May 19, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3291 •3292 • 3293

Johnson's Russia List
#3293
19 May 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
I will be in Petersham MASS with my father until Sunday
May 23--978-724-3253. Fishing not so good so far. 
1. Fred Weir on Duma approval of Stepashin.
2. AFP: Capricious tsar Yeltsin is the root of Russia's woes: critics.
3. Jens Jørgen Nielsen on anti-western sentiment.
4. Edwin G. Dolan: Anti-American Sentiment.
5. Reuters: Russian cabinet -- who's likely to be in and out.
6. AFP: Stepashin program attempts to appease right and left.
7. Reuters: Excerpts from Russian PM-designate's Duma speech.
8. Itar-Tass: Zyuganov: One Government Crisis Ends, another Begins.
9. RFE/RL: Julie Moffett, U.S. Expert Says Russia Experiencing Legitimacy 
Crisis. (James Billington and Arthur Hartman).
10. Los Angeles Times: Jim Mann, A Grim Diagnosis: Russia's a Sick and 
Dying Country.
11. Boston Globe: David Chandler, Nuclear materials in Russia seen as 
vulnerable to theft.
12. EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE REVIEW: Ed Spannaus, Policy fights over Russia 
at N.Y. seminar.]

*******

#1
From: "Fred Weir" <fweir@glas.apc.org>
Date: Wed, 19 May 1999 
For the Hindustan Times
From: Fred Weir in Moscow

MOSCOW (HT May 19) -- President Boris Yeltsin got his way completely
as Russia's lower house of parliament voted overwhelmingly Wednesday to
confirm his choice for a new Prime Minister.
By a huge margin of 297-55, Duma deputies endorsed former Interior
Minister Sergei Stepashin, a man who stresses loyalty to the Kremlin as his
main characteristic, to head Russia's fourth government in just over a year.
"I sincerely thank you for your support," Mr. Stepashin told deputies
after the vote. "I expected a lot of difficult and angry questions today,
but there were none".
The quick and easy confirmation of Mr. Stepashin came after a week of
high tension in Moscow, triggered when Mr. Yeltsin fired the well-respected
Yevgeny Primakov and his left-leaning Cabinet. At the weekend the Duma
failed in a long-planned bid to impeach the President for treason and other
grave crimes.
Analysts say the deputies were unwilling to court dissolution of
parliament, which would be in Mr. Yeltsin's Constitutional power if they
turned down his candidate three times.
With fresh parliamentary elections looming in December, the Communist
Party and other opposition forces may actually find it preferable to have a
Yeltsin loyalist in charge of Russia's economic disaster rather than Mr.
Primakov, who cooperated well with the Duma and included Communists in his
Government.
"The Communists are unwilling to aggravate the situation just now, it
serves no purpose for them," says Valery Fyodorov, an analyst with the
Centre for Political Trends in Moscow.
"Yeltsin wants a dull and colourless figure for Prime Minister, and
they're happy to let him have his way. The Communists are not ready to
really fight for power," he says.
"All these events of the past week prove that the Duma is no match for
Yeltsin. When the President is in good health and top form he dominates the
political stage".
Mr. Stepashin, who has worked all his career in the security services,
told parliament his main task will be to revive Russia's moribund economy.
"The previous government of Primakov did not allow the country to
plunge into the abyss, yet we have failed so far to drastically change the
situation either in economics or in the social sphere," he said.
"There is no room for half-measures and compromises any longer".
And he said that loyalty to the Kremlin will be his first priority.
"Regardless of any political situation, I shall never allow myself to
leave or betray the President," Mr. Stepashin said. 

********

#2
Capricious tsar Yeltsin is the root of Russia's woes: critics

MOSCOW, May 19 (AFP) - He may have dealt his foes two crushing defeats in 
less than a week, but increasingly Russia's political elite see President 
Boris Yeltsin as the country's main problem. For many, "It's the Kremlin 
stupid!"

After spiking weekend attempts by deputies to impeach him Yeltsin followed up 
Wednesday by imposing his candidate for premier on the State Duma, whose fear 
of early elections outweighed any opposition to a Kremlin loyalist.

Critics say the man who slayed the Soviet Union and vowed to transform Russia 
into a modern, prosperous democracy has systematically undermined the very 
institutions he said would lead the country to a brave new free world.

In eight years only one Yeltsin government has enjoyed majority support in 
the Duma, with cabinets hired and fired by presidential diktat without 
reference to a parliament more rubber stamp than genuine legislature, thus 
undermining its credibility.

Any challenges to his authority have been slapped down, and Yeltsin's 
decision to shell a rebellious parliament into submission in October 1993 
left deep scars in lawmakers' collective psyche.

Many senior judges owe their places in Russia's top courts to Yeltsin and 
rarely defy the Kremlin chief.

What has emerged is a tsar, elected but absolute, whose tendency to destroy 
all potential rivals has laid waste to what should have become a vibrant 
political landscape, analysts say.

The result is a paralysed political system dependent on the whim of a 
capricious president increasingly isolated from his countrymen and advised by 
a tight-knit cabal of aides dubbed by opponents as the "kitchen politburo."

"Like any tsar, Yeltsin is the product of his entourage," complained Agrarian 
Party chief Nikolai Kharitonov. "As long as he's in power, no government will 
be able to work" normally, added fellow leftist Nikolai Ryzhkov, the last 
Soviet premier.

"It's clear today that Yeltsin is dangerous, it's clear that he is 
unpredictable and it's clear that he is an unstable nuclear bomb," Vladimir 
Ryzhkov, leader of the once pro-Yeltsin Our Home Is Russia faction, warned at 
the weekend.

"A strong and capable government is only possible after the next presidential 
elections," due in June 2000, he said.

"I think that (Yeltsin) is the greatest problem because he's unpredictable, 
you can never know what political decision he will make in certain 
situations," said Yevgeny Volk of the Heritage Foundation. "He's very 
emotional, and very much a jealous person."

The dismissal of premier Yevgeny Primakov on the eve of impeachment hearings 
was a fit of pique, observers say. The move spiked efforts to push through 
the Duma a loans-for-laws deal key to securing vital International Monetary 
Fund support, and further delayed efforts to rescue Russia's failing economy 
despite widespread hardship.

Few expect sustained economic recovery until a new healthy, effective chief 
executive is installed in the Kremlin after elections next summer.

"There is growing concern about the behaviour of Mr. Yeltsin" among Russia's 
regional and national leaders, said Sergei Kolmakov, deputy head of the Fond 
Politika think-tank.

The Moscow rumour mill has it that Yeltsin sulked throughout last week's 
meeting with visiting President Jacques Chirac, having initially told aides 
he would not meet the French leader, and a no-show for talks with Spanish 
premier Jose Maria Aznar on Tuesday sparked a fresh presidential health scare.

A rambling diatribe against US President Bill Clinton, during which he 
reportedly said "No one - just let Clinton, a little bit, accidentally, send 
a missile. We'll answer immediately!" highlighted concerns about 68-year-old 
Yeltsin's increasingly fragile health.

"We are very close to the singularities of the situation in 1916, 1917 before 
the collapse of the monarchy, when the social base for the rule of the 
imperial family was shrinking with every passing day," said Kolmakov.

Now, as then, the result was a power vacuum filled by "eminences grises," who 
"influence the decision-making process in the name of the president," 
Kolmakov said.

Yeltsin is currently being advised by a narrow clique of advisors -- 
including his daughter Tatyana Dyachenko and arch Kremlin schemer Boris 
Berezovsky -- whose "interests are totally in contradiction with the 
interests of the country," added Kolmakov.

He said the Kremlin's inner clan is bent on smashing its enemies one by one, 
explaining persistent rumours of an impending dissolution of the Duma, a 
hotbed of anti-Yeltsin dissent.

Some doom laden scenarios see Yeltsin engineering a fresh political crisis as 
a pretext for banning the Communist Party and the imposition of martial law.

That would push "Russia and the whole elite to a huge mess and very close to 
the limits of constitutionality," warned Kolmakov. 

********

#3
From: Jens Jørgen Nielsen <Jens/Nielsen@fc.pol.dk>
Date: Wed, 19 May 1999 
Subject: Fwd: anti-west

Does an anti-american or anti-western sentiment prevail in Russia. Tate
Ulsaker dismisses allegations about such sentiments in Russia and hints
that it is only those reporting from hotel rooms and do not know about the
real situation in Russia who have such points of view. 

I am a Dane permanently living in Moscow as correspondent for the Danish
daily POLITIKEN and married to a Russian. I have not recently come across
physical harrasment or physical threaths. So Tate Ulsaker is absolutely
right, that we expats are not in immidiate psysical danger in Moscow or
elsewhere in Russia. So it is right to correct such exaggerated statements
about this. 

But! - the abrupt and deep change of attitude towards the west, especielly
USA could not possibly have passed unnoticed for Tate Ulsaker. My Russian
with scandinavian accent makes many Russian believe I am a yugoslav. The
initial delight often gives way to grave disappointment, when they find out
that I am a Dane. "Denmark is a member of NATO, isn´t it?" is the
ubiquitous question. And the benevolent attitude immidiately changes. The
majority of Russians have changed attitude to the west. And it is a deep
and profound phenomenon. I have travelled regularly in Russia for almost 20
years. I have never experienced such strong anti-western sentiment as
today. And it includes all layers of the Russian society, reform minded
liberals and diehard communists etc. 

With the growing disintegration of Russia, which seems likely after the
latest erratic behaviour of the long time western backed president, you
simply have to take the change in socio psychological state of the
population into account. The backdrop is an economic and social collapse,
which is much tougher than the one in Germany in the early 1930´ies. 

*******

#4
Date: Wed, 19 May 1999
From: "Edwin G. Dolan" <dolan@co.ru>
Subject: Anti-American Sentiment

The following information might be of intreest in connection with Tate
Ulsaker's querry about Anti-American sentiment (JRL 3292). 

In April, Russian MBA students at the American Institute of Business and
Economics in Moscow participated in an international survey of business
student attitudes toward a wide range of issues. One question gave a long
list of countries and asked students to respond as to their general opinion
of the country on a 7-point scale from "very favorable" to "very
unfavorable." Approximately 25 percent of students had an unfavorable
opinion of the United States, and a great many gave the extreme response of
"very unfavorable."

A follow-up question asked whether Russia was "superior" to the United
States in a number of dimensions. A majority of students responded that
Russia was "morally" superior to the United States, although nearly everyone
listed the United States as superior in terms of economics.

These results are interesting in part because the students are all
self-selected in having chosen to pursue their business education at an
American-managed MBA program where courses are taught in English by American
professors, and where a majority of students seek jobs with American-based
multinational firms after graduation. Even among this atypical group, there
is a substantial minority of individuals who admire America only for its
material achievements while holding a low opinion of the country in other
respects.

Edwin G. Dolan, President
American Institute of Business and Economics, Moscow
dolan@co.ru
www.aibec.org

*******

#5
Russian cabinet -- who's likely to be in and out

MOSCOW, May 19 (Reuters) - Russia's new Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, 
confirmed on Wednesday, will form the fourth government in 14 months but is 
likely to keep familiar faces by his side in the new lineup, which he 
promised in about a week. 

Stepashin has 10 days to name his ministers, but media and analysts already 
have an idea of the lineup, as follows: 

PRIME MINISTER - SERGEI STEPASHIN, 47, approved on Wednesday by the State 
Duma lower house of parliament and appointed by President Boris Yeltsin, 
Stepashin has promised stronger action on reform but policies similar to the 
previous government. 

Stepashin served in earlier Yeltsin governments as interior minister, justice 
minister and head of the FSB domestic security service, where he took a 
hawkish line on breakaway Chechnya. 

FIRST DEPUTY PM FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY - NIKOLAI AKSYONENKO, 50, promoted from 
railways minister minutes before former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was 
sacked last week. Worked entire career in railways ministry and is not well 
known. 

FIRST DEPUTY PM IN CHARGE OF ECONOMY - ALEXANDER ZHUKOV, 42, centrist Duma 
member who heads Budget Committee and attended Harvard Business School, is 
respected at home and abroad and widely tipped for the job. 

DEPUTY PM FOR INDUSTRY AND COMMUNICATIONS - VLADIMIR BULGAK, 58, expected to 
keep post. Deputy prime minister in previous governments and communications 
minister from 1991 until the ministry was disbanded in 1997. Tried to stop 
foreign investors gaining too large a share in the telecommunications 
industry. 

DEPUTY PM FOR SOCIAL ISSUES - VALENTINA MATVIYENKO, 50, is expected to keep 
post. Former ambassador to Greece. 

FOREIGN MINISTER - IGOR IVANOV, 52, a career diplomat expected to keep post. 
Has successfully worked to raise Russia's profile in negotiations with the 
West on seeking a solution to the war in Yugoslavia, which Russia opposes. 

DEFENCE MINISTER - IGOR SERGEYEV, 61, expected to retain job held since May 
1997. Former head of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, Sergeyev has 
difficult task of overseeing reforms in the demoralised, cash-strapped armed 
forces. 

INTERIOR MINISTER - VLADIMIR RUSHAILO, 45, head of the ministry's division to 
fight organised crime, and NIKOLAI KOVALYOV, about 50, former head the FSB, 
are front runners to replace Stepashin in his previous post. 

FINANCE MINISTER - MIKHAIL ZADORNOV, 36, expected to hold post has held in 
three previous governments of Primakov, Sergei Kiriyenko and Viktor 
Chernomyrdin. Is widely regarded as a reform-minded professional but accused 
by some foes of aggravating August 1998 financial crisis. 

TAX MINISTER - GEORGY BOOS, 36, has said hopes to keep post, though no 
official indication. Has clashed prominently with Zadornov on best way to 
improve budget revenues. Has favoured cutting taxes, though softened position 
in face of criticism from International Monetary Fund. 

ECONOMY MINISTER - ANDREI SHAPOVALYANTS, 47, expected to keep post. Worked 
for Communist-era Gosplan and then in economy ministry under all post-Soviet 
Russian governments. 

The following members of the former cabinet are expected to lose their posts: 

FIRST DEPUTY PM IN CHARGE OF ECONOMY - YURI MASLYUKOV, 61, a moderate 
Communist and a former Soviet-era Gosplan central planning chief who led 
talks with IMF, which lasted much longer than hoped. Was criticised by 
liberals. 

DEPUTY PM FOR AGRICULTURE - GENNADY KULIK, 64, former interior minister and 
Soviet-era Russian agriculture minister, Kulik is seen as old school and not 
expected to be asked to join new cabinet. 

FUEL AND ENERGY MINISTER - SERGEI GENERALOV, 35, former banker and senior 
finance executive at YUKOS oil company, Generalov is a technocrat drafted to 
head the ministry by Kiriyenko. Some in the Duma see him on the way out. 

********

#6
Stepashin program attempts to appease right and left

MOSCOW, May 19 (AFP) - Russia's new premier Sergei Stepashin has vowed to 
push ahead with Russia's IMF commitments and market reforms, but he tipped 
his hat to the Communists on Wednesday with promises to help the poor and 
reform the real sector of the economy.

Stepashin, nominated by the Kremlin a week ago, spoke about his proposed 
program with deputies in the opposition-led State Duma lower house of 
parliament Wednesday just before deputies overwhelmingly voted to confirm him 
in office.

Stepashin is playing a delicate balancing act pledging to speed up reforms 
while preserving the work of his predecessor Yevgeny Primakov, whose cabinet 
was backed by the Duma's Communists and leftists.

Herewith is a breakdown of Stepashin's proposed program:

Economic policy:

Stepashin will continue Russia's fight for market reforms but said he will 
add a dose of state control.

"We are not only going to develop the market, but to protect its principles 
we will apply tough measures to regulate the state," he told Duma deputies 
before his confirmation vote.

As his first priority, Stepashin will push the Duma to pass a raft of tough 
economic laws that Moscow must implement if it is to secure vital financial 
aid from the International Monetary Fund and avoid a generalised default on 
its massive foreign debt.

"Without their swift adoption, it is impossible to reduce the weight of the 
debt," he told the deputies, whom he had threatened Tuesday with a confidence 
vote if they failed to back the package.

Stepashin, who vowed to stand by Russia's IMF commitments, promised to 
improve ties with international financial organisations and "return the 
confidence of Russian and foreign investors" still smarting from August's 
financial meltdown.

To pursue negotiations with international agencies, the premier said he would 
create an inter-ministerial committee -- that he will head -- before the end 
of the week.

Stepashin also committed the government to resurrecting Russia's dismal 
banking system, which "will need the clear willpower of the administration, 
and we will demonstrate this," he said.

Social issues:

To mollify the Communists and leftists, Stepashin promised to help those most 
harmed by Russia's ailing economy.

"Most of the population in our country lives under the threshold of poverty. 
On the eve of elections, this cannot but cause us concern," he told the Duma.

"To raise the standard of living, it will be necessary to increase the 
salaries of government employees and pensioners, and we'll do this shortly," 
he added.

Industry:

In a speech Monday to the Federation Council upper house of parliament, 
Stepashin promised "important strategic decisions" to restructure the real 
sector of the economy within three months.

The premier-designate suggested creating a committee charged with the 
problems of the military-industrial complex.

Corruption:

Stepashin took a tough line on corruption, vowing a war on tax cheats and 
threatening severe penalities for those robbing the state of badly-needed 
revenues.

"The shadow economy paralyses all the spheres of life," he said.

He also vowed to stop businesses from spiriting billions of dollars abroad 
illegally, but said Russia currently lacks the legal basis to take such 
companies to task.

Agriculture:

Stepashin promised to appoint a deputy prime minister who has the support of 
the Agrarian Party to oversee the agricultural sector. 

********

#7
Excerpts from Russian PM-designate's Duma speech

MOSCOW, May 19 (Reuters) - Here are key excerpts from a speech by Russian 
Prime Minister-designate Sergei Stepashin ahead of his confirmation vote in 
the State Duma lower house of parliament on Wednesday: 

Today, at this podium, I feel and understand the great responsibility that 
will lie on my shoulders if you consider me worthy of heading the Russian 
government. + We are living through a long and hard crisis. 

You know the great extent to which we have taken on international 
obligations, how hard it is to revitalise the banking system after the August 
crisis, to repay salaries. 

Now social tension is on the brink. 

Under the present circumstances, debates on the programme of action cannot 
and must not lie in the ideological sphere. 

The previous government did not allow the country to fall into the abyss but 
we did not truly overcome the situation in the economy or in the social 
sphere. 

We need to keep its (the previous policy's) bones but now we need a new, more 
decisive, energetic approach. There is no room for half-measures and 
compromises. 

We will not only develop the market and protect private property and private 
initiative. In order to defend these principles, we will be using the most 
decisive measures of state control and tough financial regulation. 

Poverty and economic decline create favourable conditions for criminal 
structures to penetrate the authorities. This can be mortal for Russia. 

When they ask me whether the government should be a coalition, I answer we 
must not have a coalition of politicians but a coalition of professionals. 

A government beholden to someone is no good. Any pressure from any group of 
influence, and especially from mafia-like structures, is unacceptable. 

There are two main ideas I want to formulate: stability in the economy means 
stability in society. Secondly, the state exists for the people and not the 
people for the state. 

I am not planning to start any emergency drive. Some people are trying to 
cast my appointment in that light -- look, here comes a general, a strong 
hand, Russia is on the threshold of dictatorship. Some even compare me with 
Pinochet. 

No, I am not General Pinochet. My name is Stepashin. 

I am convinced that the use of force and non-economic decisions are not 
acceptable. 

Russia will not be a raw materials annex for developed countries, but we must 
return the confidence of local and foreign investors, provide conditions to 
fill state coffers, introduce strict control of expenditure, channel material 
and financial resources into the economy. 

Without the joint effort of the executive and legislative authorities, 
without business-like cooperation of central authority and the regions, 
nothing can be achieved. 

I myself back reforms but reforms should not be for the sake of reforms but 
for the sake of people. 

Priority will be given to science-related industry, which makes up the basis 
of the military-industrial complex. What is happening in Yugoslavia is a blow 
not only against Yugoslavia, but against Russia as well and we must draw our 
own conclusions. 

Food imports from abroad are strangling, if they have not already strangled, 
our agriculture which for centuries was the pride of our country. They drive 
us into slavery-like economic dependence and undermine state security. + The 
shadow economy is probably more efficient and dynamic than the legal economy 
-- it has millions of people involved in it. Crime and corruption are on the 
rise, they devour the state from the inside. This is the main problem which 
paralyses all spheres of life in Russia. 

We need stable economic conditions providing the rights of investors and the 
country needs your legislative support. Every day of delay means hundreds of 
thousands of dollars are flowing abroad and working in Western economies, not 
the Russian. 

We need tough administrative will and we will have it. 

Russia's well-being can be achieved only by the utmost concentration of all 
the nation's forces. The people of Russia expect concrete and positive 
results form the government. I am sure that, with the parliament's backing, 
the government is capable of meeting these hopes. 

********

#8
Zyuganov: One Government Crisis Ends, another Begins.

MOSCOW, May 19 (Itar-Tass) - Russian Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov 
believes one government crisis ends and another begins with the State Duma's 
endorsement of the candidacy of Sergei Stepashin. 

Zyuganov said the Communist faction had made a decision on a free vote on the 
candidacy. 

Explaining his personal decision not to take part in the vote, he said he had 
seen no sense in it, because the new premier had no clear programme, team and 
political will. 

An important issue is succession of the government policy, the communist 
leader said, noting in this connection that Stepashin should "resist the 
pressure" to independently form his team. 

An agreement has been reached that the cabinet will pick out the most 
important bills out of the package of primary economic ones worked out by the 
government, and the Duma will consider them first of all, Zyuganov said. 

He assured the communists would support the laws which would insure 
assistance to producers and improve the standard of living, and otherwise, 
they would vote them down. 

The main goals of the Russian Communist Party at the current stage are 
preparation for the forthcoming elections and forming of a "shadow" cabinet, 
the communist leader told a press conference on Wednesday. 

It is necessary now to make preparations for honest, democratic elections. 
For the purpose, it is necessary to adopt as soon as possible the worked-out 
law on elections, mobilise all the Communist party structures for the 
elections, prepare clear pre-election slogans and form a team and shadow 
government, he said. 

Zyuganov reiterated the communists were ready for early elections "at any 
moment." 

********

#9
Washington Journal: U.S. Expert Says Russia Experiencing Legitimacy Crisis
By Julie Moffett

Washington, 19 May 1999 (RFE/RL) -- A leading U.S. historian and scholar
says Russia is experiencing a fundamental crisis of legitimacy which, after
the upcoming elections, will likely be resolved in one of two ways --
autocracy or democracy.

James Billington, the Librarian of Congress and a leading expert on Russian
culture and history, spoke Tuesday in Washington at a forum sponsored by
the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) called "U.S.-Russia Relations: At the
Crossroads." USIP is an independent, organization devoted to promoting
research and education on the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Billington says Russia is currently experiencing one of its times of
trouble in which a long, authoritarian period has come to an end, but no
new authority yet commands sufficient respect to permit them to govern
effectively. Those times of trouble in Russia usually last little more than
10 years, he adds. But with the decline of the standard of living in Russia
and a "general meltdown" of central economic institutions adding to the
political confusion, Billington says the long period of transition appears
to be reaching a period of resolution.

Billington says that the path Russia intends to take will likely be clear
by this time next year as a result of the forthcoming Russian elections. 

"Either they will in effect, revert to the historic Russian pattern of
producing an autocracy at the end of times of trouble that is more absolute
and centralized than the one that preceded the troubles. Or they may be
able to solidify and legitimize, in some way, the formal structures of a
democratic rule of law which is a substantial devaluation of powers to
federated local governments, which is the formal path they have been
following in a uncertain and rather vacillated way up to this time."

Billington says the current conflict in Yugoslavia has dramatically
increased the probability, at least in the short term, that Russia will
move away from democracy and toward a more authoritative, nationalist form
of government. "The realistic autocratic outcome would, of course, not be a
return to communism, but a change of armbands with old communists joining
new fascists to produce something like a Russian Milosevic. Fascism in its
various and many forms always has arisen on the ruins of a failed
democratic experiment, and it can come into power quite legally, as it did
in the case of Hitler at the time of the failed Weimar Republic." 

Billington says that the geopolitical destabilizing effects of even a "mild
approximation of a (Yugoslav President Slobodan) Milosevic regime in
Russia" could hardly be exaggerated. Russia's economy already has a
capacity to function autocratically, he says, and also has a vast supply of
weapons of mass destruction for a principal export product.

Billington also says that with Russia's proximity to regions of great
ethnic instability and historic predisposition toward violence -- such as
the Balkans and the Caucasus; the rise of Islamic fundamentalism on
Russia's southern border; growing Chinese energy needs which make Siberia
look more and more attractive, are working toward creating a volatile
situation in that region.

"All of this makes increasingly probable either violence and conflict of
some kind on the territory of the former Soviet Union or a drift into an
authoritarian alliance in Eurasia, either which would be profoundly
disturbing to prospects for any kind of future world order."

But Arthur Hartman, a former U.S. Ambassador to Russia and a businessman
with current ties in Russia, says he has a far less pessimistic view of
what is happening or could happen inside Russia. Hartman, who spoke at the
forum, acknowledged that in recent years, the U.S. has done a number of
things that have exacerbated American-Russian relations, including NATO
expansion and the current conflict in Kosovo. But he says he questions
whether any American politician could have taken things in a different
direction.

Hartman says it would have been extremely difficult for any politician to
say that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland could not join NATO given
the especially active and vocal emigrant population in the U.S., coupled
with a Secretary of State who happens to be from the former Czechoslovakia
-- Madeleine Albright.

In regards to the current conflict in Kosovo, Hartman says the majority of
Russians are not getting a clear picture of what is actually happening
there. He says Russians are receiving slanted coverage of events in Kosovo,
and very little "real information" about ethnic cleansing and mass murders.

Hartman says he is confident of Russia's future as a democratic society
primarily because, as a businessman, diplomat and economist, he sees Russia
making "real progress" on the road to democracy. He also says an autocracy
in Russia would be too hard to maintain for long given its highly educated
population and new age communication tools, such as the Internet, which
rapidly spread information and news.

"The reality of Russia is that there are generations coming along now. I
used to say it would take two generations for any kind of normality, and I
don't mean Western normality, just some form of pluralistic self-expression
would come to Russia. I now think it will be three generations, mainly
because they didn't follow through on some things they started to do.
Things are rough in Russia, people have three and four jobs, corruption is
ripe but out in the provinces and in Moscow things are beginning to work.
People are learning how to run businesses, they are learning how to take
advantage of the system." 

*******,

#10
Los Angeles Times
May 19, 1999 
[for personal use only]
INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK 
A Grim Diagnosis: Russia's a Sick and Dying Country 
By JIM MANN (Jim.Mann@latimes.com)

WASHINGTON--Watch as stiff, puffy, slow-moving, weak-voiced Russian 
President Boris N. Yeltsin fires another of his prime ministers these days, 
and you are seeing much more than a very sick man. 
You're seeing the personification of a desperately unhealthy nation. 
Rarely do the sciences of health statistics and demography play a role 
in international affairs. With Russia, they do. The Russian population of 147 
million has become so remarkably unhealthy that its decrepitude could affect 
the country's role in the world for decades to come. 
Things were bad enough in the last decades under the Soviet Union. For 
years, an American researcher, Georgetown University professor Murray 
Feshbach, chronicled the progressive decay of the Soviet health system. 
But since the breakup of the old Soviet empire in 1991, the statistics 
show, Russia's death rates have increased as new stresses have compounded the 
earlier health problems. 
In a provocative essay in the coming issue of Policy Review, Harvard 
University demographer Nicholas Eberstadt writes that Russia's crisis in 
public health "is historically unprecedented: No industrialized country has 
ever before suffered such a severe and prolonged deterioration during 
peacetime." 
Eberstadt points out that this phenomenon has important political, 
economic and even military implications. Russian health problems, he says, 
could contribute to its relative economic decline for another generation. And 
poor health, he says, could well become a "significant constraint upon 
Moscow's prospects for reattaining Great Power status." 
How bad is it in Russia today? 
Every year, 700,000 more Russians die than are born. The population is 
in steady decline for the first time since World War II. 
Russia's death rate was 40% higher in 1994 than the annual average 
during the three years from 1989 to 1991 (the last three years of the Soviet 
Union). Death rates have stabilized since then, but at high levels: In the 
first half of 1998, they were still 30% higher than at the time of the Soviet 
breakup. 
Russians are dying at younger ages than in most comparable countries. 
The result, Eberstadt says, is that "Russia's health profile no longer 
remotely resembles that of a developed country. In fact, it is worse in a 
variety of respects than those of many 'Third World' countries." 
Russia's life expectancy--68 as of 1997--fell short not only of 
America's 78 but also of Mexico's 73, according to Eberstadt. And for Russian 
men, life expectancy is now only 61. Experts debate what's causing Russians 
to die at such alarming rates. 
Feshbach points to the country's environmental problems. In a recent 
issue of the Atlantic Monthly, he pointed out that bad water gives Russians 
high rates of dysentery, hepatitis and cholera, while bad air, lead emissions 
and radioactive and chemical contamination account for a variety of other 
ailments. 
Eberstadt suggests that the root causes lie elsewhere. The 
cause-of-death statistics, he notes, show that Russia has experienced 
striking increases in two categories: first, cardiovascular diseases, such as 
heart attacks and strokes; and second, deadly injuries, including accidents, 
suicides and homicides. 
"If cause-of-death statistics are to be believed, the world has never 
before seen anything like the epidemic of heart disease that rages in Russia 
today," he writes. 
Bad diet, lack of exercise and heavy smoking all contribute to this 
epidemic. But above all, Eberstadt says, is alcohol abuse. Not only does it 
contribute to high rates of heart disease, but it is also a key factor 
underlying the car crashes, industrial accidents, murders and suicides that 
make deadly injuries so prevalent in Russia. 
Russia's alcohol consumption is difficult for Americans to imagine. "In 
1996, over 35,000 Russians died from accidental alcohol poisoning," writes 
Eberstadt. "America is hardly a country of teetotalers, yet in the United 
States, a country with almost twice Russia's population, the corresponding 
figure averages about 300 persons a year." 
A few other countries have experienced spikes in mortality rates 
comparable to Russia's today. But they were all in the midst of war or civil 
war: Germany and Japan at the end of World War II, Spain in the late 1930s 
and South Korea in the early 1950s. In these countries, war itself was 
followed by outbreaks of communicable diseases, such as pneumonia and 
influenza, but recovery was only a few years away. 
By contrast, Eberstadt says, Russia will probably not be able to turn 
things around. Based on current trends, he says, Russia's overall life 
expectancy 20 years from now will be lower than the regional averages for 
either Asia or Latin America. 
During the next two decades, Russia's economy, now the world's 13th 
largest, will slip as low as No. 20. And its military will find it ever 
harder to modernize or to project power across its borders. 
In Moscow, politicians come and go. But the statistics tell a more 
enduring story. Russia's modern-day time of troubles won't go away any time 
soon. 

*******

#11
Boston Globe
19 May 1999
[for personal use only]
Nuclear materials in Russia seen as vulnerable to theft 
By David L. Chandler

Nuclear materials that could be used to build bombs are spread throughout 
locations in Russia, and the security systems in place to guard them are more 
vulnerable than had been previously estimated, according to a new report 
issued yesterday by the National Research Council.

In fact, the report said, despite efforts in recent years to address these 
problems, there is not even a reliable inventory of the weapons-grade uranium 
and plutonium in Russia, making it impossible to know whether any has been 
stolen or moved out of the country. The independent group recommends a 
minimum expenditure of $725 million over five years to continue a joint 
US-Russian program to analyze and address the problem.

''Although joint efforts by Russia and the United States have strengthened 
security at many sites,'' said Richard Meserve, head of the committee that 
prepared the report, ''we believe that terrorist groups or rogue nations have 
more opportunity to gain access to Russian plutonium and highly enriched 
uranium than previously estimated.''

Some progress has been made, the committee said. For example, protection 
systems in several buildings where the materials are stored have been greatly 
improved, and hundreds of kilograms of the material that had been widely 
distributed has been consolidated into fewer sites, making security more 
manageable.

But, the group added, Russia's recent financial woes have produced such 
hardship for many officials, nuclear specialists and workers who have access 
to the sites that there is now an ''added incentive for materials to be 
stolen or sold illegally.''

At some facilities, the report said, guards have not been paid for months and 
have not been given adequate food or clothing for outside patrols.

Overall, the report estimated, about 1,350 metric tons of plutonium and 
highly enriched uranium are located in many different kinds of facilities 
throughout Russia. About half is already in the form of nuclear weapons, and 
the remainder is in a variety of different forms, including scrap material. 
One suitcase full of either material would be sufficient to make a nuclear 
bomb.

The committee analyzed only the non-weapons material. Among their 
recommendations: Consolidate the material into fewer buildings to improve 
security; support Russian organizations to build up that nation's ability to 
better manage its stockpiles; complete a thorough accounting of the material 
now in Russia to allow it to be tracked; and devise ways of protecting large 
quantities of spent nuclear fuel left over from naval uses and experimental 
reactors.

The National Research Council is a private, nonprofit institution chartered 
by the US Congress to provide independent advice on matters of science and 
technology.

The panel said the government has requested $145 million for fiscal 2000 to 
continue a joint program to improve the security for these materials, and 
strongly recommended that funding be maintained at that level for at least 
the next five years, and at ''adequate'' levels thereafter.

With greater access to Russian nuclear facilities, the report said, ''the US 
government has identified more extensive dispersion of material and more 
pervasive inadequacies of protection systems than had been anticipated.''

Overall, it concluded, ''the gravity of the threat has increased.''

*******

#12
From: "Ed Spannaus" <Spannaus_E@mediasoft.net>
Subject: Article on Harriman Institute Conference
Date: Tue, 18 May 1999

David:
I first learned about the May 7 Harriman Institute conference on JRL. I
didn't see any coverage of it anyplace else, so here is the article I wrote
on it, just published in EIR, which you can use as you see fit. 
Regards,
Ed Spannaus 

EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, MAY 21, 1999
Policy fights over Russia at N.Y. seminar
by Edward Spannaus <Spannaus_E@mediasoft.net>

The May 12 firing of Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni
Primakov by President Boris Yeltsin had been widely
predicted, and the fight between the Primakov government
and the Russian ``reformers'' (who are now expected to, at
least temporarily, come back into policymaking positions)
was a prominent theme at a May 7 conference at Columbia
University's Harriman Institute on the topic ``How Can
Russia Recover?''
The conference illustrated the appalling nature of
much of what passes for ``expert opinion'' concerning Russia
today, and the willful ignorance regarding what leading
Russian economists--those who are not part of the radical
monetarist, ``reform'' clique--are actually thinking and
doing.
The opening panel, on the nature of the crisis and
the prospects for recovery, was chaired by former U.S.
Ambassador to Russia Jack Matlock. There was some
reasonable empirical description of the economic collapse
in Russia, and criticisms of the shock therapy and of
privatization programs, but no one demonstrated any real
appreciation of either the true causes of the crisis, or
of what the Primakov government was attempting to
accomplish. The panelists for the most part portrayed the
opponents of the ``reformers'' as pro-Communist backsliders
who yearn to go back to a Soviet-style economy.
And a number of the panelists uncritically repeated
the totally-unsubstantiated story, put into circulation by
reporter Seymour Hersh in the {New Yorker} magazine, that
Primakov had taken a large bribe from Saddam Hussein in
1997. This was intended to ``prove'' that Primakov is just
as corrupt as the rest of Russia's leaders.
One of the panelists, Prof. Marshall Goldman of
Harvard University, proclaimed that the Russians have now
begun ``to move backwards,'' away from the reforms. Goldman
said that when Russians talk about the ``real economy,''
they mean tanks, aircraft, and military production.
During the question period, this reporter directed a
question to Goldman, telling him: ``I think it's very
important to understand what Primakov, Maslyukov, and so
forth, actually mean when they talk about `real economy.'
Because they are discussing something that, in my
organization is termed `physical economy,' but they're
actually looking at the industrial process, agriculture,
the physical process of the economy, as opposed to the
financial and monetary processes.''
This reporter noted that the United States ``was built
in a totally different way'' from the emphasis on financial
and monetary processes in post-1991 Russia, pointing to
Alexander Hamilton's 1791 Report on Manufactures, which
was an inventory of what manufacturing capability existed
and what could be developed. ``We fought a revolution
against the idea, that the British were trying to impose
on us in the colonial period, that all we could do was
export raw materials, have them manufactured abroad, and
then sold back to us. But that's precisely the way many
Russians see what has happened to them over the past eight
years, is that they have become an exporter of raw
materials, they'll be manufactured abroad, and then sold
back to them; and they correctly view that as a colonial
policy.''
This reporter concluded: ``So, instead of viewing what
Primakov and Maslyukov and others are talking about as
step backwards toward communism ... why not look at it in
terms of our own history, what the American System was, of
industrial development, infrastructure, internal
improvements, and use that as a model, as opposed to the
British system? Why do we have to tell the Russians that
they cannot do, what we did ourselves, to build up this
country in the 19th century?''
Goldman's first response was to declare, ``I wouldn't
make a distinction between the British system and our
economy; the British see their development exactly the
same as ours.'' He then repeated his point: ``When I talk to
Russians about the real economy, it gives me the shivers.
Because they don't see it as you see it. They see it as
just a macho thing: it's got to be big, it's got to be
strong.''
Goldman said that ``whatever we did, whatever the
British did, whatever the Germans did, whatever the French
did, was then. This is now. We've got a very different
kind of economy; we've got an economy based on services,
we've got an economy based on software.''
``What you're talking about is the Rust Belt,'' Goldman
continued. ``If you want to develop a Rust Belt--be my
guest. But I would prefer to focus on other service kind
of things.'' Goldman again referred to ``this big macho
stuff,'' even saying that this was a problem for Russia in
the 19th century--``their factories were the largest, and
not necessarily the most competitive.'' That mentality is
the problem, Goldman concluded, ``and I would like to think
that when Primakov and Maslyukov talk about the `real
economy,' they see it in the sophisticated way you do. I'm
afraid they don't.''

- A truer picture of Russia -
The two speakers who did the most to break through
the falsified picture of Russia, were Janine Wedel of George
Washington University, and Prof. Stephen Cohen of New York
University.
Speaking on a panel on ``Western Aid to Russia: What
Went Wrong?'' Wedel described how U.S. aid to Russia,
funnelled through Harvard University, had contributed to
the decline of Russia and had contributed to a backlash
against reforms and against the United States. Wedel
described how a small group on both sides--the Harvard
Institute for International Development on the U.S. side,
and what she calls ``the Chubais Clan'' on the Russian
side--had taken control of aid programs and even
policymaking for their respective governments.
Wedel noted that U.S. policymakers and journalists
have a very different view of the Chubais Clan than is
held within Russia. She said that U.S. Deputy Treasury
Secretary Lawrence Summers had called the Chubais group
the ``dream team.'' But, in fact, she pointed out, the
policies they promoted resulted in asset stripping and
capital flight.
The Chubais Clan was a shadow government, even
negotiating with the International Monetary Fund on behalf
of the Russian government, Wedel said. Yeltsin and the
Chubais Clan carried out ``rule by decree,'' and
circumvented the Russian State Duma; they were
anti-democratic, yet were supported by the United States.
The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, especially its bond
markets committee, was another vehicle by which this group
exerted its influence.
This was not accidental, Wedel stated. She pointed to
a statement by a U.S. Agency for International Development
official, to the effect that ``we can't change the whole
country, but we can provide targetted aid to help
Chubais.'' As a result, Wedel concluded, ``many Russians
believe that the United States set out deliberately to
wreck their economy.''
Another perspective on the distorted picture most
Americans get of what is going on in Russia was presented
by Professor Cohen, who called the way the American news
media have reported on Russia since 1992 ``a kind of
journalistic malpractice.''
The assumptions of most press coverage, Cohen said,
was that Russia was moving toward something like the
American political system, and that the Yeltsin regime's
policies of going along with shock therapy,
neo-liberalism, and monetarism amounted to true reform.
Reform means making the lives of the majority of the
people better, Cohen said, but in Russia, every year of
``reform'' has meant collapse and immiseration. But we have
treated this pain and suffering as secondary, and as the
inevitable fate of all people in Russia. Cohen noted
sarcastically that proponents of the ``reforms'' say that
``we are doing this for the young people''--but, he asked,
``what about the young soldier ... the young coal miner,''
who haven't been paid in six months?
Although American journalists normally have an
aversion to ``radicals,'' they fell in love with the
``radical reformers'' in Russia, Cohen noted. And, he
pointed to another quirk in the reporting, of referring to
opponents of the reforms as ``hard-liners.'' ``If hard-liner
means anything,'' Cohen said, ``it should apply to those
promoting shock therapy.''

******