April 20, 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3249• 3250  • 

Johnson' Russia List
#3250
20 April 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Bloomberg: Russians Losing Confidence in Authorities, Poll Reveals.
2. Reuters: Russia steps up peace moves over Yugoslavia.
3. Itar-Tass: Incidence of Tuberculosis Rapidly Increasing in Russia.
4. Reuters: Slide into crisis halted, Russia tells EBRD.
5. Washington Post letter: Henry Owen, The Way to Feed the Bear.
6. Reuters: Russia firmly rules out renegotiating ABM treaty.
7. Itar-Tass: Yeltsin Seems to Be Frowning on Primakov--Nemtsov.
8. Reuters: Yeltsin says back on form, looks for allies.
9. Interfax: Russian Poll Shows Marked Drop in US Popularity.
10. Interfax: Poll: Yeltsin's Approval Rating Falls to 7%.
11. Itar-Tass: Individuals Exported $10 Billion From Russia in 1998.
12. Interfax: Luzhkov Criticizes Economic Decisions of 'Red' Duma.
13. NTV: Arbatov: Chernomyrdin Appointment Attack on Primakov.
14. Peter Chatterton: Expressions of concern.
15. NTV: Chernomyrdin Discusses Kosovo Crisis.
16. New York Times: Jack Matlock, The One Place NATO Could Turn for Help.
17. New York Times: Jane Perlez, Clinton Phones Yeltsin to Urge a Kosovo 
Force.] 

*******

#1
Russians Losing Confidence in Authorities, Poll Reveals

Moscow, April 20 (Bloomberg) -- Russians have lost confidence
in their political leaders at both national and local level, a new
opinion poll reveals. The only politician supported by the majority
of the nation is Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov.
Following are results of the opinion poll conducted by
Russia's Center of Public Opinion from April 9 - 13. The poll
surveyed 1,600 people and had a margin of error of 4 percent.

Do you approve of the following political leaders?

Yes No
President Boris Yeltsin 7% 90%
Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov 64% 27%
Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznyov 36% 46%
Federation Council Speaker Yegor Stroyev 30% 45%

Is Primakov's government capable of resolving the economic crisis?

No rather than yes 34%
Yes rather than no 31%
No 11%
Yes 5%
No opinion 19%


What is the most beneficial decision for Russia?

Yeltsin's resignation 60%
Yeltsin remains with limited power 22%
Yeltsin keeps his post 11%
No opinion 7%

If there is another crisis should Primakov's government resign?

No 58%
Yes 25%
No opinion 17%

Is it possible to eliminate corruption in Russia or at least reduce
it?

Reduce only 59%
Eliminate 22%
Impossible to do either 12%
No opinion 7%


Could Russia cope without new International Monetary Fund loans?

Yes 50%
No 29%
Have no opinion 21%


Whom do you trust the most?

Primakov 37%
Regional Governors 12%
Seleznyov 5%
Mayors 4%
Stroyev 2%
Yeltsin 1%
Nobody 29%
No answer 4%
No opinion 6%

Which authority, local or federal, is more efficient

Local authority 27%
Federal authority 14%
Both inefficient 44%
No opinion 15%

******

#2
Russia steps up peace moves over Yugoslavia
By Timothy Heritage

MOSCOW, April 20 (Reuters) - Russia stepped up efforts to negotiate an end
to the Yugoslav crisis on Tuesday, sending a special envoy to three allied
states as the head of the Russian Orthodox Church tried to mediate in
Belgrade. 

Amid signs that Moscow is working on a new peace initiative, Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov discussed the crisis with a delegation from the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) which represents Islamic
countries. 

``We are sure that continuing the war will have harmful consequences for
stability and peace, not only in the region but on the whole planet,''
Itar-Tass news agency quoted Ivanov as saying after the talks in Moscow. 

He gave no further details and did not say whether his efforts had been
coordinated with Patriarch Alexiy II's visit to Belgrade and presidential
envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin's two-day mission to Georgia, Azerbaijan and
Ukraine. 

But Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov told reporters: ``There is a united
team which sticks to one course, although the various people have different
functions.'' 

Western leaders have said Moscow could have a unique role to play in ending
the confrontation between Belgrade and NATO because of the Russians'
traditional ties with their fellow Orthodox Slavs in Yugoslavia. 

But several Russian missions to Belgrade, including one led by Primakov,
have failed to produce an agreement that halted NATO bombing raids,
intended to force Yugoslavia to accept a deal on the future of its southern
province of Kosovo. 

Patriarch Alexiy was due to hold talks in Belgrade with Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic and Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church. 

Interfax news agency quoted aides to Alexiy as saying he would propose
demilitarising Kosovo, where ethnic Albanian separatists have clashed with
Serb forces. This, he hoped, would allow the Serbs and the Albanians to
resume peace talks. They said he was also likely to seek an immediate end
to the NATO bombing, the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and a
halt to operations by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 

Chernomyrdin, a former prime minister named last week as President Boris
Yeltsin's envoy on Yugoslavia, hoped to unite Georgia, Ukraine and
Azerbaijan -- all members of the 12-nation Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) -- behind him. 

``During the talks, a common position will be worked out which takes into
account the concerns of the leaders and peoples of the CIS,'' an aide to
Chernomyrdin said by telephone. 

Moscow has persevered with its peace efforts in the hope of pulling off a
diplomatic coup to boost its image on the world stage, improve Yeltsin's
dismal ratings in Russia and help him portray himself as an energetic
leader after recent illness. 

Yeltsin has talked tough, while taking limited action over Yugoslavia, to
try to show he is still a force to reckon with. 

He urged U.S. President Bill Clinton by telephone on Monday to support an
immediate halt to the NATO bombing and to back a return to the negotiating
table for talks on an agreement granting Kosovo wide autonomy within
Yugoslavia. 

In another sign of Russia's determination to be play a role in the crisis,
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan is due to visit Moscow on April
29 at the government's invitation. 

******

#3
Incidence of Tuberculosis Rapidly Increasing in Russia 

Moscow, 15th April, ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna 
Varshavskaya: In the current year the incidence of tuberculosis in Russia 
has increased by 8 per cent. The Russian first deputy minister of health, 
Gennadiy Onishchenko, reported this at a news conference today. He said 
that approximately 2.5m people in Russia are suffering from various forms 
of tuberculosis. Moreover, 108,000 were diagnosed last year. 

The Siberian regions account for the bulk of tuberculosis sufferers. The 
numbers of cases there are double the average for Russia. This figure is 
explained by the fact that tuberculosis is an illness connected with 
social status and poverty. 

Gennadiy Onishchenko said that the risk of contracting tuberculosis in prison 
is 50 times higher. In the prisons 4,300 out of every 100,000 are 
tuberculosis sufferers, he said. 

******

#4
Slide into crisis halted, Russia tells EBRD

LONDON, April 19 (Reuters) - Russia has halted its slide towards economic 
disaster following last year's financial crash, Economy Minister Andrei 
Shapovaliants claimed on Monday. 

Addressing ministers and central bankers at the annual meeting of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Shapovaliants said 
government crisis measures had hauled the Russian economy back onto an even 
keel. 

"Our main achievement in recent months is to have succeeded in halting the 
slide of the economy towards a worst-case scenario, in stabilising the 
situation and in countering the mounting apprehension of the public and of 
investors with respect to inflation and the crisis," he said. 

The EBRD meeting is the bank's first since Russia's currency plunge and 
effective debt default last August, which shook emerging markets worldwide 
and damaged trade and growth across the bank's operating area of the former 
East bloc. 

EBRD President Horst Koehler earlier delivered a stern warning that the 
crisis was not over, and that Russia must clean up its banking system if it 
was to attract fresh investment. 

Shapovaliants said the government had managed to prevent sharp fluctuations 
in the rouble exchange rate since its initial slide against the dollar. 

He noted that Russia's month-on-month inflation rate had fallen to 2.8 
percent in March from 11.6 percent last December, while total industrial 
production in the first quarter of 1999 was expected to be no lower than in 
the same period of 1998. 

First Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov was quoted on Monday as saying he 
expected consumer price inflation to rise to 4.0-4.2 percent in April. 

******

#5
Washington Post
April 17, 1999
Letter
The Way to Feed the Bear

Congratulations to The Post on its April 1 editorial "More Billions to 
Moscow?" The Post is one of the few observers to note the distinction between 
lending Russia money for future projects and lending only the funds needed to 
avoid a Russian default on past IMF loans.

In Moscow, IMF head Michel Camdessus followed the second course. He thus 
avoided both the disadvantages of Russian default and the even greater 
disadvantages of wasting additional money in Russia before Russian actions, 
not promises, give clear assurance that concrete Russian reforms are being 
put into effect.

In doing so, Mr. Camdessus has kept faith both with his shareholders and with 
the U.S. Congress, which approved the recent $18 billion for the IMF on a 
clear understanding that those funds would not be used to subsidize Russian 
failures and errors, as they were in the past. We should applaud him for 
taking this sensible initiative.

HENRY OWEN
Washington
The writer is co-chairman of the Bretton Woods Committee. 

*******

#6
Russia firmly rules out renegotiating ABM treaty
April 19, 1999

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia Monday ruled out making any amendments to a 
landmark arms treaty with the United States governing anti-missile defenses 
but said Washington wanted to make changes. 

Although it was signed during the Cold War, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty is still relevant because Washington has worked on new defenses 
against missiles. Moscow is worried that could force changes to the 
agreement. 

``We would like to emphasize again that Russia will not participate, actively 
or not, in the consideration of amendments (to the treaty),'' the Russian 
Foreign Ministry said in a statement. 

The ministry, repeating a long-held Russian position, voiced concerns that 
U.S. plans to deploy a Star Wars-style missile defense umbrella would force 
changes to the ABM treaty, which limits both countries' ability to deploy 
anti-missile systems. 

The United States was pushing ahead with preparations to propose amendments 
despite assurances to the contrary, it said. 

Both houses of Congress voted last month to make it national policy to put 
the missile defense system in place once technology permits. 

Moscow regards the U.S.-Soviet treaty as a cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. 
Washington wants to protect U.S. territory and possibly allies from weapons 
based in countries that it considers ``rogue states,'' such as Iran. 

``Of particular concern are Washington's attempts to present this matter (a 
national missile defense system) as standing within the framework of 
mechanisms designed to guarantee the strict fulfillment of the ABM treaty,'' 
the Foreign Ministry said. 

The ministry said any change would bring into question all international 
accords covering disarmament. 

******

#7
Yeltsin Seems to Be Frowning on Primakov--Nemtsov

MOSCOW, April 19 (Itar-Tass) - Former deputy prime minister Boris Nemtsov 
said on Monday President Boris Yeltsin's now- frequent meetings with Moscow 
Mayor Yuri Luzhkov might suggest that the Kremlin chief was not satisfied 
with Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's performance. 

"A thaw in relations between the president and Luzhkov is likely to be 
explained by (the assumption) that Primakov does not satisfy Yeltsin as prime 
minister, said Nemtsov, who is now leader of the Rossia Molodaya (Young 
Russia) movement. 

Meanwhile, Luzhkov had denied reports that Yeltsin had offered him the 
position of prime minister. According to Moscow's influential mayor, such 
reports are used to set Primakov and himself at loggerheads. 

Yeltsin's meetings with Luzhkov, who has repeatedly implied that Yeltsin step 
down, testify to the fact that the head of state "has not much of a choice", 
the former deputy premier said. 

"He is alone because he has lost most his supporters, people who have worked 
together with him in recent years. That is the Kremlin's main problem," he 
said. 

However, Nemtsov gave warning that the Kremlin should not expect Luzhkov to 
reject the idea of alliance with the Communists. 

"Luzhkov is a centrist. He is trying to round up supporters from different 
sides of the political spectrum. Now he has extremely rights affiliations. 
But that does not at all mean that he will not flirt with the left in the 
nearest future," he said. 

******

#8
Yeltsin says back on form, looks for allies
By Oleg Shchedrov

MOSCOW, April 20 (Reuters) - President Boris Yeltsin told Russian regional
bosses on Tuesday he was stepping out of the shadows to resume battle with
his political foes. 

Evidently alarmed by the prospect of being sidelined by resurgent
Communists and the increasingly powerful prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov,
Yeltsin asked the regional governors for their support in return for more
autonomy from Moscow. 

``I am now in good physical shape, with no traces (of bad health) and ready
for a fight side by side with you,'' Yeltsin told the leaders of 19 ethnic
republics. There are 89 regions and autonomous republics in the huge
Russian Federation. 

``I rely on you, hope for your help and moreover insist you, rather than
the federal centre, become a priority, that you become paramount,'' he added. 

Yeltsin's control over Russia has weakened after a disastrous economic
crunch last August, which led to the departure of a liberal cabinet and the
appointment of Primakov, a compromise premier backed by the Communist-led
parliament. 

Yeltsin's Communist foes, encouraged by his absences from work through bad
health, have stepped up efforts to impeach him on charges ranging from
illegally dissolving the Soviet Union to what they describe as a
``genocide'' against the Russian people. 

But in the past few weeks Yeltsin has launched a counter-offensive against
his opponents and made steps clearly aimed at limiting Primakov's powers. 

Veiled warnings from the Kremlin camp that an attempt to launch the
impeachment process could lead to Primakov's resignation helped Yeltsin to
confuse the State Duma lower house and postpone the vote by at least one
month. 

Yeltsin has also traded verbal blows with Primakov, making clear his
support for the prime minister was not unconditional. 

In a further sign of commitment to boost his own powers, Yeltsin named
veteran ally Viktor Chernomyrdin to mastermind Russia's diplomacy in the
Yugoslav conflict, a sphere so far monopolised by Primakov and Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov. 

Yeltsin made clear he was looking for allies to rein in the monster of
Russian bureaucracy which, according to many political analysts, is
rallying behind the conservative premier. 

``The bureaucracy has penetrated deep into many organisations,'' RIA news
agency quoted Yeltsin as telling the regional chiefs. ``We need to burn it
out, and that's what we are going to do.'' 

Political analysts believe the drive to consolidate powers by the deeply
unpopular Yeltsin, who has slightly more than a year left in office, is
impossible without a union with the regional elite. 

In late 1989 regional bosses threw their weight behind him in his
opposition to the Soviet Communist leadership on the promise to give them
``as much power as they can swallow.'' 

Throughout Yeltsin's rule the political and economic autonomy of regional
authorities grew despite periodic attempts by Moscow to restore centralised
command. All regional bosses are now elected and cannot be sacked by Yeltsin. 

******

#9
Russian Poll Shows Marked Drop in US Popularity 

Moscow, Apr 18 (Interfax) -- Over the past four 
months Russian citizens' attitude toward the United States has 
considerably worsened. At the end of December 1998, 67% of the Russian 
citizens sympathized with America, but by the end of March, when the 
United States and NATO launched air strikes against Yugoslavia, this 
number dropped to 38% and by the middle of April, to 33%. These figures 
were obtained by the All-Russia Center for Studying Public Opinion 
(VTSIOM) from three polls, each one involving 1,600 respondents. 
Statistical error did not exceed 4%. The percentage of respondents whose 
attitude toward the United State was negative increased from 23% in 
December, to 49% in March, and to 53% in April. 

********

#10
Poll: Yeltsin's Approval Rating Falls to 7% 

MOSCOW, April 15 (Interfax) -- Just 7% of Russians 
approve of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's activity in April, a slight 
rise from 6% in February, according to an opinion poll of 1,600 Russians 
conducted by the Public Opinion Fund. An overwhelming 90% of respondents 
disapproved of Yeltsin's work in April and February. Prime Minister 
Yevgeniy Primakov's popularity has risen from 56% to 64% over the two 
months. The number of people who disapprove of him dropped from 32% to 
27%. Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev has also become more popular. The 
number of his supporters grew from 28% to 36%, while those opposed to him 
fell from 49% in February to 46% in April. The approval rating for 
Chairman of the Federation Council Yegor Stroyev grew from 21% to 30% in 
the two months. As many as 45% of those polled disapproved of him in 
April, as compared with 51% in February. More people (43%) trust 
Primakov's government more in April than in February (39%). Seven percent 
responded in both polls that the current Cabinet works more poorly than 
the previous one. Furthermore, 58% of Russians said that the Cabinet of 
Ministers should not be reshuffled even if a new financial crisis hits 
Russia in May, as analysts predict. A quarter of Russians, 25%, would 
want government ministers to be dismissed, while 17% are undecided. 

*******

#11
Individuals Exported $10 Billion From Russia in 1998 

Moscow, April 15 (Itar-Tass) -- Private 
individuals expatriated from Russia 10.6 billion cash dollars last year. 
In most cases, the sums exported by one person at a time exceeded dlrs 
5,000, an official said on Thursday [15 April]. 

The figures were cited by Deputy Finance Minister Sergey Ignatyev who 
was speaking at a meeting of the budget committee at the State Duma lower 
house of parliament. 

Ignatyev said customs agents had even reported several cases when people were 
taking out of Russia more than 1.5 million dollars per trip. 

The committee convened to discuss the government-proposed amendments to 
the law on currency control, which ban citizens from expatriating more 
than 5,000 US dollars at a time. 

Such sums, Ignatyev said, are not taken out for private spending; it is 
unsanctioned expatriation of either legal or illegal revenue. 

"The government does not want Russia to have more dollars. It is a false 
objective. We wish to limit the export of capital used for funding shadow 
economy operations or illegal imports," the deputy minister said. 

Non-residents in Russia are allowed to export hard currency in the amount 
equal to 
the sum they brought in, transferred or wired to Russia. The government 
measures do not apply to credits cards, bank transfers or travellers' 
cheques. 

*******

#12
Luzhkov Criticizes Economic Decisions of 'Red' Duma 

MOSCOW, April 17 (Interfax-Moscow) - The leader of 
the Fatherland movement, Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, said that reasonable 
decisions for supporting the domestic economy should not be expected from 
the Communist-dominated State Duma. "The Duma is Red today. The Reds have 
always wanted to mow the lawn to make it flat and mediocre: a medium 
wage, medium-size housing, and the rest - all second-rate and 
unimpressive. The Reds have always wanted to cut down anything above and 
beyond the average," Luzhkov said at a conference entitled "Russia: 
Choosing the Way" at the Russian Academy of Sciences on Saturday. He 
spoke critically of the Duma's hiking of the individual income tax to 
45%. He said that those who make a lot of money will dodge taxes. "We 
have creative people living in Russia, and they will find a way to do 
this," he said. "The current Duma does not know what it is doing," he 
said. In regard to Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznyov's reaction to his 
criticism, Luzhkov said that "he scolded me, threatened to sort things 
out and recalled what I did in 1991 and 1993. I am not afraid of 
(Seleznev). Let him live with his threats," he said. 

******

#13
Arbatov: Chernomyrdin Appointment Attack on Primakov 

NTV 
April 15, 1999
[translation for personal use only]

Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee 
on Defence Aleksey Arbatov has said that President Boris Yeltsin 
appointed former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin his envoy on the 
Yugoslav conflict in order to punish Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov for 
his independent position. In a live interview shown in Moscow NTV's 0600 
gmt news bulletin on 15th April, he also said that it would be extremely 
dangerous for Russia to send battleships to the Adriatic Sea. The full 
text of the interview follows: 
[Presenter Kirill Pozdnyakov] Now live in our studio is State Duma deputy
and 
Deputy Chairman of the [State Duma] Committee on Defence Aleksey Arbatov. 
Hello, Aleksey Georgiyevich. [Arbatov] Good morning. 
[Q] Yesterday President Boris Yeltsin appointed former Prime Minister 
Viktor Chernomyrdin his envoy for talks on the Yugoslav conflict. Does 
this mean that the Russian position, which has recently been quite tough, 
could be softened? 
[A] First of all, let me propose another theory. I think in our country 
decisions like these are often determined by unrelated considerations. It 
seems that the president, who was disappointed by the answer Prime 
Minister Yevgeniy Primakov gave him in his recent TV interview, decided 
to reprimand Primakov and to move him away from this issue - him, along 
with the Foreign Ministry. 
Primakov is considered not only our leading expert but also our leading 
public figure in the field of international policy. The Foreign Ministry 
remains under his very close control. So the president chose this way to 
show his dissatisfaction with the prime minister, his government and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
I may be wrong. But having observed the operations carried out in our 
higher echelons of power for many years, I would assume that this is the 
right explanation. 
As regards our position being tough or soft, it is possible that since 
Mr Chernomyrdin has good contacts in the USA, he, better than others, can 
persuade the Americans to soften their position. 
However, I am afraid that the effect will be just the opposite. The USA may 
toughen its position, believing that Chernomyrdin could be much more 
prone to compromise than any other Russian envoys or his predecessors at 
these talks. 
[Q] Do you think there is any link between the appointment of 
Chernomyrdin, who is traditionally close to the fuel and energy sector, 
and the deficit of fuel Yugoslavia is facing as a result of the NATO strikes? 
[A, laughing] Certainly not. Mr Chernomyrdin is a very influential 
person, but Gazprom is not a separate state that could decide to send 
fuel to Yugoslavia. Neither can he take fuel down there in his pocket. So 
there is certainly no such link. 
[Q] There is also discussion of unfreezing arms supplies to Belgrade. 
What do you think about the prospects of this? 
[A] This issue has already been under discussion for a long time. We 
don't have any land communications connecting us to Yugoslavia [as 
received]. If we want to deliver anything there, it has to go by air or 
by sea. They would not allow us to do it by sea. Sorry, they won't allow 
us to do it by air. 
If we try to do it by sea, we will immediately be under a blockade from 
the NATO navy [as received] and the US 6th Fleet. So we will need to send 
battleships there. Then a collision becomes very possible. It would be a 
big step towards the escalation of the conflict. 
[Q] What does Russia get from its military presence in the zone of 
conflict - I mean, in particular, our ships in the Adriatic Sea? 
[A] So far there is only a scout ship, Liman. Its presence is useful for 
us and for the Yugoslav authorities, because it helps to collect 
information about the operations carried out by the NATO navy. 
But if we send Black Sea battleships - I mean the six ships that are 
ready to depart - then we should realize that this would be a major step 
towards possible hostilities with NATO. If the ships arrive there while 
NATO continues its operations against Yugoslavia, in particular if 
aviation based on aircraft participates in strikes, then the presence of 
our ships will humiliate us. The ships will stay there while the NATO 
operation continues. Those ships would have to do something to prevent 
those operations. Then a military collision at sea would become inevitable. 
[Presenter] Thank you, Aleksey Georgiyevich.

*******

#14
From: Peter Chatterton <chatters@online.ru>
Subject: Expressions of concern 
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 1999 

To set the scene, I am British, have been involved in Russian business for
20 years and have lived here for three. I also have a home in Greece and
strong US connections. My inputs arise from diverse sources.

JRL #3248 of 19 April clearly demonstrates the dilemma facing those of us
who live and work in Russia. 

Articles # 8 & 9 clearly, succinctly and unemotionally demonstrate the
current and historical consequences of political misjudgement and the
resulting, unsatisfactory, options. Sadly, our elected leaders demonstrate
little willingness, or ability, to learn.

In his contribution (Article # 7), Mr Krauss encapsulates the concerns of
many reasonable people. The use of abusive and dismissive terminology such
as "puerile rantings" and "emotional bankruptcy" and his conveniently
economical interpretation of "autonomous" to mean "independent" do little
to further his argument. It does, however, raise sceptres of the
witch-hunts of 1930's Germany and 1950's USA. Please, Mr Krauss do not
attempt to impose your narrow views on those of us who are trying very hard
to reconcile the highly complex issues and consequences arising from the
break-up of Yugoslavia. May I take it that your views do not fully
represent those of Dresdner Bank.

Mr Krauss states that "It is the profound personal hope of many of us that
the individuals responsible for the atrocities in Kosovo will be brought to
judgement". As I understand it judgement has already been made, justice
will be another matter.

History may well show that Kosovo as just another side-show on the road to
"world order". Like other "diversions", large or small, it will be
rationalised and interpreted however it suits the purpose of future world
leaders, dutifully reported by those willing to apply conventional wisdom
and ultimately find its way into the history books - as fact.

When the dust settles on this tragic episode in European history what will
be the lessons and what will we learn from them? Will they be used to
further the cause of European integration, will they enhance or diminish
the diplomatic standing of Russia, and will we say "never again" - again. 

Cessation of bloodshed and enduring peace must be the objective, and must
be worth every effort. Of the NATO leadership, Tony Blair in particular
should be only too aware of the lasting consequences of sectarian enmity.
The problems on his doorstep go back "only" 300 years. By comparison, those
of the Balkans are almost lost in the mists of time. And let us not forget
that the not all the dominoes have yet fallen.

This is not an us and them issue but the risks are escalating, positions
are hardening. Reasonable people from all quarters are asking what is going
on, why and is it worth the price? - not only in human suffering, but in
the integrity of our institutions, our leaders and, ultimately, our ability
to counter injustice with anything other than a big stick. 

There can be no winners, but Russia will almost certainly emerge with its
diplomatic image enhanced, it's strategic importance re-established and a
healthy injection of finance from the IMF. Then the real business -
business - will resume.

Is this what the last 55 years has really been about? Today, despite all
our communications capabilities individuals, East and West, understand
little more about each other than they did at the start of the Cold War. 

Those of us who live and work in Russia will presumably continue to do our
best to live within today's realities, reconcile differing views and
attempt to understand and explain how apparently decent objectives
sometimes become distorted, confused, misinterpreted or, simply, bungled.
Life will go on, and it will be our remit to adapt to, and take forward
from, whatever finally emerges.

*******

#15
Chernomyrdin Discusses Kosovo Crisis 

NTV 
April 18, 1999
[translation for personal use only]

Interview with Viktor Chernomyrdin, newly appointed Russian Special 
Envoy for Yugoslavia, by Vladimir Kondratyev in Moscow on 18 April -- 
recorded; from the "Itogi" program; first paragraph studio introduction 

[Presenter Yevgeniy Kiselev] Last week President 
Yeltsin named former Prime Minister and Our Home is Russia leader Viktor 
Chernomyrdin his special envoy for Yugoslavia. Chernomyrdin gave his 
first TV interview since his appointment to "Itogi" observer Vladimir 
Kondratyev today. [Passage omitted: correspondent says the interview was 
filmed at Chernomyrdin's dacha in Gorki-10, video of this building, 
interview shown in a room of this building, Chernomyrdin and 
correspondent sitting at a small table] 
[Correspondent] I asked Chernomyrdin to comment on rumours in the Russian 
press that 
his new appointment was linked to the fact that the privileges he had 
retained ran out a year after his sacking, and that the post of special 
Yugoslavia envoy was invented so he could keep them. 
[Chernomyrdin] Well, first they have not run out. They will end somewhere
in 
the 
year 2000. That is how things are done. I did not ask for anything or 
insist on anything. That was not something that I even thought about. I 
think this is not a serious comment. Not serious at all. There was no 
need to invent anything. In essence I do not need any positions or 
titles. Basically, as a proper citizen of my country, if there is 
something I can do, I should do it and will do it. 
[Q] Viktor Stepanovich, your new appointment has caused people and the 
press to ask a lot of questions. It is no secret that, before your 
appointment, a certain amount of sabre rattling was going on, especially 
on the part of the military. Were you appointed to stem to some extent 
this move to drag Russia, to clearly drag Russia into the Yugoslav 
developments? 
[A] Dragging Russia into the Balkan crisis in the sense of military 
action would mean the start of World War III, possibly the last war on 
Earth. Everybody should understand that and imagine what it would be 
like. I think we must ruled it out. So, all our diplomatic effort today 
and all the efforts by the leadership and the state should be aimed at, 
first, not letting us get dragged in, and, second, taking all measures - 
persuasion, mediation, any others - essentially to convince both sides 
that above all the air strikes must be stopped, the destruction must be 
stopped and the deaths of innocent people must be stopped.. 
The situation is basically a dead end and there are few simple ways out 
of situations like this. 
[Q] It is not totally clear what your powers are. Some have already 
started calling you a parallel prime minister and are saying that you 
have taken away [Prime Minister Yevgeniy] Primakov's favourite activity 
of foreign policy. What is your view, do you think that this is pushing 
Primakov aside? 
[A] No, I don't think so. Even if that is what someone wanted to do, it 
is far from easy to achieve. The government must not be pushed aside. 
This is just conjecture and idle talk aimed at undermining people or 
catching them out. It is impossible to replace the government or to push 
it aside or to push its prime minister, especially Primakov, to one side. 
The fact that he has spent his whole life in this activity is not 
necessarily a bad thing: I think one person should complement the other. 
[Q] Before your appointment, Primakov used to hold daily conferences in 
the White House [government headquarters] with the foreign minister and 
representatives of the military and intelligence. Since you were 
appointed these conferences have ceased and the head of Primakov's staff 
has said that you, Viktor Stepanovich, are to give President Yeltsin your 
proposals on how these conferences are to be held in the future. Do you 
actually have any proposals about this? 
[A] The president is holding a conference on these lines tomorrow, with 
all the people you named present. Specific proposals about what our work 
is to be, and about the situation as it has developed and as it is today 
will be discussed tomorrow, as well as our suggestions for tomorrow and 
the day after and the steps that will have to be taken. This will 
probably include organizational issues as well. We met yesterday and 
discussed these questions. We have to meet. [Q] Who do you mean by we? 
[A] All the people you mentioned. Therefore, I think that that the prime 
minister retains his role. Whether he can convene these people or cannot 
he is still bound to know everything that is going on and he will do so. 
We will still be in contact and will be consulting each other on these 
issues. So we will be having these meetings. That is definite, and it 
will be every day, and perhaps several times a day. [Q] From tomorrow 
onwards? 
[A] From yesterday onwards. [Laughs] 
[Passage omitted: correspondent speculates about whether Primakov was 
upstaged by Chernomyrdin meeting the World Bank chairman, Chernomyrdin 
says that he regularly meets international financial officials and that 
this meeting had been planned before Primakov's illness, all this talk 
about Primakov being set aside is nonsense, he genuinely had back trouble] 
[Q] After you were appointed, spokesmen for some of the factions in the 
State Duma voiced doubts that you have the diplomatic skills to conduct 
negotiations on Yugoslavia. Yeltsin said that you are someone who can 
talk to [Yugoslav President Slobodan] Milosevic like few others could. On 
what does this conviction rest or on what is it based that you are 
capable of achieving something that [Belarusian President Alyaksandr] 
Lukashenka could not, when he visited Milosevic? Do you have some 
particular contacts or a special relationship with Milosevic? Some people 
even talk about the part played by Gazprom [Russian gas company formerly 
headed by Chernomyrdin] in these contacts. 
[A] Yes, I do know Milosevic and I know many of their leaders. Even 
before I came into the government I dealt with Yugoslavia, as I did 
basically with all of Western Europe, wherever we were present and 
wherever we worked. [Passage omitted on Gazprom's cooperation with 
Yugoslavia] So, we have long-established and long-term contacts. So, of 
course, I know how their main energy industry works, what they are doing 
there and how. Yes, President Milosevic and I do know each other. 
[Q] When will you be going to Belgrade? 
[A] Soon. 
[Q] You are now carrying out a series of meetings, mainly with 
ambassadors of foreign countries represented in Moscow. Where will your 
first visits be to - the West or Yugoslavia? 
[A] That is a very important question. I think that there will be a 
visit to the West and a visit to Yugoslavia, and to other countries also. 
Where I go first depends on how circumstances develop, on whatever 
happens today and tomorrow. We will think about this. 
[Q] NATO greeted your appointment with a degree of satisfaction but they 
said at the same time that Chernomyrdin would help NATO push through 
their five demands to Milosevic. You know what I mean. This includes a 
international force under Western guidance in Yugoslavia. Do you fancy 
this job as a sort of fixer for NATO? 
[A] [Laughs] First of all I think that I am not the right man to be a 
fixer, and many people know this. Nor am I the right man to do the job of 
passing on what other people say. I am the wrong man again for this.. I 
cannot play the part of a postman. The main priority for me is Russia. 
This is the main priority otherwise nothing will come of this. 
[Passage omitted, Chernomyrdin is asked to comment on reports that Yeltsin 
had told him to stand for the State Duma in Siberia, Chernomyrdin says 
this is all conjecture] 
[Q] As you know, Viktor Stepanovich, the president still has the sword 
of Damocles of impeachment hanging over him, though it has been postponed 
until May, and the situation with [suspended Prosecutor-General Yuriy] 
Skuratov is still unclear. Knowing the president, would you think it 
possible that Yeltsin might take some decisive action during that period? 
[A] He has to take the most decisive action and make the most decisive 
moves to ensure there is order in the state. This enormous flurry of 
activity over impeachment is just stupid and there is no more I can say 
on the subject. First, there is not going to be any impeachment. They 
say, in the country - 
[Q, interrupts] Viktor Stepanovich, do you mean that impeachment will 
not be passed or that there will be no impeachment process? 
[A] There probably will be an impeachment process, but I am sure that 
they will have no success and that there will be no impeachment. We want 
to participate as a powerful state in international processes and to take 
part in stopping crises, and at the same time we want to remove the 
supreme commander-in-chief or express no confidence in him. Do you think 
this is serious? What sort of politics is this? I do not even want to put 
words to it or call it what I would like to, otherwise someone will feel 
insulted again. They have been feeling insulted quite frequently lately. 
[Q] Thank you very much for the interview, Viktor Stepanovich. I wish 
you success. [A] Thank you.

*******

#16
New York Times
20 April 1999
[for personal use only]
The One Place NATO Could Turn for Help
By JACK F. MATLOCK (matlock@ias.edu) 
Jack F. Matlock, a professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in
Princeton, is a former Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

There cannot be security and stability in the world without Russia. 

NATO intensifies its bombing of Serbia to the cheers of a fair portion of
the Western political and intellectual elite. The bombing has rallied Serbs
behind their dictator, Slobodan Milosevic, who is using the air strikes as
a cover and pretext for mass expulsions, massacres and hostage taking. As
NATO bombing continues, outrages against the Kosovars seem certain to
continue. The weapons used against the Kosovars are not easily countered
from the air. 

The air war is clearly making things worse on the ground -- much worse, in
fact, so pressures build to use ground troops. If they had been available
for intervention from the start of the bombing, they might well have served
both as a deterrent to Mr. Milosevic and as real protection for the
Kosovars if that deterrence failed. 

But they were not available, and it will be weeks before they could be,
even if NATO governments decide today to accept the political risk of
sending them. By the time a few hundred thousand troops could be assembled
to invade, Kosovo would probably be emptied of civilian Kosovars, except
for those forced to become human shields for Serbian forces dug into a
rugged terrain. 

The Clinton Administration seems unwilling to admit the obvious: that NATO
bombing has been an unmitigated disaster for all the parties we set out to
protect. So far, the only gainers have been Mr. Milosevic and his henchmen,
whose support in Serbia, once wobbly, is now solid. 

Will that change if bombing continues, on and on and on? Perhaps. But don't
count on it. 

So long as Mr. Milosevic can pose as the ultimate barrier to the loss of
the sacred ground of Kosovo, a Serbian patriot set upon by more powerful
foreign bullies, few Serbs will take the risk of opposing him. 

Any successful strategy for peace depends on splitting the Serbian people
from Mr. Milosevic's leadership. Waging war against Serbia as a whole has
the opposite effect. 

The negative reaction in Russia to NATO's attack was predictable. After
all, we had assured Russia during the debate on NATO enlargement that there
was nothing to fear. NATO, we said, was a purely defensive alliance,
constitutionally incapable of undertaking offensive military action. (We
had earlier given Mikhail Gorbachev to understand that NATO's borders would
not be moved further east if Germany were allowed to unite and stay in NATO.) 

Now Russians are asking, Who's next? Will Moscow be bombed if the war heats
up again in Chechnya? 

The antics of those Russian politicians talking irresponsibly of military
support for Serbia, or a union of Serbia, Belarus and Russia, can be
dismissed as lunatic ravings. They are symptoms of a feeling of weakness
and humiliation, the irresponsible rhetoric of politicians who need issues
in the coming election to distract public attention from their failures to
deliver on campaign promises. 

Nevertheless, while such posturing may have no practical effect on military
operations in the Balkans, the emotions it exploits will complicate and
delay the development of democratic institutions and economic reforms in
Russia. It also increases Russian resistance to further reduction of
nuclear weapons. 

Russian official policy, as distinct from the emotional rhetoric that now
poisons the air, has actually been moderate and responsible. 

Russia was willing to join others in a diplomatic effort to deter ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo, but held fast throughout to three positions: 1. That
the threat of NATO bombing was unlikely to cause Mr. Milosevic to accept
the Rambouillet agreement. 2. That bombing would not solve the Kosovo
problem but make it worse. 3. That military action should not be taken
against a sovereign country without United Nations sanction. 

The first two points have proved absolutely correct. The third should give
the United States and its NATO allies serious pause. Are we willing to
concede to other military alliances a right to intervene at will outside
their borders? To do so would seem exceedingly unwise. 

But unless we do, how can we expect countries outside NATO to accept it as
prosecutor, judge, juror and policeman of Europe? Is that its purpose? It
would be different, of course, if the United Nations Security Council or
the General Assembly had asked NATO to enforce a decision it had made. 

Once again, we are finding that it is much easier to start a war than to
end it. So much damage has already been done that any feasible solution now
will be significantly worse than what might have been obtained by diplomacy
without threats to bomb, or by diplomacy backed up with a credible threat
to invade. But we cannot make effective policy on the basis of what might
have been. We also cannot make effective policy if we are blinded by rage
and frustration, however justified. 

The United States must find the wisdom and will to lead the alliance away
from the tragic quagmire that looms ahead if it stays on the current course
of war against Serbia. So long as we make Serbia the enemy, rather than
Slobodan Milosevic, the Kosovo problem will not be solved. Neither
partition nor independence nor indefinite foreign occupation will work in
the long run without the acquiescence of the Serbian people. 

It should also be clear by now that there is no way to restore stability to
the Balkans without Russian cooperation. President Boris Yeltsin's pledge
yesterday not to intervene militarily gives us an opening to discuss the
shape of a settlement and Russia's participation in it. 

O ther non-NATO countries can also be helpful: President Leonid Kuchma of
Ukraine recently made proposals that should be taken seriously and
explored. If the Kosovar refugees are to return and life is to be restored
to the rubble, policing by outsiders will certainly be required. NATO alone
is not capable of imposing a settlement that will last. 

Stability in the Balkans must be treated as a problem for all of Europe and
countries as important as Russia and Ukraine made part of the solution, not
forced to be part of the problem. 

Why not declare victory (we have seriously degraded Mr. Milosevic's
military potential, as we set out to do), end the bombing and welcome
active Russian participation in reaching a settlement? Given what has
happened, it certainly will not be easy, but let's face it: bombing Serbia
is not working.

********

#17
Excerpt
New York Times
20 April 1999
Clinton Phones Yeltsin to Urge a Kosovo Force 
By JANE PERLEZ

WASHINGTON -- President Clinton called President Boris Yeltsin of Russia on
Monday to press his country's involvement in a political resolution in
Kosovo that would involve Russian troops in an international security force
in the Serbian province. 

The conversation, the first between the two leaders since the NATO air
assaults began on March 24, had a sense of urgency, reflecting a perception
that the longer the bombing dragged on the more difficult a political
outcome with the Russians would become, according to an official who
listened to the 45-minute conversation. 

The call was placed five days before the NATO begins a 50th anniversary
summit in Washington, a meeting that the administration would like the
Russians to attend as guests. But the Russians, without formally rejecting
the invitation, have indicated they are unlikely to attend. 

Clinton's personal effort to engage Yeltsin followed a number of feelers
that have been put out in recent weeks by the administration to Moscow,
despite the strong anti-NATO sentiments and protests that have swept
through Russia since the bombing began. 

>From the very outset, the allied campaign looked to put Washington-Moscow
relations into a deep freeze. Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, en
route to Washington when the decision to bomb was taken, turned his plane
around in mid-air and returned home when he learned of it. Since then,
Russian officials, including Yeltsin, have issued frequent and bitter
denunciations of the campaign, ranging to hints that the Kremlin would
restore cold war targeting of its missiles. 

But with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic continuing to drive hundreds
of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from their homes and from the province
despite the rain of bombs, administration officials have been searching for
steps toward a diplomatic resolution in Kosovo. And almost from the
beginning, they have realized that any solution requires Russian
cooperation, because of the nation's special relationship with the Serbs. 

Clinton explained to Yeltsin on Monday that NATO and Russia have mutual
interests in Kosovo, according to the White House official. 

For the ethnic Albanians, NATO forces are essential to insure their
security in Kosovo. For the Serbian minority, a Russian presence would
insure their rights, and together the joint overseers would allow for the
autonomy of Kosovo within the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, the
White House official said. 

Yeltsin's reply was neither a firm yes or no, but his answers "put us on a
more constructive tone than in the past," the official said. 

So far, the Russians have insisted that a NATO-led force in Kosovo is
untenable, in large part because Milosevic has condemned an outside force
as a breach of Yugoslav sovereignty. 

The administration has softened its language on the proposed force, saying
that it would have only a "NATO-core" and that a Russian contingent could
be under a separate command, much like the Russian forces operate in the
NATO-led force in Bosnia. 

An international security force designed to secure Kosovo after the bombing
has forced all Serbian troops out, is the main element of five principles
set down by NATO for the resolution of the conflict. The force, under NATO
command and control, would insure the return of the more than 500,000
ethnic Albanian refugees who have been forced out of Kosovo by Milosevic. 

One underlying reason for pushing the Russians now, administration
officials said, was the possibility that a protracted air campaign was
likely to dim the possibilities of a political solution. In part, NATO and
the administration fear a growing likelihood of civilian casualties, a
prospect that would make it very difficult for Moscow to be part of
settlement involving NATO countries.... 

******