June 17, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3345 • 3346 •

Johnson's Russia List
#3346
17 June 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Russian Parliament Rejects IMF Bill.
2. AP: U.S., Yeltsin Still Differ on Kosovo.
3. Erin Powers: Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS).
4. Fred Weir on Russia and India-Pakistan.
5. Bloomberg: IMF's Gilman on Russia's Chances to Get New Loan: Comment.
6. New York Times: Judith Miller, U.S. and Russia Extend Deal Reducing
Threat From Arms.
7. Washington Post: Charles Krauthammer, A Russian Zone.
8. Reuters: Azerbaijan wants NATO help for Karabakh solution.
9. G. von Gross: Why Russians are NEEDED as a presence in Kosovo.
10. Michael Szporer: POLAND'S ROLE IN THE EAST AFTER NATO ENLARGEMENT:
MENDING DIFFERENCES WITH RUSSIA.
11. Business Week: Rose Brady, Poland: A Beacon for the Rest of Europe.] 

********

#1
Russian Parliament Rejects IMF Bill
June 17, 1999
By ANNA DOLGOV

MOSCOW (AP) - Russia's Communist-dominated parliament today rejected a 
pivotal part of a reform bill package that the government says is needed to 
help get crucial foreign loans.

The legislature's lower house, the State Duma, voted 219-101 to defeat a bill 
that would have imposed a new tax on gas stations.

The bill is part of a package of reforms designed to meet conditions for a 
$4.5 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. Moscow needs the 
money to pay off old debts due this year to the IMF and avoid a potentially 
disastrous default.

Since Russia's economy crashed last August, the country has defaulted on 
several large foreign debt payments and has been unable to secure new loans 
from international lenders.

Opponents of the gas station tax said it would be used as an excuse to raise 
gasoline prices, which in turn would touch off price increases for other 
goods. Observers had warned that lawmakers wouldn't pass the bill and risk 
antagonizing voters before parliamentary elections set for December.

Still, the rejection comes after representatives of the Duma and the Cabinet 
worked out a compromise version of the bill, stoking hopes that lawmakers 
would approve it.

The Duma now has until the end of next week to consider a new version of the 
bill before breaking for its summer recess. It wasn't clear when the 
legislature would take up the reworked version of the bill.

The government has urged the Duma to approve the reforms before going on 
vacation. But so far, only 2 of the 30 bills have received even tentative 
approval.

Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin warned lawmakers that if they fail to approve 
the bills, he might call a confidence vote in his new Cabinet. If lawmakers 
vote no-confidence, then President Boris Yeltsin could disband the Duma - a 
prospect lawmakers want to avoid.

The government also tried to cajole lawmakers by promising to block 
significant increases in gasoline prices. The Cabinet had secured a pledge 
from Russia's main energy companies Wednesday to limit price hikes through 
the end of the year.

Russian media immediately suggested that the move signaled a return to 
Soviet-style price controls and economic planning - something that liberals 
have feared since the onset of economic crisis in August.

But Stepashin told a Cabinet session today that he had no plans for setting 
strict limits on prices and that such an attempt would fail anyway, the 
Interfax news agency reported.

Yeltsin also sought to prevent the dispute over the bill from developing into 
a new round of confrontation between the Kremlin and its Communist opponents 
in the Duma.

Yeltsin told his envoy to the house, Alexander Kotenkov, ``under no 
circumstances to go into confrontation where compromise is possible,'' 
Interfax reported.

********

#2
U.S., Yeltsin Still Differ on Kosovo 
By Robert Burns
June 17, 1999

HELSINKI, Finland (AP) -- President Clinton and Boris Yeltin offered 
conflicting assessments on the chances of success as U.S. and Russian 
negotiators opened a second day of talks today on a Russian role in Kosovo 
peacekeeping that would leave NATO in charge. 

In Paris, Clinton predicted a ``successful conclusion'' to the talks. ``The 
atmosphere is pretty positive and pretty hopeful,'' Clinton told reporters on 
the lawn of Elysee Palace after meeting with French President Jacques Chirac. 

Nonetheless, Clinton said the NATO allies would not abandon their insistence 
that peacekeeping forces in Kosovo operate under a unified command. The 
Russians have insisted that their troops not come under a NATO commander. 

Indicating that remained a sticking point, Yeltsin insisted that Russia won't 
back down over its demand that Russian peacekeeping troops in Kosovo control 
their own sector in the province. 

Yeltsin said he had insisted on a Russian sector when he spoke by telephone 
with Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, who is negotiating here with Defense 
Secretary William Cohen over Russia's role in the peacekeeping operation. 

``In principle, most of the issues have been resolved peacefully,'' Yeltsin 
said in comments broadcast on television in Moscow. ``But one question, which 
I would undoubtedly call the principal one, is sectors. 

``In other words, they don't want to give Russia a sector.'' 

Taking his seat across the table from a smiling Russian Defense Minister Igor 
Sergeyev and his aides, Cohen also indicated no agreement had been reached on 
whether Russian peacekeepers would patrol a separate sector of Kosovo. 

``That is precisely what we are here to discuss today,'' Cohen said. The 
United States and NATO oppose giving the Russians their own sector, fearing 
that it would lead to a partitioning of Kosovo and undermine efforts to 
stabilize the province. 

Asked whether he foresaw a final deal today, Cohen replied, ``We hope so, but 
there are issues that remain to be resolved.'' 

Sergeyev said today's session would start by summarizing the progress made in 
Wednesday's negotiations, which lasted past midnight, then focus on the 
remaining disagreements. 

``We shall try to do it today,'' Sergeyev said. He said the outlook was 
brightening. 

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, meanwhile, arrived in Helsinki to meet 
with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on the peacekeeping matter, which 
is central to NATO's goal of stabilizing Kosovo and returning its hundreds of 
thousands of refugees. 

Ivanov said the two sides had agreed that the airport where Russian troops 
took up a position last week would be used for all peacekeeping operations. 
Talks were continuing about how Russian troops would fit into the 
peacekeeping operation, he said. 

The crux of the dispute is NATO's demand -- resisted by Moscow -- that all 
countries participating in peacekeeping in Kosovo operate under a single 
NATO-led command. 

Among the options discussed was giving the Russians their own geographic 
``zone of responsibility'' within a section of Kosovo that is commanded by 
U.S. or other NATO officers. 

As Cohen and Sergeyev were meeting Wednesday, Moscow sent a new convoy of 
supplies to the Russian force that suddenly took up a position last week at 
the airport near Kosovo's capital, Pristina. 

In Moscow, Vladimir Putin, secretary of the Security Council, said Russia 
wanted to cooperate with NATO while retaining limited independence for its 
forces in Kosovo. A Russian officer could be part of the overall command for 
peacekeeping forces, he said. 

Russia will insist on ``a certain degree of independence in making decisions 
and in conducting the operations,'' Putin was quoted as saying by the 
Interfax news agency. 

Meanwhile, Russia will press the United States for access to Hungarian and 
Bulgarian air space to fly troop reinforcements to Kosovo, Russian defense 
officials said. 

Sergeyev and Cohen are under pressure to resolve the peacekeeper problem 
quickly so that it does not cloud the planned meeting Sunday in Cologne, 
Germany, between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The 
two presidents will be in Cologne for the annual economic summit of 
industrialized nations, where the future of Kosovo and stability in the 
Balkans region will be a topic of discussion. 

Russia surprised and upset NATO by sending a contingent of about 200 troops 
into Kosovo last weekend ahead of the allied peacekeeping force. Russia is 
not a NATO member and strongly opposed the allies' 78-day bombing campaign 
against Yugoslavia, a traditional Russian ally. 

The United States and its NATO allies fear that if Russian troops were 
operating in Kosovo separate from NATO it would create a de facto 
partitioning of the province. That would compromise the goal of returning all 
refugees to their villages and would hand a measure of political victory to 
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. 

*******

#3
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 1999 
From: Erin Powers <epowers@fas.harvard.edu> 
Subject: Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS)

Hi David,
For once, the website is more up-to-date than our snail mail distribution.
New memos include:
Arms Control in the Context of Current US-Russian Relations, Brian D. Taylor
Security Implications of the Russian Identity Crisis, Eduard Ponarin
Changing Rules for Russian Roulette? Rethinking the Soldier, State and
Society in Russia, Eva Busza

The conference report from our last academic meeting is also available on
the site.
Best, Erin
Erin R. Powers
Assistant Director
Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS
Davis Center for Russian Studies * Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
tel: (617) 496-3426 * (617) 495-8319
email: epowers@fas.harvard.edu
program website: http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars

*******

#4
From: "Fred Weir" <fweir@glas.apc.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1999 
For the Hindustan Times
From: Fred Weir in Moscow

MOSCOW (HT June 17) -- Russia has condemned Pakistan as the initiator
of conflict along the Line of Control in Kashmir, and urged Pakistan to
withdraw the guerrilla forces that it encouraged to occupy Indian territory.
"The Russian side once again expresses its concern over the continuing
tension along the Line of Control in Kashmir, caused in the first place by
the infiltration of armed groups from Pakistan into the territory of the
Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir," said a Russian Foreign Ministry
statement issued Thursday.
"We insistently urge Islamabad to refrain from the violation of well
known bilateral agreements related to the agreed Line of Control between
India and Pakistan in the region of Kashmir. Any attempts to change this
line may lead to serious consequences," the statement said.
"Under these circumstances withdrawal of armed groups beyond the Line
of Control and restoration of the status quo ante would to a considerable
extent contribute to lowering of tension in the region".
The Russian position, the clearest yet from Moscow, came on the heels
of a similar appeal by U.S. President Bill Clinton for Pakistan to pull its
forces out of Indian strongholds seized last month, as a precondition for
peace.
"We reaffirm our principled position that all problems between Delhi
and Islamabad, including those related to Kashmir, must be resolved through
peaceful means and on a bilateral basis in accordance with the Simla
Agreement and Lahore Declaration," the Russian statement said.
"Russia does not see any other reasonable alternative to this for
strengthening stability and security in the South Asian region".

******

#5
IMF's Gilman on Russia's Chances to Get New Loan: Comment

St. Petersburg, June 17 (Bloomberg)
-- Martin Gilman, director of the International Monetary Fund's Moscow 
office spoke about Russia's chances of securing its new loan from the IMF. 
Below are some of his comments. 

Russia's lower house of parliament, the Duma is considering a package of laws 
that must be put into effect before the fund disburses the loan. 

``We're pragmatists and we understand the government can't guarantee 
enactment of legislation, but we also recognize the program can't be fully 
implemented unless this legislation is in place. 

``If everything goes fairly well and there's modification in some of the 
legislation, if we can be confident the objectives of the program can still 
be achieved . . . we'll certainly look at it. 

``There are not any'' key outstanding issues. It is just a matter of 
implementing the program. 

A tax on gasoline stations being considered by the Duma ``is important not 
just in terms of its revenue contribution, but also because it would indicate 
the Duma it is taking responsibility for key parts of the program. 

``We all have to recognize that one of the failures of the previously 
agreed-upon program was the government could not deliver on all the measures. 
Part of the political class resisted implementation of the program and being 
associated with it. Now there is a conceited effort to make sure everybody is 
on board. 

``There's no link between what the IMF is doing and events in Yugoslavia.'' 

*******

#6
New York Times
June 17, 1999
[for personal use only]
U.S. and Russia Extend Deal Reducing Threat From Arms
By JUDITH MILLER

Setting aside policy differences over Kosovo, Iraq and other contentious 
issues, the United States and Russia concluded an agreement in Washington on 
Wednesday extending for seven years programs to reduce the threat posed by 
nuclear, biological, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction. 

In a ceremony at the Russian Embassy on Wednesday morning, Ambassador Yuri 
Ushakov signed the agreement and shook hands with senior Defense Department 
officials to celebrate the extension of the umbrella agreement that 
authorizes the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. 

Started in 1991 by former Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., and Sen. Richard Lugar, 
R-Ind., the Cooperative Threat Reduction program has spent $2.7 billion from 
1992 to this year helping Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan 
and other former Soviet republics reduce, control and eliminate 
unconventional weapons in their military inventories. The bulk of these 
funds, about $1.7 billion, has been spent on projects in Russia. 

"We expect to spend at least that much, and perhaps a little more, over the 
next seven years," said a senior Pentagon official. 

According to Pentagon data, the program has already helped Russia deactivate 
1,538 nuclear warheads; destroy 254 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 30 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 40 heavy bombers, and eliminate 50 
silos for long-range missiles and 148 launchers for submarine-launched 
missiles -- all in keeping with Moscow's commitments under treaties to reduce 
strategic nuclear and other unconventional weapons systems. 

The program has also helped Russia finance the construction of storage 
facilities for fissile material and chemical weapons and the installation of 
equipment for safer storage of tactical and strategic warheads scheduled for 
destruction. And the program helped pay to eliminate weapons-grade plutonium 
by converting the cores of Russia's remaining plutonium production reactors 
and to dismantle and convert for peaceful use facilities that once made 
material for chemical or biological weapons. 

Pentagon officials vigorously argue that the program is neither charity nor 
foreign aid, but a cost-effective investment in U.S. national security, a 
view supported by many independent defense analysts. 

"The collapse of the Soviet Union left tens of thousands of nuclear, chemical 
and biological munitions and agents unsecured," said Amy Smithson, a senior 
associate of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research 
institute based in Washington. "These funds have helped secure and dismantle 
a lot of that arsenal," she said. Ms. Smithson called the program "one of the 
wisest investments of American taxpayer dollars in terms of security that has 
ever come along." 

While the program is very popular in the Senate, it usually encounters 
greater skepticism in the House. Earlier this year, the Senate approved the 
Defense Department's request for $475.5 million, some $35 million more than 
last year, for the 2000 fiscal year, which begins in October. 

But the House, displeased with Pentagon plans to build an expensive chemical 
weapons storage facility at Shchuchye, cut some $35 million from the 
department's request and eliminated all funding for the Shchuchye facility. 

Rep. Floyd Spence, R-S.C., the chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee, accused Russia of being increasingly reluctant to pay its fair 
share of the burden for disarmament and better security. "Funding for these 
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs seems to be becoming less 'cooperative' 
and more one-sided," Spence complained recently. 

Even the Senate has expressed concern this year about Russia's increasing 
inability to meet its financial contributions to the program and the mounting 
cost to America. A Senate Armed Services Committee report warned that the 
committee would not continue to support full funding if Russia, now deeply in 
debt, pursues a resolution passed by the lowe house of the Russian Parliament 
in April calling for an increased defense budget, or a Russian plan reported 
to develop new tactical nuclear forces. 

But several Senate Republicans said that overall support for the program was 
"stronger than ever" and predicted that a House-Senate conference on spending 
for the program would support the administration's request for increased 
funds. 

In May, the General Accounting Office, Congress' independent auditing agency, 
criticized Russia for its reluctance to share "critical information" with 
Washington, which the agency said may have "substantially increased" the 
costs of certain projects to the United States and caused delays in their 
completion. The report also questioned whether Russia would use some of the 
U.S.-financed facilities in a manner consistent with U.S. "national security 
objectives." 

The umbrella agreement authorizing the program was set to expire at midnight 
Wednesday. Sources on Capitol Hill and at the Defense Department said that 
the administration, unsure about whether Russia would approve the extension 
on time, quietly warned relevant House and Senate committees more than a 
month ago that all spending on joint threat reduction programs would have to 
be stopped instantly if the umbrella agreement were not signed by the 
deadline. 

One Defense Department official attributed the delay to Russian bureaucratic 
resistance and distraction in Moscow due to the Kosovo conflict and pressing 
economic crises, rather than to Russian unhappiness with the programs or any 
desire to backtrack on its disarmament commitments. 

Indeed, when Moscow suspended participation in some joint military programs 
and delayed several meetings earlier this year to protest NATO's air strikes 
against Yugoslavia, joint projects financed under the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program were conspicuously absent from the list. "Not a single CTR 
program has been jeopardized because of Kosovo," one Senate staff member 
said. 

"The last thing Moscow wants is a loose nuke or a stolen chemical warhead," 
said one Pentagon official. "Russia knows that these programs enhance their 
security as well as ours." 

Mikhail Shurgalin, a spokesman for the Russian Embassy, called the agreement 
"very important," and said Moscow was pleased that it had been signed on 
time. 

******

#7
Washington Post
June 17, 1999
[for personal use only]
A Russian Zone
By Charles Krauthammer

I have never been accused of being a comsymp or a Russophile, but anyone who 
cares about the success of American foreign policy must believe that the 
gratuitous humiliation of Russia is simply stupid. Publicly carving Kosovo 
into five zones -- American, French, British, German and Italian -- leaving 
nothing to Russia, qualifies as gratuitous humiliation.

It is pointless. This administration, in order not to offend Russia, has for 
years refused to build a defense to protect American citizens from attack by 
nuclear missiles -- an issue of supreme importance for the United States. Yet 
that same administration is willing to humiliate Russia by denying it control 
of an inch of Kosovo, a place of zero strategic significance to the United 
States.

Why? Because the administration is afraid that any Russian strip under 
Russian command will become a protectorate for Serbs, leading to a de facto 
partition of Kosovo.

True enough. But is that outcome so unthinkable that we are willing to 
sacrifice our already tenuous relations with Russia over it? Indeed, why is 
that outcome bad at all?

Partition has brought stability and relative peace to places like Cyprus and 
Bosnia. Sure, Bill Clinton waxes lyrical about the joys of multiethnic 
America and how the Balkans ought to emulate our example. But this is pious 
naivete. It took us, oh, 350 years -- a good hundred of it after our Civil 
War -- to achieve the kind of mutual recognition and equal treatment of 
groups that prevails in America today.

Kosovo's civil war ended last week -- if it ended at all. We expect people 
who have just experienced massacre and expulsion and who are, as we speak, 
discovering mass graves to start living together in peace?

If a Russian sector is permitted, things will take their natural course: The 
Serb refugees now streaming out of their homes in Kosovo will have a place to 
go. And the ethnic Albanians in the rest of Kosovo will be left to build and 
rule their land without needing an endless NATO occupation to ensure that 
they do not do unto their minority Serbs what the Serbs did unto them.

It will be said that we are caving in to the Russians. Caving? The Russians 
are prostrate. They couldn't protect the Serbs, they couldn't stop the war 
until we were ready, they couldn't prevent the NATO occupation. A consolation 
prize of a small strip near Serbia would help assuage the virulent Russian 
anti-Americanism occasioned by the war -- and cost us very little.

The Russian complaint is not illegitimate. We rightly forced NATO expansion 
on them (we did, after all, win the Cold War) -- but with the firm assurance 
that we were doing nothing more than expanding a purely defensive alliance. 
The Kosovo war and NATO's 50th anniversary Washington Summit Communique 
changed that. They demonstrated that the Western leadership sees NATO as a 
missionary force with external ambitions extending into neighboring sovereign 
states.

That, and not sympathy for the devil, is what so disconcerted Russia -- the 
combination of NATO expansion and the NATO role change. In that climate, to 
compound rising Russian anti-Americanism by denying them a sliver of Kosovo 
is simple folly.

Let the Russians have a sector. It would be costless, indeed useful. It would 
reassure them. It would allow for a Serb enclave. And most important, it 
would ease the way for a final Kosovo settlement, the only possible 
settlement that gives us an exit strategy: independence for Kosovo.

NATO says its objective is to retain Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia. This is 
crazy. Kosovo is 90-plus percent Albanian. It now has a cocky and growing 
guerrilla army fanning out daily into every region and committed to fighting 
for independence. Is NATO, the acting authority in Kosovo, going to conduct a 
counterinsurgency campaign to deny independence when the KLA decides to press 
its case with arms?

The case for independence is not just practical but principled. If the 
overwhelming Albanian majority wants self-determination, democratic 
principles -- wasn't that what we were told we were fighting for? -- should 
allow them to have what they want.

But they don't have to have every inch. Nothing is sacred about the 
geographic boundaries of Kosovo. The best solution is partition. A small 
Russian sector under independent command will allow that to happen without 
any troublesome declarations. The Serbs will congregate in that sector; the 
rest of Kosovo can claim independence; perhaps the Russian strip will 
eventually be absorbed into Serbia.

It is a solution that offers stability and a measure of equity. It gives a 
bone to the Russians and a principled exit for NATO. Or shall we spend the 
next 50 years in Kosovo teaching Serbs and Albanians to treat each other like 
Jeffersonians? 

*****

#8
Azerbaijan wants NATO help for Karabakh solution

BAKU, June 17 (Reuters) - Azerbaijan's Defence Minister Safar Abiyev has 
urged NATO to play a role in resolving its conflict with neighbouring 
Azerbaijan over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, a ministry 
statement said on Thursday. 

``We would like NATO to get involved in the resolution process of the 
Armenian-Azeri conflict,'' the statement quoted Abiyev as telling Italian 
ambassador Alessandro Fallavollita during a meeting on Wednesday. 

Although Azerbaijan has made several overtures to join NATO, Abiyev's remarks 
were the first time the oil-producing nation had asked the alliance to become 
involved in settling the decade-old Karabakh conflict. 

Karabakh, a region populated predominantly by ethnic Armenians, broke from 
Baku's rule in 1989 and seeks a merger with Armenia proper. 

Tens of thousands of people died in fighting for Karabakh before a shaky 
truce was reached in 1994. Almost one million ethnic Azeris remain homeless 
after fleeing the fighting. 

Armenia has always said it was not a formal party to the conflict, although 
it has given its ethnic kin strong moral and military support for Karabakh 
separatists. Periodical border skirmishes flare on the border between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia. 

In the worst outbreak of fighting since the ceasefire, at least two people 
were killed and six wounded on Monday in a more than four-hour shootout 
between Armenian and Azeri troops. 

Azerbaijan, seeking stronger ties with NATO, has in the past sent signals 
that Baku would welcome a more powerful alliance role in the Caucasus region. 

A senior Azeri official said earlier this year that Baku wanted NATO to 
establish bases on its territory to counterbalance Russian bases in Armenia. 

There has been no reaction from NATO. 

Armenian President Robert Kocharyan has said that Armenia opposes a role for 
NATO in the Karabakh dispute. 

******

#9
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 1999 
From: "G. von Gross" <vongross@sydney2000.net>
Subject: Why Russians are NEEDED as a presence in Kosovo.

Serbia has agreed to a limited autonomy of a province - regarded as
"historically
serbian".

The withdrawal process of both Serbian authorities and ethnic Serbians - gives
room, and properly clears the way for "future legitimate military actions"
motivated by slogans as in "to free the homeland " (by the way - under
"any" future
Serbian Presidential circumstances, as it's matching "the popular believes"
opposing to "the Greater Albania..")

It becomes more and more important - that "both Serbians and Albanians"
will share
KOSOVO - and KLA "first of all" will be disarmed.

The legendary albanian "spirit of revenge" should be taken into
consideration - and
possible atrocities involving the reversal of the situation in Kosovo - KLA
and
Albanians slaughtering Serbian civilians, under the "relaxed NATO eyes" -
should be
the target of the NATO - peace keeping forces, as this may in fact create "a
legitimacy of Serbian latter military intervention". Now NATO - has the
important
mission to cover the interests of the Serbian minority left behind - as the
Albanians solved their problem.

A "mixed" ethnic target - will be lesser prone to an open future Serbian
conflict,
and "Russian presence" will play the role of a "protective shield for the NATO
troupes" (in fact - a much needed "policy of insurance"..) - cutting short any
"future Serbian planing"..

******

#10
Date: Wed, 16 Jun 1999 
From: Michael Szporer <mszporer@polaris.umuc.edu>
Subject: Mending Differences with Russia 

[The following original draft is a critical review as well as a dialogue
with the Jamestown Foundation Conference on the future of Russia to be
presented at PIASA Conference in New York, June 18-19. The focus is on
Polish-Russian relations.]

Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America 
New York, Fordham University, June 19,1999

POLAND'S ROLE IN THE EAST AFTER NATO ENLARGEMENT:
MENDING DIFFERENCES WITH RUSSIA

Michael Szporer
Foundation for Free Speech

If in the transition years 1989-90, it was presumptuous to imagine Poland
as the conduit of reform for the former Soviet region, the occasion is
very real today. It became abundantly clear in the course of NATO
enlargement debate that Poland was the anchor of Western security strategy
for Central Europe, a regional leader. In making this claim, I do not mean
to diminish the strategic importance of Hungary, especially for the
developments in the Balkans, or the accomplishments of the Czech Republic.
I would argue that Poland evolved into this role more because of its
geopolitical location than history, albeit the colorful tradition of
dissention which culminated in SolidarityÕs short-lived triumph in 1980
and victory in 1989 inspired the West.

Poland was, as Oleg Kalugin acknowledged, the weakest link in the
communist chain, and Moscow was studiously aware of it. If the three Ws:
Walesa, Wojtyla and Wajda, by which Poland has been popularized in the
West, have passed from the political scene, they continue to inspire.
PolandÕs tiger status among the transition economies gives some hope that,
not only Central Europe, but the entire former Soviet region, including
the troubled Russia and even the regressive Belarus, can eventually join
the community of democratic societies based on the rule of law. 
Is Poland ready to seize the opportunity to facilitate building a civil
society in Russia? Poles often say they know the Russians better than
others do but is this in fact the case? What should be PolandÕs "Russia
strategy?" 

The lesson to be drawn from the transition period, underscored by the NATO
enlargement debate, is that moral or historical reflections, while a
factor and a useful means to rouse the public around an issue, yield to
practical considerations and long-term strategic needs which have their
own historical logic. In the historical tug-of-war region between Poland
and Russia of the former Kresy, or Borderland between the East and the
West, much can be done, as Poland has already recognized in its policy
towards the Baltics and Ukraine. Poland should be careful not to play up
its past; foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek perhaps overstates PolandÕs
role as a "regional power" with a special insight into the East.

Historical reflections can also lead to misunderstandings, as the debates
with Lithuanians over the rights to the Vilnius region in the twenties and
Ukrainians over ethnic cleansing campaigns in the aftermath of World War
II have demonstrated. However, the new NATO memberÕs history as a conduit
for Western ideas in the region, not always appreciated in Washington, is
an enormous advantage by comparison with Germany of the Cold War era. 
The cultural divide between the East and the West is an important
component that impinges on political decisions in the region. Belarus,
steeped in retro-ideology of Lukashenkanism, has regressed to former
Soviet "glory" days but even "batska" Lukashenka succumbs to the power of
the old Kresy myth. Russian leaders, like the presidential hopeful
Aleksandr Lebed, are also seduced by it, as if the old line had to be
redrawn to protect the East from the West, and these days, to protect it
from itself. Like many Russians, including Solzhenitsyn, general Lebed
would keep Belarus and Ukraine in the East. 

For all the uncertainty about itself, mired in nostalgia for its power
status and resentment towards the West, it has to be recognized that
Russia is the key component of the post-Soviet maze even without Belarus
or Ukraine. Of course, Ukraine and Poland present an intriguing
counterbalance, but the point is to think beyond the Cold War chessboard
and apply the Josef Pilsudski checkmate. What is to be done about Russia? 
Dr. BrzezinskiÕs idea of transforming Ukraine into a Central European
state has much strategic merit. Forging greater independence of Ukraine by
providing outlets for its exports and options for its energy resources
should be pursued. Gradual integration of Ukraine into the transatlantic
structures, particularly NATO, provides a counterbalance that can no doubt
check RussiaÕs imperial ambitions; speeding up the process could backfire.
While it is true, as Dr. Brzezinski underscores, that NATO enlargement has
been largely a problem for the elites, overplaying the Ukraine card could
be perceived as a threat. Russia, purged of its imperial ambitions, should
be more open to democratic reforms, as Robert Hutchings has observed.
However, if the inclusive policy that pandered to Russian ambitions as a
world power has not worked, dramatic demonstrations of MoscowÕs
powerlessness are likely to alienate and prolong the much needed cure.

Western opinion seems to have coalesced after the rubleÕs tailspin in 1998
to a quarter of its value and subsequent leap in inflation. As some of the
more distinguished Russia watchers concluded at the June 9-10, 1999
Jamestown Foundation Conference "Russia: What Went Wrong? Which Way Now?,"
Russian transition has been an abysmal failure, and the future of the
region increasingly uncertain. If David Satter contended that "the whole
notion of a free economy was deformed," virtually all faulted Yeltsin and
the ruling elites, as well as the shortcomings of the so-called
"Washington consensus" promoting stabilization, liberalization and
privatization. The removal of Evgeny Primakov has demonstrated that, while
Yeltsin may be personally compromised and unpopular, the superpresidency
remains intact, with the prime minister largely a puppet and the Duma
virtually impotent. For all its internal disputes, the power structure is
firmly in place. 

The key question asked was "Why did shock therapy work in Poland and not
in Russia?" Grzegorz KolodkoÕs explanation stressing long-range
institutional changes and microeconomic regimen seemed reasonable enough;
but his proposal that credited shifts in economic policy before "shock
therapy" was seen as largely revisionist. To be sure conditions for
transition varied from country to country and required fine tuning and
heterogeneous methods. On the whole Poland, and Central Europe generally
were more ripe for the transition than the former Soviet republics, but
significant exceptions existed. As Peter Rutland astutely noted, some
choices, like voucher privatization applied in the Czech Republic and
Russia, lent themselves to corruption but political expediency often won
out over economic sense. 

Dr. Brzezinski, the keynote speaker at the conference, and several other
presenters, underscored the seminal role of the opposition, the Solidarity
movement and the Roman Catholic Church. In most of the former Soviet
republics, Belarus for example, there was no significant grassroots
movements restraining power. Zenon PaznyakÕs Belarusin Popular Front never
enjoyed more than 15% of the popular support and its anti-Russian rhetoric
was an obstacle in a country in which most public business was conducted
in Russian. Reforms in Russia and in the former Soviet region were
initiated from above with many self-conscious attempts by the ruling
elites to stir periestroika to their own advantage.

Jan NowakÕs insistence on greater openness to Western ideas in Poland can
hardly be disputed, even if Nowak exaggerates the role of academic
exchanges in which both Leszek Balcerowicz, widely credited for PolandÕs
economic miracle, and Grzegorz Kolodko, participated as Fulbright
scholars. Social development cannot simply be attributed to the elites but
can be viewed in the framework of the culture of change. While leadership
matters, authority figures without grassroots support, be it
organizational or ideological, are not able to lead effectively for long.
Russian experience since periestroika amply demonstrates that history is
driven by circumstances unforeseen by the decision makers. 

In contrast, Richard Pipes and Marshall Goldman, in my opinion, give too
much credence to history and distinctive traits of Russian character that
seemed to clash with the broad assessment by the political analysts of the
current situation: the lack of strong identity and coherent describable
character in the region. Is Russian identity distinguishable from Russian
imperial ambitions? Polls suggest a growing danger of Lukashenkanism:
favoring ethnic self-identification and expressing nostalgia for the
Brezhnev yearsÑwith both Stalinist and Czarist Russia faring better than
YeltsinÕs. According to Aleksandr Buzgalin, 71% distrust the police and
64.1% distrust the legal system. While the time might be auspicious for a
strong law and order candidate, most Russians have become disillusioned
with their leaders and increasingly left out of the political process.
Crisis of identity is a given after a massive capitulation of an
all-consuming ideology and territorial disintegration of an empire.
Perhaps the question to ask is whether a discernable Russian post-Soviet
identity and future have manifested themselves historically? Peter
Reddaway quoted poll figures indicating that roughly half of the Russian
population preferred to think of itself as Eurasian [as opposed to
European], but the tag is of recent vintage, as Professor Pipes noted. If
it were possible to invent a new identity for the Russians, let it be
Borderland European, which is to say a European with understandable
multi-polar interests [Central Asia, the Pacific rim]. 

It seems to me counterproductive to pander to patterns of historical
character in a society that has applied reason to history as a means for
rationalizing its totalitarian condition. Lack of strong ethnic or
national identification, which I tagged as the local [tutejszy] syndrome
elsewhere in discussing the borderland region, might be a more
constructive way of understanding the roots identity conflicts in still
largely localized, agrarian societies like Belarus, provincial Ukraine or
Russia. The paternalism of the communist distribution system and highly
centralized power only reinforced this local syndrome. 

While the village with global ambitions mentality rooted in historical
messianism and profound sense of powerlessness offers some answers, I
would agree with the view that the West is resented because it threw its
support behind a clique of corrupt oligarchs in power who squandered the
nationÕs wealth. The feelings of resentment surfaced in the reaction to
the Kosovo bombing as a form of displaced empathy, a compression of
conflicting, often irrational impulses. It was a vehicle for Russians to
express their feeling that they have been had: with the West not holding
to its promises, with the West victimizing the Serbs, or people like us,
the Russians. Milosevic, who in many ways resembles Lukashenka and some
of the Russian ideologues, made it a war about dignity not about winning.
What is the prognosis for the future? Dr. Brzezinski compared Russia to
the worst slum run by local "crews." Watts on the eve of the riots, the
size of Russia with 30,000 nukes, is hard to grasp in one swoop even by a
seer: a black hole that can gobble up everything, not just the IMF
billions! Even an analysis of the state of the Russian military by an
organization like the Congressional Research Service warns of
"war-lordism." Marek Karp of the Eastern Studies Institute in Warsaw
generally agrees with this assessment but believes the center will hold
because a crash might be too costly to the oligarchs in power. Mikhail
Matysin has tried to put the best face on the crisis pointing to a visible
rise in regional self-sufficiency likely to press for reforms. 

Political instability in Russia is likely to persist after Yeltsin. In six
and a half years of the Yeltsin presidency, Russia has had five prime
ministers and seven different governments, three under Viktor
Chernomyrdin. With each new government, it should come as no surprise that
Russia lacks a consistent policy and that its government, for all the
incredible corruption, even the pretense of legitimacy. Russia,
Piontkovsky cautions, did not simply undergo massive privatization by the
nomenklatura whereby the former party functionaries became the owners of
the businesses they ran with systemic market changes in place.
Privatization by the Russian nomenklatura was without risk and continues
to be subsidized by the state budget and the taxpayer. 

If PiontkovskyÕs assessment is correct, one should be very cautious with
providing aid to Russia. It should be parceled out and carefully targeted
at specific local projects, not used to prop up the apparatus of the
ruling oligarchy. That option is increasingly more available. If
sufficient openness and relatively independent social groupings did not
exist in 1991, they are beginning to now. 

The principal American policy interest should be to control the spread of
nuclear weapons. As Professor Rutland observed, "lending to Russia would
have happened no matter what." Critical objectives were achieved at a
price but money was also made. Did American policy makers unwittingly
ascribe American values and features and ended up victims of their own
rhetoric? Did the experts apply universal recipes which would work
everywhere without taking into account the specific cultural traits?
Whether or not the aid was misdirected or given to those who could deliver
the goods depends on determination of the principal concerns in the
region. 

Further aid assumes that Russia can muddle through the rough times. The
Jamestown Foundation Conference participants did not rule out further
territorial fragmentation or even a massive conflict, after all the
country flirted with civil war twice in this decade. For all the IMF
billions, poured into Russia, the participants felt that creating a
climate auspicious for development was up to the Russians themselves.
They did not think that the West alone, and especially the United States,
has much leverage to stir the region to democratization and market values,
or to have significant impact on helping Russia to put its house in order. 

What role can Poland play? 

1. It should be open to a historical reconciliation with Russia on the
model its reconciliation with Germany. It should be its mission as the
point of NATO. Russia needs to be reassured, especially after the conflict
in Kosovo, that NATO is not its adversary and that the enlargement of the
alliance has brought unprecedented stability to the region to enable
Poland and Russia to normalize their relationship by gradually coming to
terms with their past. 

It is my contention that Russia, indeed the entire former Soviet region,
is the Borderland of the West, and that the democratization of Russia and
development of its economy will require some form of, albeit gradual,
Europeanization. If this is the case, Poland, and, to a lesser degree, the
Baltic states, are an essential component in this transition process to
the extent that geopolitics is still relevant in the technological age. 
In the course of this historical reconciliation, it is important to
redefine the meaning of the old Kresy myth, not as an ideological
construct but as a workable model for a multi-polar society.
Deconstructing cultural ideologies is and essential first step of policy,
in this case to breech the border of Russian imagination by a gradual
expansion of Western structures into the former Soviet region, including
as a long-term goal NATO. 

2. Poland should become even more Russia-conscious than it already is, by
building structures, such as the proposed non-governmental Eastern Policy
Forum, which could draw on scholars from various institutes and include
scholars from the Baltics, Ukraine and even Russia. The Polish-American
Foundation to be established from the proceeds to the Enterprise Fund can
certainly help in this effort but the task is enormous and requires
significant infusion of Western capital if this grand joint venture to
foster genuine democratic development of the former Soviet region is to
succeed. 

Poland has not done enough to promote its "frontline" status, really as a
conduit of ideas and a model of a successful transition. It needs to
undertake forceful initiatives looking forward to a post-Yeltsin Russia.
Both Washington and Warsaw must commit themselves to the idea that
Polish-American partnership is key in helping to reclaim the region mired
in chaos and capitulation of ideology for civil society.

(copyright, Michael Szporer, 1999) 
Foundation for Free Speech, Washington DC, 202-547-7114, Michael Szporer

*******

#11
Business Week
June 21, 1999
[for personal use only]
Commentary: Poland: A Beacon for the Rest of Europe (int'l edition)
By Rose Brady 

For a newcomer, it was quite a scene. Merchants, artisans, and even bankers 
lined the streets to offer their products at a fair in Warsaw's Old Town on a 
recent Sunday afternoon. As a band played Louis Armstrong's Wonderful World 
and other tunes, prosperous-looking Poles shopped for private pension funds 
as well as locally made goods from candies to cosmetics. What a change from a 
decade ago, when on June 4, 1989, voters ended communist rule by 
overwhelmingly supporting Solidarity candidates in Poland's first competitive 
elections. Within months, communism had collapsed across eastern Europe.
Poland not only led the way. It now stands out as the post-communist 
world's biggest economic success story. After years of covering Russia--one 
of the world's biggest disappointments--I traveled to Poland to gain a better 
understanding of its success. In chats with local managers, economists, and 
entrepreneurs, a clear message came through: Poland has enjoyed brisk 
economic growth for most of the decade because it chose radical reform, and 
despite the pain, stuck with it.
That's a simple message. But not enough policymakers in central Europe--or 
western Europe, for that matter--have heard it. While Poland thrives, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria lag behind. Germany can't match Poland's 
boldness in pension and tax reform. Nor can it come close to Poland's 
expected 3% to 4% growth this year. So Europe's leaders should revisit 
Poland's experience for clues to sorting out their own much-needed reforms.
It starts with consensus. In contrast to politically divided Russia, 
Poland was blessed with a broad agreement to build free-market democracy. 
That support gave the opening to post-communist Poland's first Finance 
Minister, Leszek Balcerowicz, who pushed through a program to eliminate price 
controls, slash state spending, and make the zloty convertible for trade 
transactions. Inflation shot up to 250% in 1990, the standard of living 
tumbled, and consensus was severely tested. But it held out long enough for 
the plan to produce a stable currency, moderate inflation, and a big spurt in 
investor confidence. While the tempo varied, each of Poland's seven 
governments since then has followed the same basic course. These days, 
inflation is running at 6.2%, and the zloty is strong.
The second ingredient in Poland's success is financial rigor. As far back 
as 1991, Warsaw's Securities & Exchange Commission worked to create 
transparent markets. Its strict disclosure requirements sparked complaints 
from companies leery of opening their books. But the rules fostered the 
investor trust that still eludes the Czech Republic and Russia. That's partly 
why Poland is seeing a surge of initial public offerings, such as April's $90 
million listing of Agora, publisher of Gazeta Wyborcza, the ``election 
gazette'' founded by Solidarity supporters in '89.
The third factor is Poland's openness to foreign investment, which boosts 
competition and productivity. Over 60% of Poland's banking assets will be in 
foreign hands after Warsaw sells 52% of its Bank Pekao to UniCredito Italiano 
and Germany's Allianz in June. And Warsaw will soon invite bids for up to 35% 
in TPSA, the state telecom monopoly. France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, and 
SBC Communications are considering investing.
NEW TEST. Poland's revolution is far from over. The challenge now is to speed 
privatization, slash taxes, and launch a drastic restructuring of agriculture 
and heavy industry. That's necessary if Poland is to join the European Union 
in the next decade. Yet farmers, 25% of the workforce, have mounted blockades 
to protest subsidy cuts. Warsaw must also lay off 100,000 coal miners. It's 
offering them 50,000 zlotys--about $12,500--to quit and start their own 
businesses.
So Poland's desire to reform will be tested again. But it has a decade of 
success to carry it through the next stage. If leaders of the old Soviet bloc 
came to Warsaw's Old Town, they would see that for themselves.

******