June 4, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3323 • 3324•

Johnson's Russia List
#3324
4 June 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Moscow Time: Jonas Bernstein, PARTY LINES: Usual Suspects Want to 
Fund Another Term.
2. The Electronic Telegraph (UK): Marcus Warren, Moscow envoy faces
betrayal 
claims at home.
3. St. Petersburg Times: Brian Whitmore, Starovoitova Murder Case Advances.
4. Sergei Zamascikov: Re: 3321-Kozlovsky/Internet Monitoring.
5. Kenneth Katzner: CD-ROM Version of my Dictionary.
6. Human Rights Watch - Moscow Office: DEATH PENALTY.
7. New EastWest Institute book: "Russia and the West: The 21st Century
SecurityEnvironment."
8. Alison Pacuska: Visa to the US.
9. The Economist: Russian business that works. Sweetly flows the Volga.
10. Itar-Tass: Constitutional Court to Consider Duma Enquiry. (Re transfer
of president's powers).
11. Moskovskiy Komsomolets: Leonid Krutakov, Man Without a Face. 
Abramovich Emerges From the Shadows: Roman Abramovich Has Taken Control of
the 
Russian Budget.]

*********

#1
Moscow Times
June 4, 1999 
PARTY LINES: Usual Suspects Want to Fund Another Term 
By Jonas Bernstein
Staff Writer

You know a country has truly entered the realm of the surreal when it's 
nearly impossible to find a photograph of the person said to be really 
running it. A few newspapers this week did manage to dig up what they said 
were pictures of Roman Abramovich, the camera-shy head of the Sibneft oil 
giant, who is reported to have supplanted Boris Berezovsky as the Kremlin's 
backstage puppeteer. 

On the other hand, it's best to take the Abramovich story with a grain of 
salt. Berezovsky, who some observers once suspected of exaggerating his real 
influence in the Kremlin (in order to create a self-fulfilling prophecy), may 
now be employing the opposite strategy. The controversial tycoon may be 
creating out of Abramovich something akin to Keyser Soze, Kevin Spacey's 
fearsome alter ego in the film "The Usual Suspects," in order to take the 
heat off himself. Maybe the photos of Abramovich in the press this week were 
computer-generated. Perhaps he's just a hologram. 

Anyway, it's as good a theory as the next. This, after all, is Russia, where 
the head of the state statistics agency gets arrested for forging statistics. 
There are no real facts here; only versiya. 

Some theories, however, are more plausible than others. It's likely, for 
instance, that when Yeltsin said this week that Sergei Stepashin's government 
"is a reformist government" that is "ready to get to work without delay," he 
didn't really believe it. Then again, maybe he did - a frightening thought 
when you look at, for example, First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai 
Aksyonenko's retrograde proposal that every industrial enterprise pay 2 
percent of its gross output into a "stabilization fund" for the regions. 

Speaking of the usual suspects, Anatoly Chubais was back this week with 
another of his praise-the-tsar routines, calling Yeltsin's replacement of 
Primakov's "political" Cabinet with Stepashin's "professional" Cabinet a 
"risky but very competent maneuver." The one-time reform icon is apparently 
back in "the family's" good graces. 

While nothing can be said with certainty about Russia's virtual politics, 
some basic trends can be identified. The Kremlin, for example, has apparently 
taken control of most of the country's key financial flows, rather than 
parceling them out to various financial-political clans, as in the past. Thus 
the State Pension Fund and customs, along with the Tax, Railways, Fuel and 
Energy, and Finance ministries, are now in the hands of people picked by the 
Kremlin, not by Stepashin (that is, the prime minister, who, in a 
parliamentary system, is supposed to choose the Cabinet). 

Why the scramble for funds? Komsomolskaya Pravda cited rumors that suspended 
Prosecutor General Yury Skuratov's investigative efforts have caused billions 
of dollars belonging to the Kremlin inner circle to be frozen in Swiss bank 
accounts. Hence the furious search for new revenue sources. 

There is no way to confirm this, and, even if it were true, it still would 
not explain why the Kremlin insiders want to control these financial flows. 
Perhaps they simply want to "privatize" them for the year remaining in 
Yeltsin's term. But that seems too crude for this crowd. A more likely 
explanation: They plan to remain in the Kremlin after June 2000. 

********

#2
The Electronic Telegraph (UK)
4 June 1999
[for personal use only] 
Moscow envoy faces betrayal claims at home
By Marcus Warren in Moscow 

MOSCOW'S Balkans envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin, flew home last night to persuade 
sceptics that yesterday's diplomatic deal ensured peace with honour for both 
Russia and Yugoslavia. Mr Chernomyrdin was accused by some of his countrymen 
of betraying Belgrade to curry favour with the West.

After five trips to Belgrade by Mr Chernomyrdin, yesterday's breakthrough 
should be hailed in Russia as a triumphant vindication of President Yeltsin's 
Balkans policy. Relations between Russia and the West appear to have been 
saved from what threatened to turn into a new Cold War, although Mr Yeltsin 
still regards the recent behaviour of Nato leaders as a personal betrayal.

However, the Kremlin is in such chaos and Mr Yeltsin in such feeble health 
that a diplomatic victory abroad is unlikely to improve the situation at 
home. Sergei Stepashin, the prime minister, insisted that Moscow's conditions 
for a peace settlement would soon be met: an end to the bombing and an 
international military presence inside Kosovo under the United Nations.

The Russian military also emphasised that its senior officers travelling to 
Belgrade to help supervise the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo would be 
answerable only to Moscow. A footnote to the peace plan circulating at the EU 
summit in Cologne highlighted differences between Russia and the West over 
the command structure of any international force in Kosovo. Russia refused to 
put its troops under Nato orders, while the West was sticking to its demand 
for a unified Nato command and control, the document revealed. 

Mr Chernomyrdin's apparently successful trip to the Yugoslav capital had been 
accompanied by a whispering campaign by top brass who believed that he was 
making too many concessions to the West. In footage of the talks in Belgrade 
broadcast on Russian television, one uniformed officer could clearly be seen 
shaking his head in disapproval as Moscow's delegation signed documents 
opposite Yugoslav officials.

Behind Mr Chernomyrdin's back, the military also briefed Russian journalists 
in Belgrade of their doubts about the package negotiated by their own envoy, 
the Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and Strobe Talbott, the US deputy 
Secretary of State. Silence from Igor Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister, 
who was returning from a visit to China, was also interpreted by some in 
Moscow as a mark of displeasure.

Deputies in the Russian parliament, which is dominated by communist and 
nationalist allies of Milosevic, also attacked Mr Chernomyrdin's efforts. 
Nikolai Kharitonov, a leading communist sympathiser, said: "The events of 
Munich at the end of the 1930s are still fresh in our memory. "hernomyrdin is 
repeating those mistakes in Nato's interests. We deputies of the State Duma 
cannot allow one person, even if he is the president's representative, to 
decide such fateful questions for Russia and the whole of Europe."

Yuri Nikiforenko of the Duma's Communist faction said: "Yugoslavia's 
capitulation is being pushed through. The generals have done the right thing 
to register their protest." Russia's opposition and voices from the Defence 
Ministry have been predicting a Nato ground invasion of Kosovo for so long 
that the prospect of a peaceful solution is almost a disappointment.

However, open insubordination from the military when Russian troops are 
ordered in to police a peace settlement is highly unlikely, although 
relations with Nato are likely to be tense at first.

The general staff will be more worried about how to put together a 
combat-ready peacekeeping force from the dejected and poorly equipped ranks 
of Russia's armed forces.

********

#3
St. Petersburg Times
June 4, 1999
Starovoitova Murder Case Advances
By Brian Whitmore
STAFF WRITER

After months of public silence, law enforcement officials this week announced 
that progress was being made in the investigation of the assassination of 
federal lawmaker and human rights advocate Galina Starovoitova.

St. Petersburg Police Chief Viktor Vlasov on Wednesday said the investigation 
is focusing on Starovoitova's "political activities" as a motive for the 
killing. Vlasov added, however, that investigators have not ruled out 
possible economic or domestic motives. He declined to elaborate.

"Nobody is going to forget this crime," he said, adding that the 
investigation has recently come across "a lot of interesting information."

Starovoitova was shot and killed by two unknown assailants on the night of 
Nov. 20 as she ascended the stairs to her apartment at 91 Canal Griboyedova. 
Her legislative aide, Ruslan Linkov, survived the attack despite being shot 
in the head and neck, and spent a month recovering in the hospital.

Linkov said this week that he has turned over documents to investigators that 
may shed light on the murder. According to Linkov, the documents, related to 
corruption probes that Sta ro voitova was pursuing prior to her death, 
include:

l Material about the financial activities of an organization called the 
Academy for National Security. Just days before her death, Starovoitova 
published an article in the weekly newspaper Severnaya Stolitsa alleging that 
Gennady Seleznyov, the Communist speaker of the State Duma, had been using 
the Academy for National Security for illicit fundraising activities. 
Seleznyov denied the allegations and sued Severnaya Stolitsa for libel. A 
federal court ruled against Seleznyov last month. 

l Documents related to the privatization of St. Petersburg's Channel 5, now 
called Petersburg Television. Last year, Gov. Vladimir Yakovlev's City Hall 
sold a 49-percent stake in the city's main television station to several 
banks with close ties to the administration. Starovoitova and other 
politicians alleged that the privatization was rigged, designed to keep the 
channel in the hands of the governor and his allies.

l Documents related to various city infrastructure projects, including a 
planned $3.7 billion 12-lane highway and a proposed $200 million new railway 
station in the city center. Prior to her death, Starovoitova had been 
investigating corruption in these and other projects sponsored by the Yakov 
lev administration.

l Material Starovoitova had collected regarding the activities of local 
lawmaker Yury Shutov, a political ally of Yakovlev's who was arrested in 
February and charged with organizing a series of assassinations in the city. 

In 1997, Shutov, then an aide to nationalist State Duma Deputy Sergei 
Baburin, was placed in charge of a Duma commission investigating 
privatization in St. Petersburg. Shutov's commission was never ratified by 
the full Duma and neither the Legislative Assembly nor then city 
privatization chief Mikhail Manevich recognized its legality. Nevertheless, 
according to Linkov, Shutov used his commission to blackmail local 
entrepreneurs, threatening them with audits if they refused to turn over 
shares in their companies to him. Some of those entrepreneurs appealed to 
Manevich, who in turn planned to hand documentation about Shutov's activities 
to Sta ro voi tova, who was planning to raise the issue in the Duma. Manevich 
was killed by a sniper on Aug. 18, one day before the scheduled meeting was 
to take place.

After Shutov's arrest this February, Sergei Stepashin, at the time interior 
minister, said he "did not exclude the possibility that Shutov was involved 
in the Sta ro voi tova murder." Last week Shutov's request for bail was 
denied after a three-day hearing. 

*********

#4
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 1999 
From: sergei zamascikov <s_zamascikov@hotmail.com> 
Subject: Re: 3321-Kozlovsky/Internet Monitoring

In response to Gregory Kozlovsky( FSB and the Internet)
There is a fundamental difference between intelligence service snooping on 
the Internet and European legal authorities passing legislation which makes 
possible authorized inquires by law enforcement agencies( similar to phone 
tapping and intercepting mail.
And there is still a bigger difference when the FSB on a basis of not yet 
passed legislation asks Internet providers to give full access to 
information without obtaining a court order.
Indeed, what is disturbing that noone else compalined. Particularly taking 
into account that most of ISPs are JVS with the US companies.

*********

#5
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 1999 17:46:41 -0400
Subject: RE: CD-ROM Version of my Dictionary
From: Kenneth Katzner <kenk@cais.com>

I would like to take this opportunity to announce the release on June
1 of a CD-ROM version of my widely used English-Russian Russian-English
Dictionary.

Many JRL readers are probably familiar with the book version, first
published in 1984 and followed by a "Revised and Expanded" edition in 1994.
The CD-ROM contains everything in the 1994 edition, plus a great deal of new
material (new words, new meanings, more examples of usage, etc.) already
gathered for inclusion in a future third edition.

The price of the CD is $45 plus $3 for shipping and handling. Orders
may be sent to Wordfind, Box 5707, Washington, D.C. 20016, though it can
also be ordered On Line. Additional information on methods of payment, as
well as on how the program operates, may be found on the Website
www.wordfind.com.

*********

#6
Date: Thu, 03 Jun 1999 
From: Human Rights Watch Moscow <dlohman@hrw.glasnet.ru>
Organization: Human Rights Watch - Moscow Office
Subject: RUSSIA; DEATH PENALTY

In the light of the latest developments around the death penalty, we
have
prepared a short fact sheet on the death penalty in Russia. I hope
you'll
find it useful. If you have any questions, please give me a call at:
(7 095) 265 4448 (w) or (7 095) 764 5938 (m).
Best,
Diederik Lohman

RUSSIA AND THE DEATH PENALTY — A FACT SHEET

FEBRUARY 1996 - ACCESSION TO COUNCIL OF EUROPE
Russia joins the Council of Europe under a series of conditions,
including the promise to:
- immediately introduce a moratorium on the death penalty.
- sign Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights (on the
abolishment of the death penalty) within a year and ratify it within
three years (by February 1999).
For general information on the Council of Europe, see:
http://www.coe.fr. For its most recent report on Russia's honoring of
obligations, see: http://stars.coe.fr/doc/doc98/edoc8127.htm

FEBRUARY TO AUGUST 1996 - CONTINUING EXECUTIONS
Russia fails to introduce a moratorium until August 1996. Between
January and August a total of 53 prisoners are executed. In 1993, 1994
and 1995, respectively four, 19 and 86 people were executed.

AUGUST 1996 - INFORMAL MORATORIUM
President Boris Yeltsin introduces an informal moratorium on the death
penalty. All prison directors are instructed not to execute any more
death sentences. Courts continue to pass down death sentences and the
number of death row prisoners grows steadily. In some prisons, there is
insufficient room on death row and death row prisoners are placed in
punishment cells.

JANUARY 1997 - NEW CRIMINAL CODE
A new criminal code comes into force and reduces the number of accounts
which carry the death penalty from 31 to five (genocide, murder and
attempts on the lives of politicians, public figures, law enforcement
officials and judges).

APRIL 1997 - PROTOCOL SIX SIGNED
Russia signs Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights. The
protocol has not been ratified, and thus has no legal force, until this
day.

MAY 1998 - DUMA: NO MORATORIUM
In 1997, the State Duma for the first time votes down a draft law
introducing a formal moratorium on executions with only about 65
deputies supporting the draft law. In May 1998, the State Duma refuses
to even consider a new draft law on a moratorium and takes the issue off
its agenda.

JANUARY 1999 PUBLIC OPINION
Public opinion remains heavily in favor of the death penalty. The daily
newspaper Izvestiia reports on January 13 that 50% of Russians are in
favor of maintaining the death penalty in its current form, 22% of
Russians wants to widen its use. The newspaper claims that in 1994,
these figures were 37% and 25% respectively.

FEBRUARY 1999 NO MORE DEATH SENTENCES
The Constitutional Court issues a decision prohibiting all Russia's
courts from issuing death sentences until jury trials are introduced
throughout the country. Since the introduction of jury trials throughout
Russia cannot be expected in the near future, the Constitutional Court
effectively bans death sentences for the foreseeable future. The court
decision can be found on the following website: 
http://www.ist.ru/VP/Lib097/z19223.htm. Experts estimate the number of
death row prisoners at around 850. On May 31, 1999, the presidential
administration states that there are 716 people on death row.

FEBRUARY 1999 - COUNCIL OF EUROPE DEADLINE MISSED
Russia misses the deadline for ratification of Protocol 6 to the
European Convention on Human Rights and for amending its criminal code
and other applicable legislation to abolish the death penalty.

JUNE 3, 1999 - ALL DEATH SENTENCES COMMUTED
President Boris Yeltsin signs a decree commuting the sentence of the
last death row prisoner. In preceding months, Yeltsin has gradually
commuted the sentences of all death row prisoners to life imprisonment
or 25 years. These prisoners will be transferred to strict regime
colonies or special colonies for life imprisonment. De facto, the death
penalty is no longer in use as there are no more death row prisoners and
courts cannot sentence people to death anymore.

JUNE 3, 1999 - LAW ON ABOLITION?
Minister of Justice Pavel Krashenninikov reports that the government has
prepared a draft law abolishing the death penalty completely. Since the
State Duma is unlikely to easily adopt this law, prospects for full
abolishment of the death penalty remain dim.

Diederik Lohman, Director
Alexander Petrov, Deputy Director
Moscow Office, Human Rights Watch
Russian Federation, Moscow 103064, A/Ya 409
7 095 265 4448 (tel/fax)
office@hrw.glasnet.ru
Website
English: http://www.hrw.org 
Russian: http://www.hrw.org/russian
Listserv address: To receive Human Rights Watch's press releases on
Europe and
Central Asia, send an e-mail message to majordomo@igc.apc.org with 
"hrw-news-europe" in the body of the message (leave the subject line
blank).

*******

#7
Date: Thu, 03 Jun 1999
From: Anya Schmemann <aschmemann@iews.org>
Organization: EastWest Institute

NEW EWI BOOK ON EURASIAN SECURITY

"Russia and the West: The 21st Century Security Environment," the first
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of security, "new threats" such as crime, corruption, migration, and
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Authors include: Lawrence Freedman, Vladimir G. Baranovsky, Hans-Hermann
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Trenin, Richard H. Ullman, Alexander A. Pikayev, Elena Nikitina, and
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The volume can be ordered from M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 80 Business Drive,
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**As an RRR subscriber, you are entitled to a special discount!**
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Series: Eurasia in the 21st Century: The Total Security Environment
Series Editors: Dag Hartelius and Alexei G. Arbatov
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Editors: Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, and Robert Legvold
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II: Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia: The 21st Century Security
Environment
Editors: Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Fedorov, and Ghia Nodia
ISBN 0-7656-0433-7

III: Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment
Editors: Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe
ISBN 0-7656-0434-5

******

#8
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 1999 
From: Alison Pacuska <alisonp@metricanet.com> 
Subject: Visa to the US

In answer to Stacey's question regarding the US Embassy-Moscow stopping the
issuance of visas, I offer the following (of course, I make no allegations
as to the situations of others):

As I understand it, the line is very long, but visas are being issued. My
Subcontractor's office manager was recently married to a gentleman who
works for an American firm. They are being transferred to Washington DC as
soon as their visa is issued. 

The process seems to be taking longer, and they seem to be more careful
about insuring the necassary paperwork is in order, but they are issuing
visas. The delay appears to be a result of a great many people wanting
visas to the US (she indicated that the line was longer than usual). She
has seen no indication that Kosovo has influenced the situation in any way.

*******

#9
The Economist
June 5, 1999
[for personal use only]
Russian business that works
Sweetly flows the Volga 
S A M A R A 

BOOMING foreign investment, modern technology, rising sales and ambitious 
plans for export—can this really be miserable, bankrupt Russia? In Samara, in 
Russia’s southern industrial heartland, the gloom and venality of Moscow are 
refreshingly distant. On June 1st Nestlé, a Swiss food company which is one 
of the top foreign investors in Russia, opened a new production line at 
Rossiya, the country’s biggest chocolate plant, which it bought in 1994. Down 
the road at Avtovaz, the country’s largest car maker, managers showed off a 
range of 20 new models, boasted about rising sales, and claimed to have 
banished Russia’s two great industrial plagues, crime and barter, from their 
business. 

Both companies’ good fortunes reflect the uneven rate of Russia’s decline 
since last summer’s financial crisis and devaluation, which made most imports 
quadruple in price, but gave a big competitive advantage to firms producing 
locally. Most Russian companies have failed to take advantage of this. Some 
sell mainly to the bankrupt public sector, or have seen their working capital 
disappear in the collapsed banking system. In others, managers have been more 
interested in stealing from their company than in raising its sales. Any 
business dependent on imports, whether western or local, faces much higher 
costs; these can be crippling if not carefully managed. But a clever handful 
are now thriving. 

“The crisis vindicated our strategy’’ says Andreas Schlaepfer, Nestlé’s boss 
in Russia. Unlike his competitors, who built sweet factories from scratch, 
Nestlé took over an existing plant, producing well-known Russian brands. This 
was cumbersome at the beginning, but it makes cost-cutting easier now—for 
example by using more (cheap, Russian) sugar and less (expensive, imported) 
cocoa. Tinkering with global brands produced in Russia, such as a Mars bar, 
is trickier. Nestlé provides few figures, but its market share is rocketing, 
and it expects sales of more than $500m this year. 

Avtovaz buys locally too, and it has kept component prices at their 
pre-crisis levels. Its standard models—simple sedans, jeeps and 
hatchbacks—cost around $5,000, whereas a new western car (after punitive 100% 
customs duties) is four times as much. Although workmanship is often shoddy 
(this correspondent’s new jeep caught fire) Russians, who expect to repair 
their cars themselves, praise their simplicity. Ruggedness also counts on the 
country’s appalling roads. Avtovaz hopes to sell 660,000 cars this year, up 
from 580,000 in 1998. 

Both companies are well insulated from the vagaries of federal politics. 
Avtovaz provides half the region’s tax revenues, giving it plenty of clout 
with Samara’s ambitious and influential governor, Konstantin Titov. Nestlé is 
an emblem of the foreign direct investment that most governors can only dream 
of. At the launch of the new production line for Nesquik, a sugary drink for 
children, Mr Titov turned up to eulogise its healthy (“vitaminised”) 
properties and to congratulate the company on its far-sightedness. The 
bureaucratic greed and bloodymindedness that often plague companies based in 
Moscow are less acute in a remote corner like Samara. “We basically wanted to 
be left alone, and Samara has been a hassle-free environment,’’ insists Mr 
Schlaepfer. 

Criminals rank alongside bureaucrats as a business problem in 
Russia—especially in distribution, which is ridden with racketeers. Nestlé 
monitors its distributors closely, rewarding the more reliable. Avtovaz has 
in past months tackled the gangsters who used to spirit cars into parallel 
distribution channels (such as roadside sales lots, brazenly located next to 
the factory). This seems to have worked, at least for now. But building a 
western-style dealer network, as planned, looks a Himalayan task given 
today’s typical salesroom: a squalid concrete bunker, featuring limited 
choice, surly service and machinegun-toting security guards. 

What Avtovaz really needs is a Nestlé to take it over. Its new range of 
models, all at less than $10,000, includes a luxury stretch Lada, a beach 
buggy, a mobile office called the Menedzher, electric cars, and an armoured 
security van using Soviet military technology. This is a tribute to the 
firm’s ingenious designers (who earn less in a year than their western 
counterparts do in a week), less so to the company’s strategists. 

Selling these models in large numbers, let alone exporting them as the 
company plans, will be hard. Russian engines remain thirsty, noisy and smelly 
compared with western ones. Avtovaz’s best car, tellingly, is powered by a 
motor from America’s General Motors. Electrical systems are also unreliable 
and corrosion is almost guaranteed. 

The plant’s antique and chaotic production lines, mostly built 30 years ago 
(and a sharp contrast to Nestlé’s gleaming new machines) make western 
standards of quality and workmanship all but impossible. Although the company 
claims—impressively if true—to have forsworn barter, which made up 80% of its 
turnover a year ago, finances (including details of the main shareholders) 
are still murky. 

So far, Avtovaz’s snooty managers have spurned foreign approaches (although 
there are well-advanced talks with General Motors about assembling cars under 
licence). If that ever changes—and the argument for outside expertise and 
technology grows ever more compelling with time—a resurgent Avtovaz could do 
for Russia’s roads what Nestlé already plans for the nation’s children. 

********

#10
Constitutional Court to Consider Duma Enquiry.

MOSCOW, June 3 (Itar-Tass) - The Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation (CCRF) on Thursday is to begin to examine a case concerning an 
interpretation of the Russian Constitution's Article 92, which deals with a 
procedure for a transfer of the powers of President of Russia in the event of 
their pre-term termination. An appropriate enquiry was initiated by the State 
Duma lower house of parliament way back in January last year. 

Part Two of the Article, along with "resignation", also mentions instances of 
"persistent incapacity due to the state of health" and "removal from office". 

Part Three of the Article stipulates that "in all cases" Presidential powers 
shall be transferred to Prime Minister and not later than within three months 
and an early presidential election shall be held. 

The State Duma enquires, firstly, what is behind the wording "in all cases" 
and whether a transfer of presidential powers to Prime Minister is permitted 
in instances other than those mentioned in Part Two. 

Secondly, the MPs ask the Court to explain whether a transfer of powers by 
the President "should entail the fixing of a date of new elections without 
fail" or the Head of State after temporarily resigning his duties may again 
re-enter upon them. 

Valery Lazarev, the State Duma representative in the Constitutional Court, 
has told Itar-Tass that the Duma enquiry is not connected in any way with an 
attempt to impeach the President and, still less, pursues the aim of removing 
the Head of State from office on medical grounds. 

"This is not a question of the state of the President's health. It is a 
question of uncertainty in the understanding of Parts 2 and 3 of Article 92 
of the Constitution," Lazarev maintains. 

The presidential side is still inclined to consider the case as part of "a 
series of ongoing attacks on the President" and not only within the CCRF 
walls. 

This is precisely how Mikhail Mityukov, the President's plenipotentiary 
representative in the CCRF, has estimated the forthcoming hearings. 

One of high-level staff members of the Kremlin administration, in an 
Itar-Tass interview, expressed an opinion that the Duma is again approaching 
the theme of impeachment, this time "a medical one". 

"It is clear that the opposition is prepared to cling to this theme," a 
Presidential administration official pointed out. He said Duma members have 
already come to realise that the present enquiry "has no sense" in this 
respect, because "it has been worded in an utterly irrational way". 

This is why, Presidential administration experts maintain, the Duma, 
following its setback connected with the impeachment procedure, has decided 
to "throw in" yet another enquiry concerning the selfsame Article 92, with a 
detailed elaboration of precisely the theme of the President's health. 

In their new enquiry, the MPs ask the Court to explain how a temporary or 
persistent incapacity of a person protected by "presidential immunity" can be 
judged. 

Thus, the "medical impeachment" theme, from which the Duma so zealously 
dissociates itself, will still be sounded possibly in autumn, if not during 
Thursday's hearings, if the CCRF takes cognizance of the new enquiry, 
Presidential administration analysts are convinced. 

*******

#11
Roman Abramovich Profiled 

Moskovskiy Komsomolets 
2 June 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Leonid Krutakov: "Man Without a Face. Abramovich Emerges 
>From the Shadows: Roman Abramovich Has Taken Control of the Russian 
Budget" 

Very many people would like to see this person's 
face today. One of the most mysterious oligarchs in Russia and the 
personal friend of Tatyana Borisovna Dyachenko, Valentin Yumashev, and 
Boris Berezovskiy, at his age of 33 he manages without any self-publicity 
the financial flows of the presidential "family". He is its treasurer. 
Even now, when this name is a common noun, the news media simply cannot 
get hold of a photograph of Abramovich. One newspaper was forced to 
announce a competition for its readers, promising a handsome prize in 
exchange for a photo. Without success. Attempts have been made to draw 
him--with the aid of Arbat artists. Unconvincingly. They caught the 
moment when his armored silver Mercedes bearing the number 101 with 
escort was sweeping at around 11 in the morning along the median strip of 
Novyy Arbat. Alas. 

Moskovskiy Komsomolets--for the first time!--publishes a photograph of this 
person. The man without a face.... 

Moskovskiy Komsomolets Files: 
Roman Arkadyevich Abramovich. Place and date of birth--city of Saratov, 24 
October 1996. Family situation--second marriage, wife's name, I.V. 
Malandina. Education--people's universities. Profession--oligarch. 
Honorary titles--"purse of the president's family". Favorite 
pastime--redistribution of financial flows. Favorite toy--oil (he 
controls more than 1.5 billion tons of Russia's proven black gold 
reserves). Personal complexes--considers himself unphotogenic. Personal 
connections--friendship with the president's family. 

Just two months ago it seemed to many people in this country that it was 
all up with Russia's "gray cardinal" Boris Berezovskiy forever. Yevgeniy 
Primakov, premier at that time, was conducting an offensive against the 
oligarch on all fronts--wholesale searches were being carried out in the 
offices of the firms owned by Berezovskiy or controlled by him. His 
proteges were disappearing from key positions. The businessman and 
politician himself was forced to lie low overseas on the pretext 
sometimes of a real, sometimes invented, back injury. 

Everything has changed since then. Berezovskiy has returned, the criminal 
proceedings against him have been closed down (or suspended, and forever, 
it seems). And Primakov has been dismissed. Today many people are sighing 
in his wake: heck, experienced a person as he was, he was unable to 
conclusively put down his adversary.... Truly, he could not. 

But perhaps he had simply picked the wrong target? The wrong adversary? 
As has become clear following the recent appointments to the Stepashin 
government and the web of intrigues surrounding the semi-positions and 
sensational resignations and idiotic reshuffles, first fiddle in our 
"backstage area" is being played by no means by Boris Berezovskiy. His 
Kremlin pass, it is said, has been taken away from him in recent days, as 
a matter of fact. He is rather a screen, a smokescreen, from behind which 
someone totally different is peering out.... 

The country needs heroes, and the "family" is giving birth to railroad 
workers. Former Ministry of Railways employees Aksenenko and Voloshin 
(the latter began his working career as an assistant engineer--ed.) are 
to ensure the cambering of the prime minister in the right direction. 

In this sense nothing surprising has happened. The latest personnel 
reshuffles in the government are remarkable only for the fact that the 
member of the "family" (which it has now become fashionable to call the 
Gang of Four) who is at this time the most influential and secretive, 
perhaps--Roman Arkadyevich Abramovich--has emerged from the shadows into 
the bright glare of the studio lights. First Vice Premier Aksenenko and 
Kalyuzhnyy, the new head of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, are 
considered creatures not of Berezovskiy but of Abramovich. 

The personality of Roman Abramovich remained for a long time unknown to 
the public at large. The position of "family treasurer" and his close 
friendship with Tatyana Dyachenko suited Roman Arkadyevich just fine. 
What was there that public gossip did not ascribe to the "family 
treasurer". 

He is alleged to have regularly paid for the vacations of Yumashev and 
Dyachenko at Swiss alpine ski resorts. He financed the purchase by one 
Stolpovskiy of a house in Garmisch-Partenkirchen (Moskovskiy Komsomolets 
has already written about this house--ed.) for the president's daughter. 
He paid from the accounts of his Swiss Runikom firm for the purchase of 
the yachts named Stream and Sophie's Choice, on which Boris Berezovskiy 
so much likes to wind down. He has regulated in the right direction for 
the "family" the raw material and financial flows of the Sibneft company, 
of which he is the virtual owner. 

All in all, Roman Abramovich preferred for a long time to remain the 
owner of yachts, steamships, accounts, and plants and he uncomplainingly 
ceded the political laurels to his immediate boss-- Boris Berezovskiy. 
Under Berezovskiy's protection Abramovich built up his powers, heaping 
onto the shoulders of the latter not only laurels but political storms 
and adversities also. 

In lobbying successfully for his long-time associate Aksenenko for the 
post of first vice premier (it is rumored that the railroad worker flew 
to see the president in Sochi on Abramovich's private aircraft), the 
"treasurer" was playing an independent political game for the first time. 
Roman Arkadyevich evidently considered himself sufficiently strong now to 
abandon the cover in the person of Berezovskiy. Abramovich's emergence 
from the shadows is today, perhaps, one of the most important events in 
the country. But this emergence did not come about all of a sudden. 

Abramovich counterposed his interests to those of Berezovskiy for the first 
time at the moment of the amalgamation of Sibneft and YUKOS. The actual 
amalgamation did not take place, specialists maintain, owing to 
Abramovich's reluctance to swap his controlling block of shares in 
Sibneft for political dividends from the merger of the two biggest oil 
companies of Russia. 

The second clash was Abramovich's attempt to have appointed to the 
position of deputy presidential chief of staff for economics, instead of 
Voloshin (a Berezovskiy promotee--ed.), one of Rem Vyakhirev's deputies. 
The scandalous appointment did not eventuate merely on account of the 
clear connection between Abramovich's protege and Sergey Mikhaylov, 
better known to the public as Mikhas. 

Abramovich managed to "break" Berezovskiy quite recently with the aid of 
common 
enemy Yuriy Skuratov. Business circles are of the opinion that it was at 
the "request" of Abramovich that Berezovskiy was forced to return to 
Russia at a time when the warrant for his arrest had yet to be canceled. 
It is said that the former had stopped payment on all BAB's obligations 
until the time that he returned home. 

Today rumor ascribes to Roman Abramovich the role of principal and most 
aggressive ideologue of the "family". He is alleged to be the author of 
the idea of a ban on the CPRF and the breakup of the State Duma. The idea 
of Lenin's reburial with the subsequent commitment to Moscow of troops to 
put down spontaneous revolts is attributed to him. 
Confirming or repudiating these rumors is practically impossible. Those that 

hang out around the Kremlin are mythologizing the latest presidential 
favorite, most likely. One thing is beyond dispute: Abramovich's 
emergence from the shadows means that Berezovskiy now has a very serious 
counterpart. 

Who Makes Masters of Us? 

However strange, Berezovskiy himself cultivated his future "gravedigger". 
Although there is nothing strange in this. It all occurred according to 
the ancient law of the natural turnover of manure. 

Korzhakov cultivated Berezovskiy, giving over to him the financial levers of 
influence on the "family," retaining the political functions for himself. 
For which he ended up paying. And Berezovskiy cultivated Abramovich, 
repeating the mistake of his "predecessor". Both forgot that the most 
important person in the king's household is not the major-domo but the 
housekeeper. 

Berezovskiy programmed today's takeoff by Abramovich at the very moment that, 
in search of financial support for ORT, he rested his choice on Roman 
Abramovich. This choice was not fortuitous, it has to be said. 
Presidential Edict 872 on the formation of the Siberian Oil Company public 
corporation was issued on 24 August 1995. Five days later the company was 
founded by the government's Decree 972. Sibneft literally broke into the 
oil charts. On a primogeniture basis Sibneft immediately took 20th place 
in the rating of the world's biggest oil companies, and sixth place among 
Russian companies. 

Originally, the role of "treasurer" was assigned Petr Yanchev, head of the 
infamous Balkar Trading firm. Balkar was the biggest exporter of the oil 
of Noyabrskneftegaz--the main extractive enterprise of Sibneft. But 
Yanchev began to demand too much, evidently. As a result, he found 
himself in Lefortovo together with his patron Aleksey Ilyushenko, and 
control of Sibneft was handed to Abramovich. 

It is only at first sight that Berezovskiy was banking on a 
little-known businessman at that time. Abramovich was little known only 
to the celestial beings of the Kremlin. In business circles Roman 
Arkadyevich had by that time commended himself as a tenacious and 
forceful oil trader. 

It is amusing that the love of oil and its derivatives seven years ago 
had just about led the future oligarch to a prison bunk. But this was the 
case. 

On 12 February 1992 some Aveks-Komi firm from Syktyvkar and the Ukhta 
Oil Refinery concluded a contract for the delivery to Moscow of 5,000 
tons of winter diesel fuel. At a total cost of R3.8 million. If anyone 
remembers, quite a substantial amount of money for 1992. 

On the appointed day 55 tank cars carrying the fuel arrived in the 
capital. Where they were joyfully greeted by Roman Abramovich, who, 
showing a sham power of attorney, readdessed the consignment to some 
military unit in Kaliningrad Oblast. As a result, the train for some 
reason or other ended up in Latvia, which was now independent, where the 
diesel fuel was dissolved conclusively. 

Need it be said that when the Ukhta plant demanded that Aveks-Komi pay 
for the delivery, it turned out that the "purchaser" did not have the 
faintest idea about any deal that had been concluded on its behalf. 

Subsequently something strange happened. On 19 June 1992 Ponomarev, deputy 
district attorney for Moscow, approved Abramovich being taken into 
custody, "considering the dangerous nature of the crime and also the fact 
that he could go into hiding." And... nothing. It is known only that the 
criminal case was forwarded from Moscow to Ukhta for further inquiry. 

Where it petered out. Forever?... 

It should be noted for fairness' sake that by the time of his 
acquaintanceship with Berezovskiy Abramovich had developed from a 
run-of-the-mill con man into a serious and respectable, by Russian 
standards, oil exporter. The Mekong corporation founded by the future 
"family treasurer" was in second place after Balkar Trading in the volume 
of sales of Noyabrsk oil. And after Balkar chief Yanchar had been sent to 
prison and by the time of the formation of Sibneft, in first place. 

Abramovich was obliged for such serious successes in the oil trade to the son 
of Gorodilov, head of Noyabrskneftegaz and the first president of 
Sibneft, Andrey, with whom Abramovich lived in the same hostel. Wagging 
tongues maintain that Roman Arkadyevich honestly "unbuttoned" 40 percent 
of profits for his patron. But after he had gotten to know Berezovskiy, 
Abramovich had a more attractive magnet. 

BAB Has Performed His Service. BAB May Leave 

In drawing Abramovich close to the "family," Berezovskiy transferred to 
him power of attorney over all the financial and raw material flows of 
Sibneft. Now, evidently, he is regretting it. 

As his first order of business, Abramovich gave all of Sibneft's 
exports--for a whole year--to the KomiTEK-Moskva company, which was 
directed by his old comrade Grigoriy Berezkin. KomiTEK-Moskva had the 
reputation at that time of having the highest percentage "shrinkage and 
leakage" in the transportation of oil. The "shrinkage and leakage" 
produced a pretty good deposit in the pockets of the exporters. 

The capital that was accumulated at the first stage subsequently was 
used to purchase the controlling block of shares of Sibneft. In the fall 
of 1996 some Sins and Rifayn Oyl private corporations successively bought 
up 34 percent of Sibneft. Sins, as the press maintained, is owned by 
Abramovich and Berezovskiy on a 50:50 basis. And Rifayn Oyl was founded 
by two 100 percent subsidiaries of Roman Abramovich--the Servet and 
Oylimpeks firms. Add here Abramovich's 23 percent share of the 
Finansovaya Neftyanaya Kompaniya limited-liability company, which owns 51 
percent of Sibneft shares, and the fact that control over Sibneft is 
today concentrated in the hands of one man is obvious even to the 
first-grader who has barely mastered addition and subtraction.... 

Having gradually captured the principal "family" enterprise, Abramovich 
little by little led an assault on the positions of his godfather. The 
"treasurer" slowly, but surely began to squeeze BAB out of management of 
the real money flow, pushing him into the purely political field. Today 
we are, by all accounts, observing the finale of this intrigue. 

But the fragile balance between Abramovich and Berezovskiy is preserved 
as yet. On BAB's side is control over FSB chief Putin and Minister of 
Internal Affairs Rushaylo. This is power. On Abramovich's side, First 
Vice Premier Aksenenko, Kalyuzhnyy, head of the Ministry of Fuel and 
Energy, and Minister Adamov. This is money. And the rule that "whoever 
pays the piper, calls the tune" operates, as distinct from fickle 
political predilections, with the rectilinearity of rolling stock. 

Having collected for himself all of oil industry and the natural monopolies 
(Gazprom, RAO YeES Rossii, the Ministry of Railways, and Transneft), 
Abramovich will attempt sooner or later to conclusively emerge from 
beneath Berezovskiy's tutelage. Seeing that the control over Gazprom, 
Transneft, and RAO YeES Rossii acquired via Aksenenko affords Abramovich 
an extensive field for the creation of the most bizarre and fantastic 
coalitions. 

There ensues from the "legalization" of Abramovich one further conclusion, 
which has as yet gone unnoticed by observers behind the analysis of 
"intra-family" permutations. A conclusion that could in the very near 
future alter the entire configuration of Russia's power elite. 

The emergence of the "treasurer" from the shadows means, in actual fact, 
that the last reserves have been thrown into the fight to preserve the 
Yeltsin regime after the year 2000. Abramovich has behind him no one. 

Whence it follows that the "family" will fight for its future to the last 
drop of blood, up to and including the commitment of troops to Moscow. I 
would like to believe that this would not be the last drop for the 
country. 

P.S. According to reports of Moskovskiy Komsomolets sources in the 
Ministry of Fuel and Energy, the owners of the controlling block of 
shares of Sibneft, Roman Abramovich and Boris Berezovskiy, are at this 
time conducting the most intricate negotiationss on the sale of their 
shares to foreign purchasers. This information is indirectly confirmed by 
the rumor that the "honeymoon couple" has begun to transfer assets 
overseas. Experts link this with the Kremlin's preparation for the 
toughest of political actions in respect to the CPRF and Mayor of Moscow 
Yuriy Luzhkov, the sponsor of which is Abramovich. But the outcome of the 
confrontation of the Kremlin and the opposition is considered 
unpredictable--which is forcing Abramovich and Berezovskiy to take out 
insurance against the risks, sending capital abroad.... 

*******