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CDI Library > Johnson's Russia List

Johnson's Russia List
 

 

June 30, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3368 3369 3370 


Johnson's Russia List
#3369
30 June 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Photo Show Highlights U.S.,Soviets.
2. Moskovskiy Komsomolets: Swiss Prosecutors Send Skuratov More 
'Kompromat' 

3. NTV: Chubays Comments on Changes at UES.
4. Charlier Christophe: legal system information.
5. The Russia Journal: Gregory Feifer, Daily life in Russia today: 
new fear of a police state.

6. Stratfor's Third Quarter Forecast. (Re Russia-China alliance).
7. Moscow Times EDITORIAL: Communists Are Useless, Not Extreme.
8. Gregory Kozlovsky: Murder with Idealistic Face.]

*******

#1
Photo Show Highlights U.S.,Soviets 
By Carl Hartman
June 30, 1999

WASHINGTON (AP) -- American and Soviet citizens led vastly different lives
in the 1930s, but they shared many hardships and experiences --
resemblances highlighted in a new show at the Washington's Corcoran Gallery
of Art. 

Both Josef Stalin's Communist dictatorship and President Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal sent out photographers to record their propaganda and
their people's dreams. 

Some of the results are on view come Saturday at the Corcoran. 

``They danced, and we danced,'' wrote Leah Bendavid-Val, the American who
put the pictures together. ``They built dams and steel mills, planted and
harvested and went hungry, nursed their children, and so did we.'' 

As part of the New Deal drive to lift the country out of the Great
Depression, photographers were sent out and came back with pictures showing
just how depressed much of the country was. 

And Soviet photographers snapped shots that belied Kremlin propaganda about
communism's ``workers' paradise.'' 

Dorothea Lange took one of the most famous of the American photos, a sad
migrant farm woman in Nipomo, Calif., nursing a large baby. 

``Seven hungry children, mother aged 32,'' said the photographer's note. 

Ms. Bendavid-Val found a matching photo taken by Arkady Shaikhet, who
worked for official Soviet publications, on a farm near a village outside
Moscow. There is no indication that either photographer suspected the
other's existence. 

Other images reflect more optimism -- a couple sitting around a monumental
1939 radio in a house they were buying on the installment plan in Hidalgo
County, Texas, and an ecstatic young tuba player in Moscow's Red Square. 

``Underlying the photographs in both countries were the firmly held beliefs
that hard, consuming work was not demeaning but elevating, that machines
meant progress, and that government public works could make people's lives
better,'' Ms. Bendavid-Val said. 

But in her catalogue is a warning from Librarian of Congress James H.
Billington, an expert on the Soviet Union. The library cooperated on the
collection, and organizers hope it will be shown in Russia as well. 

``The USSR was using photography to create Utopian hopes that masked
massive repression that verged on governmental genocide against large
numbers of its own people,'' Billington wrote. ``The U.S.A. was trying to
rediscover its better self in the wake of an economic depression by
commissioning artists to depict the real face of their country. 

``Photography, however, shows only carefully chosen slices of reality, and
it can conceal as well as reveal.'' 
------ 
``Propaganda and Dreams: Photographing the 1930s in the USSR and the US''
will be at the Corcoran Gallery of Art through Oct. 3. The gallery suggests
a donation of $3 from adults, $1 from older people and students, $5 for
groups of any size. 

*******

#2
Swiss Prosecutors Send Skuratov More 'Kompromat' 

Moskovskiy Komsomolets
24 June 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Commentary by Aleksandr Khinshteyn: "We Don't Need a Swiss Beret. 
Skuratov Prevented From Traveling Yet Again" -- title is adaptation of a 
popular song about the futility of foreign travel 

The Kremlin has conferred "pariah status" on Yuriy 
Skuratov once and for all. It is making a completely open show of its 
hostility toward the general prosecutor; there is no question of 
observing the decencies. 

Before Skuratov had even managed to recoil from the ruling of the Supreme 
Court, which overturned the verdict of the Moscow court that had ruled as 
illegal and unjustified the institution of criminal proceedings against 
the prosecutor, a new misfortune befell him. 

Yesterday he tried yet again to fly to Switzerland to meet with Swiss 
Confederation Attorney General Carla del Ponte. Once again the trip was 
called off. 

Skuratov himself told Moskovskiy Komsomolets observers in a telephone 
conversation that the trip had been aborted on the initiative of the 
Russian Foreign Ministry. Minister Ivanov sent an official protest note 
to the Swiss Foreign Ministry, claiming that since Skuratov has been 
removed from office, he does not have the right to make official visits. 
Skuratov was, however, offered the option of a compromise: to travel abroad 
as a private individual. Obviously, if the prosecutor agreed to play by 
the Kremlin's rules (since there are two invitations for him in the Swiss 
Embassy -- an official one and a private one) he would thereby be 
acknowledging himself to be an outcast. Skuratov did not want to endure 
the humiliation and preferred to stay in Russia. 

Let me recall that a similar incident happened several weeks ago, when 
Skuratov was invited to Switzerland for a European congress of crime 
fighters. The authorities delayed issuing Skuratov with a foreign-travel 
passport until the last day. Finally, when the congress was already 
drawing to a close, the Kremlin apparently had a fit of generosity, but 
at the last moment the passport was taken away from the prosecutor and 
his Swiss visa canceled. According to my information, this intrigue was 
the work of the not unknown [Internal Affairs Minister] Vladimir 
Rushaylo. 

The president's innermost circle has something to fear. It is the 
materials held by the Swiss prosecutor's office on functionaries' bank 
accounts that are the true reason for Skuratov's disgrace. They cannot 
allow Skuratov and Del Ponte to finally get together. 

Meanwhile, Moskovskiy Komsomolets has learned that the latest consignment of 
Swiss "kompromat" [compromising material] arrived in Moscow last week. 

Very, very curious. 

That means the show goes on....

*******

#3
Chubays Comments on Changes at UES 

NTV
June 25, 1999
[translation for personal use only]

[Presenter Tatyana Mitkova] Shareholders in Russian 
Joint-Stock Company Unified Energy System [UES] at their meeting have 
elected Aleksandr Voloshin, head of the presidential administration, 
chairman of the board of directors. 
Anatoliy Chubays retained the post of chief executive. Observers remark
that 
this is a success for Chubays, who today markedly strengthened his 
position today. 
Our special correspondent Vladimir Kondratyev reports from Konakovo. 
[Begin recording] [Correspondent] The results of today's meeting were 
predetermined when President [Boris] Yeltsin signed an instruction and 
essentially gave the command not just to leave Chubays in the post of 
chief executive but to make it basically impossible to remove him. 
They were saying in the corridors at Konakovo's House of Culture that 
this means all attempts by [tycoon Boris] Berezovskiy to get rid of his 
main rival have ended in complete failure. 
Until today the company's management system was constructed like this. 
Shareholders elected the board of directors, the majority of whom belong 
to the government, since it has a controlling stake of 52 per cent of 
shares, and the board named the chief executive. 
Last year, Chubays gained this post for five years after a tense 
confrontation. The board of directors could really sack Chubays at any 
moment, including today. Chubays' enemies predicted yesterday that his 
run was over. 
Matters at UES were said to be getting worse and worse, the company had 
built a debt pyramid like the government's t-bill one, intermediary 
companies essentially involved in theft were flourishing within it, 
Chubays was allegedly using UES's money to support the Right Cause 
movement and so on. 
But the finale to the intrigues turned out to be completely different. 
Formally, foreign shareholders sympathetic to Chubays - Bank of New York, 
Deutsche Bank and others - came up with an initiative to retain Chubays. 
The hold a third of all the shares in the world's second biggest power 
company. 
Frequent rotations prevent investment planning and give birth to
uncertainty 
in the West, so it was proposed to name the chief executive at a 
shareholders' general meeting with no less than 75 per cent of votes. 
Yeltsin in the end backed this initiative, and the government ordered its 
representatives at UES to vote for the corresponding changes to the 
charter. Now even if the state wants to get rid of Chubays, foreign 
investors can easily block the decisions. 
Chubays is naturally happy and was talking about mutual understanding with 
the presidential administration, [Prime Minister Sergey] Stepashin, 
[First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolay] Aksenenko and Voloshin, who will 
take the post of chairman of the UES board of directors. 
[Chubays] I would apparently have to make a separate report for each name
on a 
list like this. But it would be better if I answer about the heart of the 
matter. As regards the officials from the government and presidential 
administration who were named, I have the closest working relations with 
them. 
But to be honest, what is there to hide, I know them all personally 
quite well and for a long time, and relations are fine in the personal 
sense. 
But the most important thing is that in my work there have been almost 
no cases with any of the government or presidential administration 
officials named where we raised issues significant for the company and 
they were not resolved. We are understood. 
[Correspondent] When did you last meet Boris Berezovskiy? 
[Chubays] I last met Boris Abramovich [Berezovskiy] about three or four
months 
ago, I think. 
[Correspondent] Even the Duma acknowledges Chubays' success. 
[Vyacheslav Ovchenko, member of the State Duma committee for industry, 
construction, transport and power engineering, Our Home is Russia 
faction] It is natural that Chubays' positions were strengthened after 
this operation was carried out. 
[Correspondent] Do you have any information on how this operation was
carried out? 
[Ovchenko] [chuckles] I have this information but I will not talk about it. 
[Correspondent] Everyone is saying openly that Berezovskiy has suffered a
defeat, 
that he was against this, but nevertheless President Yeltsin signed the 
instruction. 
[Ovchenko] Yes, I have this instruction in my possession, I have seen it,
one 
could say I have it in my pocket, so I am aware of this instruction. 
[Correspondent] Chubays has proved that he can skillfully orient himself
in any 
situation. He has split the Kremlin Family. That is the 'Kommersant' 
newspaper's conclusion today. 
This assessment could be premature. But there is no doubt that any branch 
of power will now have to reckon with Chubays. Chubays is here for the 
long haul. [end recording] 
[Video shows Chubays addressing the shareholders' meeting, delegates, 
Ovchenko] 

*******

#4
From: Charlier Christophe <CCharlier@lvfinance.com>
Subject: legal system information
Date: Wed, 30 Jun 1999 

In light of all of the discussions regarding the quality of the Russian
legal system, I have decided to catch up on the Russian Constitution and
laws (both commercial law (Joint Stock Company, Privatization, Limited
Liability, etc.) and laws detailing relations among the subjects of the
Russian Federation). Can anyone recommend where I could find copies of
the Constitution and other laws in English in Moscow? I would also be
interested in internet sites containing such information.

Thank you in advance for you help.
Chris
Christophe F. Charlier
Vice President
LV Finance
ccharlier@lvfinance.com
Tel. 7 095 258-4342
Fax 7 095 258-4344

*******

#5
The Russia Journal
June 29-July 5, 1999
Daily life in Russia today: new fear of a police state
Rule of law, if used for show and taken to extremes, creates the conditions 
for zealous and arbitrary abuse of power.
The economy is in a shambles, scandals abound in the government, but the 
country can find money to fund MVD soldiers to arbitrarily harass the 
populace on the streets of Moscow.
Gregory Feifer/The Russia Journal 

Driving home one night last week in a cab in Moscow's center, a couple of 
friends and I passed some Interior Ministry (MVD) policemen lounging in the 
back seat of their Lada. The cops jumped into the front seats, screeched 
forward and pulled us over, demanding to see our passports. I'd forgotten 
mine as had one of my friends, and I was forced out of the car by a 
machine-gun wielding 18-year-old hulk.

"You've broken the law," he smiled, fingering his firearm. "You'll have to 
come down to the station."

I didn't budge.

"Why don't you have your documents?" he asked, his smile fading.

"I don't carry it at night," I lied, "because it's dangerous. If I'm robbed, 
it's safer to have my passport lying at home."

"What!? Are you calling Russians thieves!" he shouted.

"No, I'm not."

"Then where's your passport? Get in our car. We're going to the station."

"I'm not going anywhere until I call my embassy first," I replied, knowing 
full well that MVD goons have the right to lock those without their documents 
in jail for up to eight hours.

"Who are you to tell us what to do? Who do you think you are?"

The exchange continued for 15 minutes, ending when the cop told us to drive 
off before he arrested us all.

These kinds of stories are all too common in Moscow - I was lucky that my 
policy of making it too bothersome for someone in uniform to either exact a 
bribe or make himself understood paid off.

But there was something in the policeman's manner I hadn't seen before: a 
real trigger-happy, power-wielding aggressiveness. He was only doing his job, 
he informed me, but the kick he got out of harassing a foreigner was clear.

It might seem paradoxical that a state with a crumbled economy, 
scandal-ridden politics and an overwhelmingly poverty-stricken population 
spends funds on MVD foot soldiers to arbitrarily stop people on the streets 
and hassle the populace.

But it is precisely the state's burgeoning and oppressive bureaucracy that 
creates the conditions necessary for crime and corruption to thrive. Without 
Russia's massive state structure, there would be much less of a "shadow" 
economy that functions to work around the system. And without the black and 
grey markets, it would not be possible to funnel cash in the form of bribes 
and kickbacks to the cadres of bureaucrats and police. "Law-enforcers" are 
not really interested in enforcing the law. They are part of a system that 
feeds on the society, giving work to thousands.

And that system would not work without the real enforcer: fear.

Certainly not the Stalinist system's fear, needless to say, but something 
related.

Ever since the Russian empire began to expand, particularly during the 17th 
century, Moscow could not effectively control the lands it acquired, nor the 
bureaucracy it took to run them.

The only way to keep the administration running was to instill the fear of 
punishment; hence the loud public executions and stories of severe punishment 
for criticizing the tsar that figure largely in the western image of Russia.

Many believed the state's facade, especially foreigners.

And now the state is once again increasingly resorting to similar tactics. 
The most dangerous aspect of the show of rule of law is that it creates the 
conditions for zealous and arbitrary abuse of power, the kind exercised by 
the Bolsheviks after the Revolution. The state's agents are given the freedom 
to exercise their power at will.

That power, sanctioned from the top, is still considerable today and is most 
often used to generate cash. The state controls most public utilities and 
services. And many Russian enterprises still function as they did under 
Soviet rule.

That functioning is essentially of the most inefficient type of bureaucracy, 
something Russia has honed to perfection over the past 70 years, but which 
has deep roots in tsarist Russia's behavior.

Needless to say, corruption and abuse of power exist everywhere. But whereas 
in the West, a critical mass of the population essentially lives by rule of 
law, in Russia, the opposite is true. One's professional position does not 
necessarily reflect promotion after good work done. Rather, official 
positions very often reflect Russia's real infrastructure: its system of 
informal networks.

Officials' positions reflect status, not vice-versa. In the Soviet Union, 
bureaucrats saw their offices as something to milk for personal use (just as 
entire enterprises and sectors saw their goal as trying to gain as much from 
the central planning apparatus in raw materials and subsidies).

Police today are no different: Everyone in Moscow knows they in effect live 
on bribes; every driver knows he will at some point be arbitrarily stopped by 
the traffic police and asked for money that goes straight into officers' 
pockets and not the Treasury.

That kind of activity has been going on for decades. The difference today is 
the xenophobic zeal with which police carry out their tasks. It is as if 
Russia's informal system of corruption and networks is becoming official, 
openly flouted.

It is perhaps no accident that former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko - who 
recently declared he would run for the seat of Moscow mayor - said several 
weeks ago that an increasing number of politicians are becoming afraid of 
criticizing Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov.

That powerful political boss, who many think will become Russia's next 
president, is a key figure in Russia's political system whose spheres of 
influence func-tion much like the old, informal Soviet client/patron 
relationships.

Mayor Luzhkov uses tradition-al mechanisms to control the city like a 
fiefdom, and he keeps the players in his network and their motives obscured 
by his populist policies (such as putting more police on the streets to crack 
down - not necessarily on crime - though certainly on people without their 
passports).

As the country remains mired in its ongoing financial crisis, the tendency to 
revert to behavior that traditionally produces social stability is 
increasing. The chief tool is fear, and it has only just begun to grow in 
post-Soviet Russia.

*********

#6
Stratfor's Third Quarter Forecast
June 27, 1999
www.stratfor.com

Stratfor's organizing theme for its 1999 Annual Forecast is found
in the title: "A New and Dangerous World." That concept remains
valid and the fundamental trends identified within that theme
remain intact. The most important trend identified in that
forecast has now become manifest. We wrote that "Russia and China
will be moving into a closer, primarily anti-American alliance in
1999." That process is the most important global trend today. It
is well under way and is also intensifying.

It should be understood that this trend was not put into play
because of the Kosovo crisis, although it is clear that it was
intensified and accelerated by it. Indeed, Stratfor's ability to
predict the Kosovo crisis in its 1999 Annual Forecast was
predicated on this trend already being in place. A critical
element in Milosevic's strategy was his view that the deteriorating
relationship between Russia and the United States had opened a
window of opportunity for dealing with the Kosovo situation. It
was precisely because Milosevic saw this process in Russian foreign
policy as already under way that he took the risks he did. At the
same time, Milosevic's failure to allow U.S.-Russian tensions to
mature opened Serbia to a partial reversal in Russian policy that
left him in a series of untenable positions.

The split between Russia and China on one hand and the United
States on the other has still not fully matured. Therefore, the
response, a Sino-Russian alliance, has not yet fully taken shape.
Nevertheless, matters are rapidly moving in that direction.
Therefore, it is our view that the single most important global
theme of the Third Quarter of 1999 will be fairly quiet, yet
intense, diplomacy between Russia and China as they explore the
precise meaning and implementation of their strategic relationship.
A summit meeting will take place in Beijing between Boris Yeltsin
and Jiang Zemin some time this summer or autumn. The precise date
is not altogether certain at this point. There are two reasons for
this uncertainty. First, and most important, there is a tremendous
amount of work to be done at the ministerial level and below prior
to the summit. It is one thing to speak of a strategic alliance.
It is another thing to implement one. There are some real issues
outstanding between Russia and China. Second, both Russia and
China will use the available time to try to extract concessions
from the United States and the West in general, under the
assumption that they will be eager to prevent a Sino-Russian
alliance from solidifying. Both of these reasons point to a fairly
slow process.

There are fundamental geopolitical issues that need to be resolved
by the Russians and Chinese. The most important of these is the
status of the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union.
China is experiencing substantial unrest from Moslem groups in its
Xinjiang province. These groups are drawing support from, at
least, elements within predominantly Moslem states of the former
Soviet Union, and perhaps from some of the states themselves.
China clearly wants Russia's help in dealing with that problem.
Russia, however, is hesitant at this point to get bogged down in
pacifying the region. Yet, at the same time that it is hesitant,
there is a growing movement inside of Russia that regards the
collapse of the Soviet Union as a monumental error and which dreams
of its geographic, if not institutional, resurrection. We think
these forces are gaining strength, which means that there is
growing support for a more expansionary Russian foreign policy.
The geopolitics of the region may actually be a force pulling
Russian hard-liners and Beijing closer together.

A more important issue on the table is what the alliance will mean
in relation to the United States. The purpose of the alliance is
twofold. First, it is to create a counter-weight to the United
States that would force the U.S. to take Russia and China
seriously. The second purpose would be to provide a focal point
for secondary states looking for a safe haven from American power,
which would, in turn, enhance the power of the Sino-Russian bloc.
What this means in practical terms is unclear. It might range from
a general policy of coordination to a mutual defense pact pledging
each side to support the others' wars. Neither side wants to be
excessively exposed to the adventures and vulnerabilities of the
other. At the same time, too loose a relationship leaves room for
manipulation. Thus, this summer will be devoted to very quiet and
very important discussions in Moscow and Beijing aimed at defining
the relationship in concrete terms. The goal is clear: to have a
summit conference sealing the relationship no later than mid-autumn
and hopefully sooner-perhaps by the end of the summer.

There is an important second reason for delay. Neither Russia nor
China want to burn their bridges with the West. Quite the
contrary, each is using the threat of a Sino-Russian alliance as a
lever to extract concessions from the United States. At the very
least, they do not want a split with the United States to turn into
a generalized confrontation with the West. Russia, in particular,
is engaged in a complex game in which it is using its ability to
create and solve problems for NATO, and the United States, as a
tool for solving its own massive financial problems through Western
loans, aid, and investment. China has plunged its relations into
the deep-freeze with the United States as well, but continues to
hope that U.S. fears of having to confront a Sino-Russian alliance
will cause the United States to redefine its relationship with
China on terms more favorable to China. Both Russia and China want
time to explore ways to use the threat of an alliance to extract
concessions. Each sees the very process of negotiations as being a
useful tool for extracting U.S. concessions. This means that there
is a real element of distrust between China and Russia concerning
the other's commitment to the idea of strategic alliance that needs
to be overcome. All this takes time.

In our view, the strategy of using the threat of alliance to
extract concessions from the United States will fail and the
alliance will form. Here are some of our reasons for thinking
this:

*The very process of using the Sino-Russian negotiations as a tool
for extracting concessions is creating the opposite effect in
Washington from what Moscow and Beijing want. The very slowness of
the process, coupled with periodic overtures, particularly from
Russia, is convincing Washington that neither the Russians nor
Chinese are serious. Therefore, the United States will not be
forthcoming and the process will indeed end in an anti-American
alliance.

*Yeltsin has limited room for maneuver vis-a-vis the West. While
his ability to manipulate Moscow's political structure is awesome,
every tack takes him away from reform and further toward the
conservative position. Primakov may have been sacked, but Yeltsin
could only go as far as Stepashin for a replacement. The days of a
Kiriyenko are past. Each twist and turn confirms the main trend.

*The ability of NATO to get Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and for a
time, Ukraine, to agree to prohibit overflights to reinforce
Pristina, has driven home Russia's geopolitical isolation to the
Russian military. The military understands that it is powerless to
influence events in Central Europe but it also understands it can
influence events along Russia's own periphery, in areas where the
Russian military still has the upper hand and NATO and the U.S. are
relatively weak. The pressure to reassert Russian power along
Russia's periphery is extremely strong and will be hard to resist.
That will increase tensions with the United States and decrease
possibilities for accommodation.

*Russian needs and Western resources are completely out of synch.
No amount of money can save the Russian economy-certainly no amount
that the West would be rationally prepared to invest. We have no
doubt that all sorts of hints and promises were made during the
last days of the Kosovo war to induce Russian compliance. It
suited Yeltsin's short-term political interests to believe those
promises. Nothing substantial will come of it, beyond a few
billion dollars of no real consequence.

*China's demands on the United States are essentially undefined and
indefinable. The bottom line is that China wants to go back to the
good old days of ample capital flows. These have dried up for
economic, rather than political reasons. While Asia is recovering
somewhat, we see this as a cyclical upturn in a long-term down
trend. It will not substantially change Western investors' lack of
appetite for Chinese investments and loans.

*One of China's demands is a basic change of the atmospherics in
Washington to help facilitate China's access to potential American
financial partners. The problem is that the atmosphere is not
being defined by the Administration, which has lost control over
its China policy. The Administration's opponents are in control of
the mood toward China in Washington. They do not want to see a
thaw while Clinton remains in office.

*Which brings us to the most important point. A scandal-weary
Washington is facing a summer of foreign policy scandals. The
China spy scandal shows every sign of exploding again, as
revelations this weekend show that the Administration clearly knew
about Chinese espionage in 1995 and did nothing about it. This
weekend also brought Kofi Annan's statement that it appears that
the U.S. used UN cover for espionage against Iraq. The U.S.
continues to bomb Iraq, toward no clear end. The Kosovo situation
is promising to reside somewhere between instability and chaos. As
elections approach, the Republicans will do everything possible to
exploit these problems. This will lead to a serious lock-down in
the Washington policy-making apparatus.

We therefore expect that the Third Quarter of 1999 will bring
Russia and China to the brink, if not over the edge, of a formal
alliance whose goal will be to contain American power and provide a
counterbalance to American geopolitical power.

Europe will be left in a particularly uncomfortable position. On
one hand, Europe's interests are intimately linked with those of
the United States. On the other hand, Europe has much greater
vulnerability than the U.S. to tensions within the international
system. As such, Europe is inherently more risk averse. A
conservative, assertive evolution in Russian politics will leave
countries like Germany with major strategic challenges with which
it doesn't want to deal. The weaknesses of NATO's geography, where
Hungary is physically isolated from any other NATO country and in
which strategic countries like Romania are outside the alliance, is
something that comes to the fore only when there is confrontation
with Russia. Ongoing confrontation will mean the need for rapid
and dangerous evolutions in NATO. This is something that the
Europeans do not want to see happen. Aside from the costs inherent
in expanding NATO, NATO expansion logically means EU expansion.
With the euro doing so poorly, and an emerging cyclical weakness in
Europe's economy, this is not something the Europeans want to deal
with now.

Therefore, France and Germany will be working throughout the summer
to get the United States to respond to the evolution of events in
Moscow and Beijing. They will be joined by Japan, which does not
want to see itself trapped between China and the United States
while struggling with its economic problems. Thus, a secondary
round of diplomacy can be expected within the Western alliance as
the second tier powers try to find a way to focus Washington's
attention on the unfolding reality. We expect them to fail.
Washington will be utterly self-absorbed this summer. In failing,
we expect to see a new process emerge. Countries like Japan and
Germany, rather than simply marching in lock-step with Washington,
will start to search for means to establish some sort of political
neutrality between the new China-Russia alliance and the United
States, while still maintaining economic ties with the United
States. As the Sino-Russian situation solidifies, the Western
alliance will become more fluid. Indeed, one of the strategies of
a Sino-Russian alliance will be to use German and Japanese fears of
a new confrontation to create both fluidity and opportunities for
favorable economic relations with these increasingly insecure
countries. Germany is particularly vulnerable, given its fairly
harrowing experience following the American lead in Kosovo.

In short, the inevitable readjustment in the international system
will be nearing fruition during the summer of 1999. American power
from 1989-1999 was simply too overwhelming economically,
politically, and militarily to endure. It led to risk-taking and
carelessness that while not exposing the United States to major
risk, did expose others. These others inevitably are working to
create a counterbalance to the United States in order to increase
control over it. The process will not be confined to the Eurasian
powers, Russia and China, but will extend to more traditional
allies, who will redefine and modify their behavior to take
advantage of the new geopolitical reality.

There are, of course, issues not directly connected to this main
theme that will be of importance during the Third Quarter of 1999:

*The Indonesian elections seem to be promising a dangerously
ambiguous outcome. The leading candidate, Megawati, may well not
be able to form a government or, if successful, may not be able to
govern because of the political configuration. We judge the risks
to be not only high, but also an opportunity for Chinese-American
competition as each tries to influence events in this strategic
country.

*The United States still regularly conducts minor air attacks on
Iraq. The purpose of these attacks is unclear and they seem to be
going on more out of habit than out of a coherent strategy with a
clear goal. We do not think that this situation can go on
indefinitely. Since this is a domestic political issue as well as
a foreign policy issue, we expect a major review of U.S. policy on
Iraq during the Third Quarter, triggered by political criticisms of
the ongoing and endless air campaign.

*The tension within Iran is rising once again, with moderates and
traditionalists locked in an endless battle that does not seem able
to resolve itself or go away. As Russia's presence in the Caucasus
Mountains increases over the summer, these two issues will begin to
intersect.

*We do not regard the Asian recovery as a reversal of the main
trend. This is particularly true in Japan, where the basic issues
that caused the banking collapse have not been dealt with.

The post-Cold War world is over. We are now deep into the
transition to a new era.

********

#7
Moscow Times
June 30, 1999 
EDITORIAL: Communists Are Useless, Not Extreme 

Out of nowhere on Tuesday, Boris Yeltsin announced his disappointment with 
his loyal justice minister, Pavel Krasheninnikov. In a creepy bit of 
reasoning, Yeltsin noted that he had asked Krasheninnikov to look into 
possible violations of the law and the Constitution by the Communist Party f 
yet strangely, the president complained, Krasheninnikov has not reported any 
such violations. 

This was yet another thinly veiled threat to outlaw the Communist Party as 
extremists. Yeltsin floats them from time to time. 

Given the genocidal history of the Soviet Communist Party, one might assume 
that being a Russian Communist today would be an extreme position. But it's 
not. The new Communists are not fiery internationalists, but tired, 
conservative, petulantly xenophobic mediocrities. 

Under Gennady Zyuganov this party has been cowardly and collaborationist. 
It's not dangerous; it's just sort of useless. It votes for Yeltsin's budgets 
and prime ministers and jealously guards its own meager perks f even as it 
fades into further irrelevance because its elderly electorate is steadily 
dying. 

In fact, the best thing that can be said about the party is that it has 
actually helped dampen extremism. In October 1993, for example, Zyuganov 
refused to lead his followers onto the streets of Moscow. And in 1996, 
Zyuganov graciously conceded defeat at the polls to Yeltsin f even as he 
complained, correctly, that the fairness of the election was in doubt because 
Yeltsin's team exerted improper influence over media and spent well beyond 
the legal campaigning limits. 

So why is Yeltsin supposedly now concerned about "extremism" among the 
Communists? Because they encouraged a few misguided individuals to volunteer 
to go commit atrocities in Kosovo? That was certainly an ugly moment, even 
for this ugly party. But if that was what had Yeltsin worried he would also 
be going after his other kept opposition, the LDPR. 

No, Yeltsin is threatening the Communists because Yeltsin himself needs a 
political crisis (another one!). This latest Red-baiting has to do with 
Yeltsin's political extremism, not Zyuganov's. 

Lately, some have dusted off claims that Yeltsin f having failed at so much 
else f sees his chance at historical glory in removing Lenin from Red Square 
and formally burying the Communist Party. Some argue hopefully that Yeltsin 
wants to resign and will do so f if only he can accomplish those goals. 

But if that's so, a frustrated Yeltsin will surely find that he can't kill
by decree the nation's most popular party. Burying Lenin and
Zyuganov won't provide a reason to resign f more likely, it will be
added to the laundry list of reasons why Yeltsin won't want to go 

********

#8
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 1999 
From: kly@olsen.ch (Gregory Kozlovsky) 
Subject: Murder with Idealistic Face

Murder with Idealistic Face
---------------------------
By Gregory Kozlovsky, Zurich
Email: kly@aya.yale.edu

An experienced police investigator, who saw it all, normally is not
emotionally moved seeing a crime scene. But even an experienced police
investigator used to seeing most gruesome murders is sometimes shocked
by a particularly vile slaughter. Even a police investigator who
usually does not have personal animosity toward most monstrous criminal,
on certain occasions, feels intense personal anger. Likewise, there are
cases when even a seasoned observer of the media, who is used to reading
most outrageous lies, hypocrisy, and propaganda, feels deeply nauseated
after reading a particularly repulsive piece.

So I felt reading recent article by Michael Wines, "Two Views of
Inhumanity Split the World, Even in Victory" (New York Times, June 13,
1999). In a quick salvo, targeted as precisely as the bombing of a
pharmaceutical factory in Sudan, Wines presents his view of current
events on the Balkans.

Fifty-four years after the Holocaust revelations, America and
Europe had finally said "enough," and struck a blow against a
revival of genocide.
...
Germany was exorcising a few of its Nazi ghosts. Human rights had
been elevated to a military priority and a pre-eminent Western
value.
...
The war only underscored the deep ideological divide
between an idealistic New World bent on ending inhumanity and an
Old World equally fatalistic about unending conflict.

I wonder if Mr. Wines, read recent admission by Clinton of the US
complicity in murder of two hundred thousand civilians, mainly Mayan
peasants in Guatemala? Here is what CNN wrote in its dispatch from
Guatemala City (March 10, 1999).

A Guatemalan truth commission last month told of
state-sponsored genocide and massacres in one of the
harshest rebukes of the horrors of the conflict between
the army and leftist insurgents, which ended in 1996.

The commission also said U.S. military aid and Central
Intelligence Agency advisers played a pivotal role in the
bloodshed.

Accepting a share of responsibility for the murders, Clinton said:

"For the United States, it is important that I state
clearly that the support for military forces or
intelligence units which engaged in violent and
widespread repression ... was wrong."

Now, what about this inhumanity? Does Mr. Wines excuse it
because Clinton lied and it never happened, or because this murder of
two hundred thousand people happened in the past and now America is
different, or because American-sponsored two hundred thousand murders
in Guatemala were "idealistic", unlike ten thousand
alleged murders in Kosovo which were "genocide?" I intentionally will not
cite here other massacres committed in the last fifty years by "an
idealistic New World bent on ending inhumanity" directly or using
foreign mercenaries. Martin Luther King, Jr., opinion was that "The
greatest purveyor of violence on earth is my own government." However,
I don't want to start here a discussion on how many were
killed in Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, in the United States themselves,
and many other places, what are the proofs, how excusable these crimes
were, and how do these crimes compare to crimes of other nations. Let's
stick to Guatemala. Here we have a fact, long claimed by people like
Professor Chomsky, which was finally admitted by President Clinton
himself. Clinton's admission of guilt does not mean, of course, that
"violent and widespread repression" (which is better described as mass
murder) by the US and its surrogates is a thing of the past.

Consistent bias in New York Times coverage is nothing new, it was
exposed in Herman and Chomsky book "Manufacturing Consent." I never saw
any attempts to discredit their work and it is hard to imagine how it
can be done, because their analysis is based on a careful study of
specifics of coverage of particular events rather than on empty
rhetoric. However, even biased coverage can be done on certain
intellectual and literary level. Ramblings of Mr. Wines look like
something straight out of grey corridors of the Ministry of Truth.

Put baldly, there is also a yawning gap between the West and much
of the world on the value of a single life.

What about two hundred thousand lives in Guatemala, were they of no
value, or did Clinton lie about them? Did it happen too long ago? How
about more recent events?

What do you call people who bomb a bridge on a market day, full of
civilians, and when come back to kill those who help the wounded, as
it happened in Yugoslavian city of Varvarin in May? If this is not a
war crime what is? NATO military was acting from almost complete safety,
not having their families harmed by the Serbs in any way, so they do not
have any excuse. They simply used civilians for shooting practice. If
this is not a crime against humanity what is? Who are those responsible
for this inhumanity? Are they in chains awaiting trial?

Now Wines has to admit that not everything is as it should have been in
his Brave New World. There are people, whom Wines can not easily
dismiss as being hopelessly backward, who do not buy his view of the
world.

But this war's epiphany may be that a lot of people around
the world who drink Guinness, buy I.B.M. preferred and drive
Audis just don't buy into Western notions of rights and
responsibilities.

Or those ingrates, who bite the invisible hand which feeds them! Why
is not every foreigner who speaks English and uses computers is not
like Nemtsov or Chubais? The right to drink Guinness apparently have to
be balanced by a responsibility to take unlimited hypocrisy of Mr.
Wines for deep and sincere analysis of world events.

Fortunately, there are still in Russia plenty of descendants of this
long tradition of people who hate and detest all things Russian no
matter what. Their favorite exclamation is "Russia will never become
a normal country?" They attribute to the West fantastic attributes,
which no human society ever possessed. Western correspondents use code
word "intellectuals" to describe this group. Wines has no trouble
finding his own Russian intellectual.

"It's the concept that the state as an entity is much more
important than the life of one human being," said Yevgenia
Albats, an author and independent journalist who writes about
human rights issues here. "Pinochet is a hero in the press
here. For a lot of writers, the fact that he killed 100,000
people before Chile had its economic miracle is just not a
question."

Wines comments that "The West finds such views alien." Perhaps the West
finds expressing such views explicitly alien. But it surely does not
find such actions alien. Did not Pinochet come to power with support of
the CIA? Was his government not supported by the US?

Feeling that he also is an intellectual and is thus entitled to say
something on his own, our paragon of superior morality shows off his
knowledge of Russian history.

Ethnic cleansing and forced migration are not exactly unknowns
to Russians. ... And Nikita Khrushchev forcibly moved so many
Russians to Kazakhstan that by 1959 native Kazakhs made up less
than a third of the population. From Stalin on, Soviet policy was
to dilute the Soviet Union's 80-odd ethnic groups by moving
Russian citizens onto their territories, evicting them from
homelands and drawing borders so as to split large ethnic groups
in two.

Khrushchev forcibly moved Russians to Kazakhstan??? Good job, Michael!
You are on your way to becoming a "recognized expert" on Russia. You
may be a future McFaul, Marshall Goldman or even, who knows, Professor
Pipes! Of course, ethnic cleansing and forced migration are not
exactly unknown to the "idealistic New World" too.

Murdering people because a regime does not like what they say or write,
is associated in most minds with NKVD, Gestapo, or at least Pinochet.
Very recently, NATO bombed a TV station in Belgrade, killing and
wounding scores of people. They justified the bombing, by claiming that
the station was involved in propaganda. How does this killing of
journalists differ from similar acts in which Stalin NKVD was involved?
Only by the choice of weapon. To kill using high-tech is moral, to kill
using low-tech is a crime, this seems to be the real statement of the
Western morality.

Where was a tremendous wave of outrage in the Western world when
Mr Khomeini issued his fatwa sentencing a British Indian-born writer
Salman Rushdie to death. In Mr Khomeini's opinion, Salman Rushdie
insulted Islam in his book "The Satanic Verses." Western media,
governments, international organizations, all joined their voices in
the firmest possible support for the freedom of speech.

Now compare Mr. Khomeini's behavior with Clinton's and Blair's bombing
of TV station in Belgrade. Not only did they order to kill those who
produce what they rightly or wrongly called "propaganda," they killed
also technical personnel, who were just ordinary civilians earning
their living. The equivalent of their actions would be Mr. Khomeini
ordering to kill not only Salman Rushdie, but also printers and
proofreaders of the publishing house which printed the book.

Clinton did not wish to exercise an option of denying intentional
bombing. Had he a rare bout of honesty or did he want to show his
enemies and friends alike that his regime will not stop before any
cruelty, as Mafia bosses do to assert their authority? In an interview,
which was broadcasted shortly after the event, Clinton openly admitted
that the bombing was done intentionally (Clinton Says Nato May
Intervene Beyond Its Borders, USIS, Washington, April 25, 1999).

THE PRESIDENT: Our military leaders at NATO believe,
based on what they have seen and what others in the
area have told them, that the Serb television is an
essential instrument of Mr. Milosevic's command and
control. He uses it to spew hatred and to basically
spread disinformation. He does not use it to show all
the Kosovar villages he's burned, to show the mass
graves, to show the children that have been raped by
the soldiers that he sent there.

It is not, in a conventional sense, therefore, a media
outlet. That was a decision they made, and I did not
reverse it, and I believe that I did the right thing in
not reversing that decision.

By logic of Clinton, almost any civilian activity can be classified
as not "in a conventional sense," civilian. Notice, that even if we
accept all the accusations of Clinton concerning spreading
disinformation as true, in Yugoslavia, state media does not have
effective monopoly on dissemination of information. People certainly
could at least have received Western radiostations. The availability
of this alternative source of information, should be sufficient for
such passionate believer in the freedom of information and the
"marketplace of ideas" as Clinton is. Everybody who wanted to know
Clinton's version of truth was able to get a shortwave radio and tune
it in.

The facts showing that some of the failings of the East are not entirely
alien to the West, are fairly well known. Can the article of Mr. Wines
be explained by simple ignorance on his part? New York Times claims that
its readers represent the elite of American society. I wonder whether the
intellectual climate in United States deteriorated to such an extent, that
even elite can read Mr. Wines' writings without nausea?

*******

 

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