July
4, 1999
This Date's Issues: 3378 • 3379
•
Johnson's Russia List
#3379
4 July 1999
davidjohnson@erols.co
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Washington Post: Fred Hiatt, Yeltsin the Democrat? (DJ: Read this
very important piece. Progress in Washington!)
2. AFP: Leading Russian financial paper sold to foreign investor.
(Kommersant).
3. The Independent (UK): Phil Reeves, Diplomats warned off Y2K Russia.
4. Itar-Tass: Army Support Movement Eyes Cprf Voters in Duma Elections.
5. Itar-Tass: Aksyonenko Predicts Hard Comeback to Power for Communists.
6. Jerry Hough: Re: 3376-Ermarth/Merry.
7. World Socialist Web Site: Patrick Richter, The struggle for Caspian oil,
the crisis in Russia and the breakup of the Commonwealth of Independent
States.
8. Rossiyskaya Gazeta : Humanitarian Aid Faces Problems in Russia.
9. CNN: War in Yugoslavia was wake-up call for Russian military.
10. Stratfor commentary: U.S. Wants No Surprises. (re Russia and
Kosovo).]
******
#1
The Washington Post
4 July 1999
[for personal use only]
Yeltsin the Democrat?
By Fred Hiatt (hiattf@washpost.com)
The writer is a member of the editorial page staff.
In its eagerness to get relations with Russia back on track, the Clinton
administration is playing down what may be the biggest threat to the
relationship's long-term health -- the possibility that Boris Yeltsin will
trample on his constitution to keep himself in the Kremlin.
Russia is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in December and to elect
Yeltsin's successor next July, when his second -- and, legally, final -- term
expires. That July 2000 vote should be a historic moment, the first time one
Russian leader will be peacefully exchanged for another as an expression of
the people's will.
But Moscow already is having a bad case of transition jitters. There's
increasing speculation that Yeltsin will engineer a reunion between Russia
and the former Soviet republic of Belarus. The newly born nation naturally
would need a new constitution; that could give Yeltsin a constitutional fig
leaf to extend his rule.
Yeltsin fed this rumor when, in a recent interview with the German magazine
Der Spiegel, he hailed a possible union as "rooted in the community of the
historic fates and the friendship between our peoples." Preposterously, given
that Belarus is led by a Soviet-style strongman, Yeltsin also proclaimed that
union is a step "taken of their own free will by the states and peoples."
The other conspiracy theory whipping through Moscow these days envisions
Yeltsin banning the Communist Party. He fed this one, too, when he publicly
chastised his justice minister for not reining in "extremists" such as the
Communists.
Given that the Communists operate legally and with considerable popular
support, a ban would constitute a devastating blow to democracy. But, the
theory goes, it might weaken Yeltsin's opposition enough to allow him to
install a reliable successor as president. Or -- to take the conspiracy
theory one heated step forward -- a ban would elicit such a violent reaction
that Yeltsin could call in his troops to restore order and then cancel next
summer's presidential election in the name of stability.
Moscow is never free of such rumors, and most of the time they come to
nothing. Some of Yeltsin's closest advisers urged him to cancel the 1996
presidential election at a time when he seemed sure to lose, but he chose to
battle it out instead.
This time around, too, Yeltsin may have no doubts about letting democracy
take its course. He may be talking up union with Belarus to co-opt a
nationalist issue, with no intention to follow through. He may be rattling
the Communists just to keep them off guard, to remind Russia that he remains
a player despite his varied illnesses -- or simply because rattling
Communists is one of his favorite sports.
Still, there are reasons to worry that Yeltsin or his entourage might be more
tempted this time to commit foul play. The current frontrunner for the 2000
election is Moscow's mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, whose cheery smile fools no one
into doubting that he would crush any opponent if doing so proved convenient.
In early 1996, Yeltsin seemed sure to lose to another implacable foe, but at
least he had a candidate: himself. Today his camp's hope is the current
occupant of the prime minister's chair, but to most Russian voters Sergei
Stephashin isn't much more than that -- current occupant. Unlike Nelson
Mandela, in other words, Yeltsin has no loyal successor and no loyal
political party to ensure that his legacy will be respected.
And Yeltsin and his entourage have to worry about more than whether Russia
builds statues of him as father of the nation. Already, Russia's
procurator-general has been delving into reported corruption close to Yeltsin
himself. Yeltsin keeps trying to fire this investigator, and the parliament
keeps insisting that he remain. The day Yeltsin leaves office, this standoff
will end. Bank accounts, dachas, even personal freedom -- nothing will be
guaranteed.
The logical response to this dilemma is to begin establishing civilized rules
of transition and to treat opposition figures with some respect. It should be
obvious that the alternative -- trying to engineer a legal coup -- would be a
disaster. Yeltsin's popularity rating hovers around 2 percent, with a margin
of error that puts him into possible negative territory. The military would
not likely rally to his defense. The West, including the Clinton
administration, would not stick with him.
All this should be obvious, but it may not be. And that is where the
administration has to enter the picture. Senior administration officials
understand that almost no possible successor could be worse for Russia and
for U.S.-Russia relations than a disruption in the democratic process -- not
the nationalist Mayor Luzhkov, not the retired general Alexander Lebed, not
the Communist Gennady Zyuganov.
But they are not communicating this to Moscow. On the contrary, when national
security adviser Sandy Berger calls the most recent Clinton-Yeltsin meeting
"one of the best" and describes Yeltsin -- who every Russian knows is bloated
and ailing -- as "very much in charge" and "very forceful," he feeds the
Russian perception that America values the Bill-Boris friendship above all.
That's a misperception, and the administration needs to say so, very
forcefully.
******
#2
Leading Russian financial paper sold to foreign investor
MOSCOW, July 3 (AFP) - Rumors that Russia's premier
financial daily was about to be bought out by the country's most notorious
oligarch were scotched Saturday when the paper's new owner was revealed.
American Capital Investment Fund, owned by a British citizen of Iranian
descent, has purchased a controlling share of the Kommersant Publishing
House, which publishes the newspaper Kommersant, news agencies reported.
Rumors had circulated for weeks that millionaire tycoon Boris Berezovsky
had designs on the paper, which along with Kommersant's several other
financial and political publications is the favorite of Russia's monied elite.
"As far as Berezovsky's role goes, there certainly were a lot of rumors on
that subject, but so far I haven't heard any confirmation of those rumors,"
former Kommersant shareholder Boris Kaskov told Moscow's Ekho Moskvy radio
station.
The new owner was identified by Russian agencies as Kia Jurabchian who,
Kaskov said, was expected to arrive in Moscow from Istanbul on Sunday to
outline editorial policy.
The Kommersant House was previously owned by its founder, journalist
Vladimir Yakovlev, who plans to accept the post of vice president of
international relations under the paper's new owner, according to Interfax.
News agencies differed on the terms of the deal signed in the United States
on Saturday, citing share percentages varying from 76 to 85 percent, but
all reported that Yakovlev's controlling package had gone to American Capital.
Kommersant revolutionized the Russian media with its appearance in the
mid-1990s, marking a significant departure from Soviet-style journalism to
fact-based reporting and an emphasis on objectivity.
Despite its powerhouse position on the market, the company ran into extreme
financial difficulties following last year's national financial collapse,
making it less attractive to foreign investors who increasingly shied away
from Russia as high-risk.
But the paper would have been a cheap and profitable purchase for a
media-controlling financier in Russia seeking to expand political influence
ahead of upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.
Berezovsky, a one-time presidential insider who is reputed to have made a
fortune out of oil and airline holdings, has recently entered the media
market, acquiring a controlling package of the TV-6 television station.
Kaskov, slightly contradicting himself in the same radio interview, said
that Berezovsky had indeed made a bid for the paper, but that the American
Fund offer was preferable to Yakovlev, who has reportedly been living in
Florida for the last several years.
American Capital has no experience investing in the media or in Russia but
"specializes in risky investments in unstable countries," according to Kaskov.
The new owners plan to retain most of the paper's editors, including
Editor-in-Chief Raf Shakirov, according to Kaskov, who agreed to give up
his shares in the company in a separate deal with Yakovlev.
The new owners expect to produce significant growth in the company "within
one and half to two years" with the goal of eventually reselling at a
higher price, said Kaskov.
Kaskov said the sale of the controlling share was made on the initiative of
Yakovlev.
The remaining percentage will stay in the hands of the company's third
shareholder, Leonid Miloslavsky.
******
#3
The Independent (UK)
4 July 1999
[for personal use only]
Diplomats warned off Y2K Russia
By Phil Reeves in Moscow
BRITISH diplomats in Moscow are being told to consider carefully whether they
invite family and friends to Russia during the New Year period, because of
concerns about the millennium bug.
The advice, contained in an internal memo circulated within the British
embassy, comes amid widespread anxiety about what might happen as the new
century dawns in Russia, considered one of the countries most vulnerable to
Y2K problems.
Western specialists say that although Russia has sharply stepped up its
efforts to counter technology failures, it has neither the time, the money,
nor the expertise to protect itself adequately. Key areas are considered to
be at risk, such as transport, electricity supply, telecommunications and
heating systems.
No one seems to be predicting a failure involving Russia's nuclear stockpile,
which Moscow insists is safe. But there are concerns about the readiness of
other parts of the infrastructure, including air traffic control, banking,
telephones and back-up generators at nuclear power stations.
A report to the American Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by experts with
Terralink, an IT firm specialising in millennium bug issues, concluded that
it was "very likely that major infrastructure providers upon whom everybody
depends, will experience Y2K failures".
Analysts say telephone and power blackouts are high on the list of potential
failures. These could cause still more serious complications: if, for
example, there are blow-outs on the three main electricity grids and the
power output falls below a specific level, nuclear power stations must - for
safety reasons - be disconnected from the grid. The stations would switch to
back-up diesel generators to keep their cooling systems going - thus avoiding
an explosion.
The Russians have claimed they can correct power-drop problems by cutting off
low-priority customers. But some analysts worry that if nuclear power
stations are shut down, their back-up generators may fail to work, as
happened at Kola nuclear power station some years ago. "I haven't got an
awful lot of confidence," said one Y2K pundit. "They ought to test their
generators now."
The Russians, whose officials have said tests are now being carried out, are
maintaining a confident front. Ilya Klebanov, a deputy prime minister, told a
commission on millennium problems that "nothing awful is expected in Russia,
and problems will be resolved by December". But as late as May his
predecessor, Vladimir Bulgak, was complaining that 20 government departments
had not yet submitted plans on tackling the millennium bug.
Some multinationals with operations in Russia, such as Mars, have been
stockpiling raw materials. One Moscow-based Western analyst, said: "There is
no remote possibility of the Russians being ready for this. They haven't
spent the money or done the work."
Asked about the memo to diplomats, Michael Haddock, chief press officer at
the British embassy in Moscow, said: "It exists, but it is internal. It is
not a directive from the Foreign Office." But, he said, it did "reflect the
thinking at the moment".
******
#4
Army Support Movement Eyes Cprf Voters in Duma Elections.
MOSCOW, July 4 (Itar-Tass) - The 4th convention of the Movement in Support of
the Army, Defence Industry and Military Science (DPA) has been held here,
with the central items on the agenda being the current political situation in
the country and preparations for the forthcoming December elections to the
State Duma lower house of the Russian parliament.
It follows from a speech made at the convention by DPA leader Viktor Ilyukhin
that this organisation counts on support from a certain proportion of the
electorate who earlier oriented themselves to the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation (CPRF).
"We may not stay indifferent to who will gain the votes of those who would
not back the electoral bloc headed by the CPRF. We are interested in ensuring
that this proportion of the electorate sides with left-wing patriotic
forces," Ilyukhin said, in particular.
The DPA leader alluded to sociological survey data which have it that the DPA
may poll "a large number of votes among the military, Cossacks, and
defence-industry workers --all people who as patriots and
statesmanlike-minded persons do not want to vote for the Communists for
ideological considerations".
*******
#5
Aksyonenko Predicts Hard Comeback to Power for Communists.
MOSCOW, July 3 (Itar-Tass) - "I think it will be very difficult for the
Communists to make their comeback to power," First Vice-Prime Minister
Nikolai Aksyonenko said.
Aksyonenko told journalists on Saturday after the end of his working trip to
the Far East that "the Communist Party failed last year, now the probability
of a 'Communist revenge' is almost nil."
He stressed that "the present State Duma is a destabilising factor for
Russia" because it "tries to tackle scores of problems which are not in its
competence".
Aksyonenko believes that "much depends on the mood of governors, city mayors
and the heads of municipalities."
*******
#6
Date: Sat, 3 Jul 1999
From: "Jerry F. Hough" <jhough@duke.edu>
Subject: Re: 3376-Ermarth/Merry
As a very active participant in the public debates of a decade ago, I
would like to agree with much of Fritz Ermarth says. It is very hard to
criticize President Bush at that time. Gates and his people thought
there would be a military coup, I was arguing that Gorbachev would
institute martial law (and if one reads Shaposhnikov's memoirs, one sees
he was still trying in November, but washing his hands of responsibility
as he did in June and July), FBIS Trends were saying that the deal
between Yeltsin and Gorbachev made to get Yeltsin the presidency would
hold. There was a hot of heat in these debates, but the bottom line for
a president is that people were all saying the USSR would hold
together. The right response was the president's great speech in Kiev
arguing for the kind of federal system with checks and balances like the US.
Even after August, those who say it was clear that Yeltsin would
succeed have excellent hindsight. One should read Rutskoi's speeches
and Krasnaia zvezda up to March or April 1992 when Yeltsin finally got
hold of it. That Kriuchkov failed in August did not mean that a second
military coup was not possible on the outside evidence. From August
onwards, Yeltsin was claiming he would hold the country together, and the
military might well have acted at the actual breakup.
Similarly the striking feature of the fall of 1992 was all the
apparent moves Yeltsin was making to cohabit with the Civic Union.
Izvestiia was loudly proclaiming the alliance, and Chernomyrdin was
appointed loudly announcing an industrial policy. His friend
Gerashchenko laid out the program clearly in January 1993. The great
tragedy was that the Clinton Administration so strongly supported Boris
Fedorov, the Russian representative at the World Bank, and got
Chernomyrdin reversed by promising to support Yeltsin support for his
coupmrew against the Congress in March. (Yeltsin got Chernomyrdin to
switch his position in May with insider privatization of the gas industry.)
But it was a chaotic time, and Woodward shows the President had
other things on his mind in early 1993. That which is inexcusible was
the unwillingness of the Administration to reverse policy when it became
absolutely clear it had failed and that it had all the potential of
bringing very dangerous forces to power in Russia and/or lose control of
nuclear weapons. However, the lesson of the Thomas confirmation, of the
Lewinski affair, of the Summers promotion to Secretary of Treasury is that
the
right strategy in Washington is just to tough things out, not to admit
mistakes. It is the same at lower levels of the bureaucracy. God
knows how to overcome this problem other than go to a Mexican solution
of a five-year presidency. The real solution lies in Moscow. China
does what China wants to do, and Russia can do what Russia wants. When
Russia decides to return to the industrialization program of Witte and
Stolypin, the US will grouse, but it can do nothing but accept.
******
#7
World Socialist Web Site
www.wsws.org
The struggle for Caspian oil, the crisis in Russia and the breakup of the
Commonwealth of Independent States
By Patrick Richter
As NATO troops occupy Kosovo and the media is busy justifying the bombing of
Yugoslavia, new struggles are developing away from the front lines which
could lead to much greater military conflagrations. Such conflicts are taking
place on the territory of the former Soviet Union, the source of the world's
largest untapped reserves of oil and gas and a region where Russian influence
has declined dramatically.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 8, 1991, the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was founded, consisting of Russia,
White Russia and the Ukraine. On December 21 of the same year a further eight
former Soviet republics joined the CIS—the states of Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan. The
Commonwealth was founded in Alma Ata, the former capital of Kazakhstan. In
1993 the Caucasus republic of Georgia also joined the union.
Russian power was the cement which held the CIS together. However the
economic, political and military weakening of Russia has brought into the
open the centrifugal forces which had led to the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in the first place and have marked the CIS from its very beginning. Two
events have accelerated this process: the financial crisis in Russia of
August 1998 and the political humiliation of Russia by NATO in the war
against Yugoslavia.
At the beginning of the 1990s Russia was able, with its powerful military
apparatus, to exert its influence over various political conflicts taking
place within the former Soviet republics. By stationing troops Russia was
able to ensure a temporary status quo between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh; in Georgia it supported the Abkhazia
separatist movement; in Tajikistan it maintained the weak pro-Moscow puppet
government of Imomali Rokhmonov against the Islamic opposition (UTO); in
Moldova it backed the Russian separatist Transnistria republic.
More recently Moscow's military grip over these republics has weakened, while
new conflicts have arisen and old ones have reemerged. This development is
bound up with Russia's own decline and the fact that the Central Asian and
Caucasus regions have developed relations in other directions.
Overall internal trade between the CIS states has fallen by two-thirds since
1991. The percentage of foreign trade has declined from 78 percent in 1991 to
24 percent today. Trade of White Russia, the Ukraine, Moldova and Kazakhstan
with Russia is down between 40 and 60 percent; between Russia and the
Caucasus republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan trade has fallen by an
average of 23 percent; between Russia and the rest of the Central Asian
republics (Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) the decline on
average is 13 percent. While the Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are striving to
develop close links with the European Union, the Central Asian republics and
Azerbaijan aim to develop relations with Turkey, Iran and China.
This process has intensified considerably since last year's financial crisis
in Russia. Up to that point Russia, as the most stable of the CIS economies,
was able to artificially maintain links to the republics by buying products
which were uncompetitive on the world market and making available
non-repayable credits.
Since the August crisis, however, Russia has been “transformed from a centre
of gravitation to a source of economic tremors. The main concern of all its
former partners has been to put sufficient distance between themselves and
Russia”, according to Yuri Shishkov, deputy chairman of the Institute for
World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Science.
“All of the integration programmes within the framework of CIS are a thing of
the past”, he wrote in the weekly Obshaya Gazeta of May 13-19, 1999.
The atmosphere between Russia and the “partner countries” has cooled
considerably. Whereas a chorus of “hope and optimism” greeted the founding of
the CIS, today it is regarded as a “listless organisation”, whose authority
is not taken seriously by any of the member countries. Kyrgyzstan, for
example, recently joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in open defiance
of the customs regulations drawn up by five of the CIS member countries.
Turkmenia, which was formerly only able to offer its gas to the world market
via Russian pipelines and with a Russian subsidy, now delivers through Iran
and is gradually breaking all its relations with Russia. Train connections
and travel without a visa between Moscow and the Turkmenian capital,
Ashkhabad, have been stopped.
The most significant organisation to emerge as a challenger to Russian
influence is the union of states known as GUAM, formed in 1998 by Georgia,
the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In April 1999 the union was extended to
include Uzbekistan (after which the organization's name was changed to
GUUAM). From its outset the proclaimed aim of the alliance was the revival of
the “Silk Road”.
This point was first made by the Georgian president and former foreign
minister of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, Edward Shevardnadze. At an
Asian Pacific Economic Community (APEC) forum in 1994 he called for the
integration of the Central Asian and Caucasus states into the world market
with the aid of a trans-European Caucasus/Pacific communications system.
The heart of this system is a transport route for Azeri oil which circumvents
Russia and its spheres of influence. The trans-Caucasian states of Azerbaijan
and Georgia would become key elements in a transport system linking Asia and
Europe and controlling the passage of goods by road and rail. Such a system
would be highly attractive to investors. The first projects involved in this
system, such as the construction of a highway from the north Turkish
industrial town of Samsun to the Georgian port of Batumi, are being built
or—as with the oil pipeline between the Azerbaijani capital of Baku and the
Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa—are already finished.
The European Union, which partly financed this latter project, seeks as well
to participate in an oil transport route between Poti and Ilytshovsk. This
will secure a direct route for Azerbaijani oil to the states of western and
southeastern Europe fully independent of Russia. Instead of the existing
route from Grosny to Novorossik in Russia, it is to be transported by rail
from Baku to the Georgian port of Poti and then transported by ship to the
Ukrainian port of Odessa Ilytshovsk.
Ukraine and neighbouring Moldova are making their own oil pipeline available
to the Czech and Slovakian republics and Rumania, and then to Western Europe
and the Balkans. By so doing they can free themselves altogether from Russian
oil interests and grab their own share of business. Talks are being held with
Turkmenia over oil and gas pipelines through the Caspian Sea over Baku, and
further on to Georgia and Turkey.
A major problem, however, is the existence of ethnic conflicts in these
countries. Up until now these antagonisms were utilised by Russia to maintain
its control and hinder the efforts of these states to free themselves from
Moscow's grip. But with Russia's decline the GUUAM states are more and more
openly opposing Moscow and seeking the support of the United States in order
to assert their own interests.
Uzbekistan's entry into the GUUAM alliance took place in Washington during
the festivities to mark the fiftieth anniversary of NATO, which were
boycotted by Russia in protest over the bombing of Yugoslavia. For their part
the presidents of the GUUAM states made clear their unqualified support for
the actions of the US and NATO.
Moreover, since the beginning of the year joint military maneuvers by the
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been taking place for the first time
without the participation of Russia. The maneuvers were conducted as defence
exercises for the newly opened oil routes. Immediately after the CIS summit
in Moscow last April, these countries asserted their de facto withdrawal from
the treaty of Tashkent, agreed in 1992 between the CIS states with the aim of
creating a “joint defence framework”.
The United States has warmly approved the aims of GUUAM. As early as 1997 the
US Congress passed a resolution declaring the Caspian and Caucasus region to
be a “zone of vital American interests”. At the end of April this year
Clinton's special envoy for energy diplomacy, R. Morningstar, outlined
American interests in a number of points: 1) independence, sovereignty and
welfare in these countries to be secured through the imposition of economic
and political reforms; 2) reducing the danger of regional conflict through
the involvement of the states in international economic collaboration; 3)
strengthening the energy security of the USA and its allies with the help of
the countries of the Caspian region and; 4) expanding the opportunities for
American corporations.
An especially aggressive role is being played by oil-rich Azerbaijan, where
American petroleum concerns are responsible for more than 50 percent of oil
investment. Its president, Heydar Aliyev, has repeatedly boasted that “the
great possibilities for the deepening and broadening of economic and military
collaboration with the USA and NATO have been fully exploited”. Intense
efforts have been made to establish an American, Turkish or NATO base as a
counterpart to Armenia (which is supported by Russia) on the territory of the
former Soviet air defence base “Nasosnaya”, located 45 km north of Baku.
The US, which is evidently prepared to impose its interests in the region by
means of military force, sent a working group of American officers under the
leadership of General Charles Box on a special mission to the area. According
to the Russian weekly Vyek (century), they examined the possibilities of
stationing NATO troops “for the strengthening of security and stability in
the Caucasus.”
It was more than empty words when Azerbaijani Defence Minister Safar Abiyev
called for “a peace intervention by NATO” in connection with renewed fighting
in Nagorno-Karabakh. He had already offered NATO the use of Azeri air
installations for the Alliance's operations in Yugoslavia.
Europe is also well aware of the significance of the region. NATO General
Secretary Javier Solanas, who has visited the region twice in the past two
years, stated, “Europe cannot be totally secure as long as the Caucasus
states remain outside the borders of European security.”
Russian influence and CIS stability are also under threat from the Islamic
side. Because of the decline in Moscow's authority, President Rachmonov of
Tajikistan was forced to make further concessions to the Islamistic United
Tajik Opposition (UTO), which has controlled half of the shattered country
since the end of the five-year civil war in 1997. The opposition has close
relations to the Afghan Taliban militia, and in the latest conflict
opposition leader Nuri received four additional ministerial posts in the
coalition government that was formed after the civil war.
Uzbekistan, where a third of the population belongs to the ethnic Tadchikis
minority, fears for its future amid growing pressure from Tajikistan and an
increase in incidents on its short border with Afghanistan. Were Russia to
desert its neighbour Tajikistan, and the latter to fall into the hands of the
Islamists, Uzbekistan would hardly be in a position to defend its borders.
This is why Uzbekistan President Karimov is seeking to secure his rule with
the help of the US and GUUAM.
The only CIS state to maintain unconditional loyalty to Russia is White
Russia, whose economy has hit rock bottom. During the Soviet era White Russia
was closely integrated into the Russian economy and was known as the Russian
“tool-shop”. Today its economy is totally uncompetitive on the world market,
and its output has declined to less than 30 percent of the level in 1989.
Those seeking to determine the source of future military conflicts should
follow the flow of oil and gold. The ethnic conflicts encountered along the
way could well serve as the trigger for new NATO interventions.
*******
#8
Humanitarian Aid Faces Problems in Russia
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
26 June 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Anatoliy Grachev, Nikolay Senchev, Yegor Solovyev, and
Aleksandr Mozgovoy under the rubric "Special Issue: Echo of
Russia": "Here Is a Package for You From Your American
Uncle--Humanitarian Aid: What They Are Doing With It in the Provinces"
Ulyanovsk: They sent it to the dump.
The city dump near Ulyanovsk has received its latest victim. The
humanitarian freight addressed to the oblast Children's Home was hauled
there and destroyed.
There were a great many useful things on the list of objects which burned
with a blue flame. Around 10 kinds of shampoo alone. A considerable
number of different cleaning, bleaching, and disinfecting compounds,
toothbrushes, and chewing gum. Those who sent this humanitarian aid
apparently thought that the Ulyanovsk orphans' most urgent need was to
chew gum and brush their teeth.
However, that is not the point. A different question gnaws at us. Why was the
gift from across the sea thrown into the dump? This question is followed
by the suspicion: the goods were of course plundered, and they were
written up for destruction as unsuitable for use in order to hide the
evidence.
With these thoughts I set off for the Ulyanovsk customs office, which is
the first to be responsible for any freight the oblast receives from
other countries. Customs chief Ivan Gening laid a pile of documents on
the table which were supposed to prove one thing: because the
humanitarian aid fundamentally failed to meet various types of
requirements, there could be only one place for it, the dump.
That is exactly what happened in another recent case. American doctors
from the state of Oklahoma, where Ulyanovsk cardiac surgeon Aleksandr
Maltsev successfully went through practical training, sent a container
with humanitarian medical aid to his home institution, Oblast Hospital No
1. In addition to special books, hospital linen, bandages, and pills,
expensive and extremely hard-to-get surgical instruments were included in
the containers. The airplane crew of the Volga-Dnepr Airline Company
agreed to deliver this freight to Ulyanovsk free of charge. But then many
months of customs investigation began, since there were no accompanying
documents other than the list of goods.
"Let them put me against the wall, but I will never let any humanitarian
aid with such papers through," Ivan Gening says heatedly.
And it is not without reason that he gets excited. There was no
certificate for even one of the medicines or surgical instruments sent
from Oklahoma. The expiration date of most of the pills had passed. Some
of the disposable catheters had been used. Generally the customs office
in this case showed enviable patience. The customs officers agreed to
wait if the recipient of the humanitarian freight would take the trouble
to get certification. The management of Oblast Hospital No 1 tried. But
the set of prices they were given for conducting an expert study was such
that they lost any desire to appeal anywhere else. This story ended at
the dump with the burning of the shipment.
Kursk: They were forbidden to accept it.
Twenty-two letters to the most varied representatives of the executive and
legislative branches of power asking for help for the Kursk Branch of the
Red Cross produced no results.
But after all, they are not asking for much: to be exempted from
excessive taxes levied against the public organization as if it were a
commercial enterprise, to begin real cooperation, and to receive just a
little help with finances. Governor Aleksandr Rutskoy does not even admit
Red Cross representatives to see him at all. In his traditional trips
around the rayons, on the other hand, he promises the poor and those who
are trying to help them all kinds of assistance. But the assistance comes
only on paper. Or at times it turns into real opposition.
Not so very long ago, representatives of the city of Kurchatov, where
the Kursk AES [nuclear power plant] is located, asked Moscow for 5
million rubles [R] worth of humanitarian aid. Learning of this, the
governor general, who is famous for his categorical behavior, made the
initiators of this noble undertaking write explanations to him. What kind
of begging is this? he said. Apparently from his high post, the life of
people in Kurchatov seems sweet to Rutskoy. A rumor was even started that
the gallant governor had prohibited the acceptance of humanitarian aid on
Kursk Oblast territory.
But many establishments and organizations in Kursk are working on issues
of deliveries of humanitarian freight. And each in its own way. They
include the eparchy administration, social protection committees, and
enterprises. Unlike, say, Altay Kray, where a centralized commission
which includes all organizations interested in this (including law
enforcement organs) has been created to control all deliveries of aid for
poor strata of the population. And indeed this approach to the work gives
almost a 100-percent guarantee that when the "mercy packages" are
distributed, they all reach those who need them. When there are too many
cooks (or no cooks at all), it is not necessary to explain what is going on.
Bryansk: They gave with one hand and took it back with the other.
There were several telephone calls from the managers of agricultural
enterprises to Rossiyskaya Gazeta's correspondents' office in Bryansk.
They talked of only one thing--the humanitarian aid received from America
in the form of grain and meat products.
It would seem they should say thank you. But the managers ask this
question: "Why should we pay 5 percent of the wholesale price of the
humanitarian aid to an 'agent' and an 'operator'? That is no small amount!"
The managers' concern is completely justified. Let us take just one
example. For the aid allotted to it, the agricultural enterprise Snezhka
is supposed to lay out almost a million "live" rubles within 90 days.
During that time, with the grain they have received, the enterprise will
not manage to raise any poultry to sell and collect payment. In addition,
the prime cost of the output will rise, and so its price will too. That
will be a blow to the ordinary customer's lean purse.
Those leaders who take this aid for resale, that is speculation, may
benefit. But even here our very own customer is the loser. And who needs
that in the current economic and political situation?
As has become clear, the "agent" means the Moscow offices of
Raznoimport, Roskhleboprodukt, Rosmyasomoltorg, and Prodintorg. There are
so many of them sitting in their offices. And our poor agricultural
producer is supposed to give the money he earned by the sweat of his brow
to all of them. For what? For foreign aid?
The "operator" is the local freeloader represented by the officials of
the food corporation. We made the calculation and were astonished: the
remuneration for just a single one-time "aid package" comes to the annual
wage fund for almost half of the agricultural enterprises of Bryanskiy
Rayon. That is enough money to maintain the Bryansk Food Corporation for
2-3 years!
Therefore the managers of the struggling agricultural enterprises are asking
the Government to reduce the amount of altogether undeserved remuneration
to the "agent" and the "operator" to a sensible and economically
justified amount. Or to give the humanitarian aid as a commodity credit
for a year. Otherwise, as one of the directors who phoned the
correspondents' office put it: "Such aid, on the contrary, will strip the
agricultural producer bare." Arkhangelsk: The Red Cross did not let them
down.
Long before the scandal involving the Belgian dioxin chickens,
Arkhangelsk Oblast refused the European Union's humanitarian aid in the
form of poultry meat.
However, the reason here is not that the northern Pinkertons have better
information, but the normal work of the poultry factories built during
the times of the planned economy. At first the total amount of food aid
for Arkhangelsk Oblast from the European Union was set at the exact
amount of the federal transfer payment--R349 million.
The food received had to be sold quickly and within 15 to 90 days
transferred to the account of the Pension Fund of Russia. Those were very
strict conditions.
In the oblast the needs of all the municipal formations were studied
and those who could guarantee repayment of the capital through their
budgets were identified. It came out to be R56 million. The rest of the
food was refused, in order not to endanger the transfer payment money.
It is perhaps for that reason that in Arkhangelsk people devote more
attention to other humanitarian aid which comes under the aegis of the
Red Cross.
According to the chairman of its Arkhangelsk Branch, Valentina Badanina,
three
humanitarian aid programs are being implemented in the oblast. They are
programs with the Dutch Red Cross (worth $50,000), the Norwegian Red
Cross (worth $750,000), and the Norwegian Church (worth $600,000).
The recipients of the aid are strictly designated. For example, reports
in the form of lists of people (last name, first name, patronymic, and
residence) are sent to the Dutch Red Cross, and each of the persons signs
his name to confirm that he received the aid.
Of course, this aid will not solve all the problems of poor families,
but it is at least of some help anyway: they do not have to pay for
macaroni, oils, dry milk, and groats. They will squeeze by somehow and
find the kopecks for tea, buttons, and medicine... In other villages the
children do not go to school--there is only one pair of shoes for five
children. When 70 percent of the population is poor, getting something
free of charge is a joy and at times, salvation. After all, people are
going hungry in families where the adults are not loafers or parasites.
They are not to blame for anything. It is simply they are paid no money.
But the children have to be fed. One man at a blood transfusion station
was told that they could not accept his blood--his hemoglobin was low. So
he began to sob: it turned out that he had nothing to feed his child.
******
#9
CNN
War in Yugoslavia was wake-up call for Russian military
Russia's recent military exercises included more than 30 ships, several
submarines and 10,000 Russian troops
July 2, 1999
MOSCOW (CNN) -- The appearance of Russian bombers over the Atlantic Ocean
on the heels of NATO's successful bombing campaign against Yugoslavia
underscores Moscow's urgency to rescue its military from years of neglect.
NATO' air campaign -- in the heart of southeast Europe -- was a stark
reminder to Russia's generals of the growing disparity between its military
might and that of Western powers.
The Russian government has promised to boost military spending to 28.5
percent of the budget, or $6.7 billion. The United States has proposed a
defense budget of $280 billion for the coming year.
The appearance of two Russian "TU-95 Bear" bombers off the coast of Iceland
last week alarmed some Western governments. The long-range nuclear bombers
were part of larger exercises that included more than 30 ships, several
submarines and aircraft and 10,000 Russian troops.
"The West-99 military exercises, like all exercises, were planned a year in
advance, and they happened to coincide with events in Kosovo," said retired
Col. Viktor Baranetz a military affairs analyst.
Although Russia has avoided confrontation with the West since the end of
the Cold War, the NATO war on Yugoslavia may lead Moscow to pursue a
different course in the coming years.
Suspicions heightened that NATO is a threat
Russia's government has promised to boost military spending to 28.5% of the
budget
"The war undermined the perception that NATO is only for self-defense. And
that of course tremendously strengthened suspicion that NATO enlargement
threatens Russia," said Sergei Rogov, Director of the Institute of USA and
Canada Studies.
But Russia's military -- cut from 5 million personnel to 1.2 million in the
past decade -- has been humbled in recent years.
The army suffered tremendous losses at the hands of Islamic rebels in the
1994-1996 war in Chechnya and has not received any new weapons in years.
The air force has not received any new planes since 1992, and none are
expected before 2001. As a result of fuel shortages, Russian pilots average
25 hours of flying time a year, compared to at least 200 hours a year in
Western air forces.
More than 70 percent of Russia's warships and submarines are in need of
major repairs. Many sit idly in port as they continue to rust.
******
#10
Stratfor commentary
www.stratfor.com
1845 GMT, 990703 U.S. Wants No Surprises
According to the New York Times, the U.S. and its NATO allies have worked
to block Russian requests to use the airspace of Hungary, Romania and
Bulgaria to fly an expected ten plane-loads of peacekeepers into Slatina
airport in Pristina on July 4. After consultation with U.S. and NATO
officials, all three countries have denied the Russian requests. One reason
behind the delay, according to administration officials, is that terms of
the flights and technical details of the Helsinki Agreement, reached June
18, must be worked out before Russian troops can enter Kosovo. Talks
between Russian and NATO military officials ended without agreement last
week, amid reports that the Russians were attempting to renegotiate the
terms of their cooperation with NATO in Kosovo.
However, Washington had another reason for delaying the arrival of Russian
troops. According to the New York Times report, U.S. officials did not want
any surprises from Russia over the Independence Day holiday. Washington is
apparently confident Russia will not risk undermining progress made last
week toward disbursement of $4.5 billion in much needed IMF loans, and thus
will quietly accept the delay.
Washington’s desire to maintain stability over the Fourth of July weekend
is understandable. Many U.S. political and military personnel are
celebrating the holiday, leaving a skeleton crew to deal with crises. And
Russia has surprised the U.S. twice in the past few weeks – rushing into
Pristina ahead of NATO troops and forcing NATO jets to scramble as Russian
bombers skirted Norway and Iceland. But Russia’s capacity to surprise is
not limited to Kosovo. Nor is it limited to obvious tactical military
maneuvers. In fact, what Russia could conceivably attempt with ten
planeloads of troops in Kosovo is far less significant than what Boris
Yeltsin can accomplish at his country home outside Moscow.
On July 4, President Yeltsin will meet with his Ukrainian counterpart,
Leonid Kuchma, to address recent setbacks in Russian-Ukrainian relations.
In particular, Yeltsin will question Ukraine’s temporary decision to close
its airspace to Russian aircraft attempting to reinforce Russian troops in
Kosovo. With NATO members and aspirants Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria
blocking Russian overflight, Ukraine’s decision emphasized NATO’s
encirclement of Russia, prompting Yeltsin to call Kuchma on the carpet.
Washington may have avoided tactical surprise this weekend in Kosovo by
reinforcing its encirclement of Russia. But the impression of confrontation
and hostility this move generated may only bolster Russia’s desire to hand
NATO a strategic surprise, asserting overwhelming pressure to bring Ukraine
back into Russia’s sphere of influence.
*******
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