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Johnson's Russia List
 

 

November 7, 1998    
This Date's Issues: 2463 2464 


Johnson's Russia List
#2464
7 November 1998
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. U.S. News and World Report: Christian Caryl, Is this Weimar Russia?
Eerie parallels to Germany during Hitler's rise to power.

2. Peter Ekman: Lubyanka Nov 7.
3. AP: Mitchell Landsberg, Russians Disagree on Need for Food.
4. Washington Post letter: Tomas Valasek, Caspian Oil: Conflagration 
for the West?

5. Novaya Gazeta: Aleksandr Minkin, Good bye, Russia, Confessions of 
former vice-prime minister of Russia. (DJ: Infamous Alfred Kokh interview.
I want to thank Natasha Titova of Gonzaga University for the translation.)

6. Ambassador Richard Morningtar at Carnegie: U.S. Policy Toward the 
Caspian.

7. The Economist: The hopefuls lining up behind Boris.]

*******

#1
U.S. News and World Report
November 16, 1998
[for personal use only]
Is this Weimar Russia?
Eerie parallels to Germany during Hitler's rise to power
BY CHRISTIAN CARYL (110317.1466@CompuServe.COM)

MOSCOW–The president is old, tired, and very possibly senile. Hyperinflation
is making the currency worthless. Once a great power, the country feels beaten
down, and its weak democracy may soon be crushed by a hybrid of nationalism
and socialism. Is this Russia in the 1990s? Or Germany on the eve of Hitler
taking power?
It could be either. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, several
prominent historians have called attention to the frightening parallels
between contemporary Russia and Germany's Weimar Republic, which lasted from
1918 to 1933. But never has the comparison seemed as apt as it does today,
with the Russian economy in shambles and President Boris Yeltsin surrendering
daily control over government affairs to Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov.
In the aftermath of World War I, Germany had to swallow the punishing terms of
the Versailles Treaty, giving up territory and stifling its arms industry. "It
was a country that lost a war, lost its dignity, and tried to become a
democracy under the worst possible conditions," says Alexander Konovalov, a
historian and political analyst at Russia's flagship ORT television network.
Similarly, he argues, Russia today is reeling from a tacit defeat in the cold
war and has "lost huge amounts of territory, one half of its gross domestic
product, and 10 years of male life expectancy."
Befuddled. Yeltsin's 1930s counterpart was Paul von Hindenburg, the German
president and former general who was considered the guarantor of the German
Constitution. Yet it was an exhausted, befuddled Hindenburg in his second term
of office who opened the door of power to Adolf Hitler in 1933.
Yeltsin is also in his second term, and last week Russia's Constitutional
Court ruled that he cannot run again in the year 2000. Like Berliners in the
early 1930s, Muscovites openly mock their president's mental capacity: In
recent months, Yeltsin mistakenly identified Japan and Germany as nuclear
powers, failed to recognize one of his own ministers during a public
appearance, and blabbered incoherently at a press conference. (Making the
parallel even sharper, Yeltsin has become dependent on the advice of two
advisers, his daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko, and chief of staff, Valentin
Yumashev. Hindenburg also relied on his son, Oskar, and chief of staff, Otto
Meissner.)
The precedent of Weimar's failed democracy began worrying Russia watchers
during the early 1990s, when Yeltsin lifted state controls on prices and
inflation soared to 2,600 percent. Some Russians papered their walls with
worthless currency, just as Germans did in the 1920s. But fears of "Weimar
Russia" faded in the mid-1990s as the country gained a semblance of stability
and as Moscow, in particular, experienced a boom in construction and lavish
spending by the new rich.
Now, economic similarities with Weimar are apparent again. Last week the
United States agreed to send 3.1 million tons of food aid–worth about $625
million–to help Russians get through the winter after their worst harvest in
45 years and the sudden devaluation of the ruble in August. Though the United
States never gave such massive aid to Germany between the wars, Russia's
devaluation and widespread misery have a close parallel in the catastrophic
devaluation of the mark that wiped out much of the German middle class in the
1920s.
The nouveau-riche "oligarchs" of today's Russia also have a counterpart in
Hugo Stinnes, the Weimar tycoon who built up a gigantic economic empire
overnight on the ruins of assets made cheap by inflation. Stinnes made his
first fortune by exporting coal for hard currency; the oligarchs did the same
with oil and gas.
Still, even those who are enamored of the Weimar analogy cannot avoid an
obvious point: "The major difference today is the absence of Hitler," says
Alexander Yanov, a historian who claims to have coined the phrase "Weimar
Russia." Neither of the present front-runners in the race to succeed Yeltsin,
former Gen. Alexander Lebed and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, appears to be a
reincarnation of the Führer, though both are outspoken nationalists.
Weimar "is a justified parallel, but there are significant differences,"
argues Konstantin Borovoi, a liberal deputy in the Russian parliament. "We
live in a different information society. I hope that world opinion won't allow
concentration camps and other things like that to happen again." Borovoi is
among a group of Russian politicians who are lobbying for the prosecution of
ultranationalist parliament member Albert Makashov, a vehement antisemite who
recently called for Yeltsin "to be turned into soap."
Ultimately, knowledge of the Holocaust may be the biggest difference between
then and now. Weimar Germany, after all, didn't have itself as an example to
avoid. Russia's political elite has been strongly influenced by the failure of
interwar democracy in Germany and speaks about it often. Russian
constitutional lawyer William Smirnov says, for example, that Weimar "was a
negative example for the planners of Russia's present-day Constitution," who
were afraid of the possibility of extreme nationalists coming to power by
parliamentary means. That fear seemed real enough in October 1993, when right-
wing deputies led by former Vice President Alexander Rutskoi tried to topple
Yeltsin, who sent tanks and troops to drive them out of the Russian White
House. The Constitution was subsequently rewritten to concentrate power in
Yeltsin's hands and to eliminate the vice presidency–both provisions that are
now under review by a panel of Russian legal experts because of Yeltsin's
health.
What to do. Another problem with the Weimar comparison is that even those who
find it compelling may disagree on the lessons to be drawn from it. Borovoi,
for example, cites the example of Weimar to argue for a tough Western approach
to Russia. Any future aid, he says, should be contingent "if not on the
introduction of truly democratic institutions, then at least on the
observation of humane norms of behavior." Konovalov, however, thinks the West
is being needlessly vituperative. NATO's expansion, he argues, is evidence
that Western policy makers are repeating the errors of their 1920s
predecessors. "When they isolated Germany, it reacted with Hitler," he says.
"When they came to Germany after the Second World War with the Marshall Plan
and tried to integrate it in the world community, Germany reacted with
openness and democracy. Now they're behaving toward Russia like they did
[toward Germany] in 1919, not 1945."
The great question mark is whether Russia's people today would follow a
demagogic, nationalist leader of Hitler's ilk. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the hate-
spewing parliament deputy who pulled the hair of a female colleague and
befriended Saddam Hussein, has seen his popularity plummet.
Yet Konovalov believes that the chaos and corruption that have accompanied
democracy have made many Russians long for the totalitarian past: "The desire
for security, for law and order, probably outweighs the desire for freedom."
And demonstrators are resorting again to rhetoric that would have been
perfectly familiar to Germans 50 years ago, blaming a conspiracy of scheming
Jews and vengeful Westerners for Russia's problems.
One Moscow intellectual trooping along during a recent protest march made this
sober observation: "The birth of civil freedoms shouldn't be accompanied by a
stark drop in living standards. That leads to a loss of faith in freedom." Few
historians of Weimar could have put the problem more succinctly.

********

#2
From: "Peter D. Ekman" <pdek@co.ru>
Subject: Lubyanka Nov 7
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 1998 

Fred Weir reported (JRL 2463/3) on "the estimated 50,000 protesters who
gathered on Moscow's Lubyanka Square," for the Communist celebration of
Revolution Day.
I wandered into the "protest" about 12:30, 90 minutes after the scheduled
start, but in time to catch the last few minutes of Zyuganov's speech.
Without any effort I walked up, at the side of the crowd, within about 25
meters of Zyuganov. A few minutes later, after walking around the crowd, I
got within the same distance from the speaker's platform on the other side
of the crowd. I didn't see anything close to 50,000 people. I'm no expert
at estimating crowd size, but I'd guess there were 5,000 - 10,000 people
there, probably closer to the lower number.
With the platform located symbolically right in front of the old KGB
headquarters, the crowd stretched back to the grass covered island in the
middle of the square, with perhaps one-third of the square occupied by the
crowd. The crowd seemed rather geriatric, and peaceful. Maybe 10% of the
crowd was below 30 years of age and were surprisingly dressed up in their
best western fashions. What seemed to be plainclothes policemen were well
represented in the crowd. The crowd was well behaved, and only yelled after
being prompted by the speakers with "urahs." The only real source of noise
was the ten piece brass band on the island at the back of the crowd.
I counted 50 large red banners, not counting the 15 flags of the Soviet
republics near the platform. I didn't see one picture of Stalin or Lenin!
Some of the few placards were funny - one said "Yeltsin - not to Sochi, not
to the Canaries - to Lefortovo prison." On the serious side, there was a
not very well disguised Nazi banner, surrounded by a couple of dozen people,
with a placard close by saying "zhidovsky (Jewish) reforms murdered 7 million."
The Detsky Mir store was open next door, and after I went in to warm up, I
could completely forget all about the demonstration in the square outside.
The lack of participation was not because of transportation problems or
because of the weather, the metro was fairly full as people went about their
holiday business.
All told, the demonstration was rather sad. Communists may still have
some political power, but their lack of any ideological support (at least in
Moscow) would have been obvious to any observer yesterday at Lubyanka.

******

#3
Russians Disagree on Need for Food
November 7, 1998
By MITCHELL LANDSBERG

MOSCOW (AP) -- Across the frozen sweep of Russia this winter, poor people will
stock their cupboards with food bearing the distinctive stamp of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.
Wheat, corn, pork, beef -- a cornucopia of American farm products will be
headed to Russia under an agreement signed Friday. In all, 3.1 million tons of
U.S. food will be shipped, more than half of it an outright gift.
It won't be the first time that American farmers have sent surplus grain, meat
and other goods to a needy Russia. Grain shipments have been a regular feature
of U.S.-Russian relations, and many Russians still joke about ``Bush legs,''
the shipments of American chicken legs donated by former President George Bush
in the early 1990s.
What is unclear this time is how badly Russians need the food.
This has been a disastrous year for Russia. The economy collapsed in August,
and food imports practically ceased. The ruble was devalued and inflation
soared. Many Russians continued to go without regular paychecks, giving them
little ability to buy food at any price.
To top it all off, cycles of drought and floods helped produce the worst grain
crop in 40 years.
Despite all that, top Russian officials were insisting until a few weeks ago
that they had plenty of food to get through the winter and no need for
donations from other countries.
Even after Russia began negotiating with U.S. officials for food shipments,
Agriculture and Food Minister Viktor Semyonov said there was ``no threat of
food shortages, no grounds for the threat of food shortages today.''
It's hard to tell whether that was pride or reality talking.
True, grain production slumped as much as 45 percent this year. But the
biggest shortage was in forage wheat for livestock. Russian farms, notoriously
unproductive and unprofitable, have drastically trimmed their livestock herds
in recent years and have less need for grain.
Elena Tyurina, marketing director for the Institute for Agrarian Market
Trends, said Russia has actually produced more grain for human consumption
than it needs.
Dairy production is up, and Russia continues to export large quantities of the
seeds used to make vegetable oil, she said.
On the other hand, meat production is down. And while Russia exports the
seeds, it doesn't produce enough actual vegetable oil for its own needs and
must rely on imports.
In fact, First Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov warned last week that
while Russia remains heavily dependent on food deliveries from abroad, food
imports have plunged 85 percent in the past two months.
``Such is the scale of the existing threat,'' he said.
The United States is not the only potential donor responding. The European
Community has been discussing the possibility of supplying food aid this
winter. The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies has launched a campaign to feed 1.4 million Russians this winter in
the 12 most distressed regions.
U.S. officials were reluctant to discuss the reasoning behind their decision
to offer aid, although it would obviously benefit American farmers and reduce
unneeded U.S. surpluses.
Christopher Goldthwait, who led a U.S. delegation on food aid and is general
sales manager for the USDA's Foreign Agriculture Service, called it a ``win-
win situation'' for Russians and American farmers.
Officials with both the EC and the Red Cross conceded that it was not easy to
determine whether the food is truly needed.
``It is very difficult to make our own judgment,'' said Bertrand Soret, a
spokesman for the EC office in Moscow. ``We have to rely on statistics
provided by the Russian government.''
And despite the Red Cross' ambitious plans, Peter Kurlandsky, the official in
charge of its Russian winter aid program, conceded: ``We don't have any direct
information about whether there will be a dire food shortage in the country.''
As aid officials note, it is better to err on the side of caution than face
the consequences of widespread malnutrition and starvation.
Last year, the Red Cross gave food to 800,000 Russians. ``In some cases, I
have no doubt, people would not have had food without our food parcels,''
spokeswoman Caroline Hurley said.
In particular, she said, the Red Cross worries about people getting too little
protein, and hopes to lard its shipments with plenty of canned meat and fish
this winter.
Even if Russia has enough food, it has two large problems preventing people
from getting it: a poor distribution system that may fail to reach the
farthest flung parts of the world's largest country, and the simple fact that
many people lack the cash to buy food.
``In any famine, there tends to be enough food available,'' said Anders
Aslund, a Swedish economist who was among the architects of Russia's
transition to a market economy.
The problem, he said, is that people can't afford the food, or can't get
access to it. He suggested both factors are likely at play in Russia this
year. But, like most people, he stressed that he doesn't really know whether
there's a need for aid or not.
In a recent poll, 74 percent of Russians surveyed nationwide said they were
not worried about getting enough food this winter. But 14 percent did feel
threatened by hunger -- a small percentage, but a lot of people.
Uncertainty, and an unwillingness to be tragically wrong, may ultimately be
the most persuasive reasons for the West offering -- and Russia accepting --
food aid.
``It would be a sin to refuse humanitarian aid,'' observed Pavel Yemelen, a
member of the Russian parliament and spokesman for the rural-based Agrarian
faction.
Russian agriculture ``has reached the breaking point,'' he said. ``Now we are
forced to stretch out our hands for assistance.''

******

#4
Washington Post
November 7, 1998
Letter
Caspian Oil: Conflagration for the West?

The Post's excellent coverage of the competition for the Caspian oil omits the
extent of NATO's military involvement in the region ["U.S., Turkey Turn Up
Pressure for Caspian Basin Oil Pipeline," news story, Oct. 28; "The Struggle
for Caspian Oil," front page, Oct. 4; "No Peace in the Pipeline," Diplomatic
Dispatches, Sept. 2]. 
Azerbaijan and Georgia are using NATO's Partnership for Peace program as a
vehicle to engage the alliance in protecting the Caspian oil pipelines against
local insurgents. NATO's "Infrastructure Logistics & Civil Emergency Planning
Division" has been providing advice to Azerbaijan on environmental security --
i.e., handling oil spills and similar accidents.
The alliance now is considering a request from Azerbaijan to expand the
cooperation to include "operational security," meaning cooperation on actually
protecting or defending the Caucasus pipelines. NATO's role would consist of
expert visits and consultations. Although NATO has no plans to offer actual
military assistance to the Caucasus pipelines, the alliance may provide its
expertise to local militaries. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova are
discussing a joint battalion tasked with protecting the pipelines. 
Protection for oil facilities is needed because the Caucasus region -- and
Georgia in particular -- is rife with secessionist rebellions that could
target the pipelines. The coup in Georgia in October, for instance, forced a
two-day suspension in the construction of the Baku-Supsa pipeline. The
region's problems run deep, and for the West to offer military assistance for
pipeline protection is akin to putting a Band Aid on a bone fracture.
Moreover, NATO advisers are likely to be viewed as provocation by Russia and
Iran, which oppose U.S.-backed plans to build a pipeline from Azerbaijan to
Turkey.
What is needed is a diplomatic effort to settle the Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia
and South Ossetia conflicts. Without a political resolution to these
conflicts, the region never will be stable -- not just for the pipelines but
also for all the people living there. 

TOMAS VALASEK (tvalasek@cdi.org)
Center for Defense Information
Washington 

*******

#5
[Alfred Kokh article]
Novaya Gazeta #43
November 2, 1998
Good bye, Russia
Confessions of former vice-prime minister of Russia
By Aleksandr Minkin, Jr.
Translated by Natasha Titova (ntitova@gonzaga.edu)

In Soviet times, if a young man with a good career began to behave
himself poorly, he was told with a reproach: " Motherland has given
everything to you, and you in your turn…" Alfred Kokh - former
vice-prime minister of Russia, former president of Russian State
Property Committee/Goskomimuschestvo/, reliable, rich businessman, the
president of "Montes Auri"/Golden Mountains/ company - company, which
paid hundreds of thousands dollars to Chubais and his accomplices, and,
quite possible, still does. Kokh was our government. He was on the very
top. Only two positions are higher than that: the prime minister and the
president. Kokh`s book, "Soviet Empire on Clearance Sale" has been
published recently in US. For having promised to work on it, Kokh was
paid $100,000 by a small Swiss company. In this connection, a few days ago
Alfred Kokh gave an interview to the Russian-speaking radio station in
US, WMNB.

So far as he mentioned my name in it, Mikhail Buzukashvili called me
from New York and suggested listening to the tape. Having listened to
it, I said: "I think that everybody in Russia should know that."
Russian citizens, you have a unique possibility to follow the thought
path of our representatives of our government. To see how and what they
think. While reading, do not forget that it is not a phone
conversation, accidentally overheard by someone, but an open, public
speech. Chubais speaks of Kokh as of man of great honesty and his
adherent. Chubais says so about Gaidar, Gaidar - about Chubais, and this
is true: they are certainly adherents. That is why, when reading, keep
in mind that it is not a unique portrait, but a member of the team. And
if Kokh dares to say such things openly, one can only imagine what They
- Gaidar, Chubais, and Kokh - talk about between each other. What they
think to themselves is not hard to figure out either. The piece you are
about to read does not actually need any comments. But, unfortunately,
you will not hear sneers and intonation, with which "super-man" speaks
of "masses".

- -- Alfred, what meaning did you put into the title of your book -
"Soviet Empire on Clearance Sale"?
- -- I did not mean anything. The title was given by the publishing
house.
- -- They say that privatization in Russia was a wild process…
- -- It was a wild process everywhere. Czechoslovakia is not satisfied
with the results of it either. Show me the country that was happy during
this process.
- -- What did Russia gain by privatization?
- -- Russia received the fund infrastructure, the possibility of
financial operations on actions and the possibility of attracting
investments through it. Russia received… hmmm… about 20 billion dollars
and it seems to me to be enough.
- -- What was unacceptable in the way that privatization took place?
- -- Well, I`d refuse to use vouchers if not for the pressure from Supreme
Soviet ( we used to associate vouchers with Chubais for some reason, not
Khasbulatov. - A.M.)
- -- On TV and radio it is often discussed that some organizations and
companies were sold off for a miserable part of their real price, and,
thus, people were plundered by it.
- -- Nobody was plundered, since people never possessed it. How can you
steal someone's property, when it does not belong to this person? As for
cheap prices, give me concrete examples.
- -- For example, "Noril`skii Nikel"/Norilsk Nickel/, if I am not
mistaken, it was estimated to cost about 170 million dollars, when in
reality it costs few billions.
- -- Well, let those who say it costs few billions pay for it. I would
like to meet the one who will pay at least a billion for "Noril`skii
Nikel", which by the time we were selling it had loss of 13,000
billions.
- -- Does it seem to you that economic future of Russia is doubtful?
- -- To me - yes.
- -- You do not see "the light at the end of the tunnel"?
- -- No.
- -- And how would you predict the economic future of Russia?
- -- "Raw material appendage". Undoubted immigration of all the people,
that can think, but can not work ( I mean, farm/dig/build )., that can
only invent. Then - chaos, disintegration into a bunch of little states.
- -- And how long will it take?
- -- I suppose 10-15 years… You see… During 70 years, when world's
economy was forming, Russia, I mean, USSR, was an external object to the
rest of the world, that was developing according to its own - unknown -
laws. And world economy had formed without USSR. It is stable; it has
its own resources, everything. And now Russia has appeared, but nobody
needs her. /laughing/ There is no place for her in the world community,
nobody needs her aluminum. Russia only annoys everyone, it crashes the
prices with its endless crises. That's why I think Russia's fate is
indeed a very sad one.
- -- Do you predict any investments in Russia? Will it be as much as
expected?
- -- No, because nobody needs Russia/ laughing/, Russia is not
needed/laughing/, why don't you understand!
- -- But Russia has gigantic natural and human resources, and to work on
Russian market…
- -- What gigantic resources are you talking about? I want to put an end
to this myth! It's much more comfortable and warm to extract oil in
Persian bay. Nickel - in Canada. Aluminum - in US, coal in Australia.
There is plenty of forest in Brazil. I don't understand what special
resources Russia has.
- -- But trading with Russia, such a huge country, where there is a
terrible need to buy, buy, buy…
- -- In order to buy one needs money. Russians can`t earn anything and
they can't buy anything as well.
- -- So you don`t see any prospects?
- -- Me - no/laughing/. Well, if Primakov does, let him work it out. As
soon as I realized that I did not see any prospects, I did quit working
in government. ( He did not quit. He was suddenly dismissed on August
12, 1997, after he flew to US for a vacation on August 11, 1997. Despite
an obvious scandal, Chubais, as usual, announced that it had been
planned long ago. Kokh, on the other hand, is willing to persuade us,
that before dismissal he was a patriot and enthusiast, and then he sold
"SvyazInvest" and suddenly on August 12 became a pessimist and resigned.
If he finds a girl who will believe him, he should marry her - he will
enjoy living with such a credulous young lady. - A.M )
- -- In your opinion, what are the possibilities of development of
Russian economic policies in the near future? Is getting back to old
methods probable?
- -- It does not matter. Whatever you say, this country is a full
bankruptcy.
- -- And you suppose that nothing will save Russia?
- -- I think it is hopeless.
- -- Can any reforms be successful in Russia?
- -- Only if Russia stops endless talks about the special spirituality
of Russian nation and its outstanding role, then reforms can be
successful. If they stop admiring themselves and looking for a special
way of developing and stop thinking that bagels grow on trees. They are
fascinated with themselves so much, that they are still delighted with
their ballet and the literature of XIX century, that they are not able
to create anything new.
- -- But who knows, maybe Russia actually does have this unique
approach.
- -- There are no unique approaches in economy. There are laws.
- -- Yes, Polish experience, Chinese experience… will it be useful for
Russia?
- -- Sure enough. I read an article in "Financial Times" yesterday,
saying that state officials in China stole 25 billion dollars on grain
subsidies, oh yes, this will work for Russia. The problem is there no
such money there. As for Polish experience, there is nothing exciting in
it. What miracles did Polish economy produce? Any outstanding product at
all? They live quietly and eat their potatoes.
- -- According to your point of view, Russia's tomorrow looks quite sad.
- -- Yes, sad. And why would it be inspiring?/giggling/
- -- This long-suffering nation…
- -- This long-suffering nation can only blame itself. Nobody put them
into prisons or occupied them. They put themselves into jails and shot
themselves. This nation gets what it deserves.
- -- What do you expect in politics?
- -- I think that Russia holds an extremely idiotic position about
Yugoslavia. Russia is a polyethnic country: there are muslim, orthodox
and who knows how religiously oriented people there, and this protective
orthodox position does not make any sense. I don`t understand, what
Russia's foreign politics is all about, it's a bunch of disjointed
statements, made in order to create an image of powerful state. Why do
we support Saddam, perfectly realizing that his oil will cut our income
down if we only let it happen? I do not see any ties between politics
and economy in Russia, and I blame Primakov in it.
- -- What will happen in Russia if communists come to power?
- -- They already did. In full. Maslyukov, Primakov, Zyuganov and
others. They do not need any revolution to come to power: they will do
it legally, as Nazis did in 1933 in Germany.
- -- What do you expect from them?
- -- Communism may happen.
- -- What communism do you expect? Stalin and Gorbachev were communists
also.
- -- I do not want any communists, whether they belong to Gorbachev or
Stalin.
- -- But in reality, will you expect imprisoning, repression, events,
similar to those of year 1937?
- -- Maybe. There are too many people who are interested in it.
- -- For all that, many think that Zyuganov is not a communist.
- -- He is, at least because he calls himself so. Imagine a label,
saying "shit" on it. I will never wear one like that. But Zyuganov takes
the label of communist and he is proud of it. It's exactly the same
thing to me.
- -- According to Minkin, after all this confusion with fees, Chubais
claimed that 90% of this money was transferred to the fund. Minkin
mentioned that it was not done.
- -- It is all nonsense. We have our documents to prove it.
- -- Everything has been transferred?
- -- Absolutely. ( Even in court Chubais and Boiko could not prove this
fact. They transferred about 30-40% of the money to their own funds,
read: pockets, and not even a cent had something to do with charity. -
A.M.)
- -- Is West interested in what is going on in Russia?
- -- Not much. Russia must finally forget about the glory of super-power
and take her place next to Brazil and India.
- - So your suggestion is to realize our place in this world and go to
school - go study?
- -- Exactly! Instead of inventing hydrogen bomb with primary school
education.
- -- In your opinion, why and how did everything happen in Russia
lately? Any "catalyst"?
- -- It happened because of stupidity that led to catastrophe and
recognition of debt of USSR. 90 billion dollars for such an economy? It
was a question of time. West deceived Russia. West promised to
re-structure this debt and did not bother to do so. West promised
economic aid - where is it? West left Russia alone with this debt, which
was not in fact made by Russia. It is an element of social strategy, the
strategy of weakening Russia, the strategy of West.
- -- So all the economic disasters of Russia are due to the western
countries, right?
- -- All the Russia's economic disasters are caused by 70 years of
communism, which "polluted" brains and soul of nation and resulted in
Homo Soveticus as opposed to Russian, who does not want to work but
always demands bread and shows.
- -- Does West realize that chaos in Russia can threaten the whole
world?
- -- Why? Because of atomic weapons?
- -- Yes, is not it enough?
- -- A bunch of paratroopers can take away all our weapons. Just land
once and take them, damn it. Our army is not able to protect anything.
The war with Chechnya is a wonderful proof.
- -- What is your niche in Russian life?
- - There is not any/giggling/.

A.Chubais: " I know Kokh for 10 years. He is an honest man… he's been
doing a hard and unpopular job for years. Thousands and thousands of
Russians should thank him for what he has done for them. Thousands of
pensioners, soldiers and teachers, who got paid for months of their
work. It would not have happened without Alfred Kokh."

V.Chernomyrdin: "Government was a good school for A.Kokh. He will do
much more, he will go far. Privatization of "SvyazInvest" was the
financial affair of the century".

He is the adherent of Chubais and Gaidar. He was appointed by Eltsin to
control the privatization of Russian property. A man, who did not
believe in the future of the country, was in the government. So he was
there for some other reason. He will look at the dying horse and will
not move: it is not his, why worry? Yasha, Ranevskaya`s footman (
A.Chekhov, "The Cherry Orchard" ), when nobody hears him, tells old
Firs: " I can't wait till you die". And begs Ranevskaya immediately: "
Take me to Paris with you. It is impossible to live here, ignorance is
all around." With haughty contempt he says: "they", "Russians"… he does
not call them "Russian pigs", it sounds indecent. But he obviously
thinks so. Because either "Russian pigs" or " Kokh - pig". This man
considers himself to be a good and honest one.

If you love or at least respect, you would not steal. But if you do not
treat people as human beings, it is natural to plunder. A man with such
ideology is not able NOT to steal. Especially if stealing is explained
through decrees of government. One must not be punished for his
thoughts. Why then people, whom I let to take a look at the interview,
were eager to do so? Because they understand the way he acts if he
thinks like that. But anger fades away and pity replaces it. He will
have a nice, satisfying life, giggling as always. But one can only
believe in such a miracle that will make him a human being.

The last question of the interview, "What is your niche?", sounds scary.
Niche is usually mentioned when speaking of animals. The area of
inhabitance and fatherland are different notions. Kokh was asked as an
animal, but it was his own provocation. He responds quietly: "There is
not any." Anyway, everything that was said by him would have arisen less
emotions if readers did not consider him to be the former vice-prime
minister of Russia, but, which is true in reality, criminal, accused of
property machinations. A year ago "Moskovskii Komsomolets" published
Kokh`s conversations on the phone with businessmen and officials. The
conversation with former deputy leader of Eltsin`s administration,
chairman of board of directors of RAO "Gazprom" and his co-author of
unpublished book about privatization, Aleksandr Kazakov, Alfred Kokh
starts with: " San`,/nickname of Aleksandr/ I am perverted." If Kokh did
not mean his sexual orientation, it turns out to be absolutely
impossible to argue with his self-estimation.

*******

#6
Date: Fri, 06 Nov 1998 
From: Elizabeth Reisch <lreisch@ceip.org> 
Subject: Morningstar Remarks at Carnegie

“Energy and Pipelines:
Morningstar on U.S. Policy Toward the Caspian”

On November 3 the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace [in Washington DC] hosted a discussion with 
Ambassador Richard L. Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President 
and Secretary of State for Caspian Energy Basin Diplomacy. The following 
is a summary of his remarks.

Ambassador Morningstar expressed optimism that the Azerbaijan
International Operating Company (AIOC) will support construction of a
pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan in Turkey as the main export pipeline for
Caspian oil. The Baku-Ceyhan route, he said, is part of the
Administration’s plan for multiple pipelines for Caspian energy
exports. He called on the consortium to formalize its commitment to the
Baku-Ceyhan route at its forthcoming November 12 meeting and pledge its
readiness to negotiate with the countries in the region to reach
agreements on the commercial issues necessary to seal the deal. The
AIOC is a consortium comprised of the State Oil Company of the
Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and eleven international oil firms.

Morningstar identified four key objectives in U.S. policy toward the
Caspian energy basin. First, to strengthen the sovereignty,
independence and prosperity of the newly independent states of the
region. Second, to enhance commercial opportunities for the United
States and other companies. Third, to bolster the energy security of
the U.S. and its allies, and to ensure the free flow of energy from the
Caspian region to the world market. Fourth, to mitigate regional
conflicts by building economic linkages between the new states of the
region. The U.S. government, as facilitator and broker of these
projects, will provide financial support through the activities of the
Trade and Development Agency (TDA), the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC), and the U.S. Export-Import Bank. It will not,
however, directly finance the pipelines, which Morningstar said would
constitute a subsidy of primarily private oil companies by U.S.
taxpayers.

Morningstar emphasized that the Baku-Ceyhan route would not be a
singular pipeline that supplanted existing pipelines. Rather,
Baku-Ceyhan would be the main export pipeline in a network of multiple
pipelines, including: the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline
running through Russia to the north of the Caspian; the early oil
pipelines from Baku to Supsa to Novorossiysk; and a Trans-Caspian gas
pipeline stretching from Turkmenistan to Turkey. The October 29 signing
of the Ankara Declaration by the presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan underscored the Caspian presidents’
support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, according to Morningstar. The
Ankara Declaration, coupled with a statement of support for Baku-Ceyhan
by AIOC, would “take the issue out of the public limelight” and enable
the companies and the countries to hammer out the commercial issues at
the negotiating table, he said.

While acknowledging that the need for adequate oil volumes to fill
pipelines is a very real and legitimate issue for oil companies,
Morningstar said that the “current lack of such oil volumes need not be
a deal-breaker.” In the administration’s view, the lack of sufficient
volumes today should not obstruct a credible commitment to Baku-Ceyhan.
Morningstar expressed confidence that the “volumes will be there” with
more exploration, noting that most industry estimates predict that oil
volumes will match or exceed those of the North Sea.

In response to several questions posed concerning the basis of U.S.
interests in the Caspian region, Morningstar refuted the notion that
business and commercial interests drive U.S. policy at the expense of
support for political and economic reform in the region. He noted that
appropriations for the NIS under the Foreign Assistance Act in support
of such reform increased from $770 million in 1998 to $840 in 1999. In
his view, U.S. involvement in the region can only advance democracy and
market reform, and the U.S. has an obligation to keep those causes at
the forefront of its relations with the states of the Caspian region.
Morningstar said that the United States “is doing a good job at showing
the region that we are interested in more than oil.”

Morningstar fielded questions concerning the ramifications of the
administration’s Caspian policy on U.S.-Russian relations. U.S. policy,
he said, seeks not to exclude Russia from the development of Caspian
energy resources. He pointed out that U.S. support of the CPC pipeline
-- which will run from northwestern Kazakhstan across southern Russia to
the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk -- reflects U.S. policy in support of
Russia as a partner in ensuring the free flow of energy to world
markets. He added that the U.S. even envisions the eventual flow of
Russian oil through the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and Russian natural gas
entering Turkey via the Caucasus.

The administration remains opposed to piping Caspian oil through Iran,
an option that some oil companies view as cheaper than the Baku-Ceyhan
route. “It would be foolhardy for these initial pipelines to go through
Iran,” said Morningstar, arguing that Iran could become a choke point in
the export network and would compromise the sovereignty and energy
independence of the newly independent states. American efforts to keep
Caspian oil pipelines out of Iran are motivated not only by political
considerations, according to Morningstar, but also by commercial and
economic concerns.

Turkey opposes the Baku-Supsa route because it would create more tanker
traffic through the Bosphorus Straits. Turkey’s concern about safety
and environmental issues in the Bosphorus has helped shaped the
administration’s policy in favor of the Baku-Ceyhan route, according to
Morningstar.

Morningstar refuted the view that a Baku-Supsa route would be
politically and economically preferable to Georgia. He noted that
Georgian President Shevardnadze unequivocally supports the Baku-Ceyhan
route over the Baku-Supsa option, due to his concern for regional
stability and his belief that the Baku-Ceyhan option will strengthen the
sovereignty and independence of the countries of the region.
-Summary by Liz Reisch

For a copy of the Ambassador’s prepared remarks, call Carmen MacDougall
at 202/939-2319.

*******

#7
The Economist
November 7, 1998
[for personal use only]
Russia 
The hopefuls lining up behind Boris 
M O S C O W 
Five Russians with not very gleaming post-Yeltsin presidential prospects 

THERE can be few countries with a central government as enfeebled as
Russia’s. One telling sign of President Boris Yeltsin’s decline is the steady
leaking away of talent from his administration. The most recent example was
the sacking last week of his team of speechwriters; since the boss is no
longer capable of making speeches—he was still “resting” at a sanatorium this
week—their services are no longer required. The best of the ex-Yeltsinites,
however, should have little trouble finding work elsewhere. Let them look, for
instance, to the five front-runners for Mr Yeltsin’s job, for which an
election is due by October 2000—or earlier, should he resign. 
One of the ablest Yeltsin aides, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, has just been hired as
a campaign chief by the mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov. The capital’s
rumbustious mayor is probably the strongest candidate for the presidency at
the moment. But that may not last. Mr Luzhkov’s strength, his seemingly
unshakeable hold on Moscow, is also his weakness. 
The city has prospered mightily under his stewardship; it would have been
amazing if it had not, given the billions of dollars that have flowed legally
or illegally through it. But this good fortune does not help his popularity in
the rest of Russia, which even in Soviet times was resentful of Moscow’s
pampered status. Mr Luzhkov has tried to deal with this by some energetic
regional diplomacy, for instance by sending food to kindergartens in Severo-
Dvinsk, an impoverished nuclear-submarine base. But Russia’s economic turmoil
now limits his ability to play uncle to non-Muscovites. 
As the city’s bubble economy deflates, Moscow’s tax revenues plummet. It is
impossible to find out how much money is still stashed away in its murky
accounts. But the speed with which Mr Luzhkov has started to put city property
up for sale suggests that things are not as “super-liquid” as he maintains.
The longer the economic collapse goes on, the weaker his chances of the
presidency—and the greater his hurry, therefore, to round up support while he
can. In recent weeks he has all but publicly declared his candidacy; he has
launched an international charm offensive; and he has started cosying up to
the Communists, who still command many Russian votes. 
On the face of it, that is an odd tactic. The Communists’ own leader, Gennady
Zyuganov, still comes top of the opinion polls for the presidency. But the
polls also suggest that he would be beaten by almost any non-Communist in the
election’s second-round run-off. An alliance with Mr Zyuganov could give Mr
Luzhkov the nationwide organisation he lacks—but only if the Communists follow
their leader. That is a long shot. Although Mr Zyuganov and most of the
parliamentary Communists are realists, much of the rest of the party, still
deep-red in hue, is revolted by Mr Luzhkov’s municipal capitalism. 
A different sort of difficulty afflicts Alexander Lebed (not pictured), who
was elected governor of the Krasnoyarsk region of Siberia earlier this year.
Unsurprisingly, his promise to solve the problem of unpaid wages and pensions
has proved empty. He flirted briefly with price controls when the economic
troubles started (luckily, they were implemented too patchily to cause much
damage). None of this would necessarily do him great harm, for few Russians
these days expect any politician to come up with economic miracles. More
damaging is the fact that he has proved an erratic administrator, remote and
poorly advised. 
Mr Lebed is master of the biting one-liner. But, unlike the savvy Mr Luzhkov,
who learns his lines and sticks to them, the gruff ex-general is soon out of
his depth when asked to speak in paragraphs. “Barely comprehensible,” says one
ambassador who meets him regularly. 
Some of Russia’s power-brokers have been flirting with the idea that Grigory
Yavlinsky is the man to back for the succession. Mr Yavlinsky, leader of the
liberal-reformist Yabloko (Apple) group in parliament, has bounced back from a
recent heart operation. He is vigorously attacking the new government for
corruption, an allegation roughly equal to saying that gambling was rife in
wartime Casablanca. Mr Yavlinsky is sincere, and he is intelligent. That is
not enough. Polls still rank him last of the five most popular candidates. A
plausible candidate also needs a political base and the common touch, and he
has neither. 
So what about the former foreign minister, now prime minister, Yevgeny
Primakov, who spent years in the secret-service shadows, and is now visibly
relishing his current limelight? He has yet to manifest any wish to be
president. Perhaps his present job, keeping Russia’s misery quietly contained,
is task enough for him (though even that could win him votes). But Mr Primakov
should by no means be ruled out. Indeed, polls suggest that he is now second
favourite only to Mr Zyuganov. He has few enemies in Russia. He appeals
modestly to liberals—he was something of a reformist in Soviet days—and,
rather more vigorously, to the country’s many indignant nationalists, as chief
Russian trouble-maker for the West in the Balkans and the Gulf. 
Mr Yavlinsky apart, none of the candidates has a serious economic programme.
But the days when Russia could be governed from the centre are passing, as its
regions take more and more power for themselves. The longer Mr
Yeltsin hangs on, the less his successor may matter. 

*******



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