June 5, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3325 • 3326•

Johnson's Russia List
#3326
5 June 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Moscow Times: Experts' Insight Sought.
2. Reuters: Tough Russians wax poetic on Pushkin birthday.
3. The Times (UK) editorial: MUSE OF THE STEPPES. The elusive magic of 
Pushkin still weaves its spell.
4. Robert Chandler: Pushkin.
5. Gordon Humphrey: The Russia Society - employment.
6. Dmitri Glinski Vassiliev: Moscow Times' allegedly horrible mistake re 
Chubais.
7. Bill Mandel: European Union now military.
8. AFP: Moscow seeks to paper over domestic rifts over Kosovo accord.
9. AP: Health Worsening in Russian Army.
10. Irish Times: Seamus Martin, Russia's once-feared army is low on morale.
11. Albert Weeks: Yugoslavia agreement.
12. Moscow Times: Natalya Shulyakovskaya, Kremlin Trains Guns on Luzhkov.
13. Thomas Kosmo: The Mentor Group.
14. THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION PRISM: Vladimir Mironov, SHAKE-UP IN MOSCOW: 
NOTHING LASTS FOR EVER.
15. Andrew Miller: Simes Redux.]

*******

#1
Moscow Times
June 5, 1999 
IN BRIEF: Experts' Insight Sought 
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

MOSCOW -- President Boris Yeltsin on Friday called for the country's leading 
academics to evaluate the progress of Russia's democratic reforms since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. 

Speaking at the 275th anniversary celebration of Russia's Academy of 
Sciences, Yeltsin called on the scientists and academics to study Russia's 
free market and democratic reforms, and "come up with businesslike 
recommendations and a realistic prognosis." 

"It is time to analyze the first results of democratic reforms in Russia ... 
the development of Russian society and evaluate the effectiveness of the 
political system," he said. 

*******

#2
Tough Russians wax poetic on Pushkin birthday
By Adam Tanner

MOSCOW, June 5 (Reuters) - Russia's top leaders, veterans of bare-knuckle 
Kremlin politics, turned soft on Saturday and tried to outdo each other in 
praise for national poet Alexander Pushkin on the 200th anniversary of his 
birthday. 

President Boris Yeltsin, who has rarely shown any special fondness for 
literature, presided over a ceremony in the Kremlin to hand out a new 
government Pushkin Prize. 

``Last night, to somehow prepare, I decided to read Pushkin with a clear mind 
at 2 a.m. And you know it turned out it wasn't that easy,'' Yeltsin said. 

``In first grade, everything seemed to be so easy,'' Yeltsin said. ``But here 
(with Pushkin), it is not. So much intellect went into it. So much 
creativity. So many special, special intentions. Yes, one can't help but be 
proud of such a man.'' 

Such pride has moved Russians to put up pictures of Pushkin on streets across 
the country, and capitalist entrepreneurs played up the country's love for 
Pushkin to hawk vodka, chocolate and T shirts bearing his image. 

Yeltsin awarded 28 people -- such as a well-known 92-year-old academic and a 
high school teacher -- medals with Pushkin's likeness, for achievements in 
art and culture. 

Sergei Stepashin, the new prime minister who earlier served as the nation's 
top policeman and was a key figure in the 1994-96 war in Chechnya, recited, 
somewhat woodenly, lines of Pushkin and waxed poetic in his praise. 

``Standing opposite this monument of Alexander Sergeyevich (Pushkin), you 
can't believe he's 200 years old today,'' Stepashin told guests at a ceremony 
unveiling a new monument in Moscow. ``For all of us he is still young.'' 

``Pushkin is Russia, Russian language and culture,'' he said. ``Everyone sees 
something of themselves in Pushkin.'' 

Stepashin took office just two weeks ago and has a mountain of pressing 
problems. But he said he would travel on Sunday -- Pushkin's actual birthday 
-- to the region of Pskov, north of Moscow, to visit his grave. 

Igor Ivanov, the foreign minister who spent much of the spring evoking the 
language of the Cold War in condemning NATO for the war in Yugoslavia, said 
NATO had ignored the lessons of Pushkin in the Balkans today. 

Russian leaders across the spectrum including Communist leader Gennady 
Zyuganov paid tribute to Pushkin, a rare figure who brings all Russians 
together in their praise and respect. 

Russian media reported that the city of Moscow spent more than $2 million 
organising 200th anniversary celebrations, and Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, a likely 
candidate in presidential elections next year, presided at various ceremonies 
on Saturday. 

Moscow closed off its central Pushkin Square -- best known in recent years 
for its massive McDonald's restaurant -- for a VIP-only ceremony. Other 
cities held large public celebrations where children sketched Pushkin 
characters on the pavement. 

Although Pushkin is less read abroad than authors Leo Tolstoy or Fyodr 
Dostoyevsky, Russians learn to love the poet from childhood and say 
translations cannot do justice to the beauty of his writing. 

Russian television provided hours of programming related to the poet on 
Saturday. One news segment interviewed living Russians who also had the name 
Alexander Pushkin, including a student, an ambulance worker, and a boiler 
repairman. 

*******

#3
The Times (UK)
June 5 1999 
LEADING ARTICLE (editorial) 
MUSE OF THE STEPPES
The elusive magic of Pushkin still weaves its spell 

The soul of Russia is a mass of contradictions. Nowhere are they better 
illustrated than in the tumultuous life of the country's most beloved son. 
Today, as Russians celebrate the birth 200 years ago of the poet Alexander 
Pushkin, the playful yet tragic genius whom they revere as their Shakespeare 
and Mozart rolled into one, they will also be meditating on the elusive 
nature of the Russianness he epitomises. 
Paradox governed Pushkin's days. He was the father of Russian literature, yet 
African as well as Slav blood ran in his veins. He was a patriot fascinated 
by tsarist autocracy; yet he also suffered under it. He was a young nobleman 
with wild passions for gambling and women; yet he wrote with consummate 
delicacy. 

Pushkin's work reflects the same perpetual shifting of boundaries. Apparently 
artless tales of romantic love and historical adventure play with the forms 
and conventions of literature, slipping almost imperceptibly from parody to 
fantasy in a language of musical elegance; their one constant is the 
surprised and delighted half-smile playing on their readers' lips. 

The man who gave Russians their subtle modern language and way of thinking is 
a secular saint in his homeland.This devotion has made generations of 
politicians try to co-opt him as a forerunner of their cause. Today, in the 
same way, he is slipping through Boris Yeltsin's. Moscow's £2.5 million 
Pushkin jubilee is shamelessly commercial, invoking the poet's name on goods 
as prosaic as chocolate and vodka. Mr Yeltsin, more a man for vodka than 
verse, has been mocked for his gloss on Pushkinmania: "Pushkin is our 
everything." But, if they agree on nothing else, Russians believe that even 
this "privatisation" of Pushkin cannot kill their love. 

Sadly for foreigners, Pushkin also slips through our fingers. His language 
eludes translation, a quality which saddens Russians who long to be 
understood abroad and pleases those who revel in their national uniqueness. 
Bewildered Western readers thumbing through leaden translations can only take 
Pushkin's genius on trust. If, as Winston Churchill said, Russia is a riddle 
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, so too, for foreigners, is Pushkin. 

*******

#4
Subject: Re: 3325-Warner/Pushkin-Good Reason to Learn Russia
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 99 
From: Robert Chandler <kcf19@dial.pipex.com>

May I add a brief postscript to Tara Warner's article on Pushkin.

Pushkin is indeed an extraordinarily difficult poet to translate. There 
are, however, two remarkably good reecent translations of Yevgeny Onegin 
which many of your readers may not know about.

James Falen's version was published by OUP in their World Classics 
series. This is far better than any previous version. Finer still is a 
translation by Stanley Mitchell of the first chapter of Yevgeny Onegin in 
the journal MODERN POETRY IN TRANSLATION, vol 11. Only the first 
chapter - but, unbelievably, Mitchell succeeds in reproducing all of 
Pushkin's wit and music, all his elegance and sparkle. It really is as 
delightful as the original.

This volume also contains fine versions of Krylov, Russia's equivalent to 
La Fontaine.

Volume 10 of MODERN POETRY IN TRANSLATION is entirely devoted to Russian 
poetry. Most notably it contains an excellent translation by Angela 
Livingstone of extracts from one of Marina Tsvetaeva's finest poems, 'The 
Rat-Catcher'.

MODERN POETRY IN TRANSLATION is distributed in the USA by Bernhard de 
Boer, New York, and in the UK by Password Books, 23 Mount Street, 
Manchester M4 4DE. 

*******

#5
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 1999 
From: "Gordon Humphrey" <i1040@mediaone.net> 
Subject: The Russia Society - employment

Employment. The Russia Society, a non-profit Washington, DC corporation
dedicated to fostering better relations between the U.S. and Russia, is
interviewing candidates for the position of Assistant to the President. The
ideal candidate is a self-starter with a keen and demonstrated interest in
American-Russian relations, a successful track record in office
administration, project development and grants-writing. Please reply to
Gordon Humphrey, i1040@mediaone.net 

******

#6
From: xv@aha.ru (Dmitri Glinski Vassiliev)
Sent: Thursday, June 03, 1999 
Subject: Moscow Times' allegedly horrible mistake re Chubais

Paul Backer makes a strange accusation against Moscow Times, alleging it has
made a grave mistake by suspecting that Chubais might be a candidate for an
elective office. Strikingly, he quotes MT actually saying that "it is hard
to imagine" Chubais in the Duma cafeteria. In fact, both Mr. Backer and MT
appear to be wrong. Chubais was elected Duma deputy in 1993, on the slate of
the Russia's Choice (there was such a party!). But he declined his Duma seat
in order to be able to stay in the government. As for Backer's assertion,
let me remark that a number of newspapers have published evidence of
Chubais' full-blown campaign for possible candidacy in the presidential
elections.
If a politician is widely detested in Russia, he may still be quite
electable - provided that he is widely feared. Yeltsin is the most telling
example.

******

#7
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 1999 
From: Bill Mandel <wmmmandel@earthlink.net> 
Subject: European Union now military

The big news resulting from the Kosovo War is that the U.S. 
has so antagonized its "partners" in NATO that the European 
Union has decided to become a military power for the first 
time in its 42-year history.This provides a basis for 
defending or advancing the interests of the euro versus the 
dollar on a world scale.For example, at this moment European 
investments in Africa are vastly greater than U.S. So, of 
course, are European investments in Russia. Comparison to 
World War I suggests itself, or to World War II before the 
entry of the USSR, although the long-term result of 
increased U.S. influence, and now dominance, were the same. 
In a world facing a rising confrontation between Europe and 
the U.S., the swing strength will be with China, India, and 
Russia, if their cooperation becomes stronger.

*******

#8
Moscow seeks to paper over domestic rifts over Kosovo accord

MOSCOW, June 5 (AFP) - Russia sought to paper over domestic rifts over a 
Yugoslav peace accord Saturday as the Kremlin's pointman on Kosovo defended 
himself against charges that he had betrayed Moscow's historic ally Belgrade.
President Boris Yeltsin met his Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to discuss 
overnight air raids by NATO against Yugoslavia, saying "we must continue to 
search for a way out of the crisis" in the Balkans, agencies reported.

Ivanov said work on a UN resolution enshrining the Kosovo peace plan, 
accepted by Belgrade, could only start once the air war had stopped, and was 
non-committal about joining an international peace force for the province.

But while Yeltsin's Balkans envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin said the president had 
congratulated him Friday on securing Belgrade's agreement to a peace accord, 
Russia's chief diplomat gave the document a cool reception.

"Any accords are judged by their results," said Ivanov of a 10-point peace 
plan thrashed out by Chernomyrdin and EU envoy Martti Ahtisaari and approved 
by Serbian lawmakers on Thursday.

"If these accords lead to an end of the air strikes, allow the search for a 
political settlement to move forward, the results will speak for themselves," 
ITAR-TASS quoted Ivanov as saying.

But he played down talk of splits between the foreign ministry and 
Chernomyrdin over the plan, saying "one should not look for differences.

"The problem is not whether there are differences in the positions of 
Russia's representatives. The problem is to secure a halt to NATO military 
operations in Yugoslavia," ITAR-TASS reported.

Ivanov nevertheless pointedly noted that Yeltsin had confirmed that the 
foreign ministry was in overall charge of Russia's stance on Kosovo.

Deep divisions among Moscow policy-makers surfaced Friday when deputies said 
that First Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Avdeyev had told a closed 
session of parliament that Chernomyrdin had presented them with a fait 
accompli.

"Each of us will have to look into his heart and soul to judge whether we 
have betrayed Yugoslavia by accepting this peace plan," General Leonid 
Ivashov, an anti-NATO hawk who heads the defence ministry's international 
cooperation department, said Friday.

But Chernomyrdin hit back at charges that he had sold out Belgrade, telling 
Interfax news agency it was "totally absurd" to accuse him of "getting into 
bed with NATO."

"I can tell you word for word what the president said (during their Friday 
telephone conversation) 'thank you very much for all that you have done, I am 
satisfied, continue your work,'" he quoted Yeltsin as saying.

Chernomyrdin, who has said Moscow could provide up to 10,000 troops for a 
Kosovo peacekeeping force, vehemently denied claims that Russian soldiers 
could be placed under NATO command.

"Which NATO troops will be present, countries who took part in the strikes or 
not, that's for NATO to decide. But as for our presence, we will never be 
under NATO command. Never, that is ruled out," he said on RTR television.

Ivanov was more cautious, saying only that Moscow would consider 
participation "if it coincides with Russia's interests and efforts to revive 
Yugoslavia."

Krasnaya Zvezda, the defence ministry's official newspaper, urged Moscow to 
remain vigilant despite the peace accord, warning that NATO and the European 
Union could attempt to sideline Russia by pumping huge sums of cash into the 
region.

"Moscow could in the near future be placed in a very difficult situation if 
it becomes clear that they (NATO) are trying to use it as part of the 
alliance's anti-Yugoslav strategy," the paper warned. 

*******

#9
Health Worsening in Russian Army
June 4, 1999

MOSCOW (AP) -- The tuberculosis rate in Russia's armed forces has doubled 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the top military health official was 
quoted as saying in an article published Friday.

The Red Star daily also quoted Lt. Gen. Ivan Chizh of the Defense Ministry as 
saying that psychological illnesses and drug abuse in the military have risen 
sharply.

Chizh said a six-year program has been developed to combat TB in the 
cash-strapped armed forces to try to reduce the disease rate by 10 percent 
each year. He did not give specific figures on the number of TB cases.

Chizh also said psychological illnesses have risen by 30 percent among 
conscripts in the past two years and 19 percent among officers. He attributed 
the rise to increased stress, alcoholism and drug abuse.

In another sign of stress, 29 percent of all deaths in the military are 
suicides, Chizh said. Morale in the Russian armed forces is extremely low and 
conditions are bleak, and the military has been plagued by frequent outbursts 
of hazing and other violence.

********

#10
Irish Times
June 5, 1999 
Russia's once-feared army is low on morale 
The Russian army has now reached the stage at which it is underequipped and 
undertrained, writes Seamus Martin 

It was once the most feared fighting machine on earth but the defeats of 
Afghanistan and Chechnya and the economic collapse at home have mortally 
wounded Russia's army. The force which is due to share a peacekeeping role 
with NATO in Kosovo is low on morale, badly paid and fed and suffers from a 
brutal tradition of "hazing" in which young recruits become the virtual 
slaves of their elders.

Once the lines of the civil war song " . . . from the Taiga to the British 
seas, the Red army is the strongest of all" struck fear into Western hearts. 
In their long history the armies of Russia have camped in Berlin and at the 
gates of Paris. They have even crossed the Alps in victory.

That proud tradition is now moribund. Pavel Felgenhauer, the defence and 
national security editor of the respected Moscow daily Segodnya put it this 
way: "The military, including all the `other forces' - the Interior Ministry, 
the border guards and the Federal Security Service, or FSB - were disgraced 
by the Chechen débâcle. They have been underpaid and underfed for years.

They have now reached the stage at which they are also underequipped and 
undertrained. Discipline is lax and desertion is common. In the early days of 
the war in Chechnya I spoke to deserters in Moscow who claimed they had been 
sent into battle without ever having fired a shot in training.

In military hospitals young conscripts told stories of being towed into 
battle after their armoured personnel carriers had broken down, of being left 
by their officers to fend for themselves, of living off the land. Elsewhere 
in Chechnya the lethal combination of the Kalashnikov in the one hand and the 
bottle of vodka in the other put the fear of God into the most seasoned 
observers.

Even in earlier times, when the militaryindustrial complex was still intact, 
the army's discipline left a lot to be desired. Russian senior officers in 
the former East Germany were accused of massive corruption and of a dashing 
entrepreneurial spirit in which they put the hard currency budgets from 
Moscow on short-term deposit in Western banks and pocketed the interest.

When a young journalist from Moskovsky Komsomolets called Dmitri Kholodov 
began to investigate the situation he was conned into picking up a briefcase 
of "incriminating documents". When he opened it he was blown to pieces.

According to Mr Felgenhauer, in today's army officers and soldiers are 
committing suicide in unprecedented numbers. Commissioned officers, he wrote, 
committed 18,000 felonies in 1997. In the northern Caucasian, Ural and 
Zabaikal military districts the number of felonies has doubled annually.

Some units of Russia's diverse armed forces, however, operate at a level of 
professionalism which is well up to world standards. The Dzerzhinsky and 
Taman divisions have traditionally been considered as elite in comparison to 
many others. These units have also usually been based in or close to the 
Moscow region in case of political troubles in the capital. Their deployment 
in Kosovo seems extremely unlikely.

If reports from the Russian regions are indicative of the situation, it would 
appear that newly-formed units of special volunteers will be set up for the 
Kosovo operation. In the Urals city of Chelyabinsk, for example, work has 
started on forming a local battalion of 600 volunteers with 300 in reserve. 
The region's information officer said that only professionals in specialist 
military disciplines would be accepted for the force. "Contract volunteers" 
would receive a salary of $1,000 a month - a small fortune by Russian 
standards.

But the deputy head of the region's recruiting office, Mr Alexander 
Gontarenko, told the RIA-Novosti news agency yesterday: "So far I've 
personally seen only one volunteer." 

******

#11
Excerpt
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 1999 
From: Albert Weeks <AWeeks1@compuserve.com> 
Subject: Yugoslavia agrees to Russo-Finnish "International Peace Plan"

First, it is very good news that Russia was 
instrumental in getting NATO out of the mess while 
at the same time "internationalizing" the solution to the 
problem, for bringing in the U.N. Security Council is
part of the plan. All this good for these reasons:
* Domestically, the outcome of the Russian elections 
(December this year, June 2000) depends a good deal 
on resolution of the war. Russia's own prestige is bound up 
in it since Serbia is its traditional ally. The settlement clearly 
diminishes the influence of the Communist-nationalist Red/Brown 
coalition. The fact that the centrist Chernomyrdin played a 
strong role in the peaceful solution of the Yugoslav crisis buttresses 
his own presidential chances in 2000.
* Russian troop participation in enforcing the agreement
on the gound in Kosovo is also a good development
if that is worked out. Like its troop presence in keeping peace 
in northern Bosnia at the Serbian border there, a Russian 
presence in Kosovo helps normalize NATO-Russian relations 
while abetting mending of Russian-NATO fences over 
NATO's eastward extension. Who knows? Perhaps by the end 
of 2000, Russia's partnership with NATO actually will 
be strengthened.
*NATO's bombing was disgraceful, to be sure. But if the settlement
works and at least three-quarters of displaced Kosovars return
to their homeland, a precedent will have been set: The "internal affairs"
and policies of a nation-state, when blatantly violent and inhumane, are of
concern to the whole world community. Some, like the George F. 
Kennan of the 1950s, wondered why Hitler was not stopped in hos
own backyard before the Austrian Anschluss, the Nazi invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, and the Holocaust. Yet to stop Hitler, Kennan admitted, 
meant "interfering in the affairs of a sovereign state."
* Bringing the U.N. Security Council into the picture likewise is
a healthy development while also suiting the strategic interests of 
Russia. For obvious reasons, Moscow likes international crises to be
settled within the Council, not within the councils of extra-U.N.O.
military
blocs, such as NATO. In the U.N., Russia's veto can be brought 
into play. But from everyone's perspective, perhaps, isn't it better 
to have a broad, international-institutional involvement in settling 
crises than having assorted alliances operating outside it? 
The U.N. Charter permits such bloc action, of course. But in the long 
run, isn't it more useful to encourage internatiolnal unity than to have 
separate military actions effected by blocs, such as NATO in 
Yugoslavia?

*******

#12
Moscow Times
June 5, 1999 
Kremlin Trains Guns on Luzhkov 
By Natalya Shulyakovskaya
Staff Writer

Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov has become enemy No. 1 for the Kremlin, in a new 
and hostile stage in the stormy relationship between President Boris Yeltsin 
and the ambitious mayor. 

With former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov gone from government, likely 
presidential contender Luzhkov - aside from the Communists - is the only 
Russian politician who could get between a chosen Kremlin successor and the 
presidency, political analyst say. 

And Yeltsin, or his inner circle of advisers dubbed "the family," appears to 
want him out of the way - to the point of floating a potential election 
challenge to Luzhkov by former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko in December's 
mayoral election. 

Luzhkov was a key Yeltsin ally in 1993, when the president used tanks to 
blast the rebellious parliament into submission, and supported Yeltsin's 1996 
re-election. 

But the relationship between the Kremlin and the mayor's office cooled 
sharply, beginning after the August crisis when members of the presidential 
administration suggested Luzhkov as a candidate for prime minister. They 
lost, and most of the Luzhkov advocates were purged from the Kremlin. 

At the height of Primakov's popularity, Yeltsin reached out to Luzhkov to 
attempt to play him against the influential prime minister. But with Luzhkov' 
refusal to support the Kremlin line in trying to get rid of Prosecutor 
General Yury Skuratov, the relationship soured again. 

Yevgeny Savostyanov, a former Kremlin staffer who now works closely with 
Luzhkov's political movement, Fatherland, predicted the Kremlin was planning 
a major assault on Luzhkov. 

The Kremlin could undermine Luzhkov's reputation as a mayor who gets things 
done by cutting down the flow of federal budget money to companies and 
federally-funded organizations located in Moscow, Savostyanov said. 

The Kremlin started testing Luzhkov's nerve as soon as Primakov and his 
government were fired May 12. 

Ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a Kremlin ally, sent Yeltsin a letter 
suggesting that the president abolish the mayor's office and rule the city 
through a federal ministry. 

Yet another trial balloon came from Kiriyenko, who has refused to rule out 
running against Luzhkov for mayor. Kiriyenko now heads the fledgling New 
Force movement. 

"For me, it is a decided issue, that the New Force movement will not stay 
away from the Moscow mayoral elections," Kiriyenko said on NTV's "Itogi" 
Sunday news show. "To say whether I personally will run is still premature." 

Political analysts said Kiriyenko, who has been distancing himself from other 
liberals, has been looking for other possible political allies. The Kremlin 
might fit the bill, they said. 

While Kiriyenko probably would lose, he would have a platform to criticize 
Luzhkov. 

"He wanders across the political field offering himself right and left," said 
Ivan Bunin, director of the Center for Political Technologies. "Kiriyenko 
will use [the election] to spin himself and cause Luzhkov as much damage as 
possible." 

Kiriyenko seemed to be getting warmed up on "Itogi," saying that Moscow had 
become overly bureaucratic and that there was a "taboo on discussion" of 
Luzhkov's role. 

Kiriyenko criticized the city's plans to move Moscow mayoral elections from 
June 2000 to December of this year, which would let Luzhkov coordinate his 
re-election campaign with Fatherland's effort in the Duma elections to be 
held in December. 

"I am against adjusting the elections in the capital of the entire country to 
suit the interests of one political figure, even a very respected one," 
Kiriyenko said. 

City Hall responded with a counterattack. While Luzhkov vacationed this week, 
Deputy Mayor Valery Shantsev slammed Kiriyenko on Channel 31's "Our Hyde 
Park" TV program. 

"The laws in Moscow are put together by the City Duma. Its chairman, Vladimir 
Platonov, is a lawyer and a former prosecutor," said Shantsev. 

"Certainly, he - much better than Kiriyenko - knows how to interpret our 
laws." 

*******

#13
Date: Sat, 05 Jun 1999 
From: Mentor Group <mentor@beld.net>
Subject: The Article by Fritz Ermarth/3323

My work is as President of The Mentor Group, a private research institute
in Boston. We are responsible for a peer group of Supreme Court members in
the United States, the EU and Russia, where we have created The Russian
Forum for Legal and Economic Affairs that meets every year in September.
Mr. Ermarth's plaintive reference to Russia's absent democracy rings a bell
with our Russian Forum because the leaders of the Russian Parliament have
joined with our colleagues in the High Courts to develop a democratic
custom, habit, usage and practice based the elusive rule of law of the
Russian Federation. In fact, Russian law is only elusive because it is
invisible to the average observer who would have no reason to imagine where
or how law is applied in Russia. In fact, Russian law is emerging at about
the same pace law in the United States and law in the European Union did,
which is, by the nature of things, an imperceptible pace. That is why the
High Courts are so important in Russia over the long-term, and that is the
principal work of the Russian Forum, about which I can send you detailed
papers if you wish. 

Thomas Kosmo 

*******

#14
THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION
PRISM
A BI-WEEKLY ON THE POST-SOVIET STATES
6/4/99 No.11 Part 2

SHAKE-UP IN MOSCOW: NOTHING LASTS FOR EVER
After Primakov: Yeltsin and his allies try to restore 
the pre-August 1998 order
By Vladimir Mironov
Vladimir Alekseevich Mironov is a senior fellow of the Institute of
International Economic and Political Studies of the Russian Academy of
Sciences in Moscow.

The events which took place during the last month of spring brought to an
end two major political processes which had been underway in the Russian
Federation for the last year and a half, and initiated a third. First, on
May 12 President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree which had been expected for
months: Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who had been in charge of the White
House for little more than eight months--was sacked. Second, on May 15 the
attempt by some parliamentarians, led by CPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov, to
remove the head of state from power by legal means ended in failure.
Yeltsin's opponents were unable to secure the support of the two thirds of
Duma deputies (over 300 votes) required to start the impeachment process.
Third, on May 19 the new chairman of the Council of Ministers, Sergei
Stepashin, was elected at the first attempt by a parliamentary majority (301
votes). The media immediately linked these three events and began talking of
yet another victory for the head of state over his political enemies.

But is it a real victory or a Pyrrhic one? Will what has happened influence
the course of political life in the country lead to fundamental change in
Russia's political landscape and alter the developmental trends which
appeared in late 1998 and early 1999?

Before we answer these questions, we should determine what actually happened
in Moscow in May 1999. First, it appears that the president demonstrated his
consistency in his methods for dealing with awkward political situations: He
exploited his constitutional rights as head of state to "explode" the
situation and change the rules of the game. Second, the Communist Party
leaders can hardly have expected to set the impeachment process in
motion--their supporters numbered just over 240 deputies, and they were also
well aware of the Yeltsin administration's ability to "win over" dithering
parliamentarians. Their action was more of a pre-election maneuver designed
to discredit the political opponents of the communists and the People's
Patriotic Union as a whole, and the best outcome Yeltsin's political enemies
could have hoped for was that it might have prompted the head of state to
resign voluntarily.

Against this background, the leadership of the Duma and the leading
parliamentary parties managed to avoid a knee-jerk reaction to actions of
the head of state--who had refused to cooperate with the representative
legislature--and lobbied for a swift, positive vote on the candidacy of the
president's placeman for the post of prime minister.

The ploy to engineer early parliamentary and presidential elections in a
legitimate way failed. The adversaries began some complex political
maneuvering in an attempt to gain the upper hand and to determine when the
election campaign would begin.

POLITICAL TRENDS
During Yevgeny Primakov's tenure as prime minister, the political life of
the country could be characterized as calm and stable. This was fostered
both by the existence of a number of centers of political power (president,
government, State Duma and Federation Council) which restrained and
counterbalanced each other and which had come to a sort of unspoken
agreement, and also by the personality of the prime minister himself. The
unflappable and to some extent phlegmatic Primakov left his mark on the
course of political events. He was accustomed to consistency in his team,
rationality, predictability, collegiate decisionmaking and transparency in
staff appointments. Moreover, involving several power centers in the
selection procedure for candidates for this or that government post, and
monitoring the staffing and other resources of the groups participating in
the consultations, meant that it was possible to predict their outcome.

The removal of Primakov has created a situation whereby just one power
center (the president) and the "explosive" temperament of the head of state
will attempt to dominate the political life of the country. The course of
events will depend on the circumspect, changeable and unexpected--in a word,
unpredictable--nature of Boris Yeltsin's actions. The defining role in
decisionmaking will be played by intuition, staff appointments will be
governed by exclusivity and "nepotism" and the increased influence of
informal groups.

HAS THE POLITICAL SCENERY CHANGED?
Russia's political Olympus has not so much changed as returned to the status
it held in August 1998. The president is back at the summit, having refused
to search for a compromise with the parliamentarians. He has once again
demonstrated his desire to have the last word in determining the composition
of the highest political elite. There may be a number of reasons for this.
First, Boris Yeltsin is not used to feeling superfluous. Recently, Russia's
key political figures had managed to establish a working mechanism which
allowed them to take decisions and reach agreement on contentious issues.
The politicians had no need of an arbiter-president to deflate political
tension and to prevent confrontation from developing into open conflict.
Because of this political marginalization, the head of state may have felt a
certain political discomfort. Second, the president is openly trying to take
control not only of all major state decisions, but also of the financial
flows. There may be several explanations for this. It is possible that
Yeltsin has decided to take part in the elections himself, or hopes to use
the financial resources to "push through" his candidate for president, who
would guarantee him and his "family" security in the post-Yeltsin era
(though worldwide political realities are such that it is unlikely that any
politician would keep promises of constancy if the political circumstances
change when he is in power).

The disappearance of the second power center in the executive structures has
turned the prime minister (currently Sergei Stepashin) into a high-ranking
official rather than a politician responsible for the social block in the
government. Only firm control of the economic block can gain the prime
minister authority and influence. However, it is very difficult to achieve
this. First, Sergei Stepashin--who has spent all his time in Boris Yeltsin's
team handling issues of national security--does not have the required number
of devoted and loyal qualified economists. Second, he does not have the
financial and material resources to guarantee him a certain autonomy of
movement (unlike Viktor Chernomyrdin, who always had the fuel and energy
complex behind him). Third, because the government's sole source of
legitimacy is the president, it automatically becomes an adjunct to the head
of state's administration. Bearing in mind that the head of this
administration, Aleksandr Voloshin, has an economic background, he is
"destined" to intervene in the government's economic decisionmaking process.
What is more, the economic state of the country does not permit him to exert
any real influence on the course of the Russian economy. The range of
possible decisions is minimal. They would be implemented by any leader,
regardless of his ideological persuasion. Consequently, control of the
economic block is of a symbolic nature. Fourth, the split which has emerged
in the government (First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Aksenenko clearly
considers himself to be a viable candidate for prime minister and tirelessly
demonstrates his desire to occupy the post) will either force Sergei
Stepashin to devote time to suppressing the mutiny, or will turn the former
foreign minister into a puppet not just of the head of state personally, but
also of his closest circle. Particular individuals in this circle are not
important, because they can be replaced at a moment's notice on the whim of
the president.

For now, Sergei Stepashin is prepared to fight to concentrate the real
levers of power in his hands, as attested both by his attempts to appoint
loyal professionals to leading positions in the economic block (Mikhail
Zadornov, Aleksandr Zhukov), and by his intention to work more intensively
with the regional authorities. He is trying to ensure their political
support, albeit at the price of having the rules of play laid down not by
the prime minister but by the leaders of the larger and more influential
regions. These leaders have begun actively building election unions and
coalitions (Fatherland, All Russia, Voice of Russia) in an attempt to
consolidate their positions before the inevitable talks begin with the
federal authorities on the principles of the election campaigns and the
future of state power.

The political events of May seriously damaged the position of the State Duma
in the federal power structures. However, bearing in mind that the
strengthening of its position in 1998 and early 1999 was informal rather
than enshrined in law, it would be more appropriate to talk of a
reestablishment of the rules for interaction between the branches of federal
power as laid down by the Constitution and Russian legislation. The deputies
of the lower house of the Federal Assembly did not perceive the president's
candidate for prime minister as a strategic choice by the head of state,
attesting to some defined socioeconomic and political program to reform the
country, over which it would be worth entering into confrontation and trying
to influence Yeltsin's position. Even the leaders of the parties loyal to
him (in particular Russia Is Our Home leader Vladimir Ryzhkov) noted that
this was a tactical move, possibly not the last before Boris Yeltsin's term
expires, in pursuit of narrow political ends (in particular the dissolution
of the State Duma and early parliamentary elections).

In supporting the appointment of Sergei Stepashin as prime minister, the
parliamentarians were not committing themselves to anything regarding the
policies the government would follow. The deputies were merely accepting
that the government is the "patrimony" of the head of state, who can replace
its leaders as he sees fit. There was no point clashing with him over this
and giving him the opportunity to legitimately dissolve the State Duma. But
this does not entail automatic support for the bills drawn up by the
executive branch of power. In other words, the parliamentarians have
retained their freedom for political maneuvering in their legislative
activity.

The members of the upper house of the Federal Assembly distanced themselves
from the confrontation in Moscow. Apart from the more committed governors
and republic presidents of both right and left, almost nobody took part in
the swordplay. But after the government crisis receded, the speaker of the
Federation Council, Yegor Stroev, noted that the issue of changing the
constitution is becoming more and more urgent. In particular, he believes
that it is essential for the State Duma to take a more active role both in
the procedure for appointing the prime minister and in his dismissal. In
other words, Yeltsin's flaunting of his authority has strengthened the
arguments of those who advocate a redistribution of powers among the
president, the government, the State Duma and the Federation Council, to
favor the legislature.

The regional authorities appear to understand that the issue of
strengthening state intervention in the socioeconomic and political life of
the country is resolved. This process will continue regardless of the
particular figures at the top of the political pyramid. Given this, any
attempt to reinforce the regional element, which is fraught with the
possibility of the territorial disintegration of Russia, has little prospect
of success and will be blocked by the federal authorities. Consequently, it
is essential for them both to avoid providing a motive for the federal
institutions to intervene, and to bolster their position in the federal
structures, to lobby for the interests of their territories, to bind federal
politicians to particular commitments, and to demonstrate their value,
loyalty and willingness to implement the new policy. However, Yevgeny
Primakov's dismissal has disoriented them to some extent, because they have
lost a politician capable of consolidating a large part of the federal and
regional elites. Against this background, they face a difficult search for a
new political figure (or an attempt to resuscitate the old one), capable of
becoming a symbol of stability, predictability and statehood, and of
guaranteeing both that the changes which have already taken place in the
political and economic structure of the state are reinforced, and that a
particular trend in their development is followed.

All these political maneuvers are taking place against the background of a
society which has gone quiet. However, it would appear that this is not a
frightened society, but a society made wiser by historical experience, which
has decided to wait patiently for the parliamentary and presidential
elections without falling for the provocative actions of today's
politicians, many of whom should not be allowed to play with matches--they
might burn down the house. 

*******

#15
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 1999 
From: ABC in Saint Petersburg/Andrew Miller <abcspb@online.ru> 
Subject: Simes Redux

Simes Redux
Andrew Miller
St. Petersburg, Russia

If one wishes to find satisfaction from life in Russia one must, 
of course, seek the rewards of emoluments not looked for, the 
underappreciated small things in life. The twelve-cent subway ride. 
The quarter loaf of really good bread. One of the more charming of 
these is the free availability, and one could almost use the term "free" 
in both its senses, of filterless cigarettes. It is possible, and even 
easy, for those craving slow, painful suicide to buy a pack of these 
death-dealing instruments on any street corner, the transaction is 
perfectly legal , almost irrespective of age, and costs no more than one 
thin dime - less, if you find the right babushka with an overcoat. 
Moreover, the "Cigarettes Formerly Known as Papirosi" and still produced 
under the trade names Belomorcanal (they are named after the man-made 
canal from the White Sea to the Gulf of Finland, built by Stalin with 
convict labor at vicious lost of life - after all, they were "only 
convicts" - although, on the other hand, such people as the writer Isaac 
Babel might have been among them) and Prima are now manufactured at even 
higher quality/potency/efficiency by the American tobacco and Oreo giant 
R. J. R. Nabisco. As far as I know there's no truth to the rumor that, 
in the next round of "democratization" in Russia, these two products 
will be renamed "Auschwitz" and "Dachau."

All this tends to give the quip "I think he must be smoking 
something" a whole new meaning in the Land of the Midnight Gun.

Viz., on the Editorial Page of the May 13, 1999 [JRL 3285] issue of the 
Wall Street Journal, a paper I have always regarded as the best in the 
world at what it does, there appeared both an editorial and an op-ed 
piece (the latter authored by Dimitri K. Simes, President of the Nixon 
Center, a Russian Russia analyst who I have always regarded as an 
interesting and valuable voice in the field) devoted to Russia, in the 
aftermath of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's discharge of his cabinet 
the previous day. In particular, Yelsin fired former Soviet-KGB 
spymaster Yevgeny Primakov as Prime Minister and hired former 
Russian-FSB spymaster Sergei Stepashin. 

Musing on these goings-on Simes wrote, and I quote: "The 
probability that Mr. Stepashin will be confirmed as prime minister is 
extremely low. Conversely, the chances that the Duma [the lower house 
of Russia's parliament] will vote for impeachment are much higher. As a 
result, a potential constitutional crisis is in the making." The 
Journal's editorial mirrored this view, saying that a period of "open 
warfare" between Yeltsin and the parliament would follow.

But in fact, over the next two weeks the Russian Duma quickly 
and by a wide margin confirmed Yeltsin's choice of Stepashin to succeed 
Primakov. In addition, the Duma voted down all charges of impeachment 
against Yeltsin, by much wider margins than those by which U.S. 
President Bill Clinton was spared the American Congress. Even the 
charge pertaining to Yeltsin's patently illegal war in Chechnya, a war 
at least as unpopular in Russia as Vietnam was in America, failed to win 
approval.

Mr. Simes also referred to infamous Russian politician Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky as a "clownish ultranationalist." I do not know how Mr. 
Simes understands the term "clown" but, in fact, Zhirinovsky commands 
a faction of 48 members in the Duma who reliably follow his instructions 
and vote according to his party line. Zhirinovsky has just finished 
blanketing the Russian television airwaves with political commercials 
(as well as 30-minute infomercials which are ongoing) as part of his bid 
for election as governor in the southern region of Belgorod - a bid in 
which, it must be admitted, he went down to inglorious and humiliating, 
one could even say clownish, defeat - failing even, in a three-way race, 
to force a runoff. Had he been elected, however, Zhirinovksy would 
immediately ascend to membership in Russia's upper house of parliament, 
the Council of the Federation, to say nothing of being placed in control 
of a regional budget and the salaries of thousands of municipal 
employees. There is no reason to think that Zhirinovsky will not try 
again. Just to the north of Belgorod is Kursk, where ex-coup d'etater 
Alexander Rutskoi is safely ensconced in the Governor's mansion. 
Perhaps Rutskoi is, by Simes' lights, an elder statesman rather than a 
clown. I, on the other hand, consider Russian circus clowns to be 
hilarious but when I regard Mr. Z I am not amused. Nor should anyone 
be. Russians, at home or abroad, who are - are part of the problem, not 
the solution. Belgorodians, on the other hand, are the kind of Russians 
who've made the place last a thousand years. I raise a glass to them!

It is deeply disheartening for me, as I am sure for the other 
Americans struggling to make progress toward a new economic and 
political system in Russia, to have such analysis as that of Mr. Simes, 
widely circulated and unopposed, perhaps even acted upon. God only 
knows what unprofessional outsiders, like the President of the United 
States, for example, conclude from such speculations. In another piece, 
this time in New York Newsday, Mr. Simes had opined that the economy of 
Russia, which in the Journal piece he refers to as "impoverished," could 
easily "recover" with the application of some "strong government" and 
"modest" increase in world oil prices. In virtually every article he 
writes, he reminds the reader that Russia has "30,000 nuclear weapons."

In my opinion, Mr. Simes' Russia view is clouded by his long 
absence from life in this country and by his professional ego. He is 
concerned, it appears, that as Russia slowly slips into oblivion the 
need for his professional advice concerning it will likewise disappear. 
But facts are facts. The Russian economy is in a depression from which 
it will recover no more easily than did America, if at all (America 
recovered only via extraordinary wartime production demands). The 
Russian political system is a riddle wrapped in a mystery that Sherlock 
Holmes, much less Mr. Simes on his best day, would be hard pressed even 
to accurately describe, much less solve. 

Russia's nuclear arsenal is an impossibly expensive and useless 
boondoggle which the country can no longer afford to, and will not, 
maintain. The Russian GDP is 3 trillion rubles per year: the current 
value of that figure in dollars is $120 billion (roughly equal to that 
of Denmark or, say, the U.S. defense budget for, say, the month of 
January) and, measured in dollars, it gets smaller every day - as does 
the Russian population. Yet, somehow, there are still 145 million 
people living here - with, in other words, about $1,000 worth of 
production for each person each year, assuming not a penny was spent on 
the military or wasted on any other non-consumer-based spending. How 
are they living? Your guess is as good as mine. But better, of course, 
than Simes'. 

In its April 19 issue under "Conventional Wisdom," even Newsweek 
magazine's blurb on Yeltsin was, arrow down: "Yeah, yeah, yeah, you're 
gonna blow up the world. With what, vodka?" Mr. Simes needs to dip his 
toe in the cold water of reality. I'd suggest the White Sea.

Even if Russia could maintain its arsenal, repeatedly 
suggesting that Russia is a nation of war-like miscreants who might pull 
the nuclear trigger at any moment is, after seventy years of communist 
dictatorship where no such thing happened, hyperbole of a kind that does 
no one anywhere any good and slanders Mr. Simes' own race for the sake 
of professional status. Russians have many flaws and many problems, and 
deserve many criticisms and condemnations, but they are not a people 
bent on Armageddon. As a people they have lived a thousand years, and 
want to live a thousand more. Even Vladimir "Wolf" (his real middle 
name) Zhirinovsky understands that.

Russia is in desperate trouble and it needs, first and foremost, 
the light of truth to find its way - assuming it ever can. Generally 
speaking, I'd like to encourage the formation, perhaps via the Johnson 
List, of some form of condominium between those studying Russia and 
those actually living here. I think there is a growing disparity. It 
seems to me that while those of us in Russia undoubltedly can't see the 
forest for the trees, those of you outside it can't see the trees for 
the forest - and take it from me, trees HURT when you run into them as 
if they weren't there.

******