May 29, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3311 • 3312   • 

Johnson's Russia List
#3312
29 May 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Itar-Tass: Right Cause Names Its Candidates for Future Duma.
2. Reuters: Yeltsin says won't start nuclear war over Kosovo.
3. Reuters: Russia PM faces crisis just days into office.
4. Evelyn Wheeler: visas.
5. Andrei Liakhov: RE: 3310-Mikheyev/MENATEP.
6. Gordon Hahn: For Hough, Mikheev on Khodorkovskii.
7. Yale Richmond: Le plus ca change.... (Re barter).
8. Joseph Dresen: Gene Sosin.
9. Itar-Tass: Russian Minister Opposes Militarization of Science.
10. Interfax: polls on Stepashin and Belarus union.
11. AP: Russian Court Rejects Church Ban.
12. Atlantic Council of the United States--Meeting with Alexander A. 
Pikayev.
13. Moscow Times editorial: Second City Deserves Bad Reputation.
14. NTV: Russian Experts Concerned At Lack of Spy Satellites.
15. Moskovskiy Komsomolets: Mikhail Rostovskiy, Toy the Size of Russia; 
Frequent Change of Government Has Corroded White House Foundations.] 

*******

#1
Right Cause Names Its Candidates for Future Duma.

MOSCOW, Nay 29 (Itar-Tass) - The Right Cause coalition at its first congress 
in Moscow on Saturday named its three candidates for the Duma lower house of 
parliament to be elected in December. 

The Right Cause will field the leaders of Young Russia, Forward, Russia and 
Common Cause - Boris Nemtsov, Boris Fyodorov and Irina Khakamada. 

The congress has set up its headquarters to run the pre-election campaign and 
negotiate with possible new members of the coalition. 

The chief of the Unified Energy Systems of Russia electricity utility, 
Anatoly Chubais, has been elected to chair the election headquarters, whose 
members are Yegor Gaidar, the leader of Russia's Democratic Choice; Alexander 
Yakovlev, a perestroika veteran and leader of the Russian Social Democracy 
Party; Nemtosv, Fyodorov and Khakamada. 

Sorces told Itar-Tass that struggles over the three nominees had been going 
on until the very opening of the congress. Nemtsov admitted this. 

"We long discussed what the first troika should be. After long scientific and 
sociological studies, our experts proposed just this variant," he said. 

He said Gaidar would run in the Duma elections on the Moscow list of the 
Right Cause. 

The coalition has passed a platform that the congress agreed can be amended 
and supplemented in the future. 

*********

#2
Yeltsin says won't start nuclear war over Kosovo

MOSCOW, May 29 (Reuters) - Russian President Boris Yeltsin, replying on 
Saturday to a letter from a worried 10-year-old girl, said he would not start 
a nuclear war over Kosovo. 

The Kremlin press service distributed a letter it said Yeltsin had received 
through the Internet from a girl in the former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia. 

``I think one cannot use nuclear missiles, because if even one of them is 
launched, millions of ordinary people will be killed,'' Taya Rukavina wrote. 

``I know of your warning to Mr Clinton, that you will fire missiles if NATO 
does not stop its air strikes. Think of all the innocent people who will be 
killed,'' she wrote. 

In his reply, Yeltsin said her letter had touched him. 

``I know that NATO's warplanes have ruined the peace and calm not only of the 
citizens of Yugoslavia, but of many other countries, including your native 
Slovenia,'' he wrote. 

``As for your question, information that Russia might use nuclear weapons is 
not true. Believe me, I will do everything I can to stop the war. Russia will 
use only peaceful methods.'' 

The girl said she wanted peace and thought NATO's air campaign was a mistake, 
because ``I think you cannot solve any problems through bombing.'' 

She said she felt deep sympathy for Serbs undergoing NATO air strikes because 
she remembered being scared herself when she was three years old and planes 
bombed her town, but ``one shouldn't kill and torture innocent people as Serb 
soldiers are doing in Kosovo.'' 

In Soviet times the Kremlin occasionally published replies to children's 
letters as a way of showing the softer side of Moscow's totalitarian 
leadership. 

A young American girl, Samantha Smith, was invited to the Soviet Union after 
writing a letter to then leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s. She 
became a Russian national hero and had an elite children's summer camp named 
in her honour. 

********

#3
Russia PM faces crisis just days into office
By Peter Graff

MOSCOW, May 29 (Reuters) - Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin gathered
his cabinet behind closed doors on Saturday amid a new political crisis
that newspapers said threatened to topple his government just 10 days after
he took office. 

The resignation late on Friday of First Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail
Zadornov was described as a possibly fatal blow to the country's fourth
government in 14 months, and a setback to efforts to kick-start the economy. 

The head of the government press centre, Alexander Mikhailov, said
ministers discussed economic plans at Saturday's cabinet meeting and did
not talk about the composition of the cabinet. His reassurance was unlikely
to curb speculation that a crisis was being played out behind the scenes. 

Since being confirmed in office last week, Stepashin, long seen as totally
loyal to Boris Yeltsin, has fought openly with the president over shaping
his government. 

Stepashin had secured Zadornov's post to counterbalance Nikolai Aksyonenko,
another first deputy premier who was imposed on the prime minister by
Yeltsin. 

Aksyonenko, a former head of Russia's railways with no financial
experience, has claimed supreme control over the country's economy.
Russia's press said the only explanation for Aksyonenko's sudden rise to
power was the backing of a coterie of powerful tycoons in Yeltsin's inner
circle. 

"The cabinet has collapsed," the respected business daily Kommersant wrote.
"Whether or not Stepashin resigns, he is no longer head of the cabinet." 

The daily Sevodnya wrote: "The forces behind Aksyonenko are striving for
monopolistic control over the government." 

On Saturday the Kremlin confirmed the appointment of Vladimir Starostenko
as communications minister in the new cabinet. Starostenko, 50, is regarded
as an Aksyonenko ally who, like him, previously served in the railways
sector. 

Zadornov's resignation followed a week of intrigue, with rumour and
speculation over whether he could also keep his previous post of finance
minister, and a number of hastily arranged meetings between the president
and prime minister. 

"The whole affair means Sergei Stepashin has little say in forming the
government and the puppet-masters (in Yeltsin's entourage) continue to pull
the strings guiding the selection of government ministers," liberal
opposition leader Grigory Yavlinsky said. 

"I think (Zadornov's) resignation will have a bad effect on the
government's entire economic policy and on its relations with international
financial organisations." 

Zadornov, 36, shared this sentiment. "This (my resignation) will, of
course, make talks with international (financial) organisations more
difficult," he told NTV television. 

Government spokesman Mikhailov said the press was out of line in reporting
conflict between Stepashin and Aksyonenko. 

"My observation is that the relationship between them is businesslike, as
it should be between the head of a government and his first deputy," he said. 

He told NTV that Stepashin had a list of at least five possible candidates
to replace Zadornov, including liberal First Deputy Finance Minister Viktor
Khristenko. 

Neither Stepashin nor Yeltsin commented directly on Zadornov's resignation. 

Stepashin could shrug off the humiliation and get on with forming a
government, or he could resign, running the risk that parliament might
refuse the person Yeltsin named to replace him and force a full-blown
showdown. 

*******

#4
From: "Wheeler, Evelyn K." <WheelerE@state.gov>
Subject: visas

Dear David,
The consular section of the US Embassy in Moscow is not closed, and visas
are being issued every day for travel to the U.S. 

*******

#5
From: "Liakhov, Andrei" <liakhova@nortonrose.com>
Subject: RE: 3310-Mikheyev /MENATEP
Date: Fri, 28 May 1999 

MENATEP

Mr. Mikheev has rightly pointed out that the Russians are sometimes too keen
to look for conspiracies everywhere. I also quite agree that every big bank
in Russia has ties to one major finanacial grouping or the other and that
the reasons for all major bank bankrupcies are primarily vested in the
overexposure of all major Russian financial institutions to GKO pyramid
prior to August 1998.

However:

It is not also a secret that in the late Gorby period a decision was taken
to try "the Chinese approach" (or rather a bungled Soviet version of it) and
let certain trustworthy people manage KPSS (and later KGB off budget) funds
by way of creating a chain of semi-private enterprises (including banks)
throughout the USSR. MENATEP along with VOSTOK, TVERUNIVERSAL, INCOMBANK,
VILTIS, BALTIS and several others was created at the very end of '89 (sic!)
implementing that particular decision. Some of these banks (like VILTIS,
BALTIS, and SEVERO ZAPAD) fell victims of political turmoil of late '91-'92
and were either taken over by new authorities in the former Soviet Republics
or liquidated. Others (INCOMBANK, VOSTOK) were dicreetly sold off to various
industrialist groups at the end of '92 beginning of '93. Some fell victims
of mismanagement or a quite well documented aviso fraud (TVERUNIVERSAL and
GERMES). MENATEP together with ONEXIM survived throughout all this quite
turbulent period to collapse together with the GKO market.

The early shareholders list (which I've seen in around mid '91) of MENATEP
included such "interesting" names as Finansovo- Khoziaistvennoe upravlenie
CK KPSS (if I remember the name of this dept.correctly) and Commercial
enterprise "Zaria" (the usual cover for the 7th Department of the KGB -
external survelliance). I have little doubt that these names disappeared
from the list (please bear in mind that even rudimentary shareholders'
registries were not intriduced in Russia until '94) by Jan.'92 but at the
same time I have little doubts that these or succesor structures retained
some influence in the bank. On the other hand major contributors to the
charter capital of Menatep were a number of very large Soviet enterprises
which were rather cash rich at that time ('89-'91) and it's quite difficult
to establish whether KPSS/KGB had a decisive voice in the bank's affairs. 

But does it really matter now?

It must be remembered that KPSS/KGB viewed commercial organisations created
with their financial support primarily as means of making/laundering money
for their respective organisations/officials and were not really interested
in keeping interests in the created structures once their immediate goals
were achieved and I doubt that any real (i.e. formalised in any way)
influence over such structures was retained post October '93. As to the
personal ties, affiliations and the like - it is most probably a completely
different story. 

*******

#6
Date: Fri, 28 May 1999 
From: Gordon Hahn <hahn@hoover.stanford.edu> 
Subject: For Hough, Mikheev on Khodorkovskii

Khodorkovskii's ties seem to have been closer to the Komsomol than the
party per se. He was one of the beneficiaries of Ligachev's scheme to
permit the Komsomol to generate income for the party. This was later
adopted in the party as a whole and managed by the administrations of
affairs in each committee, including the Central Committee(CC). The CPSU
created tax-free youth scientific-technological creativity centers in each
raion in Moscow. Khodorkovskii was a deputy secretary for the Frunze
district and thus was brought into such activity. His center was
transformed into a bank as early as 1988.

I also know that Khodorkovskii was Ivan Silaev's financial and economic
advisor when the latter was Russian premier. It is likely that he was with
Silaev before he joined the Yeltsin team and was still a member of the
Soviet government, but I do not know this very last point for sure. I have
to check my files, but I think Silaev was a CC member. About KGB ties, I've
seen nothing. Generalov's stint as Fuel and Energy Minister suggests that
Menatep did not lose its influence during the period of the 'molodye
reformatory.' Generalov was at Menatep until his government appointment.

********

#7
Date: Fri, 28 May 1999 
From: yale richmond <yalerich@erols.com> 
Subject: Le plus ca change....

The story from Novgorod (JRL 3310) about the factory director there who
ensured the survival of his factory by selling 90 percent of his production
through barter of goods and services, reminded me of how little has changed
in the new Russia. Barter was also standard operating procedure for factory
directors in the old Soviet Union. 

Many factories had a full time employee called a "tolkach" (pusher), whose
job it was to work the phones all day long looking for much-needed parts,
materials, and equipment, and acquiring them through barter. This often
meant multiple deals with several other factories that were also looking
for something needed to keep their production lines going. For example, if
the first factory, which produced pumps, needed some valves, and its
tolkach found another factory which had some extra valves but, in exchange
for them, wanted some pipes, our tolkach had to find another factory with
pipes to spare. And so it went, on and on until the circle was completed
and everyone had the needed parts.

Arkady Raikhin, the famed Russian comic, once played the role of a tolkach
in one of his hilarious skits. The skit opened with Raikhin receiving a
phone call from his factory director who needed some parts. Raikhin got on
another phone and called a friend of his, a tolkach at another factory, who
had the needed parts but wanted to barter them for other parts. Raikhin
then got on another phone in his search for another barter partner and,
when the skit ended, Raikhin was talking on about ten phones trying to
satisfy everyone's needs.

Le plus ca change....

*******

#8
Date: Fri, 28 May 1999 
From: "JOSEPH DRESEN" <DRESENJO@WWIC.SI.EDU> 
Subject: Gene Sosin

Dear David:

I read Yuri Luri's praise of Gene Sosin's book, and look forward to
getting the chance to read it. I know it is a good way off, but
wanted to mention to you that Gene will be kicking off the Kennan
Institute's speaker program next Fall on Monday, September 27 from
12:00 - 1:00pm.

******

#9
Russian Minister Opposes Militarization of Science.

ST. PETERSBURG, May 28 (Itar-Tass) - Russian Minister of Science and 
Technology Mikhail Kirpichnikov opposes "militarization of science." 

"I am afraid of the return to militarization of science. That must not 
happen," the minister told correspondents in St. Petersburg on Friday. In his 
words, science of the defense industry has suffered most over the recent 
years but it shall not develop to the prejudice of other sciences. 

The Russian applied science still dominates in the space exploration, 
aviation, ship-building and the energy industry, Kirpichnikov said. "Research 
in the information science and software done by the Innovation-Technological 
Center under Moscow University is very promising," he noted. Russia has the 
world's best technologies of "warm" house building and small energy units 
with 100 percent efficiency based on catalytic heat source which are 
developed by the Novosibirsk department of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 
Another unique achievement is the transgenic technologies of growing 
vegetables immune to virus, the minister said. 

"The main task of now is to use the ideas in practical economy as soon as 
possible," the minister said. 

*****

#10
Date: Fri, 28 May 1999 
From: "Rutkowska, Izabela" <IRUTKOWSKA@imf.org> 
Subject: Russia Notes, May 28, 1999

Poll: 49 pct of Russians did not want Stepashin as PM -- Nearly half of
Russians, 49%,
disapproved of the appointment of Sergei Stepashin to the post of prime
minister. However, the number dropped to 23% upon the State Duma's
endorsement of him to the post, according to opinion polls of 1,500
Russians conducted by the Public Opinion Fund on May 15 and 22. Just 12% of
the respondents initially liked the candidate. Forty- three percent hailed
the confirmation of Stepashin as prime minister. Over a third, 35%, of
Russians did not want the Duma to confirm the appointment, while 29% favored
him for the post. Pollsters said that the negative reaction was triggered
by the dismissal of Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, rather than
Stepashin's personality. An overwhelming 81% of Russians disapproved of the
firing. One third of Russians, 33%, were unable to assess Stepashin's
previous work, and 32% knew nothing about his activity. Stepashin's
prior performance was poor, 21% of Russians said. Just 14% positively
evaluated it. Stepashin made a positive impression on 50% of the
respondents and a negative impression on 15% of them. The number of people
who trusted Stepashin grew from 6% to 19% between May 15 and 22. Lack
of confidence in Stepashin was expressed by 37% and 26%, respectively. Over
half, 54% of the respondents do not think that Stepashin's government
will pull Russia out of the economic crisis. Just 6% expect the situation
to improve, and 39% are in doubt. The economy will deteriorate, 46%
said, and another 29% gave up hope for changes for the
better. (Interfax)

Poll: 72 pct of Russians support union with Belarus -- Most Russians, 72%,
support unification with Belarus, up from 65% two years ago, according to an
opinion poll of 1,500 Russians conducted by the Public Opinion Fund this
month and in April 1997. However, 47% said their final opinion would
depend on the conditions for the joint state. About a third, 30%, of
Russians would vote for the union under any circumstances. Immediate
accession is backed by 15%, down from 18% two years ago. Gradual
unification over three to five years is supported by 28%, down from 30%
in 1997. Four percent of Russians think it should take longer, down from
6%, who said so in 1997. (Interfax)

******

#11
Russian Court Rejects Church Ban
May 28, 1999
By NICK WADHAMS

MOSCOW (AP) -- A Russian court has rejected an attempt to ban a 
Pentecostalist church in the far east under a controversial religion law, a 
defense lawyer said today.

Prosecutors in the port city of Magadan had accused the chief pastor of the 
Word of Life Pentecostalist Church of hypnotizing congregants to extort 
donations.

They tried to ban the congregation under a religion law that gives courts the 
right to outlaw religious groups found to be inciting hatred or intolerant 
behavior. The law has been used against several groups recently.

Congregants said local authorities, media and private citizens had harassed 
them so much that more than 400 of them applied for asylum in the United 
States at the end of January.

However, a Magadan court ruled Monday that the prosecutors' allegations had 
no legal basis, said Anatoly Pchelintsev, a lawyer working with the Slavic 
Center for Law and Justice in Moscow, which monitors religious rights 
violations in Russia.

``The prosecutor's office bears responsibility for the situation that arose 
around this case,'' he said today.

The court also said the prosecutors had violated the congregation's rights by 
illegally videotaping church services and attempting to forge court documents.

The prosecutor has until next week to appeal, which is expected. If the 
court's decision is not reversed, the congregants are expected to withdraw 
their appeal for asylum in the United States.

``This decision sends a powerful message to the government.

The style of worship varies in different Pentecostalist churches. Many 
worshippers exercise Holy Spirit ``gifts,'' including speaking in tongues, 
faith healing and modern-day prophecies.

The religion law, passed in 1997, recognizes Russian Orthodox Christianity as 
the nation's leading faith and pledges to respect Islam, Judaism and 
Buddhism. But other denominations face a host of restrictions and have to 
prove they've had a presence in Russia for at least 15 years before they're 
permitted full legal status.

Human rights groups have protested Russia's religion law as a violation of 
the Russian Constitution, which protects the freedom of religion.

******

#12
Date: Fri, 28 May 1999
From: "Edward E. Owens" <Eeowens@acus.org>
Subject: Upcoming Speech at the Atlantic Council...

Atlantic Council of the United States--
Meeting with 
Alexander A. Pikayev
Director
Program for WMD Control and Non-Proliferation
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace--Carnegie Moscow Center
on
"After Yugoslavia: Shifting Russian Priorities in Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation"

Tuesday, June 8, 1999 -- 2:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. at the Atlantic Council, 910
17th Street, N.W., Suite 1000, Washington, DC 20006

Please RSVP to Ed Owens, tel (202) 778-4971; email eeowens@acus.org; or Ken
Weisbrode tel. (202) 778-4968; email kaweisbrode@acus.org

******

#13
Moscow Times
May 29, 1999 
EDITORIAL: Second City Deserves Bad Reputation 

On the eve of St. Petersburg's 296th birthday, two people were murdered in 
cold blood and two more came dangerously close. Categorized by local 
authorities as contract hits, these attacks came as a fresh reminder of a 
trend that became alarmingly familiar last fall in St. Petersburg, when a 
seemingly endless stream of political and commercial assassinations darkened 
the city's image. 

That was the season when Russia's so-called cultural capital earned its 
second, less appealing nickname of Russia's crime capital. 

Now, as the White Nights approach and the city begins to relax with a period 
of badly needed warm-weather celebration, it's clear that it will take more 
than a few good Pushkin birthday parties to salvage the city's name. St. 
Petersburg's reputation for murder has stuck, and perhaps deservedly so. One 
thing is for sure f it won't do much for the tourist trade. 

Of course, all of Russia is lawless, not just St. Petersburg. But somehow, 
it's more striking in a city that, given its location as Russia's window on 
Europe and its haunting beauty, could be doing so much better. Instead, 
organized crime and corruption rule. 

As disturbing as this most recent string of incidents is f two murders and 
two near-misses on a single day f what's even more disturbing are the sheer 
mass of stories that often go unreported, the humbler crime stories that 
become banal through sheer repetition but drive home the same message: Life 
is cheap. 

In the past week and a half alone, Interfax has sent routine stories like the 
May 18 murder of the 33-year-old director of the Global tour agency, shot and 
killed by an unknown assailant on Ulitsa Zhukovskogo, in downtown St. 
Petersburg. 

Another was the May 24 attack on 44-year-old Tatyana Lobanova, the commercial 
director of a prominent alcohol producer, by four masked men who broke into 
her dacha and beat her, her daughter, son-in-law and a friend with baseball 
bats. The assailants then left, taking with them four cellular phones and 
jewelry. 

City law enforcement, meanwhile, continues to address the crime situation 
with its usual circumspect approach, admitting little, advising less, and 
leaving a litany of major crimes unsolved. 

What will it take to feel confidence in Russia's second city again? 

Certainly more than the city's "Safe St. Petersburg" guide, which includes 
useful information for visitors like the contact number for the 
anti-terrorism office of the Federal Security Service. Is it any wonder the 
city has got a bad rap? 

*******

#14
Russian Experts Concerned At Lack of Spy Satellites 

NTV 
May 22, 1999
[translation for personal use only]
>From "Segodnya" newscast presented by Mikhail Osokin 

[Presenter Mikhail Osokin] More news related to the 
Balkans. [Russian] President [Boris] Yeltsin has given instructions to 
military experts to prepare a report on how satellites are being used in 
NATO's operations against Yugoslavia. Yevgeniy Kirichenko reports the 
details. 
[Begin recording] [Correspondent] Long before NATO's first missiles were 
dropped on the Yugoslav territory, the Russian Defence Ministry was 
watching the developments in the Balkans very carefully. All intelligence 
channels were used in information gathering. Special emphasis was laid on 
satellites. 
The space group of all Russian satellites is controlled with the help of 
the Russian Strategic Missile Troops calculations. In Vlasikha, Moscow 
Region, where the Missile Troops' central command is located, a special 
group has been formed whose responsibilities include gathering and 
analysis of the space intelligence data. Before the beginning of NATO's 
operations the territory of the Balkans did not interest them much. After 
the bombing the routine of the satellite group's work had to be changed. 
[Valeriy Grin, captioned as deputy Strategic Misille Troops Commander in 
charge of satellites] When we used to fly over Yugoslavia before, we did 
not do any filming. We would film other areas instead. Now we target our 
special equipment at the area of the conflict. 
[Correspondent] Since the Desert Storm, Russian army experts have
conducted a 
detailed anylysis of the alliance's [NATO] operations. When it became 
known that the Balkan conflict was growing into a military phase, such an 
analysis was conducted every day. The first bombings left no doubt that 
NATO command was showing to the world the example of a new 
high-technology war in which seemingly safe satellites and not ballistics 
have the main part to play. 
The Strategic Missile Troops main headquarters are confident that Russia 
should not only review the military doctrine; it should evaluate the 
importance of space in a different way. 
[Grin] [One should] submit proposals to the government and the president on 
further development of our satellites. In other words, one should learn 
some lessons from US actions in Yugoslavia in order for our satellites to 
work not less effectively, if we have to ever conduct [military] 
operations, God forbid. 
[Correspondent] Any space group's life term is limited. A country's
security 
depends 
on how regularly new satellites will be added to it. Russia began losing 
its positions in space after the Almaz programme was over. This system's 
satellites were capable of seeing planets in the dark. You can see the 
last pictures taken by Almaz in 1991. Only the US radar intelligence 
satellite, Lacrosse, can take them again. NATO is intensely using it in 
Yugoslavia. Russia has got nothing like this. 
[Anatoliy Zapadinskiy] It is now, in 1999 or in 2000, when this problem 
should 
be resolved in principle. Either Russia needs space and then the whole 
country should be working to make this information possible, or let us 
say that Russia will enter the 21st century without space research. 
[Correspondent] As they have explained to us, every satellite may have only 
one 
point in space. If the satellite leaves it, other satellites replace it 
very soon. [end recording[ [Video shows the checkpoint in Vlasikha; 
interviews, control room, photos, employees at work] 

******

#15
Rapid Government Turnover Deplored 

Moskovskiy Komsomolets
26 May 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Mikhail Rostovskiy: "Toy the Size of Russia; Frequent 
Change of Government Has Corroded White House Foundations" 

"Yevgeniy Maksimovich, look me in the eyes! Do you 
believe me? Yes? Well, we shall be together to the end!" -- it has become 
known to Moskovskiy Komsomolets that Yevgeniy Maksimovich [Primakov] 
received this sacred promise to preserve his post from Boris Nikolayevich 
just a few weeks before his dismissal.... When on 12 May the premier's 
limousine was speeding to his final audience in the Kremlin, virtually 
everyone was already convinced of the inevitability of the government's 
dismissal. With one exception. The ex-premier's associates described how 
until literally the last minute Primakov himself did not believe this 
could happen to him. 

Today Yevgeniy Maksimovich's personal opinions are no longer of vital 
political importance. According to our information, having completed the 
formalities of the transfer of power in a single day, Primakov decided to 
leave active politics. So far the ex-premier is undergoing treatment, 
thinking, and meeting with friends at his state dacha in Barvikha. And 
soon it is expected his memoirs will be published. Perhaps today there is 
no point in speaking of the true background to Yevgeniy Maksimovich's 
dismissal. This is all part of history now. 

Premiers go but the problems remain. And the pile of problems mounts 
constantly with each change of government. Everyone knows from their own 
experience that when the commercial director of any small office changes, 
business stops for at least a month. And if there are four directors in 
14 months? Yet that is precisely what has happened in our government. And 
its owner is all Russia.... 

Three Farewells 

"What will happen after Primakov's dismissal? Nothing!" When Boris 
Berezovskiy came up with this prediction a few months ago in a narrow 
circle of acquaintances even his closest associates did not believe him. 
They predicted terrible political battles. But, as has now emerged, the 
oligarch was right this time too. 

Since everything is discovered through comparison it is worth recalling 
the two previous changes of government. 

...Viktor Chernomyrdin received the decree on his dismissal more than calmly. 
Chernomyrdin's associates even noted that he was in an elated mood. There 
were no tears, no hysteria at the "leaving" soiree for a narrow circle of 
acquaintances held at the White House in the evening. But the reaction of 
ordinary officials was far more direct. The majority of rank and filers 
indeed had nothing to lose. The premier's dismissal affects only the fate 
of the top government officials and the workers in their secretariats. 

The careers of the department workers comprising the majority of White 
House denizens are in principle not affected at all. But despite this the 
number of drunks increased markedly in the government residence in the 
evening. It was no better in the daytime. In public, naturally, the rank 
and filers preserved their imperturbable appearance. But in a narrow 
circle full rein was given to their emotions. It seemed that the 
apparatus wolves who had been through fire and water were behaving like 
kindergarten children suddenly left without their teacher during a 
terrible thunderstorm. 

But Kiriyenko's dismissal was remarkable primarily for the humor with 
which the premier's retinue accepted the inevitable. Dzhakhan Pollyyeva, 
the head of Kiriyenko's secretariat, was distinguished for the fact that 
she "cleared out" her office even before the announcement of the 
presidential edict on the government's dismissal. Another of Sergey 
Vladilenovich's associates, on the contrary, decided to prolong the 
pleasure: He persuaded them to appoint him chief of a White House 
department and lasted exactly two days in that post! Finally, a third 
group of Kiriyenko supporters took it out on Berezovskiy. Boris 
Abramovich, as we know, appeared in the White House premier's zone even 
before the new incumbent, acting Premier Chernomyrdin. But the oligarch 
was not allowed to enjoy his triumph. "Hey, guys, does anyone have a 
stake?" -- these were the words with which BAB [Berezovskiy] was greeted 
by one of Kiriyenko's associates standing at the door. "You should try 
silver bullets -- they say that works," his chortling colleagues followed 
up. 

As for the reaction of ordinary apparatchiks, at best it was correct 
and polite. But that was how they saw off a man who was extremely 
unpopular in apparat circles. It seemed that everything should have been 
different with Primakov, who enjoys tremendous prestige. After all, when 
he left the foreign intelligence service, for instance, there was almost 
mourning in the special service corridors.... 

On the day the premier was dismissed there were still traces of stormy 
emotions in the White House. Immediately after the publication of 
Yeltsin's edict frightened apparatchiks rushed to the canteen and started 
buying up anything edible, expecting a food crisis. But the panic soon 
passed. The majority of Yevgeniy Maksimovich's associates found new jobs 
for themselves in just a few hours. The premier's former press secretary, 
Aristarkhova, was immediately appointed deputy chief of the government 
press service. Primakov's press adviser, Kolesnichenko, returned to TASS. 
The solution of the question of the appointment of White House apparatus 
leader Zubakov and Markaryan, chief of the premier's secretariat, as 
ambassadors took slightly longer. The remaining White House officials 
were concerned only for their own careers. At best they spoke of the 
government's dismissal as a fact of life. At worst sincere joy was 
expressed at Primakov's departure. 

In the Kremlin the painlessness of the change of government naturally 
generated profound satisfaction. But the question is: Is that really a 
good thing? 

Apparatus Wars 

Sergey Kiriyenko and Yevgeniy Primakov might seem like complete opposites. 
But they nonetheless do have something in common. Both premiers in fact 
began a "cold war" against the White House apparatus. And they both lost 
that war. 

Any sneeze in the government invariably affects someone's interests. In 
the government of Chernomyrdin, who held his post for over five years 
(how he ruled is another question), everything was predictable. The 
arrival of new people disrupted the equilibrium of the system and the 
system started to resist. 

But the thrust of the battles which developed in the government 
residence can in no circumstances be reduced to the struggle between the 
"clever premiers" and the "corrupt bureaucrats." The purge of the White 
House which Kiriyenko carried out on instructions from the Yeltsin 
administration led to the point where the government apparatus was left 
drained of blood in many spheres. For instance, the White House 
subdepartments for communications with parliament have still not 
recovered from the shock. Primakov's steps were also sometimes dubious. 

You only have to take the unprecedented agreement on the form for access 
to secret information which Yevgeniy Maksimovich's team compelled the 
White House denizens to sign. The officials were in fact faced with a 
choice: Looking for a new job or not being allowed to change their 
address. The opportunity for his subordinates to gain access to the 
premier also generated many questions. In the opinion of the majority of 
officials it became so restricted that it was a great impediment to 
business. Finally, a very large number of White House denizens were 
sincerely offended by the behavior of members of the two premiers' 
personal teams. According to complaints from rank and filers the "Nizhniy 
Novgorod team" brought in by Kiriyenko often behaved like spoiled 
princelings. And "Primakov's people" were naturally accused of "state 
security ways...." 

...Summer 1998. At a government session Premier Kiriyenko suddenly announced 
the adoption of tough measures against Gazprom chief Vyakhirev. 
Immediately after that an information blockade was announced in the White 
House. The premier's retinue hoped in this way to keep all the oligarchs 
in a state of ignorance regarding the details of what was happening: 
After all, there were only ministers and leaders of the White House 
apparatus left in the government hall of sessions. But very soon 
Kiriyenko's aides discovered that criminal businessmen knew everything 
down to the smallest detail. It even got to the point where the editorial 
offices of some mass media connected to the oligarchs would telephone 
their White House correspondents and describe what was happening in the 
building! 

After a few months of work Kiriyenko and company concluded that any 
document in whose preparation at least 10-15 people had been involved 
would be leaked from the White House with a 100 percent degree of 
certainty. So the members of Sergey Vladilenovich's retinue gave up on 
the struggle against "foreign agents" and countered leaks only with the 
aid of counterleaks. News of the preparation of key decisions was 
published by Kiriyenko's own people. But only in an interpretation 
favorable to the premier and with the omission of particularly explosive 
details. 

Even earlier the premier's entourage discovered that there was virtually 
not a single important decree that it could legally get through the White 
House apparatus. Every experienced apparatchik knows a thousand legal 
means of sinking any document. The most commonplace is to send it, in 
full accordance with the rules, for rubber-stamping to the government 
legal administration. Russia's laws are so complex and diverse that even 
the most brilliant paper can be guaranteed to be ruined. There is a 
slightly more complex variation: Once again in full accordance with the 
rules the document is dispatched to the "merry-go-round" -- for agreement 
by all White House departments involved. One of them unfailingly fails to 
stamp the papers or temporarily "loses" them.... As a result in the first 
weeks of Kiriyenko's rule a mass of government decrees stemming directly 
from the president's edicts were in stasis deep inside the apparatus. On 
the other hand some dubious documents suddenly developed an unusual turn 
of speed. 

Kiriyenko's people never managed to find the antidote to tricks of this kind. 
The only recourse they had was the following ploy. When some associate of 
the premier's had urgently to get through some decree or other he would 
simply go to Sergey Vladilenovich and say: "Such-and-such has to be done 
urgently. Please make a political decision." After that the paper, as a 
rule in violation of all regulations, was signed in an authoritarian 
manner. "Every day I would violate myriads of various instructions," one 
of Kiriyenko's high-ranking associates admitted to Moskovskiy Komsomolets 
with unfeigned pride in his voice. 

These methods must be acknowledged to be effective in part. The only 
problem is that there can be no question of any regular work with them. 
If a handful of Kiriyenko's personal associates noticed another 
bureaucratic machination they would put the situation right. But how much 
of everything passed unnoticed! After all, surprises awaited the 
premier's retinue in the most unexpected places. In the summer of 1998 
Krasnoyarsk leader Lebed wrote a letter to the premier threatening to 
take the nuclear weapons billeted in the kray under his own control. The 
response from the press was instant. But the actual letter did not 
actually get delivered to Kiriyenko. The premier's intrigued retinue 
announced an urgent search for it. It turned out that some White House 
clerks had decided that Lebed's missive was not worthy of Sergey 
Vladilenovich's attention! And that is one of the most innocuous 
examples. In general the government apparatus undoubtedly made its 
contribution to the fact that Kiriyenko's dismissal came so soon. 

The new government chief, Yevgeniy Primakov, was fully determined not to 
repeat his predecessor's mistakes. Immediately after arriving at the 
White House he declared war on "shameless embezzlers of state funds." But 
the result of all his efforts was not much better than Kiriyenko's. 

...In January 1999 a stunning piece of news circulated among the Moscow 
political elite. According to a leak from the White House the premier, 
keeping it a deep secret from everyone, including even part of the 
leadership of the Presidential Staff, prepared some "statement on 
political accord." At first the "armchair politicians" were sincerely 
unable to understand how Yevgeniy Maksimovich could slip up in this way. 
But the explanation was found later. The leak was declared to be 
Primakov's latest and particularly subtle ploy aimed at increasing his 
influence. But according to Moskovskiy Komsomolets's information people 
from the premier's personal team swore they had never been given 
authorization for the leak and it was a serious blow to them. 

And how many leaks of important government documents have we never 
actually heard about! According to informed officials some months the 
White House was reminiscent of a sieve. Despite all the efforts of the 
premier's team, secret information about the decisions the cabinet was 
preparing regularly found its way to major businessmen, many of whom were 
in conflict with Primakov. And "annoying irregularities" very similar to 
set-ups continued to take place. Thus, on one occasion a secret document 
ended up in materials for open government distribution. A scandal was 
only avoided at the very last moment. 

Factory of Hicks 

What does being a minister mean to you? I am prepared to argue that the 
majority immediately imagine a luxurious office, a limousine with a 
chauffeur, and, finally, an obliging secretary. But these are all merely 
the outward attributes of power behind which emptiness is very often 
concealed. 

At the end of the Chernomyrdin era in the White House, for instance, 
there was one vice premier who could never manage to get through to the 
finance minister on the telephone. Zadornov's secretary, when she picked 
up even the telephone of the number one government telephone line, would 
always reply that the minister was not there. So the poor guy regularly 
had to run to the office occupied by Nemtsov, who as first deputy 
chairman of the government had a direct line to the Finance Ministry 
chief. On the other hand all the ordinary people were convinced that the 
charming vice premier, who would regularly grace the television screen, 
belonged to the narrow circle of the state's leaders. Well, there always 
have been, always are, and always will be hick ministers. The only 
problem is that recently the Kremlin seems to have been specially setting 
itself the aim of ensuring there are as many as possible of them. 

The White House only seems enormous from the outside. From within it is 
more reminiscent of a large village where everyone knows everything. A 
guard has shot himself in the toilet because of an unhappy love affair? A 
laptop computer has been removed from the office of the premier's aide? 
The premier has unexpectedly received an oligarch? Department chief A has 
fallen out of favor but official B on the other hand may "be on the up?" 

In just a few hours these and dozens of other pieces of news are known on 
all floors of the building. The building also has its own informal code 
of laws regulating the behavior of everyone from the lowest official with 
the rank of specialist or expert right up to the vice premier. It is not 
surprising that any newcomer from the outside world finds it very hard in 
the White House. 

Naturally, no one will be offensive to the outsider. On the other hand 
without 
him noticing the newcomer will be checked out. A group of officials who 
had arrived with Primakov were suddenly refused, without explanation of 
any kind, the increments to their wages that were due to them. Yevgeniy 
Maksimovich's associates were very surprised but did not immediately make 
a fuss. A little later justice was of course restored. But they had 
failed the "test of strength." Of course there are "geniuses" who pass 
all exams first time with flying colors. But as a rule initially all 
White House newcomers inevitable find themselves in the position of 
Buratino, who could be duped by any local Alisa the Fox [reference to 
Russian version of Pinocchio]. 

But it is not worth grieving over it. If a new denizen of the government 
residence is clever enough then as time passes he has every chance of 
ceasing to be a hick. If Kiriyenko had spent at least another 12-18 
months as premier then it would have been almost impossible to dupe him. 

The same is true of Primakov. If Yevgeniy Maksimovich had been given time 
he would certainly have been able to put the White House under his 
subordination. According to Moskovskiy Komsomolets's information, at the 
time of its dismissal Primakov's team had finally managed to understand 
what was happening in the building. For instance, the main sources of the 
leakage of documents had been identified. In the very near future the 
heads of by no means minor officials were due to roll. 

So that it is by no means a question of Kiriyenko and Primakov being, 
as is claimed, bad premiers. They simply did not have the time to become 
good ones. As soon as they began to understand something they were 
immediately shown the door. As a result for the second year now the White 
House has been reminiscent not of a government residence but of a school 
for premiers. 

In the Embraces of Chaos 

A we know, moving house twice is the equivalent of one fire. An 
unplanned change of government can be compared at the very least to an 
earthquake. And the outward ease with which Stepashin replaced Primakov 
as premier should not mislead anyone. 

Formally the continuity of power is indeed not disrupted for a single minute. 
The provisional premier is appointed by Yeltsin almost immediately. And 
the majority of government members from being full ministers are simply 
turned into acting ones. In addition, during the recent government crisis 
Stepashin did his utmost to ensure that the bureaucrats did not sit 
around twiddling their thumbs. Scarcely had he appeared in the White 
House before Sergey Vadimovich issued so many instructions that many 
apparatchiks had to forget about days off. But despite all this, in the 
periods of interregnums and for many weeks after the "chief boss" in the 
government house is nonetheless Chaos. 

According to nomenklatura concepts an acting chief is something like a 
bureaucratic invalid. Of course you can go to him with urgent operational 
issues. But it is better to wait if you have any problems of any 
importance. For instance, a temporary boss will make some decision and 
then be dismissed a few days later. It is logical to suppose that the new 
chief may have some totally different opinion on a given issue. And 
perhaps he will not want to alter all political strategy in this field at 
all. So officials prefer not to take the risk. 

If officials nonetheless do send the leadership an important paper it 
is by no means certain it will be looked at. For instance, many 
functionaries recall with horror the first weeks after Chernomyrdin's 
dismissal. Something incredible was happening in the secretariat of the 
new acting premier, Kiriyenko. Documents were lost in bundles. And piles 
of "luckier" papers could lie for weeks without being looked at. They say 
that even an urgent document on the payment of social benefits was signed 
only after a major fuss. 

Things were no less "jolly" in the White House during Chernomyrdin's second 
coming in August-September last year. In contrast to the spring of 1998, 
when Kiriyenko's associates simply lacked the experience to cope with the 
burden of their new duties, at that time experienced nomenklatura 
warriors were at the White House helm. But all the efforts of Viktor 
Stepanovich [Chernomyrdin] and company went on the struggle for their own 
confirmation in the Duma. There was simply no time left for the Russian 
economy. 

Of course all this in no way means that top officials threatened with 
dismissal do not make any decisions at all. According to ill-intentioned 
gossip, some of Primakov's former deputies were not languishing in 
idleness at all but with truly fantastic persistence were raking through 
the piles of paper they had accumulated. That "by strange coincidence" 
all these labor exploits were to do with the commercial interests of the 
dignitaries themselves or their friends is another matter. 

It is not a fact that if a government is allowed to work in peace for 
several years it will unfailingly cope with everything. But if the 
Kremlin continues as before to change prime ministers several times a 
year, that is a guarantee of failure. A man who rushes now left, now 
right, now north, now south, is in fact marking time. 

The constant personnel change-over in the White House could also lead to 
even more sinister consequences. Only wreckage is left from the once 
substantial prestige of Russia's cabinet of ministers. If you offer any 
strong governor the post of vice premier he will look at you as though 
you were offering him a dish of rat's meat. The real power potential of 
the White House and the central authorities in general have drastically 
declined accordingly. It is true that there is more than enough scope for 
further decline. But the downward slide cannot continue forever. One day 
the bottom will be reached.... 

Boris Yeltsin must understand that the government is not a toy. It would 
do Boris Nikolayevich no harm to recall the fate of some of his 
predecessors. Nikolay II, for instance, who first replaced four premiers 
in a year and then discovered that now he was the only person suitable 
for the role of sacrificial victim. 

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