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January 1 , 1999    
This Date's Issues: 3000 3001  



Johnson's Russia List
#3001
1 January 1999
davidjohnson@erols.cmo

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Daniel Bases, Russians seek better times in Soviet past.
2. Los Angeles Times: Maura Reynolds, Russian Santa Suffers Identity
Crisis.

3. The Electronic Telegraph (UK): Marcus Warren, Salaries frozen for 
Russia's elite.

4. Joe Walker: Americans in gulags.
5. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Geoffrey York, Russia's vodka culture.
6. The Economist: Of commissars and commissioners. (Russia and EU).
7. Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Primakov's Staff Chief Zubakov Interviewed.
8. The Economist letter: Jan Kalicki, In the pipeline.
9. The New Republic editorial: Ingrates.]

*******

#1
FEATURE-Russians seek better times in Soviet past
By Daniel Bases

MOSCOW, Jan 1 (Reuters) - Russia may be searching for a capitalist solution to
its economic ills, but some people are looking to the Soviet past to bolster
their national pride. 
There hasn't been much to be jolly about during the holiday season with a
severely devalued rouble, a cash-hungry government, a weak economy and rising
anti-Semitism. 
But 2,000 people, from all walks of life, packed the Rossiya Hotel concert
hall, just off Red Square, last month to forget about Russia's economic and
social problems and listen to traditional ``estrada'' music performed by a
25-year-old singer named Yulian. 
In estrada, singers usually wear glamorous outfits and perform melodic
middle-
of-the-road and patriotic songs, often to the accompaniment of dancers. 
Many regard it as kitsch. But it became a substitute for jazz and rock when
both were banned by Communist ideology chiefs and it still has a big following
in Russia. 
The audience, which had an average age of around 55, were taken on a trip
down
memory lane by Yulian, who sang a long list of old favourites, many of which
were written before he was born. 
In one song, ``Mother and Son,'' Yulian sang a duet with ``the golden
voice''
of Soviet Russia, Ludmila Zykina. 
Like many of her peers, Zykina has fallen on harder times since the
demise of
communism. 
Putting a modern interpretation on old Russian songs, Yulian created a link
between himself and past generations of Russian entertainers who joined him on
stage for duets and testimonials. 
One after another they spoke about the humiliation of being unable to
support
themselves and waxed nostalgic for their lost status as a strong, self-
sufficient people during Soviet times. 

NO CALLS FOR COMMUNIST COMEBACK 

But not one of the entertainers wished the country to return to communism. 
``There is a common goal here to preserve and develop the specific cultural
traditions from the Soviet times of Russia without the communist overtones,''
Yulian explained in an interview with Reuters. 
``I like to sing in the old form of estrada, or pop, whatever you want to
call
it, because after the fall of communism, many singers went western and estrada
became a joke,'' he said. 
The financial crisis wasn't lost on the audience or the parade of Soviet-era
stars. Taking turns at the microphone, they gave the country a pep talk as
portions of the evening's festivities were broadcast on Russian radio. 
``We are being pulled apart like a draw bridge,'' said Nikolai
Dobronravov, a
poet and songwriter who has worked with his composer wife Alexandra Pakhmutova
for the past 50 years. 
``Bread is important. Friendship is important. But the warmth of the human
heart is the most important,'' Dobronravov said in an impassioned plea,
telling the audience that Russia would survive, but must not lose itself to
outside influences. 
During his performance, Yulian paid tribute to the hard-hit Northern
territories, where much of Russia's wealth is located in the form of oil,
precious metals, and diamonds. 
He praised the people living in those areas for doing their civic duty by
keeping the gas and oil flowing during the economic crisis to places like
Moscow, so that ``we won't freeze this winter. 
``They could easily just cut off the pipelines. I said it to praise them
as a
citizen and not as a singer,'' he said, adding that he has travelled to some
of these places and seen the suffering caused by months without salaries. 
However, when asked if he gave more than just verbal support, he smiled
sheepishly and said that despite being a famous face and voice, entertainers,
singers, and artists like himself in Russia were suffering too. 
``There are not enough people who can buy tickets to more than just a few
shows these days,'' he explained. 
Indeed, lack of money pushed Russian estrada legend Alla Pugacheva to tour
three U.S. cities in October where Russian emigres were willing to spend from
$50 to $250 to hear her perform. That is more than most Russians earn in a
month, if they are paid at all. 

NEW FUND CREATED TO PRESERVE TRADITIONAL SOVIET CULTURE 

Most Russians are feeling the financial pinch but one patron of a new fund
called ``Rescue'' summed up the feeling among the audience. 
``By coming here we prove that despite the crisis, we can sacrifice more,
budget more, to buy tickets because we need to have warmth and feeling for
each other,'' said the patron, who wished to remain anonymous. 
``Rescue,'' a sponsor of Yulian's concert, was recently formed by Russian
businesses seeking out singers and songwriters, new and old, to support them
while they develop the fundamentals of this Soviet music tradition. 
The fund hopes that the primarily patriotic and heroic songs written during
Soviet times will help to restore a sense of pride lost as Russia lurches
between political uncertainty and financial havoc. 
``The fund will help talented musicians who with our support will become the
masters of their professions,'' said Oscar Feltsman, one of the leading
figures of Russia's music scene and a board member, along with Pakhmutova, of
the newly created fund. 
``This concert was the first opportunity for the fund to announce its
existence. On paper we have many funds, but very few actually help with
money,'' Yulian said. 
According to Feltsman, many of the businesses contributed on the condition
that they would remain anonymous. 
``You know, before the crisis hit us, I used to dress all in black, and my
stage was done all in black, but since then I have changed to more white and
colour because we already have enough black around us,'' Yulian said. 

*******

#2
Los Angeles Times
January 1, 1999 
[for personal use only]
Culture 
Russian Santa Suffers Identity Crisis 
Ded Moroz--Grandfather Frost--looks and acts a lot like St. Nick. But he's
not. 
By MAURA REYNOLDS, Times Staff Writer

MOSCOW--You might think Santa Claus has a tough job, what with flying all
over the world in a single night and figuring out who's been naughty or nice.
But these days, he has it easy compared with his Russian cousin, Ded Moroz. 
Russia's big winter holiday is New Year's, and today is when Ded Moroz
makes his rounds. By tradition, he has a somewhat more arduous job than Santa:
He usually delivers gifts in person, and he has no brigade of elves to help,
just a young girl called Snow Maiden. 
This year, Ded Moroz faces extra troubles. For one thing, the country's
economic crisis is casting a pall over moods and holiday buying. 
Ambitious politicians and regional developers are hijacking his celebrity
to promote their own causes. And perhaps most critically, he is suffering an
acute identity crisis that is partially Santa Claus' fault. 
Ded Moroz, whose name means Grandfather Frost, has a snowy white beard
and jolly red nose a lot like Santa's. But Russians say there are important
differences. 
For instance, Santa Claus is fat, while Ded Moroz is sometimes thin.
Santa wears a short red jacket and trousers, while Ded Moroz wears a long
flowing robe that can be a number of colors, including blue and white. Ded
Moroz carries a staff in addition to his sack of toys, and, while he sometimes
rides a sleigh, it is pulled by horses, not reindeer. 
Now, though, largely because of an invasion of imports, the bearded
figure bedecking Russian storefronts and lampposts looks more and more like
the trousered, imported Santa and less like Russia's beloved winter icon. At
central Moscow shopping centers, images of Santa outnumber Ded Moroz by a
hefty margin. 
"Technically, these are all Santa Claus," said Roza Zhuraviyeva, a
salesclerk in the posh GUM department store who gestured to her display of
trinkets bearing the image of the chubby, Western-style figure. "Of course,
I'd rather sell our own national version. But this is all made in China, and
they only know Santa Claus." 
Some politicians, notably Moscow Mayor Yuri M. Luzhkov, have begun to
promote Ded Moroz as a true symbol of the Russian spirit--in contrast to the
non-Russian Santa, whom they consider crass and commercialized. 
"Take a look at our huge, handsome Ded Moroz," Luzhkov bellowed earlier
this week after escorting Ded Moroz through central Moscow in a sleigh. "The
puny Santa Claus is a far cry from him!" 
Luzhkov even went so far as to claim that Ded Moroz doesn't live at the
North Pole or in Finnish Lapland, as has long been assumed. Instead, he
declared, Ded Moroz grew up right here in Russia, in a poor but pristine town
about 450 miles northeast of Moscow named Veliky Ustyug. 
Luzhkov's idea, it seems, is to turn Veliky Ustyug into a tourist
attraction that would bring trainloads of children from the capital and
presumably generate profits as well as national feeling. 
"It's a splendid northern Russian city," proclaimed Ded Moroz himself
during a news conference called by the mayor. "Ded Moroz could have been born
there. Why not?" 
One reason the Ded Moroz myth is up for grabs is that it is far less
developed than the Santa Claus legend, says Sergei A. Arutyunov, an expert on
Russian anthropology. Despite Luzhkov's bluster, Arutyunov says, Ded Moroz is
basically a pastiche based on the Western story of St. Nicholas. 
"Whatever differences exist between Santa Claus and Ded Moroz, they can't
camouflage the main thing--there is nothing inherently Russian about Ded
Moroz," he says. 
Arutyunov explains that Ded Moroz began to appear in Russia in the late
19th century as one of a number of holiday trappings borrowed from the West.
Then he was banned for a significant portion of the Soviet period as a
"reactionary religious remnant." 
"Ded Moroz does not have a long historical and cultural tradition in
Russia, and even the tradition that exists has been interrupted once or
twice," he says. 
Undaunted by such humbug, many Russians persist in believing Ded Moroz
superior to Santa, and they insist on their preference at Lyudmila Rotan's
costume stand inside GUM. 
"People usually ask specifically for Ded Moroz," Rotan said, pulling out
a red-robed felt costume selling for about $30. "But at various times, we have
celebrated Christmas and New Year's different ways. Personally, I don't think
it's that important." 

*******

#3
The Electronic Telegraph (UK)
1 January 1999
[for personal use only] 
Salaries frozen for Russia's elite 
By Marcus Warren in Moscow 

RUSSIA'S prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, boosted his popular appeal
yesterday by telling top bureaucrats that their salaries would be frozen until
the country's poorest workers received pay rises.
The announcement dampened the festive mood among government officials but it
raised a cheer in ordinary households the length and breadth of the nation.
With their chauffeurs, subsidised housing and reputation for venality, senior
government officials rival Russia's corrupt traffic police and tax inspectors
for the title of the country's most unpopular people.
Mr Primakov's government is still struggling to keep its promise to pay
months
of wage arrears to public sector workers and pensions it owes the elderly.
Many Russians will receive their salaries only after all the expense of
organising New Year feasts and visits by Grandfather Frost - Russia's Father
Christmas.
What wages or state benefits are paid have been hit by inflation, which
stands
at 84.4 per cent for 1998. With Russia still mired in crisis, many private
economists expect the rate for 1999 to be as high, if not higher.
In preparing the 1999 budget, the government has forecast inflation of 30
per
cent, but many analysts regard this as overly optimistic. Russia suffered from
hyperinflation for several years after it moved to a market economy in 1992,
but the government seemed to be taming it in recent years.
The rate was 11 per cent in 1997 and the government was expecting
single-digit
inflation for 1998 until the financial crisis struck in August. Since then,
the rouble has lost much of its value, the government has effectively
defaulted on some of its debts and the economy has been shrinking.
"As far as your wages are concerned, they will not be reduced," Mr Primakov
told a gathering of senior bureaucrats. "But I don't think it would be correct
to raise salaries for ourselves without raising the salaries of the poorest
citizens."
Many public sector workers have to get by on monthly wages considerably
lower
than what the government yesterday revealed was December's cost of the average
shopping basket of basic foods - £12.60.
The Russian economy had a disastrous 1998, with industrial output falling by
5.5 per cent. In his New Year address last night, President Yeltsin said that
it had been difficult "for the country, for many of you and for me as well".
An estimated 42 million Russians, nearly one-third of the country's
population, is living below the official poverty line, the government said
recently. According to a poll by the Institute of Parliamentary Sociology,
seven out of 10 Russians do not expect their lives to improve in 1999, despite
the government's pledge to resurrect the economy.
The real damage to the country was done by the debt default and devaluation
crisis in August and the resulting near-collapse in the banking sector. A
Moscow court has declared Tokobank, once one of the country's largest
financial institutions, bankrupt, clearing the way for the first liquidation
of a major bank since the crisis. It has debts of £220 million and assets of
just £100 million.
Russia's financial credibility on the international markets has hit new
depths, making borrowing money to cover its large budget deficit almost
impossible. Mr Primakov, 68, was appointed prime minister at the height of the
crisis and was widely seen as a caretaker figure, whose main advantage was
that he had no ambition to become president.
Three months later his consistently high scores in the opinion polls and
knack
for making populist gestures have convinced many that, despite his age, he
could be a strong candidate to take over from Mr Yeltsin.

*******

#4
From: "Walker, Joe C." <JCWalker@lasd.org>
Subject: Americans in gulags
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1998 

Dear Johnson List Members,
As a primarily American group of Russophiles and scholars, I think this is a
good place to post this inquiry.
I am very interested in the subject of Americans who were imprisoned in
Soviet gulags during the Cold War. There have been about 10 books written
from the point of view of the prisoners themselves.
The most prominent are by Walter Ciszek, John Noble, and Alexander Dolgun.
There are a few more, which I won't mention. What I am interested in is
whether there is one source that talks about the subject as a whole.
Internet searches and local libraries haven't helped much.
Can anyone offer suggestions or insight?

*******

#5
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 1998
From: Geoffrey York <york@glas.apc.org>
Organization: The Globe and Mail
Subject: Russia's vodka culture

by Geoffrey York
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
Dec. 29, 1998

MOSCOW -- There is perhaps nothing quite so hopeless as a Russian
anti-vodka campaign.
Mikhail Gorbachev proved it in 1985 when he launched a futile crusade
to limit the sale of vodka. Today the Kremlin is about to discover it
again.
In a rash burst of optimism, the Russian government is trying to ban
the distribution of cheap bootleg vodka -- the mainstay of working-class
drinkers for years, and the main cause of an estimated 30,000 deaths
from alcohol poisoning every year.
Russians are unfazed by the latest crackdown. Illegal vodka is still
available at 60 cents a bottle from elderly women who dodge the police
outside Moscow’s subway stations. Street kiosks offer the bootleg stuff
under the counter. Market vendors sell illicit bottles to their friends
and trusted customers.
~The state will never win this fight,” shrugs Andrei, a 41-year-old
labourer. ~There’s a lot of money at stake, and nobody is going to lose
this money.”
The campaign against bootleg alcohol has merely confirmed the obvious:
vodka is as inextricably Russian as snow and ice, and just about as
impossible to abolish.
The national drink has been inseparable from Russia’s cultural identity
for centuries. For millions of Russian men, the vodka bottle is at the
very heart of daily life. It is a social and business necessity, a
medical panacea, a faithful friend, and the quickest method of escape
from the hardships of post-Soviet poverty.
The most famous vodka drinkers are heroes in Russia. Next month the
Russians will proudly erect a bronze monument to their leading vodka
philosopher, the alcoholic author Venedikt Yerofeyev, who eulogized the
spirituality of booze in his classic underground novel (italics)
Moskva-Petushki (end italics). On the 60th anniversary of his birth in
October, a Russian television channel devoted six hours of programming
to his memory, while 1,500 of his biggest fans crowded into a suburban
train to retrace the alcohol-fogged odyssey in his famous novel.
Yet vodka is also Russia’s deadliest scourge. An estimated 10 million
Russians are alcoholics, and half of all deaths in the country are at
least partly caused by vodka. Of the 2.1 billion litres of vodka
consumed annually in Russia, more than half is the bootleg variety --
illicit, untaxed, unregulated, and often highly unsafe.
Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov points out that Russia suffers more
deaths annually from vodka than it endured in the entire 10 years of the
Afghanistan war. About 30,000 to 40,000 annual deaths are caused by
alcohol poisoning -- three times the total in 1990. (By comparison, only
about 350 Americans die from alcohol poisoning annually.)
Russians know that vodka can kill them, but their loyalty to the
national drink is unswerving. ~I love vodka because it’s the strongest
drink,” said Vladimir Nosov, a 41-year-old Moscow maintenance worker.
~Russians need their drinks to be very strong. Even when they make
homebrew in the villages, it’s not less than 40 per cent alcohol.
Otherwise you’d need to drink too much to get high.”
A few years ago, Russians surpassed the French to become officially the
world’s heaviest drinkers. By some estimates, the average Russian man
consumes 18 litres of pure alcohol annually -- the equivalent of a full
bottle of vodka every four days.
(Surveys of Russian drinking habits, however, can be difficult to
conduct. In one survey, as many as 2 per cent of those approached were
too intoxicated to respond.)
Alcohol has been vital to Russian life for at least a millenium. When
Grand Prince Vladimir of ancient Rus was searching for a religion for
his pagan country in the 10th century, he chose Christianity -- rather
than Islam -- because it allowed his people to keep drinking. ~Drinking
is the joy of the Russes,” he said. ~We cannot do without it.”
By the 15th century, a European ambassador in Moscow observed that the
Russians were ~great drunkards and take great pride in this, despising
abstainers.” Two centuries later, even Russia’s priests and monks were
notorious for heavy drinking, and another European diplomat remarked
that Russians were ~more addicted to drunkenness than any nation in the
world.”
Mikhail Gorbachev’s campaign against vodka in the mid-1980s is believed
to have saved the lives of 600,000 people. But it also taught millions
of Russians how to get drunk on potato-based homebrew and hundreds of
other toxic substances, including perfume, shaving lotion, insecticides,
anti-freeze, toothpaste, shoe polish and varnish. Soviet military
recruits drained the de-icing fluid from fighter jets to satisfy their
cravings. By 1988, the anti-vodka campaign had collapsed.
In the 1990s, vodka drinking surged to record levels, accelerated by
the human dislocation of the post-Soviet transition and the drastically
cheaper price of alcohol in the new capitalist economy.
The new era of vodka liberation was symbolized by the president
himself, Boris Yeltsin, who became notorious for drunken performances in
public. He opened the floodgates for cheap vodka in 1992, allowing
almost any kind of cheap booze to pour onto the Russian market. Indeed,
this was one reason for his political popularity. One poll found that
daily vodka drinkers were 50 per cent more likely to support Yeltsin
than those who drank less.
The vodka epidemic is the biggest single reason for the drastic decline
in the life expectancy of Russian men in the past decade. Their life
expectancy has plunged from 64 to 59 -- the steepest decline of any
nation in peacetime conditions -- and Russia’s population is falling by
400,000 every year. Studies have concluded that alcohol is linked to 80
per cent of Russian murders, half of all suicides, 60 per cent of fires,
75 per cent of absenteeism and half of all car crashes.
Heavy vodka consumption by Russian men is also the main reason why
Russia has the world’s biggest life-expectancy gap between men and
women. On average, Russian women live 15 years longer than men.
In the Soviet era, vodka was controlled by a state monopoly, which
provided as much as 35 per cent of all state revenue. Today, with the
monopoly dismantled, alcohol provides only 3 per cent of state revenue,
and the Russian government is losing as much as $2-billion in potential
annual revenue as a result of bootleg sales.
Most of the illicit vodka is produced in underground factories that
spring up as fast as the police can shut them down. Half of the vodka at
street kiosks is of dangerously poor quality, often made from
industrial-grade methyl alcohol. Some Russians routinely use cheap vodka
as a windshield-wiper fluid for their cars.
Because of its low production costs, the vodka trade is one of Russia’s
most profitable. Much of the cheapest stuff floods across the unguarded
border from Ukraine and Belarus, where the cost of production is even
lower. Indeed, vodka is so inexpensive that it has destroyed much of the
traditional moonshine industry. Nobody needs to make their own homebrew
alcohol when they can simply buy vodka on the street at 60 cents a
bottle.
Mr. Primakov, desperate to increase government revenue, has now imposed
a state monopoly on the distilleries that produce pure alcohol for vodka
bottlers. His goal is to reduce and eventually eliminate the illicit
production of vodka.
But the rulers of Russia have been vainly trying to control the vodka
industry for centuries. The first recorded anti-vodka campaign was in
1652. (It failed, of course.) Throughout the 1990s, the Kremlin
announced dozens of new measures to license and restrict the vodka
trade. Whenever it ordered a new licensing rule, fake excise stamps and
labels were available on the underground market within days.
~We can’t fight this competition,” said Sergei Lukashuk, production
manager of the famous Kristall vodka factory in Moscow. ~It’s very easy
to produce vodka in underground plants. You can set up a factory in a
week. It’s easy to get bottles and spirits. All this chaos must be
profitable for someone. It’s big money.”
The Kremlin is facing an immutable law: Russians will always insist on
a ready supply of cheap vodka, and the underground industry is the
easiest source.
~If the government tries to make the price too high, the illegal market
will increase,” said Maria Katkova, a Moscow art-gallery curator who
helped build the bronze monument to the vodka philosopher Venedikt
Yerofeyev.
~Russians will find a way to produce illegal vodka,” she said. ~They
live in very difficult conditions -- a harsh climate, wars, revolutions.
They need a different emotional reality. When they have problems and
sorrows, they need something to forget about life.”
Later this week, millions of Russians will gather around their
televisions to watch a pre-taped New Year’s Day television show,
featuring a host of Russian show-business celebrities. The show,
fittingly enough, is sponsored by a vodka company. ~When it was over,
the guests could hardly stand,” a Russian newspaper reported. ~We are a
drunk and talented people!”

******

#6
The Economist
January 2, 1999
[for personal use only]
EUROPE 
Of commissars and commissioners 
M O S C O W 
Say euro in Russian 

A RUSSIAN’S mental map of the world paints America large and everywhere
else small. The United States counts for most in high matters—diplomacy and
finance—as well as practical ones: the dollar, for example, is Russians’
best-trusted currency for saving and commerce. Though Germany counts for a
lot, Western Europe as an entity has never engaged Russian attention. 
Could this be changing? Certainly the European Union has never mattered
more to Russian policymakers. The hottest topic is trade. The EU is already
Russia’s biggest single trading partner, with about 40% of the total. Now
Russian exporters want to use the rouble’s collapse (by more than
two-thirds since August) to sell as much cheap steel, textiles, paper and
so on to Western Europe as possible. But they are intimidated by the
bureaucracy and protectionism of Brussels. So the government is lobbying on
their behalf, with mixed success. “It would be easier to push the Russians’
case on steel if they had fully taken up their existing quota,” sniffs a
sympathetic Eurocrat. 
Russians also fear that EU protectionism may squeeze them out of markets
in those bits of the former Soviet empire, such as Poland, now bent on
joining the EU. “There will be direct or indirect pressure for big
contracts to go to western suppliers, not eastern ones,” worries a Russian
involved in trade finance. 
The EU’s expansion also has a political price. Central European
countries are toughening visa regimes and customs services, making it
harder for Russians to go and do business there. If Slovakia, Lithuania and
Latvia also join the EU, Russia’s remaining influence in the region would
be pushed back still farther. 
But there are compensations. Russia sees the EU as more sympathetic than
America: just as rich, but less driven by superpower thinking. “Europe is a
better partner for us, less demanding,” says Vladimir Ryzhkov, a rising
young politician. European socialists’ carping at the supposedly heartless
policies inflicted on Russia by American neo-liberals strikes a melodious
chord in Russian ruling circles. 
Still, for all their talk of a “missing social dimension”, European
governments are still likely to take their cue from Washington when it
comes to another bail-out for Russia—of which there is currently no sign.
The EU’s own efforts have been mostly unimpressive. The most recent idea,
$500m in food aid, has been a blatantly self-interested move by Europe’s
farm lobby. Most other EU aid so far has been technical advice, often not
followed, and valuable chiefly to the well-paid western consulting firms
that deliver it. 
But even this may be changing a bit. The European Parliament is
reviewing the technical-aid budget. Lobbying by Germany and Finland, among
others, has delayed the food-aid package. There are signs of a new emphasis
on dealing with the Russian regions, especially those closest to Western
Europe, such as Smolensk. When Finland takes over the EU’s presidency in
mid-1999, it will launch a “northern dimension”, aimed at giving greater
oomph to EU engagement in the Baltic states and north-western Russia. 
For most Russians, the biggest practical change will be the euro.
Russian importers and exporters are waking up to the need to keep accounts
in euros. When they become available in physical form, Russian savers may
start hedging their currency exposure, by stuffing their mattresses with
euros as well as greenbacks. Those who move cash in suitcases are
especially pleased: the euro500 note (worth around $425), they note with
approval, will be much handier than four or five of those rather inadequate
$100 notes. 

******* 

#7
Excerpt
Primakov's Staff Chief Zubakov Interviewed 

Moskovskiy Komsomolets 
15 December 1998
[translation for personal use only]
Interview with Yuriy Zubakov, government chief of staff, conducted by
Mikhail Rostovskiy: "No Armchair Admiral"

Does the name Zubakov ring a bell at all? No? Then that means you
have no idea who comprises the circle of people who really run Russia. 
Vice-Admiral Yuriy Antonovich Zubakov is one of the mysterious figures of
modern Russian politics. His name is virtually unknown to the general
public. Newspapers write about him extremely rarely. His face is never
seen on television. Even though Zubakov himself categorically denies it,
in terms of real power and authority he is the equal of virtually any
vice-prime minister. On Zubakov depends how well or poorly the entire
cumbersome machinery of state will function. Finally, this vice-admiral is
the executor of all confidential and sensitive assignments from Primakov
and is one of his two closest advisors. In his entire life Vice-Admiral
Zubakov has never given an extensive interview to the press. He made an
exception for Moskovskiy Komsomolets....

Prisoners of Conscience

[Rostovskiy] Yuriy Antonovich, while everyone
acknowledges the White House's great political potential, few people have
faith in its ability to manage the economy...
[Zubakov] If they do not believe, then we will prove with our actions
who is right.
[Rostovskiy] Another common charge leveled against Primakov's
economic policy is that it amounts to a return to Soviet managementmethods...
[Zubakov] What do you mean by "Soviet methods"? I personally do not
understand what that is. Generally speaking, we favor the methods of a
market economy and a reform course. I will go even farther than that: in
fact many of those accused of "outdated" views are more market-oriented
than those who call themselves free marketeers.
[Rostovskiy] As you referring to Maslyukov?
[Zubakov] Not just to him.
[Rostovskiy] Your prediction about the fate of the budget?
[Zubakov] I think that an absolute majority of deputies are
reasonable people who realize in what a difficult situation we find
ourselves. I am certain that the budget will be considered and that the
Duma will arrive at a wise decision.
[Rostovskiy] There has been much talk lately about how passage of the
budget could be derailed by political circumstances like
Chubays'resignation...
[Zubakov] I do not lend credence to talk and rumors. There are so
many of them out there. Do any of them ever prove to be true? For
example, when people write various rumors about me, that just gives me
something to smile about.
[Rostovskiy] The budget includes an IMF loan under projected budget
revenues. What if we don't get it?
[Zubakov] Let's not talk about "what ifs." We are pragmatists and
realists. We do not intend to deceive either the Duma or the people.
[Rostovskiy] Yuriy Antonovich, is the Primakov team up to speed yet?
[Zubakov] We have undergone an accelerated familiarization with our
job. In the early days we were working from 8:00 am until 1:00 or 2:00 in
the morning. Incidentally, Yevgeniy Maksimovich also frequently stayed
until 1:00 am. That was why we were able to get everything done soquickly.
[Rostovskiy] In your opinion, is there now a unified and capable team
in this building?
[Zubakov] I think that one is being created.
[Rostovskiy] However, it is a fact that many members of the
government hold diametrically opposing views. Do you sense that?
[Zubakov] Of course everyone pulls for his or her favorite issue. 
When, for example, Valentina Ivanovna Matviyenko, as an intelligent but
also emotional woman, argues strongly in favor of the social sector, that
is only natural. But personally I do not sense here any clashes between
any party-based or other deeply-held interests.
[Rostovskiy] Incidentally, many people are saying that the staff and
the government itself will soon undergo some personnel changes...
[Zubakov] Personnel changes are gradually taking place within the
staff. Personnel changes are a normal and natural process that will never
cease completely.
[Rostovskiy] Let us continue our discussion of complaints. You
personally and the entire government are often accused of being overly
deliberate and inert...
[Zubakov] I absolutely agree that we are deliberate. When some issue
has not been thoroughly studied, there is no point in making a decision
regarding it. Speed and efficiency to the detriment of quality are not
what we need. We intend to do our job properly. If an issue is not in
dispute, a decision is made on it immediately. Incidentally, when people
want to push through some decision, that is when you start to hear: "Why
are they being so slow about this?!"
[Rostovskiy] During the first days of the Primakov cabinet virtually
everyone accused it of declaring war on the press...
[Zubakov] Are you now convinced that that is untrue? There has not
been any war with the press, nor will there be. Especially since Yevgeniy
Maksimovich is a professional journalist, a colleague of yours. How could
he declare war on you? But a press that lies and assumes no liability for
doing so... Let me just tell you about one example. Recently information
was publicized that damaged Russia's relations with other countries. I was
told, thank God, that the source was not someone inside the government. I
want to say this to all journalists: guys, you understand that when
something like that finds its way to you, it would be better not to print
it. That is dirt. Realizing that it does harm to Russia. But of course
we also understand that there are some serious flaws in our informational
efforts. And we are in favor of criticism. It helps us. Just one
request: it should be polite and objective.
[Rostovskiy] By the way, is it true that Primakov is greatly pained
by any criticism in the press?
[Zubakov] He actually takes criticism very well. But, like any
decent person, he cannot remain indifferent to lies and fabrications. 
Yevgeniy Maksimovich is not a distant person at all. He simply prefer to
focus on his job. He just doesn't have the chance to be constantly
grandstanding, and under the current circumstances he finds thatunacceptable.

Primakov Up Close and Personal

[Rostovskiy] Is it ever hard to work
with Yevgeniy Maksimovich?
[Zubakov] Well, it makes me uncomfortable to say it, but it is not
easy. Yes, it can be hard.
[Rostovskiy] What, in your opinion, are the main characteristics of
the prime minister's work style?
[Zubakov] The most important one is his ability to get to the heart
of the matter, regardless of what the issue is. When I worked with
Yevgeniy Maksimovich in intelligence, I was amazed how he, though without
any specialized intelligence or counterintelligence background, was able to
come up with such original approaches. Or how he was able to break any
highly complex international issue down into its component parts. First he
listens to everybody. Then he gives a systematic analysis that includes
absolutely every little detail.
Then there is his ability to see the long term, the systematic nature
of his thinking, as is typical of an academic. He does not merely manage,
he personally invests himself in all the assignments he gives. For
example, when documents are presented the prime minister always asks lots
of questions. And some of them are very unexpected. For that reason you
really have to be prepared when you give a report to Primakov. I have
always said that the longer you have to spend giving your report, the worse
prepared you were!
[Rostovskiy] A question for you as the prime minister's chief of
personnel. It is common knowledge that literally just two people accompany
the prime minister to any new job. But despite that Yevgeniy Maksimovich
is always in complete control of the structures assigned to him. How does
he do it?
[Zubakov] He simply genuinely works to create functional working
environments, bringing in as few people from outside as possible. This is
how he managed to retain good personnel in intelligence and at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs...

Minister of a Textbook

[Rostovskiy] Is it true that you started your career as a music teacher?
[Zubakov] I actually did graduate from a music school and worked as
an instructor for one year. But soon I was called into active military
service with the Pacific Fleet. There, by the way, my area of
specialization was as a radio operator. After my military service I was
recommended for studies at a higher KGB school...
[Rostovskiy] But how did you become a vice-admiral? After all,
didn't you spend the greater portion of your career with state security?
[Zubakov] In school I specialized in military counterintelligence and
Navy counterintelligence. Naturally all my training was in the navalfield.
[Rostovskiy] A traditional Russian question: what privileges do
government chiefs of staff enjoy?
[Zubakov] I have a key to a special staff elevator. Sometimes I use
it. I also have the right to order lunch, but I pay for it. Sometimes
there is not even enough time for lunch. The girls in my office will
confirm that: they say, sometimes we order him lunch, but he doesn't get
to eat. My dacha outside of town is a simple wooden house in
Arkhangelskoye. I lived in it back when I was deputy minister of foreign
affairs. Now, of course, I have been offered the chance to move into a
larger suburban house, but I remain loyal to my old dacha. I have a car...
[Rostovskiy] What kind?
[Zubakov] (Grinning) An Audi.
[Rostovskiy] While we're on the subject, one more question about
privileges and cars. I have heard that in September the pay of White House
drivers was withheld. Can it be that there is not even enough money
available to maintain the government?
[Zubakov] That actually did happen. And that despite the fact that
our drivers are paid lousy wages. So I requested that we at the top level
not be paid ourselves until those who worked conscientiously at lower
levels were paid first....
[Rostovskiy] How soon was the arrears paid off?
[Zubakov] (Laughs) Within a week.
[Rostovskiy] Do you have any free time? And how do you prefer tospend it?
[Zubakov] I try to keep some. Otherwise I couldn't stand it. Lately
I have been to two operas at the Telikon and Novaya Opera theaters. These
two-hour breaks give my spirit a bit of a rest. Other than that, I take
walks. I have half a day to myself on Sundays.
[Rostovskiy] Where does the rest of your family work?
[Zubakov] My wife is a professional musician, a pianist. We met a
long time ago, when we were in music school together. Now she is on
creative pension. We have one granddaughter. My daughter is an economist
by training and works with economic cybernetics. My son is studying at the
MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of International Affairs] preparatory
facility. Note that I said "preparatory"...
[Rostovskiy] Are you hinting that no strings were pulled?
[Zubakov] I am indicating that he is going through the normal course.
[Rostovskiy] One last question. What has been the most difficult and
unexpected part of your job as "czar of White House officials"?
[Zubakov] The most unexpected thing was being appointed to this post
at all. The most difficult... I am not the kind of person who knows
everything. There are areas here that I have never dealt with before,
economics, for example. Of course, we have many experts here. But one
has to understand these things for oneself. So that sends me back to the
textbooks and the dictionaries!

*******

#8
The Economist
January 2, 1999
[for personal use only]
Letter
In the pipeline 

SIR—Your article on Caspian energy (November 28th) asserts that prospects for
building a main export pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan in Turkey have rarely
looked so doubtful. In fact, prospects for this project have never looked
better. 
In the past, many observers thought a pipeline between Baku and Supsa in
Georgia could provide the optimal route for exports from offshore Azerbaijan.
But during the past 12 months, companies and regional governments have
realised the importance of some broader considerations. These include long-
term energy security, the viability of shipping large volumes of oil through
the Bosporus, and the attractiveness of a large-diameter pipeline to a port
like Ceyhan, which is able to handle exports from both sides of the Caspian. 
The contention that the bulk of output from eastern Caspian producers will
flow to a Russian terminal on the Black Sea may be true, but only for a
limited time. Significant potential exists for boosting the proven oil
reserves of Kazakhstan, both offshore and onshore. If fully realised, these
additions could exceed the capacity of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s
first- and second-phase pipelines to the Russian Black Sea coast. 
In early December, Kazakhstan and three companies—Chevron, Mobil and
Shell—agreed to study the feasibility of creating a unified system of oil and
gas pipelines from western Kazakhstan to Turkey. This will be an important
step towards aggregating Caspian output and enhancing the viability of the
Ceyhan export route. The Azerbaijan International Operating Company,
meanwhile, has said negotiations are continuing with potential transit
countries. 
These developments, plus the likelihood of incentives from regional
governments, will ultimately make Baku-Ceyhan the optimal route for Caspian
oil exports. 

JAN KALICKI 
Counslor to the Department of Commerce 
WASHINGTON, DC 

*******

#9
The New Republic
January 18, 1999 
Ingrates
By The Editors 

When the United States and Britain bombed Iraq, the harshest condemnation 
came from two pro-Iraq Security Council members with whom the Clinton
administration has worked overtime to improve relations: Russia and China.
Boris Yeltsin left his sickbed to express "the most serious concern, a feeling
of dismay and deep alarm." Russia's ambassador to the United Nations huffed
about "gross violations of the rule of law." China's U.N. ambassador said the
U.S. had "violated the U.N. charter and the norms governing international
law." Isn't there something a little odd about the Clinton administration's
equanimity toward such abuse from countries it has so solicitously befriended?
Consider what the U.S. has done to help bail out the Russian economy. In
July,
at the administration's behest, the International Monetary Fund promised
Russia $22.6 billion to stave off financial collapse. The Russian economy
collapsed anyway, and the IMF suspended disbursements once a $4.8 billion
installment disappeared. But the Russians are dickering for more, which would
merely add to the $14.3 billion the IMF has loaned Russia since 1992 (a figure
that does not count the aforementioned $4.8 billion). This summer, the World
Bank loaned Russia $1.5 billion, the largest loan it has ever made in Europe
or Central Asia. New World Bank loans during the next year and a half may
reach $6 billion--over and above the $11.4 billion Russia received in its
first six years as a Bank member. Needless to say, both the IMF and the World
Bank are largely underwritten by American taxpayers. And don't forget: The
IMF-World Bank largesse came on top of U.S. bilateral aid, totaling $4.9
billion between 1992 and 1997, plus more than $1 billion worth of financing
and investment insurance from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. 
Congressional support for such assistance has waned recently, but the fiscal
1999 budget still calls for $200 million in new aid. The Clinton
administration keeps thinking up new reasons, some wiser than others, to send
money to Russia. One sensible idea, the $30 million nuclear cities initiative,
seeks to employ Russian scientists so they won't sell out to the likes of
Iraq. The Department of Agriculture has announced $625 million in food aid.
But what justifies the administration's planned $660 million bailout of
Russia's space program? Is manned space flight really a priority in a near-
starving country? 
Russia has also been soaking up money from U.S. allies. The Germans have
shelled out $29.6 billion in government credits and loan guarantees; Germany's
private banks, at their government's urging, loaned Russia some $30.5 billion.
South Korea issued $2 billion of guaranteed loans during the 1991-92 period,
and Japan provided about $6 billion worth of aid and loans from 1991 to 1998.
As part of last summer's bailout agreement, Japan joined with the World Bank
and IMF to promise another $1.5 billion to Russia. 
A tnr survey of outside support for Russia, conducted by reporter-researcher
Garance Franke-Ruta, reached the tentative but still-disturbing conclusion
that, all told, Russia has sucked in $150 billion from Western sources, public
and private--and that no one can really say where this fantastic sum has gone.
Obviously, not much went to create productive enterprise. Just as obviously,
plenty of it wound up in offshore accounts. Moody's Investor Services says
Russian investors contributed $43.9 billion to capital flight during the
three-year period of 1995-97. Russia's Central Bank reports that Russians
stashed $2.5 billion abroad in September 1998 alone. 
Gaining an edge for U.S. business is also the rationale for the soft U.S.
line
on China. True, China is not about to default on its debts. But it faces
enormous internal problems that spell trouble for the Communist Party's
attempt to carry out "Market-Leninism." Special economic zones on the southern
coast are faltering. Add ethnic tensions, environmental destruction, and
unemployment, and you have the makings of internal unrest. 
Beijing's response to these trends has been a vicious crackdown on dissent.
Dissident leader Xu Wenli has just been sentenced to 13 years for subversion.
Two formerly New York-based dissidents, Zhang Lin and Wei Quanbo, having
sneaked back into their home country to test the limits of its political
space, face three years in a labor camp. These punishments are a sign of the
regime's weakness, not its strength; they show how greatly Beijing fears any
challenge to its legitimacy in the current climate of economic uncertainty. 
Neither Russia nor China has the military might to challenge the United
States
directly. But both can play the role of spoiler--and they do. As Russia and
China work to gut inspections, lift sanctions, and aid Saddam in every way
possible, they are deliberately snubbing the same U.S. government that has
bent over backward to accommodate them. Russia and China have decided that
some of their interests are inimical to ours. How much longer will it take the
Clinton administration to recognize the implications for America's national
interests? 

****** 





 

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