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CDI Library > Johnson's Russia List

Johnson's Russia List
 

 

July 4, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3378  3379

Johnson's Russia List
#3379
4 July 1999
davidjohnson@erols.co

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Washington Post: Fred Hiatt, Yeltsin the Democrat? (DJ: Read this
very important piece. Progress in Washington!)

2. AFP: Leading Russian financial paper sold to foreign investor.
(Kommersant).

3. The Independent (UK): Phil Reeves, Diplomats warned off Y2K Russia.
4. Itar-Tass: Army Support Movement Eyes Cprf Voters in Duma Elections.
5. Itar-Tass: Aksyonenko Predicts Hard Comeback to Power for Communists.
6. Jerry Hough: Re: 3376-Ermarth/Merry.
7. World Socialist Web Site: Patrick Richter, The struggle for Caspian oil, 
the crisis in Russia and the breakup of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States.

8. Rossiyskaya Gazeta : Humanitarian Aid Faces Problems in Russia.
9. CNN: War in Yugoslavia was wake-up call for Russian military.
10. Stratfor commentary: U.S. Wants No Surprises. (re Russia and
Kosovo).] 


******

#1
The Washington Post
4 July 1999
[for personal use only]
Yeltsin the Democrat?
By Fred Hiatt (hiattf@washpost.com)
The writer is a member of the editorial page staff. 

In its eagerness to get relations with Russia back on track, the Clinton 
administration is playing down what may be the biggest threat to the 
relationship's long-term health -- the possibility that Boris Yeltsin will 
trample on his constitution to keep himself in the Kremlin.

Russia is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in December and to elect 
Yeltsin's successor next July, when his second -- and, legally, final -- term 
expires. That July 2000 vote should be a historic moment, the first time one 
Russian leader will be peacefully exchanged for another as an expression of 
the people's will.

But Moscow already is having a bad case of transition jitters. There's 
increasing speculation that Yeltsin will engineer a reunion between Russia 
and the former Soviet republic of Belarus. The newly born nation naturally 
would need a new constitution; that could give Yeltsin a constitutional fig 
leaf to extend his rule.

Yeltsin fed this rumor when, in a recent interview with the German magazine 
Der Spiegel, he hailed a possible union as "rooted in the community of the 
historic fates and the friendship between our peoples." Preposterously, given 
that Belarus is led by a Soviet-style strongman, Yeltsin also proclaimed that 
union is a step "taken of their own free will by the states and peoples."

The other conspiracy theory whipping through Moscow these days envisions 
Yeltsin banning the Communist Party. He fed this one, too, when he publicly 
chastised his justice minister for not reining in "extremists" such as the 
Communists.

Given that the Communists operate legally and with considerable popular 
support, a ban would constitute a devastating blow to democracy. But, the 
theory goes, it might weaken Yeltsin's opposition enough to allow him to 
install a reliable successor as president. Or -- to take the conspiracy 
theory one heated step forward -- a ban would elicit such a violent reaction 
that Yeltsin could call in his troops to restore order and then cancel next 
summer's presidential election in the name of stability.

Moscow is never free of such rumors, and most of the time they come to 
nothing. Some of Yeltsin's closest advisers urged him to cancel the 1996 
presidential election at a time when he seemed sure to lose, but he chose to 
battle it out instead.

This time around, too, Yeltsin may have no doubts about letting democracy 
take its course. He may be talking up union with Belarus to co-opt a 
nationalist issue, with no intention to follow through. He may be rattling 
the Communists just to keep them off guard, to remind Russia that he remains 
a player despite his varied illnesses -- or simply because rattling 
Communists is one of his favorite sports.

Still, there are reasons to worry that Yeltsin or his entourage might be more 
tempted this time to commit foul play. The current frontrunner for the 2000 
election is Moscow's mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, whose cheery smile fools no one 
into doubting that he would crush any opponent if doing so proved convenient.

In early 1996, Yeltsin seemed sure to lose to another implacable foe, but at 
least he had a candidate: himself. Today his camp's hope is the current 
occupant of the prime minister's chair, but to most Russian voters Sergei 
Stephashin isn't much more than that -- current occupant. Unlike Nelson 
Mandela, in other words, Yeltsin has no loyal successor and no loyal 
political party to ensure that his legacy will be respected.

And Yeltsin and his entourage have to worry about more than whether Russia 
builds statues of him as father of the nation. Already, Russia's 
procurator-general has been delving into reported corruption close to Yeltsin 
himself. Yeltsin keeps trying to fire this investigator, and the parliament 
keeps insisting that he remain. The day Yeltsin leaves office, this standoff 
will end. Bank accounts, dachas, even personal freedom -- nothing will be 
guaranteed.

The logical response to this dilemma is to begin establishing civilized rules 
of transition and to treat opposition figures with some respect. It should be 
obvious that the alternative -- trying to engineer a legal coup -- would be a 
disaster. Yeltsin's popularity rating hovers around 2 percent, with a margin 
of error that puts him into possible negative territory. The military would 
not likely rally to his defense. The West, including the Clinton 
administration, would not stick with him.

All this should be obvious, but it may not be. And that is where the 
administration has to enter the picture. Senior administration officials 
understand that almost no possible successor could be worse for Russia and 
for U.S.-Russia relations than a disruption in the democratic process -- not 
the nationalist Mayor Luzhkov, not the retired general Alexander Lebed, not 
the Communist Gennady Zyuganov.

But they are not communicating this to Moscow. On the contrary, when national 
security adviser Sandy Berger calls the most recent Clinton-Yeltsin meeting 
"one of the best" and describes Yeltsin -- who every Russian knows is bloated 
and ailing -- as "very much in charge" and "very forceful," he feeds the 
Russian perception that America values the Bill-Boris friendship above all. 
That's a misperception, and the administration needs to say so, very 
forcefully.

******

#2
Leading Russian financial paper sold to foreign investor
MOSCOW, July 3 (AFP) - Rumors that Russia's premier
financial daily was about to be bought out by the country's most notorious
oligarch were scotched Saturday when the paper's new owner was revealed.

American Capital Investment Fund, owned by a British citizen of Iranian
descent, has purchased a controlling share of the Kommersant Publishing
House, which publishes the newspaper Kommersant, news agencies reported.

Rumors had circulated for weeks that millionaire tycoon Boris Berezovsky
had designs on the paper, which along with Kommersant's several other
financial and political publications is the favorite of Russia's monied elite.

"As far as Berezovsky's role goes, there certainly were a lot of rumors on
that subject, but so far I haven't heard any confirmation of those rumors,"
former Kommersant shareholder Boris Kaskov told Moscow's Ekho Moskvy radio
station.

The new owner was identified by Russian agencies as Kia Jurabchian who,
Kaskov said, was expected to arrive in Moscow from Istanbul on Sunday to
outline editorial policy.

The Kommersant House was previously owned by its founder, journalist
Vladimir Yakovlev, who plans to accept the post of vice president of
international relations under the paper's new owner, according to Interfax.

News agencies differed on the terms of the deal signed in the United States
on Saturday, citing share percentages varying from 76 to 85 percent, but
all reported that Yakovlev's controlling package had gone to American Capital.

Kommersant revolutionized the Russian media with its appearance in the
mid-1990s, marking a significant departure from Soviet-style journalism to
fact-based reporting and an emphasis on objectivity.

Despite its powerhouse position on the market, the company ran into extreme
financial difficulties following last year's national financial collapse,
making it less attractive to foreign investors who increasingly shied away
from Russia as high-risk.

But the paper would have been a cheap and profitable purchase for a
media-controlling financier in Russia seeking to expand political influence
ahead of upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.

Berezovsky, a one-time presidential insider who is reputed to have made a
fortune out of oil and airline holdings, has recently entered the media
market, acquiring a controlling package of the TV-6 television station.

Kaskov, slightly contradicting himself in the same radio interview, said
that Berezovsky had indeed made a bid for the paper, but that the American
Fund offer was preferable to Yakovlev, who has reportedly been living in
Florida for the last several years.

American Capital has no experience investing in the media or in Russia but
"specializes in risky investments in unstable countries," according to Kaskov.

The new owners plan to retain most of the paper's editors, including
Editor-in-Chief Raf Shakirov, according to Kaskov, who agreed to give up
his shares in the company in a separate deal with Yakovlev.

The new owners expect to produce significant growth in the company "within
one and half to two years" with the goal of eventually reselling at a
higher price, said Kaskov.

Kaskov said the sale of the controlling share was made on the initiative of
Yakovlev.

The remaining percentage will stay in the hands of the company's third
shareholder, Leonid Miloslavsky. 

******

#3
The Independent (UK)
4 July 1999
[for personal use only]
Diplomats warned off Y2K Russia 
By Phil Reeves in Moscow 

BRITISH diplomats in Moscow are being told to consider carefully whether they 
invite family and friends to Russia during the New Year period, because of 
concerns about the millennium bug. 

The advice, contained in an internal memo circulated within the British 
embassy, comes amid widespread anxiety about what might happen as the new 
century dawns in Russia, considered one of the countries most vulnerable to 
Y2K problems. 

Western specialists say that although Russia has sharply stepped up its 
efforts to counter technology failures, it has neither the time, the money, 
nor the expertise to protect itself adequately. Key areas are considered to 
be at risk, such as transport, electricity supply, telecommunications and 
heating systems. 

No one seems to be predicting a failure involving Russia's nuclear stockpile, 
which Moscow insists is safe. But there are concerns about the readiness of 
other parts of the infrastructure, including air traffic control, banking, 
telephones and back-up generators at nuclear power stations. 

A report to the American Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by experts with 
Terralink, an IT firm specialising in millennium bug issues, concluded that 
it was "very likely that major infrastructure providers upon whom everybody 
depends, will experience Y2K failures". 

Analysts say telephone and power blackouts are high on the list of potential 
failures. These could cause still more serious complications: if, for 
example, there are blow-outs on the three main electricity grids and the 
power output falls below a specific level, nuclear power stations must - for 
safety reasons - be disconnected from the grid. The stations would switch to 
back-up diesel generators to keep their cooling systems going - thus avoiding 
an explosion. 

The Russians have claimed they can correct power-drop problems by cutting off 
low-priority customers. But some analysts worry that if nuclear power 
stations are shut down, their back-up generators may fail to work, as 
happened at Kola nuclear power station some years ago. "I haven't got an 
awful lot of confidence," said one Y2K pundit. "They ought to test their 
generators now." 

The Russians, whose officials have said tests are now being carried out, are 
maintaining a confident front. Ilya Klebanov, a deputy prime minister, told a 
commission on millennium problems that "nothing awful is expected in Russia, 
and problems will be resolved by December". But as late as May his 
predecessor, Vladimir Bulgak, was complaining that 20 government departments 
had not yet submitted plans on tackling the millennium bug. 

Some multinationals with operations in Russia, such as Mars, have been 
stockpiling raw materials. One Moscow-based Western analyst, said: "There is 
no remote possibility of the Russians being ready for this. They haven't 
spent the money or done the work." 

Asked about the memo to diplomats, Michael Haddock, chief press officer at 
the British embassy in Moscow, said: "It exists, but it is internal. It is 
not a directive from the Foreign Office." But, he said, it did "reflect the 
thinking at the moment". 

******

#4
Army Support Movement Eyes Cprf Voters in Duma Elections.

MOSCOW, July 4 (Itar-Tass) - The 4th convention of the Movement in Support of 
the Army, Defence Industry and Military Science (DPA) has been held here, 
with the central items on the agenda being the current political situation in 
the country and preparations for the forthcoming December elections to the 
State Duma lower house of the Russian parliament. 

It follows from a speech made at the convention by DPA leader Viktor Ilyukhin 
that this organisation counts on support from a certain proportion of the 
electorate who earlier oriented themselves to the Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation (CPRF). 

"We may not stay indifferent to who will gain the votes of those who would 
not back the electoral bloc headed by the CPRF. We are interested in ensuring 
that this proportion of the electorate sides with left-wing patriotic 
forces," Ilyukhin said, in particular. 

The DPA leader alluded to sociological survey data which have it that the DPA 
may poll "a large number of votes among the military, Cossacks, and 
defence-industry workers --all people who as patriots and 
statesmanlike-minded persons do not want to vote for the Communists for 
ideological considerations". 

*******

#5
Aksyonenko Predicts Hard Comeback to Power for Communists.

MOSCOW, July 3 (Itar-Tass) - "I think it will be very difficult for the 
Communists to make their comeback to power," First Vice-Prime Minister 
Nikolai Aksyonenko said. 

Aksyonenko told journalists on Saturday after the end of his working trip to 
the Far East that "the Communist Party failed last year, now the probability 
of a 'Communist revenge' is almost nil." 

He stressed that "the present State Duma is a destabilising factor for 
Russia" because it "tries to tackle scores of problems which are not in its 
competence". 

Aksyonenko believes that "much depends on the mood of governors, city mayors 
and the heads of municipalities." 

*******

#6
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 1999
From: "Jerry F. Hough" <jhough@duke.edu>
Subject: Re: 3376-Ermarth/Merry

As a very active participant in the public debates of a decade ago, I 
would like to agree with much of Fritz Ermarth says. It is very hard to 
criticize President Bush at that time. Gates and his people thought 
there would be a military coup, I was arguing that Gorbachev would 
institute martial law (and if one reads Shaposhnikov's memoirs, one sees 
he was still trying in November, but washing his hands of responsibility 
as he did in June and July), FBIS Trends were saying that the deal 
between Yeltsin and Gorbachev made to get Yeltsin the presidency would 
hold. There was a hot of heat in these debates, but the bottom line for 
a president is that people were all saying the USSR would hold 
together. The right response was the president's great speech in Kiev 
arguing for the kind of federal system with checks and balances like the US.

Even after August, those who say it was clear that Yeltsin would 
succeed have excellent hindsight. One should read Rutskoi's speeches 
and Krasnaia zvezda up to March or April 1992 when Yeltsin finally got 
hold of it. That Kriuchkov failed in August did not mean that a second 
military coup was not possible on the outside evidence. From August 
onwards, Yeltsin was claiming he would hold the country together, and the 
military might well have acted at the actual breakup.

Similarly the striking feature of the fall of 1992 was all the 
apparent moves Yeltsin was making to cohabit with the Civic Union. 
Izvestiia was loudly proclaiming the alliance, and Chernomyrdin was 
appointed loudly announcing an industrial policy. His friend 
Gerashchenko laid out the program clearly in January 1993. The great 
tragedy was that the Clinton Administration so strongly supported Boris 
Fedorov, the Russian representative at the World Bank, and got 
Chernomyrdin reversed by promising to support Yeltsin support for his 
coupmrew against the Congress in March. (Yeltsin got Chernomyrdin to 
switch his position in May with insider privatization of the gas industry.)

But it was a chaotic time, and Woodward shows the President had 
other things on his mind in early 1993. That which is inexcusible was 
the unwillingness of the Administration to reverse policy when it became 
absolutely clear it had failed and that it had all the potential of 
bringing very dangerous forces to power in Russia and/or lose control of 
nuclear weapons. However, the lesson of the Thomas confirmation, of the 
Lewinski affair, of the Summers promotion to Secretary of Treasury is that
the 
right strategy in Washington is just to tough things out, not to admit 
mistakes. It is the same at lower levels of the bureaucracy. God 
knows how to overcome this problem other than go to a Mexican solution 
of a five-year presidency. The real solution lies in Moscow. China 
does what China wants to do, and Russia can do what Russia wants. When 
Russia decides to return to the industrialization program of Witte and 
Stolypin, the US will grouse, but it can do nothing but accept. 

******

#7
World Socialist Web Site 
www.wsws.org

The struggle for Caspian oil, the crisis in Russia and the breakup of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States
By Patrick Richter

As NATO troops occupy Kosovo and the media is busy justifying the bombing of 
Yugoslavia, new struggles are developing away from the front lines which 
could lead to much greater military conflagrations. Such conflicts are taking 
place on the territory of the former Soviet Union, the source of the world's 
largest untapped reserves of oil and gas and a region where Russian influence 
has declined dramatically.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 8, 1991, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was founded, consisting of Russia, 
White Russia and the Ukraine. On December 21 of the same year a further eight 
former Soviet republics joined the CIS—the states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan. The 
Commonwealth was founded in Alma Ata, the former capital of Kazakhstan. In 
1993 the Caucasus republic of Georgia also joined the union.

Russian power was the cement which held the CIS together. However the 
economic, political and military weakening of Russia has brought into the 
open the centrifugal forces which had led to the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in the first place and have marked the CIS from its very beginning. Two 
events have accelerated this process: the financial crisis in Russia of 
August 1998 and the political humiliation of Russia by NATO in the war 
against Yugoslavia.

At the beginning of the 1990s Russia was able, with its powerful military 
apparatus, to exert its influence over various political conflicts taking 
place within the former Soviet republics. By stationing troops Russia was 
able to ensure a temporary status quo between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh; in Georgia it supported the Abkhazia 
separatist movement; in Tajikistan it maintained the weak pro-Moscow puppet 
government of Imomali Rokhmonov against the Islamic opposition (UTO); in 
Moldova it backed the Russian separatist Transnistria republic.

More recently Moscow's military grip over these republics has weakened, while 
new conflicts have arisen and old ones have reemerged. This development is 
bound up with Russia's own decline and the fact that the Central Asian and 
Caucasus regions have developed relations in other directions.

Overall internal trade between the CIS states has fallen by two-thirds since 
1991. The percentage of foreign trade has declined from 78 percent in 1991 to 
24 percent today. Trade of White Russia, the Ukraine, Moldova and Kazakhstan 
with Russia is down between 40 and 60 percent; between Russia and the 
Caucasus republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan trade has fallen by an 
average of 23 percent; between Russia and the rest of the Central Asian 
republics (Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) the decline on 
average is 13 percent. While the Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are striving to 
develop close links with the European Union, the Central Asian republics and 
Azerbaijan aim to develop relations with Turkey, Iran and China.

This process has intensified considerably since last year's financial crisis 
in Russia. Up to that point Russia, as the most stable of the CIS economies, 
was able to artificially maintain links to the republics by buying products 
which were uncompetitive on the world market and making available 
non-repayable credits.

Since the August crisis, however, Russia has been “transformed from a centre 
of gravitation to a source of economic tremors. The main concern of all its 
former partners has been to put sufficient distance between themselves and 
Russia”, according to Yuri Shishkov, deputy chairman of the Institute for 
World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Science. 
“All of the integration programmes within the framework of CIS are a thing of 
the past”, he wrote in the weekly Obshaya Gazeta of May 13-19, 1999.

The atmosphere between Russia and the “partner countries” has cooled 
considerably. Whereas a chorus of “hope and optimism” greeted the founding of 
the CIS, today it is regarded as a “listless organisation”, whose authority 
is not taken seriously by any of the member countries. Kyrgyzstan, for 
example, recently joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in open defiance 
of the customs regulations drawn up by five of the CIS member countries. 
Turkmenia, which was formerly only able to offer its gas to the world market 
via Russian pipelines and with a Russian subsidy, now delivers through Iran 
and is gradually breaking all its relations with Russia. Train connections 
and travel without a visa between Moscow and the Turkmenian capital, 
Ashkhabad, have been stopped.

The most significant organisation to emerge as a challenger to Russian 
influence is the union of states known as GUAM, formed in 1998 by Georgia, 
the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In April 1999 the union was extended to 
include Uzbekistan (after which the organization's name was changed to 
GUUAM). From its outset the proclaimed aim of the alliance was the revival of 
the “Silk Road”.

This point was first made by the Georgian president and former foreign 
minister of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, Edward Shevardnadze. At an 
Asian Pacific Economic Community (APEC) forum in 1994 he called for the 
integration of the Central Asian and Caucasus states into the world market 
with the aid of a trans-European Caucasus/Pacific communications system.

The heart of this system is a transport route for Azeri oil which circumvents 
Russia and its spheres of influence. The trans-Caucasian states of Azerbaijan 
and Georgia would become key elements in a transport system linking Asia and 
Europe and controlling the passage of goods by road and rail. Such a system 
would be highly attractive to investors. The first projects involved in this 
system, such as the construction of a highway from the north Turkish 
industrial town of Samsun to the Georgian port of Batumi, are being built 
or—as with the oil pipeline between the Azerbaijani capital of Baku and the 
Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa—are already finished.

The European Union, which partly financed this latter project, seeks as well 
to participate in an oil transport route between Poti and Ilytshovsk. This 
will secure a direct route for Azerbaijani oil to the states of western and 
southeastern Europe fully independent of Russia. Instead of the existing 
route from Grosny to Novorossik in Russia, it is to be transported by rail 
from Baku to the Georgian port of Poti and then transported by ship to the 
Ukrainian port of Odessa Ilytshovsk.

Ukraine and neighbouring Moldova are making their own oil pipeline available 
to the Czech and Slovakian republics and Rumania, and then to Western Europe 
and the Balkans. By so doing they can free themselves altogether from Russian 
oil interests and grab their own share of business. Talks are being held with 
Turkmenia over oil and gas pipelines through the Caspian Sea over Baku, and 
further on to Georgia and Turkey.

A major problem, however, is the existence of ethnic conflicts in these 
countries. Up until now these antagonisms were utilised by Russia to maintain 
its control and hinder the efforts of these states to free themselves from 
Moscow's grip. But with Russia's decline the GUUAM states are more and more 
openly opposing Moscow and seeking the support of the United States in order 
to assert their own interests.

Uzbekistan's entry into the GUUAM alliance took place in Washington during 
the festivities to mark the fiftieth anniversary of NATO, which were 
boycotted by Russia in protest over the bombing of Yugoslavia. For their part 
the presidents of the GUUAM states made clear their unqualified support for 
the actions of the US and NATO.

Moreover, since the beginning of the year joint military maneuvers by the 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been taking place for the first time 
without the participation of Russia. The maneuvers were conducted as defence 
exercises for the newly opened oil routes. Immediately after the CIS summit 
in Moscow last April, these countries asserted their de facto withdrawal from 
the treaty of Tashkent, agreed in 1992 between the CIS states with the aim of 
creating a “joint defence framework”.

The United States has warmly approved the aims of GUUAM. As early as 1997 the 
US Congress passed a resolution declaring the Caspian and Caucasus region to 
be a “zone of vital American interests”. At the end of April this year 
Clinton's special envoy for energy diplomacy, R. Morningstar, outlined 
American interests in a number of points: 1) independence, sovereignty and 
welfare in these countries to be secured through the imposition of economic 
and political reforms; 2) reducing the danger of regional conflict through 
the involvement of the states in international economic collaboration; 3) 
strengthening the energy security of the USA and its allies with the help of 
the countries of the Caspian region and; 4) expanding the opportunities for 
American corporations.

An especially aggressive role is being played by oil-rich Azerbaijan, where 
American petroleum concerns are responsible for more than 50 percent of oil 
investment. Its president, Heydar Aliyev, has repeatedly boasted that “the 
great possibilities for the deepening and broadening of economic and military 
collaboration with the USA and NATO have been fully exploited”. Intense 
efforts have been made to establish an American, Turkish or NATO base as a 
counterpart to Armenia (which is supported by Russia) on the territory of the 
former Soviet air defence base “Nasosnaya”, located 45 km north of Baku.

The US, which is evidently prepared to impose its interests in the region by 
means of military force, sent a working group of American officers under the 
leadership of General Charles Box on a special mission to the area. According 
to the Russian weekly Vyek (century), they examined the possibilities of 
stationing NATO troops “for the strengthening of security and stability in 
the Caucasus.”

It was more than empty words when Azerbaijani Defence Minister Safar Abiyev 
called for “a peace intervention by NATO” in connection with renewed fighting 
in Nagorno-Karabakh. He had already offered NATO the use of Azeri air 
installations for the Alliance's operations in Yugoslavia.

Europe is also well aware of the significance of the region. NATO General 
Secretary Javier Solanas, who has visited the region twice in the past two 
years, stated, “Europe cannot be totally secure as long as the Caucasus 
states remain outside the borders of European security.”

Russian influence and CIS stability are also under threat from the Islamic 
side. Because of the decline in Moscow's authority, President Rachmonov of 
Tajikistan was forced to make further concessions to the Islamistic United 
Tajik Opposition (UTO), which has controlled half of the shattered country 
since the end of the five-year civil war in 1997. The opposition has close 
relations to the Afghan Taliban militia, and in the latest conflict 
opposition leader Nuri received four additional ministerial posts in the 
coalition government that was formed after the civil war.

Uzbekistan, where a third of the population belongs to the ethnic Tadchikis 
minority, fears for its future amid growing pressure from Tajikistan and an 
increase in incidents on its short border with Afghanistan. Were Russia to 
desert its neighbour Tajikistan, and the latter to fall into the hands of the 
Islamists, Uzbekistan would hardly be in a position to defend its borders. 
This is why Uzbekistan President Karimov is seeking to secure his rule with 
the help of the US and GUUAM.

The only CIS state to maintain unconditional loyalty to Russia is White 
Russia, whose economy has hit rock bottom. During the Soviet era White Russia 
was closely integrated into the Russian economy and was known as the Russian 
“tool-shop”. Today its economy is totally uncompetitive on the world market, 
and its output has declined to less than 30 percent of the level in 1989.

Those seeking to determine the source of future military conflicts should 
follow the flow of oil and gold. The ethnic conflicts encountered along the 
way could well serve as the trigger for new NATO interventions.

******* 

#8
Humanitarian Aid Faces Problems in Russia 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta 
26 June 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Anatoliy Grachev, Nikolay Senchev, Yegor Solovyev, and 
Aleksandr Mozgovoy under the rubric "Special Issue: Echo of 
Russia": "Here Is a Package for You From Your American 
Uncle--Humanitarian Aid: What They Are Doing With It in the Provinces" 

Ulyanovsk: They sent it to the dump. 

The city dump near Ulyanovsk has received its latest victim. The 
humanitarian freight addressed to the oblast Children's Home was hauled 
there and destroyed. 

There were a great many useful things on the list of objects which burned 
with a blue flame. Around 10 kinds of shampoo alone. A considerable 
number of different cleaning, bleaching, and disinfecting compounds, 
toothbrushes, and chewing gum. Those who sent this humanitarian aid 
apparently thought that the Ulyanovsk orphans' most urgent need was to 
chew gum and brush their teeth. 

However, that is not the point. A different question gnaws at us. Why was the 
gift from across the sea thrown into the dump? This question is followed 
by the suspicion: the goods were of course plundered, and they were 
written up for destruction as unsuitable for use in order to hide the 
evidence. 

With these thoughts I set off for the Ulyanovsk customs office, which is 
the first to be responsible for any freight the oblast receives from 
other countries. Customs chief Ivan Gening laid a pile of documents on 
the table which were supposed to prove one thing: because the 
humanitarian aid fundamentally failed to meet various types of 
requirements, there could be only one place for it, the dump. 
That is exactly what happened in another recent case. American doctors 
from the state of Oklahoma, where Ulyanovsk cardiac surgeon Aleksandr 
Maltsev successfully went through practical training, sent a container 
with humanitarian medical aid to his home institution, Oblast Hospital No 
1. In addition to special books, hospital linen, bandages, and pills, 
expensive and extremely hard-to-get surgical instruments were included in 
the containers. The airplane crew of the Volga-Dnepr Airline Company 
agreed to deliver this freight to Ulyanovsk free of charge. But then many 
months of customs investigation began, since there were no accompanying 
documents other than the list of goods. 

"Let them put me against the wall, but I will never let any humanitarian 
aid with such papers through," Ivan Gening says heatedly. 

And it is not without reason that he gets excited. There was no 
certificate for even one of the medicines or surgical instruments sent 
from Oklahoma. The expiration date of most of the pills had passed. Some 
of the disposable catheters had been used. Generally the customs office 
in this case showed enviable patience. The customs officers agreed to 
wait if the recipient of the humanitarian freight would take the trouble 
to get certification. The management of Oblast Hospital No 1 tried. But 
the set of prices they were given for conducting an expert study was such 
that they lost any desire to appeal anywhere else. This story ended at 
the dump with the burning of the shipment. 

Kursk: They were forbidden to accept it. 

Twenty-two letters to the most varied representatives of the executive and 
legislative branches of power asking for help for the Kursk Branch of the 
Red Cross produced no results. 

But after all, they are not asking for much: to be exempted from 
excessive taxes levied against the public organization as if it were a 
commercial enterprise, to begin real cooperation, and to receive just a 
little help with finances. Governor Aleksandr Rutskoy does not even admit 
Red Cross representatives to see him at all. In his traditional trips 
around the rayons, on the other hand, he promises the poor and those who 
are trying to help them all kinds of assistance. But the assistance comes 
only on paper. Or at times it turns into real opposition. 

Not so very long ago, representatives of the city of Kurchatov, where 
the Kursk AES [nuclear power plant] is located, asked Moscow for 5 
million rubles [R] worth of humanitarian aid. Learning of this, the 
governor general, who is famous for his categorical behavior, made the 
initiators of this noble undertaking write explanations to him. What kind 
of begging is this? he said. Apparently from his high post, the life of 
people in Kurchatov seems sweet to Rutskoy. A rumor was even started that 
the gallant governor had prohibited the acceptance of humanitarian aid on 
Kursk Oblast territory. 

But many establishments and organizations in Kursk are working on issues 
of deliveries of humanitarian freight. And each in its own way. They 
include the eparchy administration, social protection committees, and 
enterprises. Unlike, say, Altay Kray, where a centralized commission 
which includes all organizations interested in this (including law 
enforcement organs) has been created to control all deliveries of aid for 
poor strata of the population. And indeed this approach to the work gives 
almost a 100-percent guarantee that when the "mercy packages" are 
distributed, they all reach those who need them. When there are too many 
cooks (or no cooks at all), it is not necessary to explain what is going on. 
Bryansk: They gave with one hand and took it back with the other. 

There were several telephone calls from the managers of agricultural 
enterprises to Rossiyskaya Gazeta's correspondents' office in Bryansk. 
They talked of only one thing--the humanitarian aid received from America 
in the form of grain and meat products. 

It would seem they should say thank you. But the managers ask this 
question: "Why should we pay 5 percent of the wholesale price of the 
humanitarian aid to an 'agent' and an 'operator'? That is no small amount!" 

The managers' concern is completely justified. Let us take just one 
example. For the aid allotted to it, the agricultural enterprise Snezhka 
is supposed to lay out almost a million "live" rubles within 90 days. 

During that time, with the grain they have received, the enterprise will 
not manage to raise any poultry to sell and collect payment. In addition, 
the prime cost of the output will rise, and so its price will too. That 
will be a blow to the ordinary customer's lean purse. 

Those leaders who take this aid for resale, that is speculation, may 
benefit. But even here our very own customer is the loser. And who needs 
that in the current economic and political situation? 

As has become clear, the "agent" means the Moscow offices of 
Raznoimport, Roskhleboprodukt, Rosmyasomoltorg, and Prodintorg. There are 
so many of them sitting in their offices. And our poor agricultural 
producer is supposed to give the money he earned by the sweat of his brow 
to all of them. For what? For foreign aid? 

The "operator" is the local freeloader represented by the officials of 
the food corporation. We made the calculation and were astonished: the 
remuneration for just a single one-time "aid package" comes to the annual 
wage fund for almost half of the agricultural enterprises of Bryanskiy 
Rayon. That is enough money to maintain the Bryansk Food Corporation for 
2-3 years! 

Therefore the managers of the struggling agricultural enterprises are asking 
the Government to reduce the amount of altogether undeserved remuneration 
to the "agent" and the "operator" to a sensible and economically 
justified amount. Or to give the humanitarian aid as a commodity credit 
for a year. Otherwise, as one of the directors who phoned the 
correspondents' office put it: "Such aid, on the contrary, will strip the 
agricultural producer bare." Arkhangelsk: The Red Cross did not let them 
down. 

Long before the scandal involving the Belgian dioxin chickens, 
Arkhangelsk Oblast refused the European Union's humanitarian aid in the 
form of poultry meat. 

However, the reason here is not that the northern Pinkertons have better 
information, but the normal work of the poultry factories built during 
the times of the planned economy. At first the total amount of food aid 
for Arkhangelsk Oblast from the European Union was set at the exact 
amount of the federal transfer payment--R349 million. 

The food received had to be sold quickly and within 15 to 90 days 
transferred to the account of the Pension Fund of Russia. Those were very 
strict conditions. 

In the oblast the needs of all the municipal formations were studied 
and those who could guarantee repayment of the capital through their 
budgets were identified. It came out to be R56 million. The rest of the 
food was refused, in order not to endanger the transfer payment money. 
It is perhaps for that reason that in Arkhangelsk people devote more 
attention to other humanitarian aid which comes under the aegis of the 
Red Cross. 

According to the chairman of its Arkhangelsk Branch, Valentina Badanina, 
three 
humanitarian aid programs are being implemented in the oblast. They are 
programs with the Dutch Red Cross (worth $50,000), the Norwegian Red 
Cross (worth $750,000), and the Norwegian Church (worth $600,000). 
The recipients of the aid are strictly designated. For example, reports 
in the form of lists of people (last name, first name, patronymic, and 
residence) are sent to the Dutch Red Cross, and each of the persons signs 
his name to confirm that he received the aid. 

Of course, this aid will not solve all the problems of poor families, 
but it is at least of some help anyway: they do not have to pay for 
macaroni, oils, dry milk, and groats. They will squeeze by somehow and 
find the kopecks for tea, buttons, and medicine... In other villages the 
children do not go to school--there is only one pair of shoes for five 
children. When 70 percent of the population is poor, getting something 
free of charge is a joy and at times, salvation. After all, people are 
going hungry in families where the adults are not loafers or parasites. 

They are not to blame for anything. It is simply they are paid no money. 
But the children have to be fed. One man at a blood transfusion station 
was told that they could not accept his blood--his hemoglobin was low. So 
he began to sob: it turned out that he had nothing to feed his child. 

******

#9
CNN
War in Yugoslavia was wake-up call for Russian military 
Russia's recent military exercises included more than 30 ships, several
submarines and 10,000 Russian troops 
July 2, 1999

MOSCOW (CNN) -- The appearance of Russian bombers over the Atlantic Ocean
on the heels of NATO's successful bombing campaign against Yugoslavia
underscores Moscow's urgency to rescue its military from years of neglect. 

NATO' air campaign -- in the heart of southeast Europe -- was a stark
reminder to Russia's generals of the growing disparity between its military
might and that of Western powers. 

The Russian government has promised to boost military spending to 28.5
percent of the budget, or $6.7 billion. The United States has proposed a
defense budget of $280 billion for the coming year. 

The appearance of two Russian "TU-95 Bear" bombers off the coast of Iceland
last week alarmed some Western governments. The long-range nuclear bombers
were part of larger exercises that included more than 30 ships, several
submarines and aircraft and 10,000 Russian troops. 

"The West-99 military exercises, like all exercises, were planned a year in
advance, and they happened to coincide with events in Kosovo," said retired
Col. Viktor Baranetz a military affairs analyst. 

Although Russia has avoided confrontation with the West since the end of
the Cold War, the NATO war on Yugoslavia may lead Moscow to pursue a
different course in the coming years. 

Suspicions heightened that NATO is a threat 

Russia's government has promised to boost military spending to 28.5% of the
budget 

"The war undermined the perception that NATO is only for self-defense. And
that of course tremendously strengthened suspicion that NATO enlargement
threatens Russia," said Sergei Rogov, Director of the Institute of USA and
Canada Studies. 

But Russia's military -- cut from 5 million personnel to 1.2 million in the
past decade -- has been humbled in recent years. 

The army suffered tremendous losses at the hands of Islamic rebels in the
1994-1996 war in Chechnya and has not received any new weapons in years. 

The air force has not received any new planes since 1992, and none are
expected before 2001. As a result of fuel shortages, Russian pilots average
25 hours of flying time a year, compared to at least 200 hours a year in
Western air forces. 

More than 70 percent of Russia's warships and submarines are in need of
major repairs. Many sit idly in port as they continue to rust. 

******

#10
Stratfor commentary
www.stratfor.com

1845 GMT, 990703 U.S. Wants No Surprises

According to the New York Times, the U.S. and its NATO allies have worked
to block Russian requests to use the airspace of Hungary, Romania and
Bulgaria to fly an expected ten plane-loads of peacekeepers into Slatina
airport in Pristina on July 4. After consultation with U.S. and NATO
officials, all three countries have denied the Russian requests. One reason
behind the delay, according to administration officials, is that terms of
the flights and technical details of the Helsinki Agreement, reached June
18, must be worked out before Russian troops can enter Kosovo. Talks
between Russian and NATO military officials ended without agreement last
week, amid reports that the Russians were attempting to renegotiate the
terms of their cooperation with NATO in Kosovo.

However, Washington had another reason for delaying the arrival of Russian
troops. According to the New York Times report, U.S. officials did not want
any surprises from Russia over the Independence Day holiday. Washington is
apparently confident Russia will not risk undermining progress made last
week toward disbursement of $4.5 billion in much needed IMF loans, and thus
will quietly accept the delay.

Washington’s desire to maintain stability over the Fourth of July weekend
is understandable. Many U.S. political and military personnel are
celebrating the holiday, leaving a skeleton crew to deal with crises. And
Russia has surprised the U.S. twice in the past few weeks – rushing into
Pristina ahead of NATO troops and forcing NATO jets to scramble as Russian
bombers skirted Norway and Iceland. But Russia’s capacity to surprise is
not limited to Kosovo. Nor is it limited to obvious tactical military
maneuvers. In fact, what Russia could conceivably attempt with ten
planeloads of troops in Kosovo is far less significant than what Boris
Yeltsin can accomplish at his country home outside Moscow.

On July 4, President Yeltsin will meet with his Ukrainian counterpart,
Leonid Kuchma, to address recent setbacks in Russian-Ukrainian relations.
In particular, Yeltsin will question Ukraine’s temporary decision to close
its airspace to Russian aircraft attempting to reinforce Russian troops in
Kosovo. With NATO members and aspirants Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria
blocking Russian overflight, Ukraine’s decision emphasized NATO’s
encirclement of Russia, prompting Yeltsin to call Kuchma on the carpet.
Washington may have avoided tactical surprise this weekend in Kosovo by
reinforcing its encirclement of Russia. But the impression of confrontation
and hostility this move generated may only bolster Russia’s desire to hand
NATO a strategic surprise, asserting overwhelming pressure to bring Ukraine
back into Russia’s sphere of influence.

*******


 

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