August 16, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3443 • 3444 •

Johnson's Russia List
#3444
16 August 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Itar-Tass: Russia, US to Hold Consultations on Abm, Start Treaties.
2. Itar-Tass: Primakov to Head Council of Fatherland-All Russia.
3. The Guardian (UK): Jonathan Steele, Kremlin gets it wrong again.
(Re Dagestan).
4. Reuters: Russia's Putin sets law and order agenda.
5. Reuters: Main points of Putin speech to Russian Duma.
6. Bloomberg: Russians Cynical About Putin as Next Prime Minister: Comment.
7. Los Angeles Times: Stevven Merritt Miner, The Logic in Yeltsin's Madness.
8. Newsweek: Bill Powell, Masters of the Kremlin.
9. Reuters: Separatists see no accord with Georgia. (Abkhazia)
10. Itar-Tass: Yeltsin Speaks Highly of "Team of Power Ministers".
11. The Electric Telegraph (UK): Marcus Warren, Pop hit tunes into Russian 
racism.
12. Los Angeles Times: Maura Reynolds, For Yeltsin Heir, Challenge Is to
Move 
Out of Shadows.
13. Financial Times: John Thornhill, Fears grow in Moscow over Dagestan. 
14. AP: Yeltsin Says Back Treatment Worked.]

*******

#1
Russia, US to Hold Consultations on Abm, Start Treaties.

WASHINGTON, August 16 (Itar-Tass) - The United States' intersectoral 
delegation leaves Wasghinton for Moscow on Monday for consultations with 
Russian experts to work on August 17-19. 

The delegation is led by John Holum, undersecretary of state in charge of 
armaments and international security. 

The American and Russian delegations will open discussion of prospects of 
changes to Russia-US anti-ballistic missile treary of 1972 and of preparing a 
Start-3 strategic arm reduction treaty. 

The delegation of Russian specialists to the consultations is expected to be 
headed by Grigory Berdennikov, chief of the Russian Defense Ministry's 
secority and disarmament department. 

Agreement to start these consultations was reached at the meeting of the 
Russian and American presidensts, Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton, in Cologne 
and during the former Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin's visit to Washington 
in late June. 

The need for the consultations is in particular prompted by the fact that the 
United States is considering a new national anti-ballistric missile system 
that is to protect it from missiles of "unfriendly regimes", or North Korea, 
Iran and Iraq. 

A US administration official in charge of arms and security problems said in 
an interview with Itar-Tass that he hoped the sides can exchange opinions on 
the situation with ballistic missiles in the world. He said increasing 
dangers of these arms prompt, from the standpoint of the United States, the 
need for discussing changes to the anti-ballistic missile treaty that would 
needed in order to create the limited-scope anti-missile defense system. 

However, the American delegation does not appear to be coming with specific 
proposals on modifications of this crucial treaty. The administration 
official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said the United States 
expected the Moscow consultations to centre on general needs of the day and 
their significance for the anti-balllistic missile treaty. He said he did nit 
think that the very wording of the treaty would be discussed. 

The American governmental expert also said that in a few coming years, the 
deveploment of ballistic missiles in different countries could become a 
menace to many states. 

As the nature of this menace is changing, the United States believes that it 
has to take certain measures in the military field. 

The US administration hopes to demonstrate to the Russian government that 
these measures are aimed just against the changing military menace and not 
against Russia, he said. 

The administration official voiced confidence that there is is a string of 
real possibilities for cooperation of Russia and the United States in the 
field of anti-ballistic missile defense. 

Certainly, such work is sometimes related to the use of very sensitive 
technologies, and both sides would handle this problem very cautiously, he 
added. 

However, there are possibilities for cooperation both at the stage of working 
out the system and at the stage of its use, he said. 

As for subjects of the Moscow consultations, the official said the sides 
would address the issues of the next phase of strategic arm reduction treaty. 

It would be good if the discussion would help the Start-2 treaty's 
ratification by Russia's State Duma, or the lower house of parliament, the 
administration official said. 

We expect that discussion of the preparation of Start-3 will be continual, 
the American expert said. 

He said the United States and Russia need to hammer out an agenda of these 
talks and determine the stance of the sides. 

******

#2
Primakov to Head Council of Fatherland-All Russia.

MOSCOW, August 16 (Itar-Tass) - Former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov is 
going to head the coordinating council of Fatherland-All Russia electoral 
bloc, sources in the council told Itar-Tass on Monday. 

It is not ruled out that other parties and movements will join the bloc, such 
as the Agrarian Party of Russia and Women of Russia that already have offered 
a merger. Boards of Fatherland, All Russia and the Agrarian Party, which 
planned a joint meeting over a merger, have put off the meeting for the 
second time, for August 17, sources in Fatherland told Itar-Tass on Monday. 

The meeting was postponded from last Friday because of an ailment of Oleg 
Morozov, a coordinator of All Russia. 

A spokesman at the Moscow mayor's office told Itar-Tass that attending the 
meeting of Fatherland's board in not on the Monday work schedule of Mayor 
Yury Luzhkov. 

******

#3
The Guardian (UK)
16 August 1999
[for personal use only]
Kremlin gets it wrong again 
Jonathan Steele in Moscow 

Russia's crisis in Dagestan need not slip into a repetition of the Chechen 
fiasco, because the issues are different. But, given the current thinking of 
Moscow's politicians and military leaders, Russia may succeed in turning a 
little local difficulty into a full-blown regional conflagration. 
Dagestan is about the size of Scotland, and is home to three dozen different 
nationalities. 

Given this diversity, it is hard to see how the small group of Wahhabi 
militants and Chechen fighters who seized seven villages close to the Chechen 
border nine days ago could hope to unify it. 

Their rigid brand of Islam is not popular in most of the republic. Nor is 
there in Dagestan the memory of Russian persecution the Chechens have had 
since Stalin deported them en masse during the second world war. 

Dagestan's politics are based on a system of rotating power among the main 
ethnic groups, since none is numerous enough to form a majority. Some have 
called it the Bosnia of the Caucasus. That may be an unfortunate analogy, 
since the real danger to Moscow is not that everyone unites against Russian 
rule to demand independence, as the Chechen fighters' leader Shamil Basayev 
wants, but that the various groups resort to civil war. 

This is especially true now that the rules for power-sharing seem to be 
weakening and there is no longer an omnipotent Communist party to enforce 
unity. Last year the parliament changed Dagestan's constitution so that the 
present president can run again. 

Economic discontent is another danger. Dagestanis can no longer migrate so 
easily to Russian cities, partly because of the huge increase in the cost of 
internal travel, but also because of the discrimination and hostility they 
face there. 

To contain trouble on the border, the Russian and Dagestani authorities need 
to show intelligence and flexibility, and to spend money on improving social 
conditions. But they tend to see the issue in largely strategic terms, in 
which "outsiders" are blamed. 

A key oil pipeline from Azerbaijan runs through Dagestan, and some 
politicians claim that the mini-invasion by the Chechen-based fighters is 
inspired by forces which want to create instability in Dagestan and Russia. 
These could be Turks, Americans and Iranians, all of whom are all said to 
want to weaken Russia's image and get the oil flowing south and west, not 
north. 

Some Moscow politicians see the issue as linked to domestic politics. They 
suspect that the crisis has been manufactured by President Boris Yeltsin to 
impose a state of emergency in Russia. 

Even if the Kremlin did not somehow inspire the invasion - there are reports 
in some Russian newspapers that Alexander Voloshin, the Kremlin chief of 
staff, met Mr Basayev a few weeks ago in France - they argue that Mr 
Yeltsin's new prime minister, Vladimir Putin, is deliberately exaggerating 
the crisis . 

If so, a lot of people are falling into the Kremlin's trap. Virtually every 
Russian politician, including Grigory Yavlinsky, whose Yabloko faction 
opposed the Chechen war, is talking the same language. 

"The bandits must be liquidated," is the constant refrain. Though the cause 
of the crisis is very different from Chechnya, Russia is reverting to 
excessive and badly aimed fire-power all over again. 

********

#4
Russia's Putin sets law and order agenda
By Anatoly Verbin

MOSCOW, Aug 16 (Reuters) - Vladimir Putin, presenting his programme to 
parliament as Russian prime minister designate, put law and order at the top 
of his priorities on Monday and said reviving Russia's military might was 
also high on the agenda. 

``None of the tasks can be carried out without installing elementary order in 
the country, without strengthening the executive vertical of power,'' Putin 
told deputies in the State Duma lower chamber, delivering a terse, hardline 
speech. 

His 13-minute speech was clearly drawn along the lines used by former Soviet 
and KGB leader Yuri Andropov. 

Andropov, then chief of the KGB secret police, came to power in the Soviet 
Union in 1982 and stayed at the Kremlin helm until his death in 1984. 

His policy of draconian discipline, combined with the appearance of cheap 
vodka, won him some popularity with a population tired of his predecessor 
Leonid Brezhnev's weakness. 

Kremlin sources said Putin's speechwriters and Kremlin spin doctors made the 
parallel intentional, hoping this would win sympathy both from the 
Communist-led Duma and a population tired of lawlessness and corruption in 
President Boris Yeltsin's era. 

``One of the main tasks is to secure calm and order in the country and to 
ensure carrying out fair and honest (parliamentary and presidential) 
elections,'' said Putin, 46, a former KGB spy. 

Many observers believe that Yeltsin's choice of Putin was dictated by his 
desire to tip the balance in the Kremlin favour in the Duma poll scheduled 
for December 19. Current trends show that opponents of Yeltsin are likely to 
win the poll. 

Yeltsin also said last Monday he wanted Putin to become his successor as 
president. 

One of Putin's previous jobs was head of the Federal Security Service, a KGB 
successor. 

Another task, Putin said, was ``to revive and maintain the defence might of 
the state,'' Putin said, suggesting that defence industry debts to the state 
budget could be written off. 

Foreign policy would remain unchanged, Putin said, but diplomats should work 
better to defend Russia's national interests as a world power. 

``For centuries, Russia has been and remains a world power. It has and 
retains zones of its rightful interests...and we cannot allow our interests 
to be ignored,'' he said. 

Putin also vowed to crush a separatist rebellion in the southern province of 
Dagestan by lawful means and to eliminate corruption in the country. 

He mentioned reforms once, saying they were not a goal but a means of 
improving living standards of the population which he vowed to achieve. 

The agricultural sector also needed support, he said. 

It was wrong to try to curb press freedoms, Putin said, but at the same time 
it was the duty of the state to prevent ``an orgy on television screens.'' 

*******

#5
Main points of Putin speech to Russian Duma

MOSCOW, Aug 16 (Reuters) - Following are the main points of Russian Acting
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's speech to deputies of the State Duma lower
house of parliament at confirmation hearings on Monday. 

COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT 

Main task is promoting ``stability and reliability of the authorities,''
therefore most ministers remain in their posts. 

ELECTIONS 

Second task is to ``secure calm and order in the country and to ensure fair
and honest (parliamentary and presidential) elections.'' 

ORDER AND DISCIPLINE 

``None of the tasks can be carried out without installing elementary order
in the country, without strengthening the executive vertical of power.'' 

Corruption and flourishing of black market is unacceptable. ``The cause of
this, of course is the weakness of government institutions.'' 

ECONOMIC POLICY 

``A main goal is to improve the quality of life of the population.'' 

Short term positive effects of the rouble's devaluation have already lapsed. 

Tax burden should be moved from producers to consumers. 

Talents of Russians are being used abroad but not at home. 

Investment needed in science and technology. 

Pay all debts on pensions and government sector wages. 

Support the army and military-industrial complex. ``We must all, together,
restore the respect of society towards people in the military.'' 

Support domestic producers and farmers. 

REGIONAL POLICY 

``Market rules are genuinely effective only where there is no division in
the united mechanism of state administration.'' 

Respect for autonomy of regions is the ``main course of Russia's
development as a federal state.'' 

No double standards in relations between centre and regions. 

``Economic discipline, a single legal regime and mutual responsibility are
the three most important elements in our regional policy.'' 

NORTH CAUCASUS 

``The lack of settlement of old conflicts inevitably leads to new ones.
Dagestan is an example.'' 

The harshest measures possible against terrorism. 

The Duma should quickly consider a law on rules for a declaration of
emergency. ``I think it will be possible to localise the conflict and
liquidate its sources without this extreme measure. If it is necessary we
will turn to the Federation Council (upper house of parliament) to put in
place a special legal regime in this hot spot.'' 

``We will not only struggle against terrorism but resolve the
socio-economic causes of this tendency.'' 

State commission on North Caucasus soon to meet. 

``Russia's territorial integrity can not be an object of discussion, much
less bargaining or blackmail.'' 

*******

#6
Russians Cynical About Putin as Next Prime Minister: Comment

Moscow, Aug. 16 (Bloomberg) -- Russians have grown accustomed to constant
political changes. The following are comments as the lower house of
parliament, the Duma, debated the nomination of Vladimir Putin as prime
minister. Putin would be Russia's fifth prime minister in 18 months after
Viktor Chernomyrdin, Sergei Kiriyenko, Yevgeny Primakov and Sergei Stepashin. 

Lyudmila Akhunova, 48, who sells pantyhose: 

My salary has remained at 800 rubles through the times of all of them:
Chernomyrdin, Kiriyenko, what's the next name? And it's not going to be
changed with another one. Our way of living is still the same.'' 

Yuri Gushchin, 32, a driver: 

``It's clear Putin will be confirmed, and clear it doesn't affect Russia.
Any significant moves can be expected only after parliamentary elections.
Still we live in democracy, as it seems.'' 

Alexander Solomatin, 26, a security guard: 

``Putin is a cool guy, he came from an enforcement body and is able to
twist off all militants in the Caucasus. Though Stepashin was a cool
security guy too. What was the reason to replace him? 

Dmitry Solomatin, 18, a bartender: 

``It's okay with me -- premiers take turns all the time. I would already
feel uncomfortable if they would stop.'' 

Anna Vorontsova, 36, a housewife: 

``It's sad what's happening to Russia but let them better confirm Putin as
prime minister. As I understood, they all are the same team - Putin and
Stepashin. 

*******

#7
Los Angeles Times
August 15, 1999 
[for personal use only]
The Logic in Yeltsin's Madness 
By STEVEN MERRITT MINER
Steven Merritt Miner, Professor of Russian History at Ohio University, Is the 
Author of "Selling Stalin," About Soviet Propaganda

ATHENS, OHIO--Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin has again tossed a 
political hand grenade before darting back behind the Kremlin's walls, 
leaving observers to wonder at his increasingly inexplicable behavior. With 
Yeltsin's firing of Prime Minister Sergei V. Stepashin last week, and his 
appointment of the virtually unknown Vladimir V. Putin as his successor, a 
total of four people have now served in that position during the past 18 
months. In the Western press, commentators struggling to explain the string 
of firings have concentrated on Yeltsin's poor health, in many cases linking 
his frailty to his concern to secure his legacy: a more democratic Russia, 
set on the path of market reforms, increasingly linked with the West and free 
from the menace of a communist resurgence. 

The Russian press has a much more jaded view of Yeltsin's record and motives. 
Seen up close, the president's legacy seems much less impressive and scarcely 
worth defending. Russian politics are increasingly corrupt, opaque and 
authoritarian, thanks in part to Yeltsin's own constitution, which invests 
enormous powers in the president. Following last August's economic collapse, 
market reforms have lost much of the luster they once seemed to have. The 
ruble has lost 75% of its value this year alone, and millions of Russians 
find it hard to make ends meet, even if they are fortunate enough to receive 
a paycheck. Relations with Western countries have gone from bad, with NATO 
expansion, to worse, with the East-West rift over Kosovo. Finally, despite 
Stepashin's assurances to the contrary when he visited Washington last month, 
Russian communism is far from being a spent political force. The Communist 
Party controls the largest bloc of seats in the lower house of the Russian 
parliament, the Duma, and it looks set to gain from an anti-Yeltsin political 
backlash in the parliamentary elections set for December. All segments of the 
Russian public are heartily tired of Yeltsin, whose public approval rating 
hovers at the statistically insignificant 7% level. 

Much commentary, especially outside Russia, has neglected an important 
element of the current political situation, which may go a long way toward 
explaining Yeltsin's moves. The Russian Federation is threatening to come 
apart at the seams. Since the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, the 
underlying forces of Russian political and social life have been centrifugal, 
drawing power away from Moscow, where it always lay during the highly 
centralized Soviet years, to the provinces and autonomous republics. While 
the world's attention has been focused on the political dust storms and 
instability in the Russian capital, regional power bosses have steadily 
undercut the center's claims. Yeltsin and the Duma may issue decrees, but 
local bosses enforce the rules as they see fit. Most important, financial 
power has ebbed away from the Kremlin, as regional authorities withhold 
payment of tax revenues. 

Among many political failures as president, one of Yeltsin's most serious has 
been his inability, even his unwillingness, to create a political party that 
would unite his supporters and create a countrywide organization that could 
reach beyond Moscow into the provinces. Yeltsin seems to have feared that a 
party might slip beyond his control and, like Ross Perot, he would find that 
his creation could live on without him. Lacking the presidential imprimatur, 
supporters of political liberalization, westernization and market economics 
have been forced to form their own microparties, which war with one another 
and split the reform vote. Meantime, the president's rivals have slowly built 
up party structures that pervade the vast hinterlands of Russia, where 
Yeltsin's political authority hangs in midair, with no local roots. The 
Communist Party, which has large-scale regional organizations left over from 
the Soviet era, has been the principal beneficiary of Yeltsin's shortsighted 
and politically self-centered approach. 

Politically ambitious people who did not want to join the Communist Party or 
the various nationalist and right-wing groups, such as Vladimir V. 
Zhirinovsky's misnamed Liberal Democratic Party, have faced two choices 
during the Yeltsin years. First, they could work within the Moscow-based 
apparat, advancing by playing the Byzantine game of Kremlin politics, hoping 
to catch the presidential eye or the patronage of one of the capital's 
financial or political power barons to climb the slippery political pole. 

This is the route chosen by most of Yeltsin's prime ministers, including 
Putin. Putin has no experience in the world of electoral politics, and he has 
no ready constituency within Russia at large or in the legislature. A colonel 
of the old Soviet KGB, he made the leap to the Kremlin big leagues by 
befriending Anatoly B. Chubais, Yeltsin's one-time champion of economic 
privatization. Once ensconced within the Kremlin power elite, Putin rose 
steadily, coming to command the Federal Security Service, successor to his 
old employer, the KGB. Yeltsin has explicitly endorsed him as his own 
successor in the presidential elections scheduled for next June. 

That endorsement might be the kiss of death, leaving an electorally 
inexperienced Putin to campaign with the full weight of Yeltsin-era 
corruption on his back. Other ambitious reformists hoping to capture the 
noncommunist reform mantle foresaw this dilemma and have chosen the alternate 
route to political power. Politicians such as Moscow mayor Yuri M. Luzhkov 
and another of Yeltsin's former prime ministers, Yevgeny M. Primakov, have 
chosen to distance themselves from the corruption and cronyism of Kremlin 
politics, linking relatively moderate nationalist appeals with calls for 
greater probity in politics and economics. 

This year, these aspirants for the moderate, noncommunist opposition banner 
took decisive measures to overcome the political fragmentation and organize 
nationwide. In April, regional power brokers formed the political bloc All 
Russia, under the leadership of President Mintimer S. Shaimiyev of Tatarstan, 
one of the Russian Federation's many autonomous regions. This group brought 
together the people who have gradually assembled the real levers of power in 
their hands, but lacked a leader of national prominence to contest power at 
the center. Following several months of negotiations, this group finally 
allied with the smaller organization Fatherland, headed by Luzhkov, early 
this month. This latter group, though lacking strong nationwide organization, 
enjoys power at the center, media access and, in Luzhkov, a leader of 
national prominence. Together, these two forces stake a powerful claim to the 
post-Yeltsin noncommunist political ground. 

These developments are far from happy for Yeltsin, who fears any group that 
he has not created and does not control. Although corruption is rife in the 
regions and in Luzhkov's Moscow, the new group will campaign as though this 
is all a product of presidential malfeasance or neglect. Furthermore, within 
the ranks of this alliance, many voices are calling for legal prosecution of 
those--right up to the president--who looted Soviet economic assets. Wih the 
election of the wrong successor, Yeltsin might find himself in the dock, 
rather than in quiet retirement. 

The formation of the new political alliance coincided with the eruption of 
the latest armed secessionist movement, this one in Dagestan, a province 
neighboring Chechnya. During the last few days, armed Islamic rebels, 
numbering 1,200 in Russian accounts, have infiltrated the province and 
declared a jihad. Although Russian armed forces have promised massive 
retaliation, airstrikes have failed, so far, to drive the rebels back, and 
the whole affair rekindles memories of the failed 1994-96 Chechen war, a low 
point of Yeltsin's presidency. 

By naming Putin as the new prime minister, Yeltsin is apparently trying to 
demonstrate that he is placing a firmer hand at the wheel, one that will deal 
quickly with the Dagestan rebellion before it flares out of control and 
spreads the secessionist virus throughout the Russian Federation. 

In his remarks when appointing Putin, Yeltsin signaled that he hoped the new 
prime minister would also deal with rivals closer to home. Although Putin 
lacks any political base outside Kremlin walls, presidential elections are 
still a year away. Yeltsin said, "I think that he has sufficient time to 
prove himself." Perhaps. But the time may have passed when Yeltsin can 
persuade the Russian people, or the world, that all is well in Moscow simply 
by reshuffling the political deck. The political forces that will usher in 
the post-Yeltsin era are already waiting in the wings, prepared to capitalize 
on the ills of Russian life. The Dagestan crisis may give them the opening 
they need.

*******

#8
Newsweek
August 23, 1999
[for personal use only]
Masters of the Kremlin
'The Family' prompts Yeltsin — whom some now call 'Dead Man Talking' — to 
fire another prime minister 
By Bill Powell 

For almost his entire tenure as president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin has relied 
on no one more than Anatoly Chubais. Campaign manager; economic czar; 
counselor behind the scenes. But early last Monday morning, Chubais could not 
get in to see Boris Yeltsin, even though he had a scheduled appointment. 
Other members of Yeltsin's tight circle of advisers had schemed to keep him 
out. The reason? Chubais wanted to prevent the ailing Russian president, who 
has fired four prime ministers in the last two years, from dismissing yet 
another. Especially as Russia was about to get sucked into another internal 
war with Muslim separatists, this time in Dagestan, a region that borders 
Chechnya. "I thought it would be disastrous," Chubais later told a friend. 

His efforts were fruitless. Yeltsin's victim this time was the inoffensive 
Sergei Stepashin, who had been prime minister for just three months. His 
replacement: Vladimir Putin, an anonymous bureaucrat who has spent most of 
his professional life in the KGB. Extraordinarily, Yeltsin last Monday not 
only nominated Putin as the next prime minister, but in a taped address 
(delivered so slowly that one politician called him "Dead Man Talking"), he 
claimed he wanted Putin to succeed him in next summer's presidential 
election. 

In Russia now they call them "The Family": a knot of six key people who have 
access to and influence on Boris Yeltsin. And like too many families, this 
one is seriously dysfunctional. Its undisputed head is Tatyana Dyachenko, the 
younger of Yeltsin's two daughters. She is the president's gatekeeper, 
protector and final, most important voice on all key political questions. 
Then there is the man routinely called the son Boris Yeltsin never had: 
Valentin Yumashev, who served as Yeltsin's chief of staff for a year and a 
half and ever since has been, next to Tatyana, his most trusted adviser. 
Kremlin officials say only these two have consistent access to what Kremlin 
insiders call "The Body" — the president himself, whose mental competence and 
health are increasingly questioned in Russia. 

It was Tatyana and Yumashev, along with current chief of staff and Family 
member Aleksandr Voloshin, who decided that Stepashin was too weak to serve 
Yeltsin's purposes now, according to former Kremlin aides. Moscow political 
analysts believe they were egged on by the ubiquitous oligarch Boris 
Berezovsky, who helps manage the Family's finances. What united them had less 
to do with policy than a fear of what might happen to them when Yeltsin is 
scheduled to leave office next year. Serious corruption allegations surround 
Berezovsky and another powerful Kremlin apparatchik, Pavel Borodin. 

The corruption investigations coincided with ominous political events. 
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, a possible presidential candidate, had persuaded a 
large group of powerful regional governors to ally with his newly formed 
political party — called Fatherland — in December's legislative elections. He 
was also close to enticing former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov into the 
group, according to Moscow media reports. Primakov is the most popular 
political figure in the country and a sworn enemy of Berezovsky. The Family 
convinced Yeltsin that the new prime minister, Putin, was tougher than 
Stepashin and could beat back a Luzhkov-Primakov alliance — which is the 
biggest threat to Yeltsin's plan to name his successor (especially one who 
might keep the Kremlin insiders out of legal jeopardy). 

Now poor Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin has a lot on his hands. First he must 
try to put down the mounting Islamic rebellion in Dagestan. Late last week, 
Russian troops were pouring into the region. One former Kremlin aide said the 
inner circle was discussing declaring a state of emergency, which could delay 
the elections (Putin dismissed the idea). But most of all, perhaps, Putin's 
job will be to protect the Family. 

******

#9
INTERVIEW-Separatists see no accord with Georgia
By Lawrence Sheets

SUKHUMI, Georgia, Aug 16 (Reuters) - The leader of Georgia's breakaway 
Abkhazia province has blamed the Tbilisi government for lack of progress in 
talks aimed at returning stability to the Caucasus mountain state. 

``Unfortunately there is no progress. The Georgian side is not interested in 
signing an agreement,'' Vladislav Ardzinba told Reuters in a weekend 
interview. 

``They don't want to sign anything, because Abkhazia is in an economic 
blockade. It is their last instrument of pressure on us,'' he said. 

The two sides are now discussing a deal under which Abkhazia would allow some 
Georgian refugees who had fled the Gali district of Abkhazia to return home. 

In exchange, the Georgian government would lift some sanctions crippling 
Abkhazia's economy. The measures, which limit movement and trade through its 
border with Russia, have been in place for several years. 

Ardzinba, who recently returned from another round of consultations with 
Georgian officials in Moscow, said Georgia was ``not serious'' about the 
deal. 

He said Abkhazia had several times agreed to new Georgian conditions for an 
agreement, such as a demand that half of the police in the Gali district, to 
which the refugees would return, be made up by ethnic Georgians. 

Gali, whose pre-war population was nearly 100 percent Georgian, was the scene 
last year of the most violent Georgian-Abkhaz clashes since the 1992-93 war 
which left the subtropical Black Sea region de facto independent. 

Adjacent to the de facto border between Georgia and Abkhazia, Gali is plagued 
by sporadic violence despite the presence of 1,500 Russian peacekeepers. 

Ardzinba said Georgia was now demanding that the Russians expand their 
peacekeeping functions, currently limited to a 24-km (15 mile) zone along the 
Georgian-Abkhaz border, to all of Abkhazia. He called the demand 
unacceptable. 

He said Georgia's October parliamentary election was hindering talks because 
Presdient Eduard Shevardnadze's party did not want to take pre-poll risks. 

Ardzinba said Abkhazia had no desire to join what he called ``a totalitarian 
state.'' 

``I think the sanctions will end and sooner or later there will be 
international recognition. Such a situation cannot continue forever,'' 
Ardzinba said of Abkhazia's current isolation. 

``The best thing is to have Georgia on that side of the border and Abkhazia 
on this side of the border, as two kind neighbors. That would be the best 
thing for both,'' he said. 

******

#10
Yeltsin Speaks Highly of "Team of Power Ministers".

MOSCOW, August 16 (Itar-Tass) -- President Boris Yeltsin speaks highly of the 
present "team of power ministers". "Throughout my presidency there has never 
been such a team of power ministers -- closely rallied, strong and 
well-organised," Yeltsin said during a prolonged conversation with reporters 
in his Kremlin office on Monday. 

Yeltsin said that the power ministers "work in harmony", really as a team. "I 
am very much pleased that we have such power ministers. This gives guarantees 
to our society for order in the country." 

The president said that the existence of a strong team of power ministers 
also ensures the foreign policy and gives protection against "various 
external situations". 

******

#11
The Electric Telegraph (UK)
13 August 1999
[for personal use only] 
Pop hit tunes into Russian racism
By Marcus Warren in Moscow

THE song that half of Russia seems to be singing, and which the country's 
radio stations and music video channels have played all summer, might have 
trouble getting on air in the West.

"Ai, Ai, Ai, they killed the negro, for nothing, for nothing," goes the 
chorus of the smash hit by the Forbidden Drummers. "Ai, Ai, Ai, the bastards 
did him in." Even in Russia, where racism is alive and well, the lyrics of 
They Killed the Negro have raised some eyebrows.

When the group appeared on Russian MTV recently, viewers claiming to be from 
Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University, which has many African students, 
telephoned to protest. Russia's most famous pop diva, Alla Pugacheva, has 
also joked that the group might never be allowed into America as a punishment 
for defying political correctness.

"But we don't sing 'nigger'," its lead vocalist, Viktor Pivtorypavlo, 
protested to the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper. "In Russian the word 'negro' 
is not abusive. That is what we were taught in school: every black person is 
a negro."

Mr Pivtorypavlo had a point. "Black man" is usually translated from English 
into Russian as "negr", a word that most native speakers would argue has no 
negative connotations. But the lyrics do seem dubious in the context of 
modern Russia, where the small number of black people often face harassment 
and violence.

*****

#12
Los Angeles Times
August 16, 1999 
[for personal use only]
For Yeltsin Heir, Challenge Is to Move Out of Shadows 
Russia: Ex-spy chief Putin would need overhaul to leap from premier to 
president. 
By MAURA REYNOLDS, Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW--In July of last year, a former intelligence agent named Vladimir V. 
Putin walked into the central Moscow headquarters of the former KGB. 
The building, an imposing red and yellow edifice with no front door, 
houses the KGB's main successor, the Federal Security Service. It is a place 
most people enter with fear and trembling. 
Not Putin. He was arriving for his first day of work as the security 
agency's director. And his reaction, according to Profil magazine, was to 
announce: "I'm home at last." 
If all goes as expected, Russia's lower house of parliament, the Duma, 
will confirm the 46-year-old Putin today as the nation's new prime minister. 
And if all goes as President Boris N. Yeltsin wants, Putin will move on in 
less than a year to become his successor. 
All Putin needs to become prime minister is a majority vote in the Duma. 
But becoming president will be far trickier--especially for a man who has 
never run for office and has spent most of his career away from public view 
and public accountability. 
The consensus in Moscow seems to be that, despite Yeltsin's designation 
of Putin as heir, the succession is far from assured. 
To become president, Putin will have to undergo a metamorphosis, moving 
in the course of two years from one of the world's most secretive jobs to one 
of the most visible. 
In the role of a public politician, Putin's physical appearance alone 
would give most image consultants pause. His pale face looks as bloodless as 
alabaster. His features are angular, with his straight eyebrows and lips 
seemingly etched at precise right angles to his nose. 
Smiling seems to pain him. In a TV interview the day Yeltsin nominated 
him, he sat rigidly and answered questions with military precision. He didn't 
crack a smile, even when he appeared to crack a joke. 
"Are you going to run for president?" the interviewer asked. 
"Well," Putin replied in a deadpan, "the president says I am, and it 
would be unseemly to contradict him." 
Despite this want of appeal, parliament is likely to confirm Putin 
without a fuss. Duma members have tired of battling Yeltsin over his prime 
ministers, whom he has taken to changing more frequently than some people 
change their oil. Putin is the fifth in less than a year and a half. And with 
voting for a new parliament set for December, deputies' energies are already 
concentrated on their own reelection. 
The presidential ballot is scheduled for six months later, in 
June--which gives Putin a total of 10 months to lose his KGB taint and make 
himself presidential. 
That might not seem like much time, but politics moves fast in Russia. 
Two of Putin's predecessors as prime minister--Sergei V. Stepashin and 
Yevgeny M. Primakov--were derided as gray and colorless when they were put 
forward for the job. But in a matter of months, both warmed and brightened in 
the public spotlight, and they are now two of the country's most popular 
political figures. 
Alan Rousso, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center think tank, says it 
appears that the Kremlin is counting on something similar happening to Putin. 
"That may turn out to be a miscalculation," Rousso says. "I don't think 
Putin can be a real presidential candidate. There is a very, very firm 
ceiling on how high he can rise." 
A major reason, Rousso says, is Putin's KGB background. Both Primakov 
and Stepashin served a stint as head of the security service. But both 
officially made their careers elsewhere--Primakov in academia, journalism and 
the diplomatic service and Stepashin in the Interior Ministry. 
By contrast, Putin joined the KGB in 1975 as soon as he received his law 
degree and remained there for 15 largely mysterious years. For most of that 
time, he served in East Germany, a center of espionage during the Cold War. 
In 1990, he moved back to his hometown of Leningrad, soon to be renamed 
St. Petersburg, and started working as deputy to the mayor, Anatoly A. 
Sobchak. 
Until allegations of corruption forced Sobchak into exile in Paris, he 
was one of Russia's most prominent "reformers"--and Putin's supporters 
describe the former security chief as someone who, while military in bearing, 
is a democrat at heart. 
"When you see Vladimir Vladimirovich on TV, he appears reserved and 
maybe even grim," says Stanislav G. Yeremeyev, a St. Petersburg State 
University administrator who worked with Putin in the city government. "But 
when you talk to him yourself, his words quickly convince you that his 
mentality is very European. His world outlook has been formed under the 
influence of civilized European ideas of democracy and liberalism. This is 
very important for understanding Vladimir Putin." 
Nonetheless, Putin earned a fearsome reputation in St. Petersburg. He 
was dubbed the "gray cardinal" of Sobchak's administration, the real power 
behind the city throne, less an enforcer of democratic principles than an 
enforcer, pure and simple. 
"When Sobchak didn't want to deal with the media, he sent the dour 
Putin--who would scowl, tell us nothing and frighten the more timid among us 
away," recalls Brian Whitmore, a journalist for the English-language St. 
Petersburg Times. 
While working in the city government, Putin met Anatoly B. Chubais, who 
later became one of Yeltsin's top deputies. On Chubais' recommendation, Putin 
moved to Moscow in 1996 after Yeltsin's reelection and became deputy director 
of the sensitive Kremlin department that administers state property. 
His subsequent promotions followed in dizzyingly short order. In March 
1997, he was named Yeltsin's deputy chief of staff, responsible for keeping 
Russia's wayward regions in line. Sixteen months later, he was appointed 
director of the Federal Security Service. 
According to some media reports, Putin's return to the security service 
was resisted by some of its top generals, largely because he held the 
inferior rank of lieutenant colonel. He also began an unpopular effort to cut 
the agency's central administration from 6,000 to 4,000 employees. 
Under Putin, the agency made a number of moves that caught public 
attention. One was to tighten surveillance of the Internet. Another was to 
establish a constitutional department. 
That new office played a strange role in Russia's impeachment crisis 
last spring. As the Duma was preparing to vote on whether to impeach Yeltsin, 
the security service sent it an unprecedented document warning that the 
articles of impeachment contained "significant mistakes of a legal nature." 
It was the first time the security service was known to have commented 
on a public legal matter, and it was widely viewed as a veiled warning that 
the agency was prepared to intervene if deputies were to vote for 
impeachment. 
Some analysts see the impeachment document as part of a sinister thread 
in Putin's career, suggesting that Putin's loyalty to his bosses overpowers 
any constitutional or legal concerns. 
For instance, the Federal Security Service is rumored to have been 
behind a videotape that surfaced last winter purporting to depict Russia's 
prosecutor general having sex with two prostitutes. The official, Yuri I. 
Skuratov, had begun probing the financial dealings of members of Yeltsin's 
inner circle, and the video in effect put him and his investigations out of 
commission. 
Indeed, many observers say Putin's main qualification to be prime 
minister is his unqualified loyalty to Yeltsin and his coterie. 
In the absence of verifiable information, rumors about Putin are rife. 
One of the most persistent is that the ongoing rebel incursion into the 
republic of Dagestan has been engineered by Putin and the security agency to 
provide a pretext for imposing a state of emergency and canceling elections. 
Others speculate that Putin was Yeltsin's choice because he has 
expertise in influencing--some might say rigging--elections. He is rumored to 
have fought fiercely and crudely in 1996 to reelect Sobchak, who lost only 
narrowly to a candidate with ties to Moscow Mayor Yuri M. Luzhkov. These 
days, with the Kremlin worried about Luzhkov's burgeoning presidential 
campaign, Putin's anti-Luzhkov credentials are undoubtedly also attractive to 
the Kremlin. 
In the end, however, for all the speculation, Putin remains a 
cipher--yet one who may hold the key to his country's future. 
"A Russian leader with the face and psychology of a KGB investigator is 
no gift," says Alexander Tsipko, an analyst with the Nezavisimaya Gazeta 
newspaper. "Perhaps Vladimir Vladimirovich, having come to power, will break 
down and become a good and charming czar. But the opposite is more likely. 
After all, power in Russia has never fostered a moral personality." 

******

#13
Financial Times
16 August 1999
[for personal use only]
Fears grow in Moscow over Dagestan 
By John Thornhill in Moscow

Russian federal troops continued to battle with separatist Moslem militants 
in the north Caucasian republic of Dagestan over the weekend as the 
repercussions of the conflict spread into the Moscow political scene and the 
international arena.

Russia's interior ministry said on Sunday it had launched an offensive to 
force rebel gunmen out of the mountainous Botlikhsky region of Dagestan, 
which was occupied earlier this month. Moscow said federal forces had killed 
200 militants in the latest surge of fighting with the loss of 14 of their 
own men.

But the separatists, who want to create an independent Moslem republic in 
Dagestan, disputed these figures, saying they had inflicted far higher 
casualties on the Russian side.

The fighting, the worst in the Caucasus since the end of the Chechen war in 
1996, has alarmed nearby republics, which fear the spread of instability in 
the poor and ethnically mixed region. Neighbouring Chechnya declared a state 
of emergency yesterday.

Vladimir Putin, Russia's acting prime minister, who faces a confirmation vote 
in parliament on Monday, has promised he will quickly crush the Moslem 
militants. But rival politicians in Moscow have expressed fears that as 
former head of the FSB, one of the successor organisations to the KGB, he may 
exploit the conflict for his own political ends.

Yuri Luzhkov, Moscow's mayor and a strong contender to succeed President 
Boris Yeltsin, said he supported the federal government's attempts to 
eliminate the extremists in Dagestan. But he warned that the conflict could 
be used by political forces in Moscow to justify the introduction of a state 
of emergency.

Mr Luzhkov said last week's sacking of Sergei Stepashin as prime minister 
showed the "continuous absurdity of those in power".

"What do we want: to strengthen the power structures and the authoritarian 
line in the state or to solve the challenges of creating jobs, increasing 
industrial output and stabilising agriculture?" Mr Luzhkov asked.

The foreign ministry also warned Islamic states not to interfere in Russia's 
internal affairs amid allegations that foreign mercenaries were fighting 
alongside the Moslem militants.

Igor Ivanov, foreign minister, said the Russian authorities had proof that 
some Moslem states were assisting the rebels in Dagestan.

"It is clear that any form of support for the terrorists' actions will be 
viewed as rude interference in the internal affairs of the Russian 
Federation, with all the logical consequences," Mr Ivanov wrote in a letter 
addressed to the United Nations and Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

The foreign ministry did not specify which Moslem states it had in mind. But 
Russian officials have previously said many gunmen in Dagestan are from the 
Moslem Wahhabi sect, which Moscow claims is funded by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Military officials have also claimed that Saudi-born Osama bin Laden, who is 
blamed by Washington for organising the bombing of two US embassies in Africa 
a year ago, is supporting the gunmen in Dagestan. Mr Bin Laden is currently 
believed to be living in Afghanistan, which still views Russia with hostility 
following the Soviet invasion of 1979.

The Russian media have quoted refugees from the war-torn regions of Dagestan 
as saying the rebel forces include mercenaries from as far afield as Jordan 
and other Arab states, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Africa, and the Baltic states. 
But similar allegations were made at the time of the war in Chechnya and 
later proved to have been exaggerated.

*******

#14
Yeltsin Says Back Treatment Worked
August 16, 1999
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV

MOSCOW (AP) - President Boris Yeltsin said today that a visit to a medical
clinic last week helped ease a long-standing nerve inflammation in his back
that had contributed to periodic heart pains.

Yeltsin spent about an hour last Wednesday at the Burdenko Institute in
downtown Moscow for an exam on his ailing back.

The president told reporters today that the nerve inflammation had
contributed to heart pains that troubled him for the past three years,
Russian news agencies reported.

The pain has ``almost fully disappeared'' following the visit to the
clinic, he said, according the Interfax news agency.

Yeltsin underwent a quintuple heart bypass surgery in November 1996 that
followed several heart attacks. The presidential doctors have said
repeatedly that his heart is in good condition following the surgery.

But Yeltsin said today that he felt pain in his heart and chest in the
years that followed the surgery, even though examinations indicated that
his heart was fine.

``I was feeling heart pain all the time,'' he said, according to the
ITAR-Tass news agency. ``And it wasn't the heart that was aching, it was a
spinal nerve that was injured.''

Following last week's treatment, the president said he now feels like a man
who rid himself of a toothache that had tormented him for years, the report
said.

``My heart is now working like a clock,'' Yeltsin was quoted as saying by
Interfax. ``My blood pressure is 120 over 80 whether you measure me at
stress or wake me up in the middle of the night, and my pulse, 64 beats per
minute.''

He spoke clearly and strongly during a meeting with Russian reporters at
the Kremlin, excerpts of which were broadcast on Russian television.

The 68-year old president has had a number of other health problems in
recent years, including bouts of pneumonia, respiratory infections and a
recurring ulcer.

Yeltsin insists he is in good shape and will remain Russia's leader until
his term ends in the middle of next year.

He has been active and appeared relatively fit in recent weeks, although he
still spends most of his time at a country residence outside Moscow,
visiting the Kremlin only briefly to meet with officials.

*******