Center for Defense Information
Research Topics
Television
CDI Library
Press
What's New
Search
CDI Library > Johnson's Russia List

Johnson's Russia List
 

 

May 14, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3286 3287    



Johnson's Russia List
#3287
14 May 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Fred Weir on latest developments.
2. Bloomberg: Yeltsin Has Legal Right to Dismiss Duma, Minister Says.
3. Reuters: Russian military won't stray into politics.
4. Izvestia: Government Members Wanted.
5. Moscow Times: Jonas Bernstein, PARTY LINES: Elite Breathes Easier With 
Primakov Out.

6. The Nation editorial: Showdown in Moscow.
7. AFP: Influential Regional Chiefs Warn Against Yeltsin Impeachment.
8. Reuters: Duma speaker predicts narrow Yeltsin impeachment.
9. Sovetskaya Rossiya: The Primakov Government Was Honestly Trying 
To Save the Country, But Yeltsin Needs Upheavals.

10. Itar-Tass: Primakov: Government Did 'Nothing To Make it Blush' 
11. Los Angeles Times: Nina Khrushcheva, In Moscow, It's All Boris, All 
the Time.

12. Reuters: Ghost Of 1993 Haunts Russian Politicians.
13. Reuters: Russia's Stepashin sees no major govt shakeup.
14. USA Today: Fred Coleman, Russia may get tough economic medicine.
15. New York Times editorial: Dangerous Sideshow in the Kremlin.] 

********

#1
From: "Fred Weir" <fweir@glas.apc.org>
Date: Fri, 14 May 1999 
For the Foreign Editor, Hindustan Times
From: Fred Weir in Moscow

MOSCOW (HT May 14) -- Whatever the outcome, Saturday's vote in the
State Duma on impeaching President Boris Yeltsin will highlight the
continuing deep and bitter divisions within Russian society after a decade
of failed economic reforms, civil conflict and political drift.
"The effort to impeach Yeltsin is fraught with new dangers, but it is
in many ways just the latest chapter in a struggle that's been going on for
almost 10 years," says Viktor Levashov, a sociologist with the Institute of
Social and Political Studies in Moscow.
"The failure of Russia's transition from communism, and Yeltsin's
responsibility for that, is at the root of all our political turmoil. Today
we live in a society of total discontent".
The Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament, is debating five charges
of treason against Mr. Yeltsin and will put each of them to a separate vote
on Saturday.
Although the Kremlin has accused parliamentarians of hysteria and
demogoguery, recent opinion surveys suggest the vast majority of Russians
are even more fed up with the direction of post-Soviet Russia than their
cautious parliamentarians and more than two-thirds of them blame Mr. Yeltsin
personally.
A poll carried out last week among Moscow residents by the Research
Centre of the Youth Institute found that just 1 per cent of respondents
thought Mr. Yeltsin not guilty of all five charges being considered by the
Duma.
Those charges are:
* That Mr. Yeltsin conspired in secret with the leaders of Ukraine
and Belarus to illegally and undemocratically disband the Soviet Union in
1991.
* Mr. Yeltsin violated his oath of office, trampled the legitimate
Constitution of Russia and illegally dissolved the elected parliament in
September 1993. When the parliament resisted, the Kremlin brought troops and
tanks into Moscow and bombarded it out of existence on October 4, 1993, with
the loss of at least 200 lives.
* Without consulting any other institution of Russian state power,
Mr. Yeltsin launched a military invasion of the secessionist Russian
Republic of Chechnya in December 1994. In almost two years of bloody
warfare, never approved by parliament, nearly 80,000 Russian citizens lost
their lives.
* Russia's national defences have been undermined by years of
underfunding, neglect and denigration of the armed forces.
* Bungled market reforms have led to mass poverty, plunging
birthrates and dramatically lower life expectancies. In consequence
Russia's population has been shrinking by almost half a million people
annually, which the article of impeachment describes as "genocide".
If even one of the articles is approved by a two-thirds vote in the
Duma Saturday, the process of impeachment will be launched. The charge must
then be examined by the Supreme and Constitutional courts for its technical
correctness and constitutionality, and finally must win two-thirds support
in the Federation Council, Russia's upper house of parliament.
Most analysts consider the chances of impeachment clearing all these
hurdles to be extremely remote. But that may be missing the central point,
which is that Russians are profoundly disaffected with the Kremlin and are
only likely to become more so if Mr. Yeltsin demonstrates that he is beyond
accountability.
"These charges are very politicized, but each in some way expresses
the pain of some part of the population," says Mr. Levashov. "The Duma, as
the branch of government closest to the people, feels it must react in some
way -- especially in an election year".
The Youth Institute survey illustrates how deep and angry are the
feelings of most Russians on these points. Only about 40 per cent of
respondents felt Mr. Yeltsin is guilty on the first two articles -- both
issues of direct emotional interest mainly to elderly and pro-Communist
Russians. But 82 per cent blamed him for the Chechnya war, 68 per cent said
Mr. Yeltsin was guilty for destroying the armed forces and 73 per cent said
he had to bear responsibility for impoverishing the country.
"The only one of the five articles that stands a good chance of
passing is Yeltsin's guilt for the war in Chechnya, which almost all
political factions in parliament agree on," says Andrei Piontkovsky,
director of the Centre for Strategic Studies in Moscow.
Mr. Yeltsin reacted to the threat of impeachment proceedings in the
Duma by firing left-leaning Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, whom he blamed
for not preventing it.
Leaving the country without a government in the midst of an
impeachment proceding threatens a full-blown Constitutional crisis,
analysts say.
"Impeachment itself may not turn out to be a catastrophe, the country
will probably survive whatever happens," says Mr. Levashov. "But Yeltsin
will go down in history as the first Russian President who made his country
try to impeach him. That's his personal catastrophe".

********

#2
Yeltsin Has Legal Right to Dismiss Duma, Minister Says

Moscow, May 14 (Bloomberg) -- Russia's acting Justice Minister Pavel 
Krasheninnikov said President Boris Yeltsin has the constitutional right to 
dissolve the lower house of parliament even if it votes to impeach him 
tomorrow, Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported. A clause in the 
constitution prohibiting the dissolution of the parliament if the impeachment 
process begins does not override two other clauses requiring the president to 
dissolve the lower house if it fails to approve his choice of prime minister 
in three separate votes, Krasheninnikov claimed. Commenting on the 
impeachment charge most likely to win parliamentary backing -- illegally 
starting a war in Chechnya -- Krasheninnikov said ``everyone forgot that the 
Chechnya issue has already been considered by the constitutional court and it 
didn't find any violations of law in Yeltsin's actions,`` the paper reported. 

*******

#3
Russian military won't stray into politics
By Martin Nesirky

MOSCOW, May 14 (Reuters) - Russia's defence minister said on Friday his 
forces would not be dragged into the country's political crisis because 
President Boris Yeltsin's own rules prevented it. 

Marshal Igor Sergeyev said the Kremlin chief determined the role of the armed 
forces and there had been no changes. Yeltsin, ailing and unpredictable, 
plunged nuclear power Russia into renewed uncertainty when he sacked the 
cabinet on Wednesday. 

Some Russian media have suggested Yeltsin could use force against opponents 
if the State Duma lower house of parliament votes to launch impeachment 
proceedings against him and rejects his replacement prime minister, Sergei 
Stepashin. 

Communist parliamentary speaker Gennady Seleznyov suggested even if Yeltsin 
bent the rules, the disillusioned armed forces would either stay in their 
barracks or take aim at the Kremlin, rather than at the opposition. 

Defence chief Sergeyev, speaking during a visit to an elite army base in 
Moscow, said: ``The armed forces of Russia cannot be drawn into the country's 
domestic political processes.'' 

Russian television said it was his first public appearance since Yeltsin, 68, 
ditched Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and asked the cabinet to stay on 
until a new government was formed. 

``The areas of the armed forces' activity have been defined by the president 
and have so far remained unchanged,'' Sergeyev said in comments reported by 
Russian news agencies and confirmed by the Defence Ministry. 

During a hardline revolt in Moscow in 1993, reluctant armed forces commanders 
moved troops into the capital on Yeltsin's orders and used tanks to force 
rebel deputies to leave the besieged parliament building. One of the five 
impeachment charges against Yeltsin covers precisely this point. 

But diplomats and defence experts have played down the chance of a repeat of 
1993, pointing to poor army morale and skills. 

Seleznyov, taking a break from the impeachment debate in the State Duma lower 
house, also rejected such talk. 

``I rule out any military coup,'' he told reporters. ``Everything is 
proceeding in a constitutional way now, and I think the president understands 
this perfectly well.'' But he said the military would not follow Yeltsin's 
orders. 

``If there is an order to shame the army again and seize or disband 
parliament by military might, I know many leaders and officers and division 
commanders who say, perhaps with extraneous emotion, that then 'we would turn 
our tanks and bayonets against the Kremlin','' he said. 

Sergeyev said his visit to the 27th Special Motorised Rifle Brigade, which 
Russian television said was one of the army's most battle-ready units, was 
entirely unconnected with Russia's political crisis. He was attending a 
military meeting. 

Under military reforms, Russia's forces have been cut to 1.2 million men and 
women, partly because the country cannot afford more and partly to reflect 
post-Cold War realities. 

Sergeyev's remarks did not cover Interior Ministry troops, which do have a 
remit to guarantee internal security. Their role in the 1994-96 war against 
separatist Chechnya was widely criticised. Defence experts estimate the 
forces at some 300,000. 

Those forces would have reason to be loyal to Stepashin. He was hitherto 
interior minister and is a colonel-general. 

Sergeyev said NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia and U.S.-led air strikes on Iraq 
had prompted Russia to review its security strategy and military doctrine. 
The defence weekly Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye said many in the 
military had high hopes a Stepashin government would pay more attention to 
them. 

*******

#4
Izvestia
May 14, 1999
Government Members Wanted
By Svatlana Babayeva, Gennady Charodeyev, Vladimir Yermolin 

Acting Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin has started consultations on the 
makeup of a new Russian Government, writes IZVESTIA. One of the first 
politicians he met with was Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky [it is rumored 
that he was offered the post of Deputy Prime Minister in charge of 
macroeconomics, though Yavlinsky denies this]. There are also other potential 
candidates for this job, such as former chief of the Federal Tax Service (and 
earlier Finance Minister) Boris Fyodorov and former Prime Minister Sergei 
Kiriyenko. Observers also saw Anatoly Chubais and Viktor Chernomyrdin in the 
Kremlin. 
Government officials fear that some figures might be imposed on Stepashin, 
in which case there will be no team. They say that if Railways Minister 
Nikolai Aksenenko, recently promoted to the First Deputy Prime Minister's 
post, is given the entire economic block, this will not be good either for 
the economy or for the government. Aksenenko is known as a good manager, so 
it will be better if he is given the real sector of economy to command. If 
there is no well-knit team, Russia will have to forget about "dynamic 
economic reforms," the paper warns. 
Observers also lively discuss whether the current Foreign Minister, Igor 
Ivanov, will preserve his post. Some diplomats say he should stay, whereas 
others believe that he will be replaced. Among the candidates, they name 
Chairman of the Duma Foreign Relations Committee Vladimir Lukin, former 
presidential press secretary Sergei Yastrzhembsky, current Deputy Foreign 
Minister Grigory Krasin and former Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh. 
But the most striking rumor is that the President may propose Viktor 
Chernomyrdin for the Foreign Minister's post, because he has shown himself as 
a "skillful diplomat in settling the Balkan crisis." 
Because of his new appointment, Stepashin will have to vacate the post of 
Interior Minister. Among the most likely candidates for that job observers 
name one of two of his current deputies, Vladimir Vasilyev and Vladimir 
Rushailo [the latter was promoted to Colonel- General just a few days ago]. 

********

#5
Moscow Times
May 14, 1999 
PARTY LINES: Elite Breathes Easier With Primakov Out 
By Jonas Bernstein
Staff Writer

President Boris Yeltsin's decree firing Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov 
essentially marked a return to the pre-August 1998 status quo. 

Indeed, it must have seemed like an all-clear to the leaders of the New Class 
- a signal that their dark months of tribulation at the hands of 
Gorbachev-era interlopers were finally over. One could almost hear the sighs 
of relief and the popping of champagne bottles emanating from villas on the 
French Riviera and in Monaco, the private jets fueling up for the 
Moscow-bound journey. 

It has not, of course, been an entirely smooth ride in the wake of Primakov's 
sacking, with the Russian market taking a steep tumble (a strange reaction to 
the ouster of an anti-market Cabinet) and dollar sales increasing 10-fold on 
Thursday (hardly a ringing endorsement of the proposition that Yeltsin's move 
signaled a "strengthening of reforms"). And then there's the problem with the 
International Monetary Fund, whose next multi-billion-dollar credit is 
contingent upon getting revenue-enhancing laws through the Duma. Deputies 
there probably won't want to make things difficult for average Russians just 
to make things easy for the Fund and the Kremlin. 

Yet this, too, shall pass. Once the uproar surrounding the firing, Sergei 
Stepashin's confirmation as Primakov's replacement and impeachment has 
subsided, Yeltsin will have to finish staffing the new Cabinet. If he 
decorates it with a few energetic young reformers (EYRs) - Sergei Kiriyenko 
and Boris Fyodorov are already being talked up on the rumor mill - and, 
perhaps, throws in Old Reliable (Viktor Chernomyrdin), the Western moneybags 
are likely to become more generous. And, with luck, there won't even be a 
Duma to worry about. 

What is more, Fortune dealt Russia a high card this week when Lawrence 
Summers replaced Robert Rubin as U.S. Secretary of Treasury. In 1996, just 
two years before Russia's financial collapse, Summers hailed Yeltsin's 
appointment of Anatoly Chubais and other EYRs as the arrival of an "economic 
dream team." (Summers did not, to the best of my knowledge, bring up the 
dream team again when Russia's economy collapsed.) Chubais was back 
Wednesday, hinting that he played a role in Primakov's ouster. His return to 
the political arena increases the likelihood that if the IMF gets cold feet 
about Russia's dough, Summers will prod the Fund in the "right" direction, 
just as he did right before last August's default. 

But the most entertaining phase in Russia's political tragicomedy, I suspect, 
lies ahead. In an interview published Thursday in Obshchaya Gazeta, Grigory 
Yavlinksy gave us a preview. Asked about the plans of Yeltsin and Belarus 
President Alexander Lukashenko to move toward a unified state, the Yabloko 
leader answered: "It is entirely possible that Yeltsin needs it to maintain 
his presidential status after the year 2000. If such a union is established, 
it is possible that the president of the union state will be appointed, not 
elected. This also suits Lukashenko. He believes that he will be able to 
outplay Yeltsin and enter the Russian political arena." 

Whether or not Yeltsin engineers an extra term, it is probable, as Obshchaya 
Gazeta's Dmitry Furman noted this week, that the regime he has created will 
outlive him. 

Russia's "transition," it seems, is complete. 

*******

#6
The Nation
May 31, 1999
Editorial
Showdown in Moscow

By dismissing Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and warning that Russia may
pull out of the Yugoslav peace talks, Boris Yeltsin has shown again that he
will do almost anything to save his skin, even jeopardize his country's
domestic stability and role on the international stage. For years the
darling of the Western establishment, Yeltsin is in real danger. As
investigations of financial scandals close in on the Kremlin, his family
and his entourage, Yeltsin feels gravely threatened.

Yeltsin no longer (if he ever did) trusts the popular Primakov to protect
him from the possibility of impeachment or from prosecution upon leaving
office next year. And once Parliament starts impeachment proceedings,
scheduled to begin on May 13, he can no longer legally dismiss it (although
Russia's constitutional court is capable of authorizing anything).
Moreover, in the parliamentary elections scheduled for December the
Communists and other opponents of the regime are almost certain to increase
their numbers in the Duma. Still worse, in the presidential election next
June, no pro-Yeltsin candidate stands a reasonable chance.

Recklessly, and dangerously, Yeltsin is trying to replace Primakov with
people he can trust. By naming Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin-the
country's top policeman, who controls Russia's best-maintained military
units and was an architect of the bloody and disastrous war in Chechnya-as
acting prime minister, Yeltsin is signaling that he has in mind a less
constitutional solution to his problems. Indeed, he is telling Parliament
that he is prepared to disband it by force, as he did its predecessor in
1993. The domestic consequences of such a step are unpredictable. It is not
clear that Stepashin can control his own police forces or what the regular
army's reaction to a showdown with the President might be. Thus has Yeltsin
risked the stability achieved by the Primakov team at a time when a stable
government is badly needed to proceed with economic recovery and play a
crucial role on the international stage.

Those who hope that, weakened by self-inflicted wounds, Russia will be more
amenable to Western pressure are making a mistake. The mood in Russia is
probably more anti-American today than at any stage in Russian, or even
Soviet, history. Indeed, it's widely believed by political observers in
Russia that anti-Primakov forces in the Clinton Administration (and the
IMF) were involved in his ouster. As a result, Primakov's expulsion will
make it more difficult to find support in Russia for the peace process or
any deal made in the coming weeks.

*******

#7
Influential Regional Chiefs Warn Against Yeltsin Impeachment 

MOSCOW, May. 14, 1999 -- (Agence France Presse) Influential regional leaders 
have appealed to Russian deputies to drop moves to impeach President Boris 
Yeltsin, saying he should stay because of his role in founding a democratic 
post-Soviet Russia. 

Presidential hopeful Alexander Lebed was among the 17 governors and republic 
leaders to sign the letter, which was being distributed to deputies who 
Thursday began debating the process of impeaching Yeltsin. 

The letter was addressed to Boris Kuznetzov, a deputy speaker of the Duma, 
the lower house of parliament, who is from the pro-Yeltsin Our Home is Russia 
party. 

"We firmly ... call on your colleagues in the Duma to stop the procedure of 
impeachment against the president of the Russian Federation," the letter 
said. 

Among the signatories were Mintimer Shaimiyev, the president of Tatarstan 
which is one of the republics with the loosest links to Moscow, North 
Ossetia's President Alexander Dzasokhov, his Ingushetia counterpart Ruslan 
Aushev, and the former general Lebed, now governor of Siberia's mineral-rich 
Krasnoyarsk region. 

"We think that it is right and historically proven that President Boris 
Yeltsin has built the basis for a democracy in Russia," said the letter, a 
copy of which was seen by AFP. 

They added that "today, as never before, it is important to keep a 
constitutional balance among the branches of power." 

The regional leaders said they supported Yeltsin's tough line against NATO on 
the Yugoslav crisis and approved of his moves to grant the regions broader 
powers to run their own affairs. 

"We give special importance, together with the president, for clean 
parliamentary elections and we will do everything to ensure that happens," 
they said. 

Russian voters are due to elect a new parliament in December. 

The sacking by Yeltsin of premier Yevgeny Primakov on Wednesday, on the eve 
of the impeachment debate, has plunged Russia into its sharpest political 
crisis since Yeltsin used tanks to quell a parliamentary revolt in October 
1993. 

If deputies reject premier-designate Sergei Stepashin three times, parliament 
in theory is dissolved, although the Duma insists that cannot happen once the 
impeachment process has begun. The Constitutional Court could be asked to 
rule on this point. 

*******

#8
Duma speaker predicts narrow Yeltsin impeachment
By Adam Tanner

MOSCOW, May 14 (Reuters) - Gennady Seleznyov, the speaker of Russia's State 
Duma lower house of parliament, predicted on Friday that deputies would 
narrowly vote to impeach President Boris Yeltsin on at least one of five 
counts on Saturday. 

The Duma continued a second day of impeachment debates on Friday, with the 
opposition hoping to gather more than 300 votes in the 450-member body to 
vote to impeach on Saturday. 

The third of five charges, on starting the 1994-96 war in the separatist 
Russian region of Chechnya, appears to have the best chance of being 
approved. 
``My prediction is that on the third item we'll get not less than 312 
votes,'' the moderate Communist Seleznyov told a news conference. ``There 
will be fewer votes on the other ones, but enough to send the matter to the 
Supreme Court and Constitutional Court.'' If the Duma approves at least one 
impeachment charge, the case goes before the country's top two courts before 
the upper house of parliament takes a final vote on the matter. 

A Duma vote in favour of impeachment would bar the president from disbanding 
the legislature for three months. 

But the chamber would trigger a constitutional deadlock if it voted down 
Yeltsin's new candidate for prime minister, Sergei Stepashin, three times, 
because the constitution says in that case the Duma must be disbanded 
immediately. 

In 1993 Yeltsin turned tanks on the Soviet-era elected Duma after they 
started a mutinous uprising following a long period of political tensions. 

Seleznyov said he did not expect any bloody resolution to the latest standoff 
between the Kremlin and parliament. 

``I rule out any military coup. Everything is proceeding in a constitutional 
way now, and I think the president understands this perfectly well,'' he 
said. 

The speaker also said Yeltsin would no longer enjoy the loyalty of the armed 
forces in an internal struggle. 

``If there is an order to shame the army again and seize or disband the 
parliament by military might, I know many leaders and officers and division 
commanders who say, perhaps with excessive emotion, that then 'we will turn 
our tanks and bayonets against the Kremlin','' Seleznyov said. 

Seleznyov, whose Communists are the largest party in the Duma, said that if 
the chamber voted for impeachment and against Yeltsin's candidate for prime 
minister three times, they and the president would likely seek a compromise 
candidate for premier. 

The Duma's first vote on Stepashin's nomination is expected next Wednesday. 

Seleznyov declined to predict chances for the former interior minister, 
saying party leaders would hold consultations on the nomination on Monday and 
Tuesday. 

``There are many doubts about Stepashin,'' he said. ``He has always been a 
security official. He led security structures and the government mechanism is 
much more complex.'' 

But he also added that Stepashin was in favour of continuing the line of 
sacked Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who was popular with the 
opposition-dominated Duma. 

*******

#9
Yeltsin's Dismissal of Primakov Said To 'Suit Washington' 

Sovetskaya Rossiya
13 May 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Unattributed article: "The Primakov Government Was Honestly Trying 
To Save the Country, But Yeltsin Needs Upheavals" 

So after all, contrary to logic and common sense, 
what has happened is precisely what the magpies that hang around the 
Kremlin had been chattering about so loudly on all the TV channels: 
Yeltsin has dismissed Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov's government and 
appointed as acting premier S.V. Stepashin, a man who is personally 
devoted to Yeltsin, a specialist in party work in the firefighting units 
and minister of internal affairs, who was elevated to the rank of first 
vice premier at the end of April in return for who knows what services. 
Commenting immediately after that rather bizarre appointment, Sovetskaya 
Rossiya, in its article "Trouble-Shooting Appointment..." (in the 29 
April issue), predicted that "a new 'trouble-shooting appointment' is 
very possible." And now it has happened... 

Contrary to some reports in the media, Ye.M. Primakov did not submit a 
resignation request to the president, and everything is fine as regards 
his health (at any rate, his health is much better than Boris 
Nikolayevich's own). As for the results of the last government's work 
over a short period -- eight months -- they speak for themselves: The 
country has managed to avoid hyperinflation. The ruble rate against the 
dollar has started to rise and a slow growth in industrial production has 
begun. As Yeltsin himself admitted, "the government has completely fulfilled 
the tactical task that it was set." Evidently the president was afraid 
that it would also fulfill economic tasks of a strategic nature, and 
therefore he adopted this "difficult decision," to use his own words. 

As the hero of A.S. Griboyedov's comedy "Woe From Wit" ironically 
observed, "rank is conferred by people, and people can be deceived." B.N. 
Yeltsin is admittedly entirely worthy of an entry in the Guinness Book of 
Records for the record number of totally irresponsible personnel 
decisions he has made during the years of his presidency, but the case of 
Ye.M. Primakov was almost the only time he did not blunder. 

It is curious that even the pro-presidential NDR [Russia Is Our Home] 
Duma faction, through the lips of its leader Vladimir Ryzhkov, has on 
this occasion dissociated itself from Yeltsin's decision, believing that 
Ye.M. Primakov's dismissal "can only complicate mutual relations between 
the executive and legislative branches of power." And even Yu. Luzhkov, 
who usually follows in the wake of Yeltsin's policy, "very much regrets 
the decision" and "sees no serious reasons to explain Yevgeniy Primakov's 
dismissal." As for the president's attempts to replace Ye. Primakov with S. 
Stepashin, Duma Speaker G. Seleznev rightly called this "the president's 
biggest mistake in recent times." However, the reaction to this mistake 
on the London currency and financial markets is noteworthy. The currency 
exchange and share rates recorded that the Kremlin has made personnel 
decisions that suit Washington. According to ITAR-TASS's correspondent, 
the news of Ye. Primakov's dismissal from the post of head of the Russian 
Government boosted the dollar rate against the euro, while the prices of 
Russian eurobonds immediately fell five points. 

On the eve of the State Duma hearings on impeachment, Yeltsin is 
deliberately disrupting the fragile political balance that had existed in 
the country. What will he gain as a result? Duma experts believe that the 
chances of Yeltsin's removal from the post of president have 
substantially increased after his latest personnel reshuffle. 

********

#10
Primakov: Government Did 'Nothing To Make it Blush' 

MOSCOW, May 12 (Itar-Tass) - "I think our 
government has done nothing to make it blush, said Yevgeny Primakov at a 
session of the Cabinet on Wednesday. He thanked members of the Cabinet 
for "well-coordinated, and very fruitful and efficient work carried out 
in a friendly spirit." 

"We have done our job as we could, professionally, and I believe it has 
been good," Primakov said. 

He underlined that the government under his leadership managed "to 
avoid hyperinflation which had been predicted." 

"To the present day, the rouble exchange rate has never reached the 
level of fifty roubles against the dollar as was predicted," Primakov 
stressed. 

"At the macroeconomics level, we have managed to improve the situation 
which developed after August 17, 1998, stabilize the situation in society 
both in a political and a social aspect. The number of strikes has 
sharply declined, which is the evidence that the social situation in the 
country has been controllable," Primakov said. 

The government has developed a programme of the economic development for 
the year 2000, he said. The programme has been passed by all the 
departments, has been examined by international financial organizations 
and has been acknowledged as optimal under the present conditions." 
Primakov said. 

"I am turning over this programme to Stepashin and hope that he will 
probably find it useful," Primakov said. 

"I feel much better now and can walk better now," Primakov noted. 

*******

#11
Los Angeles Times
May 13, 1999 
[for personal use only]
PERSPECTIVE ON RUSSIA 
In Moscow, It's All Boris, All the Time 
It's Yeltsin's pattern to lash out when he's threatened; a prime minister 
was again the victim. 
By NINA KHRUSHCHEVA
Nina Khrushcheva Is Director of Communications and Special Projects at the 
East-west Institute in New York

On the one hand, Russia is not the most predictable country in the world. On 
the other, what can be more predictable than Russia, whose leader for a 
number of years has being doing things that seem impossible, irrational and 
illogical? And he does them in very consistent fashion. 

It has been Boris N. Yeltsin's habit that when there is a situation in which 
his authority or power is threatened, he does everything to solidify his own 
power, often at the expense of common sense. 

Just-fired Prime Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov enjoyed popularity among the 
population. He has been able to stabilize the political situation and 
encourage the International Monetary Fund to give another round of support to 
Russia. But Yeltsin's own political pride is surely of most importance. It 
was not the good of Russia but Yeltsin's imminent impeachment process that 
decided Primakov's future. 

In the present case, Yeltsin is charged with five impeachment counts, the 
most serious of which is his responsibility for the war in Chechnya. Even 
lesser threats to Yeltsin's power have, in the past, invoked political 
retribution. 

Mere rumors that Viktor S. Chernomyrdin was considering running for president 
resulted in his dismissal in spring 1998. Summer 1998 brought the sacking of 
another government, now a reformist one, with 35-year-old Sergei Kiriyenko as 
the prime minister. Boris Berezovsky, one of the major Russian oligarchs, 
lost his position as an executive secretary of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States in March due to his increased influence in Russian 
politics in general and Yeltsin's private family matters in particular. 

What recent history teaches us is that Yeltsin's response to humiliation--and 
he regards all threats to his power as humiliating--is to attack with only 
his own survival in mind. 

Impeachment hearings in Russia are, in fact, very much a symbolic act. There 
are no constitutional facilities to remove a living president. It is also a 
long process, one that will surely take longer than the remaining year 
Yeltsin has left in the Kremlin. 

The Duma must approve the motion by a two-thirds vote, which it is unlikely 
to do for psychological reasons. The constitutional court, the next step in 
the impeachment process, is very pro-Yeltsin, and despite its democratic 
appearance, willn't interfere with the country's laws and tradition. Finally, 
the parliament's upper house, the Federation Council, must pass the motion by 
a two-thirds majority. 

But as impractical as these impeachment threats are, they put the country in 
real danger. Yeltsin has another quality which defines him as a Russian 
leader: He doesn't forgive those who have betrayed him even if these 
betrayals exist only in his own head. All those who appear to be more 
independent than his unlimited authority allows he considers to be traitors. 
If Primakov thinks he can rule the country by himself, Yeltsin wants to show 
who's in charge here. 

Primakov's acceptance and respect by both aisles of the Duma, the left and 
the right, made him a prime minister last September. This very acceptance and 
respect, especially by the Communists--the Duma's majority--brought him down 
Wednesday. It doesn't take Sigmund Freud to guess what Yeltsin was thinking. 
"If Communists support Primakov and are against me, let's see what they're 
going to do when there is only me and no Primakov.' " 

And this is a good question. What are they going to do? Constitutionally, 
Yeltsin cannot dissolve the rebellious parliament while the impeachment 
process is in motion. However, if the Duma, by the third vote, doesn't 
approve of his choice of replacement for Primakov--Sergei V. Stepashin, a 
recently appointed first deputy prime minister who was a minister of internal 
affairs and Yeltsin's protege--the president might still dissolve the Duma. 
And even if dissolution proves to be impossible, obviously this latest move 
shows that in Russia there is always a way for the man in power to assert his 
will. 

The impulsive Russian president didn't hesitate to send troops against the 
parliament headquarters--the Russian White House--in 1993. The excuse was 
obvious. Democratic Yeltsin was fighting for democracy even if it had to be 
with the help of guns. If this time the simple dissolution of the Duma is not 
possible, we can only wonder what Yeltsin might do next. 

Besides, if Stepashin's his familiarity with the power structure, his 
campaign against corruption in the capital and the region and his general 
responsibility for firm order in the country make him a perfect executor for 
a potential assault on parliament. As grim as it sounds, unfortunately, it's 
only in the tradition of Yeltsin's predictable unpredictability. 

*******

#12
Ghost Of 1993 Haunts Russian Politicians 

MOSCOW, May. 14, 1999 -- (Reuters) When Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
disbanded the Soviet-era parliament in 1993, he offered top members jobs in 
the government as an incentive to comply with his order. 

Many Supreme Soviet deputies rejected Yeltsin's mix of incentives and 
threats, and two days of bitter fighting broke out soon afterwards. More than 
140 people were killed in clashes that followed and Yeltsin sent tanks to end 
the rebellion. 

One of the top parliamentarians co-opted by Yeltsin's offer was the then 
chairman of the parliamentary defense and security committee, Sergei 
Stepashin, who immediately become deputy security minister. 

Stepashin has remained loyal to Yeltsin ever since. After spells as justice 
minister, interior minister and first deputy prime minister, he was nominated 
by the president on Wednesday to replace Yevgeny Primakov as prime minister. 

That appointment, and the start of debates in the lower house of the new 
parliament on whether to impeach Yeltsin, sets the stage for the most direct 
confrontation between the president and parliament since 1993. 

Yeltsin needs parliamentary backing for Stepashin but has alienated deputies 
by ousting a premier most of them backed. 

Despite the political turmoil, Russian security analysts and Moscow-based 
diplomats say a bloody ending looks unlikely this time. 

"This situation is different from the one in 1993," said one military 
attache. "I don't think anything will happen. This is only the worst-case 
scenario." 

Another diplomat said: "I don't think it's a big danger, not for the time 
being." 

A Kremlin official also dismissed the possibility of any repeat of the events 
of 1993. 

"No one on the president's side will ever do anything outside the 
constitution," he said. "Everything that happened (in 1993) is now in the 
past." 

Other analysts say Yeltsin would be less likely to risk such a confrontation 
now because he was much more popular in 1993 and now has little public 
backing. 

Support in the military for any use of force is also questionable although 
interior forces would have reason to be loyal to Stepashin, their former 
chief. 

Legal experts say the impeachment debates that started on Thursday in the 
Duma, the lower house of parliament, could however lead to a constitutional 
impasse. 

If deputies vote to impeach the president, the constitution says he cannot 
dissolve the Duma. Yet if the Duma votes down Stepashin as prime minister 
three times, the constitution says the chamber must be disbanded. 

"There would be a constitutional case that would be decided in a 
constitutional way," the Kremlin official said. 

But Kommersant business newspaper quoted other officials as acknowledging the 
possibility of a direct confrontation. 

"Most of Kommersant's Kremlin sources recognize the possibility of the 
situation developing into a violent scenario and confirmed that 'the 
president will react adequately to any anti-constitutional actions,'" it 
wrote. 

The memory of 1993 lingers not as a bloody ghost of the past but also as one 
of five charges on which the Duma is now considering impeaching Yeltsin. 

Another Supreme Soviet deputy who accepted Yeltsin's bid to join the 
government in 1993, Yevgeny Kozhokin, said 1999 is very different -- and less 
explosive -- because the confrontation is not over the constitution itself. 

"Then there was the situation where the parliament was constitutionally 
entitled to change the constitution and take powers away from the president," 
said Kozhokin, director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. 

"Now the whole conflict between two different branches of the constitutional 
order is taking place within the bounds of the constitution." 

******

#13
Russia's Stepashin sees no major govt shakeup
By Brian Killen

MOSCOW, May 14 (Reuters) - Russia's Acting Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin 
said on Friday he would keep the backbone of his predecessor's government -- 
accused by President Boris Yeltsin of being spineless on reform. 

``The backbone will certainly be maintained and there will be no reshuffle,'' 
Interfax news agency quoted Stepashin as saying. 

Stepashin, a former interior minister and staunch Yeltsin ally, was named 
acting premier by Yeltsin on Wednesday when Yevgeny Primakov was sacked for 
failing to implement reforms more decisively. 

But Stepashin, 47, appeared to call for a new economic philosophy by saying 
on Friday that the crisis required ``a technocratic government'' and it was 
not clear who would now assume overall responsibility for the economy. 

Primakov's economic supremo, moderate Communist Yuri Maslyukov, has said he 
does not plan to serve under Stepashin, who ruled out forming a coalition 
government. 

Primakov also liked to refer to his government as a team of professionals, 
but he formed it with the aim of restoring political and economic stability 
in the wake of the August financial crisis rather than pushing ahead with 
reforms. 

The composition of Primakov's government, which included leftist opposition 
members, reflected his desire to cooperate with the Communist-led State Duma 
lower house of parliament. 

Stepashin's remarks, while ruling out wholesale changes, suggested a return 
to the vigorous reformist approach of Sergei Kiriyenko's pre-crisis 
government, which ran into a wall of resistance from the Duma. 

The new acting premier also stressed the need for cooperation with the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, but he could face the same 
problems as Kiriyenko when it comes to seeking legislative backing for 
IMF-sponsored reforms. 

The IMF and World Bank have promised to lend Russia billions of dollars 
provided reforms are implemented, including new tax measures that require 
Duma support. 

Prime-Tass news agency quoted Stepashin as saying failure to adopt this 
package of laws, which would unlock $4.5 billion in IMF loans over 18 months, 
would throw in doubt agreements reached with international financial 
organisations. 

He also said the main parameters of the 2000 draft budget would be considered 
by the government in two weeks so that the document could be debated by the 
Duma before its summer recess. 

Interfax quoted Stepashin as saying Yeltsin's economic reform course would 
continue, but he repeated some of the mantras of the Primakov-Maslyukov team 
-- support for domestic industry, measures to stimulate investment, tax and 
social sector reforms, fight against crime and corruption. 

Stepashin, described as a Russian Pinochet in some local newspapers, also 
showed the law enforcer in his character by warning that unjustified rises in 
petrol prices would draw a swift government response, RIA news agency 
reported. 

Petrol prices in St Petersburg rose sharply after a mysterious disruption to 
supplies in the city. Moscow prices have also risen, but Stepashin said there 
were no shortages. 

*******

#14
USA Today
May 14, 1999
[for personal use only]
Russia may get tough economic medicine
By Fred Coleman, USA TODAY

MOSCOW - The conventional wisdom here is that Boris Yeltsin fired Prime 
Minister Yevgeny Primakov this week to get rid of a political rival.

But Russian analysts think the real reason was to clear the way for a sea 
change in government policy.

The second group says the shift makes sense if Yeltsin intends to move to the 
"Pinochet model" of development.

The daily Moscow Times agreed, saying in an editorial that the high-level 
shuffle sounds "like the prelude to a Pinochet-style defense of authoritarian 
capitalism."

The reference is to Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet who ruled with a heavy 
hand to force painful but necessary economic change in Chile in the 1970s.

It is an idea that appeals to a post-Soviet Russia that has failed to create 
a stable democracy and a successful market economy at the same time. 

The Pinochet model puts the economy first, even at the expense of draconian 
measures, so that a healthy democracy can develop later.

Some Russian analysts say Yeltsin hinted at that strategy by firing Primakov 
for failing to improve the economy, and then putting in his place Sergei 
Stepashin, with a mandate to use "harsh measures" as the way toward economic 
progress.

Stepashin is a symbol of law and order, having run both the uniformed police 
as interior minister and the secret police or former KGB, but he has no 
economic experience.

Still, his appointment makes sense, analysts say, if Yeltsin names a proven 
economic reformer as Stepashin's first deputy to prescribe the medicine that 
the tough new premier will then make the country swallow. Some think this 
could occur within days.

"That way the new government can be authoritarian politically and liberal 
economically," says Andrei Kortunov, president of the Russian Science 
Foundation, a leading think tank.

Anatoly Chubais, a leading reformer and former first deputy premier, added 
further weight to speculation that a policy change is afoot. Chubais, who 
discussed the shake-up with Yeltsin, called it "a well thought-out process." 

"The whole success of the Yeltsin changes depends on who will be appointed 
first deputy prime minister in charge of the economy," says analyst Andrei 
Piontkowski of the Center for Strategic Studies.

If a Soviet era apparatchik gets the post, however, it indicates that Yeltsin 
sacked Primakov only for political reasons, using the economy as a lame 
excuse.

Even if a reformer is chosen, the policy shift is far from a sure thing in 
Russia. The fight over impeachment could tie up the country for weeks, while 
the Duma, or lower house of parliament, may never confirm Stepashin as 
premier.

On the economic front, the key is a $4.5 billion loan from the international 
monetary fund over the next 18 months to keep Russia from defaulting on its 
foreign debt this year. 

Longer term, the Pinochet model would require the muscle to put in an 
effective tax collection system, curbs on capital flight and a crackdown on 
bureaucratic corruption. The lack of all three is a major reason for Russia's 
economic mess.

On foreign policy, the main effect of the political and economic uncertainty 
in the weeks ahead is that Russia will likely play a lesser role on the world 
stage, starting with scaling back ambitions to mediate the Kosovo crisis, 
analysts say.

The bottom line, according to the sea-change theory, is Yeltsin failed with 
his "soft option" of appointing Primakov to disarm the Communists and 
nationalists in parliament.

Under the "hard option," Yeltsin would now confront opponents head-on. In the 
end, that could include dissolving the Duma, quashing the impeachment process 
and ruling by presidential decree.

*******

#15
New York Times
May 14, 1999
Editorial
Dangerous Sideshow in the Kremlin

It is probably too much to expect from Russia's Communist legislators, but 
they ought to drop their misguided impeachment drive against Boris Yeltsin 
before it further destabilizes the Kremlin. No good can come of this needless 
confrontation, and it could produce a protracted crisis that leaves Russia 
even more wounded than it is today. 

The case has simmered for months, periodically used by the Communists as a 
club against Mr. Yeltsin, but it is now moving rapidly toward a vote by the 
Duma, possibly before the week is out. Mr. Yeltsin's dismissal of Prime 
Minister Yevgeny Primakov has galvanized his opponents, and they may now be 
within reach of the simple majority they need in the lower house of 
Parliament. Fortunately, additional steps are required before Mr. Yeltsin can 
be removed, including approval by two high courts and by two-thirds of the 
upper house. Those hurdles are probably insurmountable. 

But even a Duma vote to impeach will compound Moscow's political problems. 
Though the Russian Constitution forbids a sitting president to dissolve 
Parliament after the lower house has approved impeachment charges, Mr. 
Yeltsin is quite capable of trying to shut down the legislature anyway. The 
same Constitution empowers the president to disband Parliament and call new 
elections if the Duma votes three times to reject his choice for Prime 
Minister. These clauses could soon be in conflict, for Sergei Stepashin, the 
newly designated Prime Minister, may be rejected. 

This impasse might be unavoidable if the case against Mr. Yeltsin were 
legitimate. Certainly, he has been an erratic and increasingly ineffective 
leader, partly because of declining health. But that is not grounds for 
impeachment. The Communists, looking for any excuse to remove him, have 
assembled an outlandish case. It charges Mr. Yeltsin with responsibility for 
the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the impoverishment of the Russian 
military. He is also implausibly accused of waging a campaign of genocide 
against the Russian people with his economic policies. The only remotely 
tenable charge involves the war in Chechnya, which Mr. Yeltsin conducted 
without seeking the approval of Parliament. 

Russia desperately needs steady, democratic leadership. Mr. Stepashin may be 
unproven, but he should be allowed to form a government and get on with the 
hard business of reforming and reviving the economy. Impeachment is a 
senseless and potentially damaging distraction. 

*******


 

Return to CDI's Home Page  I  Return to CDI's Library