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CDI Library > Johnson's Russia List

Johnson's Russia List
 

 

April 17, 1998  
This Date's Issues: 2151 2152 


Johnson's Russia List
#2152
17 April 1998
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Parliament Rejects Yeltsin Nominee.
2. RIA Novosti: ELEVEN LEFT OPPOSITION MEMBERS BACK SERGEI KIRIYENKO'S
CANDIDACY AS PRIME MINISTER TODAY.

3. Rory MacFarquhar: Re: 2146-Helmer/Glazyev. (Debt).
4. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: BEREZOVSKY DENIES RUMORS OF RIFT WITH 
YELTSIN.

5. Christian Science Monitor: Neela Banerjee, A One-Time 'Showcase' of
Reform Now

Embarrasses Moscow. (Nizhny Novgorod).
6. Moscow Times: Leonid Bershidsky, MEDIA WATCH: Papers Become More Local.
7. Executive and Legislative Newsletter: RUSSIANS ASKED ABOUT PAST AND
FUTURE 
GOVERNMENTS.

8. Washington Post: Charles Krauthammer, Good Geopolitics. Is NATO
expansion directed 
against Russia? Of course it is.

9. Argumenty i Fakty: A SEVENTH STATE DUMA: TENTATIVE COMPOSITION.
10. Boston Globe: David Filipov, Yeltsin arranges favors for approval of
premier.

11. RIA Novosti: YURI LUZHKOV BELIEVES THAT ALEXANDER LEBED AS 'A POLITICAL LEADER 'IS DANGEROUS FOR RUSSIA.' 
12. Komsomolskaya Pravda: Aleksandr Gamov, Conflict Over Premiership
Seen Close to 
1993 Intensity.

13. Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Yeltsin Might Nominate Gaydar If Kiriyenko
Rejected Again.]


**********

#1
Parliament Rejects Yeltsin Nominee 
By Vladimir Isachenkov
April 17, 1998

MOSCOW (AP) -- Russia's parliament overwhelming rejected Boris Yeltsin's
candidate for premier today for a second time, setting up a showdown with
the president in next week's expected third and final vote. 
Parliament's lower house, the State Duma, resoundingly turned down the
nomination of Sergei Kiriyenko by a vote of 271-115. 
The president immediately renominated Kiriyenko, his office said. 
If parliament rejects the president's candidate a third time, Yeltsin is
empowered to dismiss the State Duma, parliament's lower house, and call new
elections. 
Yeltsin ``took the outcome of the ballot calmly,'' said presidential
spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky. ``We expect the third round to bring the
result which is necessary for the entire country, and Sergei Kiriyenko will
be confirmed.'' 
Kiriyenko had lobbied hard to win additional support this time, but
received even fewer votes than last week, when he was turned down 186-143. 
He needs 226 votes, or a simple majority in the 450-seat Duma. 
Today's ballot was an open vote, which allowed the Communist Party and
other opposition factions to see which way their members voted. Last week's
vote was done by a secret ballot, and that may have accounted for
Kiriyenko's stronger showing in the first round. 
Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov gave an impassioned speech to the Duma
before today's ballot, saying parliament and the Russian people ``have
become hostages to a dead constitution and an absolutely incapable
president.'' 
``If we do not show courage today, we would all be participants in the
final destruction of Russia. Our children and our grandchildren would not
forgive us. We shall not vote for Kiriyenko,'' Zyuganov said. 
But Yeltsin has insisted he has no other candidate besides Kiriyenko, a
35-year-old former banker with less than one year of government experience. 

The Communists and other Yeltsin foes in the Duma say that Kiriyenko is
too young and green to lead Russia's government. 
In his weekly radio address, Yeltsin insisted the impasse was no crisis
for Russia. 
``Many developed countries treat such things calmly. They don't
dramatize the situation, as they understand that such a crisis is not a
catastrophe. We also have no reason to build up fears and frighten
people,'' he said. 
``All the ministries and government institutions are working,'' Yeltsin
added. ``Whatever our opponents say, whatever they frighten us with, a
normal political process is underway.'' 
Russia has been operating with an interim government since March 23,
when Yeltsin abruptly dismissed the entire Cabinet, saying he was
frustrated with the government's inability to improve Russia's weak economy. 
Kiriyenko, who served as fuel minister in the previous Cabinet, has been
holding regular meetings with government officials, but the interim Cabinet
has not made any major policy decisions recently. 

********

#2
ELEVEN LEFT OPPOSITION MEMBERS BACK SERGEI KIRIYENKO'S
CANDIDACY AS PRIME MINISTER TODAY
By RIA Novosti correspondent Yuliya Panyushkina
MOSCOW, APRIL 17, RIA NOVOSTI - Eleven members of the left
opposition today supported Sergei Kiriyenko's candidacy for the
premiership.
This correspondent was told that among pro-Kirienko votes
there were two from the Communist faction, five from People's
Power and four from the agrarians. It is even known who of the
Communists defied the party's plenum ruling. They are Yuri
Maslyukov, chairman of the Duma's economic committee, and deputy
Oleg Shenkaryov.
As for State Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov, who urged the
house to confirm Kiriyenko as Prime Minister, he did not take
part in the ballot. 
On the other hand, the Yabloko and Liberal Democratic
factions demonstrated rare and typically "Bolshevik" unanimity.
To judge from today's open vote results, none of the
deputies representing these factions was courageous enough to
back up Yeltsin's appointee.
All of them to a man -- 47 Liberal Democrats and 34 Yabloko
members -- said no to Kiriyenko's candidacy. 
The largest number of votes in support of Kiriyenko -- 52
-- came from the Our Home is Russia faction, which is 67
strong.
The Prime Minister's appointment was also supported by 34
members of the Russian Regions group, which numbers 41 deputies.
Kiriyenko also got 18 independent votes.

**********

#3
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 98 
From: "MacFarquhar, Rory" <rmacfarquhar@recep.glasnet.ru>
Subject: Re: 2146-Helmer/Glazyev

Dear David,

I would like to make a technical comment on just one of the many 
bizarre claims made by Sergei Glazyev in his interview with John 
Helmer ("GLAZYEV WARNS OF GOVT DEBT PYRAMID", JRL #2146, 14 April), 
because it seems to reflect a broader confusion among Russian 
policy-makers (including the acting prime minister in his recent 
speech to the Duma). According to Glazyev: 

"Debt service is now two and a half times higher than tax revenues, 
and it's growing at 30% per annum."


It is appropriate to be worried about the rapid growth of Russia's 
debt, on the back of extremely large deficits over the last few years, 
but debt service is not the culprit.

To set the record straight (according to Ministry of Finance data - 
the only source of budget data and the source on which Glazyev must 
also be relying): debt service payments in 1997 were R118 trn, or R6 
trn LESS in nominal terms than in 1996. Needless to say, they were 
also lower in real terms and as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP). They fell not because the stock of debt was lower - in fact, 
the state debt grew from 44.6% of GDP at the end of 1996 to 45.2% at 
the end of 1997 - but because real interest rates have fallen from 
their sky-high levels at the time of the presidential election. The 
1998 budget foresees debt service payments of R124 bn, the same level 
in nominal terms as in 1996. 

By way of comparison, tax revenues were R262 trn in 1997 (of which 
R203 trn were in what the government and IMF call "cash").

I think that Glazyev's (and Kiriyenko's) mistake is partly due to a 
change in the Ministry of Finance's definition of debt service. For 
historical reasons, the ministry did not include interest payments on 
a major component of the government debt - GKOs and OFZs - in its 
figures for debt service. These interest payments had to be added to 
get a realistic picture of government expenditures (and have been in 
the data given above). As of January 1, 1998 (and in the 1998 budget 
law), all interest payments are included in the ministry's own 
figures.

For a discussion of the sustainability of Russia's current government 
debt, see the Russian Economic Trends March 1998 monthly update 
(http://www.hhs.se/site/recep/recep.htm)

Sincerely,
Rory MacFarquhar
Russian Economic Trends

********

#4
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
April 17, 1998

BEREZOVSKY DENIES RUMORS OF RIFT WITH YELTSIN. Interviewed on Russian TV
last night, tycoon Boris Berezovsky denied media reports that he had been
reprimanded by President Boris Yeltsin for trying to meddle in the formation
of the new Russian government. (NTV, April 16; see also the Monitor, April
16) Berezovsky did, however, dismiss the chances of Yeltsin's appointee,
Sergei Kirienko, of winning endorsement by the State Duma today. Berezovsky
said he had nothing personal against Kirienko, whom he described as likable
enough. But, Berezovsky said, Kirienko lacked the necessary experience to be
entrusted with running the country should the president be incapacitated.

Instead, Berezovsky sang the praises of his own preferred candidate, acting
Deputy Premier Ivan Rybkin, under whom Berezovsky worked when Rybkin headed
Russia's powerful Security Council. "Rybkin is an exceptionally intelligent
and decent man," Berezovsky said. "He would be at least as good a candidate
as Kirienko."

Berezovsky admitted that he is supporting the campaign of retired General
Aleksandr Lebed, who is running for governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai in eastern

Siberia, Russia's second largest component territory. He explained, however,
that he was backing Lebed not because he endorsed Lebed's presidential
ambitions, but in a calculated effort to undermine the presidential chances
of other candidates whom Berezovsky sees as equally undesirable presidential
material: Communist party leader Gennady Zyuganov and Moscow Mayor Yuri
Luzhkov. None of the three, he said, could provide the "continuity" that
Russia needs, and their efforts to change Russia's economic course would
inevitably lead to civil strife and bloodshed.

*********

#5
Christian Science Monitor
April 17, 1998
[for personal use only]
A One-Time 'Showcase' of Reform Now Embarrasses Moscow
Populist mayor is elected in Nizhny Novgorod despite a criminal record. 
He's now in jail, the vote annulled.
Neela Banerjee 
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

NIZHNY NOVGOROD, RUSSIA 
Alongside the battle over President Boris Yeltsin's choice of Sergei 
Kiryenko as Russia's new prime minister, the central government is 
facing a public relations fiasco over events in the young banker's 
hometown of Nizhny Novgorod.
The Volga River city and region of the same name is seeing scratches on 
its carefully manicured image of being in the vanguard of economic 
reform.
The debacle concerns another native son: Andrei Klimentyev. Reminiscent 
of Washington, D.C., Mayor Marion Barry with his criminal record and 
populist ways, Mr. Klimentyev, a local entrepreneur, won the city's 
mayoral race March 30 by edging out less dynamic candidates backed by 
the Kremlin.
By April 1, however, the election results were canceled and by April 2, 
Mr. Klimentyev was in jail, detained in connection with 1995 charges of 
making off with $2.5 million in federal monies that he was managing for 
a state-held shipbuilder. He'd already been found guilty on some of the 
allegations two years ago and served an 18-month sentence.
Most people here suspect an embarrassed Kremlin orchestrated the ouster. 
Although officials deny involvement in the matter, Mr. Yeltsin has fired 
his representative in the region and sent a top security aide to mop up. 
The aide claimed locals had been misled by Klimentyev, a claim that 
insulted and infuriated the electorate.
The rise of men as different as Mr. Kiryenko and Klimentyev underscores 
the complicated progress of economic reforms in Russia, which has 
enabled the few to amass wealth and influence. Klimentyev's victory here 
is a stunning reminder of how economic change, even when apparently 
successful, has bypassed the majority of Russians and left them angry at 
the current regime.
In addition, the situation raises fundamental questions about how well 
Russia's leaders understand democracy. "Democracy in Russia still isn't 
intentional. It's there when it suits the authorities," says Vladimir 
Ionov, a columnist with the independent weekly Birzha. "And when they 
don't like something, they just get rid of it."
The Klimentyev affair has roused this city of 1.5 million. On a recent 
icy morning, Svetlana Boikova waited in front of the courthouse with 
dozens of others to sign a petition demanding his release. A 

demonstration was due to begin shortly.
"How can we talk about reform when what the government has done smacks 
of dictatorship?" she says. A cook in a kindergarten who earns about $20 
a month, Mrs. Boikova adds, "All this talk about Nizhny Novgorod being 
the cradle of reform is just hype."
Yet the region has undergone a startling transformation thanks in part 
to hype. Called Gorky in honor one of Soviet leader Josef Stalin's 
favorite writers, it was a closed military site during the Soviet era 
and the place where noted dissident Andrei Sakharov spent his years of 
internal exile.
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the state took back its 
historic name, and led by its young governor, Boris Nemtsov, now a 
deputy premier in the Yeltsin government, built a profoundly different 
reputation.
Mr. Nemtsov understood the value of the press, and lost no opportunity 
to advertise his region as being on the cutting edge of reform.
He pushed ahead with "firsts" in privatization of state holdings, from 
land sales to peasants to turning over small stores to their workers. He 
spoke English and successfully courted foreign investment in the region.
During the election, Klimentyev took a page from from Nemtsov's book. He 
campaigned tirelessly and caught the media's attention. He promised 
lower prices and fatter pensions, pointing to his own wealth - a casino 
and three stores - as a sign of what he could do for the people.
Klimentyev's Kremlin-backed rivals looked drab in comparison, boasting 
about the new trolleybuses the city had bought and seldom campaigning.
Nearly everyone here knew of Klimentyev's past, including a Soviet-era 
conviction on pornography charges. He did nothing to hide it, and few 
voters seemed to care.
It's not clear how the mayor-elect would have solved the region's 
problems, given the opportunity.
During the Soviet era, defense plants comprised about 80 percent of 
Nizhny Novgorod's economy. Now, the defense industry accounts for 
perhaps 10 percent. Enormous plants that once supported entire towns 
stand idle. Still, Klimentyev promised to resign if he didn't make a 
dent within 100 days.
It seems an outlandish pledge, but one that people in dire circumstances 
were willing to take a chance on.
"Everyone wants a miracle," says Andrei Chugunov, editor of the weekly 
Monitor, "and it's not going to happen."

*********

#6
Moscow Times
April 17, 1998 
MEDIA WATCH: Papers Become More Local 
By Leonid Bershidsky 

According to some recent press reports, Bank Menatep is selling the 
weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta, which it acquired in 1996, to the 
Metropolis media holding, which has close ties to Moscow Mayor Yury 
Luzhkov. I think this may be the first sign of a trend that is likely to 
developin the next few years: Major banks are going to lose interest in 
the printed press, and governors are going to further tighten their 
control over it. 
According to the Journalists' Union, the national press is rapidly 
losing its readership. A report published last year said the press that 
calls itself national is in fact only distributed in Moscow and 

neighboring regions of Central Russia. "In Siberia, the Far East and a 
number of other regions there is one copy of a national newspaper per 
1,000 residents," the report said. "The number of subscribers to 
national publications is constantly dropping. If in 1990 the annual 
circulation of all national publications made up 71 percent of the total 
circulation of all publications in Russia, in 1997 it was down to 30 
percent." 
The Russian press is fast becoming regionalized. What do giant banks 
gain by owning national newspapers? Well, a certain amount of influence 
over federal officials and politicians, who read all the national 
dailies or at least scan summaries of their issues prepared by press 
secretaries. But in the coming electoral season, which is going to last 
for about two years, that is not going to be as important as influence 
on the masses. 
Most national dailies wildly overstate their circulations. They seem to 
have one figure for their advertisers, another for their owners and a 
third for internal use. And circulation data is extremely hard for 
owners or advertisers to check outside Moscow. Many national papers 
actually print in several cities, and local retail networks are 
inscrutable for anyone trying to check on them from Moscow. 
So the correct policy for someone trying to wield political power in 
Russia through the printed media is to try to get control of the local 
press. But the Moscow banks cannot really do that because local 
publications are already under somebody's strict control. Powerful 
governors, who have enough autonomy from Moscow to run their regions as 
personal fiefdoms, do not allow any dissent in the press. The biggest 
newspaper in a region is as often as not published by the governor's 
office, and the rest are either published by other official bodies, 
subsidized or warned not to cross the governor or face closure. 
Abuses of press freedom in Russia's regions have been relatively 
well-reported. Kalmykia President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov's 1993 crackdown on 
an opposition newspaper, whose editor was forced to publish it in a 
neighboring region and then smuggle it into Kalmykia, was covered in 
both Russian and foreign media. So were the cases of intimidation of 
journalists by the local authorities in the Far East, where the local 
tsar, Governor Yevgeny Nazdratenko, does not tolerate criticism. When 
the feisty MK-St. Petersburg was bought by Balt-Uneximbank, this was 
seen as an attempt by St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev to bring 
it under his control. In Thursday's The Moscow Times, there was a 
front-page story about a small local newspaper in the Ural Mountains 
region of Bashkortostan that was closed down because it was critical of 
the republic's president, Murtaza Rakhimov. 
The Moscow press rarely dares to criticize Luzhkov. The advantage that 
the Moscow mayor has over his colleagues in the regions is that most of 
the national press is published on his territory. He does not control 
these publications -- banks do -- but he can count on a more or less 
neutral attitude from them because it is bad for business to get on the 

Moscow mayor's wrong side. 
But Luzhkov wants more than neutrality. He wants direct control. He is 
helping, with money from banks associated with the Moscow city 
government, to set up the Metropolis holding, run by Lev Gushchin. The 
holding has already launched a national newspaper, called Rossiya, to 
carry Luzhkov's views to the regions, and now it is buying the 
unprofitable but respected Literaturnaya Gazeta. Gushchin says profit is 
not what his holding is looking for from the deal: he plans to launch a 
new popular newspaper to support Literaturnaya. 
And Menatep is ceding control over the paper. It is a drain, albeit a 
relatively small one, on the bank's financial resources and it does not 
give Menatep much of a PR advantage. It is a matter of time before other 
large banks realize they do not need the newspapers. They cost a lot and 
they are much less efficient as instruments of political influence than 
television is. Luzhkov, Yakovlev and others will be waiting to snap up 
what the banks no longer want. 

*********

#7
>From RIA Novosti
Executive and Legislative Newsletter, No. 15
April 1998
RUSSIANS ASKED ABOUT PAST AND FUTURE GOVERNMENTS

From 3 to 7 April the All-Russian Center for the Study of
Public Opinion (VTsIOM) surveyed 1,600 Russians over the age of
18. The data is presented as a percentage of the total number
of respondents, comparable to similar surveys conducted by
VTsIOM.

How would you evaluate Viktor Chernomyrdin's activities as
Prime Minister?
March 1997 April 1998
Excellent 1 3
Good 9 13
Satisfactory 31 33
Unsatisfactory 47 41
Don't know 12 10

How would you evaluate Anatoly Chubais' activities as
First Vice-Premier (in 1997, as chief of the Presidential
Staff)?
March 1997 April 1998
Excellent 1 1
Good 5 6
Satisfactory 19 17
Unsatisfactory 56 62
Don't know 19 14

After Chernomyrdin and Chubais' dismissal, will a new
government led by Sergei Kiriyenko be better able to resolve
the problems facing Russia today? (Before April 1998, the
question sounded differently: Do you think the government
worked better to resolve the problems facing Russia after
Chubais and Boris Nemtsov were brought into the government?)

1997 1998
April September December January April
Better 15 26 13 15 18
The same 54 43 48 55 43
Worse 9 12 20 14 10 
Don't know 22 19 19 16 29

If Boris Yeltsin insists on Kiriyenko's being confirmed as
Prime Minister, how will the State Duma react?
The State Duma will ultimately confirm Kiriyenko 52
The State Duma will enter into conflict
with Yeltsin 19
Don't know 29

Given the current situation, what do you think of the idea
of forming a government "of the people's trust," with the
participation of communists and other representatives of the
opposition?


Approve 45
Disapprove 21
Don't know 34

If you had to choose from the following activities of the
government, which 3-4 of these would you name as the most
important? (the total sum of responses exceeds 100%, since it
was possible to give several answers)

Intensifying reforms, strengthening the
position of private capital 8

Socially-oriented reforms for 
this country 30

Return to a state-run economy 25

Continuing the course of privatization,
transferring land to private ownership 7

Reviewing the results of privatization with
regard to the largest state-owned enterprises 20

Improving tax collection 13

Reducing the tax load on the population and
legal entities 23

Increasing industrial production 51

Closing down unprofitable enterprises 8

Providing state support for the most
important sectors of the economy 22

Reducing the influence of the natural monopolies
and the new financial-industrial groups in 
the country in general 8

Paying off debts owed for salaries and pensions 51

Stimulating private enterprise, offering 
loans to open new businesses 13

Other 1

Don't know 6

**********

#8
Washington Post
17 April 1998
[for personal ues only]
Good Geopolitics
Is NATO expansion directed against Russia? Of course it is.
By Charles Krauthammer

Next week the Senate is due to vote on whether to admit Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic to NATO. It would be nice if we could have a
straightforward debate on so momentous a question. Unfortunately, the
administration is constrained from doing so. It is required to issue such
pablum as calling NATO expansion nothing more than extending the borders of
peace; building new bridges; strengthening an alliance directed against no
one in particular, certainly "not arrayed against Russia" (to quote the
secretary of state).
This is all nice and good. It is, however, rubbish. In order not to
offend the bear, the administration must understandably pretend that NATO
expansion has nothing to do with Russia. Those not constrained by
diplomatic niceties, however, can say the obvious: NATO, an alliance
founded in that immortal formulation "to keep America in, Germany down, and
Russia out," is expanding in the service of its historic and continuing
mission: containing Russia.
Critics of NATO expansion see this reasoning as hopelessly retrograde.
Why are we being so unfriendly to post-Soviet Russia? Isn't the Cold War
over? Yes, but just because Russia is no longer an ideological rival does
not mean that it has ceased to be a Great Power rival. 
Russia, the largest country on the planet, has an imperial past, a
troubled present and a potentially great future. It shows no sign of
accepting the diminished role it has been offered as bit player and buddy
to the United States and the Western alliance. A country that expanded at
the rate of one Belgium every two years for 300 years does not easily learn
the virtues of self-containment. 
Consider: Two of the leading presidential candidates to succeed Boris
Yeltsin are the nationalist Gen. Alexander Lebed, a potential Bonaparte,
and the mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov. Luzhkov recently likened Latvia's
government to Pol Pot's and accused it of "pursuing a consistent policy of
genocide." This after the Latvian government dispersed marchers protesting
the second-class status of Latvia's Russians. Luzhkov, mind you, is a
moderate.

And both he and Lebed are noncommunists. They represent Russia's
future. As for the present, Russia's foreign minister has gone to every
length to embarrass and thwart the United States in an area as vital to
American interests as the Persian Gulf.
This does not mean that the Russians are bad or that Czar Boris runs an
evil empire. On the contrary. Russia is simply doing what comes naturally
to a Great Power: pursuing its own interests in its region (as we do in
ours, by the way). 
For now, it is restricting its bullying to just near neighbors, the
colonies it ruled during the Soviet era: the Baltic States, Transcaucasia,
Ukraine. (To say nothing of its "union" with Belarus.) This, while it is
prostrate. When Russia regains its strength, however, as one day it
undoubtedly will, it might seek to exert similar pressure on its awkwardly
situated, relatively weak erstwhile satrapies in Central Europe.
Hence NATO expansion. It says to the world, and particularly to the
Russians, that the future of Central Europe is settled. The no man's land
is no more. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are now securely part of
the American-allied West. Finis. And if any Russians entertain other ideas,
they can forget about it.
Why is this a good idea? Because the weakness, instability and unsettled
state of Central Europe has been a temptation to its Great Power neighbors
for all of this century and a major cause of its great wars. Germany's
ambitions in Central Europe were a major cause of the Second World War.
Similar Russian aspirations triggered the Cold War. (The struggle for
supremacy in Central Europe played a significant role in the outbreak of
World War I as well.)
The point of NATO expansion is to consign the struggle for Central
Europe to the back pages of history -- the same pages that contain the
story of such other unfortunately situated territories as Alsace and
Lorraine. These provinces lying between France and Germany have, since
1870, exchanged hands four times and helped ignite three Franco-German
wars. Today their status is so settled that the Alsace-Lorraine problem
(like the even hoarier Schleswig-Holstein question) lives only in the pages
of the densest history texts.
Moreover, Central Europe's accession to NATO is certain to take. It is
wholly natural. The Central European peoples consider themselves part of
the West. They have always considered the Soviet occupation of 1945-1989 an
aberration. By rejoining the West, they are rejoining their own histories.
NATO expansion is simply a return to -- a ratification of -- normality.
By ruling Central Europe out of bounds to Russia, NATO expansion takes one
of this century's fatal temptations off the table. It is the easiest U.S.
foreign policy call of the decade. 

********

#9
>From RIA Novosti
Argumenty i Fakty, No. 16
April 1998
A SEVENTH STATE DUMA: TENTATIVE COMPOSITION

If the deputies reject three times the candidacy of Sergei
Kiriyenko for the post of prime minister, President Boris Yeltsin
has the right to dissolve the State Duma and appoint the new
elections. On the order from AiF, the Institute of Parliamentary

Sociology of Nugzar Betaneli carried out a poll to answer the
following question: If you have to elect again deputies of the
State Duma from the same parties, movements and associations as
in 1995, whom would you vote for today? (the poll involved 6,000
respondents from 62 constituent members of the Russian
Federation). 

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------
Dec 17, 1995 election July 1-5, 1997 poll
March 30-April 2, 1998 poll 
(data of Central (% of those intending
(% of those intending 
Electoral Commission) to vote)
to vote) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------- 
Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation 22.3 34.73
37.9 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------
Liberal Democratic Party 
of Russia (LDPR) 11.18 6.0
6.0 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------
All-Russia social and political 
movement Our Home Is Russia 10.13 8.73
9.1 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------
Public association Yabloko 6.89 15.11
17.0 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------
Women of Russia 
political movement 4.61 4.98
4.2 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------
Communists--Working Russia-- 
for the Soviet Union 4.53 1.0
1.3 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------
Social and political movement 
Congress of Russian Communities 4.31 8.53
5.9 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------
Working People's Self-Government 
Party 3.98 2.7
2.8 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------
Russia's Democratic Choice 
United Democrats 3.86 1.8
1.4 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------
Agrarian Party of Russia 3.78 1.53
1.1 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------


Other electoral association, bloc 19.75 3.78
6.0 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------
Against all 2.77 11.1
7.3 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------

********

#10
Boston Globe
17 April 1998
[for personal use only]
NEWS ANALYSIS
Yeltsin arranges favors for approval of premier 
Confirmation of the presidential choice called 'a question of who gets what'
By David Filipov

MOSCOW - The beauty of Boris N. Yeltsin these days is that in his
increasingly frequent public gaffes, the Russian president lets the rest of
us in on secrets a more circumspect Kremlin leader might not divulge. 
And so it was that Yeltsin let it be known that he was ready to hand out
perks in exchange for legislators' support in today's critical parliament
vote on his choice for prime minister. 
Yeltsin said this week that he had ordered the Kremlin office in charge
of providing officials with cars, housing, and suburban cottages to ''solve
the problems'' of legislators who show ''a constructive attitude'' at
today's confirmation vote of Acting Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko. 
It was a blunt acknowledgement of what Kremlin-watchers have known for
some time: While the stakes are no doubt high in today's vote, they are not
what they seem. 
On the surface, Russia is spinning toward all-out political
confrontation, as Yeltsin faces off with the State Duma, the
Communist-dominated lower house of parliament that is determined to block
his young reformist candidate. The Duma rejected Kiriyenko last week. If it
votes ''no'' again today, then the house will have only one more chance at
approval. After that, Yeltsin is obliged to dissolve the Duma and call new
elections that Russia's struggling economy can ill afford. Duma leaders
yesterday said they would never approve the 35-year-old former energy
minister, and Yeltsin vowed to stick with his candidate. 
But the political standoff contains a heavy dose of political theater.
Behind the scenes, the Kremlin and the Duma are engaged in a round of
horse-trading that has little to do with party labels and ideology, and
everything to do with maintaining the status quo. Few observers doubt the
Duma will eventually agree on Kiriyenko, if not tomorrow, then in the
decisive third vote next week. 
''It's not a question of who is who,'' commented Vyacheslav Nikonov, a
former Duma member and occasional Yeltsin political adviser. ''It's a
question of who gets what.''
Nikolai Ryzhkov, the head of a bloc that usually votes with the
Communists, said that some legislators had a price for their votes. ''All
the deputies are thinking about the fate of the country,'' Ryzhkov said
this week. ''But there are deputies who think of themselves as well as the
country.''
But the dealings in the Duma are not limited to lining deputies'
pockets. Privately, Duma members admit that the pro-Communist alliance that
controls nearly half of the house's 450 seats depends on the Kremlin's
direct financial support. The Duma doubles as the Communists' main party
headquarters. Many of the faction's aides are paid out of the state budget.
If Yeltsin were to dissolve parliament, the Communists would lose their
most important power base. That at least partly explains the position of
the Communist speaker of the Duma, Gennady Seleznyov, who urged the house
to approve Kiriyenko. 
Yeltsin has threatened dissolution, but he has also dangled the
possibility of cabinet posts to his opponents. He, too, would rather not
replace this Duma, because he can work with it. And the status quo can only
last till Duma elections in 1999 and presidential elections in 2000. 

His tight-spending 1998 budget made it through the house after the
Communists, who loudly protested against the spending plan, conspired with
pro-Yeltsin factions to make sure the required number of deputies voted
''yes'' on a secret ballot. 
If today's vote is a secret ballot, Kiriyenko has a chance to summon the
226 votes he needs to pass. Most likely, that will not happen yet, because
the Communists can benefit by extending the standoff until third vote. 
''The longer it goes on, the more chance they have to be in the center
of attention,'' Nikonov said. ''The better they look to their voters.''
Yeltsin is also concerned about his image as Russia's unchallenged
ruler. Last month, he fired his entire Cabinet in a move to stem the
growing influence of then-Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Kiriyenko,
who has no independent power base, poses no such threat. 
But Kiriyenko's critics openly question putting a political neophyte a
heartbeat away from control over Russia's nuclear arsenal. In Russia, the
premier takes over if the president dies or is incapaciated. 
Yeltsin's physical condition has deteriorated to the point where he can
work only a few hours a day, according to his aides. On Wednesday, concerns
about his health resurfaced following a report of a sudden hospitalization.
Yeltsin, who is due to depart for a state visit to Japan tonight, said
yesterday that he had merely done some overdue dental work, and declared
himself ''as healthy as ever.''

*********

#11
YURI LUZHKOV BELIEVES THAT ALEXANDER LEBED 
AS A-POLITICAL LEADER 'IS DANGEROUS FOR RUSSIA' 
MOSCOW, APRIL 17 - RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT PYOTR BOLOGOV.
Alexander Lebed as a political figure "is dangerous for Russia,
for in the event he comes to power one could expect from the
ex-general "repressions and dictatorial rule that would possibly
be even ruthless and bloody," journalists were told by Moscow
mayor Yuri Luzhkov today. Luzhkov said that while running for
the post of governor of Krasnoyarsk Territory, Lebed does not
set himself the aim of boosting the region's economy and
settling other economic problems. He needs these elections as a
spring-board for presidency, believes the mayor.
Commenting on Boris Berezovsky's statement in yesterday's
"Hero of the Day" program on the NTV TV channel, in which the
former deputy Security Council secretary compared the political
figures of Yuri Luzhkov and Alexander Lebed, Luzhkov said that
the businessman had compared "two incomparable things." "I am a
citizen of my country and a patriot. I declare my support for
the Russian-speaking population in the CIS countries, the Black
Sea fleet, the Russian frontier guards in Tajikistan. 
Berezovsky, however, mixes up this sincere patriotism with
chauvinism and nationalism. This is something I do not have,"
stressed Luzhkov, adding that Berezovsky is engaged in a
"dangerous policy."
The Moscow mayor also declared in the interview that "he
still does not have any presidential ambitions. As for elections
to Krasnoyarsk Territory, the mayor believes that "it is up to
everyone to support his candidacy." Evidently this statement

refers to Luzhkov's forthcoming trip to that territory to meet
with current governor Valery Zubov, who is now conducting an
election campaign.

********

#12
Conflict Over Premiership Seen Close to 1993 Intensity 

Komsomolskaya Pravda
14 April 1998
[translation for personal use only]
Commentary by Aleksandr Gamov under the "View From the Sixth
Floor" rubric: "A Whiff of Gunpowder in the Corridors of Power?
New Money Has Already Been Dubbed 'the Kiriyenko.' Will Cabinet
Repeat Fate of Kerenskiy Government?"

Judging by the mood of the Kremlin and the leaders of the leading Duma
factions, we can expect this week a repeat of what we have seen already. 
That is, the lower house may again disregard the president's proposal and
not allow Sergey Kiriyenko to occupy the premiership, which is now growing
quite cold. If, of course, Gennadiy Zyuganov, Aleksandr Shokhin, Vladimir
Zhirinovskiy, and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy on the one hand and Boris Yeltsin on
the other do not stop pulling the prickly government blanket in their own
direction and tear it to shreds.
In the event of this all-too-predictable outcome the head of state
will have nothing left to do but to pick up the coarse threads and sew it
all back together, and Duma deputies will have to patch up the seats of the
pants they have worn through to no avail and pack their suitcases. Because
after the third trying on of Kiriyenko (size 48, height 2 meters -- there
are simply no other candidates, as the president stressed again yesterday)
the dissolved but proud deputies will all go home to prepare for new
elections.
Meanwhile, that quaint Russian formation dubbed the "acting
government," it would appear, has already gotten used to its temporary
status and will now continue "acting reforms." The country, which is only
just beginning to live in a civilized way, according to laws, will again be
switched to a diet of edicts and directives from a president who, as is the
custom, will burden himself with "additional powers."
And so it will continue until the fall, when new (old) deputies flock
to Okhotnyy Ryad [State Duma]. Then even the most inveterate
oppositionists may discover that "Sergey Vladimirleninovich" has grown a
little and even put on a little weight during their "retirement," and his
dimensions will fit the prime minister's chair nicely. They will make
their peace with the president and together with him begin to add up the
preelection redenominated billions that, instead of being used to pay the
wages of working people, went to pay off the losses resulting from the
Kremlin's shortsighted policy connected with the spontaneous dismissal of
Chernomyrdin's government and on funding the deputies' ambitions.
Unfortunately, for some reason both Kremlin and Duma analysts lose
sight of this fall result of the spring crisis. But it is precisely in
this fall outcome, in my view, that we should seek the key to the solution
of the Kremlin-Duma conflict, which in its intensity is already close to
the conflict that preceded the "Black October" of 1993.
According to my information, the Kremlin is already apparently
preparing a new method of putting pressure on the Duma -- a new candidate

for the post of premier, an absolutely unacceptable figure from the
deputies' viewpoint, could be "hung up" in Okhotnyy Ryad as a scarecrow --
someone like Chubays. And chief oppositionist Gennadiy Zyuganov is
allegedly seriously thinking about supporting the initiative of his
comrades in arms Lev Rokhlin and Viktor Ilyukhin in calling for the
impeachment of the president. I fear that our politicians may ruin
themselves completely with all this bargaining
On Friday [10 April] there was a search for a bomb in the Duma.
Fortunately, none was found. And yesterday Boris Yeltsin admitted that "I
have nowhere spoken, nor am I now speaking" about the possible dissolution
of the lower house. And expressed the hope that the Duma itself would put
an end to such talk. True, for this it must confirm Sergey Kiriyenko as
the new premier.
There is still optimism in the president's powder kegs!

********

#13
Yeltsin Might Nominate Gaydar If Kiriyenko Rejected Again 

Moskovskiy Komsomolets
13 April 1998
[translation for personal use only]
Unattributed commentary: "The Kiriyenko Move"

Yeltsin has planted a bomb under the State Duma, and the Duma itself
is being swept by rumors that the whistle blown about a bomb having been
planted in the wake of the negative vote on Kiriyenko and the subsequent
evacuation of the deputies is nothing more than a psychological attack on
the deputies themselves in the course of which they are supposed to become
aware of how precarious their position in the building on Okhotnyy Ryad is.
It must have been assumed that the deputies would fall to thinking at the
moment of sudden evacuation: "Over some idiot voting we could lose
everything in a flash: prestige, connections, television popularity, money
and an office in the heart of the capital, when all is said and done.... 
But need we?" The next vote will show whether the psychological attack (if
it was a psychological attack) had any effect or not. But it is already
clear today that the leaders of factions face one sole task: to contrive
to keep their Duma seats and keep their opposition image in the eyes of the
public. It remains to be hoped that Yeltsin will help them with this one. 
And everything will be all right.
The nearer the second round of voting in the Duma on the candidacy of
Kiriyenko, the more talk there is about further scenarios. If Kiriyenko is
confirmed (this will most likely happen), there is no problem. And if not,
it is an absolutely different thing. Persistent rumors sweeping the Duma
have it that Yeltsin will submit anyone but Kiriyenko the third time
around. Just to be nasty. Or to spite the Duma. Kiriyenko is said to be a
compromise candidacy, and as far as a third vote is concerned, Yeltsin may
submit someone who really is his man, because it is obvious that the Duma
would "swallow" anyone on the third go. True, the deputies cannot ever
agree on one question: Who is this remarkable Yeltsin-nominated candidate?
Nevertheless, Yegor Gaydar is being named more often then anyone else. 
They recall that when Yeltsin was dismissing him he promised that they
would by all means still work together, and he spoke about his intellectual

qualities in very flattering terms. Of course, the Kremlin has done much
since to consolidate the negative charisma of the first Russian monetarist,
but on the other hand, no economic school of thought equal in strength to
that of Gaydar has appeared in the country during the six years that have
elapsed. As for public opinion, which would most certainly be alarmed
hearing a name associated with the loss of savings and spiraling prices,
they say that Yeltsin at the moment is in such a mood that he can simply
overpower not only the Duma but also massive protest rallies.

********

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