April 120, 1998  
This Date's Issues: 2156•  2157• 

Johnson's Russia List
#2157
20 April 1998
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Rossiiskaya Gazeta: YELTSIN ADDRESSES NATION. (On new government).
2. Reuters: Russia Heads into Crucial Political Week.
3. Interfax: Russian PM-Designate Thinks Probability Of Approval High.
4. AP: Russia's Kiriyenko Reassures U.S.
5. Jonathan Weiler: Yabloko and progressivism.
6. Jerry Hough: Re: 2154-Rendall/Yabloko.
7. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Alexander Zhelenin, A NEW PARTY OF NEMTSOV.
8. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Sergei Dubovsky, THE DECLINE OF GAIDAR-CHUBAIS' 
CAPITALISM. It's time to change the right-wing radical economic policy for
a right-wing 
centrist one.
9. RIA Novosti: 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF SOVIET INVASION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
WILL BE MARKED IN MOSCOW, SAYS SERGEI FILATOV.
10. RFE/RL NEWSLINE: LUZHKOV DISPUTES COMPARISON WITH LEBED and
LEBED RULES OUT PRESIDENTIAL BID IF HE LOSES IN KRASNOYARSK. 
11. Paul Goble (RFE/RL): Turkmenistan: Analysis From Washington -- When
Interests 
Collide.
12. Boston Globe: David Filipov, Russian is hard to forget in Estonia.
13. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: "MAIN BATTLE LIES AHEAD," YELTSIN SAYS.
14. Nikst: Sarov (ex-Arzamas-16): http://www.sar.nnov.ru/~courier
15. Christian Science Monitor editorial: Boris & Ryu's Deal.]

*******

#1
>From RIA Novosti
Rossiiskaya Gazeta
April 18, 1998 
YELTSIN ADDRESSES NATION

President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation addressed
the people of Russia over the radio April 17.
The text of Yeltsin's radio message follows below.

My fellow Russians,
Today I'm leaving for Japan where I'll meet Prime Minister
Ryutaro Hashimoto. This trip, which has been planned a long time
ago, is very important for our two countries.
My departure has coincided with the current government
reshuffle. However, I see no reasons for postponing this visit.
The government continues to discharge its duties, just like it's
supposed to do. All ministries and departments keep operating. And
the formation of a new government is proceeding in strict
conformity with the law and the Russian Constitution.
Such a state of things when one cabinet has resigned and when
another cabinet has not yet been established is usually referred
to as a government crisis. Many developed countries regard this in
a calm manner, without over-dramatizing the situation. This is
because they understand that such a crisis doesn't amount to
disaster. We, too, have no reasons for inciting fears and scaring
people.
True, Russian governments don't resign very often. However,
such a resignation has taken place within the framework of the law
and in line with constitutional provisions. Actually, the
Constitution describes the subsequent actions of all state-power
branches in a clear-cut and concise way.
As I see it, another thing has become clear today -- it's
very dangerous to amend the Constitution during the reform period
because the Constitution is the foundation of nationwide political
stability. It's very hard to amend our Constitution. But, owing to
this factor alone, it's well-nigh impossible to tamper with the

Constitution and to tailor it to time-serving interests.
That's why Russia has been living without coups and upheavals
over the last few years.
The Constitutional Court plays a major role in protecting the
Russian Fundamental Law. The Constitutional Court's verdicts are
seen as mandatory by everyone, the President included.
As you know, the Constitutional Court has made it incumbent
upon me to sign a bill dealing with those specific cultural values
that were acquired by us after the Second World War. I disagree
with that law, which does great damage to the interests of our
country. That law's provisions will prevent Russia from returning
its national property in other countries of the world. We must
prevent this from happening.
Right now, I've been forced to obey this verdict and to sign
the law. This is because I respect the Constitution and because I
respect and observe the Constitutional Court's decisions. However,
the Russian Constitution gives me the right to defend my position
and to submit another inquiry to the Constitutional Court. And I
have already taken advantage of this right.
My fellow Russians, 
The readiness to tackle all disputes in strict conformity
with the Russian Fundamental Law constitutes our great
achievement. No matter what opponents may say, and no matter how
they may scare us, but a normal political process is taking place
today.
The current debates and discussions are quite understandable.
You see, the subsequent image of our government is being forged
today. The government's program for overcoming various economic
and social difficulties is also being discussed.
However, all state-power branches must act in line with the
law; they must also respect the Constitution, unfailingly
fulfilling all Constitutional-Court decisions. And this is seen as
the most important thing today.
As a result, no political crises, resignations or elections
will threaten Russian stability and order.

*******

#2
Russia Heads into Crucial Political Week 
20 April 1998

MOSCOW -- (Reuters) A political crisis that has gripped Russia since
President Boris Yeltsin sacked his government a month ago could be finally
resolved this week or possibly extended indefinitely. 
The opposition-dominated Duma must decide whether to approve young
technocrat Sergei Kiriyenko as prime minister or vote itself into oblivion. 
The Kremlin chief dismissed the Cabinet of veteran Prime Minister Victor
Chernomyrdin on March 23 and named Kiriyenko, 35, to form a team to pursue
economic reforms more vigorously. 
The Duma has twice rejected the former regional banker. Unless it backs
him in a third vote, which must be held by Friday, Yeltsin says he will
dissolve the chamber, plunging the country into an unwanted and costly
early election. 
Grigory Yavlinsky, who heads the liberal Yabloko party and opposes
Yeltsin's candidate, suggested that Kiriyenko would almost certainly end up
as prime minister one way or the other. 
"This won't be a vote for Kiriyenko," he said on Russian television,
alluding to the president's right to appoint the prime minister if the Duma
is disbanded. "If Yeltsin doesn't change his nominee it will be on the
future of the Duma." 
Acting First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, Kiriyenko's mentor,
made a similar point to reporters in Japan. 

"The question of Kiriyenko has already been decided," he said at the
end of Yeltsin's weekend summit with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. "On
Friday it is the question of the Duma that will be decided, whether it will
carry on working or not." 
Yeltsin aides and the understated Kiriyenko seemed quietly confident
that sufficient opposition deputies in the 450-seat chamber would
understood this to give him the necessary 226 votes. 
But although such a shift in the Duma was discernible, nothing could be
ruled out in Russian politics. 
Asked on Sunday's weekly analytical television program Itogi how he
rated his chances, Kiriyenko said: "I don't rate these as my chances. In my
view, the Duma will be voting after all on the government's action program." 
Pressed to say whether he would win the Duma vote, Kiriyenko smiled
patiently and sipped from a cup of tea. "I think there is a sufficiently
high probability that they will approve me," he said. 
In a phone-in poll, 16,408 callers to Itogi said they agreed while 8,655
thought he would be rejected and a similar number favored a compromise. 
Communist Party chief Gennady Zyuganov told Itogi he was sure his
deputies would not change their minds and would agree at a party meeting on
Thursday to vote against Yeltsin's man. "Kiriyenko's candidacy is not
acceptable," he said. 
But at least two senior communists went off on a different tack, arguing
that voters would not easily forgive deputies for precipitating a costly
election. 
"There isn't a kopeck in the budget," said Duma speaker Gennady
Seleznyov, a communist, on the Zerkalo television show. 
"It means the president gets the right to say to teachers, doctors,
servicemen 'I need a minimum 2 billion rubles ($300 million) from the
budget to fund the Duma election.' What will our electorate say to that?" 
Looking beyond the immediate crisis to the ultimate prize in the Russian
power stakes, gruff reserve general Aleksander Lebed said he would bow out
of the race for the presidency if he lost an election for regional governor
next Sunday. 
Lebed, a former Security Council chief who helped to get Yeltsin
re-elected in 1996 and is seen as a contender in the mid-2000 presidential
poll, is standing for governor of the vast Siberian region of Krasnoyarsk. 
"If I lose, there'd be no point taking part," he told the Obozryevatel
show. "I wouldn't waste my time or nerves." 

********

#3
Russian PM-Designate Thinks Probability Of Approval High 

MOSCOW, April 20 (Interfax) - Acting Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko
believes that the State Duma may approve his nomination as prime minister
in a third voting. 
He told an NTV program Saturday night that he had taken calmly the
results of the last Friday's voting in which he won 28 votes less than in
the preceding one, chiefly because the voting was by roll call. 
Communist leader *Gennady Zyuganov*, Yabloko party leader Grigory
Yavlinsky and Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky who took
part in the program did not say that their MPs would vote for Kiriyenko. 
Zyuganov wanted him to withdraw his name. 

Zhirinovsky said LDPR MPs would vote for Kiriyenko if two or three
party members become ministers. 
Yavlinsky said that the president who had provoked the political crisis
had to nominate "a political but nonparty figure carrying sufficient
political weight," not intending to run for presidency in 2000 but capable
of maintaining continuity in the case of a political or economic crisis. 

*******

#4
Russia's Kiriyenko Reassures U.S 
By Vladimir Isachenkov
April 20, 1998

MOSCOW (AP) -- President Boris Yeltsin's nominee for prime minister told a
senior U.S. official today that Russia's political turmoil would not hamper
Russia's free-market reforms. 
``Our course for the continuation of reforms remains unchanged,'' Sergei
Kiriyenko told Strobe Talbott, the visiting deputy secretary of state. 
Kiriyenko, 35, has been rejected twice in the past two weeks by the
State Duma, parliament's lower house. But he remained optimistic about his
chances to be confirmed in the third and final vote this week. 
``The probability of endorsement is quite high,'' Kiriyenko told
Russia's NTV network on Sunday. 
The constitution gives Yeltsin the power to dissolve parliament and call
new elections if lawmakers fail to confirm his candidate in three votes. 
The Communists, the largest bloc in the Duma, have led the opposition to
Kiriyenko, citing his youth and government inexperience. 
Despite that, Gennady Seleznyov, a Communist who is speaker of the Duma,
has called on lawmakers to accept Yeltsin's choice to save the parliament. 
Another prominent hard-liner, Nikolai Kharitonov, the leader of the
Communist-allied Agrarian faction, echoed Seleznyov's call today. 
``Common sense tells us that we should preserve'' the parliament, the
ITAR-Tass news agency quoted Kharitonov as saying. 
But Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov reiterated Sunday that his party
would oppose Yeltsin's nominee and said the Duma should begin preparing for
new elections. 
Hard-line Communist Viktor Ilyukhin said today that more than 30
lawmakers had sent a letter to the prosecutor's office demanding criminal
proceedings against Yeltsin, which could lead to impeachment. 
Ilyukhin accused Yeltsin of ``deliberate extermination of the Russian
people'' through his reforms. 
Hard-liners long have called for removing Yeltsin from office, with no
result. But lawmakers might be tempted to consider pursuing impeachment
this time as a tactical move: Under Russian law, Yeltsin cannot disband the
Duma if it has launched impeachment proceedings against him. 
The latest political turmoil began March 23, when Yeltsin dismissed the
government of former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and accused the
Cabinet of moving too slowly with reforms. 
At a meeting with Talbott today, Kiriyenko said the new Cabinet -- if he
is approved -- would ensure the implementation of accords reached between
Vice President Al Gore and Chernomyrdin, the Interfax news agency reported. 
Kiriyenko and Talbott also discussed Yeltsin's meeting with President
Clinton scheduled to take place next month when both leaders attend the
summit of leading industrialized nations in Birmingham, England. 


********

#5
Date: Mon, 20 Apr 1998 
From: Jonathan Weiler <jweiler@email.unc.edu>
Subject: Yabloko and progressivism

David
I think the recent comparisons between Yabloko and early twentieth century
American progressives miss the mark on a number of fronts. First, such
comparisons assume that Russia is somehow progressing along a
normal capitalist trajectory, just like the US. Therefore, its own
"gilded age" of loans-for-shares and voucher privaitzation, while
functional, must now give way to a more orderly, humane form of liberal
capitalism. You will forgive my extreme skepticism about whether Russia's
gilded
age has been functional in any sense, other than to make a few people
phenomenally rich. Whatever else we can say abou the US between 1865 and
1900, we can say that it became a major industrial power while expanding
its markets rapidly into much of the North American continent as well as a
broad. This is nearly the opposite of both the geographical and economic
contraction that has characterized Russia since the late 1980s. I would
argue that absent a rapidly industrializing
economy and exploding population, it is impossible to talk about a
reconfiguring of the social contract in the way that
turn-of-the-century American
progressives attempted. (This, in addition to their efforts to break
the immigrant-dominated machine politics of the major cities.)
Second, Yabloko
utterly lacks any mass base of support and also utterly lacks any serious
links to the prevailing power structures. They are not pragmatic,
policy-oriented reformers, trying to fine-tune a burgeoning economic
machine, albeit a rapacious one. Rather, Yabloko's program
consists in its conviction that somehow, in the context of a nearly
decade-long depression, without any grass roots support, it can simply do
capitalism the way it's "supposed" to be done, notwithstanding that the
model on which Yavlinsky's notions of capitalism are based has no
historical antecedents. Yavlinsky's understanding of capitalist
development is fundamentally ahistorical, and so are comparisons between
Yabloko and American Progressives.

*******

#6
Date: Mon, 20 Apr 1998
From: "Jerry F. Hough" <jhough@acpub.duke.edu>
Subject: Re: 2154-Rendall/Yabloko

Dear David:

I disagree with Matthew Rendall on Yabloko's prospects, but it 
seems to me that he is phrasing the issue in precisely the right way. 
We need to look comparatively at Russia. My judgment about Russia today 
is that like Mr. Rendell, those in the democratization program in the US 
and those in the reform movement in Russia are in, fact, looking at the 
Progressive movement in the US at the beginning of the century and that 
we are being anachronistic. Russia in my judgment is more like America 
of the 1820s and 1830s when capitalism and mass democracy were first 
being introduced. That was crony capitalism at its best, that was a 
time from the 1820s to 1900 when industry rose and produced prosperity, 
when land grant colleges and public schools were established, when 
city bosses arose to fill a series of social 
needs. Russia needs industrial giants (not just Lenin's Wall Street), 

trade unions, solid political parties, and the public is, in my opinion, 
going to vote for that rather than Progressivism and environmentalism 
until there is something to control. If the democratic forces don't 
offer them pro-business democratic parties (that is, an alliance of 
democrats and nomenklatura, not financial capital) and pro-labor parties 
like the social democrats under Bismarck and then Roosevelt, the public 
in my opinion is going to vote for someone who offers them growth without 
democracy. Since Russia already has an industrial base and an educated 
public, there is no reason to think it would take Russia 80 years to get 
from America's 1820 to 1900, but I think it very optimistic to think it 
will take less than a decade or two.

But, to repeat, it seems to me that Mr. Rendell is raising the 
question right and that is what is crucial to do.

Sincerely, Jerry Hough 
*******

#7
>From RIA Novosti
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
April 18, 1998
A NEW PARTY OF NEMTSOV
By Alexander ZHELENIN

It is possible that soon the first vice-premier will form
his own political organization.

According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the acting first
vice-premier, Boris Nemtsov, plans to form his own party in a
near future. If that really happens, this will mean that at any
moment he can switch from the official sphere to that which is
known as open politics, do so initially on a private basis. It
is said that for this he has even declined the post of the
premier which was supposedly offered to him by Boris Yeltsin
after the latter has sent the cabinet of V.Chernomyrdin into
retirement. As for the post of the first vice-premier which is
effectively reserved for him already, it suits him much more
because it leaves certain freedom of action for him for
engaging in public politics. It is rumoured that this is
precisely the reason why he has offered the president the
candidacy of Sergei Kiriyenko instead of himself for the
premiership.
So what kind of hypothetical organization it may be?
Judging by Nemtsov's motley crew, ideologically it may
represent a kind of three-headed dragon, with the heads
representing liberalism, laborism and enlightened patriotism,
respectively. If one is to speak of Nemtsov's liberalism and,
accordingly, the liberalism of his possible party, the first
attempts at construction which have been suspended so far
because of the government crisis, its difference from the
liberalism of Gaidar and Chubais consists only in that Gaidar
and Chubais are clearly pro-Western, while Nemtsov intends to
combine the liberal ideas of anti-monopolism, reliance on
medium-sized business and equal access for all to the financial
sources, with the ideas of partiotism and laborism (social
democracy).
Nemtsov's patriotism stems, most likely, not only from
pragmatic considerations, which means the rejection of the
Westernization ideas by a considerable mass of the electorate.
Needless to say, these days partiotism as an integral part of
the general party ideology is more acceptable than a clear
pro-Western policy. However, it appears that partiotism

corresponds to his own views to a certain extent. This is
confirmed by the fact that one of his supporters today is the
moderate patriot Viktor Aksyuchits. One may be reminded here
that the present acting first vice-premier, before his
appointment to the post of the governor of the Nizhni Novgorod
region, was even a member of Aksyuchits' Russian Christian
Democratic Movement.
As for the labour component, most likely it will be
right-wing laborism in the spirit of the British prime
minister, Tony Blair, who often pursues an even more rightist
policy than his conservative predecessor, John Major. It is
known that trade unions are collective members of the labour
party. If one is to suggest that cooperation between the
biggest Russian trade-union association: the Federation of
Independent Trade Unions (FITU), and the first vice-premier
develops in the same constructive spirit in which it develops
now, then it cannot be ruled out that the Federation may become
the mass basis for Nemtsov's party. All the more so since the
contacts between the FITU leaders and Nemtsov are fairly
regular today.
Another reminder: so far the official trade unions (as the
opponents of the FITU are calling it) number more than 40
million members. Even if only a tenth of the regional
organizations of FITU join the new structure, it will be the
most massive organization in the country. Besides, to a
considerable extent this will resolve the problem of its
financing. The point is that the share of trade-union fees
which are automatically deducted from people's wages and
salaries after the old Soviet tradition, this money could be
immediately transferred to the party's fund on perfectly legal
grounds. Another advantage of the organization of the party by
this principle could be a possible union with the country's
powerful employers' bloc because today the Russian trade unions
are very closely linked with the employers.
But then all these are just suppositions so far, although
it is known that some practical actions in the depths of
Nemtsov's staff have already been undertaken. Whatever it is,
in the purely political sense the idea of a liberal-patriotic
labour party headed by a prominent and fairly popular
politician should be considered quite fruitful. The question is
how attractive it proves for its potential members and voters.

********
#8
>From RIA Novosti
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
April 15, 1998
THE DECLINE OF GAIDAR-CHUBAIS' CAPITALISM
It's time to change the right-wing radical economic
policy for a right-wing centrist one
By Sergei DUBOVSKY, scientific adviser to the 
president of the Finist joint stock company

Not everyone understands yet that the resignation of the
Russian government in March was the result of not so much a
political intrigue, as of the bankruptcy of the right-wing
radical economic policy of 1992-98, a policy which was dictated
by exclusively mercenary interests and political aims. The idea
was to create the social base of the regime in the form of a
class of large owners. That is why property, together with
profits, was passed over from the state to the economic elite

in incredible amounts. It did not suffice to pay for vouchers
and the people's lost savings. 
The result was the Gaidar-Chubais capitalism, which
differs from ordinary capitalism by the method of the
distribution of profits. Under ordinary, normal capitalism, the
hired labour gets 55-60% of the GDP, with the remaining
revenues divided roughly equally between the government which
collects taxes, and the owners who get profits. In this
country, only 23% of the GDP was spent on remuneration to the
hired labour, the government is striving to get its 25-27% of
the GDP in the form of taxes, and the rest goes to owners. 
This fantastic - from the viewpoint of common sense -
distribution of revenues produces four main results. 
Since the share of revenues of the mass consumers has
plummeted from 49% in 1990 to 23% in 1997, the domestic market
shrank to less than one-half of its former self. Consequently,
this shrinking of the domestic market led to the halving of
industrial output and the fall of investments to 25%. 
At the same time, the share of revenues of the owners
surpassed all imaginable amounts and topped 50% of the GDP, and
hence the share of savings grew to 30-35% of the GDP. But these
large savings clash with the low investment demand (12-15% of
the GDP), which is why the excess of savings is turned into
dollars and "exported" abroad. Investment capital is leaving
the crisis economic system, which does not have a full-blooded
domestic market. But when there is no investment, there is no
research-technological progress. 
The third result concerns the state budget. Since the
right-wing radicals gave property and profits from it to the
new owners, the state budget is formed predominantly on the
basis of taxes: two-thirds of the budget constitute taxes on
labour, and one-third, returns from production. The size of
wages and salaries is dwindling and production is falling, and
hence this taxable base has shrunken to a minimum. So far, the
budget deficit has been covered by internal and external loans,
the sale of the few enterprises remaining in state ownership,
non-payments and the money emission, with subsequent inflation,
but the system is teetering on the brink of bankruptcy. 
And lastly, after the destruction of the domestic market,
the national economy has been made dependent, through the
export of natural resources, on the permanently unstable world
market. 
The results came quickly. Oil prices fell on the world
market at the exact time when we had to repay our debts, which
caused the financial bankruptcy of the government. It was a
kind of bankruptcy which entails a prison term under normal
capitalism. The economic defeat of Russia in 1992-98 is not an
orphan, it has its parents - the right-wing radicals who have 
sacrificed the economy for their mercenary interests,
ideological and political aims.
In the past six years, we created an absurd, self-
destructing economic system, without a normal economic growth
and research-technological progress, which the investment
capital is fleeing, and which has a permanent budget deficit,
excessive dependence on the world market, and growing social

tensions. What next?
The potential changes in the future are still possible
because in the past six years the right-wing radical economic
policy has become fatally dangerous not only to those who lost
their property and profits, but also to those who snatched
them. 
First, the system can collapse before the end of the
century for purely economic reasons given above. 
Second, we can lose everything in a revolt using tactical
nuclear weapons and resulting in the deployment of
international peace-keeping forces for "controlling nuclear
facilities." The new regime will gladly sacrifice the old elite
and snatch everything that will be ecologically safe. 
Consequently, the power and economic elites are facing a
choice: either to emigrate from "this dangerous country" closer
to their money (Dr. George Soros recommends precisely this
variant), or try to stabilise the situation by introducing
self-imposed restrictions. The latter presupposes a quick
evolution from the Gaidar-Chubais capitalism to normal
capitalism, with a normal distribution of profits. 
A smooth turn of the rudder of the economic policy can be
made today only by accepting right-wing centrist programmes,
which have been persistently suggested in articles by experts
and statements of prominent politicians (Yuri Luzhkov, Grigory
Yavlinsky, Yegor Stroyev, Anatoly Kulikov, Boris Berezovsky).
The right-wing centrists are loyal to the presidential power
and can guarantee the preservation of capitalism in Russia. At
the same time, they see the danger of the past policy which is
heading for a dead-end. Moreover, only right-wing centrists can
preserve capitalism in Russia today without shocks and
cataclysms. 
If the presidential administration does not trust domestic
right-wing centrists, it can seek the advice of those American
experts in Tokyo, who are encouraging the Japanese government
to take emergency measures to expand domestic consumption in
Japan in order to maintain the economic growth rates and
prevent an economic slide. The economic laws of market economy
are the same for all countries. 

********

#9
30TH ANNIVERSARY OF SOVIET INVASION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
WILL BE MARKED IN MOSCOW, SAYS SERGEI FILATOV
MOSCOW, April 20, 1998 /from RIA Novosti correspondent
Alexandra Utkina/ -- The 30th anniversary of the "Prague Spring"
which was crushed by Soviet tanks will be marked in Moscow on
August 20, 1998, Sergei Filatov, head of the Russian
Intellectuals Congress and former presidential chief-of-staff,
said at a news conference in Moscow today. According to Filatov,
the anniversary will be marked by a conference, a photo
exhibition and a preview of film footage made 30 years ago. 
The organizing committee of the Congress comprises members
of the Moscow Writers' Union, the Democracy Fund (chairman
Alexander Yakovlev) and Russian intellectuals, including actor
Mikhail Ulyanov and writer Viktor Astafyev. 
Speaking at the news conference, Czech ambassador to Russia
Lyubomir Dobrovsky said that the consequences of the "Prague
Spring" could be felt even today. According to Dobrovsky, the

festivities in Moscow could mark an "important step" towards
boosting the authority of new Russia. 

********

#10
RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol 2, No. 75 Part I, 20 April 1998

LUZHKOV DISPUTES COMPARISON WITH LEBED. Moscow Mayor Luzhkov 
on 17 April denied that there any political similarities 
between himself and former Security Council Secretary 
Aleksandr Lebed, Russian news agencies reported. The 
influential businessman Boris Berezovskii announced the 
previous day that he is supporting Lebed's gubernatorial bid 
in Krasnoyarsk Krai in order to boost Lebed as a viable 
competitor with Luzhkov for the nationalist vote in the next 
presidential election (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 17 April 
1998). Luzhkov described himself as a "citizen of my 
country" and an outspoken patriot but claimed that 
Berezovskii had confused "sincere patriotism" with 
"chauvinism and nationalism." The mayor charged that Lebed 
is a "dangerous" and unpredictable politician who might 
impose "ruthless and bloody" dictatorial rule if he came to 
power. In addition, Luzhkov again denied that he harbors 
presidential ambitions but claimed that Lebed is running for 
governor only as a springboard for a future presidential 
bid. LB

LEBED RULES OUT PRESIDENTIAL BID IF HE LOSES IN KRASNOYARSK. 
Lebed told the network TV-Center on 19 April that his 
performance in the upcoming gubernatorial election in 
Krasnoyarsk Krai will determine whether he runs for 
president in 2000, Interfax reported the next day. Lebed 
said that if he loses the governor's race, he "will not 
waste either the time or the nerves" on running in the next 
presidential election. Many Russian media have predicted 
that Lebed will lose in Krasnoyarsk (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 
7 April 1998). He finished third in the first round of the 
1996 presidential election with some 15 percent of the vote. 
LB

*********

#11
Turkmenistan: Analysis From Washington -- When Interests Collide
By Paul Goble

Washington, 20 April 1998 (RFE/RL) -- Turkmenistan President Saparmurat
Niyazov's visit to the United States this week highlights the difficulties
Western countries often face in combining the economic, political, and
geopolitical interests they have in many of the post-Soviet states.
But at the same time, his visit calls attention to the dangers involved
of pursuing one set of interests to the exclusion of others and
consequently to the need for an approach which takes all of them into account.
As media coverage in advance of Niyazov's arrival has made clear,
Turkmenistan now presents three very different faces to the world, some
extremely attractive to the West and others precisely the opposite.
First, Turkmenistan has one of the largest reserves of natural gas in
the world. Because of that, Ashgabat has already attracted enormous Western
interest. Several former senior American officials have taken up the cause
of developing the gas fields there. And many of them have suggested that
U.S. interests in access to this energy source should define U.S. policy
toward Turkmenistan.
Indeed, while some of these former officials have argued that the
development of Turkmenistan's natural gas sector will lead to economic and
later political change in that country, most of them have suggested that
the stability provided by the current regime is so valuable that it should
be exempt from the kind of withering criticism that its political system
would seem to invite.
Second, the Turkmen government is one of the least democratic in the
entire region. Not only does Turkmenistan have a dismal record on human and
civil rights, as documented by the U.S. Department of State and human
rights groups, but the Turkmen authorities continue to show their contempt
for both Western public opinion and the rule of law.

With an eye to his upcoming visit, Niyazov said on March 26 that he
would be willing to relinquish some of his enormous political powers to
parliament and that he favored giving the citizens of his country an
expanded role in the government. And he announced plans to amend the
constitution to do so just that.
Not unexpectedly, Niyazov's promises were greeted by many in the West as
an indication that the Turkmenbashi, as Niyazov styles himself, really
plans to change. But any optimism on that score must be tempered both by
his own statement and by the more recent actions of his officials.
When the Turkmen president said that he was prepared to devolve power to
the parliament and the people, Niyazov indicated that he would introduce
the necessary constitutional changes only after the December 1999
elections, more than 18 months from now.
And last Friday night, on the very eve of Niyazov's visit to the United
States, Turkmen officials detained Avdy Kuliyev, the former Turkmenistan
foreign minister and leader of the opposition in Turkmenistan, as he
attempted to return to Ashgabat from Moscow.
And third, Turkmenistan -- by virtue of its geographic location -- will
play a key role in the establishment of a new, post-Soviet balance of power
in Central Asia and the Caspian basin. How Ashgabat relates to Russia,
Iran, and the other countries of this region will define not only the
direction Turkmenistan is likely to go but also the status of others as well.
If Turkmenistan remains dependent on Russia for pipeline routes to the
West, then Moscow will be able to project power far more easily across all
of Central Asia. If Turkmenistan reaches an accommodation with Iran, the
geopolitical balance will tilt in a different direction. And if it moves
its gas in another direction, that balance will again shift.
Because these consequences of Turkmenistan's decisions are so fateful,
many foreign policy analysts have urged that they should be at the center
of American and Western concerns and that these should determine how the
U.S. and other Western countries deal with Ashgabat on economic and human
rights issues.
Advocates on each of these three issues -- economic, political, and
geopolitical -- often suggest that the West should pursue theirs to the
point of ignoring the other two. Thus, for example, supporters of economic
involvement urge that the West downplay its human rights concerns, and
human rights advocates sometimes dismiss the West's obvious economic
interests.
While often emotionally satisfying to their advocates and even
superficially attractive to others, a Western approach to Turkmenistan or
other countries in the region that reflects only one of these sets of
interests will almost certainly prove self-defeating either now or in the
future, just as has happened elsewhere when Western countries have focused
on only one of the three.
Consequently, President Niyazov's visit represents an opportunity to
demonstrate that the West's interests in Turkmenistan are far broader than
natural gas: they include a commitment to the democratic transformation of
that country and a new geopolitical arrangement which gives the Turkmen
people a chance to have a better future politically and economically as well. 


*********

#12
Boston Globe
20 April 1998
FOREIGN JOURNAL
Russian is hard to forget in Estonia 
By David Filipov

TARTU, Estonia - ''Sprechen Sie Deutsch?'' asked Daina, the museum guide.
The American visitor did not speak German, or Estonian, Daina's native
language. And Daina spoke little English. There was only one way this
conversation was going to work. 
''Oh, no, not Russian, anything but Russian,'' Daina cried, in fluent
Russian. Daina did not want to speak the language that she, like many
Estonians, equates with five decades of Soviet oppression of her homeland. 
So Daina spoke in broken German as she showed her visitor the museum, a
faithful replica of a 19th-century Estonian merchant's house nestled among
the ruins of Tartu's Old City. 
It is a humble exhibition, - a collection of ordinary household items.
But like the way the tour was given, the museum is symbolic of Estonia's
effort to restore a culture nearly wiped out after the Soviets annexed the
tiny Baltic state in 1940. 
Tartu, an ancient university town and a center of Estonia's cultural
revival in the 19th century, all but suffocated under Soviet rule. Although
Estonia was considered one of the Soviets' ''most European'' republics,
Tartu, home to a Soviet strategic bomber division, was closed to foreigners. 
The neoclassical buildings that lent Tartu the sobriquet ''Athens on the
Emajogi River'' crumbled from neglect. To show too much interest in local
culture and language was to invite charges of ''anti-Soviet activity,'' a
criminal offense in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
''We were prisoners in a prison called the Soviet Union,'' said Valter
Timusk, a retired police major who now spends his time studying English at
Tartu's university. ''Now we want to forget Russia and Russian and Russians.''
But forgetting is not so easy. Estonia, like its Baltic neighbor Latvia,
faces a major obstacle in consigning to oblivion its Soviet legacy - a
large Russian-speaking population. Unlike other former Soviet republics,
Estonia and Latvia did not grant automatic citizenship to Russian-speaking
residents after independence in 1991, instead requiring them to pass a
language test. 
Recently, Russia has threatened economic sanctions against Latvia over
what it says is Latvia's mistreatment of Russian speakers. Estonia's
relations with Moscow are a little better. But minority issues still cause
tension in northeastern Estonia, where ethnic Russians outnumber Estonians
by 9 to 1, but cannot hold public office unless they show a working
knowledge of Estonian. Russian speakers there complain they have no way to
pick up the language. 
ven in Tartu, where Russian speakers make up a quarter of the 100,000
residents, many adults have been unwilling, or unable, to learn Estonian.
The result is a society split along linguistic lines. 
It is a short walk through Tartu's Old Town from the museum where the
guide will not speak Russian to one of the great centers of Russian
literary studies, the Slavic Philology department of Tartu University. 
Under the leadership of the late Yury Lotman in the 1960s and 1970s, the
department enjoyed legendary status in the world of literary criticism, an
achievement all the more amazing because Lotman's structuralist theories
clashed with the orthodox Soviet approach to literature. Yet the department
thrived, in Lotman's words, as ''an ivory tower for scholars who were of no
use'' to the regime. 

This reputation has largely survived the Soviet breakup. This weekend,
hundreds of Slavic specialists will descend on Tartu for an annual
conference that still attracts students from throughout the former Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. 
But few Tartu residents know about their city's contribution to Slavic
culture, a fact that hit home when the American visitor asked directions to
the department. 
''We don't know that anymore,'' remarked one student, in English, with a
wry grin. ''It's been a while since we've had to.''
David Filipov is the Globe's Moscow bureau chief. 

********

#13
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
20 April 1998

"MAIN BATTLE LIES AHEAD," YELTSIN SAYS. President Boris Yeltsin returned to
Moscow after his visit to Japan for a final week of wheeling and dealing in
which he must try to persuade the Russian parliament to approve his nominee
for prime minister. "The main battle is still ahead." Yeltsin said over the
weekend. (Itar-Tass, April 18) The Communist-dominated State Duma has twice
rejected Sergei Kirienko, Yeltsin's thirty-five year-old nominee. It must
now approve him by Friday, April 24. Yeltsin has said that if it does not,
he will dissolve parliament and call fresh elections. No one wants this
outcome, but parliament has reacted with resentment and hostility to what it
sees as Yeltsin's efforts to browbeat it into accepting an unacceptable and
inexperienced candidate. Communist party leader Gennady Zyuganov has
described Kirienko as "a young Gaidar with the personality of Chubais"--a
reference to Yeltsin's first, reforming prime minister Yegor Gaidar and the
architect of privatization, Anatoly Chubais. (Izvestia, April 14)

The Communist party has scheduled a meeting of its policymaking Central
Committee for April 23 in which it will decide how to vote the following
day. Zyuganov says he is sure the party will not change its mind and that he
will instruct its members to vote against Kirienko again on Friday. (NTV,
April 18) Kirienko himself said he was guardedly optimistic that the Duma
would approve him. So too was the Duma's Communist speaker, Gennady
Seleznev. He told Russian TV on April 19 that he will attend the Central
Committee plenum and advise it to change its position: "I shall explain what
price will be paid for dissolving the State Duma. I think Russia will not
forgive us for that." Seleznev said it was unrealistic for the Communist
party to demand that Yeltsin would ever appoint one of its members prime
minister. He added that, if the Duma were dissolved, Yeltsin could appoint
Kirienko and rule by decree pending an election. (RTR, April 18)

Kirienko, who continues to insist that he will not change his policies to
seek confirmation, indicated over the weekend that, if he is approved, he
will appoint some opposition members to his cabinet. He said Yeltsin had
promised him one week in which to form a new government. (NTV, April 18)

********

#14
From: "nikst" <nikst@glasnet.ru>
Subject: Sarov: Happy families in Stalin's hellhole 
Date: Mon, 20 Apr 1998 07:07:01 +0400



Dear David,

On your:
Johnson's Russia List
#2156
20 April 1998
> #7
> Sunday Times (UK)
> 19 April 1998
> [for personal use only]
> Happy families in Stalin's hellhole 
> by Mark Franchetti 
> Sarov 

There is no need to visit *personally* the *closed* city 
Sarov (ex-Arzamas-16) now. Everybody can visit their
"open to the whole world" web site of local weekly
"Gorodskoy Kur'yer" ["Town's Courier"] <In Russian only>.


http://www.sar.nnov.ru/~courier

By the way, it is very interesting and information-rich paper,
in which they freely discuss all actual problems of the city
and its inhabitants: in particular, how could the city, the nuclear 
center and its staff most profitably use the huge S&T potential,
accumulated during the previous "Cold war" period.

And, trust me, they have something to propose even to their
"counterparts" in Los-Alamos Livermore Laboratory ;-).

Editor-in-Chief: Pyotr Gakalenko
E-mail: pag@infra.sar.nnov.ru

Best wishes!

Sincerely yours, NikSt

*********

#15
Christian Science Monitor
20 April 1998
Editorial
Boris & Ryu's Deal

Boris & Ryu have just one-upped Bill & Al on a favorite Clinton-Gore 
subject - cutting greenhouse gas emissions.

Nickname-dropping Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Japanese Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto agreed at a chummy summit last weekend to 
carry out the world's first greenhouse-gas emissions swap. Under their 
deal, Japanese energy technicians would convert some 20 Russian power 
plants and factories to reduce their emissions of carbon dioxide and 
other gases that trap solar warmth. In return Japan would win credits to 
count in its own gas reduction efforts.

We applaud the plan. It's good for the stagnant Japanese economy, good 
for Russia's aging plants, and a good example for other nations.

The credit-swap system was a part of the global climate treaty signed 
last December in Kyoto for which Vice President Gore's US delegation 
fought most vigorously. But Messrs. Clinton and Gore are still trying to 
figure out how to persuade a skeptical US Senate to ratify the Kyoto 
treaty. One way to gain backers is to show that an emissions swap system 
is practical. To be so, it would have to make both developing - and rich 
- nations' factories more efficient, and create profitable new 
businesses in technically advanced nations.

Such steps provide prudent climate insurance - plus more thrifty use of 
energy resources - while scientists analyze further climate data. The 
Boris-Ryu deal is a useful start.

*********