August 10, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3429 • 3430 • 3431

Johnson's Russia List
#3431
10 August 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Yeltsin knows what he's doing, brother says.
2. Murray Feshbach: A fuller explanation of the health side of the issue.
3. Moscow Times: Brian Whitmore, Putin Sets Kremlin Sights on Regions.
4. STRATFOR.COM: Change of Priorities Drives Change of Russian Government.
5. NTV interview with Putin.]

*******

#1
Yeltsin knows what he's doing, brother says

MOSCOW, Aug 10 (Reuters) - Many Russians may have been mystified by Boris 
Yeltsin's latest abrupt sacking of his government, but the Russian 
president's brother says he knows what he is doing and history will vindicate 
him. 

``He has always acted responsibly, and the later results always show that he 
was right in what he did,'' Mikhail Yeltsin told Reuters by telephone from 
his home in Yekaterinburg on Tuesday. 

President Yeltsin abruptly fired Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin on Monday 
and appointed former KGB spy Vladimir Putin to take his place. He also said 
Putin would be the best person to succeed him as president. 

The decision, the fifth change of acting prime minister in 17 months, was 
widely criticised by Moscow's press as being motivated more by Yeltsin's 
self-interested need for a loyal successor than by concern about Russia's 
well being. 

But Mikhail Yeltsin, who has rarely given interviews and who is known for his 
modest lifestyle, said his brother has a clearer view than the sceptical 
pundits. 

``Things are clearer from there (in the Kremlin),'' he said. ``I am 
completely calm about the changes.'' 

The younger brother said he had fallen out of touch with the president in 
recent years, and when they did telephone each other, the subject of politics 
was off limits. 

``We never talk about such things, never. We talk about the family,'' he 
said. ``But we talk very rarely. The last time was in the spring sometime.'' 

Mikhail Yeltsin said the president, who has suffered a series of serious 
health problems in recent years, still had the same old spark, but the 
effects of time were inevitable. 

``He's as lively as ever, although of course we all become less active 
through ageing. It affects everybody,'' he said. 

******

#2
DATE: 6 August 1999
FROM: feshbach@gunet.georgetown.edu (Murray Feshbach)
Subject: A fuller explanation of the health side of the issue/
Ray Smith's comment on JRL/3424

I thank Ray for his very good comments. Let me add that I am not an
advocate of more is better per se, but was using the model to demonstrate
the dramatic decrease in potential labor force, the likely consequences of
health crises on males, and therefore family stability, and military
capabilities. I happen to believe that the Russian state will have trouble
maintaining itself as a unitary formation, but that is not what I was
trying to demonstrate in my very short piece. 

At this time, however, let me also add that I did not give the health
crisis picture in my piece referred to by Ray. It is not only reproductive
health of women, but also the health of males which makes some 15-20
percent of couples infertile, but also the incredible increase in sexually
transmitted diseases which leads to an increases of 30-40 times of
registered illness among 0-14 year old girls, much of which is due to
increases in prostitution (including a small number of congenital syphilis
cases). This is also related to the dramatic increase in drug abuse among
both males and females--especially the younger portion, and which is the
principal means of transmission of new cases of HIV/AIDS, reportedly 80
percent or so of new cases of HIV. With drug abuse increasing by almost 4
times in the last 5 years (officially registered again). With a new law
passed early in 1998, it is likely the real number is much higher as those
found abusing drugs may find themselves in jail, not a medical institution.
This leads to a draft cohort more likely to have had drug abuse as well as
illness (presenting with 11 times more syphilis than 8 years before). 

The number of cases of HIV/AIDs is estimated by Pokrovskiy to accelerate up
to 1 million cases by 2002, deaths will occur some 5 or so years later
among this population at a much larger number, as will the tuberculosis
population, with or without multi-drug resistance, as they also are
projected by a former Minister of Health to number some 1 million as well
by the end of 2000 (likely a few years later). But all these numbers are
subject to the usual caveat of official versus "real" number–the official
number in Russia for TB is 108,000 in 1998, WHO shows 150,000, and I would
expect that this is low as well.

Pokrovskiy says that the recorded number of an 11 times increase of
HIV/AIDS in Moscow City and Moscow Oblast in the first half of 1999
compared with the same period in 1998, is much too low and that all figures
for HIV/AIDS is 8-10 times higher (at other times he states it is 20 times
higher), making the 1 million figure for the country as a whole more
possible. Thus, the population will be weakened if not dying earlier than
even before.

Why are cancer and heart mortality levels of 15-19 year olds dying in 1995
in Russia are both almost exactly double the rates (per 100,000 population
in each country) double that of the rate in the United States? The suicide
rate in Russia is slightly more than double that in the United States for
this age group. (See Yermakov, Komarov, Notzon et al., Maternal and Child
Health Statistics..., US Department of Health and Human Services, March
1999, p. 48.) But this is the group entering the armed forces, forming
families, entering the labor force–if alive, and they are being impacted
beyond just the overall numbers.
Alcoholism must not be omitted from any consideration of health and
population trends. DeLeon and his colleagues in London have found that the
mortality rates follows closely to this measure. I think that this will
change in the near future as well with the impending terrible impact of
deaths from HIV/AIDS and TB. But when WHO stipulates that 8 liters per
capita is the upper limit for consumption before major health problems
ensue, then what do we say when the Russian level is 14-15 liters per
capita (all ages, not just adults). Vodka production in the first half of
1999 is reported by ITAR-TASS (in RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 30 July 1999) to have
increased by 65%–and that is just legal production!

Tobacco smoking prevails among two-thirds of all males and one-third of
Russian women. If some 55% of all deaths are due to heart disease and
cancers another 20%, then the estimate by WHO that between 20 and 30% of
both diseases are caused by smoking, then its reduction is vital (not a
pun). Of these 32% are males, 5% are females. (WHO Fact Sheet No.157, May
1997.) 

For me, I am very worried about the increase in birth defects, congenital
anomalies, mental retardation, and the like, and the quality of the
population, not just the numbers that I described in my first item. 

Again, I am not ignoring issues brought up many years ago by the Club of
Rome, Zero Population Growth, Neo-Malthusians, and the like, but the item
was showing the results of a model driven by Total Fertility Rates,
assuming mortality will stay constant. I do not believe that this will be
the case as I have described again very, very briefly here. Ray's point
about the GDP per capita, about the social and environmental consequences
in the United States of a large increase in the American population, and
others are certainly correct and should be noted carefully. Tom Graham,
separately, also addresses the geopolitical situation in the future (in his
Jamestown Foundation piece summarized in JRL earlier), but the numbers are
important in their own right, as well as the consequences that I tried to
point to in my first contribution.

Respectfully, MF

*******

#3
Moscow Times
August 11, 1999 
Putin Sets Kremlin Sights on Regions 
By Brian Whitmore
Staff Writer

Even before parliament debates his nomination for prime minister, Vladimir 
Putin is to leave Moscow on a trip to Siberia to meet with regional 
governors, whose loyalty President Boris Yeltsin is eager to secure. 

Political analysts expect Putin, the former head of the Federal Security 
Service, or FSB, to lean on regional leaders - many of whom have aligned 
themselves with Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov, who is deeply distrusted by 
Yeltsin's entourage and has all but declared his candidacy for president. 

No definitive explanation of Yeltsin's decision to fire Prime Minister Sergei 
Stepashin on Monday and replace him with Putin has been offered. But the 
emerging consensus is that Stepashin failed to derail Luzhkov's political 
locomotive, which has lined up the backing of leading regional governors 
ahead of the December parliamentary elections. 

Reaction to Yeltsin's decision to dump Stepashin and name the heretofore 
obscure Putin has wavered between boredom at yet another government crisis 
fueled by Kremlin intrigue and apprehension that the move is a prelude to 
canceling elections and declaring a state of emergency. 

In his first full day on the job, Putin met with Yeltsin to discuss 
escalating tensions in the Caucasus and his upcoming confirmation vote Monday 
in the State Duma, the lower house of parliament. Yeltsin opened the meeting 
by asking Putin about his mood. 

"Combative," Putin said, in his trademark terse manner. 

Later in the day, Putin, who kept tabs on the regions when he was a Kremlin 
aide, announced plans to visit Tomsk, Western Siberia, on Thursday to attend 
a session of the Siberian Interregional Association, a loose grouping of 
Siberia's governors, where issues related to next year's federal budget will 
be discussed. 

"I don't expect Putin to use rude or direct methods with the governors," 
political analyst Yury Korgunyuk of the INDEM research center said. "He will 
use more sophisticated and subtle means to persuade them to the Kremlin's 
side." 

Some say that the ever-pragmatic regional leaders could - with the proper 
enticements - be persuaded to return to the Kremlin fold. 

Meanwhile, in what is fast becoming a trend for former prime ministers, 
Stepashin on Tuesday found himself the object of political courtship. 

Both Luzhkov's Fatherland and the liberal electoral bloc Right Cause publicly 
asked Stepashin, whose popularity rose in presidential polls from nil to 
about 10 percent in his 82 days in office, to run from their respective 
movements for a seat in the State Duma." 

For the 80 days of his work as chairman of the government, the level of trust 
in Stepashin had approached, judging by polls, that of Yury Luzhkov and 
Gennady Zyuganov, and he had not made a single serious mistake," said former 
Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, a member of Right Cause. 

Stepashin held meetings Tuesday with various politicians at his dacha, but 
has yet to comment on either offer, Interfax reported. 

Another top politician who has been oddly silent is Luzhkov, who is 
reportedly vacationing outside of Moscow. 

Putin, meanwhile, has been courting the Duma. On Monday night, he met with 
Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznyov to schedule meetings with the leftist factions 
- the Communists, Agrarians and Popular Rule - that dominate the lower house. 
Those meetings will take place next Monday at 10 a.m., hours before the Duma 
is slated to debate Putin's candidacy. Seleznyov has said he expects Putin to 
win confirmation, possibly on the first vote. 

Despite media speculation that other ministers might be fired, Putin said 
there would be "no spontaneous dismissals." He also asked all of the 
so-called power ministers - defense, foreign affairs and interior, plus the 
head of the FSB - to remain in office. 

Kommersant newspaper said Mikhail Zadornov - Yeltsin's special envoy to 
international financial organizations - may be replaced by Alexander 
Livshits, now the president's representative to the Group of Seven industrial 
nations. NTV television reported that controversial Deputy Prime Minister 
Nikolai Aksyonenko may also be dismissed. 

Meanwhile, suspended Prosecutor General Yury Skuratov - whom the Kremlin has 
been trying to fire - said Putin's nomination could be the first step toward 
canceling upcoming elections and declaring emergency rule. 

"The Kremlin may take the most unexpected moves," Skuratov was quoted as 
saying by Interfax. He compared the situation to the 1991 coup, in which an 
attempt to declare emergency rule "led to the collapse of the ruling regime." 

The media has been spinning emergency rule scenarios for months, including 
the Kremlin using tensions in the North Caucasus as a pretext, or provoking 
the Communists into street protests by burying Lenin. The presidential 
entourage is eager to secure a friendly successor to ward off reprisals - 
such as corruption trials - from their enemies. 

Last week, the weekly newspaper Moskovskiye Novosti speculated - correctly as 
it turned out - that Stepashin might be fired and replaced by Putin, who is 
considered a tougher defender of the Kremlin's interests. If the Duma fails 
three times to confirm Putin, Yeltsin could disband the parliament and then 
plan his next moves in peace. 

Political analyst Yevgeny Volk, head of the Heritage Foundation's Moscow 
office, said that he "didn't exclude the possibility" that such a scenario 
was on the minds of Yeltsin's inner circle. But such a turn of events now 
seems remote, given Putin's likely confirmation. 

Korgunyuk said "a state of emergency is not a possibility," adding that 
Russia's bureaucratic class is too divided and too interested in maintaining 
the status quo to accept such a move. 

"This is a myth that has thrived in the media," he said. "In reality we have 
a diverse bureaucracy, with conflicting interests, but which also wants to 
preserve its current arrangements." 

n Former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko said Tuesday he plans to initiate a 
national referendum on changing the Constitution prior to next year's 
presidential elections, Interfax reported. 

The referendum, Kiriyenko said, will seek to restrict the president's ability 
to fire the Cabinet, which President Boris Yeltsin has done four times in 17 
months. "The new president must be elected under a new constitution," 
Kiriyenko said. 

"If the system cannot be changed by means of talks with authorities, let us 
talk directly with society," Kiriyenko said, adding that initiators of the 
referendum are prepared to begin the collection of the necessary 2 million 
signatures. 

******

#4
STRATFOR.COM
Global Intelligence Update
August 10, 1999

Change of Priorities Drives Change of Russian Government

Summary:

Russian President Boris Yeltsin has long dealt with strategic 
issues tactically, using a series of prime ministers as proxies 
to make up for his political weakness and disposing of them when 
they have served their purpose. Now he has elevated his 
intelligence chief to prime minister to meet the challenge of 
manipulating the upcoming Duma elections. This time, however, 
the strategy might fail. When the time comes for Putin to go, he 
may not, since the resources at his disposal to affect the 
elections can as easily be used against Yeltsin as for him. 
Yeltsin may just have handed the keys to the Kremlin to the 
successor of the KGB.

Analysis:

On August 9, Russian President Boris Yeltsin fired Prime Minister 
Sergei Stepashin and his entire cabinet, marking the fourth time 
in 18 months Yeltsin has replaced his prime minister. Declaring 
that he was clearing the way for the man whom he deemed best fit 
to succeed him as president, Yeltsin replaced Stepashin with the 
head of Russia's Federal Security Service and Security Council, 
Vladimir Putin. In a televised address, Yeltsin said, "Now I have 
decided to name the person who in my opinion is capable of 
consolidating society." Yeltsin added, "I'm convinced [Putin] 
will serve the nation well while working in this high post, and 
Russians will be able to appraise Putin's human and business 
qualities. I trust him. I also want everyone who goes to the 
[presidential] polls in July 2000 to make their choice to trust 
him, too." Putin announced that he would undoubtedly seek the 
presidency, and in the meantime vowed his government would not 
greatly alter the economic approach taken by his predecessor.

After shaking off their initial, short-lived surprise, the 
international community rallied behind Yeltsin's decision. The 
White House, several Western European nations, Ukraine, and the 
IMF all said that they do not anticipate any changes in relations 
with Russia following the government shakeup. 

Yeltsin's opponents were also scarcely surprised, though they 
were less generous with their evaluations of Yeltsin's move. 
Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov said, "It is 100 percent 
lunacy... We told you a long time ago that this government would 
be sacked by September." "Nothing new has happened. It is the 
death agony of the regime," added Zyuganov. State Duma Security 
Head Viktor Ilyukhin stated that he does not believe Vladimir 
Putin has the right qualities to rule the country and believes 
that he is not the Kremlin's final candidate, but rather a first 
placement. Ilyukhin claimed that Yeltsin's ruling "family" had 
not been satisfied that Stepashin could or would guarantee their 
interests and continued grip on power, and so were fishing about 
for a more reliable candidate.

>From the other end of the political spectrum, former Deputy Prime 
Minister Boris Nemtsov said in a radio interview on Ekho Moskvy, 
"It's hard to explain madness. The people have grown tired of 
watching an ill leader who is not capable of doing his job." And 
deputy head of the Yabloko party, Sergei Ivanenko, said Russia's 
"personnel reshuffle is unreasonable," because former Prime 
Minister Sergei Stepashin's cabinet "did not make any serious 
mistakes."

Still, Russia's Duma is scheduled to meet August 19 to debate 
whether or not to confirm Putin as prime minister, and all 
indications are that he will win confirmation. None of the 
parties see the government shuffle or Putin as much more than a 
sign of Yeltsin's weakness and panic. With Duma elections 
scheduled for December 19, none want to waste time on a 
protracted squabble over the nomination. And if Putin fails to 
be confirmed by a simple majority of the Duma after three 
attempts, Yeltsin can dissolve the Duma and force early 
elections.

While most analysts are focusing on Yeltsin's apparent caprice 
and desperation in dumping his government in advance of Duma 
elections, Stratfor views the situation somewhat differently. 
Yeltsin is a weak president, but he is neither frivolous nor 
stupid. The "rotating door" in Yeltsin's government is a 
calculated tool of governance. Yeltsin has such abysmally low 
levels of popular and Duma support that he has developed a 
strategy of surrogate governance. First, Yeltsin constantly 
keeps potential opponents -- from all ends of the political 
spectrum but particularly from within his own entourage -- 
divided and bickering amongst themselves. Then, depending on the 
task at hand, he dips into the seething pool and pulls out a 
prime minister appropriate for the job. He uses that prime 
minister's strengths, charisma, and political chips to achieve 
the task at hand, and then proceeds to dump him. This not only 
serves to stunt the careers of rising stars -- as many observers 
have pointed out -- but also clears the way for the person 
appropriate for the next task.

A perfect example of this was the transition from Yevgeny 
Primakov to Sergei Stepashin. Yeltsin used Primakov to win back 
control after the failure of economic initiatives for which he 
had tapped Sergei Kirienko. Primakov appealed to the 
nationalists and communists, helping Yeltsin tack to the 
prevailing political wind and avoid a serious challenge from the 
Duma. Primakov also served well to play off of the nationalist 
anti-NATO sentiment at the beginning of Operation Allied Force. 
With Primakov, Yeltsin could be a strong Russian, pan-Slavic 
leader. However, when Yeltsin felt he was better served selling 
out Slobodan Milosevic, cutting a deal with NATO, and cashing in 
at the IMF, he dumped Primakov for Stepashin. 

Stepashin served well to woo back the West, but he was 
inappropriate to the next task at hand -- controlling the outcome 
of the Duma and presidential elections. Stepashin was unreliable 
politically, having hinted at his allegiance to the All Russia 
party of Mintimer Shaimiyev. Moreover, the former Interior 
Ministry chief was a liability with the eruption of violence in 
Dagestan -- an event that played into the hands of Yeltsin's 
nationalist and communist foes. First, Stepashin was tainted by 
his involvement in the previous Chechen conflict. And second, if 
he was able to control one Russian ministry, it should have been 
the interior ministry. Given the interior ministry's handling of 
the events leading up to the current crisis, there may have been 
some concern in the Kremlin as to whether Stepashin had their 
best interests at heart in the North Caucasus.

So enter Putin, the man of the hour for dealing with the election 
campaign. Ilyukhin was quite correct in stating that there was 
little guarantee that Putin would be Yeltsin's presidential 
candidate tomorrow, let alone next year. In the past few days, 
Yeltsin has hinted at support for both Stepashin and Viktor 
Chernomyrdin in that post, and tomorrow it could as easily be 
Anatoliy Chubais -- who incidentally originally brought Putin 
into the Kremlin. No, Putin is not important for his own 
candidacy but for what he can do for and against Duma candidates. 
Putin brings with him the support and resources of the Federal 
Security Service, the successor to the KGB, and will no doubt be 
called upon to wield those tools in manipulating the elections. 
Then, following Yeltsin practice, sometime in January he will 
likely be sacked.

But here Yeltsin's tried and true method of proxy governance may 
well fail. Putin has the resources and backing to take down 
Yeltsin's foes, and to take down Yeltsin as well. When it is his 
time to go, he may not. Whatever his loyalty, if he draws on the 
resources of the security apparatus, he is both a spokesman and 
hostage for their interests. Boris Yeltsin has played with all 
manner of politicians and their constituencies, but he has never 
so brazenly called on the full force of the Federal Security 
Service. He may have just handed the keys to the Kremlin to the 
successor of the KGB.

******

#5
Putin 'Hero of the Day' Interview 

NTV
August 9, 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Studio interview with Russian Acting Prime Minister Vladimir Putin by 
Svetlana Sorokina on 9 August -- live; from the "Hero of the Day" program 

[Sorokina] Today [9th August] we will talk to the 
newly-appointed [Prime Minister Vladimir] Putin on various topical 
issues. Hello again, Vladimir Vladimirovich. 
The first thing I want to recall is our previous conversation when you 
said to me that you are a bureaucrat and probably a good one but that you 
are not a politician. It seems, however, you have to change roles. 
[Putin] In a certain way. But the post of prime minister is a post one gets 
by appointment, at least partially by appointment. One is appointed 
mainly by the president, of course. So, in this respect, I still have the 
necessary qualities. 
[Sorokina] In this respect, indeed. The prime minister is also a
bureaucrat. 
But today the president said he sees you as his successor, a desirable 
successor for the post of president. This means big politics. Are you 
ready for it? 
[Putin] I have already been asked this question before. It would be 
ridiculous to say that I am not ready when the president has already said 
[that I am]. 
You know the main problem we have is the absence of political stability. 
Why are our own citizens, our businessmen so reluctant to invest in our 
economy? Why do our low-income earners prefer to keep their savings in 
foreign currency? Why is it so difficult for us to get foreign credits? 
Precisely because of political stability. If people with power do not try 
to maintain the policy they have been conducting for a long time, they 
admit they have been wrong. And vice versa: if leaders, I stress, at all 
levels believe that there must be some sort of continuity, this creates 
an element of stability. In this sense, I do not think the president has 
said anything out of the ordinary. 
[Q] But we are now facing fresh instability. We have again entered a 
political crisis of sorts. I understand what you are saying. You are 
speaking about the long-term aims. What you have already explained about 
the changes. The fact that the political configuration had changed, as 
you said. 
[A] I think that the president was acting out of a need to change the 
political configuration inside the country in connection with the 
forthcoming elections to the State Duma, the election of the Russian 
Federation president in the year 2000 and in connection with the 
deteriorating situation in the Caucasus. 
[Q] This is probably both for me and many others quite an unclear 
explanation. What do you mean? Why were the Stepashin government and 
Stepashin himself not suitable at this stage? 
[A] It's hard to say because I didn't take the decision. I do not think 
that Stepashin's government and Sergey Vadimovich himself failed to suit 
anyone. It's just that there is a system of links, of relationships and 
developed structural relations and they were all in favour of replacing 
one of the key figures in the country, all in favour of replacing the 
prime minister and of changes of one kind or another taking place. The 
president evidently thought that these changes would be appropriate. 
[Q] Vladimir Vladimirovich, what was the attitude of the presidential 
administration to your appointment? There are rumours going around that 
they almost talked you out of it. 
[A] I do not think that is what actually happened. More likely the 
opposite: they tried to convince me that this needed to be done. 
[Q] And was it a surprise for you or have you been expecting this turn 
of events for some time? 
[A] The first conversation about this was on Thursday [5th August] when 
the president called me and Sergey Vladimirovich in and told us of his 
decision, the decision to sack the government and said that he was 
choosing the candidates for the post and I was one of the candidates. I 
said that if the decision on the sacking had already been taken and I was 
one of the candidates and I was offered the job, I would take it. 
[Q] What did you mean when you said that Sergey Stepashin had some 
interesting suggestions and that it was quite possible that you would 
continue to work with him in the future? 
[A] Above all, I believe that Sergey Vladimirovich Stepashin has not had 
the chance to show his full potential. He did not spend long in his post. 
He has very good intellectual and organizational skills. And he has 
gained these skills through experience, through political experience. He 
used to be a deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and he has been engaged 
in political activity ever since. He is still quite young and I am sure 
that all this has yet to be reclaimed by the state. The president has 
made a number of proposals to him, and we have talked with Sergey 
Vladimirovich today. He told me about current problems in the 
government's work. He said he would take two or three days off to have a 
rest and then he would return to the subject. 
[Q] So, he has not yet accepted any proposal, has he? 
[A] No, as far as I know he did not. 
[Q] Is he very upset? 
[A] I do not think this is the most joyful time in his life. So, he is 
unlikely to be delirious with delight. But he is quite a charitable 
person. He has a strong will. I can assure you that any talk of him 
becoming sad is absolutely wrong. 
[Q] Do you have a good personal relationship with Sergey Vladimirovich? 
[A] Yes, very good. 
[Q] You have spoken about a changing political scene and about the fact 
that everything is now geared towards elections, not just towards 
parliamentary elections but towards the presidential election. Does this 
mean that changes are not going to be confined merely to the change of 
prime minister? Will there be some serious changes in the cabinet? 
[A] No. Precisely because I have been on very good terms with Sergey 
Vladimirovich for a long time. I respect his choice. I know that his 
approach to the selection of his team was very thorough. I am certain 
that his key, his main government appointments were correct. Therefore, 
there will be no global changes in the government. 
[Q] In other words, deputy prime ministers and heads of power-wielding 
structures will not be changed, will they? 
[A] Do not be in such a rush here. We must first do some work with the 
Duma. I must meet the governors, many important governors. But I want to 
say it again: I have had no intention of sacking the team and the 
government. And I will not have any such intention in the future. I know 
many of them personally. There are almost no people there whom I would 
not know. I know everybody very well. 
I know very many of them personally, there is hardly anyone I don't 
know there. I know everyone very well. 
[Q] Vladimir Vladimirovich, something about the State Duma. You must 
have heard reaction from State Duma deputies and governors today. 
Whatever the media had said earlier and however much they had tried to 
forecast the events, it was quite an unexpected development. However, as 
far as I can see, even today there are voices saying that you will be 
voted in from the first try because the elections are more important. But 
was an option considered that the State Duma might reject you and will 
have to be disbanded? 
[A] I did not consider such theories. I received this proposal and 
accepted it. It was not my duty to consider possible political 
consequences. 
[Q] But now you will have to. 
[A] Now I will have to, of course. But I presume that the State Duma 
will be guided not by the interests of the moment but by state interests 
and will take a decision rooted in Russia's interests rather than private 
sectarian interests linked with the elections. There are, as a rule, 
people well-know in their constituencies who don't need the State Duma's 
apparatus that much, even if it provides quite a good backup in the 
election struggle. I think that a decision will be taken on the basis of 
criteria of principle rather than time-serving ones. 
[Q] Have you started work with the leaders of factions and groups of 
deputies? 
[A] I haven't had time yet. Today I had the Security Council and the 
Russian Federal Security Service in my working schedule, and I had to see 
both matters through. Also I had to meet key ministers and hold a 
government meeting, even if a short one. I had to meet the government 
today, naturally I met Sergey Vadimovich [Stepashin] and the president in 
the morning. The only thing I managed to do was to ring [Federation 
Council head] Yegor Semenovich Stroyev and State Duma speaker Gennadiy 
Seleznev. We arranged to meet this evening. So after our conversation I 
will go to meet them. 
[Q] The president has called you his preferable successor. You were 
already asked today about whether you are entering the presidential race 
in earnest and you said "yes". And there was a sensible remark that 
experienced politicians don't reveal their ambitions of this kind so 
early, almost a year before the presidential elections. Why have you made 
this statement? Simply because the president impels you to? 
[A] Firstly, I'm not an experienced politician. I told you I was not 
engaged in politics. Secondly, I think that those who do not directly 
state what they want, are really, it would seem, not yet ready to do this 
or are people who are ready but say one thing and do another and think 
something else and they do not deserve to be trusted. I think that 
representatives of power at any level, starting with the president and 
ending with the head of some district administration, should take 
responsibility for what they do. And I repeat that a lot depends on the 
intention to stand, to be elected. If someone intends to be elected, to 
stand, then he understands the degree of responsibility and this means 
continuity and this is one of the elements of stability in society and in 
the state. If we take on some of the responsibility today, it should be 
clear, it should be evident to everyone, that we will strive for the 
optimal results. But when I say that I am prepared to stand, to be 
elected for anything even the post of president of the Russian 
Federation, you should of course proceed from the understanding that we 
are all, all of us who are in power today, or will receive the moral 
right to do this only if we do something to improve the lives of the 
people, first and foremost to improve the living standards of the people. 
[Q] The dollar rate started to fluctuate again today and evidently our 
financial markets will experience more possible upheavals, which we very 
much don't want, of course. It was the change of prime minister which 
caused this. And, specifically, you inherited this, were presented with 
this as prime minister. My question is this: firstly, do you have any 
education in economics, perhaps you can tell us about your education and 
secondly, do you have any idea about how the government should act in the 
economic sphere to improve the situation? 
[A] As for education, my basic education was in law. I graduated from 
Leningrad University's law faculty. And I submitted my dissertation as a 
candidate in economics some time ago. So I am a candidate of economic 
sciences. As for my ideas about what to do, of course I have some. And 
they will be implemented. There will be nothing revolutionary in 
comparison to the previous government. I just agree with the opinions of 
the people who were in government before Stepashin. In the situation 
which has taken shape, we much approach the market mechanism very 
carefully and use the levers of state regulation carefully and 
appropriately, without violating the laws of the market. That is the very 
general picture. But those who are engaged in sowing today, let's say, 
those who do not have enough fuel to bring in the harvest will understand 
me very well. And as for the increase in the dollar rate, I must say that 
I met the head of the Russian Central Bank today. Indeed there is some 
fluctuation and the Central Bank has indeed made a small intervention. 
But the Central Bank does not expect any sharp leaps and moreover 
[Central Bank head Viktor] Gerashchenko is sure that the rate will fall, 
will go down a bit tomorrow. 
I should say that the dollar exchange rate usually fluctuates at the 
end of August every year. Do you know why? Because this is the time when 
major import purchasing begins, and the demand for foreign currency 
sharply increases on the internal market. Everyone knows about it in 
advance and this is expected, this is something that happens every year. 
[Q] Will the government's economic bloc be reshuffled? 
[A] I think that the financial bloc will stay put. 
[Q] The financial bloc? 
[A] Yes. As far as the economic bloc on the whole is concerned, we shall 
see. I have already said that I am not planning any major changes. 
[Q] But will minor changes take place? 
[A] We shall see. 
[Q] Vladimir Vladimirovich, you are going to stand for president. Do you 
have any idea as to what political forces you are going to establish 
contacts with? Well, I am not saying that you will join a movement or a 
party, but who will be your allies? Who will you negotiate with? You need 
some backing, don't you? 
[A] Yes, I do. First of all, the people should provide this backing. I 
must say that all these mergers and unions are parts of a generally 
positive process, given that this process involves level-headed 
reasonable forces, of course. But on the whole, any merger or any union 
is a symptom of weakness. If you are strong, you don't seek to form 
unions. 
[Q] But political parties and movements exist everywhere in the world. 
[A] The process itself is positive. This is my opinion. The head of a 
government, an acting head, a president or any leader in power should 
only seek people's support. There will be no results regardless of 
whoever they will merge with or secede from, or the results will be 
negative, if there is no practical work that bears fruit. For a 
government the results are primarily economic. If there are economic 
results, then one can hope for a wide support among the population. If 
there are no practical results, nothing will help regardless of who you 
will join or whom you will leave, who your friends are and all the rest 
of it. It will be impossible to gain people's support in that case. 
[Q] That is, in effect, you hope that your good work in the post of 
prime minister will win you recognition and that if this happens then 
this will be your basis. 
[A] I think that in our country there is no other way. 
[Q] I have this question for you. In principle some people are already 
linking your appointment with the struggle being waged by the 
administration - the Kremlin's struggle, as people now put I - against 
the Fatherland movement in alliance with All Russia. What sort of 
relations do you have with Moscow mayor [Yuriy] Luzhkov? And how do you 
intend to interact, cooperate and build relations with him? 
[A] Relations will be businesslike. During the time that I was working 
in the Russian Federal Security Service I must say that Yuriy 
Mikhaylovich always supported our structures. He assisted the Moscow 
directorate. As the capital's mayor he responded very rapidly and 
operationally to all of our requests. I have very warm feelings for him. 
But, as to how we are going to build relations - on a businesslike basis, 
of course. He is the mayor of a major region of the country -- the 
capital. I am sure that this cooperation will be constructive. 
[Q] And what is your attitude to such political forces as the union of 
Fatherland and All Russia? 
[A] I have already answered that question. 
[Q] Things that merge are weak? 
[A] Of course, this is a manifestation of weakness. That is not my 
opinion. I am not going to name the person who said it. It was a rather 
well known politician in our country and I promised him that I would not 
reveal his name. But I repeat there is nothing wrong with this. If fact, 
this is a positive process. My attitude to it is positive. 
[Q] Right. Recently many people have got the impression that it is not 
the cabinet of ministers which is running the country but rather the 
presidential administration - Aleksandr Voloshin. Will you manage to 
ensure the independence of the cabinet of ministers or are you of the 
opinion in advance that it is necessary to cooperate very closely with 
the administration? 
[A] I am of the opinion in advance that it is necessary to cooperate 
very closely with the administration. But this does not mean that the 
cabinet of ministers will not be independent. I can give 100-per-cent 
assurance of this: the cabinet of ministers, the government of the 
Russian Federation, will be an absolutely independent political 
magnitude. 
[Q] Vladimir Vladimirovich, it is very strange the way things have 
turned out with regard to Chechnya and the situation in Dagestan. Many 
people think that it is no coincidence that the change of government here 
has occurred at the same time as this major incident on the border of 
Dagestan. What is needed for a state of emergency to be declared in the 
country? 
[A] A decision by the Federation Council is needed. We have considered a 
special regime on territories bordering on Chechnya. I have already said 
this. But no emergency measures throughout the whole country have been 
ever considered. I repeat that there are no domestic political 
indications for that. There will be no state of emergency in the country, 
nor is one being planned. 
[Q] But what, for instance, if the situation in the south will be 
compounded by, God forbid, a couple of terrorist acts, and in another 
place people will go out and sit of the rail track? Will you consider a 
state of emergency then? 
[A] Will they go out or will they sit? 
[Q] Both. 
[A] They will sit [in prison]. Those who will destabilize the situation 
in the country will be put away. 
[Q] I see. Another question, Vladimir Vladimirovich. You must have 
received many messages with greetings after your appointment today. Have 
governors telephoned you? 
[A] Yes, some of them have. 
[Q] What relations do you have with Russian governors, in general? 
[A] Good and businesslike, and friendly with some, with many. While I 
worked as first deputy head of the presidential administration, it was 
one of my duties to liaise with the regions, with governors. Therefore, I 
have positive recollections about building relations with Russian 
governors at that time. 
[Q] After leaving the post of head of the Interior Ministry and becoming 
prime minister, Sergey Stepashin continued to somehow supervise that 
ministry personally. Will you be supervising the Federal Security 
Service? 
[A] No, I won't. The Federal Security Council is a purely presidential 
structure. The Federal Security Service is subordinated directly to the 
president, and the president has not given me such powers. 
[Q] Is your deputy, who was appointed acting head today, likely to 
become your successor? 
[A] I would like it to be so, but it is up to the president to decide. 
But I will put forward his name. 
[Q] What are his strong points? 
[A] He has experience, he is a regular officer in the security bodies, 
he held an independent post of security minister in Karelia and has 
worked for many years at the central office of the Federal Security 
Service in Moscow. He headed one of the major directorates, which dealt 
with checking production activity , shall we say, in the Federal Security 
Service. Later he worked as deputy director and headed the economic 
security department. In other words, he has a wide range of professional 
skills and experience. 
[Q] That is, you will recommend him? 
[A] Yes, I will recommend him. 
[Q] Is there a candidate for the head of the Security Council? 
[A] I don't have one yet. The president may have, we will find that out 
quite soon. 
[Q] But isn't it true that Sergey Stepashin will be among those proposed 
for this post? 
[A] That's correct. 
[Q] But so far he hasn't responded? 
[A] A decision hasn't been made yet. 
[Q] I see. Finally, how well acquainted are you with the president's 
family? 
[A] Slightly. I have met his wife a few times, but I hardly know the 
other members of his family. 
[Q] So we can know something about you, can you tell us a few words 
about your own family. 
[A] I have a wife, two children -- two girls, one 13, one 14. 
[Q] They are studying somewhere here, are they? 
[A] Yes, they are studying in Moscow. 
[Q] What about hobbies? 
[A] Theirs or mine? 
[Q] Yours. 
[A] Sport, literature, and music. As far as sport is concerned, 
wrestling -- sambo and judo. 
[Q] Vladimir Vladimirovich, what do you think, at the preparations for 
the presidential elections, what sort of compromising materials can you 
expect as regards your candidature? 
[A] All kinds. Let's wait and see. I believe that it is wrong to live 
and expect any sort of compromising materials. One should act 
consistently and persistently, just like in the story books. If you look 
back, you freeze. One must never look back and stop. 
[Q] Vladimir Vladimirovich, if during the election campaign you come up 
against Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, who quite possibly also might take 
part in the presidential campaign - I know that you have quite good 
relations with him - and if so, will you be his rival on the battlefield? 
[A] I do indeed have great respect for Yevgeniy Maksimovich. I think he 
has done a great deal for his country throughout his working life, and I 
am sure that in any situation, especially if this depends on me, people 
like Primakov will be in great demand. 
[Q] There's a friendly joke going round - what do Primakov and the 
American Harrier fighter have in common? - Vertical take-off. Well, maybe 
they say the same could be said about you today 
[A] I don't think this applies to Primakov. He has been on the country's 
political scene a very long time. He was in the CPSU Central Committee, 
and he worked with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, he was head of the 
foreign intelligence services under him, where, as you know, I worked for 
some time. He worked in the Foreign Ministry. 
[Q] We know about him, yes. 
[A] So, he's a very intelligent man. 
[Q] And what if he wins? 
[A] Well, if an intelligent man wins, what's wrong with that? I would 
just like to wish him good health. 
[Q] Vladimir Vladimirovich, here is my very last question, simply to 
conclude what we started with. To sum up today's events. Today has been a 
day of events. Everything was most unexpected for a Monday morning. What 
is your personal impression? What made it necessary to carry out today's 
radical changes? 
[A] I have already replied to that question. 
[Q] Could you give a brief and succinct reply? 
[A] I do not think that a very brief and succinct reply can be given 
because these questions are too serious to be painted in just black or 
white. 
[Q] All the same, was the most important cause the forthcoming 
elections? 
[A] There are many important things. I can only repeat what I have 
already said. In my view the president reckoned that a change of 
government would somewhat alter the political situation, the 
configuration, the disposition of the political forces and this 
arrangement would accord better with making progress towards and holding 
normal elections to the State Duma and the election of the country's 
president. 
Let me repeat that all of this is taking place against the background of 
an intensified situation in the Caucasus - in essence there are combat 
operations going on there. As you know, until very recently I was the 
head of the Security Council which coordinated the activities of the 
power-wielding structures. Part of the responsibility lies with the 
government. Perhaps the president proceeded from the position that I 
would retain my possibilities in the Security Council and as head of the 
government would be able to concentrate the levers of power in my hands 
to make the actions of the federal authorities in these hot spots more 
effective. 
[Q] Thank you, Vladimir Vladimirovich. Let me remind you that I have 
been talking to Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. Since this morning he has 
been the acting head of the Russian government. Thank you for your 
attention. Goodbye. 

******