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Johnson's Russia List
 

 

April 25, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 32573258   


Johnson's Russia List
#3258
25 April 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Boston Globe: Graham Allison, Could the US and Russia wind up at war? 
2. Reuters: Daniel Bases, U.S.-Russian relations at 15-year low - experts.
3. AFP: Chernomyrdin's Yugo mission a high-profile failure.
4. Reuters: Timothy Heritage, Russian govt faces pressure before IMF talks.
5. Aleksey Lipchin: Unique Source of Russian News.
6. Rachel Douglas: 1993.
7. Oleg Petrov: Russia and Kosovo.
8. Kommersant Daily: Yuri Luzhkov, NATO – a nasty anniversary.]

*******

#1
Boston Globe
25 April 1999
[for personal use only]
Could the US and Russia wind up at war? 
By Graham Allison
Graham Allison is director of Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs. 

Could NATO's current bombing campaign against Serbia lead to deadly
conflict between the United States and Russian military forces? Until last
week, my answer was a categorical no. But then I went to Moscow.

The primary reason for my trip was to speak to a conference of 6,000
participants from across Russia about mortgages and housing. For the past
18 months, a Harvard project I head has been providing technical assistance
to Moscow's Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and his Moscow Mortgage Initiative.

After my presentation, Mayor Luzhkov asked that I come see him that
evening. We discussed Moscow's progress in developing a market-based
mortgage system. We assessed Russian macroeconomic policies. As I prepared
to leave, he changed the subject.

''Is the American government thinking carefully about the consequences of
its decisions in Kosovo?'' he asked. To him, the United States appeared
surprised by the not unlikely consequences of its actions: Milosevic's
reaction to Rambouillet, dismissal of the threats of bombing, defiance of
the bombing campaign, increased support from the Serbian people, and
ferocious attack on the KLA and atrocities that created the flood of
refugees to Albania and Macedonia.

''Are American policy makers analyzing carefully scenarios from the current
situation to the end of this story?'' he asked. ''Specifically, have they
considered the possibility that intensifying pressures of public opinion in
Russia as well as the United States could create domestic dynamics that
lead to direct military conflict between the US and Russia?''

I responded that the foreign policy community was trying to analyze all
scenarios. I noted President Yeltsin's warning about such a danger but
discounted it as ''noise.'' I said that I had never seen a credible
scenario for such a catastrophic conclusion and offered a judgment that
such an outcome was almost inconceivable.

''If the bombing fails, as it appears likely to do, could NATO launch a
ground invasion to liberate Kosovo?'' he asked. I agreed that it was quite
possible. ''In that case, what would Russia do?''

He reiterated his condemnation of Milosevic and his barbarism. He
identified no significant national interest in Serbia. He has opposed
Communist-sponsored proposals for security guarantees to Serbia or even
confederation. He reaffirmed his belief that Russia should not become
involved in this war.

''But if NATO ground forces began invading Serbia,'' he asked, ''could the
Russian government maintain the embargo on the supply of arms to Serbia?''
Unlikely, in his view. Russian arms, perhaps including S-300 surface-to-air
missiles capable of shooting down US aircraft, would be supplied to Serbia.

By what route? The mayor noted last week a convoy of military vehicles,
fuel, and humanitarian assistance to Serbia that had been stopped by the
Hungarian government at its border. Hungary would undoubtedly deny ground
shipments of arms to Serbia.

''What would Russia do then?'' he asked. ''Could it not deliver arms by
air transport? The United States took that route in supplying Berlin during
the blockade of 1948.'' Would NATO allow Russian aircraft to violate
Hungarian airspace and deliver arms to Serbia? Or would they choose to
shoot down Russian planes instead?

''If NATO were to shoot down Russian planes, how would Russia respond?
Would Russia stand down? Or would Russia retaliate by attacking NATO
aircraft, or the bases from which NATO aircraft that shot down Russian
airplanes had flown?'' Russia could, of course, do this with non-nuclear
missiles, he said.

This conversation went on into the night. Throughout, the mayor was not
threatening but analytic. In his view, allowing mad momentum to push
politics to such an end would be ''crazy.'' He recalled the logic of Greek
tragedy in which the actors are moved by a compelling, self-destructive
dynamic to results they would never have chosen rationally. Remember 1914.

As I left the mayor's office I thought back to an uncomfortable historical
analogy. In the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, US and Soviet leaders
stood ''eyeball to eyeball,'' each with the unilateral power of mutual
annihilation in hand. On the final Saturday of that crisis, a Soviet
surface-to-air missile in Cuba shot down an American U-2 aircraft, killing
its pilot. The Kennedy administration had considered that scenario and
prepared its response. It would retaliate by bombing Soviet SAM sites in
Cuba - an action that in their estimate would have killed at least scores
of Soviet soldiers.

At this brink, President Kennedy paused. That evening, before proceeding
with the retaliatory attack, he undertook an extraordinary initiative to
provide Khrushchev an escape, including significant concessions -
sufficient to persuade Khrushchev to withdraw Soviet missiles without war.

Even at this late date, after Milosevic's atrocities and four weeks of
steady NATO bombing, it may not be too late to pause for a serious
strategic reassessment of the path along which we are now being driven.

*******

#2
U.S.-Russian relations at 15-year low - experts
By Daniel Bases

HARRIMAN, N.Y., April 25 (Reuters) - U.S.-Russian relations have deteriorated 
to their worst level since the fall of the Iron Curtain, partially because of 
NATO's inclusion of three former Soviet bloc nations and its bombing of 
Serbia, academics say. 

``We are at the worst position in relations since just before (former Soviet 
President Mikhail) Gorbachev'' (1985-1991), said Marshall Goldman of Harvard 
University at a recent conference sponsored by both Columbia and Harvard 
Universities. 

While Russia and the United States have had disputes over the military 
campaign in Kosovo, the gulf between the dominant nuclear powers began long 
before Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic started clearing Kosovo of more 
than 535,000 ethnic Albanians, academics say. 

``The Russians have assumed that much of Western policy, led by the United 
States, ... was designed to diminish Russia, to displace Russia and force its 
influence back,'' said Robert Legvold, former director of Columbia's 
Harriman Institute. 

``This was brought to a fine point by NATO's recent expansion, but it is a 
misreading of U.S. policy. Right now the situation is bad and getting worse, 
and a thing like Kosovo,'' exacerbates it, he said. 

NATO accepted Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into its fold on March 
12. 

``The expansion of NATO was a profound mistake,'' said Marshall Shulman, a 
retired international relations professor at Columbia. 

Besides NATO issues, Russia's economic collapse on August 17, 1998, when it 
devalued its currency, the ruble, and announced a debt moratorium, threw a 
nation of 153 million people into a destabilised and disoriented state. 

``There is now a displaced resentment and anger at not being able to make 
ends meet in Russia,'' Shulman said. ``It is an anxious time'' in the history 
of U.S.-Russian relations. 

``All of the leaders of Russian liberalisation are associated with the 
Americans, and right now Russians are not happy with America,'' said 
Alexander Livshits, a former economic advisor to President Boris Yeltsin who 
stepped down in the wake of the financial crisis. 

Russians associate the failure to build a market economy with America's 
influence in shaping its economic reforms. 

Additionally, anti-Americanism has grown rapidly in Russia, as the United 
States is seen as the main force behind NATO's decision to bomb Yugoslavia, 
conference participants said. 

Russians from across the political spectrum are supporting their fellow 
Orthodox Christian Slavs in Serbia. 

``Russia is in a state of suspended animation, politically, economically and 
there won't be any reforms, nor will there be upheavals before the 
(presidential) elections'' in June 2000, Livshits added. 

In Legvold's view, America is suffering from ``Russian fatigue'' caused by 
Russia's inability to fix its own problems. 

``We are bored by them, frustrated by them and at the core this is a problem 
of indifference that is leading to a widening of the relationship,'' he said. 

Russia has interpreted this ``fatigue'' as a willingness to let it fail, 
shattering the view that the country was too big to be allowed to go under. 

``In the early 1990s we met and got to know all of the reformers, and then 
they were gone and we don't know where they went,'' said Representative 
Howard Berman, a California Democrat and senior member of the House 
International Relations Committee. 

``The Russian Duma, with its resurgent Communists, nationalists, 
anti-American sentiment, plus delays in ratifying START II'' make dealing 
with Russia difficult, he added. 

The Duma, or lower house of the Russia Parliament, has repeatedly delayed 
ratification of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), most 
recently to protest NATO's bombings of Serbia. 

START II, a bilateral agreement concluded in January 1993, would cut both 
America's and Russia's nuclear weapons arsenals to a maximum of 3,500 
warheads each by 2003. 

Berman admitted that Washington's focus on foreign relations has shifted away 
from Russia and toward China, as business interests are drawn to the world's 
most populated country and away from a financial cripple. 

``To some degree (there is) a feeling among a small minority of congressmen 
that Russia is still a major potential threat,'' Berman told Reuters. Berman 
stressed, however, that he did not subscribe to this view. 

One ray of hope for bolstering relations, Legvold said, ``is that we are very 
close to achieving a new Conventional Forces in Europe agreement, which I 
think is a very important step in managing the next phases of NATO and NATO 
expansion.'' 

The CFE was a cornerstone of security during the Cold War, limiting the 
number of tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft and other non-nuclear arms that 
state could hold and deploy. 

*******

#3
(ANALYSIS) Chernomyrdin's Yugo mission a high-profile failure
MOSCOW, April 25 (AFP) - Russia's Balkans envoy Viktor
Chernomyrdin has returned home from Belgrade to mixed reviews, with early
hopes that he had solved the Kosovo crisis quickly replaced by allegations
of political posturing.

The reactions filtering in from world capitals of a Russian-drafted peace
plan were always less than enthusiastic, with Washington wearily
acknowledging Chernomyrdin's efforts as helpful.

Soon everyone was acknowledging that the mission by Chernomyrdin, who
returned here Friday, had failed.

Some in Moscow were not at all surprised at the results garnered by
Russia's former prime minister, who has a reputation as a master of fudge
and self-promotion.

"It's not a question of whether he can accomplish anything in Kosovo, but
that he can gain some political capital with the voters," said analyst
Sergei Markov.

"Chernomyrdin is now the center of everyone's attention. His last press
conference drew 30 television cameras."

Moscow foreign policy insiders agree that Chernomyrdin came to Belgrade to
meet Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic last Thursday mostly for show.

"Chernomyrdin's trip and the whole of Russia's diplomacy for now are only
propaganda," said Institute of Europe head Pavel Kandel.

When the former premier came out of his meeting with Slobodan Milosevic to
announce that the Yugoslav President had agreed to the presence of a
"military" force in Yugoslavia, the Russian media went wild.

Belgrade's subsequent contradiction of that statement was reported lower
down in the stories.

Another top Russia-watcher puts Chernomyrdin's snap mission into simple terms.

"Sure, Yeltsin wanted to rub Primakov's nose in it," said Andrei Piontkovsky. 

There is a very evident power struggle swirling around Russian President
Boris Yeltsin and his premier Yevgeny Primakov. The cabinet head in March
led his own unsuccessful mission to Belgrade.

Chernomyrdin's appointment as Yeltsin's personal Balkans envoy on April 14
was seen as a major slight against Primakov.

The ex-premier is making grand announcements while the spotlight is upon him.

"The danger exists that we will slip into a third world war, the final
war," Chernomyrdin said on Saturday.

These sentiments strike a chord with Russian voters, whom Chernomyrdin
hopes to woo when he runs for the presidency in 2000. He made the final
announcement of his candidacy over the weekend.

What analysts fear, however, is that Chernomyrdin's unsuccessful Belgrade
mission may spoil Washington's plans to engage Russia as a negotiator
between NATO and Yugoslavia.

They have long wondered how much effect Russia actually has on the
decision-making of their historic allies in Belgrade.

The conflicting statements following the Chernomyrdin-Milosevic meeting did
nothing to bolster the idea of Russia's influence.

"Certainly there were disagreements (between Chernomyrdin and Milosevic,"
conceded Kandel of the Institute of Europe. "But Belgrade still needs
Moscow to negotiate against NATO."

Others are more scathing. "The result of his mission is nil. And that is
because he brought nothing new to the table," said Piontkovsky. 

********

#4
Russian govt faces pressure before IMF talks
By Timothy Heritage

MOSCOW, April 25 (Reuters) - A high-level Russian delegation left for 
Washington on Sunday to hold talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
amid pressure to do more to end the country's economic problems. 

First Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov headed a mission including the 
finance minister and central bank chief which is expected to meet IMF 
Managing Director Michel Camdessus and World Bank President James Wolfensohn 
during a five-day trip. 

Moscow is seeking new loans to enable it to meet debt repayments due next 
month. Failure to secure new credits soon would strike a deep economic and 
political blow to the government, and could put its survival in deep doubt. 

"The government has managed to stabilise the political situation...but there 
are no clear benchmarks (for turning around the economy)," Moscow mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov told a congress of his centrist Fatherland party on Saturday. 

"We need goals that would consolidate society and ensure support for the 
government," said Luzhkov, who is expected to run in the presidential 
election due in mid-2000 and could find himself standing against Prime 
Minister Yevgeny Primakov. 

Primakov, 69, has calmed political tensions since he was appointed last 
September after the collapse of the previous government at the height of 
Russia's economic crisis. 

His cautious economic policy, stalling the more liberal reforms of his 
predecessors, has ensured him of broad support in Russian parliament but he 
has found it harder to please the IMF. 

Russia is hoping the IMF will lend it at least $4.8 billion this year, enough 
to meet repayments due to the Fund next month on earlier loans. IMF approval 
of the government's economic programme would also ease the way in talks with 
other creditors as Russia tries to ease its $140 billion debt burden. 

Even if the government wins new loans -- and the government says a deal is 
close -- Primakov could remain vulnerable. 

Aides to President Boris Yeltsin have expressed reservations about the 
government, and speculation is rife that the Kremlin chief could reshuffle 
the cabinet to reassert his authority. Some analysts say Primakov himself 
could be ousted. 

Maslyukov, who will be accompanied in Washington by Finance Minister Mikhail 
Zadornov, Economy Minister Andrei Shapovalyants and central bank chief Viktor 
Gerashchenko, is also in danger -- especially if the loan talks break down. 

Yeltsin, too, is under pressure. His authority has been dented by illness and 
Primakov's rise, the usually loyal upper house of parliament defied him in an 
important vote last week and the lower chamber is considering impeaching him. 

Yeltsin, 68, received some reassurances from Luzhkov and another centrist 
leader, Viktor Chernomyrdin, at the weekend. Both said they opposed 
impeachment. 

But, in a veiled criticism, Luzhkov also said Russia must in 2000 elect an 
"effective president who is capable of taking decisions on the country's 
basic questions." 

*******

#5
Subject: Unique Source of Russian News
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 1999 
From: Aleksey Lipchin <alipchin@MIT.EDU>

I would like to offer your subscribers who read Russian
a unique insight into life in Russia. I have a correspondent
who daily sends me letters in which he relates significant
events of the day, cites items from the press both important
and amusing, and makes his own observations. These letters
can be read on my website in KOI-8 (UNIX), CP1251 (WIN), or
transliteration. I maintain an archive extending back several
years. All who read Russian are welcome! 

http://www.gis.net/~lipchin/letters/koi8/title.html

Thanks.
Yours,
Aleksey
Dr. Aleksey Lipchin
66-250
Department of Chemical Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge MA 02139
USA
Office Phone: (617) 253-6547
Fax Number: (617) 258-8224 
web-address: http://www.mit.edu/people/alipchin/home.html
Email: alipchin@mit.edu

*******

#6
From: cmgusa@mediasoft.net (Rachel Douglas)
Subject: 1993
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 1999 

On the events of 1993 (JRL #3253 and #3255), especially because
extremely divergent "takes" on what happened then are still a powerful
presence in the minds of policy-makers in both Russia and America, I'd like
to recall something else about what people wrote or could have written in
major publications. News reporters, even if they were prisoners of deadline
and of habitual reliance on the local press and TV, as well as op-ed
authors, even if they were prisoners of their pre-conceptions, could have
availed themselves of other sources -- if not at the height of the clashes,
then at least to continue a serious investigation afterwards.
In JRL #1256 (October 4, 1997) you posted the chapter on the Ostankino
clash, from S. Govorukhin's book. It was based on films taken throughout
the afternoon and evening, as well as other eyewitness accounts, rather
than only the selected images broadcast on TV ("a thousand times you have
seen those shots on the screen, some 15 or 20 minutes out of hundreds of
hours of videotape: the truck crashing through the glass door of the
Television Center, the dead soldier from the Vityaz unit, the dead sound
engineer. . ."). It showed that there's a question mark not only over
political evaluations ("defending the government against an armed
insurrection" -Kirkpatrick), but also about what happened on the ground
("On Oct. 3, Rutskoi sent out a force of armed irregulars to capture
Ostankino TV Station" -Rudnitsky).
In Chapter 9 of The Great Criminal Revolution, Govorukhin had written,
"The authorities needed blood in order to impose terror. And blood has been
shed. A crowd is moving on the Television Center. Was that really Rutskoy
who cried, 'Go to Ostankino'? I would never have believed it. But there he
was on the screen. Volodya, his bodyguard, was covering him with a
bulletproof shield, and those were his words, 'To Ostankino!'" In a
footnote to the second edition, the author corrected his report: "I wrote
this page on October 4. At that time I did not know all the circumstances
of the tragedy and I allowed myself to be disoriented by the press and
television; I believed that the 'Storming of Ostankino' actually took
place. A month later, when I viewed videotapes made by many cameramen, I
realized that there had been no `storming.' It was a trap, a carefully
calculated, low-down trick, followed by cold-blooded shooting at the crowd
and passersby."
I thought that change of the account was of interest, not as the last
word on the events, but as an instance of a serious effort to consider new
evidence and improve one's understanding of them, such as precious few
reporters and commentators elsewhere ever undertook.

*******

#7
From: Opetrov@worldbank.org (Oleg Petrov)
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 1999 
Subject: Russia and Kosovo

It is very frustrating to see how this whole Kosovo affair is destroying all
the fruits of 14 years of building mutual ties, understanding and trust
between
America and Russia. It is even more frustrating to see where it all leads.
Indeed, it is a perfect example of when the road to hell is paved with good
intentions.

Instead of taking advantage of a unique opportunity under the Primakov
Government to consolidate the many achievements of democratic reforms and
prevent a come-back of totalitarian dictatorship whether disguised as
market-friendly, nationalist or communist, the West is staunchly pushing
Russia
into isolation and embrace of its foes and strategic competitors.

In order to recover and prosper Russia needs three things:

1. Political and economic stabilization
2. Systemic reform of public administration, massive clean-up of Aegean
stables of crime and corruption
3. Massive foreign investment, literally invasion of foreign
professionals and
businessmen

The Primakov Government has successfully achieved the first objective -
political stabilization and hopefully, with IMF/WB support will soon achieve
economic stabilization, first signs of which are already obvious. In order to
restore credibility and attract substantial foreign aid and investment on
Stage
3 Russia needs first to clean up and reinvent the entire system of government
and clamp down on crime in a big way. This is where the West could really
help
and that would be a single most cost-effective and far-sighted form of
assistance for which future generations of Russians will be most grateful
indeed.

This has to be a massive aid package, a concerted effort by a number of donors
with a major technical assistance component to help reinvent the whole system
of public governance from education to prisons, from Public Service Code to
anti-corruption and anti-crime efforts.

The Primakov Government is the best hope for Russia and the West to resolve
the
corruption and crime problem and thereby prepare a ground for massive foreign
investment on the scale seen last during Peter the Great times when foreigners
were given the most favored treatment and helped modernize medieval Russia.
Primakov is ready to accept such assistance if it is offered in earnest and
without a second agenda. President Yeltsin will also support it.

The Kosovo war is distracting public attention from the need to move to Step 2
and instead distabilizes both the economy and politics. The anti-American
sentiment can grow from a temporary conflict between good friends to a chronic
distrust and hatred. For Russian reforms to succeed and for Western
assistance
not be wasted, we have to get this nuisance behind us as soon as possible and
pretend that nothing has happened.

After all, it is in the West's and especially America's national interest to
stop the war in Kosovo immediately. While Russia's and Serbia's negotiating
position and political capital grows day by day as there is a clearer evidence
of utter absurdity of the bombing campaign, a wider and worldwide
acceptance of
this conclusion and more eloquent arguments as to why the Kosovo war was a
major
foreign policy error; at the same time the US and other NATO countries are
blindly heading to face a major disgrace like Vietnam or even worse.

It is a source of major frustration for all of us who wish well for America
and
US-Russian partnership to see how a hand of a friend extended to save face of
another friend (when he has cornered himself into a trap and keeps drowning
without even realizing it) is being rejected, almost slapped. Latest
Chernomyrdin's plan was not a panacea yet, but it offered a clear chance for
finding a mutually acceptable compromise. The sides are now closer to an
agreement than ever before, it's just a matter of defining what international
peace-keeping force will be like. Still, the US and Britain rushed to reject
the proposal on the fly without even looking at it. With this kind of
suicidal
attitude of major players, the world seems to be doomed.

What is to be done in Kosovo?

1. Role of Russia. Russia needs to be seriously involved in finding a
compromise solution. Chernomyrdin can broker a peace deal between US/NATO,
Albanians and Serbia. All sides should give him a chance and unambiguous
support. He is certainly not the best candidate for the job (e.g. Gorbachev
would be better in the ideal world) but he has been given a full support by
President Yeltsin, Primakov and Russian Foreign Ministry which is a key
factor.

2. Dialog with Serbia. The West should stop demonizing Serbs and Milosevic
because it smells very much like a double standard and sheer propaganda. While
Serbia is no Vatican and Milosevic is no angel, there are countries/rulers who
can be kept responsible for a lot more violence and ethnic cleansing then the
Serbs. To be fully consistent with its self-imposed world policeman mandate,
US/NATO should first look for more crying cases of ethnic cleansing, genocide
and cruelty like Rwanda, Cambodia, Columbia or Turkey. Also, the US should
answer a question: is it ready to bomb Israel if it violently and cruelly
suppresses renewed efforts by the Palestinians to achieve independence in the
near future? What if Turkey started a new round of eradicating Kurdish
independence bid? Will the US at least support a UN bombing campaign? If not,
America will not look good after all its much advertised compassion for
Kosovars.

Also, with all its intelligence satellites looking for compromat, US has not
produced a single credible photo evidence of mass slaughter, genocide, rapes
despite all the rhetoric fueling anti-Serbian public sentiment. Even if
some of
this took place, the mitigating factor is that the blame for unleashing the
latest round of violence and refugees crisis lies squarely on the NATO's
plate.
Whatever is the case, let's stop the killings on both sides and then figure
out
who is wrong and who is right, after all this is what international law exists
for.

The reality is that the world is not quite ready for a police force, all the
more so for a self-assigned police force. If justice and peace enforcement
is to
take place, it has to be legitimized by the appropriate fora like the UN and
OSCE. Only with their authorization such instruments as NATO could be used to
resolve humanitarian crises and conflicts.

Serbia has its own position and arguments and these have to be taken into
account to achieve any compromise. One cannot discount a whole nation,
especially with such a heroic past as Serbia. Objectivity is badly needed,
especially in the Western media. This is not to say that the Russian or
Serbian
media have been entirely objective. But the truth is always in the middle. One
may not respect Milosevic as a private person but it is inexcusable to show no
respect for the whole nation and ignore their legitimate concerns and
sentiments
which may have a seven hundred-year history. It is important to distinguish
our
attitude to him as an individual versus a legitimately elected
representative of
millions of innocent people. You don't have to shake his hand at a private
party
but one has to overcome personal feelings when it comes to saving lives of
thousands of other people. Stalin was much worse but Roosevelt and Churchill
overcame their personal animosity to save millions of innocent lives in Europe
and elsewhere. The Western leaders need to rise to the high standards set by
their great predecessors.

3. Compromise solution for Kosovo. Kosovo should not become a new
independent
state or be allowed to join Albania as this will set a very dangerous
precedent
and can further escalate ethnic animosities in the Balkans. Full partition of
Kosovo should be left only as a last resort option. The preferred option would
be to divide Kosovo into a Serbian and Albanian parts and give it a
substantial
autonomy within Serbia or Yugoslavia (e.g. as a federal republic). The
predominantly Serbian part would be protected by a peace-keeping force made up
mostly of Russians/Eastern Europeans. The predominantly Albanian part could be
protected by a NATO force made up from from countries not participating in the
bombing. Then the refugees could safely return. The idea of a referendum made
sense before but today both warring sides may find it unacceptable. Should the
Albanians staunchly oppose a solution short of independence one may consider
holding a referendum in five years in the Albanian part of Kosovo. After the
economic recovery takes hold and passions clam down, Kosovars are likely to
make
a more objective decision. The whole operation should be done under the
aegis of
the UN or OSCE and both NATO and Russian peace-keepers would be under a
UN/OSCE
command. Serbs will clearly not agree to any mention of NATO on its territory
after all they endured thanks to ill-thought NATO bombing.

4. Rethinking European Security Architecture. It may be a good time to
rethink
the whole system of security in Europe. It is now increasingly clear that any
structure which excludes Russia and other key countries and is perceived as
US-dominated is bound to fail to resolve regional crises like the one in
Kosovo.
As curently structured, NATO lacks both legitimacy and credibility to be an
appropriate security instrument in today's environment. Let's keep in mind
that
the main reason of the previous two world wars was that Europe was divided
into
defense alliances which had nothing else to do to resolve their differences
but
to resort to force. Those of us who were against a narrow-minded
pre-occupation
with NATO expansion two years ago (which today became a reality with a new
aggressive war immediately following the "peaceful", "defensive" enlargement)
and proposed to design a broader structure of the European security such as
PEACE (Pan-European Alliance for Collective Engagement), perfectly envisioned
where that hasty and opportunistic profiteering on Russia's temporary
weaknesses
could lead. As Yeltsin put it - to a pan-European and possibly a world war.
This
is not a threat but knowledge of history and interpolation of the current
worrisome trends. This should be stopped...

It is particularly worrisome to see that NATO has now officially proclaimed
its
right to attack other countries without a UN mandate to punish for
(NATO-interpreted) human rights violations and to uphold NATO values. One can
make educated guess that in order to be safe, one has to be very friendly with
the the US or join the alliance and then feel free to violate any values or
human rights as one pleases. Israel, Columbia and Turkey come to mind as
primary
beneficiaries of this new version of "law of jungles".This could lead very far
indeed and Yeltsin's apocalyptic vision may become a sad reality.

In conclusion, let me say that the main issue today is not how to stop the
war -
as there may be all kinds of options and a compromise solution will be
found as
soon as there is a political will for a diplomatic solution in Washington and
London - but what LESSONS can we draw from this unfortunate military
adventure.
The key lesson in my opinion, is that the curent security structure in Europe
doesn't work and is in need of major repairs. Whatever is the final
architecture, it should be based on a collective security principle rather
than
defensive alliance and include all European nations without any exceptions.
It
can be based on the NATO, be an umbrella-type organization like OSCE or can
replace NATO altogether. The key policy decisions on European security matters
should be made not by a self-appointed exclusive group of Western nations
but by
a broad consensus of all of Europe, including Russia. The US could be a
important part of this given its historic presence but only as an equal
partner
not as a dominant force like in today's NATO.

Hope this clarifies what many Russians feel today,

******

#8
From: "Robert Devane" <robertdevane@glasnet.ru>
Subject: NATO – a nasty anniversaryBy Yuri Luzhkov
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 1999 

The following is an unofficial translation of an article titled "NATO – a
nasty anniversary" by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov. The article was published
in the Friday, April 23rd issue of the daily newspaper Kommersant Daily.
This translation is provided courtesy of Renegade Capital (Moscow) and
appears in the April 26th issue of Renegade Weekly, an analytical
publication of Renegade Capital. JRL subscribers, who wish to receive the
April 26th issue on a complimentary basis, should follow the ordering
instructions provided below.

NATO – a nasty anniversary
By Yuri Luzhkov

Today, when Yugoslavia is being subjected to cruel bombardments, no matter
to which issue in relations with the West we turn, we are constantly
running into the abbreviation "NATO". We have lived for half a century with
a sense of being under threat and with alarm, which emanated from the
North-Atlantic alliance, and were taught not to expect anything good from
this organization from the school bench.

Several years ago doubt appeared: "Were we perhaps overbending the stick?
Perhaps, as they say, the devil isn't so frightening as he is made out to
be?" We are forced to resolve these doubts to the sound of air defense
sirens of Belgrade and other peaceful cities of Yugoslavia, to the sound of
the drumbeat of extremists in Brussels as well as, unfortunately, in
Moscow.

We'll say it straight: the priorities of Russian politics, and therefore
the lives of millions of Russians, will to a large extent depend on how
soberly and weighedly we determine our attitude towards NATO. Those
Russians who ask with alarm "Is it possible again that cannons will replace
meat?" I will remind that according to the latest surveys NATO evokes
apprehension amongst 64% of our citizens. That's 13% more then in 1997,
when Russia signed the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and
Security" with NATO. Moreover, 70% believe that NATO's military action is a
direct threat to Russia's security, but 86% oppose having Russia pulled
into the war in the Balkans.

NATO's last anniversary in 1989 was celebrated by the adoption at the
summit of the block [meaning NATO] of a Declaration in connection with the
40-year anniversary of the North-Atlantic alliance. It established the
goals and policy of the allies for the tenth decade, including assistance
in overcoming divisions in Europe and the establishment of a fair and
peaceful order there. Its half-centennial anniversary, it is known, the
block is celebrating with bombardment of an independent European state,
which has already lead to the deaths of hundreds of peaceful inhabitants of
Yugoslavia and the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Albanians and Serbs
from their native territories. By accepting new members of the alliance,
which by no mans facilitates the creation of a unified Europe, but
separates European nations into "clean" and "unclean".

We are witnessing how one of the largest international organizations and a
most powerful military block is violating its own charter norms. The
founding agreement of the North-Atlantic alliance of April 4th, 1949, 
spoke only of defense in the event of an armed attack on one or several
members of the block. Moreover, the term "armed attack" was specified, but
none of the criteria even with a wild imagination can be imposed onto the
current actions with respect to Yugoslavia.

Not only in the agreement, but also in one of the still active founding
documents -- the strategic conception of the North-Atlantic alliance of
1991—nothing is said on the use of military force beyond the block's zone
of responsibility. The current operation means that the block has overtly
exceeded its functions.

In this same conception it is noted that the block aspires towards peaceful
settlements of disputes in accordance with the provisions of the UN
Charter. With their bombardments, NATO has effectively crossed out the
hater and the principles of United Nations. NATO has struck a powerful blow
to the Founding Act between Russia and NATO, having unilaterally violated
many of its principle provisions. In it, it is stressed that Russia and
NATO "will in good faith observe their obligations [with respect to the] UN
Charter and the provisions of Universal Declaration on Human Rights, as
well as their obligations with respect to the Helsinki Concluding Act and
subsequent documents of the OSCE". What of kind of observation of human
rights is there to speak of against the background of extermination of
civilian population and a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo, which has
broken out as a result of NATO's action?

And what about the obligations set forth in the Act on "conducting
consultations" and "striving towards cooperation" with Russia in such areas
as "security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region or in concrete
crises" and "prevention of conflicts"?

Unfortunately, past talk and assurances about the block's transformation
towards its political component have to a large extent remained as talk and
assurances. The current situation proves that on the contrary, in the
current priorities of means, political means are increasingly supplanted by
military means. NATO remains first of all a military block, and such
reality must be considered for the entirety of the near future. Although,
it must be mentioned in connection with this that the current military
actions are increasingly evoking doubts in the West, not only in the
effectiveness of the bombing, but also in the extent to which the block's
military doctrine, which was traditionally oriented towards confrontation
with the Warsaw Pact organization, is adapted to other types of conflicts.

Yes, no one can remove responsibility from Slobodan Milosevic, who is a
sort of an explosive mixture of communism and nationalism, for the ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo. But every person with sober thinking understands that
NATO bombardment, the deaths of innocent people, and the humanitarian
catastrophe in the Balkans are, to put it mildly, disproportionate
[excessive] compared to the actions of the Yugoslav authorities. They are
most likely an excuse for the use of military force in connection with
realization of broader objectives. A thought comes to mind about the
necessity of thinking through the introduction of the concept of
"ethnocide" into international law, with corresponding punishment of the
guilty.

But at this juncture NATO has is not planning on stopping, preparing for a
possible ground attack on the territory of a sovereign state. I wish to
remind that the people of Yugoslavia learn quickly and know how to fight.
In the first three weeks of the [German] fascist invasion in 1941, the
Germans lost 2.5 thousand people in casualties, and in total during the
first four months of 1945, when the German troops were tossed out of the
country, their losses comprised 300 thousand men.

I also wish to remind during [Joseph Broz] Tito's rule, Yugoslavia's
military forces had prepared for extended defensive actions, first of all
against the Warsaw Pact organizations, including partisan operations with
corresponding infrastructure. And it is necessary to keep in sight even the
psychological mindset of the Yugoslavs, who are prepared for a war of this
nature. It is no accident that former Secretary General of NATO Willi Klas,
who has experience in using the alliance's forces in Bosnia, is warning
against involving land forces in the current conflict. 

Changes in priorities cannot not raise guards, and not just with respect to
the European continent. For example, NATO sees its involvement as
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means
of delivering it. What now instead of political and economic measures for
pressuring "borderline" countries, bombardment or bringing in troops onto
the territory of a sovereign nation, suspected of creating such weaponry,
without a blessing from the UN?

More than that. Now India and Pakistan, who since last year's tests of
nuclear weapons have been in [the state of] remote defense from the world
community, can now take an offensive position, since the possibility of use
of military force against a nuclear nation is one thing, and against a
weaker nation another. It is revealing that already during the period of
bombing Yugoslavia, both countries have demonstratively conducted tests of
medium-range ballistic missiles, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead.
And the reaction of the world community wasn't as impetuous as last year.
It is entirely likely that as a result of NATO's actions in the Balkans,
other countries will attempt with tripled vigor to repeat India's and
Pakistan's example.

Suspicions emerge that NATO reserves "additional work" for itself in
advance. While effectively stimulating interest in the creation of weapons
of mass destruction and the means of their delivery, it is to an outrageous
extent in a self-licensed manner expanding the geographical boundaries of
its activities and expanding the list of potential targets, depending on
its own interests by the way, coming from a double standard and ignoring
the UN's position. Is it this objective perhaps that the current conception
of the block, which envisages military actions outside of the territories
of the NATO countries, is called upon to illuminate? Are not the declared
goals of opposing other "risks", including "international terrorism",
directed towards this?

In the Founding Russia-NATO Act the intention of "developing a sound,
stable, and long-term partnership" is declared. However, is a partnership
possible with an organization that violates its own and international
documents, and which with its policy of force doesn't solve, but aggravates
international problems? It is doubtful. That's why it is expedient to think
about the fate or the nature of this agreement.

That being the case, two circumstances connected with military actions
against Yugoslavia ought not be let out of sight. First, NATO has played a
very dangerous game, having attempted to test Russia's durability. Either
Russia accepts the rules of the game, withdrawing silently from the crisis,
or in principle from an openly flung challenge to the foundations of
international security created so laboriously, from the block's desire to
return the "law of the jungle" to the world arena, with an unlimited right
of the strong to punish or to pardon, or it will get involved in the
military conflict which will transform into a global war. The stakes are
too high, and the readiness to make them evidences either irresponsibility
or excessive thrill with power.

It is necessary to give its due to our leadership, which is acting in the
right direction with a sense of responsibility for Russia's fate. And NATO
ought not to forget that any reconciliation with its actions against
Yugoslavia, including its role as a "policeman", are counter to Russia's
national interests as well as international law. And we ought not to forget
that successful military resolution of the objectives set by NATO will
further on only double the appetite of this war machine.

Secondly, concurrently with the process of expansion, it were precisely the
strikes at Yugoslavia that clearly revealed that NATO has in fact become
the main irritant of our relations with the West. But that means, strange
as it may seem at first, that we must not under any circumstances get
tangled up in NATO in foreign policy, turning it into a central problem.

We should and must hope that NATO will not be able to become a watershed in
the further development of Russia's cooperation with the West in political,
economic, and other areas. My recent conversations with the French leader
Jacques Chirac and Leonard Jospen, the Prime Minister of Bavaria Shtoiber,
and other Western partners, attest to this. At the same time my contacts
abroad illustrate that voices in the NATO countries sound with increasing
intensity in favor of Russia not watching from the side how international
law is arbitrarily interpreted. Rather, it must use its influence in
reestablishing and strengthening the truly unique institutions like the UN
and OSCE. Only together with Russia is it possible to effectively
intermediate international conflicts, in this case in Kosovo. And that is
one more lesson of NATO's military action.

It is necessary to in all ways stimulate political contacts and the
rapprochement of positions with leading European nations, with the European
Union, with other nations, including countries in the East. These contacts
must be aimed at preventing the erosion of existing mechanisms of
maintaining international peace, counter to the NATO-centrist tendencies.
If the latter had previously evoked concerns only hypothetically, now we
see their results.

It is impossible to not note that NATO by its expansionary and military
actions is effectively provoking Russia to enter self-isolation, attunement
in favor of a "besieged fortress". Such a "fortress" would be a gift for
those circles within NATO that are, as before, in search of justification
of their powerful arsenal and military programs, clearly excessive just for
"punishing" disobedient small and medium-size countries.

But such actions are not and will not be effective. New democratic Russia
will under no circumstances engage in recreating the iron curtain, but will
strive towards activating its foreign and military policy, towards further
integration into the world economy, towards developing contacts with the
world community.

With that, Russia, and this is already the first lesson for us, must not
forget, as in recent past, about the needs of its own defensibility and
military-industrial complex. Although NATO will not receive one more
coveted "gift" such as pulling us into an arms race. 

NATO's actions have had serious influence on the internal political life in
Russia. They once more reminded of the necessity of overcoming the economic
crisis as quickly as possible, and restoration of the state's power. They
reminded of the necessity to mobilize Russians for the renaissance of a
strong Russia, strong for providing for its own security and world
security, and not for threatening other nations. But such stabilization
must indeed be consolidatory and constructive, without dashing towards the
recent past. With a strong Russia the use of force will be possible to a
lesser extent.

In connection with this it is necessary to say something about one more
NATO "anniversary" lesson. Military activities in any event have
established a principle boundary in the development of the world community,
as well as in our perception of certain threats against Russia. It's time
to think together about the new emerging elements of world order, having
shed all polar points of view and having collected intellectual and
political potential. In order to bear out and develop those of them, which
would serve the interests of peace on our Earth and the interests of the
world community, and to establish all the positive that has been worked out
in the recent decades into an international security mechanism.

We must together not only establish a list of the real challenges and
threats to Russia's security in the new "post-April" conditions, but most
importantly select real and adequate countermeasures. In order so that a
peaceful, democratic, and secure Russia be an equal and inseparable part of
the world community.

Such work must begin immediately. Time doesn't wait.
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