August
10, 1999
This Date's Issues: 3429 • 3430 •
3431
Johnson's Russia List
#3430
10 August 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Papers see Yeltsin selfish interest in PM change.
2. Boston Globe: David Filipov and Brian Whitmore, Yeltsin's 'family'
is seen behind latest move.
3. New York Times editorial: Russia's Parade of Prime Ministers.
4. Washington Post editorial: Prime Minister No. 5.
5. AFP: Former prisoners of Russia's Gulag still fight for recognition.
6. Financial Times: PUTIN: Another surprise gift. Boris Yeltsin's
appointment
of one more prime minister may not prevent him losing control, says
John Thornhill.
7. Ira Straus: Trends toward the break-up of Russia.
8. Rossiya: Nikonov on Post-Yeltsin Era.
*******
#1
Papers see Yeltsin selfish interest in PM change
By Adam Tanner
MOSCOW, Aug 10 (Reuters) - Russian newspapers agreed on Tuesday that
President Boris Yeltsin's sudden firing of Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin
was motivated by his own selfish interests rather than concern about
improving Russia's plight.
Some newspapers saw Yeltsin's motivation in naming Vladimir Putin as prime
minister and his preferred candidate for president as a move to protect his
inner circle of Kremlin advisers called ``The Family'' after his term ends
next year.
``Fired because of family complications'' was the top headline in the daily
Sevodnya.
The fear is that Yeltsin or his top advisers -- who include his daughter
Tatyana -- could face charges on anything from turning tanks on the
Soviet-era parliament in 1993 to financial improprieties while in power.
The question puzzling many newspapers was why Stepashin was sacked without
having committed any clear offence against Yeltsin.
``A dismissal out of the clear blue sky,'' a Noviye Izvestia headline said.
Later it wrote: ``In the record short 80 days of his government, he didn't
achieve anything good, but of course he didn't mess up anything either.''
The daily showed a cartoon of Yeltsin placing a crown on a puppet Putin and
declaring him Russia's president.
Some dailies gave details of the behind-the-scenes Kremlin manoeuvring that
led to Stepashin's ousting, a plan Putin said he and Stepashin learned about
last Thursday.
The leading financial daily Kommersant wrote that the trigger for Yeltsin's
unhappiness was the alliance between the Fatherland political bloc of his
rival, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, and the All Russia party of regional
leaders last Wednesday.
``The nightmare of the Kremlin's residence materialised: Fatherland joined up
with All Russia,'' it wrote.
``Stepashin was not only unable to oppose this,'' it said. ``But when the
Kremlin made a last desperate effort to advance Stepashin as the head of this
bloc, he retreated and announced that he would not join any political bloc.''
Kommersant said influential former Yeltsin aide Anatoly Chubais argued on
Thursday against firing Stepashin, causing delay. But the worsening of
tensions in the Caucasus region of Dagestan over the weekend appeared to
further weaken Stepashin's position.
``The change of the head of the White House from one military man to a
special serviceman could signify a change of Russia's position in the
Caucasus conflict,'' Kommersant wrote. ``Stepashin came out against playing
the military card to introduce a state of emergency to Russia.''
Several dailies homed in on Yeltsin's impetuous ways.
``The present authorities do not enjoy even minimal support from any layer of
society or government institutions, but in one matter or another they are
hostage to the moods of Boris Yeltsin,'' Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote.
A commentary in Sevodnya also raised the question of Yeltsin's health having
an impact on his actions.
``It is possible to explain the president's heightened impatience...on the
condition of his health, but let's leave that theme to medical professionals.
So far they are silent,'' Leonid Radzikhovsky wrote.
*******
#2
Boston Globe
10 August 1999
[for personal use only]
Yeltsin's 'family' is seen behind latest move
By David Filipov, Globe Staff and Brian Whitmore Globe Correspondent
MOSCOW - At first glance, Boris N. Yeltsin's latest government shakeup
makes as little sense as anything the erratic president has done.
But behind the scenes, Yeltsin's Kremlin entourage may have viewed
yesterday's move as a matter of life or death. And that, analysts said, is
the key to understanding the mercurial Russian leader, as time runs out on
his presidency.
Yeltsin yesterday fired Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, 47, a former
intelligence chief from St. Petersburg whose main political trait is his
loyalty to the Kremlin. Yeltsin replaced him with Vladimir Putin, 46, a
former intelligence chief from St. Petersburg whose main political trait is
his loyalty to the Kremlin.
Stepashin fell after the influential group of family members and Kremlin
insiders, known as ''The Family,'' apparently decided that they needed
someone tougher in the prime minister's office.
The trigger for Stepashin's dismissal appears to have been the alliance
announced last week between Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, a likely favorite in
next year's presidential elections, and a grouping of powerful regional
leaders.
This union poses a threat to the Kremlin's influence in shaping the 2000
presidential election, in which Yeltsin is barred from running for a third
term. ''The Family'' distrusts Luzhkov, and has been hoping to install a
successor who would preserve its position, and, it is said, to ensure its
immunity from prosecution by the next regime for outstanding corruption
charges.
Luzhkov's new alliance with the governors, who were once Yeltsin's allies,
made it clear that power was slipping away from the Kremlin. When word
leaked that Stepashin might join Luzhkov's alliance, the premier's fate was
all but sealed.
''The only explanation'' for the firing ''is Stepashin's inability or
unwillingness to protect the Kremlin's interests in dealing with Luzhkov,''
said Alexei Venediktov, news editor of Ekho Moskvy radio.
Even observers familiar with Yeltsin's penchant for unpredictable moves
expressed surprise that the Kremlin leader would risk plunging the country
into a new government crisis at a time when Moscow faces a standoff with
militants in southern Russia.
''This is 100 percent lunacy,'' said the Communist leader, Gennady
Zyuganov, a longtime Yeltsin rival.
''Madness is hard to explain,'' added Boris Nemtsov, leader of a pro-market
bloc and a former member of Yeltsin's Cabinet.
Analysts agreed that this time, Yeltsin had his own interests, rather than
those of the country, in mind.
''Yeltsin's team is concerned only with self-preservation and
self-interest,'' said Alan Rousso, director of the Carnegie Center in
Moscow. ''Unfortunately, they don't have a vision for the country, and this
is a clear sign that the country is adrift.''
By naming Putin his preferred candidate in the presidential elections,
Yeltsin, who is barred from running for a third term, has signaled the
Kremlin's willingness to fight for the country's most powerful office in
next year's elections.
But will it fight fair? Putin, a former KGB spy, is seen as much better at
pressuring regional leaders than Stepashin. As deputy head of Kremlin
administration, and more recently as director of the Federal Security
Service, Putin was not shy about opening criminal cases against
uncooperative elites in Russia's provinces.
''Putin's appointment can be seen as a message to the governors,'' said
Yuri Korgunyuk of the INDEM think tank.
Some analysts said the choice of Putin boosts the likelihood that the
Kremlin will try somehow to put off parliamentary elections, set for Dec.
19. Putin, they said, is more suited to carrying out a crackdown.
They also said that about Stepashin three months ago. Like his predecessor,
Putin spent his first day yesterday reassuring the press that he had no
plans to declare a state of emergency.
Another theory on Stepashin's firing is that he had become too popular.
Yeltsin is notorious for jealously guarding the prerogatives of his office.
Stepashin's recent trip to the United States received wide and favorable
television coverage here.
Stepashin's growing popularity had made him a viable presidential
candidate. Yeltsin does not like that. He fired Yevgeny Primakov in May and
Viktor Chernomyrdin last year for being too independent and popular.
But that raises doubts about Putin's potential as a candidate for
president. Will Yeltsin let his latest protege gain popularity? Or should
we ignore the talk?
''You shouldn't take the president's words to heart,'' said Nemtsov, once a
favorite to succeed Yeltsin. ''He says a lot of things in the heat of the
moment.''
*******
#3
New York Times
August 10, 1999
Editorial
Russia's Parade of Prime Ministers
These are strange and dispiriting times in Moscow. By sacking another Prime
Minister yesterday -- the fourth in the last 17 months -- Boris Yeltsin
invites parody at a moment when his country desperately needs stability.
Mr. Yeltsin and his evanescent governments seem increasingly irrelevant to
the lives of most Russians, a sorry picture for a man who did much to free
his nation from the stranglehold of Communism.
As Mr. Yeltsin heads into the final year of his presidency, he seems more
interested in finding a successor than a prime minister. Insuring that
Russia's next president is a democratic reformer is a laudable goal, if
that is Mr. Yeltsin's intent, but the way to get there is not by appointing
a succession of mediocre Prime Ministers. In picking them, Mr. Yeltsin
mistakes fealty for leadership and fails to recognize that such rapid
turnover in the Kremlin is likely to discredit anyone associated with him.
Mr. Yeltsin's latest selection, Vladimir Putin, shares some of the same
questionable qualifications as his immediate predecessors, Sergei
Stepashin, who lasted only three months, and Yevgeny Primakov, who served
for nine months. All three held senior positions in the Russian security
services that succeeded the Soviet K.G.B., organizations not known for
teaching the fine points of democracy. During the cold war Mr. Putin, who
is 46, worked as a top Russian security officer in Germany, and most
recently ran Russia's internal security service.
None of these men had experience in economic management when they were
appointed Prime Minister, making it difficult for them to devise programs
that might revive Russia's sinking economy. If Mr. Putin is confirmed by
the Communist-dominated Duma, he will have to move quickly to show the
International Monetary Fund that he is exercising budgetary restraint,
collecting taxes effectively and taking other steps to justify a new round
of lending.
Mr. Yeltsin's clumsy efforts to stage-manage the next presidential election
now leave Mr. Putin as his designated candidate in a likely field of far
more prominent, seasoned politicians. Other possible contenders include Mr.
Primakov; Yuri Luzhkov, the Mayor of Moscow; Gennadi Zyuganov, the
Communist Party leader, and Aleksandr Lebed, a former general who is now
Governor of a region in Siberia. So far the only prospective candidate with
strong democratic credentials is Grigory Yavlinsky, who has had difficulty
building a national base. It is hard to imagine how Mr. Putin, with no
experience in electoral politics and no organized party behind him, can
expect to compete for the presidency.
Mr. Yeltsin, enfeebled by heart problems and frequent bouts of pneumonia,
is more a subject of ridicule than respect in Russia. With Russian troops
once again engaged in military combat in the Caucasus region, this time
against several thousand Islamic militants, Russians can only wonder what
Mr. Yeltsin's next surprise will be.
*******
#4
Washington Post
10 August 1999
Editorial
Prime Minister No. 5
AN AILING AND shaky Boris Yeltsin, the Russian president, has now fired his
fourth prime minister in less than a year and a half and named a relatively
inexperienced and little-known bureaucrat, 46-year-old Vladimir Putin, as
his fifth. Mr. Yeltsin named him, too, as his choice to succeed him as
president -- elections are due in 2000 -- although the value of a Yeltsin
endorsement is at best dubious and other major contenders are both more
practiced in government and better equipped with a political base. In fact,
the designation of Mr. Putin is an impulsive move, based apparently less on
careful political calculation for the sake of governing than on desperate
political maneuver for the sake of holding on to power. With a career
centered on security and political-staff work, Mr. Putin seems at face
unready to justify his boss's presentation of him as "a man who in my
opinion is capable of uniting society, based on the broadest political
forces, to ensure the continuation of reforms in Russia."
To make matters worse, the latest purge in Moscow comes at a moment of an
ominous buildup of tensions in the Russian Caucasus Islamic republic of
Dagestan, neighbor and kin to Chechnya; the Chechens fought their way to
effective independence from Russia in the mid-'90s. A deepening rather than
a dampening of hostilities in Dagestan would, whatever its military
consequences, further strain the Russian political fabric. The country has
a weak central government and a loose grip on the rule of law, and is ill
fitted for another full-scale war in its Islamic hinterland. As if Russians
did not have enough neuralgic issues on their plate already: How the
Dagestan crisis plays out is likely to feed directly into the presidential
elections next July.
Just two weeks ago, Mr. Putin's predecessor was in Washington acting as
though he were a real prime minister and being gratefully accepted as the
worthy interlocutor that is Washington's recurrent desire no matter what
regime rules in Moscow. Bill Clinton, like other American presidents, is
regularly accused of getting too close to whoever sits in the Kremlin. But
there is business to be done -- drawing Russia further into arms control,
for instance -- and anyway the right mix of engagement and detachment can
serve the larger American purpose of accustoming Russia to democratic ways.
Mr. Yeltsin, a vigorous spokesman for reform, needs to be encouraged to
implement his rhetorical commitments to it. Here Russia's Western banks
have a responsibility and a role.
*******
#5
Former prisoners of Russia's Gulag still fight for recognition
VORKUTA, Russia, Aug 10 (AFP) - Ten years after the last Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev pledged to reveal all about the atrocities committed by his
notorious predecessor, the victims of Josef Stalin are still fighting for
recognition.
But at Vorkuta on the Arctic Circle, centre of the network of prison camps
made famous by Alexander Solzhenitsyn as the Gulag archipelago, memories of
the Stalin era are fading fast.
The numbers of ex-prisoners who survived hard labour in the Vorkuta mines
from the beginning of the 1930s after being arbitrarily condemned as
traitors, Trotskyites and other "enemies of the people" are shrinking.
The association Memorial, founded in March 1991, just before the break-up of
the Soviet Union, has the self-appointed task of establishing the historical
truth of Stalin's crimes and their recognition as crimes against humanity.
According to Memorial some 200,000 prisoners, known as zeks, died in the
camps surrounding Vorkuta, out of more than two million deported between 1932
and 1954.
"The mortality rate of Vorkuta was not high because the aim was not to
liquidate the prisoners but use them as cheap labour in the mines," explained
Vitaly Troshin, the president of Memorial.
But tens of thousands of others died building the railway line to Vorkuta,
and it is said that bones can still be found along the tracks.
Some 50,000 foreigners have been identified of the most diverse
nationalities, including a black American, among those buried here.
Tens of thousands of Poles were sent to Vorkuta after half of their country
came under Soviet rule following the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939, along with
residents of the Baltic states annexed by Moscow in 1940.
Other inmates were many Russians who made the mistake of being captured
during the conflicts with Finland and in World War II. Immediately suspect,
they were despatched to the camps on their release.
Each pit had its corresponding camp, now replaced by a mining village. But
despite the remains of the barbed wire, many of today's miners do not know
that hundreds of their predecessors lie buried close to their workplace, and
fewer care.
"It's all in the past," said Vorkuta's mayor Igor Shpektor. "There's a new
generation which does not even know about World War II, and is anyway more
concerned with the problems of modern life."
The camps and Stalinist repression "carry no political weight at the moment",
a local journalist commented.
Living history remains in the shape of residents like Olga Petrovna, 89, who
was sentenced to ten years in the mines and on the railway in 1938. At the
end of her sentence, she chose to remain in Vorkuta rather than return to her
native Leningrad, now Saint Petersburg.
"When the old generation has gone, the young won't bother about all this,"
she said.
Troshin, 52, the son of a victim of Stalinism and an architect by profession,
has decided to concentrate Memorial's efforts on the children of Vorkuta and
their teachers.
He would like to organise summer camps for teenagers from other parts of
Russia, combining leisure activities such as fishing, hunting and
berry-picking with showing what remains of the dark side of Russia's history.
"Someone with no history has no future either," he said.
*******
#6
Financial Times
10 August 1999
[for personal use only]
PUTIN: Another surprise gift
Boris Yeltsin's appointment of one more prime minister may not prevent him
losing control, says John Thornhill
Boris Yeltsin has not remained faithful to many guiding principles in his
time as Russian president. But if his behaviour has often been erratic, he
has at least achieved consistency in two ways. In eight years at the helm, he
has invariably proved both impulsive and ruthless.
Mr Yeltsin has repeatedly acted first and rationalised later - as he himself
admitted when he signed the Belovezhsky Woods agreement in 1991 to dissolve
the Soviet Union. "Perhaps I did not completely fathom the prospects opening
up before me, but I felt in my heart that such decisions must be taken
easily," he wrote in his memoirs.
So perhaps Mr Yeltsin was only being predictably unpredictable in sacking
Sergei Stepashin yesterday as his prime minister and appointing Vladimir
Putin in his place. Mr Stepashin, who was steadfastly loyal to Mr Yeltsin
throughout the 1990s and was widely touted as a potential presidential
candidate, nonetheless seemed devastated by the decision as he stood before
his cabinet colleagues trying to explain his own dismissal.
It was not only Mr Stepashin who was left stumbling for words. The
politicians canvassed for their views by the Echo Moskvy radio station
yesterday morning seemed equally lost for rational explanations. Boris
Nemtsov, the former governor of Nizhny Novgorod and a leader of the liberal
Just Cause movement, said Mr Yeltsin's action was "complete madness" and
could have alarming repercussions.
The decision would further discredit the authority of the federal government,
weaken the institutions of the state, strengthen the support of the
Communists in December's parliamentary elections and undermine Russia's
reputation abroad.
"I consider that this is a terrible mistake of the president," said Mr
Nemtsov, claiming that Mr Stepashin could have evolved into a worthy
successor to Mr Yeltsin.
Mr Stepashin appeared to have done a perfectly competent job as prime
minister since his appointment in May. In his 90 days in office, the
unflappable, bespectacled former interior minister had helped neutralise the
political passions provoked by the sacking of his predecessor, Yevgeny
Primakov. He concluded an agreement with the International Monetary Fund that
triggered the gradual release of a fresh $4.5bn credit. Mr Stepashin had also
begun to make a favourable impression in the international arena, making
successful trips to Sarajevo and Washington. His opinion poll ratings, which
were negligible when he was appointed, were rising slowly but steadily.
But these considerations counted for nothing when set against Mr Yeltsin's
apparent gut instinct that Mr Stepashin was not tough or worthy enough to be
considered as a presidential contender. Instead, Mr Yeltsin has opted for Mr
Putin, who remains for most Russians little more than a blur. Even Mr
Yeltsin's closest advisers seemed stunned by the decision.
In a television address to the nation, Mr Yeltsin praised Mr Putin's
competence and experience as deputy mayor of St Petersburg, head of the FSB -
the domestic arm of the former KGB security service - and secretary of the
security council. Mr Yeltsin said he believed Mr Putin would make a sound
prime minister.
"I am sure that he [Putin] will be very useful to the country working in this
post and the citizens of Russia will be able to assess Putin's business and
human qualities," Mr Yeltsin said. "I have confidence in him. And I want
those who go to the polls next July to be confident in him as well and make
their choice. I think he has enough time to show himself."
Despite Mr Yeltsin's optimism, the average Russian in Red Square may find it
almost impossible to distinguish between Mr Stepashin and Mr Putin, who are
both in their late 40s and are - or were - close friends. Both men appear to
be colourless bureaucrats, with no readily discernible ideological views, who
have spent most of their political lives flitting between the security
services and public office.
Mr Putin was born in Leningrad - now St Petersburg - in 1952, and graduated
from the city university law faculty in 1975. Like many of the brightest
intellects of his generation, Mr Stepashin was snapped up by the KGB and went
on to work as a spy in Germany. This aspect of his past may irritate German
politicians when it comes to discussing the write-off of part of Russia's
Soviet-era debt.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, Mr Putin quickly moved into the orbit of
Anatoly Sobchak, the St Petersburg mayor, who was then one of the rising
stars of Russia's democratic movement. But in 1996 Anatoly Chubais, then head
of the presidential administration, invited Mr Putin to Moscow, where he
worked as deputy to Pavel Borodin, the manager of the presidential office.
In less than a year, Mr Putin was promoted to deputy head of the presidential
administration. In July 1998, he was named head of the FSB. Like Mr
Stepashin, Mr Putin developed a reputation for being privately liberal and
publicly hawkish. But unlike Mr Stepashin, Mr Putin has built no political
base outside the narrow presidential clique, and is more or less unknown to
the general public.
Mikhail Gorny, a director of the Strategiya political institute in St
Petersburg, says Mr Putin is remembered as an effective administrator when he
worked alongside Mr Sobchak but made no startling impression. "Putin is not a
simple guy. Like all those from his background, he is a clever and cunning
man. But I do not see why Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin] will be any better a
prime minister than Sergei Vadimovich [Stepashin]," Mr Gorny says.
However, Mr Yeltsin seems to believe that Mr Putin may succeed where Mr
Stepashin failed in realigning the political configuration in the country
ahead of the parliamentary elections in December, and the presidential
elections in July. The Russian president appears to have been incensed that a
group of powerful regional governors, belonging to the All Russia movement,
defied the Kremlin's wishes last week and joined forces with the Fatherland
movement headed by Yuri Luzhkov, Moscow's ambitious mayor.
This coalition, which now seems intent on signing up Mr Primakov, the popular
former prime minister, threatens to dominate the centre ground of Russia and
to marginalise Mr Yeltsin and his entourage in the forthcoming electoral
season. "Stepashin failed Yeltsin in the most significant task of
consolidating a support base for a peaceful transition of Yeltsin's regime
into the 21st century," says Boris Makarenko, deputy director of the Centre
for Political Technologies, a Moscow-based political think-tank. "Stepashin
failed to become leader of this new political bloc."
Mr Putin is hardly likely to win over Russia's independent-minded governors
by the force of his personality. But he does have a reputation as a far
tougher operator than Mr Stepashin. While working in the presidential
administration, Mr Putin headed the control department, which managed the
Kremlin's relations with Russia's 89 regions, often by fairly brutal means.
Mr Yeltsin may consider Mr Putin just the man to pull the unruly governors
back into line when they assemble in Moscow at the end of August for a
meeting with the president.
The Kremlin entourage, which has been steadily amassing more control over the
media, may also believe that it can turn Mr Putin into a viable presidential
candidate by emphasising his relative youth and "tough guy" credentials. Some
of the influential oligarchs who backed Mr Yeltsin's re-election campaign in
1996 appear to believe they wield enough influence over media organisations
to get anyone of their choosing elected.
But independent political observers suggest that Mr Putin has almost no
chance of winning the presidential elections in anything approximating a free
and fair fight. "Yeltsin can conceive of Putin as his successor, but I do not
see any possibility that Putin can succeed Yeltsin as a popularly elected
president," says Mr Makarenko. "Yeltsin does not understand that the issue of
deciding the outcome of the next presidential election is already beyond his
control."
Mr Makarenko fears that, once this realisation dawns on the Kremlin
entourage, it may well be tempted to resort to extra-constitutional means to
preserve its power and privilege. The groundwork for such moves already
appears to have been laid. In recent weeks, the Kremlin has been pushing the
idea that Russia might merge with neighbouring Belarus.
There has been speculation in the Russian media that this could be used to
create a new state and a new constitution and allow the postponement of next
year's presidential elections. Alternatively, a state of emergency might be
declared in Russia because of the deteriorating situation in the north
Caucasus. Last week, Moslem militants crossed from Chechnya into Dagestan and
occupied four mountain villages, prompting a build-up of federal forces in
the region.
Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist party, which remains the
country's strongest political force, is convinced Russia is witnessing the
"death pangs" of the Yeltsin regime. But he claims it is completely improper
for Mr Yeltsin to appoint his successor.
"In general, Yeltsin rolled the country back 50 years and now he is trying to
turn it back to the Middle Ages. It is only monarchies that name heirs. In
democratic countries the sovereign power resides with the people," Mr
Zyuganov says.
There is an irony here. When Mr Yeltsin came to power in 1991 it was he who
was teaching the discredited Communist party about the meaning of democracy.
But the revived Communist party is now - with some justice - lecturing Mr
Yeltsin on the same subject as he prepares to depart the political stage. If
he had stuck to his original principles, he would be less vulnerable to such
criticism. But that would not be Boris Yeltsin.
*******
#7
From: IRASTRAUS@aol.com (Ira Straus)
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 1999
Subject: Trends toward the break-up of Russia
JRL has in the last few days carried a number of pieces on trends toward the
break-up of Russia, and on how it's getting blamed on the U.S.
Boris Kagarlitsky has shown on JRL how the logic of the political struggle in
Moscow is pushing inexorably toward the further empowerment of the regions
and the collapse of central authority. This is due to the conditions of an
already overly-weak center and overly powerful regional authorities who are
well-practiced in rigging votes. Up-and-coming politicians have to appeal to
the regional bosses for support. The result, he concludes, is to strengthen
the regions in each round of elections -- catastrophically so, to the point
of break-up in each round of change of leaders, as when Yeltsin replaced
Gorbachev.
Another article cited movements that are seeking the independence of all
Islamic areas in the Caucasus, and that wish to establish Islamic law and are
connected with terrorist and kidnapping rings. Sergei Stepashin himself, in
his last day as Prime Minister, said that Russia might be losing Dagestan at
this very moment.
Maskhadov of Chechnya blamed America for fanning the secessionists in the
Caucasus. So did a Russian official in another article. And Paul Goble
speculated on the motivations for those who have been pretending that it is
America's fault. He concluded that, since outside fanning of ethnic disputes
can indeed be an essential factor in stimulating them to become vicious and
interminable, the Russians are anxious to scare the West off from interfering.
My guess is that Russia is not going to break up in the current political
cycle; but that Kagarlitsky is right to the extent that it is likely to
suffer further erosion of central authority from the dynamics of regional
assertiveness in this cycle of elections; which in turn would lay the grounds
for a considerable likelihood of a break-up further down the road, perhaps in
the next cycle when similar dynamics could again prevail.
All this ought to be alarming to Americans, on two levels:
I. A break-up of Russia would be very dangerous to Western and American
interests. This would be true not only of secessions in the Caucasus under
Islamist banners, but of an overall break-up of Russia, which would mean
a) the loss of a fairly coherent Russian national loyalty and state tradition
in favor of local-regional states with no legitimacy or deep loyalty or
stability of borders, but only some recently-brewed half-baked folklore to
shore them up;
b) an incoherent division of the country's nuclear infrastructure and
scientific facilities and of their loyalties; and
c) the triumph of local resource-controlling and patronage-controlling
patrimonial regimes, much like those that came to power in the Republics of
the former Yugoslavia when it was breaking up; destroying even the weak
elements of a national market that exist today.
II. If all this were not dangerous enough for the West, it is even more
immediately dangerous for the United States that people are blaming us for
the whole problem.
Our government PR people in the State Department and the former USIA ought to
be massively engaged in dispelling the impression that we're trying to break
up the country. The Russians are really going to hate us, after all, if they
go on thinking we are trying to break up their country -- especially if their
country really does break up. Our diplomats, who represent our country's good
name abroad, ought to be actively concerned about this.
The best way to dispel the impression is to undertake policies genuinely
supportive of central authority in Russia. The other way is for our
representatives and our PR people to be willing to speak out unambiguously in
support of central authority in Russia.
Ironically, all these dangers of break-up are growing in Russia just at a
moment when a Southern secessionist party has been formed in the U.S. Yep,
we've got a new party in America -- it held its founding convention just in
the last week -- which has explicitly taken up anew the good ol' cause of the
Confederacy. (And it has done this with good post-1960s Republican Revolution
rhetoric. Somehow they kept a straight face while saying that they're acting
for the cause of liberty; never mind that they were talking in the same
breath about the good ol' homogeneity of their Southern National tradition,
which, to someone not blinded by decentralist rhetoric, might call to mind
the days when the states had the power to enforce homogeneity and when
minorities were suppressed forthrightly.) We suffered from the secessionist
disease here, too, a century and two score years ago. We know from bitter
experience how much damage it can do.
America is in fact against the new secessionism in Russia. It has spoken out
against it, it has fretted over the dangers of it, and it has leaned over
backwards to support Russia against it in the case of Chechnya. But it gets
no credit for this; partly because we've been lack the theoretical and
rhetorical languages needed for taking pride in our support for central
authority in Russia, and so we never advertise our support effectively;
partly because we are inconsistent in other aspects of our policies.
It is indeed manipulative, as Goble say, to blame all the successionism on
America. In many cases this is done maliciously, not just out of pragmatic
calculations about the need to warn off the West from encouraging
secessionism, but as a way of projecting blame and rallying nationalist
sentiment against the Western devil. Nevertheless, it is not merely
manipulative; nor is it merely false. There are some serious reasons, both
psychological and logical, why Russians are blaming America for the trends
that favor break-up:
1) The overall condition surrounding the break-up trends is a condition of
Western triumph and Russian prostration; and sometimes of Western
triumphalism and Russian humiliation.
2) NATO is in fact surrounding Russia with its involvement in areas ranging
from Central Asia and the Caucasus to the Balkans to the Baltics (to which
Strobe Talbott a couple weeks ago virtually promised NATO membership soon). ,
this naturally looks to Russians like a hostile "encirclement", and it gets
described as such in their media. There isn't much other way they could view
it, since by now nearly everyone has given up on Russia ever joining NATO --
except, ironically, Zbigniew Brzezinsky, who has begun to make a serious
point about the need for it. (Alas, Russians derive no solace from that.
Rather they have feared and hated Brzezinski as Public Enemy No. 1 ever since
his other comments favoring a break-up of Russia into a loose confederation,
and they won't take any advice from him, good or bad. Which shows just how
damaging it can be to come to be perceived as one who is trying to break up
the country.) In particular, NATO is described as "moving into" these areas
that broke away from the former Soviet Union, and as trying to "expel"
Russian influence from these areas. It seems to follow that NATO could be
expected also to "move into" areas that would break away from the Russian
Federation. The Bush Administration, to be sure, had spoken out against the
break-up of the Soviet Union, but did nothing effective to prevent it or to
help make Gorbachev's reform regime viable; and afterwards the West quickly
"discovered" its interest in the independence of the post-Soviet states and
started "moving into" them. The West is expected to do the same regarding the
break-up of the Russian Federation.
3) Western penetration of Russia has been very deep since the late 1980s. The
West has also put an increasing emphasis in recent years on developing
political and economic links with the regions. Proponents of this approach
often use a language that downgrades Moscow, and leaves an impression of
preferring to by-pass the center, which isn't so "easy" anymore, when dealing
with the regions. It seems natural for Russians to assume that the West
recognizes the strategic value of its penetration of Russia, and to believe
that the West in turn assumes that a further weakening and break-up of Russia
would reinforce that penetration, by rendering the remnants of Russia further
susceptible to and dependent on the West.
4) Americans have constantly been preaching decentralization in Russia. This
preaching is, to be sure, always done in the name of a better and ultimately
stronger federal system in Russia. But in practice, what it comes down to in
this era is a constant harping on the theme of decentralizing. This is
strangely one-sided. Coming in a Russia where de facto decentralization has
already gone dangerously too far (despite some residual spheres of excessive
centralization), this has a curious ring to it. To a trained ear, it often
sounds closer to the Antifederalists of the 1780s than to the genuine
American Federalism.
In America itself, to be sure, the American Federal Union is deeply
entrenched, and all the waves of Antifederalist rhetoric and Southern
secessionist parties can't do more than peripheral damage (and occasionally
can even spur a few valid reforms). But in Russia, this kind of preaching,
carried out in the false name of representing the principles of American
success, can do serious damage.
Russia is a country that is psychologically vulnerable and is in process of
re-forming itself. The constant drumbeat of demands for decentralization in
Russia has encouraged attitudes of chipping away from Federal authority and
strengthening the centrifugal capabilities and tendencies of the regions.
Development of links with Russian regions can have the same effect -- if it
is done in a manner that encourages the confidence of regional power
structures vis-a-vis Moscow. Russians, conspiratorial-minded as they are,
assume that the negative consequences are intentional and the goodwill is
just rhetoric.
America needs to reflect on the unintended consequences of its decentralist
rhetoric and practices. It needs to reconsider the habit of exporting its
careless rhetoric and prejudices instead of its sounder mainstream practices
and traditions. And it needs to consider major remedial action to repair its
reputation in Moscow as an upholder not an undertaker of the unity of Russia.
Ira Straus
Senior Associate,
Program on Transitions to Democracy,
The George Washington University
U.S. Coordinator,
Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO
www.fas.org/man/nato/ceern
*******
#8
Nikonov on Post-Yeltsin Era
Rossiya
30 July 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Contribution to debate of V. Nikonov, president of the Politika
Foundation, prepared by Tatyana Tsyba: "Will There Be Life in Russia
After Yeltsin?"
Very many analysts and politicians are asking
themselves this question at this time. The answer to it would seem to me
to be very important. It is possible to speak of a free democratic state
when the first free elections have been held there or when a democratic
constitution has been adopted, only when the most crucial frontier--the
constitutional law-based transition of power from one institution to
another, from one party to another--has been negotiated. Only then may a
country with every justification be called democratic. This frontier has
been crossed by all countries of East Europe and very many states of the
CIS, it has been negotiated by Russia and a whole number of neighboring
countries. Thus on 23 July of the year 2000, when the second circle of
presidential elections is to take place, it will be ascertained whether
we are living in a democratic state.
Why does the question: "Will there be a post-Yeltsin era" arise at all?
Not only on account of the rumors agitating society but also because of
the actions of the Kremlin, which is affording grounds for the most
diverse suspicions. The present Kremlin leadership, called the Family in
common parlance, took shape as a single whole in the period of the
campaign battles of 1996. The activity of the Kremlin at that time was
connected with monopoly control of almost unlimited information,
administrative, and financial resources, which were thrown into Boris
Yeltsin's reelection. On the threshold of the new cycle the Kremlin is
attempting to impose monopoly control over the campaign situation. A
policy of clearing the political field lest the independent forces that
emerge in it spoil the grass of the Kremlin lawn has been adopted.
Maximization of power, maximization of influence--this is the basic
instinct of any politician, any public institution, and they can hardly
be blamed for this.
The question lies elsewhere: what is the purpose of this instinct? Are
there alternative centers of influence and institutions capable of
preserving political pluralism? Does this central institution intend to
observe democratic standards, maintain stability, and stage democratic
elections? The status quo that existed until recently under Primakov
obviously did not suit the Kremlin, which at some point in time had begun
to give way to alternative centers of power. It is paradoxical, but it is
the machinery of state, which is the guarantor of stability and the
constitution, that is prepared to act the part of principal destabilizing
factor and to provoke a political crisis. The communists and the mayor of
Moscow cannot really be seriously suspected of a capacity for exploding
the situation. This is without doubt within the power only of the
president, and he has shown this capacity constantly, putting the country
in a feverish state by his reshuffles of premiers. Any of the options of
a way out of the crisis that are being discussed at this time, be it the
dismissal of the latest chairman of the government, the dissolution of
the Duma, a ban on the Communist Party, and the cancellation or
postponement of the elections, may be realized only by the president, and
no one else. The work on the clearing of the political field that is
being performed by the Kremlin is truly titanic. It began with the
dismissals of Skuratov and Primakov and has since then continued at an
accelerated pace. Considerable success has been achieved in marshaling
into a single file financial flows, the government and power structures,
and the most important television channels.
But no end to the work on eradicating the uncontrolled centers of
influence is yet in sight. Vyakhirev and Gazprom, Luzhkov's Moscow group,
and Vladimir Gusinskiy's Media-MOST holding company simply cannot be
uprooted in the economic field. Nor, in the power field, can officers of
the law enforcement authorities anxious about the law. Things are even
more complicated on the political front, where Primakov, Luzhkov,
Yavlinskiy, and the not always dutiful governors are only strengthening.
Recent weeks have brought us attempts to oust Vyakhirev from Gazprom and
to discredit Gusinskiy, a fight with Luzhkov on all fronts, the family
front included, and so forth. And we're not through yet, it would seem.
Going on his latest vacation, Boris Nikolayevich left us all completely
ignorant as to the Kremlin's future political plans. The president's
actions, the texts that have been read out as of late, and his remarks
have been characterized as very uncertain. Elections will be held or they
will not, Stepashin will be removed or he will not, the Communist Party
will be banned or it will not. The imposition of a state of emergency as
a result of the exacerbation of the situation in the North Caucasus is
being cited increasingly often as grounds for cancellation of the
elections. Yeltsin has asked the power ministers to keep things from
reaching the point of war, but war is not obligatory for a state of
emergency. The president has made a habit of discussing the upcoming
parliamentary elections with the leadership of the security services and
the Ministry of Defense. I can imagine what would happen in America, for
example, were President Clinton to go to consider the progress of
preparation for future parliamentary and presidential elections to the
FBI or the Defense Department. I believe that the press and the public
would be on their guard. In the West and democratic countries it is
believed that it is parties that should be involved in elections, the
power structures stay out of politics.
A state of emergency, analysts believe, could arise in response to a
ban on the Communist Party and a retaliatory step on the part of the
communists. It is impossible to ban the left electorate, which would
still with great enthusiasm support any party that simply raises the red
flag. Parties represented in parliament are not banned in democratic
countries, there are civilized ways of influencing the political process
there.
The creation of a union with Belarus is being speeded up. The
legalization of what is in principle the harmless idea of performing the
"Milosevic scenario," he having become head of Yugoslavia when his
presidential term in Serbia came to an end, makes the actual idea
ambiguous. What are we actually doing: uniting with Belarus or extending
President Yeltsin's term?
So what, for all that, is the answer to the question of whether there
will be a post-Yeltsin era. And what is the answer to the question of
when will the post-Yeltsin era begin? I shall venture to say that it will
begin in year's time. Because the scenario of cancellation of the
presidential elections is practically infeasible, in my view. In order to
take advantage for this of a union with Belarus it is essential, at a
minimum, to create a single federative state. The Russian leadership, not
to mention the leaders of the republics within the Russian Federation, is
not ready for this. Even less does this idea warm the heart of the
Belarusian elite, which has absolutely no desire to be dissolved in the
Russian elite. The elite may be broken only by one man--Alyaksandr
Lukashenka personally. But for this he needs guarantees, at a minimum, of
the position of Russian vice president, and this is hardly acceptable to
the Kremlin.
Yeltsin himself at this time lacks a presidential approval rating. Ninety
percent of voters unequivocally deny him their support. Consequently,
union with Belarus is no solution for him. He would not be elected the
next president. The scenario of exacerbation of the situation, when a
state of emergency, in which elections are not held, is introduced, is
simpler, it would seem. But it should not be forgotten that the
introduction of a state of emergency is the prerogative not of the
president alone but of the Federation Council also. The governors would
have to have extremely compelling reasons to assent to such a scenario.
The logic of the senators hardly coincides with that of the Kremlin. Nor
would the scenario of the Federal Assembly's consent to a simultaneous
postponement of the parliamentary and presidential elections being
obtained wash either. The Duma could not be persuaded to extend the
president's term in exchange for an extension of its own term, granted
all the cynicism of our corps of deputies. Could the results of the
elections theoretically be voided after they have taken place? This would
not work in practice either because the legitimacy of the former power
after presidential elections that have been held and the capacity for
influencing the situation in the country would have diminished to zero.
The international context of the election campaign in a year's time is
important also. The West, which earlier closed its eyes to the
quasi-constitutional actions of the president, would on no account on
this occasion support a postponement of the elections, were any of the
scenarios that I have mentioned above to be implemented. I still have
faith in Yeltsin's democratic instincts. He would not want to complete
his rule, whose main achievement is the establishment of many democratic
norms, with a clearly undemocratic action.
So although it is also very hard to imagine Yeltsin retiring, we will
in a year's time, all the same, know the name of the new president. What
name will this be? Only three show through at this time--Primakov,
Luzhkov, and the person occupying the premiership at the time of the
elections. Hardly anyone else. We have exactly a year to wait.
*******
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