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CDI Library > Johnson's Russia List

Johnson's Russia List
 

 

May 13, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3284 3285    



Johnson's Russia List
#3285
13 May 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Itar-Tass: Ex-Premier Primakov May Return to Politics.
2. Itar-Tass: PRIMAKOV'S Resignation Not to Influence Impeachment Vote-Mp.
(Lukin).

3. Reuters: Media Criticises Yeltsin on Sudden PM Sacking.
4. Reuters: Russian Duma considers Yeltsin impeachment.
5. AP: NATO Bombing Causing US-Russia Rift.
6. Wall Street Journal: Dimitri Simes, Russia's Crisis Gets Worse.
7. Washington Post: Thomas Graham, Yeltsin Is The Problem.
8. Moscow Times: Catherine Belton, Yeltsin's Move May Test Constitution.
9. Elizabeth Davis: Comment on the "New Government."
10. Robert Devane: The Primakov Cabinet Sacking.
11. Washington Post editorial: Dangerous Russia.
12. New York Times editorial: Revolving Prime Ministers.
13. Sovetskaya Rossiya: Leftist Reader Mocks Yeltsin's 'Puppeteers.'] 
Brief comment from DJ: An excellent source of news and commentary can

be found at www.polit.ru/english 
We are all purveyors of partial truths. Mine is that what's missing 
in most US commentary on the latest developments is the appropriate sense 
of ownership of Yeltsin and the Russia that has
been created under Yeltsin. There was no historical inevitability about
the degeneration that has taken place but US alliance with Yeltsin, however
stormy the relationship, is clear and profoundly influential. The huge amounts
of money thrown at Yeltsin (and now the debt burden of the Russian people) 
were done primarily to try to keep Yeltsin in office. Even the riveting
"loose 
nukes" problem is largely the consequence of the economic collapse (again not 
inevitable) that accompanied the Yeltsin-US economic policies. These
extremist 
politically motivated policies, never of course fully implemented in the
real world, 
should never have embarked upon in the first place. The case against
Yeltsin and 
his sponsors is, ironically, well articulated in the Duma's impeachment
proceedings. 
Impeachment is the logical, democratic response of Russians to what life
has taught 
them. I am optimistic about Russia after Yeltsin. I'm even optimistic about
the
basic level-headedness of Russians across the political spectrum in dealing
with the latest irrationality thrown at them by Yeltsin. The model of the
American New Deal will return.] 

********

#1
Ex-Premier Primakov May Return to Politics.

MOSCOW , May 13 (Itar-Tass) - "Yevgeny Primakov does not rule out his return 
to politics," Tass was told by a source from among the ex-premier's 
associates on Thursday. 

The source said Primakov "now may ponder on the proposals made to him" 
earlier. 

Primakov's "experience, vast analytical abilities, exceptional decency, 
honesty, and insight must be used in this trying period through which Russia 
is living," the source said. 

Beginning Thursday Primakov will no longer appear in the Russian government 
building. On Wednesday evening, he turned over his duties to acting premier 
Sergei Stepashin. All his personal belongings and documents have already been 
removed from the premier's office. 

********

#2
PRIMAKOV'S Resignation Not to Influence Impeachment Vote-Mp.

MOSCOW, May 13 (Itar-Tass) -- The Russian government's resignation is not 
likely to influence the outcome of the State Duma voting on President 
Yeltsin's impeachment, Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the State Duma Committee 
for Foreign Affairs and one of the Yabloko faction leaders, said on Thursday. 

"I do not think that the government's resignation has considerably changed 
the situation," Lukin told Itar-Tass. "There is a certain psychological 
shock, but if we consider the outcome of the voting I think it will be nearly 
the same as many analysts had predicted before the government's resignation," 
he said. 

Most of the analysts agreed that the State Duma would not raise the 300 votes 
necessary to bring out charges against the president. 

Lukin confirmed that Yabloko had not changed its stance and would support 
only one point of the charges against the president, which accuses him of 
starting the Chechnya war. 

********

#3
Media Criticises Yeltsin on Sudden PM Sacking

MOSCOW, May 13 (Reuters) - Russian newspapers criticised President Boris 
Yeltsin on Thursday for sacking Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, saying he 
was motivated by his own lust for power and sometimes irrational instincts. 

Several newspapers also said Yeltsin's poor health in recent years was a 
motivation in appointing loyal ally Sergei Stepashin, a police and security 
veteran, as acting new prime minister. 

"Boris Yeltsin is persistently trying to save political face," Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta wrote. "This is becoming ever more difficult." 

It added: "Illness takes its toll and it is fairly difficult to hide its 
influence. In such a case the best means become the hard presidential fist 
unleashed over the head of either the government or the State Duma." 

Obshchaya Gazeta also highlighted health concerns about Yeltsin, who in 
recent years has undergone heart surgery and suffered pneumonia, ulcers and 
other illnesses. 

"The country is again following with fear the unstable gait of its 
president," the paper said. "Unfortunately, Yeltsin of late is doing worse in 
handling the deficiencies of his character. 

"He is behaving like a person surrounded only by enemies, treachery and 
betrayal." 

The mainstream Sevodnya's headline asked: "A presidential mistake?" 

"By sacking Yevgeny Primakov the president took what may have been the most 
unpopular decision of his career," it said. "He is alone as never before (to 
say nothing of his worsened health)." 

Several papers offered in-depth articles on Stepashin. 

Noviye Izvestia showed a photo of Stepashin wearing dark sunglasses and a 
trench coat seated before troops and wrote: "A new foothold for General 
Stepashin" 

"Can Colonel General Sergei Stepashin undo the confrontation between 
parliament and the Kremlin with peaceful methods?" Nezavisimaya Gazeta asked 
in another headline, highlighting the latest political confrontation. 

Many newspapers noted the complex political situation as the State Duma lower 
house of parliament began presidential impeachment debates on Thursday. 

"Boris Yeltsin has again complicated the political situation to the extreme," 
the business newspaper Kommersant wrote. 

"Most of Kommersant's Kremlin sources recognise the possibility of the 
situation developing into a violent scenario and confirmed that 'the 
president will react adequately to any anti-constitutional actions'." 

The paper also wrote that some Kremlin officials say liberal opposition 
economist Grigory Yavlinsky could become deputy prime minister overseeing the 
economy. 

********

#4
WRAPUP-Russian Duma considers Yeltsin impeachment
By Martin Nesirky

MOSCOW, May 13 (Reuters) - Russia's opposition-dominated lower house of 
parliament began a long-delayed -- and long-winded -- debate on Thursday on 
whether to launch impeachment proceedings against President Boris Yeltsin. 

The Communist head of the State Duma's impeachment commission began the 
session with a dry overview of the five counts against the ailing and 
increasingly unpredictable Kremlin chief, who unexpectedly sacked the 
government on Wednesday. 

``The commission has found all charges against President Boris Yeltsin 
well-founded,'' Vadim Filimonov told the chamber. 

Another Communist, Viktor Ilyukhin, then put the impeachment case on counts 
that range from destroying the Soviet Union and starting the 1994-96 war 
against the separatist Chechnya region to setting tanks on Russia's 
parliament in 1993. 

Yeltsin's Duma representative, Alexander Kotenkov, outlined the Kremlin's 
defence, saying the opposition was basing its case on newspaper articles 
rather than solid legal arguments. 

The debate is expected to last three days, further raising the temperature 
after the 68-year-old Yeltsin pushed Russia deeper into political and 
economic crisis on Wednesday by ditching Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and 
his cabinet. 

The move shook markets. The rouble fell further on Thursday, dipping below 26 
to the dollar compared with 24.95 on Wednesday. Emerging markets currencies 
were softer across the board. 

``Until we see some stabilisation in the politics in Russia investors are 
going to be wary,'' said Jake Moore, emerging market currency analyst at 
Barclays Capital in London. 

Russian newspapers were scathing about Yeltsin and political analysts 
struggled to fathom a seemingly counterproductive step. 

The daily Obshchaya Gazeta, among others, highlighted health concerns about 
the Kremlin leader, who in recent years has endured heart surgery, pneumonia, 
ulcers and other illnesses. 

``The country is again following with fear the unstable gait of its 
president,'' it said. ``He is behaving like a person surrounded only by 
enemies, treachery and betrayal.'' 

Many politicians saw Yeltsin's move as an attempt to tackle the Duma head-on 
before the debate. His spokesman, Dmitry Yakushkin, told Interfax news agency 
Yeltsin was nonetheless ``inclined to cooperate constructively'' with the 
Duma. 

But media speculated Yeltsin might consider using force against his opponents 
if the crisis deepens, presumably to the point where the Duma voted for 
impeachment and rejected his candidate for prime minister, Sergei Stepashin, 
three times. 

The daily Kommersant wrote: ``Most of Kommersant's Kremlin sources recognise 
the possibility of the situation developing into a violent scenario and 
confirmed that 'the president will react adequately to any 
anti-constitutional actions'.'' 

Newspapers also noted Stepashin commanded police and troops in his previous 
role as interior minister. 

But there is no evidence forces are on alert, and threatened mass Communist 
action across Russia has not materialised. There were scattered protests on 
Thursday, including in the Far Eastern city of Vladivostok. 

The nearest thing to action in Moscow was on the central street outside the 
450-seat Duma, where several hundred anti-Yeltsin protesters waved flags and 
banners and exchanged whistles with a smaller group of pro-Kremlin 
demonstrators. 

Inside, as the session dragged on, deputies drifted away and the chamber was 
half empty after two hours. 

There is still some way to go. The debate is scheduled to last until 
Saturday. There will be lengthy presentations for and against, followed by 
voting on each of the five counts. 

If the Duma backs even one of the counts, an impeachment procedure will be 
launched. The country's two top courts and the Federation Council upper house 
then consider the case. 

Yeltsin, who met French President Jacques Chirac on Thursday, is unlikely to 
be ousted before his term ends in June 2000. 

By dumping Primakov before the impeachment debate, Yeltsin placed a timescale 
on the Duma, which backed the ex-premier. 

Deputies have three chances to approve a premier. If they still vote ``no,'' 
the Duma is dissolved and an election called. 

Stepashin faces a battle. His leading role in the Chechen war made him 
enemies on all sides. The Communists said they had yet to decide how they 
would vote. 

********

#5
NATO Bombing Causing US-Russia Rift
May 13, 1999
By TOM RAUM

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The rift in U.S.-Russian relations caused by the NATO
bombing of Yugoslavia, now complicated by political turmoil in Moscow, is
raising fresh questions about long-term cooperation between Moscow and
Washington.

``It is obvious that all is not well in the U.S.-Russian relationship -- or
American foreign policy towards Russia,'' said Rep. Benjamin Gilman,
R-N.Y., chairman of the House International Relations Committee, after
Russian President Boris Yeltsin dismissed yet another prime minister.

Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., one of a group of 11 House members trying to
broker a separate peace deal on Kosovo with members of Russia's parliament,
said the administration was wrong in ``tying its planning only to Yeltsin.''

``They are making a big mistake, because Yeltsin is not Russia's future.
He'll be lucky if he holds on to the next election,'' said Bartlett.

That nonbinding peace plan by Bartlett and others -- discouraged Wednesday
by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright -- was being considered today by
the International Relations panel.

It contains many features sought by NATO, including withdrawal of Serb
forces from Kosovo and an armed international peacekeeping presence. But a
main difference is that it leaves the composition of the peacekeeping force
up to the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council -- on which
Russia and China sit and hold a veto.

Both have insisted on a first-step end to the bombing.

President Clinton has invested a huge amount of political capital in
supporting Yeltsin's government. And with a rising tide of anti-Americanism
in Russia, the stakes have seldom been so high, suggest members of Congress
involved in foreign policy.

``We're in chaos and we have to find our way out. We need to find a way to
engage the Russians, and not just as old Cold War enemies,'' said Rep. Sam
Gejdenson, D-Conn., senior Democrat on the International Relations panel.

Yeltsin named a close ally, Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin, as acting
prime minister. The upheaval sharpened Yeltsin's collision course with the
parliament and threatened to disrupt the Kosovo peace process, political
stability and efforts at economic recovery.

At a House hearing on Wednesday, senior State Department adviser Steven R.
Sestanovich said he did not anticipate the upheaval would affect the status
of Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russia's envoy to Yugoslavia.

Sestanovich said it was still ``rather hard to tell'' the consequences of
the sacking of Primakov. If Yeltsin's choice is approved, that could
strengthen Yeltsin's mandate, Sestanovich suggested.

The U.S. official said Stepashin was someone the United States could work
with. However, his appointment as Primakov's permanent replacement appeared
to have little chance of approval in the Duma.

Sestanovich suggested the move was a ploy by Yeltsin to detract attention
from next week's impeachment vote by the Duma.

Rep. James Leach, R-Iowa, said the administration had precipitated both a
``hot war'' against Yugoslavia, which was not going well; and ``two new
cold wars'' with Russia and China after the accidental bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.

Meanwhile, Bartlett and 10 colleagues were trying to do an end-run around
the administration with their separate peace plan, drawn up two weeks ago
with Duma members at a meeting in Vienna.

Albright met the delegation, led by Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., on Wednesday.

Bartlett said Albright seemed ``prepared to convince us that we were
sending mixed signals, that it would be counterproductive. We emphasized
that we were trying to help.''

``Our agreement was not meant to constrain a negotiation but to permit an
agreement,'' Bartlett said.

But Sen. Dick Lugar, R-Ind., a senior member of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, called it ``far-fetched to think that members of our
House are trying to negotiate peace for Kosovo with the Duma while the Duma
is trying to impeach Yeltsin.''

********

#6
Wall Street Journal
13 May 1999
[for personal use only]
Russia's Crisis Gets Worse
By Dimitri K. Simes (dsimes@nixoncenter.org), 
president of The Nixon Center and author of "After the 
Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power" (Simon & Schuster, 1999).

The dismissal of Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov by President Boris 
Yeltsin, and Mr. Primakov's replacement by Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin 
(only recently promoted to first deputy prime minister) is a blow to Russia's 
political stability and may trigger a major constitutional crisis in an 
impoverished, embittered nation with 30,000 nuclear weapons. While Mr. 
Yeltsin attributed the change to the lack of improvement in the economy and a 
need "to bring to the cabinet's work the necessary dynamism and energy," 
neither Mr. Stepashin nor his new first deputy, Railroad Minister Nikolay 
Aksenenko, has a record as an economic reformer.

Mr. Stepashin, 47, spent most of his career in the Soviet police and the 
Russian Federal Security Service (successor to the KGB). After a short stint 
as justice minister, he headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where he had 
almost one million police and internal troops under his command. He is known 
primarily as a Yeltsin loyalist who is prepared to use force to protect his 
president.

I first met Mr. Stepashin six years ago when he was chairman of the Security 
Committee in the now-defunct Supreme Soviet, Russia's first parliament. At 
the time, he complained that then-Prime Minster Yegor Gaidar's "shock 
therapy" was polarizing Russian society, and he criticized Mr. Yeltsin's 
advisers for creating an "unnecessary" war with the parliament. When the time 
came to choose sides, however, Mr. Stepashin left the Supreme Soviet to 
become a top security aide to Mr. Yeltsin and supported him in his use of 
tanks against the parliament.

Later, Mr. Stepashin won notoriety as a key member of the so-called war 
party, which orchestrated Russia's brutal assault on Chechnya. He was forced 
to resign in 1995 after troops under his command failed to rescue hostages 
from Chechen rebels, but his willingness to use force on Mr. Yeltsin's behalf 
ensured his eventual return to positions of power after a brief interlude. If 
Mr. Yeltsin wanted to send a signal to the Duma, the lower house of Russia's 
parliament, that he will stop at nothing to protect his authority, Mr. 
Stepashin's appointment is quite logical.

As for Mr. Aksenenko, the new first deputy is a relatively unknown, 
50-year-old career railroad executive. He came to the government as a protégé 
of clownish ultranationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky and reputedly has 
strong ties to the controversial tycoon Boris Berezovsky. Mr. Aksenenko has 
been accused of corrupt practices by Russia's semi-independent parliamentary 
auditing commission; one notable boondoggle was a proposed high-speed rail 
project that was cancelled after several hundred million dollars disappeared.

Of all the governments appointed by Mr. Yeltsin since 1991, this team appears 
to be the least qualified to revive the economy or inspire public confidence. 
But these goals were probably the furthest from Mr. Yeltsin's mind in 
ordering this latest government reshuffle. Rather, the Russian president--who 
is no longer intellectually, physically or morally fit to govern but does not 
want to allow anyone else to do the job--seems to be trying to generate a 
political crisis like that of 1993 in order to defeat his opposition and 
enhance his prerogatives until the next presidential elections or (despite 
constitutional limitations) perhaps even beyond.

The immediate cause of Mr. Primakov's ouster was today's scheduled 
commencement of impeachment hearings in the Duma. By nominating Mr. 
Stepashin, Mr. Yeltsin probably sought to intimidate the Duma into dropping 
the matter. But it was very unlikely that Mr. Yeltsin would actually have 
been removed from office in the first place. There was a fair chance that the 
Communists and their allies would not have won the two-thirds support 
necessary to bring charges. And even if the Duma voted for impeachment, the 
case would be sent to the Supreme Court, which is packed with Yeltsin 
appointees, and then to the Federation Council.

But now the dynamics have changed. The probability that Mr. Stepashin will be 
confirmed as prime minister is extremely low. Conversely, the chances that 
the Duma will vote for impeachment are much higher. As a result, a potential 
constitutional crisis is in the making.

According to the Russian constitution, if the president's nominee for prime 
minister is rejected by the Duma three times, the Duma can be dissolved 
pending new elections. But the same constitution prevents the Duma's 
dissolution if it has voted for at least one article of impeachment.

If Mr. Yeltsin dissolves the Duma, the political turmoil in Russia will 
surely worsen. Because this could help the Communists and other Yeltsin 
opponents increase their representation in the next Duma (scheduled to be 
elected in December), the president's associates have already hinted that he 
may decide to ban the Communist Party and introduce emergency rule. But with 
Mr. Yeltsin's popularity in low single digits, with many regional governors 
supporting the Communists and with a number of military units and security 
detachments under local rather than federal control, a new Yeltsin assault on 
the parliament may prove to be much more destabilizing than that of 1993.

Also, enraged by Mr. Primakov's dismissal, the Duma will not vote for the new 
taxes and other legislation required by the International Monetary Fund as a 
condition of restructuring its previous loans to Moscow. And Mr. Yeltsin will 
not be in a position, either legally or politically, to introduce new taxes 
by decree. For its part, the IMF--its credibility already shaken--would pay a 
price for disregarding its own terms to help Mr. Yeltsin out. Moreover, the 
vast majority of Russians would view such a step not as a goodwill gesture 
but as a payment to the despised Yeltsin regime. The result may well be yet 
another anti-American backlash that in the long run could seriously harm 
vital U.S. interests.

Russia's new political crisis offers the U.S. no good choices. Given that Mr. 
Yeltsin has practically no domestic base except the odd alliance of the 
security services, Mr. Zhirinovsky's ultranationalist party, and tycoons like 
Mr. Berezovsky, he will desperately need Washington's support. This gives the 
administration some leverage in soliciting Russian diplomatic cooperation in 
Yugoslavia. Yet exploiting that leverage could carry a considerable cost by 
adding fuel to the fire in Russia's domestic politics.

After the predictable failure of Mr. Stepashin's candidacy, the Clinton 
administration would do well to resist its normal temptation to exploit Mr. 
Yeltsin's position and use its remaining influence to urge Mr. Yeltsin to 
observe constitutional procedures and avoid an explosive confrontation with 
the Duma. This is the only way to ensure minimally smooth sailing until 
Russia's forthcoming Duma and presidential elections.

********

#7
Washington Post
May 13, 1999
[for personal use only]
Yeltsin Is The Problem
By Thomas Graham (tgraham@ceip.org)
The writer, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, was a U.S. diplomat in Moscow from 1994 to 1998. 

The Kremlin spinmeisters will follow Boris Yeltsin's lead and portray the 
Russian president's firing of his prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, yesterday 
as the consequence of profound policy disagreements between the two: Primakov 
was taking no aggressive steps to turn the economy around; he was too cozy 
with the Communists and other retrograde forces; his recent suggestion that 
governors ought to be appointed instead of elected revealed his 
anti-democratic leanings. 

But as usual in Kremlin politics, the real problem was power, not policy. 
Yeltsin is extremely jealous of his prerogatives, and he is at his best when 
struggling for power and political survival. And Primakov was a threat. He is 
the most popular politician in Russia today, enjoys solid elite support and 
is respected within the military and security forces. Most important, he 
managed to do what no other prime minister had under Yeltsin, and that is to 
establish himself as an independent source of political power and authority. 
Yeltsin simply could not tolerate this situation of dual power.

The full consequences of Yeltsin's decision will unfold over the next few 
weeks. But amid the present uncertainty, some things are clear.

First, the governmental crisis will not be quickly resolved, and it could 
deepen. Yeltsin's actions increase the chances that the Duma, or lower house 
of parliament, will impeach him later this week. Under the constitution, that 
step would deprive Yeltsin of the prerogative to dissolve the Duma should it 
reject his choice to replace Primakov, as it almost surely will. But the 
constitution also clearly states that should the Duma reject the president's 
candidate for prime minister three times, the president has to disband it and 
set a date for early elections. The inherent contradictions and omissions in 
the constitution increase the risk that this conflict will move along 
extraconstitutional paths, with all the negative ramifications that will have 
for building democracy in Russia.

Second, the crisis will drastically reduce Moscow's ability to play a 
constructive role on Kosovo, in part by increasing the chances that Kosovo 
will become a pawn in domestic politics, where being seen as serving American 
interests is a distinct minus. It is not accidental that Yeltsin, on the same 
day he fired Primakov, warned that Moscow would pull out of the negotiations 
if its interests were not taken into account.

Third, the International Monetary Fund agreement with Russia is dead. The 
Duma will hardly pass the legislation the IMF is demanding as a condition for 
disbursing the loan; getting that legislation was going to be a tough fight 
even with Primakov at the helm of the government. This will only delay any 
hopes of rebuilding the Russian economy. It could hasten economic decline.

Fourth, the big winner in this crisis is not going to be Yeltsin or the 
Communist opposition but rather the regional elites. As they have in the 
past, they will now undoubtedly exploit disarray in Moscow to consolidate 
their hold on their respective regions. Depending on how the crisis unfolds, 
they might even muster enough unity to seek to dictate a resolution to the 
warring parties in Moscow. This could turn out to be the one positive outcome 
of the crisis, because it would increase the likelihood of Russia's building 
a genuine federation, something that is critical to the fate of Russian 
democracy over the long run.

Overall, this crisis demonstrates what has been clear for some, but what the 
Clinton administration has steadfastly refused to recognize because of its 
own close association with Yeltsin: Yeltsin is the problem. He has lost 
whatever ability he might once have had to play a constructive role in 
Russian domestic politics. With his frail health, erratic behavior, lack of 
vision and deep unpopularity (his approval rating hovers around 2 percent), 
he cannot forge the coalition needed to design and implement a program that 
addresses Russia's pressing needs.

Moreover, his jealous protection of his own power prerogatives and his 
entourage's general disregard for the country's welfare retard the formation 
of such a coalition. While hardly any guarantee, the transfer of power from 
Yeltsin to a successor is a condition for Russia's recovery. And the sooner 
that happens, the better for Russia and the world.

*******

#8
Moscow Times
May 13, 1999 
Yeltsin's Move May Test Constitution 
By Catherine Belton
Staff Writer

President Boris Yeltsin's dismissal of Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov raises 
the prospect of Russia tumbling into constitutional crisis. 

An apparent conflict in Russia's Constitution about when the State Duma may 
or may not be dissolved creates a discrepancy that could lead to a political 
logjam between Yeltsin's effort to win approval for a new prime minister and 
the Duma's effort to impeach Yeltsin. 

If the Duma rejects Yeltsin's candidate three times, the president is 
required to dissolve the Duma, triggering elections to seat a new Duma within 
four months of the old one's dismissal. 

But Yeltsin's decision to remove Primakov, who was broadly supported in the 
Communist-dominated Duma, is likely to spur lawmakers to gather the 300 votes 
needed to set the impeachment process in motion in a vote set for Saturday. 

The Constitution says the Duma cannot be dissolved while impeachment is 
pending - while another section of the Constitution says the Duma must be 
dissolved if the Duma turns down the prime ministerial nominees. 

"Yeltsin cannot dissolve the Duma during impeachment hearings against him. 
But the chances of the Duma approving Yeltsin's PM candidate now verge on 
zero," Yevgeny Volk, senior political analyst at the Heritage Foundation, 
said. 

"There is nothing written into the Constitution that provides for the 
scenario of impeachment proceedings simultaneously occurring with wrestling 
in the Duma over the PM's appointment," he explained. 

It would be up to the Constitutional Court to decide which claim held greater 
weight, leaving Russia hanging in a political vacuum. 

Some legal experts have speculated Yeltsin might suspend the Duma while the 
court decides, raising the prospect of a standoff like the one in 1993, when 
a lack of constitutional clarity pitted president against parliament. That 
struggle ended when Yeltsin ordered in tanks to shell parliament into 
submission. 

But political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky of the Center for Strategic Studies 
played down this scenario. 

"The main difference between now and 1993 is that then the Constitution was 
full of holes and contradictions. Constitutional law was far from 
established, unlike now when it is set firm," he said. 

Analysts also say the impeachment procedure could collapse within a matter of 
weeks. Impeaching the president is a convoluted legal wrangle that favors the 
president. 

After being approved by the Duma, charges must be examined by the Supreme 
Court to determine whether they constitute serious criminal offenses, as 
required by the Constitution, and by the Constitutional Court for procedural 
correctness. 

Then they go to the upper house of parliament, the Federation Council, where 
a two-thirds vote is required to remove the president. If the council does 
not act within 90 days, impeachment fails. 

"The Supreme Court is not going to find Yeltsin guilty of any of the 
impeachment charges," Piontkovsky predicted. 

"If they say Yeltsin has committed a crime by launching the war against 
Chechnya, then this would mean they would overturn a ruling made by the 
Constitutional Court in 1995," he said. "The legal precedent on Chechnya has 
already been set." 

********

#9
Date: Wed, 12 May 1999 
From: "Elizabeth Davis" <EDavis@marykay.ru> 
Subject: RE: 3282-Yeltsin Fires Primakov

Comment on the "New Government"
Elizabeth Davis

Your readers may remember me as one of the early voices of OUTRAGE following
the first revelations of FIMACO back in early February. Since then I have
gone through many changes and now consider myself a "reformed" Russophile.
That is to say that I haven't started packing my bags yet, and I haven't
discarded all of my romantic illusions, but I have stopped thinking that the
government in any way, shape or form will ever begin to put the welfare of
the people and good of the state above their personal interests and greed.

Why do we have yet for the third (!) time the sacking of the Prime Minister?
Why has Yeltsin chosen this moment to shake up the government and thus the
economy at a time when "stability" was the only success that "his"
government could point to since the crisis. One reason: self-interest,
greed, and self-protection. No government in Russia (or the USSR) has ever
had any other motive for their actions and they don't today. Protecting
their own perquisites and realms of wealth and national largesse at the
expense of the people is the national model. That's why theft and capital
flight are not only tolerated but encouraged! That's why technical
assistance programs and loans from the West "go missing" or worse provide
new technologies and new ideas for how to "steal better" from the people.
What other political reason can there be for risking your economy, for
risking your thin remaining balance of national reservices, for risking the
near-potential re-instatement IMF funding and financial standing in the
world, and for risking the goodwill of every Western business trying
desperately to hang on to their fragile piece of this crumbling market??!?
(Of course, conveniently you've already crushed the nascent hope of the
people, so at least you don't have to worry about that.)

The Russian people understand this most of all. On a television program
tonight, callers were asked to comment on what they thought Yeltsin's reason
was: a) as a blow to the "opposition"; b) as a blow to the Duma; or c) the
whim of Yeltsin. The overwhelming majority chose (c). There is no
underlying reason or point, it's just his whim today, for himself, or his
family, or anyone else (Beresovsky?!) who has convinced him that his (their)
personal interests are at risk.

The Western analysts and former Sovietologists will ponder this lastest move
for the next days and weeks but we who live here (and the Russians) will
move on quickly because there is no deeper meaning and there is no
fundamental change to our lives and the timeless uncertainty and instability
that is Russia. It is just another maneuver in the on-going schemes of the
post-Soviet bureaucracy to preserve and preferably send abroad as much of
the country's wealth as possible, all the while keeping the people quiet
with promises that noone believes but which they've just become comfortable
with.

The Russian government and the Russian people will continue to reap what
they sow - discord with the world, discord between the government and the
people, and discord between themselves. This strangely remains the mystery
at the heart of the enigma that is Russia that continues to draw my
fascination. An endlessly vicious circle in which everyone survives but no
one actually learns to live. And so it goes into the new millenium. 

*******

#10
Date: Wed, 12 May 1999 
From: "Robert Devane" <robertdevane@glasnet.ru> 
Subject: The Primakov Cabinet Sacking

THE FOLLOWING IS AN EXERPT FROM THE COMMENTARY ON THE PRIMAKOV CABINET
SACKING, STEPASHIN APPOINTMENT, AND YELTSIN IMPEACHMENT, PROVIDED BY
RENEGADE CAPITAL TO ITS CLIENTS EARLIER TODAY. THIS IS FOR INFORMATION
PURPOSES ONLY, AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE INVESTMENT ADVISE AND SHOULD NOT BE
RELIED UPON AS SUCH.

We view the sacking of the Primakov cabinet as a net positive development,
though a bit late in coming. As you may recall, in November issue of
Renegade Quarterly we had forecast a serious cabinet by March. That hadn't
happened exactly as we had theorized, though serious discussions about "the
end" of the Primakov cabinet began in earnest in late-February -
early-March. We consider that the situation with the Primakov government
has in effect been a ticking bomb, which finally detonated this morning.

The Primakov cabinet's focus on preserving the economic status quo through
economic abstinence at the expense of continuous political concessions had
taken Russia to the worst position in domestic and external politics since
1991. This year, Russia has faced the most realistic threat of succumbing
to a red-brown revenge. It was clear some months ago that the Primakov
government, especially its economic block, lacked the potency to implement
any meaningful change needed in Russia so badly. Instead, the Prime
Minister had allowed himself to become a hostage of the leftist and
nationalist forces, which in effect eventually nullified his claim to the
role of a political stabilizer. Catering to the whims of the country's
dominant political force hardly passes for stabilization. 

The cabinet's fate became sealed when after months of spinning its wheels
its Communist members Maslyukov and Kulik appeared to drift towards austere
measures espoused by the IMF. The Duma was in effect asked to adopt a set
of legislative measures, which were remarkably similar to those proposed by
the Kiriyenko government last summer.

Sergey Stepashin's appointment has the important short-term repercussion of
cooling the hot heads who would entertain the notions of stirring up social
unrest and rebellious activities in the military and law enforcement
agencies. Stepashin is a highly respected professional within the so-called
"power block" (and beyond it), and will ensure that the current reshuffle
does not culminate in excesses of the October 1993 variety (when Supreme
Soviet parliamentarians were shelled by tanks in the Russian White House).
As for Stepashin's longer-term prospects, it remains to be seen whether
Yeltsin will "really" pick him as the next Prime Minister, or whether his
nomination this morning is a red herring. It is almost a certainty that the
Duma will decline to confirm Stepashin in the first of the three votes
allowed by the Russian Constitution. Doing anything else would be seen as
the Communist Party rolling over for Yeltsin and would not be well received
by the Communist electorate. After the first vote on Stepashin, Yeltsin
will then have the right to either nominate Stepashin again, or offer a new
candidate. The names of former PM Victor Chernomyrdin and former First
Deputy PM Anatoly Chubais have come up as possible options. At this
juncture it is much too early to call the outcome on this one. The one sure
thing is that the Duma must vote on the Stepashin nomination by next
Wednesday.

If Stepashin does become the new Prime Minister, Russia will get a young,
intelligent, and energetic PM, whose links to Russia's democratic movement
are a well established fact. This afternoon Anatoly Chubais gave Stepashin
an excellent reference, describing the general as a member of St Petersburg
intelligensia. Stepashin holds a Ph.D. in history and a Dr. Sci. in law. 

The key, however, will be the new economic block. These key appointments
will determine whether Russia continues to tread water in the foreseeable
future, or begins to move towards sustainable economic recovery. They will
also play a key role in determining how political campaigns are financed
over the next year. All things considered, there is a high likelihood that
a Stepashin cabinet would include younger reform-oriented ministers.

Overall, we view Primakov's sacking as a positive development, though we
fully expect that there will be some political turbulence in the near term,
replete with chest beating and saber rattling. There are two main reasons
for this optimistic assessment. First, Primakov had become an unpredictable
wildcard (and therefore a source of risk) in the outlook for the
presidential elections of 2000. As you are aware from the opinion poll
statistics we have regularly reported in Renegade Weekly, the probable
presidential
election outcomes differ sharply, depending on whether Primakov is included
in the polls. With Primakov out of the picture I am currently betting that
Yuri Luzhkov will
become Russia's next President with Grigory Yavlinsky as his Prime
Minister. The second factor is that throughout Primakov's tenure, the
Communists have been able to strengthen their positions and financial
status, thanks largely to Maslyukov and Kulik, who were alarmingly close to
the state coffers. With only half a year left before the Duma elections,
any move that declaws the Communist Party and their nazi allies should be
viewed as a cause for celebration.

Needless to say, Yeltsin's move to sack the Primakov cabinet one day before
the impeachment hearings are set to begin will go down in history as one of
his boldest plays. The move will undoubtedly light fires under the seats of
the Communists & Co., but it is not clear that the likelihood of the
Yeltsin impeachment going through will increase as a result of the sacking.
As we had argued in yesterday's commentary, it will be a struggle to get
the 300 votes necessary to impeach Yeltsin, even assuming a 100% turnout on
judgement day. The three-day proceeding, which begins tomorrow, will be
broadcast live over the government owned RTR channel, which will facilitate
first hand monitoring of the moods in the Duma. 

We continue to believe that Yeltsin is moving towards disbanding the Duma
before the December elections, probably in conjunction with either banning
or otherwise restricting the Communist Party. 

We expect to see debt spreads widen out further on the political
uncertainty that lies ahead. The equity market took a hit today on
significant volume (by Russian standards). The benchmark RTS index was down
by 81.39 points (16.18%) on volume of US$17 million. Despie the market's
sell-off, we firmly believe that we have just come upon the watershed event
that will turn the situation around towards recovery in the longer term.

*******

#11
Washington Post
May 13, 1999
Editorial
Dangerous Russia

AS TO WHY President Boris Yeltsin would fire yet another prime minister, one 
answer is: because he can. Hemmed in by Russia's declining fortunes and his 
own declining health, Mr. Yeltsin, once at the center of history, now can 
hardly influence events inside or outside Russia. One of the few things he 
can do to remind people that he still haunts the halls of the Kremlin is to 
change premiers, and so he does, with disturbing regularity.

Russia has survived so much upheaval during the past decade that another dose 
of political turbulence might seem inconsequential. After all, Yevgeny 
Primakov, the outgoing prime minister, managed to restore calm to Russia 
essentially by doing as little as possible during his eight-month tenure. He 
brought the country out of economic crisis by boasting that he had no 
economic policy. Mr. Yeltsin, master of an enormous nuclear arsenal, is in 
uncertain control of his own faculties; last week, he babbled so 
embarrassingly at an official ceremony that his aides persuaded Russian 
television networks not to air the tape. Yet Russia and the rest of the world 
survive.

It would be a mistake, however, to draw too much comfort from the resilience 
of the Russian people and the catastrophes avoided thus far. The fact that 
oft-predicted calamities such as national disintegration or social upheaval 
have yet to come true does not mean they never will. More to the point, even 
as it avoids revolution, Russia is in a state of gradual collapse. People are 
dying younger and younger. Last year 300,000 young men drafted for military 
service were undernourished and unfit. The government is less and less able 
to perform the minimal functions of a state: providing security, collecting 
taxes, caring for the most vulnerable.

The possibility of an inadvertent missile launch or an illicit warhead sale 
also has lost its ability to frighten or motivate us after years of repeated 
warnings. But such horrors grow more likely as Russia weakens, not less. 
Russia's entire approved defense budget for this year is about $4 billion -- 
far less than the supplemental budget Congress will approve to pay for just a 
few months of Kosovo operations. This means Russia cannot be a threat to 
anyone in conventional terms. But chaos and demoralization within the 
military can present threats of their own. Mr. Yeltsin's decision last month 
to put new emphasis on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in military 
doctrine hints at the unforeseen and perilous potential consequences of 
weakness.

Mr. Yeltsin's latest nominee, Sergei Stepashin, is known chiefly for the 
unquestioning loyalty he has shown Mr. Yeltsin over the years and for his 
major role in pushing Russia into its disastrous war in Chechnya in 1994. In 
Soviet times, he graduated from the academy of the ministry responsible for 
internal security; he wrote his doctoral dissertation in 1986 on "Communist 
Party Leadership in Leningrad's Fire Brigades During World War II." No 
matter, perhaps; the parliament is unlikely to confirm his nomination. More 
likely is a new period of political combat and instability, including 
possibly the impeachment of Mr. Yeltsin, as Russia slides further downhill. 

*******

#12
New York Times
May 13, 1999
Editorial
Revolving Prime Ministers 

Boris Yeltsin has given new meaning to an old Kremlin post, the disposable 
prime minister. Yevgeny Primakov is the latest, dismissed Wednesday 
ostensibly for failing to revive the economy. The actual reason is doubtless 
more byzantine. Like Yeltsin's previous decapitations, the removal of 
Primakov and his Cabinet leaves Moscow's domestic and foreign policies in 
disarray. 

The timing could scarcely be worse. The Russian economy is still staggering, 
but Primakov had at least restored a measure of political stability in Moscow 
and recently gained agreement from the International Monetary Fund to resume 
limited lending to Russia. The Russian Government has also been trying to put 
together a peace agreement to end the war in Yugoslavia, a role that may now 
be diminished because of infighting in Moscow. 

Yeltsin's labored appearance on Russian television to announce his decision 
could only have added to the common perception among Russians that their 
President is enfeebled and increasingly out of touch with the country's 
urgent interests. 

The political machinations of the Yeltsin court have come to rival the 
intrigue that flourished under the czars. Yeltsin is under constant attack 
from Communist politicians, who use every stratagem including possible 
impeachment to bring him down. Leaders like Primakov and Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
another former Prime Minister, are anointed, sacrificed, rehabilitated and 
again discharged. All the while the people's needs are ignored. This is no 
way to manage a modern state with more than 10,000 nuclear weapons. 

Yeltsin said he was acting in defense of democracy and economic reform. If 
so, the most charitable interpretation is that he removed Primakov, no 
champion of reform, before he could establish himself as the leading 
candidate to succeed Yeltsin. A less generous assessment is that Yeltsin once 
again acted impulsively to preserve his own power by ousting an increasingly 
popular and independent Prime Minister. 

Just how the dismissal relates to a planned impeachment vote in the Duma this 
weekend is unclear, though it seems likely Yeltsin's decision will arm his 
opponents. The charges against Yeltsin, compiled by the Communists, would 
seem bizarre almost anywhere else. Among other things, he is accused of 
instigating the collapse of the Soviet Union, which of course he did and for 
which the world is eternally grateful. Before he can be ousted, the upper 
house of Parliament will have to approve the action by a two-thirds vote, 
which is considered unlikely but not inconceivable. 

Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin, Yeltsin's new choice for prime minister, 
has spent his life in internal security jobs, not exactly a breeding ground 
for democracy. In the turbulent world of Kremlin politics, he may never be 
confirmed by the Duma. If he is, he can probably look forward to being 
dismissed by Yeltsin someday. That is, if Yeltsin is still President. 

******

#13
Leftist Reader Mocks Yeltsin's 'Puppeteers' 

Sovetskaya Rossiya
May 11, 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Letter from engineer Aleksandr Trubitsyn: "Another Parade Lies Ahead..." 

Zelenograd -- Among the multitude of theatrical 
genres you have the one where actors wearing dark costumes and trying to 
blend into the background operate a brightly painted, life-size puppet, 
saying its words for it. If I am not mistaken, this genre is known in 
Japan as joruri. There was once a popular vaudeville act in our country 
in which unseen puppeteers operated a puppet representing an idiot youth: 
"I am not your typical teenager and all my life I wouldn't have had it 
any other way: Give me 100 grams of 'Stolichnaya' vodka and I'll sing you 
a song!" 

You laughed to look at the idiot youth, but you felt ashamed to see the 
elderly Yeltsin controlled by puppeteers. It is wrong to laugh at sick 
people, but "democratic" television appreciates neither what is shameful 
nor what is wrong. In this respect so-called Russian television is just 
like the foreign newspaper from which this photograph apparently showing 
the supreme commander in chief laying flowers on the grave of the Unknown 
Soldier [the piece is accompanied by a photograph from the Moscow Times 
of Yeltsin apparently being physically supported]. Maybe the photographer 
got mixed up: Yeltsin is not actually laying anything, but he himself is 
about to be laid in the Central Clinic. Foreigners can be excused for 
laughing at another country's shortcomings or getting mixed up. But see 
what television is doing to the nationally elected president: The 
anchorman cheerfully announces that Yeltsin is in splendid physical shape 
-- while at that very moment, on the screen, someone trying to be an 
unseen puppeteer is leading Yeltsin by the hand to a chair and then 
maneuvering Yeltsin into the chair. 

I'm sorry, but you do not have to lead healthy people in that way. It is 
something you do either to the blind or to the mentally deficient, who do 
not know where they are or what they should be doing. What they call 
harmless idiots. When the puppeteer had gotten Yeltsin seated and had 
withdrawn Yeltsin obviously began to act strangely. First he started to 
read something from a piece of paper, then he stopped, turned his head to 
one side and pulled a face. Still pulling that face, he sat for a long 
time motionless. Then someone either prodded him under the table or gave 
him a quiet nudge, and he said that the seating was all wrong. He 
demanded that former troubleshooter Stepashin, who is now one of 
Yeltsin's favorites, sit closer to him. Just like the kindergarten, in 
fact: I can still remember Olezhka Miklin and me arguing who should sit 
closer to Lariska Lapshina, while Tolik Silkovskiy would decide who would 
join him at the dinner table today. 

Here you have a living (or barely living) example of how intelligent and 
serious the Kremlin occupants' pursuits are -- the head of state 
distributes chairs among his entourage. But then they simply have nothing 
else to do. Have you ever seen the authorities have such fun before? 

*******

 

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