August 13, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3437 • 3438 •

Johnson's Russia List
#3438
13 August 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Yeltsin Seeks Approval of Premier. 
2. Christian Science Monitor: Judith Matloff, Russians seek scapegoats 
in hard times.
3. Financial Times: John Thornhill, Nemtsov predicts liberal alliance. 
4. The Times (UK): Alice Lagnado, Holidaymakers are shunning Russia. 
5. Izvestia: Svetlana Babayeva, Marriable General. (Stepashin). 
6. Stratfor Commentary: Yeltsin Clique Opens New Front in War on Political 
Rival. (Re Gazprom and Luzhkov)
7. Moscow Times: Robert Coalson, Elections to Be Tough Test.
8. Christian Science Monitor: Vyatcheslav Nikonov, Yeltsin's desperate 
game.
9. The Economist: Yeltsin's Russian Caprice.
10. RFE/RL: Sophie Lambroschini, Russia: Standard Of Living Still Lower A 
Year After Economic Crisis.
11. Financial Times: Yuri Luzhkov, Another Chechnya. (Re Kosovo}

*******

#1
Yeltsin Seeks Approval of Premier 
By Vladimir Isachenkov
August 13, 1999

MOSCOW (AP) -- President Boris Yeltsin said today that the
communist-dominated lower house of parliament wouldn't dare oppose
his new choice for prime minister. 

Yeltsin abruptly sacked Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin and named
Vladimir Putin, a former KGB spy, as his successor on Monday -- the
fourth Cabinet reshuffle in 17 months. 

``It would be preferable if (Putin) is approved on the first attempt,''
Yeltsin
said at the start of a meeting in the Kremlin with Alexander Kotenkov, his
envoy to the lower house, the State Duma. 

If he isn't, ``there will be no tragedy,'' Yeltsin added. ``He will pass on
the
second try.'' 

Under Russian law, the Duma is disbanded if it rejects a presidential
candidate for prime minister three times. Communists and other hardliners,
who dominate the house, appear reluctant to defy Yeltsin because they
need their parliamentary offices and other privileges of incumbency to
campaign for December's parliamentary elections. 

Kotenkov told reporters after the meeting that Yeltsin would ``never''
disband the Duma. 

Yeltsin and Kotenkov also discussed ways to advance approval of
presidential bills that have been sent to the Duma. 

Kotenkov said that the Kremlin would push for the ratification of the
START II arms reduction treaty, which was ratified by the U.S. Senate in
1996. Communists and other lawmakers have balked at its ratification,
claiming that the treaty would hurt Russia's security. 

Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov said this week that the house was
unlikely to pass the treaty because of lawmakers' distrust of the United
States. 

Kotenkov also mentioned a bill on a state of emergency, which he said is
needed to more effectively confront crises, such as the Islamic uprising in
Dagestan, a southern region bordering breakaway Chechnya. The
government is now trying to uproot the rebellion. 

``The situation in the North Caucasus shows that this law is essential,''
Kotenkov said. 

Russian media and politicians have expressed concern that Yeltsin may
use the state of emergency to put off parliamentary and presidential
elections, but the Kremlin has said that they would be held as scheduled. 

Russia has a Soviet-era bill describing specifics of a state of emergency,
and the constitution allows Yeltsin to introduce it on consent of the upper
house of parliament, the Federation Council. 

Putin discussed the possibility this week at his meeting with the upper
house members, saying that there was no immediate need for the state of
emergency but leaving the door open. 

It has remained unclear whether the upper house, consisting of regional
leaders, would support emergency moves. 

Upper house speaker Yegor Stroyev harshly criticized Yeltsin today for
the Cabinet reshuffle, saying it undermined stability in Russia. ``The people
are stunned by the government reshuffles,'' Stroyev said today on a trip to
Siberia, according to the ITAR-Tass news agency. 

Stepashin, speaking in an interview with the daily Komsomolskaya Pravda
published today, said he lost his job because he had refused to ``service
the interests of a certain group.'' 

He wouldn't elaborate, but the news media and analysts say that Stepashin
was fired under pressure from members of Yeltsin's inner circle who
accused him of not being firm enough in confronting Moscow Mayor Yuri
Luzhkov. 

The Kremlin has fervently opposed Luzhkov, a likely presidential
candidate, and vainly tried to prevent him from striking an election alliance
with a bloc of powerful regional governors. 

*******

#2
Christian Science Monitor
13 August 1999
Russians seek scapegoats in hard times
Anti-Semitism and ethnic harassment are expected to rise as elections near. 
By Judith Matloff 

A bomb is discovered at a Moscow synagogue where 200 people had gathered for 
a religious ceremony, in one of more than half a dozen arson or bomb 
incidents in recent months. 

Six graves in the Jewish cemetery in Tomsk, Siberia, were defiled earlier 
this month. In July, a Russian Jewish leader was stabbed inside a Moscow 
synagogue by a man with a swastika tatoo. Among many Communist politicians, a 
pejorative term for "Jew" is back in fashion, as is blaming Jews for the 
country's economic woes. 

Meanwhile, unrest in Dagestan on top of years of strife in Chechnya have 
given Russian militias an excuse to harass, beat, or detain anyone whose 
darker skin might indicate a Caucasus origin. 

Welcome to Russia at the end of the millenium - a place that is striving to 
be a civil society but remains marked by hints of historic pogroms. 

"Nationalist extremism is increasing in our country," said Vladimir 
Kartashkin, chairman of the Presidential Commission for Human Rights, at a 
June 16 conference on the topic in Moscow. "We should nip this danger in the 
bud." 

Old ethnic hatreds have reemerged and new ones have appeared as frustrations 
over the collapse of the Soviet Union eight years ago and the disintegration 
of the economy have found a focus: ethnic minorities. 

Communist and ultranationalist politicians are stirring up this nasty brew 
ahead of December's parliamentary elections and the presidential poll due six 
months later. 

Prejudice is particularly severe in Krasnodar, a stridently Communist region 
500 miles south of Moscow. For centuries this was the stronghold of Cossack 
horsemen who defended the czar and carried out pogroms. Today, Krasnodar 
Governor Nikolai Kondratenko fuels anti-Semitism with harsh rhetoric and by 
permitting Cossack paramilitary organizations to intimidate minorities. 

"They circle us on the streets and shout insults and demand money. No one 
helps us," says an Armenian woman who asked to be identified only as Irina. 

THE region's tiny Jewish community of 3,000 worships discreetly in a 
scientists' club rather than in a synagogue, which members worry would 
attract too much attention. Elders lock the 200-year-old Torah, their 
scripture, in a safe at night to guard against theft or desecration. 

Russia's nationalists see themselves as defenders of a Slav majority under 
assault. Among them is Vyacheslav Ilunchev, who heads a security company and 
a Cossack social group here in Krasnodar. Mr. Ilunchev complains that many 
good jobs are held by Jews. He says Chechens fleeing the violence since a 
1994-96 independence bid in their nearby republic are murderers and thieves. 

"Slavs don't have money, but refugees and other people have it," he says. 

Krasnodar does not have a monopoly on intimidating minorities. Moscow Mayor 
Yuri Luzhkov robustly condemns anti-Semitism and has banned demonstrations by 
neofascists. But his city government has implemented a Soviet-style 
registration program aimed at cracking down on migrants from the Caucasus. 

President Boris Yeltsin also regularly denounces anti-Semitism. But human 
rights advocates say ethnic hatred is too deeply rooted to be eradicated by 
declarations. 

"The basic problem is the economic situation," says Adolf Shayevich, Russia's 
chief rabbi. "People have no work and no prospects. Historically, that's when 
Russians look for scapegoats." 

In the past, these scapegoats often have been Jews. Pogroms during czarist 
times sent thousands fleeing to America. Later, the Soviets internally 
deported entire communities of other ethnic minorities. 

Today, popular anger at the growing polarity between the ultrarich and abject 
poor often finds easy targets in prominent bankers or politicians perceived 
as Jewish. The most notable person to be labeled a "bad Jew" is the tycoon 
Boris Berezovsky, an adviser to the Yeltsin clan. 

At the international conference on extremism in June, participants concluded 
that authorities took too little action to crack down on ethnic 
discrimination. Name-calling and harassment were only expected to increase as 
campaigning politicians exploit the nationalist tide. 

"The major part of the population believes they have been impoverished at the 
expense of rich Jews," says Sergei Grigoriants, chairman of the Glasnost 
Public Foundation in Moscow. "I fear that before and after the elections 
intolerance will increase." 

*******

#3
Financial Times
13 August 1999
[for personal use only]
RUSSIA: Nemtsov predicts liberal alliance 
By John Thornhill in Moscow

Before the 1995 Russian parliamentary elections, President Boris Yeltsin 
decreed there should be a right-of-centre party and a left-of-centre party, 
just as there were in the US and the UK. But the concept of the Kremlin 
creating political parties never really caught on and the resulting chaos 
helped the Communist party sweep the elections.

It is quite possible, however, that Mr Yeltsin's original vision will be 
realised before the 1999 parliamentary elections - but this time 
spontaneously and without the president's support.

A left-of-centre party is now coalescing around the Our Fatherland is All 
Russia bloc founded by Yuri Luzhkov, Moscow's mayor, and several regional 
governors. But the emergence of this party appears to be spurring a 
realignment of Russia's right-of-centre movements.

Boris Nemtsov, one of the leaders of the Just Cause movement, which includes 
many of the "young reformers" such as Yegor Gaidar, Anatoly Chubais, and 
Boris Fyodorov, believes Russia's fragmented liberal parties will unite 
before the parliamentary elections - possibly as early as next week.

This putative right-of-centre bloc could embrace two other parties headed by 
former prime ministers: the Our Home is Russia movement headed by Victor 
Chernomyrdin and the New Force movement led by Sergei Kiriyenko. But Mr 
Nemtsov hopes to attract supporters from further afield.

Traditionally, Russia's liberal politicians have had colossal egos and 
trenchant views, seemingly rendering them incapable of agreeing about 
anything.

But Mr Nemtsov believes it possible that all these right-of-centre groupings 
might bury their differences under the leadership of the baby-faced Sergei 
Stepashin, who was sacked as prime minister this week.

"He needs us and we need him. This is a rare occurrence in politics," Mr 
Nemtsov said in an interview with the Financial Times. "Stepashin would not 
only preserve his political position but would also have a powerful, 
political base for the presidential elections."

Of course, Mr Stepashin must first agree to join such a right-of-centre bloc 
and that is, as yet, far from certain. The Our Fatherland is All Russia bloc 
is itself actively wooing Mr Stepashin, who won relatively high approval 
ratings during his brief tenure as prime minister.

But Mr Nemtsov thinks Mr Stepashin would have ideological and personal 
problems joining this left-of-centre bloc, which is also likely to embrace 
other ageing apparatchiks such as Yevgeny Primakov, another former prime 
minister.

"It is clear that a fight will break out between Primakov and Luzhkov after 
the parliamentary elections if not before," Mr Nemtsov says. "There is not 
room for three bears in the same den."

Even with Mr Stepashin's backing, it is not clear how much support this 
putative right-of-centre bloc could win. Recent opinion polls suggest Mr 
Nemtsov's Just Cause party would be extremely lucky to garner the 5 per cent 
of votes needed to enter parliament.

Mr Nemtsov concedes the Our Fatherland is All Russia bloc will be a stronger 
force in the parliamentary elections drawing many votes from the Communist 
party. But Mr Nemtsov still hopes a unified, youthful right-of-centre bloc 
can win up to 15 per cent of the vote, giving it a strong base to contest 
presidential elections in July.

"Everyone understands, even if they hate us, that we are the future of the 
country," he says. "The elections in Russia will not be between a 
Conservative and a Labour party but between the past and the future. It is 
Turgenev's struggle between Fathers and Children."

*******

#4
The Times (UK)
13 August 1999
[for personal use only]
Holidaymakers are shunning Russia 
Culture in plenty, but few comforts for visitors Alice Lagnado reports

ALTHOUGH Russia has a treasure-trove of breathtaking historical monuments, 
its share of tourists is dwindling because of incompetence and hostility. 

Eight years after Russia opened up to Western visitors, the number of 
tourists is falling. In 1997, 2.2 million visited; a year later, it was only 
1.9 million. Even Sergei Shpilko, deputy head of the Tourism Ministry, 
admitted recently: "It will be a long time before Russia attracts ordinary 
tourists." 

The Hermitage Museum ranks alongside the Louvre in Paris and the Metropolitan 
in New York as one of the world's greatest art museums. Cathedrals within the 
Kremlin rival Rome's finest churches. Top-class orchestras can be seen for 
less than a pound. Those looking for something different will find plenty to 
please them in the Russian obsession with outer space or in restaurants 
decked out as film sets or salons of Soviet kitsch. 

So what is going wrong? First, the stress involved in getting here. You can 
spend up to three mornings queueing at the Russian Embassy in London for a 
visa, unless you want to pay the heavy costs of a courier. On arrival at the 
airport, delays can be long, staff are surly and the aggressive taxi mafia 
charge up to £60 for a 40-minute ride into the city. 

There are no reasonably priced hotels with good service and most services 
charge foreigners more than they do Russians. At the Mariinsky Theatre in St 
Petersburg, staff prefer to have empty seats than to let foreigners pay less 
than ten times the Russian price. 

Once you are out sightseeing, there are no tourist information offices. Some 
of the country's top attractions have basic facilities. Once inside the 
Kremlin, for example, there is nowhere to get a drink or a snack. The vast 
Hermitage is disgraced by its shoddy café, selling greasy chicken legs. 

The lack of the necessities of life makes for a trip that is as exhausting as 
it is exciting. "It's not organised. At one palace, we had to queue miles for 
a toilet and then find a dollar and squeeze four people in one," said 
Christine Whitley, 60, who came to Russia on an organised boat trip. "There's 
nowhere for a cup of tea or a sit down. You laugh about it, but it's not what 
you expect." 

The funnier side of sightseeing is provided by the babushki, the elderly 
women who are the backbone of this country. They reign in every museum or 
gallery - and can make or break your visit. 

When I visited museums recently with friends, babushki ran after us, 
switching lights off and on in every room because the museums cannot pay 
their electricity bills. In one museum, they refused us entry for three days 
because we came near to closing time and they wanted to go home early. We 
were sent through a maze of corridors to find an elderly accountant who 
charged us ten roubles a photo and gave us a a special scrap of paper that 
was studied by all the babushki in the museum. 

In the Mayakovsky Museum, a tiny woman insisted on delivering paeans to the 
handsome poet. Some are unexpectedly kind: one brought my flagging mother a 
cup of tea. 

Things are changing, very slowly, but for now, only those with plenty of 
stamina and a keen appreciation of the ridiculous will visit Russia. 

*******

#5
Izvestia
12 August 1999
Marriable General 
By Svetlana Babayeva 

Ex-Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, like Yevgeny Primakov, his predecessor, 
has become an object of struggle among various political parties and 
movements, both left- and right-wing, for having him in their election blocs, 
writes IZVESTIA. A few hours after his dismissal an invitation came from the 
Fatherland-All Russia bloc. The right- wingers invited him later that day. 
Ex-Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko and former First Deputy Prime Minister 
Boris Nemtsov want him to head the entire right-wing coalition. So far, 
Stepashin has not replied. 

Nobody thinks, the paper writes, that Stepashin's political career is over. 
Government officials say he may be given a high post again, since even after 
the resignation he confirmed his loyalty to the President. This is 
appreciated in the Kremlin. 

Besides, many do not believe that the union of President of Tatarstan 
Mintimer Shaimiyev, leader of the All Russia movement, and Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov, head of Fatherland will last long. Before allying with Fatherland, 
Shaimiyev showed preparedness to join an election bloc to be supported by the 
authorities, and Stepashin conducted negotiations with him. For this reason 
it is not ruled out by many that relations between Stepashin and Shaimiyev 
will not end. But it is unlikely that Stepashin will accept the invitation to 
the Fatherland-All Russia bloc, as he will not be offered to top the election 
list there. Stepashin's political and economic views have always been closer 
to right-wing politicians and he will hardly want to be in alliance with 
Luzhkov and Primakov, if the latter ultimately agrees to join this bloc. 

Stepashin is waited for eagerly in the right wing, which is to materialize 
finally by the end of this month. The members of the right-wing coalition say 
they would like to make Stepashin number one in their election list. 

Everybody agrees that Stepashin remains a "figure in the political field," 
the paper writes. Some say he may run in the elections to the State Duma in a 
single-mandate precinct or form his own election bloc. In the latter case he 
may be joined by the governors who have not yet joined any bloc. 

Another paper, KOMMERSANT-DAILY [08/12/99, p. 2], writes that the 
resignation of Stepashin and his Cabinet posed an unexpected problem for the 
organizers of a right-wing bloc. On Tuesday (August 10) a few members of the 
Voice of Russia gubernatorial movement declared that it was impossible to 
unite with the Right Cause and on Wednesday ex-Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin, leader of Our Home Russia, in fact refused to join a right-wing 
coalition. The paper explains such a change in his position by his meeting 
with acting Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who evidently assured Chernomyrdin 
that he still regarded Our Home Russia to be his party, of which he is a 
member since 1996. 

*******

#6
Stratfor Commentary
990811 – Yeltsin Clique Opens New Front in War on Political Rival

In an interview with French daily newspaper Le Monde, Russian tycoon Boris
Berezovsky said the executive director of Russian energy giant Gazprom, Rem
Viakhirev, would have to soon resign on his post due to political reasons.
Berezovsky said Viakhirev should leave his post over his support for a
presidential candidate. "Rem Viakhirev has behaved in an unacceptable
manner by supporting [Yuri] Luzhkov," Berezovsky was quoted as saying.
Berezovsky explained his position in regards to Viakhirev by saying, "The
state is the majority shareholder in Gazprom and it is not normal for its
financial muscles to be used against the president and the government."

Moscow Mayor Luzhkov is a powerful candidate for the presidential
elections, scheduled for the summer of 2000. According to the latest
ratings of presidential candidates conducted by the Russian Public Opinion
Foundation in early August, 10 percent of voters would give their vote to
Luzhkov, which puts him at the fourth place behind Yevgeny Primakov (20
percent), Gennady Zyuganov (16 percent) and Grigory Yavlinsky (11 percent).
Recently, Luzhkov has strengthened his position even more by forging an
alliance between his Otechestvo (Fatherland) party and the All Russia
movement of powerful regional governors to jointly run for the State Duma
(the Lower House of the parliament). On August 5, Luzhkov offered the
number one position on Otechestvo’s list of candidates for the December
parliamentary elections to the currently strongest presidential candidate
Yevgeny Primakov. Although it is not clear yet whether Primakov will accept
the offer, such powerful alliance would increase considerably Luzhkov’s own
support base.

Being a strong presidential candidate with a good potential to extend his
support base, Luzhkov, who has been denied support by the Kremlin, became a
political threat to Yeltsin and his clique. The battle between Yeltsin’s
main oligarch backer Berezovsky and Gazprom tycoon Viakhirev is the second
recent proxy war Berezovsky has fought against Luzhkov on behalf of Yeltsin
in the past few weeks. In July, Berezovsky waged a media war against
Luzhkov-backer Vladimir Gusinsky, head of MOST Media Group. Berezovsky
controls the state-run ORT television network, which is essentially the
mouthpiece of the Yeltsin administration. Not only did ORT and the MOST
Media Group’s NTV trade a war of words over allegations NTV aired about the
Yeltsin administration, but the Russian tax police raided MOST Media’s
offices. By putting Gusinsky’s media empire under pressure, Yeltsin aimed
to eliminate Luzhkov’s strong supporter, as well as to keep influential
media under control during the upcoming parliamentary elections campaign.

Now Yeltsin appears poised to launch Berezovsky on another proxy attack to
get rid of another strong Luzhkov’s supporter – Viakhirev – and to extend
his grip on power over the strategically important gas giant Gazprom. As
almost the sole producer of Russian gas and a primary contributor to the
country’s state budget, Gazprom currently represents an important lever in
Moscow’s domestic and foreign policy. By eliminating Viakhirev and
installing his own man in his place, Yeltsin will centralize even more
power in his hands, creating more room for himself to maneuver in foreign
and domestic political arenas. 

*******

#7
Moscow Times
August 13, 1999 
MEDIA WATCH: Elections to Be Tough Test 
By Robert Coalson 
Robert Coalson is a program director for the National Press Institute. The 
opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of NPI. 

In moments of optimism, I like to think that it is still not too late for the 
Russian media to participate constructively in the election process. I like 
to imagine that the elections - rather than further eroding the media's 
already shaky status with the public - might actually be an opportunity for 
journalists to strengthen ties with their audiences. After all, both the 
media and average citizens want most of all to avoid being victimized by a 
closed political process dominated bythe candidates. 

But journalists have the deck stacked against them. The laws governing the 
media's role in the campaign process are obviously designed to protect the 
rights of candidates rather than the freedom of the media or the public 
interest. One commentary even describes the candidates and parties as the 
media's "partners" in the election process - a chummy relationship that 
doesn't sound much like democracy to me. 

The election laws obligate all state-subsidized media to reserve free space 
or air time for unedited statements by all registered candidates and parties. 
For subsidized newspapers (any paper receiving at least 15 percent of its 
revenues from state budgets), the law stipulates that at least 10 percent of 
its total weekly volume must be set aside for the virtually uncontrolled use 
of the candidates. In addition, at least another 10 percent must be available 
for paid political advertisements. 

For those who live in Moscow and other large cities where there are many 
non-subsidized newspapers, this might not seem particularly ominous. However, 
for the majority of Russians who live in small towns served by only one 
municipally controlled newspaper, this law amounts to a severe restriction of 
the amount of information available during this period. Many such towns get 
just 16 or 24 pages of news each week as it is. 

The Russian media will have to conduct its coverage of the elections against 
the background of this flood of campaign propaganda. Moreover, journalists 
will have to work under libel laws that are even more intimidating than those 
under which they are constantly persecuted even during less sensitive times. 
With so much space reserved for the posturing and mud-slinging of the 
candidates (does anyone out there think that candidates will use their 
allotted space for a substantive discussion of the issues?), it will be very 
difficult for journalists to play a constructive role unless they think 
consciously and strategically about what they want to achieve. 

If the press hopes to emerge from the next 10 months with any public 
credibility at all, it should think now about what it can do - even under 
such adverse conditions - to draw Russia's cynical and largely 
disenfranchised population into the process. I believe that there are ways, 
some big and some small, of making progress toward this goal and, if it 
happens, journalists could emerge with the public support they will surely 
need no matter who wins the election. 

To take just one seemingly small example, consider the media's use of 
"horse-race" election polls. Week after week, NTV television's "Itogi" 
informs us exactly what would happen "if the elections were held today." The 
rest of the national and local media regularly follow suit. 

I have a strong bias against hypothetical events masquerading as news. For 
instance, I thought it was questionable journalism when a newspaper in St. 
Petersburg marked Pushkin's 200th birthday by publishing a picture of a 
bare-breasted black woman with an article speculating that this is what the 
great poet's grandmother may have looked like. Such horse-race polls have 
about the same news value. 

They stifle the election process before it begins. Candidates automatically 
become either "electable" or "unelectable," and endless space is wasted 
discussing fluctuations that don't even exceed the poll's margin of error. 
What is worse, the public is left with the impression that the election is 
already decided and that further deliberation and participation is 
unnecessary. 

All this plays into the hands of the established candidates, who hijack the 
process and leave the media crippled and the public disgusted. As I said, I 
don't think it is too late for the media to begin reversing this trend. But 
journalists need to think a lot more about how they cover the elections and 
about how their coverage influences the process. 

*******

#8
Christian Science Monitor
13 August 1999
Yeltsin's desperate game
By Vyatcheslav Nikonov
Vyatcheslav Nikonov is president of the Polity Foundation in Moscow. He was 
head of political analysis in Boris Yeltsin's 1996 presidential campaign. 

Currently in Russia there is only one serious destabilizing force - President 
Yeltsin, himself, and his inner circle, identified as "The Family." 

It's the only force powerful enough to sack a prime minister - again - for no 
obvious reason, shuffle the Cabinet, institute proceedings against political 
opponents, and begin a new Caucasian war. It's also the only force powerful - 
or desperate - enough to keep concerns alive among Russians that it would 
remove Lenin's body from Red Square, ban the Communist Party, declare a state 
of emergency, or postpone elections. 

The Family's logic has little to do with the interests of Russia as a state, 
such as the promotion of democratic reform and a market economy. Certainly, 
Mr. Yeltsin is sincere in his stated anti-Communist motives - but the 
Communists returning to power is a threat long gone. No serious analyst 
believes the Communist Party could win a national election anymore. 

The Family's aim in its lurching machinations is to prolong, at all cost, its 
political existence, to somehow guarantee its influence and financial 
prosperity after the presidential elections of July 2000, when Yeltsin's term 
ends. 

And this is the logic behind this week's sacking of Prime Minister Sergei 
Stepashin and the appointment of former security chief Vladimir Putin as his 
replacement. 

Mr. Stepashin's only real failure was not to support the Kremlin actively 
against its most dangerous political rivals. Among them are Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov and his ally, independent media mogul Vladimir Gusinsky, and ex-Prime 
Minister Yevgeny Primakov. 

Stepashin failed to prevent the Kremlin's worst nightmare - the formation of 
a moderate reform alliance of influential regional governors with Luzhkov - 
an alliance that's likely to include Mr. Primakov, the leader in public 
opinion polls for the presidency. 

This bloc has bright prospects in December parliamentary and June 
presidential elections. 

Stepashin, certainly not disloyal to Yeltsin, didn't show the kind of 
super-loyalty The Family desires. His inclination was to compromise and not 
use the strong hand his position would allow to crush any measures or forces 
that didn't suit The Family. For example, having to deal with pro-Communist 
Duma legislators, he couldn't always support tough anti-Communist measures. 
His Cabinet choices and policy priorities weren't always in lock step with 
The Family. 

So the president chose a new crown prince, Mr. Putin, who is more likely to 
go to the very limit under any circumstances for The Family. When a career 
special service officer, having not the least experience in political spheres 
of state activities, is appointed prime minister, it's a message that 
characterizes the sort of tasks he's expected to carry out. 

There's every reason to believe the Duma will approve Putin on Monday. Not 
because legislators like him, but because the Duma wants to avoid being 
dismissed, which is what the Constitution requires if it doesn't approve a 
nominee for prime minister. Legislators facing elections in December prefer 
having their headquarters in the comfortable Duma, not out on the street. 

But whether Putin can play the role of crown prince is the question. He 
certainly has all the tools at his disposal: absolute support from state TV 
channels; and more money in the election treasury for Yeltsin's appointed 
candidate than in the treasuries of all the other candidates combined. And he 
can use state structures and law enforcement to complicate life for his 
opponents. But none of this guarantees a victory for The Family candidate. 

Putin - with no proven political ability - ranks zero in popularity ratings. 
The electorate doesn't even know who the man is. And with polls showing 
Yeltsin with a 90 percent disapproval rating, his blessing is more a 
political kiss of death. 

Stepashin was quite popular in comparison with Putin. By rejecting him for a 
dark horse, Yeltsin has taken the most risky gamble of his career. If he 
fails, there's little time to try another. 

*******

#9
The Economist
August 14-20, 1999
[for personal use only]
Yeltsin's Russian Caprice
Exit, pursued by a bear, again 
M O S C O W 
President Boris Yeltsin was busy this week sacking his government again, an 
upheaval that is at best pointless, at worst ominous 

LOYALTY is not enough: only absolute obedience will do. This, seemingly, is 
the lesson from the abrupt decision by President Boris Yeltsin on August 9th 
to sack his prime minister, Sergei Stepashin—in office for a mere 82 days—and 
replace him with an even tougher, even greyer figure: Vladimir Putin, 
formerly head of the secret police. 

Mr Stepashin’s brief record was creditable. He made no big blunders, kept 
the economy stable and started mending Russia’s relations with the West. So 
why was he dumped? It could be that he was doing too well, and that Mr 
Yeltsin was jealous—something that has brought the downfall of previous prime 
ministers. Or it may simply have been a fit of presidential caprice. The most 
likely explanation is that Mr Stepashin lacked the necessary enthusiasm and 
ruthlessness to be useful in the country’s main political battle: that 
between Mr Yeltsin’s inner circle and its chief opponents, headed by the 
mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov. 

Mr Luzhkov’s party, Fatherland, is growing in influence, forming an alliance 
last week with a regional governors’ group, All Russia. On current form, the 
new block looks set to do well in the parliamentary election which has now 
been set for December 19th. With Yevgeny Primakov, a steely former prime 
minister, as its likely candidate, it would then be favourite to win the 
presidency next summer. 

Mr Yeltsin, still proclaiming himself a democrat at heart, insists that he is 
prepared to lose power at the ballot box. His cronies, who have plenty to 
fear if this happens (not least a scrutiny of their finances), are less keen. 
So they are looking to Mr Putin, whom Mr Yeltsin named this week as his 
preferred successor, to rescue them from defeat, by fair means certainly, 
possibly by foul ones too. 

The new prime minister’s first job, which saw him jet off to Siberia this 
week, is to weaken Mr Luzhkov’s regional support. During a previous stint at 
the Kremlin, Mr Putin handled relations with the heads of Russia’s 89 
constituent parts. He knows their wants and their weaknesses, and has both 
carrots (federal patronage) and sticks (compromising material) to hand. Mr 
Luzhkov’s larder and armoury, by comparison, are less well stocked. The city 
of Moscow is rich by Russian standards, but nothing like as rich as the 
presidential administration and federal government combined. 

Mr Putin’s other immediate task will be to sharpen the attack on Mr Luzhkov’s 
Moscow base. Last month, while Mr Putin was still at the federal secret 
police, it raided banks holding accounts of firms owned by Mr Luzhkov’s wife, 
which have enjoyed lucrative municipal contracts. Tax inspectors have begun 
to investigate the city’s finances. 

Fatherland’s main media ally, Media-Most, which broadcasts the only 
nationwide television programmes that are not under the government’s control, 
is also in the firing line. Kommersant, the last remaining heavyweight 
independent daily newspaper, was bought last week by Boris Berezovsky, an 
influential tycoon close to Mr Yeltsin’s powerful daughter, Tatyana 
Dyachenko. The editor promptly resigned, and journalists say interference 
from on high is palpable. Mr Berezovsky has already been to the editorial 
offices to tell journalists to be “fair”. 

Bashing your opponents is one thing. Finding something positive for people to 
vote for, however, is another. This is where the Kremlin camp is weakest. Mr 
Yeltsin’s own popularity hovers at about 3%. Popular, democratic, reformist 
politicians want to distance themselves from the president; one calls 
association with him the “kiss of electoral death’’. The idea seems to be to 
build up an alternative group of regional leaders, based on Dmitri Ayatskov, 
the governor of Saratov. But the chances that an incoherent new outfit like 
this would do well in the parliamentary election look slim. The Kremlin lot’s 
best hope is that, by weakening Fatherland, they may help other parties less 
threatening to themselves, for instance Yabloko (a centre-left group led by 
Grigory Yavlinsky) and Right Cause (a much weaker group of well-known—and 
mostly unpopular—economic reformers, such as Anatoly Chubais). 

Dark shadows 

The really worrying prospect is that Mr Yeltsin’s camp is toying with other 
ideas, ranging from the outlandish to the wholly unconstitutional: declaring 
a union with Belarus, for example, or banning the Communist Party, and 
announcing a state of emergency. With Mr Stepashin out of the way, and the 
efficient Mr Putin (a former Soviet spy) in charge, each of these looks a 
little less improbable—though still unlikely. 

The lower house of Russia’s parliament, the Duma, may be prepared to accept 
Mr Putin as prime minister, but it would probably not accept anything that 
postponed the parliamentary election, or downgraded its importance. Declaring 
a state of emergency would require the consent of the upper house of 
parliament, the Federation Council, which would not readily oblige. And the 
Communist Party, though an irritant, is not Mr Yeltsin’s real problem. Its 
leadership is uninspired, its ranks are divided, and it looks certain to lose 
in any imaginable run-off for the presidency. Most important, Mr Yeltsin 
himself seems genuinely determined to stick to the letter, if not the spirit, 
of the law. 

Most mysterious of all, amid these goings on, is a war in the southern 
republic of Dagestan, where a rogue group of Chechen guerrillas started a 
rebellion a week ago. They have declared an “independent Islamic state” and 
have been fiercely fighting over several villages—though by mid-week, 
according to officials, the army was regaining control. Could the timing just 
be coincidence? Secessionist rumblings have been heard in Dagestan for a 
while. Although the crackdown was begun under Mr Stepashin, it could be that 
Mr Putin finishes off the job—and gets the credit. Dealing firmly with 
“Muslim extremists” is, after all, a guaranteed vote-winner in Russia—if it 
is done successfully, which it was not in Chechnya. 

There could be more such stunts. But none will alter two big problems for Mr 
Yeltsin and the members of his court. They are extremely unpopular, and the 
chances of their holding on to power constitutionally grow more remote by the 
day. 

********

#10
Russia: Standard Of Living Still Lower A Year After Economic Crisis
By Sophie Lambroschini

This is the second of two features marking the one-year anniversary of the
Russian financial meltdown of August 17, 1998. In part two, RFE/RL Moscow
correspondent Sophie Lambroschini reports that while average Russians are
far from regaining their modest pre-crisis standard of living, many
Muscovites have "adapted" to the new circumstances. However, she says that
reports from many of Russia's regions indicate life outside the capital is
tougher. 

Moscow, 12 August 1999 (RFE/RL) -- Right under the Kremlin walls, the
Alexandrovsky garden attracts hundreds of Muscovites on sunny weekends for
a walk or even the celebration of a wedding. Hot-dog, ice-cream and
soft-drink vendors stand shoulder to shoulder. While rented
stretch-limousines wait outside the park, newlyweds line up to lay
carnations at the tomb of the unknown soldier before swallowing the first
of many glasses of champagne. Nothing reflects the economic crisis that hit
just one year ago. 

However, many of those enjoying a sunny summer day in the garden are quick
to tell you that times are hard. They know that since the ruble collapsed
and Russian banks gobbled up peoples' savings, the standard of living of
the average Russian has fallen by up to 30 percent. And under the
appearance of well-being, not much can temper the bitterness they feel.

Yulia, a teacher, and Dimitry, a construction worker, are the parents of a
"crisis baby". Misha was born September 7. Before the crisis, Dimitry
earned the equivalent of $500 to $600 a month. He and Yulia could afford
going out and buying furniture. Now he manages to earn the equivalent of
$100, and that is only when he can find work. So for the past year they
have spent all their money on food. The couple talked with RFE/RL:

Dimitry: "Of course we had to give up all kinds of achievements of
civilization. Pampers and the like.

Yulia: Now we use pampers only in exceptional cases. The rest [of the time]
we have to do like in the old days, like our mothers. 

Dimitry: It's a step away from civilization. 

Yulia: For us it has become more difficult. We used to be part of the
middle class and now we are on the brink."

Others, like Natalia Novikova, who sells hot-dogs for 4000 rubles a month
-- now roughly $160 -- feel the crisis didn't only hit their consumption
but also jeopardized their family's future. Her ruble income has stayed the
same even as the ruble has plunged. She says she recently told her son that
he would have to drop out of computer school to find work.

"My son can't study because I can't pay {for his tuition]. I didn't get a
raise. My salary stayed the same."

In Moscow, the collapsing standard of living doesn't mean starvation.
Muscovite Olga Pavlovna told our correspondent "It's just that we have come
to consider ham as a great delicacy". She adds "we just sacrificed things
we got used to and can't afford anymore." 

But some say that their lifestyle hasn't changed. Roman, a law-student,
says he "just took on two extra jobs."

"There's nothing sad about that, actually. Moscow is a European city. You
just have to make an intellectual effort, show some diligence. Then
everything will turn out all right."

Analysts say such optimism is representative of the younger generation. And
according to Yuri Levada, the main issue is adjusting. Levada, the director
of the Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (Vtsiom), says that
"adaptation is where Russians excelled this year".

Analyzing opinion polls his center conducts every two months, Levada says
that the mood of Russians has stabilized in recent months, or perhaps has
even improved slightly. He says that a poll taken just before the crisis
showed that 29 percent of respondents said that they could barely make ends
meet. He says the percentage of those saying their situation was dire rose
to 40 percent in December but then fell to 37 percent in July.

Levada says that several factors explain this slight improvement. The
economic catastrophe everyone was expecting did not take place. Also, the
economy seems to be getting a little better. However, Levada says that it
is difficult to say whether the slight improvement in mood is based on a
real improvement in peoples' lives or whether their way of looking at
things has changed. Levada says that "Russians still believe that the
future holds better times for them than the present." He adds that "People
manage to adapt. They want very much to adjust and therefore they have very
few expectations. They really long for stability and therefore are ready to
find stability in situations where there is practically none."

But in many regions away from Moscow, the situation seems more desperate.
Early this month near Ulyanovsk, a middle-sized town about 700 kms
southeast of Moscow, two men trying to steal potatoes from a private
vegetable plot got caught by the owners. Furious at having lost some twelve
potatoes, the owners beat the thieves to death. According to Itar-Tass news
agency, last month six would-be thieves were killed in vegetable gardens in
the same region.

In a report shown by Russian television ORT, villagers in the Mari-El Ural
region complained that rubles have completely disappeared since nobody has
a job paid in cash. The report said that Samogon, Russian home-made vodka,
has become the local currency. 

*******

#11
Financial Times
13 August 1999
[for personal use only]
Comment / Personal View 
Another Chechnya
By Yuri Luzhkov 
The author is mayor of Moscow 

Unless Russia and the west help to end the ethnic violence in Kosovo and 
restore order, the criminal activity and religious intolerance will spread 
unchecked

The ending of bombing in the former Yugoslavia was a significant achievement 
for international diplomacy - including the active role played by Russia. To 
build on this success, Russia and the west should make joint efforts to end 
ethnic violence and restore civil order in Kosovo.

These must include reinstating the leading role of the United Nations. The 
security of this long-suffering region - and the stability of Europe - depend 
on it. Events in Kosovo grow more serious every day. The west is not paying 
enough attention to the alarming events in the region as it concentrates on 
depriving Slobodan Milosevic of power.

It is true that Mr Milosevic was personally responsible for ethnic cleansing 
in Kosovo. His latest efforts to pressurise Montenegro reflect his intention 
to preserve power by any means. Russia and the European Union should issue a 
joint warning to him to stop intimidating Montenegro's leaders. In the worst 
case, they should consider joint action against Belgrade.

But while leaders come and go, the problems of Kosovo remain. Its future must 
be built on justice, equal treatment and the law, not vengeance. The 
peacekeeping forces in Kosovo are supposed to be implementing the objectives 
of the UN Security Council's resolution 1244. These include the return of all 
refugees - regardless of nationality and religious beliefs - the preservation 
of the territorial unity of Yugoslavia, and the disarmament of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA).

But regrettably we now appear to be distancing ourselves from these 
objectives. While ethnic Albanians are returning home, a massive departure of 
Serbs, Montenegrins, Gypsies and Jews from Kosovo is taking place. One 
hundred thousand Serbs and Montenegrins left the region at the end of the 
military operation. Power in Kosovo is being seized by supporters of 
separation from Yugoslavia, with the KLA in a leading role.

A frank memo from the general staff office of the Spanish army has described 
the KLA as "a terrorist organisation, gravitating towards Islamic 
fundamentalism". The main aims of the KLA include not only separation from 
Serbia, but the unification of other territories in the region to create a 
"greater Albania".

Concerns are growing in neighbouring Macedonia that it will be the next 
victim, and these tensions are being provoked by Tirana. A report by the 
Albanian Academy of Sciences states that the territory of the present 
Macedonia is historically a part of the Albanian state, and that now is the 
time to "reinstate fairness".

Instead of strict implementation of the Security Council resolution, there 
has been a sluggish removal of weaponry from the KLA. The "liberating army" 
keeps its headquarters, representatives and even prisons. Turning a blind eye 
to the unwillingness of radical forces to disarm has obvious consequences. 
Russia has seen the result of criminal actions in Chechnya.

The first signs of the "Chechenisation" of Kosovo are already apparent. As in 
Chechnya, there has been mass kidnapping based on ethnic identity. Religious 
intolerance is obvious. In 1998, even Catholic Albanians were forced to leave 
the region because of persecution by the KLA. Today, Serbian monasteries are 
being debased and priests are being kidnapped.

It is no secret that a mob consisting of Kosovo Albanians controls drug 
distribution channels in the UK, Germany, Austria, France and Scandinavia. 
Together with the arms trade, illegal narcotics is a serious source of 
currency that helps perpetuate the existence of the KLA. Its Kosovo field 
commanders have defied the central authorities and are acting in the 
interests of clans and gangs.

The KLA claims that outrages towards Serbs and Gypsies and the destruction of 
Orthodox churches are being carried out by "wild" legions that have nothing 
to do with their organisation. These explanations are painfully reminiscent 
of Chechnya. Russia in its own time did not pay close enough attention to the 
strengthening of extremist factions in Chechnya, and now faces problems in 
preserving the territorial unity of the country and in ensuring basic human 
rights in the republic and surrounding regions.

The outcome of such short-sighted policies has been frightening. So we can 
legitimately ask: what kind of seeds are we planting now in Kosovo? The 
ongoing fighting between clans and arbitrariness of field commanders promise 
years of unlawfulness and heavy losses comparable with ethnic cleansing of 
the recent past.

Regrettably, it is clear that little is being done in Kosovo to prevent a 
repetition of what occurred in Chechnya. There are clear double standards 
operating in the region - not only is there a relatively tolerant attitude 
towards the KLA, but there is an absence of measures to protect the civil 
rights of non-Albanian citizens.

Such policies show the wrongness of the decision not to offer a separate 
security sector to Russia. This means that the Serbs are forced either to 
flee Kosovo, or seek the protection of the church - their last hope. The way 
in which some of those in Kosovo can act with impunity while others are left 
in an intolerable situation does not offer much hope for the future.

Europe and Russia to a certain extent lost control over the situation in 
Kosovo, and were unable to force Mr Milosevic to stop before it was too late. 
The same mistake should not be repeated with the separatist forces. We must 
examine the events in Kosovo objectively, and without double standards.

Russia and the west must act together to ensure stability and security in 
this region, and peace in Europe. There must be joint responsibility for all 
peacekeeping forces, regardless of sectors or national identity.

******