June 24, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3358 • 3359 •

Johnson's Russia List
#3359
24 June 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Yeltsin Claims Win at G-8 Meeting.
2. NTV: Yeltsin Ignores Luzhkov, Stumbles at Memorial Ceremony.
3. NTV Carries Clinton Interview.
4. Obshchaya Gazeta: Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, The Last Phase of Agony?
(Assesses Yeltsin period).
5. Sovetskaya Rossiya: Yevgeniy Popov, Clinton Played the Hypocrite on 
Itogi Program. The Noble Heart of the Aggressor.
6. Kennan Institute: Talk by Stephen Holmes, Can Foreign Aid Promote the 
Rule of Law? Reflections on the Russian Experience.] 

*******

#1
Yeltsin Claims Win at G-8 Meeting 
By Vladimir Isachenkov
June 24, 1999

MOSCOW (AP) -- President Boris Yeltsin claimed today he had won a victory
at the Group of Eight summit by obtaining promises of economic aid for
Russia and some concessions on Yugoslavia. 

``We did everything we wanted in Cologne,'' Yeltsin told Prime Minister
Sergei Stepashin at the Kremlin about the meeting in Germany of the world's
seven leading industrial powers and Russia. 

Yeltsin attended the last day of the summit Sunday and left with a
tentative promise from Western leaders to help Russia reschedule payments
on its $100 billion in Soviet-era debt and keep it from defaulting. 

In a concession to Yeltsin, the final summit statement contained no
specific ban on providing reconstruction aid to Moscow's ally Yugoslavia --
devastated by a 78-day NATO air campaign -- while President Slobodan
Milosevic remains in power. 

Yeltsin said Russia would take an active part in rebuilding Yugoslavia.
``Restoration of Yugoslavia is now becoming one of the main issues,'' he
said. 

The Cologne meeting was a major face-saving event for Russia, whose
protests were mostly ignored by the West during the Yugoslav crisis. But
Western leaders acknowledged Russia's mediation efforts played an important
role in ending the NATO air campaign. 

Speaking to reporters after meeting Yeltsin, Stepashin hailed the G-8's
decision to help Russia alleviate its Soviet-era debt. 

He said Finance Minister Mikhail Kasyanov left today for talks with the
Paris and London clubs of Russian creditors. 

``We are now discussing debt rescheduling and writing off some debts,''
Stepashin said. ``This is a very serious decision. It means that the issue
looming over us is already solved this year.'' 

But G-8 leaders also said talks on debt rescheduling should be preceded by
Russia reaching agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The IMF
says it will only give Russia a new $4.45 billion loan after parliament
approves a package of austerity bills intended to bolster the government's
revenues. 

The parliament's lower house, the State Duma, on Wednesday passed several
of the government proposed bills, increasing chances that the loan will be
approved. 

*******

#2
Yeltsin Ignores Luzhkov, Stumbles at Memorial Ceremony 

NTV
June 22, 1999
[translation for personal use only]

[Presenter Grigoriy Krichevskiy] On the day the 
Great Patriotic War began [22nd June] President [Boris] Yeltsin and all 
Russian leadership laid wreaths at the Eternal Flame. Some confusion 
occurred during the ceremony, which might be linked to Russian current 
politics, in witnesses' opinion. 
[Begin recording] [Correspondent Mikhail Antonov] Having arrived at 
Aleksandrovskiy Garden [near the Kremlin wall], the president immediately 
went to the group of war veterans, politicians and ministers to say 
hello. A particular episode happened then. You see the president greeting 
[State Duma] deputies and politicians in the second row. [Fatherland 
leader and Moscow mayor] Yuriy Luzhkov is on his left. In a few seconds 
Boris Yeltsin will not greet him. 
During the whole ceremony the head of state refused to notice Moscow mayor. 
Yuriy Luzhkov also stayed away from the president. 
Meanwhile, no more oddities happened. Boris Yeltsin laid his wreath at the
Tomb 
of the Unknown Soldier, then spoke for several minutes to Chief of 
General Staff [Army Gen] Anatoliy Kvashnin, most likely about the Kosovo 
situation. After that the president went to work. 
On the Day of Memory and Mourning the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was 
also attended by Patriarch Aleksiy II and other Orthodox hierarchs. 
In the first half of the day the president received in the Kremlin a 
group of the participants of the Russian press congress and declared 
gratitude to them. They were editors-in-chief of some foreign 
periodicals. 
[Unspecified Yeltsin aide] To 'Novoye Russkoye Slovo' ['New Russian Word'] 
newspaper, USA. 
[Yeltsin, handing in honorary diploma to the editor] I am grateful to you and 
all your staff for your devotion to the Russian word. 
[Editor] Thank you, Boris Nikolayevich. 
[Yeltsin] Thank you. 
[Correspondent] The president said that the Russian public had gained
access to many 
publications, like 'Russkaya Mysl' ['Russian Thought'], not long ago. Now 
they are read all over Russia. This is a democratic achievement, the 
president said. [end recording] 
[Video shows Yeltsin shaking hands with war veterans and passing by 
Luzhkov; Yeltsin stumbling as he lays wreath; speaking to Gen Kvashnin; 
the patriarch in Aleksandrovskiy Garden; Yeltsin shaking hands with 
journalists and talking to them in his Kremlin office] 

******

#3
Russian NTV Carries Clinton Interview 

NTV
June 20, 1999
[translation for personal use only]

Interview with US President Bill Clinton in the Hyatt Regency Hotel, 
Cologne, on 20 June via video link -- recorded; from the "Itogi" news 
program presented by Yevgeniy Kiselev 

[Presenter Yevgeniy Kiselev] Today [20th June], on 
the last day of the G-8 meeting in Cologne, US President Bill Clinton 
agreed to answer our questions. This, by the way, is the first interview 
he has given to any Russian channel in his entire tenure at the White 
House, except for the TV relay of the US President's meeting with members 
of the Russian public during Clinton's first visit to Moscow way back in 
1994. 
President Clinton is now in Cologne, at the Hyatt[-Regency] Hotel, which has 
served as his residence for the duration of the G-8 meeting. 
I will now speak in English. [Kiselev continues in English, with 
Russian translation superimposed] Hallo, Mr President, I am very grateful 
to you for granting us an interview. 
[Clinton, in English with superimposed Russian translation drowning the 
English] Thank you very much, I am also very grateful to you, and pleased 
to work with you. 
[Q] Let me start with this question. In the past one-and-a-half weeks, 
relations between Russia and the West have been complicated by the 
unexpected [translator added "and unilateral" although Kiselev did not 
use the phrase] deployment of Russian troops in Pristina. What then is 
the gist of the differences that exist between Moscow and Washington, or 
Moscow and the West, concerning the involvement of Russian troops, and 
how can these differences be resolved? 
[A] First of all, let me say that this difficulty in Kosovo has been a 
major test for us, and also for Russia. I believe, however, that both 
sides have passed the test successfully, thanks to President Yeltsin's 
leadership and the work of our ministers of defence and foreign affairs, 
and of [Prime Minister] Mr [Sergey] Stepashin. I am not sure we have had 
serious differences concerning Russia's involvement. I said from the 
outset that I am in favour of having a good contingent of Russian troops 
in Kosovo, and with the accord he have reached on Russian participation, 
on the role they are to play at the airport, at the air base, and now in 
three different sectors, I think we have succeeded in finding a solution 
which provides an opportunity to establish peace and provide security 
both to the Serbian minority and the Albanian majority in Kosovo. 
[Q] Today Mr President you met with Russian President Yeltsin. What 
questions did you discuss and what did you manage to reach agreement on? 
[A] Well, first of all, I must say that we discussed Kosovo and spoke 
about what a major challenge this issue was for us, for both of our 
countries. We agreed that we wish to work together on the basis of 
goodwill. And we must pay tribute to the Russian people, to the Russian 
leadership and to all of those who worked so hard in this area. 
The second thing we discussed was all of our questions connected with 
arms limitation, questions of the proliferation of dangerous weapons. 
President Yeltsin, apart from other matters, also said that he hoped that 
the Duma would adopt SALT-2 and would ratify it and then we would move on 
to discussing the questions of SALT-3 and also questions connected with 
the ABM treaty. 
The third thing we discussed was the need to carry out more work in the 
sphere of Russia's economic development so that Russia should become a 
qualified user of sources of funds from the IMF, and also the removal of 
debts, the annulment of Soviet-era debts. We hope to help Russia to raise 
the economic level and the welfare of every citizen of Russia. We are all 
in favour of this. 
[Q] Mr President, let me ask you this. Both in Russia and in the West 
the issue of President Boris Yeltsin's health constantly comes up. How 
did you find Mr Yeltsin today? 
[A] Today he was strong. He spoke clearly and was alert. He stated 
Russia's position on all issues in a very forceful way. And we did what 
we usually do. Do not forget, it was our 17th meeting in the past six and 
a half years. We had a good and clear-cut agenda. We removed a number of 
differences and undertook to move forward. He admitted he had been unwell 
and even ill at times. But I found him in Cologne today fully capable, so 
to speak. He answered all questions clearly and conducted the talks. 
[Q] Mr President, let me ask you about this. The NATO operations in the 
Balkans have led to the appearance of anti-Western and anti-American 
feelings in Russia. What do you plan to do to improve America 's image in 
the eyes of Russians? And what concrete steps do you intend to undertake 
in order to strengthen relations between the USA and Russia? 
[A] Well, first, I hope that this interview will help us and give us the 
chance to explain the positions of the two countries, to tell you about 
our adherence to ensuring that a successful, stable and strong Russia 
participates in all international matters and is a fully fledged member 
of all international organizations. I consider that this will be very, 
very important in the next century for every Russian citizen. 
Secondly, as we work together and cooperate in Kosovo and as you transmit
all 
the facts about the horrors that were committed in Kosovo and about what 
the people of Kosovo suffered and about the points of view held by the 
Russian government and the US government [sentence as heard]. I wish to 
say that we did not seek here any political or economic advantages. We 
did not at all wish to alter the balance of forces or to turn back the 
position of the other side. No, we simply wanted Russian forces to take 
part together with our forces. It is very important that we should get 
back to our major agenda so that the Russian people and the American 
people should benefit from our talks and conversations and discussions. 
All of these matters are in the interests of both the Russian and the 
American people. We are committed to this. 
I consider that as we work together, I hope that the Russian people 
will feel that the American people is with them. We very much want our 
partnership to work and for every ordinary Russian citizen to know this 
and to feel it in his heart. 
[Q] Mr President, with regard to the NATO operation in the Balkans, many 
people are now asking: does it not seem to you that the actions of the 
USA and NATO show some kind of double standards? I mean, America is not 
acting in the Balkans in the same way it is, or isn't, acting in 
Kurdistan, in Rwanda, and in other regions of the world where the 
authorities pursue a policy of genocide or the oppression of minorities. 
[A, in English only] First let me say - 
[Q] I am sorry I am interrupting you, but will NATO take the same line 
with regard to the KLA and the Kosovo fighters, to make sure they do not 
put the Serbian population in danger? 
[A] The answer is yes, and a strong yes. No innocent person should be 
subjected to these actions. We should give equal protection to both 
sides, both groups. I would like to stress here that the KLA [translator 
says "Kosovo"] has agreed to disarm, to give us all their weapons, to 
stop any military operations and the training of its personnel. We 
should, however, remain vigilant, we should monitor this. 
I would also like to say that it is our commitment to protect every 
last individual in Kosovo. I would like Russia to take part in this, to 
become a full partner, and to protect the Serbs same as the Albanians. 
The Serbs have to feel that they are being protected by all sides. And 
the Albanians have to feel the same, so that we can leave this terrible 
period behind, achieve reconciliation, and start restoring this region. 
[Q] And as far as the first part of my question is concerned? 
[A] I have already spoken a lot about this in America. America has 
played a really vast role in northern Iraq, for example, where we have 
defended the Kurds. We have intervened several times in various regions 
to defend the Kurds. And we shall continue to support those people who 
have suffered and who are dying. 
In Rwanda over a short period of about 100 days so many people were 
killed. We did not respond [to help] the poor inhabitants of African 
regions. I very much regret that. We should all move aggressively 
forward, to take up these issues, to defend these poor and innocent 
people anywhere in the world. This does not mean that we can expect all 
people everywhere to respect and love each other. No, but where there are 
innocent victims of such terrible military operations we must all put a 
stop to this. 
[Q] Let me ask you about Russia's role in the peace deal in the Balkans. 
There are two points of view. Some people believe that NATO had to turn 
to Russia for help because only Russia could speak with both sides and 
persuade Milosevic to agree to that peace plan. Others believe that the 
West could have done everything the way it wanted without asking Russia 
but it did what it did out of goodwill in order to preserve Russia's role 
in the Balkans and nothing else. What is your point of view? 
[A] I would say that there is a little bit of both there. The United 
States and NATO regard Russia as a friend, and we believe that Russia 
should play a corresponding role in the Balkans. I have always believed 
that we must find a diplomatic solution to the situation and that Russia 
should play a role there. Don't forget that we have cooperated with 
Russia and sought a diplomatic solution for 14 months because we knew 
that Russia's positive influence would have a key role indeed. But when 
we saw that our diplomacy might fail, we appealed to President Yeltsin 
who was ready to appoint Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin. He came to 
visit us, and we tried to find yet another person who could represent 
Europe's interests. We found Finnish President Ahtisaari. And the Russian 
people must be proud of the most important role that Russia has played in 
this crisis. Mr Chernomyrdin and Mr Ahtisaari did great work, many thanks 
to both of them, we all must be very grateful to them. 
[Q] And there is probably one last issue I would like to ask you about. 
Today is the last day of the G8 summit. The Western press usually 
describes it as G7 plus Russia, even though Russia was officially 
accepted into this club of the world's leading powers over a year ago in 
Birmingham. Is Russia in fact a full-fledged member of G-8, or is it 
still too early to speak of this because Russia is still experiencing 
some economic difficulties? Is the USA going to exert pressure on the 
International Monetary Fund to grant loans to Russia? And is the United 
States itself going to help the Russian economy? 
[A] I think I shall try and answer all your questions. It is G-8, not 
G-7 plus Russia but G-8. The communique we published today, which covers 
a very wide range of economic and social issues - Russia played a full 
role in the drafting of this communique, alongside all the rest of us, 
the other presidents. President Yeltsin attended the meeting today at 
which all the leaders not only studied all the provisions but also 
ratified this communique. I therefore think, and I am personally very 
pleased, that we have this G-8. 
Secondly, you have asked about the future, and whether will are going to
exert 
pressure on the IMF. The answer is, we have always supported IMF's 
assistance to Russia. However, we also support the great changes that the 
IMF is asking Russia to implement, because no matter how much money the 
IMF gives Russia, private investors will never invest in Russia unless 
Russia implements these basic changes in its system, its structure. And 
it is imperative that they do invest. It is vital not only for Russia but 
for all countries. Russia has to be a powerful, economically strong and 
prosperous state. 
Your third question was whether we could do something on our part, 
separately from the IMF. I spoke about it with President Yeltsin today. I 
would like you to understand that the United States believes that a 
democratic, free and powerful state like Russia has to be actively 
involved in partnership with the United States, to find solutions, to 
respond to such problems as terrorism, ethnic cleansing and the 
proliferation of dangerous weapons. We sincerely want the Russian people 
to be prosperous, to live in safety, in a safe world, and this will also 
benefit the USA and our people. 
[Q] Mr President, thank you for your time, thank you for your answers, 
a nd I wish you good luck. 

*******

#4
Yavlinskiy Assesses Yeltsin Period 

Obshchaya Gazeta
June 10-16, 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Grigoriy Yavlinskiy: "The Last Phase of Agony?" 

It looks as if everybody knows--and is calling by its 
proper name--what is happening today in our state structures: the 
Kremlin and the government. What to do also is obvious: We need a 
different president, a different government, and changes in the 
Constitution. It is useless to give advice or help the current 
rulers--they have different interests. These notes are an attempt at 
a warning: What is happening now may turn out to be not merely the 
end of the post-Soviet period but a prologue to Russia's 
disappearance as a sovereign state. 

I deliberately refuse to publicly comment on the situation 
with regard to the government. It is an unseemly and at the same 
time meaningless task to analyze the array of clans and cliques 
waging a battle for Russia's dwindling resources. One thing is 
clear: All of us currently are witnesses and participants in the 
last phase of agony. But the agony of what? What system is coming to 
an end? Can this system be linked with Yeltsin's name? 

I have great doubts in this respect. By definition, a system 
is something stable. If there is no stability--even temporary--there 
is no system. Let us try to recall whether anything has been stable 
over the period of Yeltsin's rule. 

At the beginning of 1998, one could get an impression that 
certain elements of stability were present in the Russian political 
system produced by Yeltsin's Constitution. Today, having gone 
through three cabinets in less than a year and a half, it is obvious 
to everyone: A Constitution that does not contain any 
counterbalances to the President's arbitrariness cannot be a source 
of stability. Rather the opposite. 

Before August 1998, one could get the impression that Russia 
finally had a stable ruble--the foundation of future economic 
growth. The events of 17 August shattered these illusions. And on 
top of that dealt a painful blow to those citizens who on the basis 
on this illusion placed their trust in banks. 

What social or economic phenomenon, what institution can be 
chalked up as a Yeltsin-period asset? The President is lauded for 
the fact that he destroyed or persecuted his political opponents. In 
Russia, anybody would be grateful for this. But Gorbachev had 
already put a stop to it. It was also under Gorbachev that we got 
freedom of speech and the iron curtain dropped. By the way, under 
Yeltsin, freedom of speech has become a rather relative notion: The 
subjugation of the mass media by financial groups is a Yeltsin- 
period phenomenon. 

A certain prototype of a multiparty system has emerged. This 
can indeed be considered an achievement. But it may be destroyed at 
any moment if the threat to repeal elections by party lists is 
carried out. 

The institution of local self-rule was formally legislated, 
but the federal authority immediately doomed it to extinction by 
eliminating local taxes. 

Everything that at some point could be considered a Yeltsin- 
period achievement--the stable ruble, the banking system, the 
emerging middle class--turned out to be soap bubbles and burst 
overnight. Does this mean that the new authority has to start 
everything from ground zero? No. We cannot start everything from 
ground zero, because in many respects the country has been thrown 
back compared to 1991. 

Here are just some of the most obvious indicators. From 1990 
to 1998, Russia's GDP fell almost by one-half, the share of gross 
accumulation in the GDP--by a factor of 1.5, and investment in 
capital assets--by a factor of four. New housing construction fell 
from 49.4 million square meters in 1991 to 30.3 million square 
meters in 1998. Such a significant indicator as the ratio of the 
average wage to the subsistence minimum has changed from 3.16 in 
1992 to 1.48 in the first quarter of 1999. Life expectancy has gone 
down from 69 in 1991 to 66 in 1998. 

Take small business--an economic and at the same time social 
force in any capitalist country. It is both the foundation of the 
middle class and a nurturing environment for normal market 
development. Well, the most favorable conditions for small business 
existed right before the Gaydar-Chubays reforms and were destroyed 
by the latter. First, the 1992 hyperinflation bankrupted those first 
entrepreneurs who rose on the wave of the 1980s cooperative 
movement. Then privatization created a situation where property was 
acquired not by those who could buy it from the 
state according to their ability to manage it effectively but by 
those who were in a position to buy it up with 
vouchers at fraudulently low prices, taking advantage of the lack of 
legislative restraints and their official position and/or access to 
power. 

The results are well known. The economic sectors that enabled 
the Soviet Union with its monstrously expense-based economy to 
survive for extra 15 years have today become the source of super- 
incomes for several thousand persons. It is they who today have 
split into clans and cliques waging an endless battle for a place at 
the helm of the country. 

Transforming this system of monopoly oligarchic capital into a 
civilized democratic free-market society is much more difficult than 
doing it to the Soviet system of 1990. First, today 
the state does not possess the political or economic resources for 
reforming the economy and creating a middle class on the scale it 
had back then. It will have to mobilize once again first of all 
political clout in order to ensure free competition in the market, 
collect taxes, protect the economy from gangsters, and enforce the 
bankruptcy procedure against ineffective owners. 

Second, the oligarchic groups of the end of the 
1990s are not perestroyka-period Soviet monopolies. The latter could 
not even dream of the ability to influence the authority that the 
modern oligarchs have. Third, and this is probably 
the most important, the level of society's confidence in the plans 
for democratic and free-market reform in the country has dropped to 
an all-time low. 

In 1990, Yeltsin faced three major problems: his enemies--the 
Communists; a state that had fallen apart; and a nonworking economy. 
Today, 10 years later, these remain the same--except more acute. 
When Yeltsin was in the process of ascending Russia's political 
Olympus, the country did not have so many people with an 
questionably criminal reputation in power, surrounding power, and 
outside the reach of power. The scale of corruption and organized 
crime was not yet close to being a national disaster, and Russia had 
not yet been branded as one of the top 10 most corruption-ridden 
countries in the world. 

At the beginning of Yeltsin's rule there was no opposition-- 
Communist or nationalist--to the democratic course of reforms. 
Thanks to Yeltsin, the Communist movement in Russia has acquired a 
second life, shown immense quantitative growth, and formed itself 
organizationally. As to Russian fascism as an active political 
force, it owes Yeltsin everything--both its coming into existence 
and the unprecedented growth of its ranks. 

At the beginning of the 1990s, Yeltsin took over from 
Gorbachev a state that was beginning to crack at the seams but that 
still retained a viable administrative system. There were problems 
with several republics (Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Yakutia), and it was 
to them that he said in 1991 (and, by the way, repeated a month ago, 
on the eve of impeachment): "Take as much independence as you can 
swallow." He said it to them, but it was heard by everybody. And so 
began a mad race for "sovereignty"--by krays, oblasts, and 
autonomous okrugs. And as a result, it turned out that federation 
components are ready to swallow sovereignty in any quantity, while 
Kremlin ideologists simply do not know where the line is beyond 
which independence becomes a complete loss of federal 
presence. 

The federal authorities today are unable to guarantee the full 
extent of observance of elementary civil rights in the regions or 
ensure unity of the legal and economic space. They do not even have 
the power to control their own local structures. Regional 
procuracies, internal affairs administrations, and branches of 
ministries are coming under the control of the governors 
(presidents) everywhere. Where is a citizen to turn to for 
protection from local arbitrariness? He can turn to the court-- 
provided, of course, that the latter is not in the governor's pocket 
too. He can go all the way to the Supreme Court, but it is far from 
an assured fact that its decisions will be enforced on the territory 
of a republic, kray, or oblast. Especially if these decisions run 
counter to the local authorities' interests. Meanwhile, Yeltsin's 
Constitution does not contain any counterbalances to regional 
arbitrariness. 

Does this situation have anything in common with federalism? 
Unquestionably--no. Federalism is a system of separation of powers 
between a federation and its components. A federation's inability to 
enforce indicates a state that is transitioning to a different 
quality. In his speech in Kazan in 1990, Yeltsin promised: "There 
will be a confederation accord within the entire Russia." This 
probably is one of the few promises he did keep. 

A confederation in Russia means that regions will turn into 
patrimonies, each living by its own rules. In some oblasts in the 
European part of the country, the idea of a law-ruled state may 
still win out. But this is an exception. The greater part of the 
country will be covered by a patchwork of authoritarian-criminal 
regimes--from classic Asian-type despotic rule and primitive 
Lukashenka-style dictatorships to uncomplicated compradorial 
formations--easy prey for colonizers. We will have to forget about a 
unified legal, economic, and cultural (educational) space. What will 
happen to these states' subjects? Will their prosperity rise? 

Unlikely. More likely, they will get used to it, and reconcile 
themselves to the low standard of living that deficient, resource- 
poor regimes can offer them. In the socioeconomic respect, they will 
move to the third-world category, and from the standpoint of level 
of civilization, they will be thrown back to barbarism. 
Boris Yeltsin bears personal responsibility for the country 
moving in this direction. While disingenuous economic reforms can be 
blamed on "young reformers," and a bad Constitution--on politically 
slanted jurists, the process of Russia's feudalization is fully on 
the conscience of the President, who in exchange for political 
loyalty is always willing to close his eyes to any mockery of 
citizens, the law, and the state's authority perpetrated by regional 
princes. The warm attitude that the President's team displays today 
toward the election-campaign alliances of governors who do not hide 
their desire to reduce to nothing the federal presence in the 
regions is not accidental either. 

There is much talk today about the potential disintegration of 
Russia. Disintegration is a process that may start with little- 
noticed things and stretch over a long period of time. I will dare 
to say that the period of Yeltsin's rule has been a period 
of disintegration. The economy has been disintegrating, as 
a result of which the country ended up in bankruptcy. The state has 
been disintegrating, gradually turning into a confederation of 
appanage principalities. The society has been disintegrating, 
responding to all this with criminalization and moral 
decline. 

What has disintegrated is not Yeltsin's system, since Yeltsin 
has not created any system. The Soviet Communist system has been 
disintegrating. The first President of Russia's mission was to halt 
this disintegration and start building a new system of economic, 
political, and social relations. However, dealing with this task 
required not merely a man (even of very impressive looks and a very 
tall one), and not merely a politician, but a 
statesman--something Yeltsin never was. While being 
very proficient in grabbing and keeping power, he had no idea 
what to do with it. Such a man was unable to stop 
the disintegration. Thus, all his attempts to build something 
lasting were paralyzed by the inertia of disintegration. 

Today he himself is becoming a victim of his organic inability 
to think as a statesman. Having failed to create a stable political 
and legal system, Yeltsin himself is becoming hostage to an 
unpredictable course of events. Today nobody in Russia, including 
the President himself, can guarantee that the current political 
regime with its Constitution and laws will not be swept away by 
revanchist forces. 

The President and his inner circle see in this extremely 
uncomfortable and unstable situation the guarantee of their own 
security in preserving at any cost Boris Yeltsin's 
personal power. Hence the abundance of unconstitutional scenarios 
for the development of events that is expanding as the elections 
approach. To achieve this goal, Kremlin strategists are willing to 
do anything: from crazy unification with Belarus and parceling 
Russia into regional barons' possession to creating a special 
criminal clan controlling all of the country's financial flows under 
the guise of the government. 

The agony of the Communist system is entering the last phase, 
after which clinical death may set in. Everybody is in more or less 
equal conditions today: There is not a single person in Russia who 
in this situation would feel confident about his and his children's 
future. 

Nevertheless, an isle of hope has not yet disappeared from the 
horizon. It is the elections. Of course, nobody can provide a 100- 
percent guarantee that they will be held in the manner and time 
frame set by law. But it is the business of politicians and 
political parties to take care of that. The politicians' main task 
today is to prevent any attempts to deprive the country of the 
ability to elect a new authority capable of resisting the inertia of 
disintegration and open up a new page in the country's 
history. 

However, making this historic choice today depends not so much 
on the politicians as on the voters. At the change of the 
millennium, Russia is getting the last chance to preserve itself and 
grow in the 21st century as a great, cultured, independent country. 
All hope lies on Russian citizens' common sense and goodwill. 

*******

#5
Moscow Daily Slams Clinton TV Interview 

Sovetskaya Rossiya 
22 June 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Yevgeniy Popov: "Clinton Played the Hypocrite on Itogi 
Program. The Noble Heart of the Aggressor" 

Last Sunday [20 June] NTV showed the interview that 
Bill Clinton gave to Yevgeniy Kiselev in the Itogi program while at the 
Hyatt hotel in the German city of Cologne. The Itogi presenter again 
demonstrated both his modest knowledge of English (after a cheerful 
opening "Mister President, hello" he began reading the questions from a 
sheet of paper) and his infuriating servility toward America and NATO. 

On the day of the television interview the North Atlantic Alliance 
officially announced through Secretary General Javier Solana the 
cessation of the punitive operation against Yugoslavia (previously they 
spoke only about a "suspension" of the bomb and missile attacks from 10 
June). To call things by their real name, Clinton appeared on the 
television screens before the Russian public in the role of... the 
ringleader of an international terrorist gang which had arrogated to 
itself the right arbitrarily to punish whole states and peoples. But like 
the well-known Al Capone, once regarded as America's no. 1 criminal, Bill 
Clinton tried to present himself as a man with a noble heart and the 
benefactor of the all mankind. He tried to take the credit not only for 
the 78-day nightmare of technotronic barbarism over Yugoslavia which 
resulted in the death of at least 1,500 civilians (one-third of them 
children) as well as the destruction of a sovereign country's 
life-support system and economic potential. Clinton quite easily played 
the hypocrite about America's equally noble deeds in Iraq where, it turns 
out, the Pentagon was... protecting the Kurds. At the same time the U.S. 
President sidestepped an even trickier Kurd-related subject -- the Kurds 
in Turkey, a country which treats its ethnic minority brutally but at the 
same time took part in the NATO aggression under U.S. patronage on the 
pretext of "protecting the Kosovo Albanians' rights." 

But the president of the most powerful country shed a tear for the 
citizens of Rwanda and other "poor inhabitants of the African regions" 
which America's generosity has not yet reached. 

It emerged in the corridors of the conference in Cologne that the world 
was on the brink of serious upheavals with unpredictable consequences 
after the Russian airborne troops' rapid advance from Bosnia to Pristina. 
As Vladimir Kondratyev, NTV's special correspondent in Cologne, reported 
during the same Itogi program, "the United States was devising strong-arm 
measures to counter the Russian action." Even British Premier Tony Blair, 
who usually follows blindly and unquestioningly in the wake of U.S. 
policy, this time used his influence to restrain Clinton from embarking 
on a most dangerous adventure. But for Yevgeniy Kiselev, who kowtows to 
America, even the folly that his idol Clinton almost committed is a 
manifestation of state wisdom. By the very posing of the question itself 
the Itogi presenter is expressing solidarity with the United States in 
advance: "Recently relations between Russia and the United States have 
been complicated by the unexpected and unilateral deployment of Russian 
troops in Pristina." It goes without saying that Clinton sympathizes with 
this assessment. And he is completely satisfied with the subsequent 
development of events when as a result of the agreements in Helsinki this 
entire rapid advance by the Russian airborne troops was completely 
devalued: Albright insisted on having her own way: Russia did not get "an 
inch" of Kosovo's territory for its sector and as a result around 100,000 
Serb civilians were forced to leave Kosovo where their forefathers had 
lived for many centuries. But Clinton is in relaxed mood: At the meeting 
with Yeltsin he said "what a great challenge this was for our two 
countries and we agreed that we want to continue working together on a 
good-will basis." 

Having shamefully turned this truly Suvorovian dash by the Russian airborne 
troops into a purely propaganda operation that the press has now 
ironically dubbed "Rule the Roost-99," Yeltsin backtracked in the talks 
with the United States on a whole series of other questions of vital 
importance for Russia. According to Clinton Yeltsin said that "he hopes 
that the Duma will adopt and ratify START II and then we will move on to 
the discussion of questions pertaining to START III." 

With an ingratiating tone in his voice the presenter asked the U.S. 
President whether he will try to influence the creditors into "helping to 
develop the Russian economy." Bill Clinton said that Russia should be a 
"qualified user of IMF funds," stressing a quite strict linkage here: "We 
support the enormous changes that the IMF is calling for in Russia." In 
other words, Russia is being asked to follow submissively the path on 
which it has already lost its position as the world's second economic 
superpower after the United States and in terms of economic potential has 
slid to 68th in the world rankings. And all this to the accompaniment of 
Clinton's cheerful exhortations that the "democratic, free, powerful 
state of Russia must be an active participant in the partnership with the 
United States." 

In D. Carnegie's well-known bestseller "How to Win Friends and 
Influence People," there is a long section on the hypocritical speeches 
of America's biggest criminals. Ranging from the aforementioned Al Capone 
to the supergangster Kouli [as transliterated], who shot a policeman down 
in cold blood simply for asking to see his driver's license. One of the 
most dangerous criminals in New York's history wrote sincerely about 
himself: "Under my shirt beats a troubled but kind heart which has never 
done anyone harm." Sunday's Itogi interview with an international 
terrorist of the very highest level -- U.S. President Bill Clinton! -- 
indeed fall into this category. 

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#6
Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian StudiesWashington DC
Expert Calls for New Approach to Funding Russian Legal Reform
By Joseph Dresen

"Can Foreign Aid Promote the Rule of Law? Reflections on the Russian
Experience" A seminar, April 15, 1999, at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. 

How do you establish a society in which the rule of law prevails?
According to Stephen Holmes, law professor and editor of the East European
Constitutional Review, the task is impossible without developing a "policy
science" of law and legal development. The failure of Western assistance
to promote the rule of law in Russia, Holmes said, is a case in point.
Thus far, foreign legal advice to Russia has not done that country much
good. Holmes predicted that, unless donors develop a common language and
take a more scientific approach to promoting the rule of law in Russia,
their efforts will continually be frustrated. 

Now that the honeymoon is over between Russia and its Western donors,
Holmes said he envisions a period of intensive analysis of past experiences
as the best, perhaps the only, way forward. If participants in aid
programs could meet to share information, then the aid community might be
able to develop a common language and goals. 

Holmes stressed that the goals at this stage should be ambitious enough to
capture the attention and imagination of donors, but not so ambitious as to
be doomed to failure from the outset. Discussions between donors should be
based on the lessons that can be drawn from cumulative experience. For
instance, experience thus far has taught that a "market economy" is not a
natural state of being – it needs to be underpinned by solid social
institutions in order to be effective. Also, private enforcement of
contracts, debt collection, and dispute resolution cannot take the place of
enforcement by the state. State law enforcement must be seen as a public
good, a crucial ingredient in giving laws legitimacy. 

Western legal assistance was initially valuable in drafting laws in Russia,
Holmes said. This was because the country had had no private property laws
during the Soviet era. Since then, however, the assistance community has
failed to come to grips with the obstacles inhibiting the rule of law in
Russia. Holmes urged that donors examine the problems stemming from the
organization of Russian society, which is the heart of the problem. 

The Russian state does not discipline its powerful members in the interests
of the weak, said Holmes. Public goods that should come from the state
(such as the rule of law and environmental controls) are lacking. Russian
society watches powerlessly as the nation's assets, from factory equipment
to natural resources to company profits, are siphoned out of the country
through corruption and theft. The result is a kind of cold war between
society and state, where the state fails to protect society and society
refuses to obey the state. 

The answer is not to strengthen state control, Holmes declared. On the
contrary, the government must be held accountable for its actions. People
must be able to trust that when the state uses its power, it is for the
benefit of society as a whole, not for those with connections or even the
government itself. The way to build trust between society and government
is by inviting private actors to provide input into policy -- e.g.,
teachers to help draft education laws. Likewise, trust must be built
within government, between the various branches, Holmes said. 

Without cooperation between private actors and the state in drafting laws
and policy, society comes to see law as a stick, and not as a guarantee of
individual freedom and rights. Nowhere is this more true than in Russia,
Holmes said, where the state has historically used law as a tool of
repression against the individual. 

Ironically, Holmes added, assistance programs have been undermining
trust-building. Typically, donor aid has the effect of peeling elites away
from serving society by pressuring them to act in the interests of the
donor in order to secure future funds. Holmes said that this should change,
advocating that assistance programs change their mission to creating and
fostering cooperation between private actors such as indigenous NGOs and
the government in order to build trust. 

Holmes predicted that if the fragmented donor community could come together
and share its expertise, the result would be a set of practical guidelines
for creating an effective aid policy. He suggested the following list as a
starting point: 
* Don't attempt "reform by decree", whether by state or by donor;
experience has taught it does not work. 
* Target areas where the legislative and executive branches are in
agreement. Good laws are drafted only when there is cooperation between
legislative and executive branches. 
* When supporting reform, don't put the prestige of a program behind policy
tools like bankruptcy, if that tool is to be used as a political weapon. 
* Avoid the "mirror image" syndrome, where donors attempt to instill
concepts from their own society (e.g. jury trials) with a "donor knows
best" attitude. 

Ideally, said Holmes, such guidelines would form the basis of a new policy
science: a mixture of philosophy and practical experience that reflects a
profound understanding of the requisite conditions for a government based
on the rule of law. 

Holmes pointed out that some of this is, of course, common sense. It does
not make sense, for instance, to pursue projects where donor and recipient
are at cross purposes. For example, pushing the development of anti-piracy
laws protecting software will almost certainly backfire when most of your
government stakeholders are using such software in their offices -- the
reform is seen as an effort to redirect funds to Western software firms.
Intellectual property rights are important, but priority should be given to
areas where interests between donor and recipient coincide. 

A better example of an aid program that captures the interest of donor and
recipient alike is pre-trial detention reform. In Russia, suspects can be
held for months without trial during the investigation of a crime. Given
the frequency of tuberculosis outbreaks in Russia's overcrowded jails,
such detention can sometimes turn into a death sentence. 

Thus the donor's ally in a pre-trial detention reform program is the prison
administration, which has an interest in reducing populations in
overcrowded prisons and fighting tuberculosis outbreaks. The donor's enemy
is the prosecutor; but even here, Holmes insisted, there is common ground.
Assistance programs (such as in investigative training and forensics) can
be designed to reduce the prosecutor's traditional reliance on pretrial
detention of suspects. 

Given scarce donor resources, it is necessary to make strategic choices in
assistance programs in order to attract funding and still have a chance at
success. The motto, said Holmes, is "strong allies, weak enemies." 

Holmes noted in closing that the amount of funds to support legal reform is
not an accurate predictor of the program's ultimate success. In fact, the
reverse may be true. The less relevant law is to a society (in terms of how
it is actually enforced), the more willing that society will be to accept
legal reform assistance. If the laws are not actually enforced against the
powerful interests in society, then people will correctly perceive legal
aid as a "harmless playground for legal reform consultants."


Joseph Dresen is a program assistant in the Center's Kennan Institute for
Advanced Russian Studies. 

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