July 28, 1998   
This Date's Issues: 2286 •  • 

Johnson's Russia List
#2286
28 July 1998
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Interfax: Duma Official Insists On Ratification Of IMF Agreement.
2. Obshchaya Gazeta: Leonid Sedov, RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT NOT LEGITIMATE, 
PEOPLE SAY. Political Chaos in Minds and in Deeds. (Poll).
3. Jerry Hough: The current crisis in Russia.
4. Moscow News: Jean MacKenzie, CONFESSIONS OF A RUSSOPHILE: English 
Antidote to Russia.
5. Sovetskaya Rossiya: Left Papers Commit To 'National Liberation
Struggle.' 
6. Itar-Tass: Over 250,000 Tax Dodgers Exposed in Russia in 1998.
7. The Independent (UK): Helen Womack, Street life - How to survive the
fruits of 
the forest.
8. John Wilhelm : On Nicholas II.
9. Albert Weeks: Kovalyov's sacking.
10. Russia Today: Rod Pounsett, Knocking Russia -- A matter of relativity.
(Software piracy).]

********

#1
Duma Official Insists On Ratification Of IMF Agreement 

MOSCOW, July 28 (Interfax) - Russia's agreement with the International
Monetary Fund on the extension of a large loan must be ratified by both
houses of the Russian parliament, Chairman of the State Duma's Committee
for Legislation and Judicial Reform Anatoly Lukyanov of the Communist
faction, told Interfax Tuesday. 
He said he disagreed with Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko and other
Cabinet members who argue that the ratification of this agreement is not
mandatory. "It's clear already that these documents are not confined to
purely financial issues," Lukyanov said. Among the terms of the agreement,
he continued, there are those that, contrary to the Russian constitution,
will cause the population's living standards to go down. This cannot be
disregarded by parliament, he said. 
He said that despite Kiriyenko's promise to supply the deputies with all
the loan documents, including its terms, the Duma has not received
anything. He said that "by not providing the documents the government is
violating the law, which may entail the initiation of legal proceedings
against it." 
He said that from the juridical point of view the agreement with the IMF
is very fragile. He also said that loans unconfirmed by the lower house may
"not be considered Russia's state debt" and that parliament will not take
any responsibility for it. 
"In 1917 Russia renounced all agreements on the Russian empire's debts,"
Lukyanov said. He added that this fact is most probably known to
"international organizations and banks" which, he said, "are very well
aware that foreign loans are the prerogative of parliament, not a matter of
presidential decrees and government resolutions." 
"Foreign organizations know the value of law in their home countries,
but do not want to understand that in Russia such laws are highly valued,
too," Lukyanov said. 

*******

#2
>From RIA Novosti
Obshchaya Gazeta
July 23, 1998
RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT NOT LEGITIMATE, PEOPLE SAY
Political Chaos in Minds and in Deeds
By Leonid SEDOV

The Power poll held by the National Public Opinion Research
Centre in February-March 1998 offers an embracing picture of the
depth of the crisis of the government system which became
established in Russia in the past six years since the dissolution

of the Soviet Union. 
The spontaneous development of the regime pushed the country
towards crime, the appearance of local authoritarian regimes
poorly controlled by the central authorities, the transformation
of virtually all organisational structures into corporations
which rely on force in their relations with other structures, and
the development of authoritarian trends in the central power,
which is becoming an "omnipotent-impotent elected monarchy."
This was bound to affect the public consciousness. It is
regrettable, but the bulk of the people see a way out of the
crisis not in the continued development of democratic foundations
in social and economic relations, but in the use of such original
ideas as the "iron fist" power, workers' self-government, and on
to "Red restoration." The idea once voiced by Winston Churchill
that democracy is a very bad form of government, but all other
forms are worse still, is supported by only 25% of Russians. 
When asked about democracy in Russia, only 10% of the
respondents reply that it is the best possible variant of
development, while nearly 50% believe that "there is another,
more perfect form of government for Russia." We are sorry to say
that the people think this better form is the previous, Soviet
regime, which they recall somewhat idealistically and compare it
as such to the current regime.
Replies to the question about the qualities of Soviet power
of the late 1970s to the early 1990s leave no doubts to this
effect (see Table 1).
Table 1 (in % of the respondents)
------------------------------------------------------------
Qualities Soviet regime Current regime
------------------------------------------------------------
Close to the people 36 2
Alien to the people 8 41
"Our own," which we are used to 32 3
Legal 32 12
Illegal 1 13
Strong, durable 27 2
Weak, impotent 8 30
Bureaucratic 30 22
Short-sighted 23 28
Respected 21 2
Secretive, closed to the people 17 8
Honest, open 14 3
Fair 16 3
Criminal, corrupt 13 63
Narrow-minded, unwise 9 12
Inconsistent 8 32
Parasitic 8 18
Unprofessional 6 12
Educated, intelligent 8 6
------------------------------------------------------------
"Corrupt and criminal" are the dominant characteristics of
the current authorities. Unlike the Soviet power, which was
"close to the people," the current regime is "alien to the
people," and "weak" and "inconsistent" into the boot. 
The most paradoxical thing is that the Soviet regime, which
existed without genuine elections and was clearly the regime of
usurpers, is regarded by a considerable part of the respondents
as "legal," while only 12% accept the legality of the current
regime, which survived quite a few elections. At the same time,
61% of the respondents regard elections as the best method of

forming the national leadership, and 45% are convinced that we
should have parties and a parliament. 
It should be remembered, though, that none of the positive
characteristics of Soviet regime got more than 35% of votes. Only
35% of the respondents regard it as "power by the people,"
"humane," and these respondents are the reliable electorate of
the left-wing opposition. On the other hand, 75% of the
respondents had a positive word to say about the previous regime,
and barely 20% see positive elements in the current authorities,
while the number of those who regard the current government
negatively reached 85%.
To get a better view of the people's dissatisfaction with
the current system of public relations, we compared the real and
ideal (desired) structures of influence of the current forces, as
seen by the people. By comparing the number of answers to the
question who wields the greatest influence now, and who should
wield such influence, we get an inverted pyramid, which testifies
to the people's desire to turn the situation upside down. 
Table 2 enumerates the current influential forces in Russia
and the number of positive answers with regard to their current
or (in the second case) desired influence. 

Table 2 (in % of the respondents)
------------------------------------------------------------
Who has the influence Who should have the influence
------------------------------------------------------------
Criminal groups 80 Intelligentsia 81
Bankers, financiers 77 Trade unions 64
Bureaucrats 61 Mass media 56
Businessmen 50 Directors 54
Mass media 48 Bankers 44
Foreign businessmen 47 The military 44
Company directors 45 Bureaucrats 38
The church 23 The church 33
The army 16 Businessmen 26
Intelligentsia 10 Foreign businessmen 11
Trade unions 4 Criminal groups 4
------------------------------------------------------------

The direction of this "turnover" is clear. The people want
to see their authorities above all smart and educated. (It is
another matter than in practice they seldom can make the
distinction correctly, and the most talented and competent
administrators lose to such "doctors of science" as Zyuganov.) 
They believe that the influence of intelligentsia, which is
negligible in Russia today, must become predominant. The other
preferences are clearly social-democratic and syndicalist. The
second most influential force should be the trade unions, the
respondents say, and the role of major directors and industrial
associations must grow. 
It is interesting that such institutions as the mass media,
the church and the army, which are traditionally trusted by the
people, should occupy a higher place in this pyramid. This means
that the people have learned to value the freedom of speech, as

proved by the fact that the mass media are afforded a place close
to the top, although quite a few respondents (44% and 33%) spoke
up for the growth of influence of clerical and military forces. 
This can be interpreted as a potential threat of the
militarisation of society, or a leaning towards religious
fundamentalism. But, when they speak about a higher influence of
the church, the respondents mean above all the peace-making
function of religion, and its possible role in cushioning the
confrontation which is tearing society apart. Such hopes are
widespread among less educated people, pensioners, state
officials, and (most interesting) criminal groups. (The poll
showed that 4% of the respondents advocate greater influence of
criminal groups and at the same time a stronger church.) 
The respondents who described themselves as "the upper
class" are leaning towards "reliance on Christianity," too. This
may mean that in conditions of a dramatic aggravation of the
crisis and the threat of a "Red revenge," a part of the elite,
searching for ways (not necessarily constitutional ones) to
preserve their power, might pin their hopes on the church as a
political force and a source of legitimacy. 
The legitimacy of the regime is becoming a burning question,
as proved by the data given at the beginning of this article. It
can be buttressed by observations which prove that the Russian
society is moving towards a deep split between the ruling elite,
which the people think has lost the right to rule, and the bulk
of the population, who can hardly claim the name of citizens. 
Most respondents agree that the state does not fulfil its
obligations to the people, while the people do not do their duty
to the state. But they place the bulk of the blame on the state.
In particular, only 5% of the respondents think that the state is
doing what it has to do, while 70% disagree. Only 40% said they
did not do their duty to the state, while 18% think they perform
their civil duty quite well. 
This is an excessively complimentary evaluation. If the
standards of maturity and consciousness of Russians are so high,
why then is the quality of Russian statehood so poor? We might
explain this by the influence of some extraneous, heavenly
forces, but this would be in the realm of superstition, rather
than a sober analysis of reality. 

********

#3
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 1998
From: "Jerry F. Hough" <jhough@acpub.duke.edu>
Subject: the current crisis in Russia

The discussion about the current crisis in Russia has naturally 
focussed on economic reform. It seems to me that the political 
scientists should be discussing the political system more fully.

If I may be excused from returning to an earlier theme, I think 
that we in this country--and this includes its scholars--have no 
reasonable way of thinking about democracy and authoritarianism. Those 
Americans associated with the effort to introduce democracy in Russia 
have really been anarchists of the New Left who are quite dubious about 
any role for government in political and economic life. McFaul's 
association with the Hoover Institution illustrates perfectly how the 

seeming extreme left and the seeming extreme right have converged in 
America. The consistency is precisely in the anarchist assumptions of 
both about government and the economy, and unfortunately those promoting 
democracy have so assumed that the extreme marketization of Milton Friedman 
will lead to democracy that they have supported dictatorship in Russia 
and called it democracy if it supports a Friedman-like economic policy.

Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin have been destroyed by accepting the 
advice they accepted from the West. If Lebed or someone else is soon to 
come to power, we need to try to ensure that he has a more 
sophisticated notion of market reform and political systems than his 
predecessors. Lebed's long association with Glazev suggests he probably 
has the former, but his remarks on politics suggest real naivite of the 
kind found in the West.

The word "authoritarianism" has a series of meaning. If we use the 
David Easton model of inputs-black box-outputs, then the first refers to 
how policy is made in the black box. An authoritarian regime is one 
dominated a single person or small group that has the decisive role in 
policy-making. Those in the so-called conflict school in the past 
raised questions about whether Stalin and Khrushchev were real dictators 
by pointing out that others sometimes made decisions and that even their 
decisions had either been opposed by others or were influenced by 
others. The evidence was accurate enough, but it only showed that the 
most powerful dictators do not take absolutely every decision without any 
input or influences. If we are going to use authoritarian or dictator 
in a reasonable comparative sense, Stalin and Khrushchev fit the 
category, and so does Yeltsin. The category is obviously broad, and 
Yeltsin has none of the detailed interest in policy of those two 
predecessors and is a chaotic administrator. But that doesn't change 
his domination of the black box.

This is the first point we need to emphasize to Lebed. An 
authoritarian regime is not inconsistent with elections--indeed, they 
almost all have legislative elections. Most authoritarian rulers are 
far more respectful to the legislature and opponents than Yeltsin has 
been. Lebed could be a quite dominant figure and rule more like the 
ruler of Singapore--and be a far superior ruler to the current one. He 
could win elections the way the president of Peru does. We have been 
trying to make this point to China, and we should make it loudly and 
clearly to Russia. Indeed, the Russians who read this letter need to 
make it. Democracy does not mean what Lenin and the American 
democratization program say--dictatorial rule by the financial elite. 
It means an economic program that the majority will support. It means 
an economic program that will produce growth and that includes the 
controls on financial flows found in Chili, not the kind of lack of 
controls that led to disaster in Asia. It means a government that is 
concerned with public health, not one that kills millions of its 
citizens (and that is literally true) by starving the health sector.


The second definition of authoritarianism relates to the output 
side. How harsh are the policies? This is quite compatible with 
majority rule. The majority in the American South imposed 
segregation. Indeed, even today the majority in the US imposes a death 
penalty that Europeans consider barbaric and a severe infringement of 
human rights. Europeans see America as having far more government 
social regulation than in Europe--and that includes liberal measures as 
well as conservative. I make these latter two points only to make the 
general point that harsh authoritarian policies are in the eyes of the 
beholder. Laws do limit freedom, and the question is which are needed 
to prevent chaos and secure justice. Both friend and foe alike would 
agree that Yeltsin has not been authoritarian enough in this realm, not 
as authoritarian as any Western elected leader. He has not tried to 
enforce laws, he has not prosecuted corruption, he has been an extremely 
personalistic ruler who has systematically destroyed institutions rather 
than try to administer through them. 

The third definition of authoritarianism is a stylistic one. 
A dictatorial ruler may rule with a smile and a gracious style, and a 
democratic ruler can be quite authoritarian in the style he or she uses.

Russia almost surely now needs an authoritarian ruler in the 
third sense. Yeltsin has played the role of a kindly patriarchical father 
who promises everything but punishes nothing. Russia needs a ruler who 
either is the tough boss like Luzhkov or even more frightening like 
Lebed. Indeed, Luzhkov would have to repudiate his image with respect 
to corruption. People have to believe that crime might be punished and 
lieutenants have to believe that they will be punished if they do not 
perform.

The question is what is needed to achieve that. A comparative 
scholar who compares the Russian revolution with the French has long had the 
sense that the guilotine in Red Square would make great television, and 
all of us have a list of candidates to be television stars. But if 
Lebed is going to be Napoleon, he needs to understand that we are four or 
five years late in the cycle for the guillotine. Napoleon is supposed to
introduce order and stability. There obviously needs to be renationalization
of most of the exporting industries and a few show trials, but all of this can
be done in a civilized manner.

The real question is the force to be applied against the population.
Should the troops be called out against miners in order to impose a 
Pinochet like economic reform that adds more depression to the existing 
one? Agricultural reform that gives the countryside prices that 
encourage production must be introduced, and is police action 
necessary in the big cities as the subsidies to them are ended? Should 
those like the Communists who criticize the IMF policy be banned and perhaps 
imprisoned?

It is in this area that tragedy must be avoided. As I finish 
working on a book on the relationship of democracy and economic reform in 
the Yeltsin period, one that involves going through the media of the 

past in great detail, I am ever more convinced that Yeltsin adopted an 
unpopular economic reform precisely because it would provoke a political
reaction that would allow him to establish authoritarianism in the Black Box
with Western legitimatization as a democrat and financial support. (The 
Western advice also set very well with his desire not to have strong
institutions.)

But by the same token, a ruler who convincingly says that a 
fundamental change in economic policy is going to occur almost surely can 
buy several years of social peace that does not require massive 
repression. A reassertion of support for the IMF program surely will 
require major repression and an end to elections.

It is time--long past time--for the United States to reassess its 
policy. As one rereads six years of Financial Times, one gets an 
education on the IMF as much as on Russia. Not many years ago it saw 
itself as a simple stabilizing institution, and performed a useful 
goal. Under the current head, it changed its role to interfere 
in the internal policy of other countries. It has, as World Bank chief 
economist says, been extraordinarily doctrinnaire and ideological.
Sometimes it does no harm. In 1995 when the dollar was near 80 
to the yen, the IMF and its president were insistent that the US 
raise its interest rates sharply even though its growth was sluggish. 
Otherwise there would be a further fall in the dollar, collapse of the world 
financial system and major inflation in the United States. Fortunately the
US was not in a hopeless financial position, and Greenspan simply ignored the
IMF. He did not raise interest rates, but cut them. The result has been
rapid growth, a reduction in the level of inflation, and the rise of the
dollar 
to 140 yen. 

If the IMF does not know the real relationship between foreign 
trade deficits, currency levels, and inflation, why does it think it 
understands the creation of markets and their functioning in early 
capitalism? As I have said a number of times, I have a book two-thirds 
done on American history. Early capitalism in America and early 
democracy looks very similar to that in Asia and Russia. 
(Unfortunately, we did introduce full democracy too soon in the 1830s and 
got the Civil War.) The difference in places such as Thailand and 
Russia from the United States is that the IMF has the power to impose 
economic reforms about which it knows less that the relationship between 
foreign trade, currency levels, and inflation.

The priority for the United States in Russia is for it to have 
control of nuclear weapons and a benign foreign policy. The economic 
priority is for it to have a government that is predictable, that is 
growing, and that has the protectionism that American investment 
requires. Given the highly educated nature of the Russian population 
and advanced stage of the movement of rural to urban population (both quite 
unlike China or Nigeria), there is no reason that a quite strong ruler, 
even an authoritarian one in many senses, can not maintain a limited 
democracy. Indeed, he can expand it by decentralizing tax resources to 

the regional level.

Yeltsin, despite what Specter said in an otherwise excellent 
article in the Sunday New York Times Magazine, was not the father of 
Russian democracy. He destroyed the democracy that Gorbachev created. 
A Lebed can be the kind of figure such as Solon who reintroduces both 
order and democracy. It may not be in his personality to do so, but the 
West and Russian intellectuals need to try to educate him about the 
options he has rather than suggest as the Times and Post usually are 
nowadays that his only option--and a desirable one at that--is to be 
a Pinochet who enforces a badly-failed economic policy with repression. 

**********

#4
Moscow News
July 28, 1998 
CONFESSIONS OF A RUSSOPHILE: English Antidote to Russia 
By Jean MacKenzie

One of these days, in the interests of science, I'm going to spend an 
entire year in Russia without a break. My theory is that at the end of 
that time I will have acquired the stoic acceptance of the vagaries of 
life that I see in my Russian friends, the shoulder-shrugging refusal to 
be unduly upset by the labyrinthine logic of this looking-glass world. 
Or I may throw myself off the Kremlin bell tower. We'll see. 

But in the meantime, I need my vacations. I find that three months at a 
stretch is the limit. After 90 days or so my nerves start to fray, and 
Moscow's absurdities no longer seem charming, or even bearable. At that 
point I start checking plane schedules. 

My latest escape took me to England, a land that, to my mind, is 
temperamentally, if not geographically, at the opposite end of the globe 
from Russia. I had hoped that England's carefully tended verdure and 
buttoned-down politesse would provide an antidote to Moscow. 

I tagged along with a friend who had business in a small town a bit to 
the north of London. West Wycombe is not exactly a bustling metropolis 
-- I would put the total population at somewhere around 500 at the peak 
of the tourist season, when all 12 rooms at the local inn are booked. 
But it was green and sweet-smelling, with a decadently high ratio of 
pubs to residents, so I was quite happy for most of the two days I spent 
there. 

The village's centerpiece is a rather large church on a hill overlooking 
the main (and only) street. It is crowned with a golden globe, which 
some well-traveled 18th century peer had decided was quite the thing 
after he returned from a trip to the brand-new city of St. Petersburg. 
This is no luxurious orthodox onion dome, keep in mind, it's more of a 
restrained sort of cocktail olive, but a wandering Russophile can squint 
a bit and fancy herself back in the land of the tsars, if she so 
chooses. I opted for a pint of bitter and a small visit to the one and 
only tourist attraction in town, a system of caves carved out of the 
hillside by the same peer who skewered the gold ball on the church. 

One would think finding a major landmark in a pocket-sized town would 
not be a problem, but my myopia, combined with the British aversion to 
signs, had me wandering around for hours. I stopped to ask directions, 
but this is where I got into trouble. 


I've long had a fairly complicated relationship to things English. It 
all seems so treacherously familiar. Years of shared literature, from 
Charles Dickens to Agatha Christie (not to mention Shakespeare, of 
course) have given me a sense that it's, well, almost home. Until I open 
my mouth, that is. My Yankee twang sounds so flat and boring up against 
those plummy British vowels, and the mildest comments sound maddeningly 
condescending when uttered in "Masterpiece Theater" tones. 

It's become something of an obsession of mine, especially since a recent 
party, when an upper crust type took me aside. "I really respect you for 
what you've achieved," he said, his perfect public school pronunciation 
barely marred by the staggering amount of alcohol he had consumed. 

"Especially considering where you've come from." 

So I was prepared for rebuff, and I was not disappointed. 

"The entrance to the caves? It's at the bottom of the hill, of course," 
said a dog-walker, sounding as if she were explaining things to a 
dim-witted child, instead of a winded pilgrim who had just climbed 
straight up for 45 minutes. "You see, they're underneath us. You'll have 
to walk back down." 

At the bottom, the lone sign stubbornly pointed back up. Another local 
sent me off in a completely different direction. 

Everyone was unfailingly polite, but I was starting to wonder if there 
was a conspiracy afoot. 

I finally found the caves, which were hardly worth the bother. But with 
that my patience for country lanes and cottages small was just about 
exhausted, and I decided to go to London. 

I did the sightseeing bit for a few days -- everything from Westminster 
Abbey to the British Museum, with lots of shopping in between. After 
Russia's dark and twisted history, it is a delight to be in a country 
that is proud of its traditions. 

"When a man is tired of London, he is tired of life," said Samuel 
Johnson. 

I think I've still got a few good years left. 

*******

#5
Left Papers Commit To 'National Liberation Struggle' 

Sovetskaya Rossiya
21 July 1998
[translation for personal use only]
Letter by Sovetskaya Rossiya Chief Editor V. Chikin and Zavtra
Chief Editor A. Prokhanov: "From the Patriotic Information
Bureau"

According to reports from circles close to the Presidential Staff,
Deputy Chief of Staff Savostyanov, who is famous for his failures during
the initial stages of the Chechen War and his indefatigable combating of
"political extremism," is initiating the closure of the opposition
newspapers Sovetskaya Rossiya and Zavtra.
The unconstitutional Chamber for Information Disputes has already
called for Sovetskaya Rossiya's "public flogging," while Zavtra's editorial
office has been sent two warnings from the Press Ministry which give the
latter the right to start a procedure to close it down. In accordance with
Savostyanov's aim, the Justice Ministry department in charge of public
organizations has been instructed to monitor the suppression procedures,
while Federal Security Service [FSB] staff, who have twice drafted
memorandums which do not recommend the closure of the Russia-wide

opposition newspapers, are obliged to collect "compromising material" on
them. However, the persecution continues and forms part of a general
project for the establishment of a so-called liberal dictatorship whereby
the authorities intend to suppress the people's growing opposition and
crush opposition protest. Criminal prosecution of miners picketing the
railroads has already been initiated. General Rokhlin, one of the most
consistent opponents of the regime, has been murdered. A secret Yeltsin
edict has been signed establishing within the FSB a directorate for the
"protection of the constitutional system," whose structure is a carbon copy
of the KGB Fifth Directorate and is aimed at combating dissent. It is now
the turn of the opposition press, which expresses the opinion of 80 percent
of the population.
The source of the extremism for which Sovetskaya Rossiya and Zavtra
are blamed is actually the policy of a regime which has enriched a handful
of money-grabbers and bribe-takers, a policy which carries away 1.5 million
of the Russian population every year, suppresses any manifestations of
Russian self-consciousness, and openly sows class, religious, and ethnic
discord.
The extremist is Savostyanov himself, whose hands were freed by the
bloody slaughter in the Caucasus, which led to the deaths of hundreds of
thousands of people, the devastation of cities, and, ultimately, to
Chechnya's unconstitutional, de facto secession from Russia.
The editorial boards of Rossiya and Zavtra, which repeatedly suffered
outright high-handedness and closedowns in 1991 and 1993, assure their
readers that they will remain the print organs of the national liberation
struggle, which is expanding across Russia's expanses.
[Signed} V. Chikin, chief editor of Sovetskaya Rossiya
Prokhanov, chief editor of Zavtra
[Description of Source: Sovetskaya Rossiya -- Pro-communist daily
sympathetic to CPRF leader Gennadiy Zyuganov.]

********

#6
Over 250,000 Tax Dodgers Exposed in Russia in 1998 

Moscow, 23 Jul (ITAR-TASS) -- The Russian State Tax Service carried
out over 55,000 swoops throughout the country in the first half of 1998, as
a result of which over 250,000 individuals engaged in entrepreneurial
activity were exposed for leasing tenantable and untenantable accommodation
without the appropriate registration and without paying tax. This was
revealed today at a news conference by Sergey Shtarev, deputy head of the
State Tax Service.
Of this number about 80,000 were Russian citizens and 170,000
foreigners, PRIME-TASS reports. About 210,000 persons, who have had
payments amounting to over 30 million rubles [R] and received
administrative penalties of over R10 million, have been cited to pay income
tax. [passage omitted: tasks of state tax inspectors in Moscow Region]

********

#7
The Independent (UK)
July 28, 1998
[translation for personal use only]
Street life - How to survive the fruits of the forest
By Helen Womack
Samotechny Lane, Moscow 

In the Children's Park next to Samotechny Lane, a young woman was 
rooting around under a tree. At first, I thought she had lost her keys 
or something. But then I realised she was looking for mushrooms. 


It's not a good idea, really, in central Moscow, which must have one of 
the highest concentrations of lead anywhere in the world. Probably she 
had no means of getting out into the countryside. And Russians are so 
obsessed with mushrooms that they will hunt for them even in the inner 
city if they have no alternative. 

This summer, there is a superabundance of mushrooms in Russia. Old 
ladies are standing at metro stations, selling them by the basket. 

I did not really register this until Oleg, one of my neighbours, rang to 
tell me it was a record year. With typical Russian delight in 
doom-mongering, he added: "It's a bad sign. A glut of mushrooms means 
famine and war." 

It is true, as old people will tell you, that there were a lot of 
mushrooms in the forests the summer before the Nazis invaded in 1941. 
But weather could have as much to do with it this year as impending war. 
Russians often say corrupt police or drunken husbands are as common as 
"mushrooms after rain". 

You could express that the other way round and say that, after rain, 
mushrooms are as plentiful as politicians' promises. After all, this has 
been a particularly humid summer, ideal weather for fungi. 
Strange as it may seem, in my 10 years in Russia, I have never practised 
the national sport of mushroom-hunting. I was afraid of picking the 
wrong variety and poisoning myself, or picking the right fungus but 
discovering too late that pollution had made it mutate. "Family killed 
by mutant mushrooms", is one of the common summer-season headlines that 
can be found in the Russian press. 

However, when my old friend Zina, a geologist knowledgeable about nature 
in general, suggested we go out into the woods just north of Moscow to 
look for mushrooms, I thought I should risk it at last. 

Russians love and fear the forest in equal measure, much as the English 
do the sea, and you cannot say you have had the full Russian experience 
until you have been on a real mushroom safari. 

Only a few kilometres outside Moscow, the woods are as dense as the 
Amazon rainforest and you can easily get lost if you do not keep track 
of the paths you have taken. 

The air is thick with mosquitoes and it is advisable to cover your head 
to protect yourself from "Siberian klesh" (ticks) which, if you are very 
unlucky, can give you meningitis. 

In the mixed birch and pine woods where we rambled, we discovered dozens 
of trees that had been felled by the June hurricane, their trunks 
charred by the lightning. 

And what struck the eye first were not the shy and retiring mushrooms 
but glowing berries that seemed to have "Eat Me" written all over them. 

"You can eat those," said Zina, pointing to some bright red berries that 
looked like garden raspberries, only they were shinier and had a sour 
taste closer to cranberry. They were "kostyaniki" (seed berries), not to 
be confused with poisonous "volchya yagodi" (wolf berries) that seemed 
to me to be identical, except the bushes on which they grew were higher. 

"Oh it's not just that," said Zina. "You can feel that the one gives out 
good energy while the other exudes something nasty. The same applies to 

mushrooms." 

I felt very dubious about this "new age" or rather age-old approach, 
though gradually even my stunted animal instincts began to awake and I 
somehow knew, without having to be told, that we would not find any 
mushrooms as long as we were hacking our way through nettles. 

We found them instead under birch trees: carpets of brown speckled 
"tiger mukhomor" or poisonous toadstools. "They could be deadly for 
children or make an adult very sick," warned Zina. But she was excited, 
because wherever toadstools pop up, the nutritious "whites" that go into 
homemade Russian mushroom soup are never far away. 

Sure enough, we soon came upon the good fungi. Zina cut them very 
carefully with a knife to preserve the ground mould for next season. 

We had less luck in our hunt for the many different varieties of small 
mushrooms that can be salted and saved up for winter, to be eaten with 
potatoes or as a snack accompaniment to vodka. Neither were there any 
"lisichki" (little foxes), which the French call chanterelles and serve 
at exorbitant prices in the best restaurants. 

The reason was that hordes of poor grannies, knowing mushrooms contain 
as much protein as meat, had already been through the forest like vacuum 
cleaners. We bought from them instead at the nearest metro station and 
had a mushroom feast. 

Days later, I am still alive to tell the tale. Oleg had said mushrooms 
portend a cataclysm and I was neurotic about mutants. But so far we 
remain at peace and have not yet been taken over by aliens. 

********

#8
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 1998
From: John Wilhelm <jhw@ams.org>
Subject: On Nicholas II

Although Yeltsin's attendance and moving comments at the interment of
Nicholas II were a welcomed surprise, it is unfortunate for both the
Russian peoples and for us that the importance of this event was
depreciated by political considerations. Whatever else one may think
of Nicholas II, he was a faithful ally during a period of great peril
for the Western Democracies and deserves credit, as Winston Churchill
eloquently argued in the interwar period, for his important
contribution to the Allied cause and to that of his country in the
Great War.

A genuine state funeral in which the leaders of the major Allies, the
President of France, the Queen of Great Britain and the President of
the United States, had seriously been invited to attend could have been
an appropriate occasion for Western leaders to acknowledge the debt we
owe Nicholas for the freedoms we still enjoy. And it could have been
an opportunity to recognize the great contribution of the Russian
peoples in two world wars in sparing us the dreadful consequences of
of a successful drive for military dominance in Europe by the Germans.

These are not inconsequential considerations. Despite the horrors of
Soviet rule, which none of us, least of all the Russian peoples, should
ever forget, we owe these people a great deal for what they did for us
in two periods of great peril for Western Democracies. It is unfortunate
that a sense of gratitude does not inform Western policy of the opportunities
opened up to us as a consequence of the fall of Soviet power to reintegrate

into our civilization a peoples who contributed so much to it prior to
the great disaster that started in 1914 and culminated in 1917 and its
aftermath.

Perhaps the upcoming summit in Moscow might offer another opportunity
for expressing much deserved gratitude to the Russian peoples by the
President articulating something that we currently do not have: A
workable policy towards Russia that could help us all.

********

#9
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 1998
From: Albert Weeks <AWeeks1@compuserve.com>
Subject: Kovalyov's sacking

The day before Russian Navy Day, July 25,
President Yeltsin purged the chief of the FSB, or Federal Security Service.
No explanation was given for the abrupt sacking of the FSB chief, Nikolai
Kovalyov. Yet it appeared ironic that Yeltsin should make this critical
move on the eve of the naval red-letter day. Kovalyov had been the
official who had ordered the arrest of Russian Navy Capt. Grigory Pasko,
the officer who had told the truth about Russian dumping of nuclear wastes
into the Sea of Japan. For his honesty, Pasko was clapped into jail a year
ago, thanks to testimony by the FSB. Today his case is a cause-celebre in
his hometown of Vladivostok, site of Russia's big naval base.
The Pasko case had become a burning issue with the Vladivostok wing
of Russian ecology movement, Ekologos. Valdivostok authorities, always
ready to defy Moscow as other provinces are, had lined up with the
environmentalists as has the public thus embarrassing Moscow Center. Raucus
demonstrations have been taking place in the city that houses the Maritime
Province Russian Pacific fleet. And local TV and newspapers carry protests.
Is it possible, then, that Yeltsin sought to defuse this hot issue by
ousting the FSB official who was ultimately responsible for a possible
miscarriage of justice, as Pasko's defenders claim? It appears a bit
too coincidental that his ouster took place on the eve of Navy Day. 
This, at any rate, is one theory that might help explain Kovalyov's
dismissal. But his replacement, Vladimir Putin, Kovalyov's former
assistant, is a no less a controversial figure. Putin had served in the KGB
as a master spy in Germany in the late 1980s. He is the first
post-Communist security chief with that kind of 
"spooky" background.
Meantime, Yeltsin's office has refused to give any reasons for the
shakeup in one of the country's most sensitive cabinet posts. It is
obvious, 
however, that any Russian leader, but especially Yeltsin, must be vigilant
and make sure that the security police are absolutely loyal to him. This is
especially true today when opposition to Yeltsin within the public is at an
all-time high and when mass strikes are planned for autumn. The slogan of
these strikes is expected to be that Yeltsin must resign or be impeached,
according to 'Moscow News.'
Yeltsin has reason, too, to fear plotting against him within the
upper councils of the government--always a chronic Russian threat. It is
alleged that bugging of official phones is widely practiced by the FSB and
that official discontent with Yeltsin is widespread. The president expects

the security police to keep a close lookout for the hatching of any such
plots or attempts at a coup, particularly when he is away from the capital,
as he is now. Whether he found Kovalyov to be deficient or untrustworthy in
this respect is not known. 

********

#10
Russia Today


http://www.russiatoday.com
July 27, 1998 
Knocking Russia -- A matter of relativity
By Rod Pounsett

Considering the everyday problems and plethora of bad news the average
Russian has to confront daily, they can be excused for sometimes losing
their cool and hitting back at those of us who comment on their world. 

This week it was my turn. "Why always pick on us?" a long-standing friend
in Moscow vexed. "Is your world so perfect?" 

An avid consumer of Western media, he proceeded to list headlines that
mirrored the very issues commentators like me see as fair game when
reporting on the down side of Russia. Examples included crime, corruption,
political sleaze, diplomatic duplicity, big-business botch-ups and
mismanagement -- stories frequently considered the lifeblood of newspaper
editors in the Western world. 

No, of course "our world" is not perfect, I admitted; it is just that
Russia has the propensity to serve things up much in much bigger proportions. 

In my discussion with my irate friend, I chose to focus on piracy -- of
commercial games and even military computer software, and videos and music
CDs, to almost anything involving copyright or intellectual rights
ownership. We are talking about very big numbers. These forms of piracy
costs the U.S. alone nearly $12 billion a year worldwide, and Russia stands
high on the accused list, where losses are said to be well in excess of a
billion dollars. 

By the last reckoning, it was estimated that as much as 96 percent to 98
percent of all computer software used in Russia was obtained illegally;
this represents hundreds of millions of dollars in losses to software
developers. Western music makers and publishers are said to be losing an
equal if not higher amount of cash because of illegally copied cassettes
and CDs circulating on the Russian market. The figures for other forms of
piracy are just as enormous. 
I know it is bad elsewhere in the world, but those responsible for
monitoring these issues, like the International Intellectual Properties
Alliance, a U.S. trade group, and the Business Software Alliance, or BSA,
an international organization of publishers dedicated to fighting piracy,
have put Russia way up the top of the list of malefactors, just behind
China as the biggest offender. 

And it was an issue Microsoft's Bill Gates put high on his agenda when he
had talks with the Russian government last year. Apart from his company's
losses, he also believes piracy is hindering the high potential for
software development in Russia. 

Just one postscript about the computer software piracy issue -- with so
much illegal software in use, one dreads to think about the "millennium
bug" computer problem and how many small businesses may collapse in silence
for fear of revealing the source of their software. 


There has also been some tough lobbying for a Russian government crack
down from Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Picture Association of
America. He claims his industry is losing hundreds of millions of dollars a
year just from illegal video copying in Russia. 

There have been few signs of the Russian authorities cracking down on this
area of crime. Sure, they have made promises to the international community
and there has been sporadic action by the relevant law enforcement
agencies. All too often, however, cases never go to trial or fines are
insufficiently punitive. 

Another friend in Russia once told me that I needed to look more closely at
cultural development during the Soviet regime years to better understand a
Russian's attitude toward the piracy issue. 

When there was not much of anything, he told me, people learned to share.
For ordinary Russians not much has changed; there are still shortages so
people go on sharing, and copying software, music CD's and videos is part
of the sharing culture. That people are making money out of this illegal
activity did not seem to come into his equation. 

But more than just the cash losses to the West, the levels of this sort of
piracy in Russia exemplifies something much more basically wrong about the
nation. It attacks Russia's fundamental integrity and willingness to obey
the law as well as highlighting the absence of any meaningful legislative
infrastructure. The average Russian's attitude to this problem is very
similar to their reluctance to pay their taxes: "No one else pays in
Russia, so why should I?" 

********