January 29, 1998    
This Date's Issues: 3033• 3034 • 

Johnson's Russia List
#3034
29 January 1999
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AFP: Poll: Majority of Russians Lament for Brezhnev's 'Golden Age.'
2. Moscow Times: Natalya Shulyakovskaya, U.S. Aid for Press Not Wanted
3. William Bontrager: Re Moral Degradation in Russia (Itar Tass, 3029).
4. The Economist: Russia's Rich Presidency. The crown estate.
5. AFP: Russian governors unite to fight elections, combat separatism.
6. BBC: Alan Little, Embalming - the new Russian revolution .
7. RFE/RL: Robert Lyle, Russia: Three Key Areas Require Reform. (Views
of Lawrence Summers).
8. Intellectualcapital.com: The President Still Remembers Me.
An Interview with Boris Nemtsov.
9. Moskovskiy Komsomolets: Vladimir Pashkov, "I Believe. The Falcons of
Metropolitan Kirill." (Church Said Too Closely Tied to State).
10. INDEPENDENT MEDIA NEWS UPDATE: RATING THE WORLD'S MOST EXPENSIVE 
CITIES, MOSCOW MOVED FROM THIRD TO EIGHTY EIGHTH PLACE.
11. Interfax: Russian Military Calls for Strategic Stability Treaty.] 

*******

#1
Poll: Majority of Russians Lament for Brezhnev's 'Golden Age' 

MOSCOW, Jan. 29, 1999 -- (Agence France Presse) More than half of Russians
believe that the rule of hardline communist leader Leonid Brezhnev was a
"golden age" for their country, a public opinion poll published by Interfax
news agency said Thursday. 
Asked under which leader Russians felt they were best off and enjoyed
highest international esteem, most of the 1,500 people polled said Brezhnev. 
Sixty-five percent of people between 35 and 44 years hailed the Brezhnev
era, the Public Opinion Foundation poll found, even though it was a period
of stagnation for the Soviet Union. 
Brezhnev succeeded Nikita Khrushchev as communist party leader in October
1964 and died in power in 1982. 
Other Soviet or Russian leaders garnered between 8 percent and 1 percent.
Nineteen percent of people over 60 years said the best period was that of
communist dictator Joseph Stalin who died in office in 1953. 
Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, and Russian President Boris
Yeltsin who replaced him in Moscow after the demise of the Soviet Union in
1991, were both given poor ratings. 

*******

#2
Moscow Times
January 28, 1999 
U.S. Aid for Press Not Wanted 
By Natalya Shulyakovskaya
Staff Writer

The $10 million in U.S. aid announced by Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright
to promote independent media in Russia drew a scathing reaction Wednesday from
Communists in the State Duma. 
Speaking for the party's faction in the Duma, parliament's lower house,
Deputy
Rinat Fabidullin called the U.S. initiative a "gross intervention into
Russia's internal affairs." 
Albright announced the aid Monday during a two-day visit, saying, "vigorous
investigative journalism helped build momentum for change here more than a
decade ago; it is more vital than ever today." 
But the Communists, who have long demanded public advisory boards at
television and radio stations to give themselves more control over the media,
said the U.S. aid would be too intrusive in light of the upcoming Duma and
presidential elections, "which will define the future fate of Russia." 
"Those who pay, order the music," Fabidullin said. 
His statement was echoed by Zhanna Kasyannikova, a deputy editor of
Sovietskaya Rossiya, a staunchingly anti-reform newspaper. 
"If there is the smell of money, what sort of independence can you talk
about?" Kasyannikova said. "Cheese is only free in a mousetrap." 
Albright's promise of aid also raised the question of who would actually
receive the money. Much of the money from some past aid programs has gone
toward paying U.S. and other Western consultants. 
The programs to help Russian media are being developed by Western
foundations,
said Nina Balyasnikova, who heads the media program at the Moscow branch of
the Open Society Institute, a branch of the Soros Foundation. 
The U.S. money for supporting independent media in Russia will be joined by
another $10 million being given by the Open Society Institute, she said. 
The Dutch government as well as several international organizations also are
contributing to programs to help Russian media combat dwindling circulations,
dropping ad revenues and other problems stemming from the financial crisis,
Balyasnikova said. She gave no figures. 
"We are looking at the slow death of a lot of independent media," said Ann
Olson, director in Moscow of Media Viability Fund, an international non-
governmental organization that also will participate in projects supporting
independent press in Russia. "Not only is it one of the most crucial times
financially, it is also one of the most crucial times politically." 
Much of the aid is likely to be directed at the regional media, Balyasnikova
said, but specific programs will be announced no earlier than mid-February.
They likely will include training programs for Russian journalists. 
In the regions, some journalists said the international aid would come up
against political alignments formed over the years and cemented with financial
kickbacks. 
Yekaterina Aksyonova, a journalist at Narodnaya Gazeta, or People's
Newspaper,
in the Siberian city of Ulyanovsk, said it was highly unlikely that her paper,
which receives financing from the regional governor, would accept any
international aid. 
"Because of political reasons, we probably will not accept any help, because
how would we then look our governor in the eye?" Aksyonova said in a telephone
interview. 

*******

#3
From: "William D. Bontrager" <wdb@ltlap.minsk.by>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1999
Subjecdt: Re: Moral Degradation in Russia (Itar Tass, 3029)

Now in my fifth year teaching law in the former Soviet Union, I have
noted a problem which, I believe, lies at the heart of the future of Eastern
Europe.
When people have no law or legal system which they may use in their
self-interest, or in their self-protection, or the results of which they may
reasonably predict (and all of this is true of the former Soviet Union), the
people, will, of necessity, develop survival mechanisms. It is, after all,
"we the people versus them, the totalitarians". Nor is this something which
developed over the past 80 years; totalitarianism is hundreds of years old in
the East.
These survival mechanisms may be seen at all levels. They include such
matters as:
(1) No one changes money at the bank but ony in the black market;
(2) Cheating in the classroom is endemic;
(3) Vast numbers have black market work and/or exist in barter, both
of which are, of course, untaxed;
(4) The old "I'll skim off something that you need if you will skim off
something I need" continues unabated;
(5) And, of course, official corruption continues apace starting with
the lowest official to the highest.
"May you have to live on your salary" is the ultimate curse. "How do
you like the way we live on our salaries" is the joking admission that nothing
is as it seems.
The problem is that all of these survival mechanisms are outside the
law! Yes, there is written law, and process. Some of it reads beautifully.
But the words never had meaning, the the process was always politicized. And
so an entire society, for generations, became outlaws. I offer no
condemnation
for this, but it must but recognized.
Then came the fall of the wall, and the opportunity for freedom and
economic reform. But that also brought the necessity to make a hard choice:
give up the outlaw survival mechanisms and come under the law, demanding that
the law work in an unpolitical manner (rule of law) or continue the old ways.
"Better the devil I know than the devil I don't know" has, so far, been the
answer.
Continuing to live outside the law invites the law to remain harsh.
It invites a "strong man". It guarantees continued politicalization of the
law and legal processes. Coming in out of the cold and under the law, on the
other hand, risks starvation. Starvation would force confrontation with the
powers that be, the graft, and corruption. But the confrontation will have to
be taken while there is still no reason to expect anything other than a gulag.
In the face of the failure of the average adult, let alone the leaders
and bureaucrats, to choose to live under, within, and subject to the law,
the youth and young adults choose a "go for the gusto" approach to life in
full
expectation. The anarchy we see is, however, not a RESULT; it is a chosen
LIFESTYLE of generations.

*******

#4
The Economist
January 30, 1999
[for personal use only]
Russia's Rich Presidency 
The crown estate 
M O S C O W 

IF IT were a business, the presidential property office would be one of the
largest in Russia. It owns, by its own account, sanatoria, farms, garages,
hundreds of properties, an airline and a publishing house. Many Russians
believe there is much more. 
Almost all countries have some sort of agency for managing government
property. But few combine the wealth and secrecy of Russia’s. It reports
directly to the president, and produces no proper public accounts of its
property, or its earnings. It is responsible for the safety and comfort of
tens of thousands of officials, which in the higher reaches of Russian public
life translates into spectacular luxury and security. 
Now it is branching out. On January 26th, it opened a five-star hotel in
Moscow, the Golden Ring. Its partner is Mabetex, an equally octopodous firm
based in Switzerland. Its previous coups include rebuilding the artillery-
damaged Russian parliament building and air-freighting two handsome motor-
boats to President Boris Yeltsin’s holiday homes. 
Quite why Moscow needs another swish hotel is unclear: the city has dozens
already, most of them largely empty. Travel companies say the real need is for
decent mid-market rooms, of which there are almost none. But good government
connections will no doubt help steer delegations and conferences to the Golden
Ring. 
It is also puzzling why the presidential office has shed its customary
secrecy
to highlight the deal. A reflection, perhaps, of growing worries about
possible corruption investigations should Mr Yeltsin, still out of action with
a bleeding ulcer, die? Or does it point up the growing influence of the prime
minister, Yevgeny Primakov, whose austere habits are shown to advantage
against the extravagances of the presidential family and its hangers-on? 
Most mystifying of all is the glimpse that Pavel Borodin, the agency’s
director, has given into its accounting habits. Asked to explain how he had
come to value the presidency’s assets in Russia at $600 billion (more than
three times the country’s GDP), he said the calculation was at “real prices”.
Ignore, he said, the country’s current “artificially low” market prices; value
them as if they were actually in the West—in central Tokyo, for example. Well,
yes. An original argument, but one unlikely to please the IMF, which is still
haggling over a plan for Russia’s disastrous economy. 

*******

#5
Russian governors unite to fight elections, combat separatism

MOSCOW, Jan 28 (AFP) - More than 20 powerful Russian regional chiefs announced
the formation Thursday of a new political movement to prevent the country from
falling apart and fight this year's parliamentary elections.
Konstantin Titov, governor of the central Russian region of Samara, said
that
heads of a smattering of republics from Kaliningrad in the west to Khakassia
in the east were forming the group to bolster democracy and strengthen the
glue holding the fragile federation together.
"We don't like a lot of the distribution of responsibility, of powers, of
property and of budget and tax federalism," Titov told journalists. "This bloc
is based on creating a group in the State Duma which will professionally
represent the interests of the subjects of the federation."
The group includes leaders from Kaliningrad, Khakassia, Khanty-Mansiisk,
Nizhny Novgorod, Penza, Rostov, Saratov, Tyumen, and Vologda and will put up
candidates for the Duma elections due in December.
Russia's 89 regions frequently complain that their interests are not
represented in Moscow. Governors have chided the centre for failing to earmark
enough funds for regions and to transfer the money promptly.
Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov has repeatedly warned that Russia is in
danger
of being torn apart by separatist forces pulling from the four corners of the
country.
Titov said that his fellow governors were not openly separatist as such
but "a
split is happening because if you have power but no economic basis to exercise
these powers then of course you will want to free yourself.
"The creation of our bloc is specifically aimed at preventing a break-up of
the subjects of the federation," he added, stressing a "strong family, strong
home, strong district, strong town, strong region, strong centre."
Titov and other regional leaders in the Federation Council upper house have
balked at the 1999 budget for giving regions too small a slice of the pie. He
said that governors wanted to see more funds for Dagestan (southern Russian),
Tuva and Khakassia (both central Siberia) before approving the draft bill.
He also called for a range of tax breaks and customs loopholes to be
reviewed,
as "we must pay our taxes."
Titov was formally a deputy chairman of former premier Viktor Chernomyrdin's
parliamentary group Our Home Is Russia (NDR), which he said was now going
nowhere.
"I don't like the strategy which Viktor Chernomyrdin has taken. It is
leading
to a dead end. NDR is going nowhere, to ruin." 

*******

#6
BBC
January 27, 1999
Embalming - the new Russian revolution 
If it's good enough for Lenin ... 
By Alan Little in Moscow 

Embalming in Russia used to be the preserve of revolutionary leaders, but it
has now become the must-have of the Mafia chieftains and wealthy new Russians
who hold sway. 
Vladimir Lenin, founder of the Soviet state, was buried 75 years ago on
Wednesday.
In death as well as in life, Lenin was a pioneer. His successors decided to
preserve his body for the inspiration of future generations of Communists. 
He still lies in a mausoleum in Moscow's Red Square. These days, however,
Lenin is no longer in the hearts and lives of Russians. 
Interest instead has turned as much to the revolutionary scientific
techniques
used to embalm him, and how they are being used to preserve the remains of the
people who now hold sway in post-Communist Russia. 
The Russian revolutionary wanted to be buried alongside his mother in St
Petersburg. But Lenin's successors had a higher use for him. 
By embalming him, they tapped into the Russian passion for holy relics and
religious veneration that the revolution had denounced and swept away. 

Communist preservation 

Ilya Zbarsky was 10 years old when his scientist father was summoned to the
Kremlin in January 1924. 
His father was instructed to preserve the leader's body for all eternity
- on
the grounds that Communism - the ultimate destination of all mankind - was
here to stay. 
Initially, they tried to preserve him by freezing him - but that failed. 
According to Ilya Zbarsky, "the state of the body was not very good. It
began
to decay and it was urgent to take measures immediately. 
"My father and his collaborators were working at the underground mausoleum
...it was very difficult and very nervous work, for there was no precedent of
conserving the body with a good resemblance." 
Ten years later, Ilya himself had become a member of the embalming team and
was to work on Lenin's remains for the next 20 years. 
He said: "Twice a week, we would soak the face and the hands with a special
solution. We could also improve some minor defects...then once a year the
mausoleum was closed and the body was immersed in a bath with this solution. 

Scalpel search for Lenin's genius 

But, the scientific institute that developed the ground-breaking
technique is
breaking ground no more. 
Once, it sliced open Lenin's disease-shrunken brain in a search of dubious
scientific credibility - the hunt for the source of the great man's genius. 
It helped embalm Stalin - who joined Lenin in the mausoleum for 10 years
before being denounced. 
It even embalmed Ho Chi Min, Mao Tse Tung and Augustino Neto of Angola. 
These days, like everything else in Russia, the institute is taking its
chances on the open market. 
Its director, Valeri Bykov, said: "We continue to work on embalming
techniques
as an ongoing process. We're learning about molecular and cellular structures,
even when life is stopped. 
"We do use this fundamental knowledge for the preservation of corpses. We
can
keep a body preserved indefinitely, or at least for as long as is needed." 

Mafia clients 

These days the clients are to be found among Russia's wealthy elite - the
Mafia bosses who want to remain like Lenin - objects of veneration and fear
even after their deaths. 
Samuel Hutchinson is the co-author of a new book called Lenin's
Embalmers. He
said: "Usually if there's a lot of work to be done on the bodies, if for
example the dead man is bandaged because he has received a lot of bullets in
his face, then there might be a lot of work to be done, up to one week, and
the institute would charge $10,000. 
If it's just one day of work then it would be $1,500 to $2,000. A year and a
half ago there was an average of two gangsters per month. 

A nation divided 

It is often said here that Russia will not move on until Lenin is finally
laid
in his grave in St Petersburg. 
But the country remains bitterly divided over his legacy. No leader dare
move
him. He has become a secular saint. 
His continued presence is an enduring symbol of a paralysed country
unable to
decide whether the system he built was good or bad. 
But even Ilya Zbarsky - the man who spent so much of his life in the
unending
fight against decomposition - believes it's now time to stop. 
He said: "I don't think that it is traditional for a civilised people to
conserve some political man's relics and the figure of Lenin is not now... so
I think that it is better to inter Lenin's body. 
Russia though yearns for the certainties of the past. It is not yet ready to
part company with the closest thing to a deity those lost lamented days have
bequeathed.

*******

#7
Russia: Three Key Areas Require Reform
By Robert Lyle

Washington, 28 January 1999 (RFE/RL) -- The U.S. government's top official
focusing on the global economy has reiterated again that Russia will only
get international financial help if it acts in three key areas of reform. 
Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, briefing a Senate Foreign
Relations subcommittee in Washington Wednesday, said the U.S. fully
supports the demands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that to get
more help, Moscow must take "concrete steps" in three important areas: 
Summers said Russia must adopt a sound budget, put a workable financial
system back together and, most importantly, move to establish the rule of
law for business. The IMF has said it is only prepared to support Russia in
the context of such a policy framework, to help the Russian people and not
flow into Swiss bank accounts. 
Summers said the IMF, with full U.S. backing, is requiring that specific
measures must be adopted in all three areas. He said the budget must be
realistic, the banking system must guarantee that deposits are not stolen
are simply used to provide credits for inherently unprofitable industries,
and the rule of law accepted for commercial activity. 
The U.S. official said the Duma's passage last month of production sharing
agreement legislation for oil and gas was an "encouraging step" in adopting
the rule of law. 
Summers was speaking on the global financial crisis and the need for reform
of the IMF. 
He gave the IMF full credit for the successes of the global economy in the
last ten years, saying the prosperity that has occurred is directly related
to the role of the fund in mitigating many international financial crises. 
More important than the crisis times, said Summer, the far greater value of
the IMF is it's work in spreading generally accepted international
accounting standards and pushing countries to adopt more prudent financial
and monetary policies. 
The IMF is indispensable in this role, he said. But that doesn't mean it
can't be better. He said the U.S., along with many other nations, has been
pushing a whole series of reforms at the fund, including increased
transparency or openness with information on what it is doing, greater
accountability to its 182 member nations, more loans based on market
conditions, greater burden-sharing with the private sector and improved
lending and reform policies. 
The fund has learned from its experiences in dealing with the Asian crisis
and earlier problems in Latin America, he said. 
But in the end, he said, how well the IMF's policies and programs work
depends entirely on the nation seeking help: 
Summers says countries shape their own destiny. While everyone talks about
IMF programs, they are in reality the country's program and it is theirs to
carry out. Financial support and advice can make the difference, but
ultimately economic success depends on the determination of a government
and its people to carry out the reforms. 

*******

#8
http://www.intellectualcapital.com
January 28, 1999
The President Still Remembers Me
An Interview with Boris Nemtsov

Boris Nemtsov is a former governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region and former
deputy prime minister. Long considered one of Russia's leading "Young
Reformers" by Western press and governments, he lost his post in the last
government shake-up following the August collapse of the ruble and economic
crisis. IC spoke with Boris Nemtsov in his office on Ilyinka Street in the
Central Archives Service building, which is owned by the presidential
administration. 

IC:Boris Yefimovich, could you please explain what happened to your
movement, "Young Russia"? Recently when you created it, you said that such
people as Sergey Kiriyenko, Irina Hakamada and Boris Fedorov were going to
join. But in the end you found yourself in brilliant isolation, and
Kiriyenko even founded his own movement. Why did that happen? What disputes
got in the way? 
BN: There are no disputes between us at all. It's just a development 
strategy: Each person has a right to create his own movement. I don't see any
contradictions here. Some like Nemtsov, others Kiriyenko, and still others
Gaidar or Chubais. So let everybody have an opportunity to choose whom they
like. But still we must unite. It's quite obvious that no one of the
democratic parties is going to make it to the Duma alone. So we are simply
doomed to cooperate. As for "Young Russia," it's like new blood in the
democratic movement. We registered on Dec. 18, so now nobody can deny us
the right to take part in the elections. Currently, regional conferences of
our movement are taking place in several Russian cities. IC:One can join
your movement on the Internet. But do you recognize that Internet users are
not quite like ordinary voters? BN:Of course I understand that the Internet
public is rather unusual, and they are not like the majority of Russians at
all. But it just happened that "Young Russia" lives on the Internet. Of
course there is a certain element of "game" here. After all, to many the
Internet is still a toy. Uniting games and politics is my know-how. I think
we still didn't quite realize the organizing force of the Internet. After
all, "Young Russia" actually came to life out of that box [nodding toward
the computer on his desk]. The idea to come out into the real world also
came out of the Internet, by the way. My site started to receive
increasingly more letters to the effect of, "Enough talk, let's all start
doing something." Then there was a proposal to meet "live," and then the
idea to form a movement was born. Now many of the people with whom I was in
touch on the Internet are putting together real party cells. I received a
letter from New Zealand from a political scientist who wrote that no party
in the world has ever been created like that. 
You see, I want to make the "Young Russia" into an organization of advanced
people. So there should be a place there for business, for young
intellectuals, for students and for the future political elite. 
IC:Will you take part in the Duma elections as an independent movement?
BN:"Young Russia" will take part in the elections only as part of [a]
coalition of right-democratic forces. Though in local elections -- e.g.
elections of governor in Pacific region or in Yaroslavl -- it certainly can
go as an independent political force. 
IC:And how is the process of putting
together regional organizations of the right-democratic movement going?
BN:Formally, the right coalitions are now in place in more than 60% of the
regions. But, of course, we don't have great illusions. We very much
understand that the majority of those regional organizations need further
strengthening, both ideologically and financially. So now the main thing is
pre-election party development. I believe that the only chance to attract
new people, as well as business and financial interests, is in not being a
sectarian organization. It seems to me that to overcome the certain
marginalism of the right movement, provincial leaders must personally head
the regional lists of candidates. For example, Nemtsov in the Volga region,
Chubais in the Northwestern region;,Kiriyenko in Moscow;,Hakamada, Fedorov
somewhere else. And one of us must be at the top of the federal list. 
This scheme would allow us to deal with several issues at the same time.
First, this would be quite a different level of responsibility. You are the
first in the region, so the election results depend on you directly.
Second, there will be no problem of leaders' ambitions. Everyone of us
becomes the first among equals. 
We can afford such luxury; we have many leaders. Which other parties can
boast that? "Yabloko" or "Fatherland" have one leader; Communists have
several but still few. And we are about the only ones who can put together
a shadow Cabinet. I think if we will be working along two lines --
strengthening our organizations in the regions and being active on the
federal level -- it will bring results. 
Also, we have another advantage over many politicians. We have already been
in the government. We want to get into the new Duma not because we want to
grab power but because we want Russia to have an adequate Parliament in the
21st century. 
IC:Aren't you afraid of a clash between all of you over the leadership
issue? 
BN:No, there will be no clash. I'll repeat it once again: Power to
us is not something to fight each other for. In our right-democratic
movement, there are enough sensible people who will not reduce themselves
to settling personal scores. IC:Last week the head of the presidential
administration, Nikolai Bordiuzha, said that at the next Duma elections the
Kremlin is going to support all parties and movements capable of ensuring
succession of reforms. Did you feel that support yet, in any way? BN:No,
and frankly, I don't think the administration is going to give us special
support. Oleg Sysuyev, who signed the address to the right forces urging
them to unite, supported us rather as an individual, not as the first
deputy head of the administration -- though, of course, the Kremlin is
loyal to us. IC:When did you see the president last? BN:In September.
Actually, it was when he proposed that I become his deputy in the Council
for Local Self-Government, without pay. Also, he sent me New Year greetings
-- even wrote a few words on the postcard personally. So he still remembers
me.
IC:And what are your responsibilities as Yeltsin's deputy in the area
of local self-government? What are you doing now other than party
development?
BN:I have a team [that] developed a municipal anti-crisis
program for 12 Russian cities. First of all, it's optimization of municipal
budgets, issues of city management, staff training, attracting investors.
Of course, these are rather expensive projects, though they don't demand
funds from local budgets. The money could be found from the federal budget
-- by taxing small- and medium-sized business, by selling land, by passing
such local laws as the law on mortgages. 
Here I play the role of advocate of local self-government. For example,
concerning the case of firing Vladivostok Mayor Cherepkov -- I am ready to
take his side. But not because of personal likes or dislikes; it's about
the principles of government system, which I am ready to stand for. 
Also, I am now active in the "Buy Russian" movement. It's not a political
movement; it's a patriotic one. 
IC:Is that a kind of sequel to your campaign to make all officials to drive
in Volga automobiles? 
BN:If you like. ... This movement is joined by such
competitive Russian companies as Baltika (beer), Svoboda (confectionery
factory). And the main idea for which that movement was created is to
introduce a kind of capitalist "seal of quality." That seal should be a
sort of franchising, so consumers buying the goods [that] have it can be
sure that the quality is guaranteed. And there will be no cheating of
consumers here. After all, lots of Russian goods are really superior to
Western ones. 
As to the Volgas, I still believe it was the right thing to do. If I had
gotten what I wanted, we could really support the Russian car industry.
Secondly, we would have to improve Russian roads. Thirdly, I cannot
understand why Russian taxpayers should support Western producers. And
fourthly, it would be simply profitable to us. 
IC:And what's happening with your program of training young professionals
abroad?
BN:I still keep an eye on how the program for "Yeltsin's nestlings"
is implemented. I am very happy that all members of the last year's party
came back to Russia. Not one of more than a thousand trainees decided to
stay abroad, though they have been offered jobs there. True, almost all of
them faced the same problem after they returned -- jealousy from their
bosses - [because] it turned out that yesterday's trainees know more than
their managers. And after the crisis, many of them lost their jobs. 
So after that, they decided to create an association. After all, they are
the managers of the 21st century. It's they who in that century will come
to business and to the government You know, I have a dream. Do you remember
the Communists' "25,000" slogan? Well, I have a similar idea -- our country
needs 25,000 professional managers. 
So to support that program, I put together a structure [that] now functions
without me. Commissions to select worthy candidates are still working in
all regions. The federal budget pays for their retraining, language courses
and return tickets to their place of training. Local budgets pay for their
travel within the country -- e.g. to Moscow. Foreigners pay for their stay
there and their stipends. The economic effect of the program is that for
each dollar invested by Russia, there are $15 invested by Western partners.
The thousand people who already came back and now work here is just the
beginning. The program is designed to train 5,000 people annually. 
IC:Will that association of trainees join your movement, "Young Russia"?
BN:Probably not as an organization. But maybe some of them will support me.
IC:Now, six months after you left the government, what do you think about
its work and mistakes [that] led to the August crisis?
BN:You know, I am
positive that we will remember 1997, the year when they allowed us to work
in the government, as we remember 1913 and will be comparing all indicators
with it. After all, in both instances the real income of people started to
grow; the number of poor was reduced by 1,5 million; the GDP (gross
domestic product) grew; we abandoned the system of authorized banks; and
inflation was lower. 
The August 1998 crisis was inevitable because of objective circumstances --
inefficient economy, hence budget deficit, conflicts with the Parliament,
which couldn't pass the most important legislation, such as the tax code
and the land code, plus an oligarchic regime. And of course the external
factors -- oil prices, the world financial crisis. 
But I think the scale of the crisis would have been less destructive if
Yeltsin behaved like a true czar. Yeltsin sent our government away, though
a czar should have done differently. He should have summoned us and given
us two months to fix things. And if we would have failed to do that then
fire us. So now we pay dearly for the new government's training; it's not
fit for governing modern Russia. 
IC:Do you know what to do now to change the economic situation? 
BN:There
should be a whole set of measures. First, an anti-corruption program must
be adopted. Second, efforts to revive the economy must be taken, and on the
macro-economic level, too. After all, 40% of our industrial companies are
bankrupt. But 25% are feeling good. I believe that privatization has been
done inefficiently. Forty percent are bankrupt. They must be privatized
anew. But not like Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov suggests to do it, where
owners should be changed by courts of law. This would just freeze in the
inefficient economy. 
IC:Many political scientists now agree that you were
"burned" in vain when you were pulled out of Nizhny Novgorod and invited to
join the government. They believe that in Nizhny you would have worked
quietly until 2000, and you would have been the best possible presidential
candidate. Do you regret that you moved to Moscow? 
BN:I knew that from the
point of view of political prospects I would indeed have done better
staying in Nizhny. Then my position would really have been much more
favorable. I was aware of all that, but my decision to join the government
was not determined by political expediency. Tatiana Borisovna [Yeltsin's
daughter] came to me and said literally the following: "When the president
was strong, he helped you. Now you help him." So I agreed. 
Do I regret this? Probably not. I now have unique experience, unlike
anybody else. I have been both a governor and a government member, so now I
know and understand much more than many other politicians. Also, I am not a
man who puts political ambitions above human relationships. I prefer to
remain a normal human being in politics, too. 

*******

#9
Church Said Too Closely Tied to State 

Moskovskiy Komsomolets 
January 19, 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Vladimir Pashkov: "I Believe. The Falcons of
Metropolitan Kirill"

If the ancient Roman priests of the heathen Mars were to
appear in 20th century Russia, they would be extremely surprised to
see that many Christians here--whom in their day they persecuted,
oppressed, subjected to degrading punishments, and forced into the
arena with the lions for public entertainment because they
proclaimed "Thou shalt not kill" and thou shalt love they brother--
have become not simply an influential force in the society and the
state, but have also borrowed something from them. Those who
initially were opposed to the state machine with its repressive
apparat and troops ready for battle have themselves become a part of
this machine, right to the point of the appearance of positions as
military clergy. And now, it seems, they are trying on for size the
role of cassock-wearing deputy commanders for politicalaffairs.
The church and the army, or the government armed forces in
general, are two institutions whose relations require clear
definition. It is one thing to bless fighting as defense against
foreign aggression, against enslavers, while remaining beyond
earthly, secular power and its structures. It is another thing to
become a part of the state machine of suppression and join in on the
aggressive imperial foreign policy with the status of acomponent.
The authority of the Russian Orthodox Church dropped rather
low at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, not
least of all because its representatives were especially in evidence
as an element of the state apparat (in this case the Synod) in
military units. All the campaigns of the Russian Empire (their
ideological pretexts are not important) during this period were
aggressive and aimed at conquest. The Russian Orthodox Church
proclaimed no moral positions regarding this (and it could not, as a
part of the state machine). And the army not only expanded the
Empire's boundaries but also suppressed agrarian uprisings, strikes,
and peoples' liberation movements. The position of the Russian
Orthodox Church was actually one of solidarity with the repressive
actions of the state, whose victims were thousands of desperate
people protesting oppression and injustice, including like-believers.
The Bolshevist power, by an irony of history, did what the
Orthodox leader could not do, although they very much wanted him to.
It separated the church from the state and did not stand in the way
of the revival of the Patriarchate. Later, true, religion along
with its followers began to be destroyed in the most terrible andmerciless
way.
During this terrible, bloody period the authority of the
Russian Orthodox Church increased not only because of the principle
"He who is persecuted for his faith is righteous," but also because
it did not participate in the evil deeds of the Communist regime.
There was no expressed resistance to it after the death of Patriarch
Tikhon (only the underground Russian Orthodox Church exerted passive
resistance), but even the external alienation of the official church
from the repressive state machine was a factor in the population's
increased confidence in it as a social institution.
But there was an actual attachment between religious
associations, mainly the Russian Orthodox Church through its
ramified agency network, and the state and its repressive machine.
This union was secret. Attempts through the work of a special
parliamentary commission during 1991-1992 to raise the curtain
covering this secret were frustrated. The new government with the
old nomenklatura and the same church nomenklatura again established
a certain kind of cooperation. And the good graces of many in the
hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church were simultaneously taken
advantage of by the elite in the opposition, including those with
nationalistic--even Nazi--and Communist leanings (obviously they are
related, if not ideologically, then organizationally).
The Russian Orthodox Church, under the domination in its
bureaucratic leadership of cadres who at one time were nursed in
Lubyanka and Staraya Square, is incapable of becoming a morally
supportive constructive element of the society and thus preventing
the state from once again deteriorating into a punitive type. Let
us take a couple of instructive examples.
At the end of September and the beginning of October 1993
there was a constitutional crisis in Russia. The president issued
Edict No. 1400, which greatly aggravated the confrontation between
the power structures. The Supreme Council got back at him: It
enlisted extremists as allies. They opened the door to thebloodshed.
The Patriarchate made a gesture toward reconciliation and
announced that the first to violate the negotiating process and
cause an armed attack on the other party would be anathematized as
the instigator of a civil war. But the opposition, taking advantage
of the withdrawal of the troops from the capital, interrupted the
negotiations, violated the truce, destroyed the mayor's office, and
attacked the Ostankino Television Center and the Podmoskovye
publishing house. The dead and wounded are on their conscience.
What did the Patriarchate do? It remained silent and did not keep
its word about the anathema.
But then the opposition, not having achieved a decisive
victory, took up its defense in the current House of Government,
protected by the living shield of the peaceful population. Paying
no attention to this circumstance, the executive branch began to
fire. And what did the Patriarchate do? It did not "notice" this
barbaric action and did not condemn it. Apparently it did not want
to have a falling out with either of the sides.
But what about from a moral position? It seems that the
priority of advantage over morality has been convincinglydemonstrated.
The same thing happened with the war in Chechnya. The church
did not resolutely condemn either the immoral policy of the
authorities, mainly the executive, or the war itself as a hideous
act, or the murder of the Orthodox clergyman by the fanatical
Chechen bigots. The silence was a sign of agreement with those who
committed the crimes.This was a brilliant illustration of the convergence
of the
institution of the militarists and the most reactionary part of the
high church circles. And no wonder: The generals are also
interested in moral support from the church. And the latter
responds with complete reciprocity.
I do not know about anybody else, but I was shocked by a clip
from a television program from the strategic missile command point,
which the military and church leaders were assigned to protect...
Holy Mary! What kind of blasphemy is this: to call upon the Virgin
Mother as a protector of arms capable of destroying all that is
living and beautiful--God's world on earth! The heathens--they
could pray to Mars, Odin, Perun, and others to give their weapons
greater killing force. But for Christians to do this...
I recently learned that one Russian Orthodox Church archbishop
awarded a high church order to the designer of the Kalashnikov
rifle. One wonders--why?! After all, his automatics did not
repulse the fascist attack on the Motherland. They proved
themselves in Hungary, where our army units went to suppress the
rebellion against the local pro-Stalinist regime; in Czechoslovakia,
where our militarism also played a punitive role; and in numerous
"hot spots" that appeared through the fault of our leaders. Not
only that: They also they also gave a number of Kalashnikovs and
the technology for their production to various dictators, after
which these creations of the new-fledged church order bearer were
used to kill our boys from foreign outposts.
Apparently the high church official considered these facts
unworthy of his attention. The main thing was to bless the armed
force, and whether or not it worked for the good of the people and
the country was not important. But here is what is instructive. No
award was conferred on Ilizarov for the invention that made it
possible for victims not to become cripples, or the inventors of
vaccines against terrible diseases, or the inventors of prostheses
and equipment to save people from the consequences of natural
disasters and catastrophes--no! They, as it turns out, were
unworthy. But the inventor of an implement of murder--he is quiteworthy.
In Krasnoarmeysk in the Moscow area the senior priest of the
Church of St. Nicholas in the village of Tsarevo, N. Glebov, in 1991
blessed the defilement of a temple that happened to end up on the
area of a local firing range, stating that the military-industrial
complex was more important to him. Complaints from believers had no
effect and the holy father remained in his position--teaching that
kind of--if I may call it that--Christianity and patriotism. Now it
has all begun. We will have to wait and see which clergy will be
assigned as patrons of poisonous gases, other chemical weapons,
antipersonnel mines (whose victims are mainly peaceful residents,
including children), and other such "achievements" that are worthy
of high awards, according to the logic and practice of Russian
Orthodox Church hierarchy. But God forbid that Communists, Nazis,
and similar "patriots" come to power--look and you will see film
clips of them sanctifying hard labor barracks and guard towers in
the revived Gulags and they will have to decide which of the clergy
will be the patrons of the furnaces in the crematoriums... This
state of affairs, which I consider to be unseemly, disgraceful for
the reputation of Orthodoxy, comes about because Christianity as
such is gradually giving way to a quasi-religion, which I would call
Christian Marsism. For judging from the numerous facts, for many
servants of the church of various ranks, the main, true but
concealed object of worship is Mars along with his attributes:
weapons, big-power military might, and an apparatus for violence and
suppression. Replacing Christianity, this cult in its disguise, is
leading--and successfully, I think--to the establishment in Russia
of a Nazi-theocratic-militaristic system. If the upper hierarchy of
the Russian Orthodox Church does not notice this and put a stop to
it, Russia will not be able to avoid disaster. And then it will be
more terrible than the power of Bolshevism or the invasion of
Hitler's fascism.

******

#10
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 1999
From: "INDEPENDENT MEDIA" <research@imedia.ru>
Subject: INDEPENDENT MEDIA NEWS UPDATE, 28 January 1999, issue 76

RATING THE WORLD'S MOST EXPENSIVE 
CITIES, MOSCOW MOVED FROM THIRD 
TO EIGHTY EIGHTH PLACE
--------------------

MOSCOW, 28 Jan. (Kapital) - According to the
recently published results of the survey
conducted by the London Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU) in Autumn 1998 in 123 cities around
the world, Moscow lost its status as the most
expensive European city. The Russian capital,
which was the third most expensive city of the
world for a long time, is now at 88th place -
lower than Istanbul and higher than Prague. St.
Petersburg, having moved from the 32nd to 115th
place, is now the cheapest European city.

EIU conducts its survey twice a year and
estimates average living expenses in dollar
equivalents in large cities. Information about
prices on goods and services (the list contains
167 items) is analyzed, and a special index is
calculated for each city relative to New York
City, which has an index of 100.

All calculations are based on information
collected by people recruited by EIU. According
to Bill Ridgers, EIU expert, the company recruits
one person for each city, who within two weeks
has to collect prices in three types of shops (a
cheap supermarket, a shop with average prices and
a specialized shop), some restaurants, hotels,
dry cleaners, etc.

More information about the survey results can be
obtained from the Russian-language newspaper
Kapital, dated 27 January-2 February.

*******

#11
Russian Military Calls for Strategic Stability Treaty 

Moscow, Jan 26 (Interfax) -- Supreme Commander of
the Strategic Missile Forces RVSN, Colonel General
Vladimir Yakovlev, has called for drafting a global strategic stability
treaty. 
"We suggest moving over to the discussion of a strategic stability treaty
that would allow the removal of the differences existing
between Moscow and Washington on the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] problem
and other issues," he said in an interview with Interfax
on Tuesday [26 January]. 
This document, according to him, should provide for efforts "for lowering
the level of the nuclear warheads, envisaged by the START I,
START II, and START III Treaties." 
To keep strategic stability intact, Yakovlev suggested reaching an
agreement with the U.S. "on the inviolability of space" with a pledge
not to create space vehicles capable of destroying missile attack warning
space systems. 
"If we begin to develop anti-spacecraft destruction vehicles, this will
lead to strategic instability by crushing one of the main channels of
getting unbiased information on nuclear strategic forces," the commander
said. 
He said that prospectively the treaty should be joined by "the other
nuclear club members -- France, Britain, and China." "In the next few
years, France and Britain will be able to adopt a total of 1,000 strategic
weapons for arms," Yakovlev said. He added that within the
framework of a strategic stability treaty it is necessary to negotiate
limits on conventional and high precision weapons and solve the
question of distinguishing between tactical and strategic anti-missile
defense." 

*******