I've already had to say this, and want to say it again. In fact I 
can repeat this as often as I need to and as often as I am asked about 
it. A state of emergency is not on the agenda. There are no such plans. 
Unfortunately, public opinion is inclined towards disaster scenarios - 
and there are plenty of them. The beauty of these scenarios, for those 
who dream them up, is that they strengthen a sense of foreboding in 
society. They create unnecessary expectations and it's very difficult to 
deny them because the only time you know it's wrong is when it hasn't 
actually happened. But I can tell you that there are no such plans, no 
pieces of paper, no reports, no lists - nothing at all. There is another 
factor that I regard as very important here. The great changes of the 
past 10 years, whether you approve of them or not, have resulted in a 
public awareness and an awareness among the leading politicians, 
especially during an election campaign, that it simply cannot happen. It 
physically can't be done. You just can't turn the country back into the 
past. That's very important....

[Q] I want to bring in a question from Sergey [Buntman] here about the 
political families, political clans, political parties and blocs that are 
springing up before our very eyes today - how does the Kremlin, the 
president, view the coming Duma election campaign? Does he believe in a 
presidential or ruling party, the left-wing opposition, the radical 
opposition? How does the president regard the spectrum of political 
families and groups? Those of today, I mean, because it could be 
different come December. 
[A] There is no ruling party and there won't be one. The president has 
said that. Despite all these movements and parties that are being set up 
virtually every day, I don't think that the president's position has 
changed since, say, the beginning of the year or at least since he 
delivered his message [state-of-the-nation speech] to the Federal 
Assembly. That position is support for all constructive forces. The 
president has said many times that the Duma is not doing what it's 
supposed to be doing, and that is annoying for the president. It's 
supposed to be working on specific laws and adopting them. Instead of 
that, it's descending into a pointless political talking shop. The 
president has said that there has to be an opposition - but one that is 
constructive, not destructive and not obsessed with itself. He was of 
course very annoyed by this, there's no point in hiding that. Of course, 
he'd prefer to see in the Duma professionals who would get on with the 
job. Of course, he'd prefer the elections to be clean and fair. There are 
plenty of dirty tricks around at the moment. Look at the amount of 
scandal around - it's all in the media. A lot of things happening are 
being interpreted as an attack on one camp by another one. 
[A] The media reflects the situation in society. Look at the frenzy in 
the media. There are many actions which are being interpreted as an 
attack by one group against another. And they are all concerned with 
trivia, such as cutting off water supplies or tax police. And this is 
just the beginning. It is still August. One should do everything to 
ensure the most civilized elections possible in present-day Russia, in 
our situation. 
The president was very glad that the latest government session discussed 
the political aspect of preparations for the elections. Actually, without 
criticizing those who worked earlier in the White House, this is the 
evidence of what the president believes is the main thing in the 
government's work: to hold the elections, which must take place on time, 
as they will. 
[Q] At the level of general perceptions among the public, there is an 
idea that the president is not at all happy about the so-called 
left-centre bloc, Fatherland - All Russia. He is unhappy about its 
strengthening. Are the president and the administration looking for a 
counterbalance in the right-centre wing? The right-wing quasi-opposition 
is trying to create a counterbalance. There is such an idea. What do you 
think about it? 
[A] I will not deny that the president's administration is involved in 
politics in a broad sense of the word. The administration's contacts 
embrace the whole spectre of political forces. This is a technical 
question. I would not give you the names of those politicians or leaders 
of blocs who appear frequently in the Kremlin. I can assure you that they 
represent the whole political spectre. 
[A] So in this sense, the administration is very active. It should be 
active. It is the main political headquarters, as it were, the main 
political adviser to the president, which helps the president to made 
decisions. 
However, the president's position has not changed in principle in the last 
few months. It would be a gross exaggeration to say that the president 
will welcome the victory or strong presence of the left-wing forces in 
the Duma. He believes that in this sense that centrist bloc which 
appeared - [change of thought] He spoke about this before the formation 
of the bloc, when one of the leaders, Yuriy Mikhaylovich Luzhkov, was 
just saying that he was going to get involved in the political process - 
I remember how we discussed these questions at the end of the last year, 
when he was only announcing his intentions. The president has always 
thought that if this centrist bloc attracts votes from the left-wing 
spectrum, which has a majority in the Duma, then this is a positive 
phenomenon. He welcomes this event. This is the main thing. Everyone who 
is for reforms, everything which is constructive and pushes the country 
forward and does not freeze it - because in our specific Russian 
conditions to stop often means to go back to the very ambiguous state of 
1989-1990 - everything that pushes the country forward is welcomed by the 
president. 
[Q] However, if this centrist bloc... 
[A, interrupting] I will add that the image of these reforms... [pauses] 
There can be different attitudes towards reforms, I realize that we can 
start discussing now how exactly reforms must be carried out. Everyone 
wants reforms, but the path towards reforms and tactics can be different. 
There are nuances here. 
[Q] About nuances and Yuriy Mikhaylovich Luzhkov. Yes, probably the 
centrist bloc is closer to the president than the left-wing bloc. This is 
obvious. But how can you comment on today's speech by Yuriy Mikhaylovich 
Luzhkov at the Fatherland congress, who bluntly, in comparison with 
Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, described the movement as an 
anntipresident one. I more or less quote from the text: the democratic 
authorities in Russia, said Luzhkov, are incomprehensible for the people 
and dangerous for the country. 
[A] I could say the following in reply. This kind of reasoning is not 
very original and in my view reflects an unfortunate but prominent 
tendency in our society to see everything in black and white. They 
identify some fortress - and everyone usually understands what this 
fortress means, it's this particular place in the centre - and this 
fortress must be taken by storm, a kind of crusade should be proclaimed 
and, figuratively speaking, a new leaf should be turned. 
I think that this is, first of all, a very unhealthy tendency because, 
once again, it is dividing the country into camps, into two or more 
camps. It indicates, as it were, that there are bad people and good 
people, that some are squeaky clean in white gowns while others are bad 
people who should be destroyed. Incidentally, the word destroyed is used 
by these people who are serious politicians who were in the government 
only yesterday. I have in mind an absolutely concrete pronouncement which 
I read today. They speak about destroying or suppressing. This has never 
resulted in anything good in Russia and if this starts again, God forbid, 
the same thing will happen. We must learn our Russian history and 
mentality. We should not build barricades and call people to come out 
into the streets. Because this is what it is, in fact. So I believe that 
this is a sick logic, first of all, and second, it is at odds with 
reality. Life is much more varied and complex. And this is not a 
philosophical view but political. Let us look at the politicians who are 
now active in blocs. Where have they come from? All this is a result of 
the political changes led by President Boris Yeltsin. Of course, nobody 
denies that they have their good and bad sides, and the bad sides should 
be criticized. Incidentally, the president himself feels very strongly 
about his mistakes, and he has mentioned some of them in public. But if 
another person was in the president's place, he would do different 
mistakes but they are unavoidable. I don't call for turning a blind eye 
to everything or for encouraging something, but we must cast a sober 
glance on the reality in which we live. We must see who we were 10 or 
five years ago. 
It's only a few years ago that we have the events of 1993. And when you 
think about it, you become much more indifferent to those calls of 
accusatory nature, quite aggressive calls which, unfortunately, can be 
heard and will be repeated increasingly often as 19th December 
approaches. 
[Q] You have just said that the Fatherland-All Russia centre could take 
away left-wing votes, and this will be a positive moment. But it is quite 
feasible that it could also take away right-wing votes, the votes of 
those on the right of our political life, the centre-right votes which 
are not yet united. Would it be better for the president and his 
administration if a more united right-of-centre bloc existed as a 
counterweight? And what is your view of the fact that the right-wingers 
failed to gather together, while Sergey Stepashin said today that he was 
not joining any bloc but would stand only in a single-mandate 
constituency in St Petersburg. Sergey Vadimovich is going to St 
Petersburg tomorrow and will announce this once again at a big news 
conference there. The centre-left has its leaders: Primakov, Luzhkov. 
Stepashin was named as the leader of the centre-right. But perhaps one of 
the reasons for Stepashin's sacking was precisely the fact that such a 
powerful bloc in opposition to the president had emerged. Now can we say 
that Vladimir Putin - after all, he summoned all right-wing leaders to 
his office, former prime ministers - that he has failed to assemble a 
centre-right bloc? 
[A] Well, you see, I would like to remain as diplomatic as possible 
here. After all, I am an official who voices the president's view, so I 
would say in general terms that any split or strife can't be good. I 
would support [Head of Our Home is Russia State Duma faction] Vladimir 
Ryzhkov who said in the latest "Itogi" programme, it seems, that we can 
already see as a positive achievement compared with the elections in 1995 
the fact that the ordinary voter will have to cope with a much smaller 
number of election associations, and it will be easier to make one's 
choice. And this is already a positive change, some kind of restructuring 
of the political process has already taken place. Apparently, there 
already are associations in the right-wing camp so that people should not 
feel uncomfortable about who should follow whom and that their 
preferences be channelled because there is a huge number of people who 
would like to vote for the right wing and naturally, it would be bad if 
there were several associations belonging to this political tendency thus 
creating confusion in people's minds. It is not that I am speaking about 
the interests of the Kremlin, President Yeltsin or his administration, I 
am speaking in general. It is a good thing that there is no endless lists 
of endless parties, like social democrats, socialist parties and the like 
but instead there are main tendencies, and this makes the choice easier. 
I will not hide the fact that Boris Nikolayevich feels personal liking 
for people in the right-wing camp as politicians. It is an obvious fact, 
he has worked with many of them recently. I think that if Sergey 
Vadimovich Stepashin succeeded in creating an association with somebody 
else, this would enhance Stepashin's positions and the positions of the 
association because Stepashin enjoys prestige, he has a very high rating. 
Look, after three months his indices are very good. Naturally, if he goes 
it alone or if someone fails to agree with him on building a coalition, 
this will cut his chances, and this is an obvious thing too. 
[Q] And the last question, perhaps. Now, on the eve of parliamentary and 
presidential elections, virtually all political forces, all, I can't even 
think of who would be against - perhaps, [Workers' Russia leader Viktor] 
Anpilov but no, he is for it too - all are speaking about the need to 
revise the constitution and change the president's powers, thus giving 
more independence to the government and the Federal Assembly. Well, at 
the congress or the political council of Fatherland-All Russia they spoke 
straightforwardly about introducing the post of vice president. So what 
is Boris Nikolayevich's view of changing the constitution and reducing 
presidential powers? He is completing his term with his former powers 
intact but, in principle, has he said anything about this with Russia's 
future in mind? 
[A] You see, on this issue too his stand has not changed so far. Very 
many people would like to manipulate the constitution. It is very 
dangerous to rewrite this document because one alteration entails another 
and an uncontrolled revision starts. It is another matter that, 
naturally, life introduces its own corrections which should be viewed 
with a cool head and calmly. So from this point of view he thinks that 
after the elections have taken place and a new president has been elected 
- Russia will have a new president in the year 2000 - the new president 
should handle this, and his view of this problem will be very important. 
And I'm not sure that the pronouncements in favour of revision that can 
be heard today will remain the same after the elections 2000. I think 
that another view may emerge then. Anyway, it is up to the next 
president, not President Yeltsin. 
[Q] Have you ever discussed what President Yeltsin will do after leaving 
the presidential post? What will he do? Have you ever discussed this? 
[A] I think that to-date, in August 1999, he is very busy with current 
affairs most of all. But I think that as the parliamentary elections and 
especially the presidential elections are drawing nearer, he will be 
thinking more and more about his life after the presidency. I think that 
he will be thinking about the past, about what has been done and what has 
not been. I think that it will be more important for him to ponder the 
policy he has been pursuing, to think again about the legacy, about what 
Russia was and what it has become and what needs to be done. So he will 
be dealing with more eternal issues if this term can be applied to 
political life. But today's life keeps him away from this. [Q] And 
another question: will the president meet the editors-in-chief who have 
sent him a letter? Has such a meeting been included in the presidential 
diary for the next month? 
[A] You see, the thing is that the president doesn't like to do anything 
under pressure, that is Boris Nikolayevich's nature. 
[Q] But the request to meet him was submitted long ago -[interrupted] 
[A] No, he is aware of this, he is. You know that it is not just a 
request for a meeting, there is a certain background there. If you want 
we could devote your next broadcast to it. But this is an absolutely 
different issue. He is aware of all the nuances of this position. You 
see, it sounds like an outrage for the public ear - allegedly there are 
violations of freedom of the press. But there are no specific violations. 
There are specific financial and business interests which often 
interweave and bring about aggressive propaganda which instils into 
people the idea that something wrong is going on with the media. But 
today, for example, this Saturday, nothing dangerous has happened with 
regard to media rights or free speech. We should highlight this fact. In 
the last 10 years President Yeltsin has been doing all he can to prevent 
this. And I think that he will continue to do the same in the remaining 
year. 
[Q] But will there be the meeting, after all? 
[A] In order to hold a meeting we must know what we want to tell each 
other. I think that such a meeting cannot be ruled out, but I can't say 
in what format or when. The purpose of such a meeting should be clearly 
defined. But the president has never neglected any opportunities of 
meeting journalists. 
[Q] [passage omitted: poorly worded remarks by the interviewer on the 
possibility of the meeting]. 
That was Dmitriy Yakushkin, press secretary of the Russian President. 
Thank you very much. 

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