March 31, 1998  
This Date's Issues:    2125 •  2126 

Johnson's Russia List
#2126
31 March 1998
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Laura Belin: Expert.
2. Jerry Hough: Scenarios.
3. Reuters: Duma to Mull Request to Yeltsin over New PM.
4. Interfax: Nemtsov Predicts Duma Will Adopt Kiriyenko As Russian PM.
5. Segodnya: Nikolai Ivanov, 'THERE'S MORE TO KIRIYENKO THAN MEETS THE EYE.
Insignificant Technocrat May Make a Significant Politician.
6. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Vladislav Kuzmichev, DUMA SOURCE COMES UP WITH NEW 
VERSION OF CHERNOMYRDIN'S RESIGNATION. Duma Does Not Exclude the Possibility 
of a Coalition Government.
7. Moscow Times: Jean MacKenzie, CONFESSIONS OF A RUSSOPHILE: Don't Blame 
'Dark Masses.' 
8. NTV: Zhirinovskiy Courts Gay Voters in St. Petersburg.
9. Reuters: Russia sees U.N. as key player in post-Cold War game.
10. Moskovskiy Komsomolets: Yeltsin Antics Among Summit 'Surprises.' 
11. New York Times: Thomas Friedman, Gulf of Tonkin II.
12. Moscow Tribune: Dmitry Polikarpov, Tax-dodging palace builders face
new threat.
13. Vladimir Shlapentokh: Go to Moscow Kenneth Starr! The Russians Need
You.]

********

#1
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 1998 09:33:14 -0500
From: "Laura Belin" <belinl@rferl.org>
Subject: Expert

Regarding Yulia Latynina's article "Next Victim At Top Could Be Berezovsky"
(JRL 2125): 

The Moscow Times identified Latynina as a staff writer for Expert but,
surprisingly, did not mention that Expert is financed by
Oneksimbank--Berezovsky's leading business rival.

Time will tell whether Latynina's analysis is correct. But when considering
her arguments, JRL readers should be aware of the financial constraints of
her employer. 

Expert has a vested interest in helping bring about Berezovsky's
downfall--just as Nezavisimaya gazeta (financed by Berezovsky's Obedinennyi
Bank) had an interest in publishing numerous articles predicting that
Chubais would become the target of Yeltsin's wrath. 

Laura Belin
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Prague

*******

#2
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 1998 
From: "Jerry F. Hough" <jhough@acpub.duke.edu>
Subject: Scenarios

Everyone says that if the Duma rejects the president's candidate 
three times, there is a dissolution of the Duma. The constitution says 
"the president's candidates." In the past, legal commentary has said 
this implies the president cannot nominate the same candidate all three 
times. Korniyenko is not a bad man to run Chernomyrdin's oil and gas 
responsibilities. The question is who would replace Chubais or Chubais 
and Nemtsov if Yeltsin, true to form, does not want allies as premier and 
first deputy premier and finance minister. Korniyenko doesn't 
form a government. Only the president can do that. A Yeltsin who feels 
threatened by Chernomyrdin is not likely to be happy about the present 
position of Berezovsky and Luzhkov. One can imagine scenarios that 
would fill your whole issue.

********

#3
Duma to Mull Request to Yeltsin over New PM 
Reuters
31 March 1998

MOSCOW, -- (Reuters) The lower house of Russia's parliament decided on
Tuesday to vote on an appeal to President Boris Yeltsin asking him to
suspend the nomination of Sergei Kiriyenko as new prime minister. 
Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov told reporters after the meeting of the
chamber's managing council that the appeal would also urge the president to
hold talks with parliamentary leaders and other major political forces to
find a compromise. 

"We have included into tomorrow's agenda a debate on the appeal asking
Yeltsin to convene roundtable talks on Thursday and for the time being
suspend considering his candidate for the head of the government,"
Seleznyov said. 
The president sacked his entire cabinet last week and named the
little-known outgoing energy minister Kiriyenko as his choice for a new
prime minister. 
Yeltsin warned the communist-dominated Duma he would use his
constitutional powers to dissolve the chamber if it rejected Kiriyenko. 
Yeltsin's ultimatum prompted angry reaction in the communist-dominated
Duma, which is due to consider Kiriyenko's nomination on Friday. 
The deputies say the 35-year-old technocrat, with less than a year of
government experience, is too young and inexperienced for the job. 
The first deputy Duma speaker, Vladimir Ryzhkov of the centrist faction
Our Home Is Russia, said the appeal was backed by all parliamentary groups
except for Vladimir Zhirinovsky's ultra-nationalists. 
Ryzhkov told reporters Yeltsin's positive response could defuse the looming
crisis between him and the legislature. 
"If the president responds positively to the Duma appeal, this will
considerably ease tensions and improve Kiriyenko's chances to be approved,"
he said. "If consultations are not held, Kiriyenko will be rejected on
Friday." 
Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov indicated the Duma could drag its feet
on Kiriyenko's approval if the chamber did not get an immediate response
from Yeltsin. 
"Under the constitution, laws and regulations we are obliged to take up
the candidacy for consideration," Zyuganov told reporters. "But we are not
at all obliged to vote on Friday. We can debate (Kiriyenko's nomination) as
long as we need."

*********

#4
Nemtsov Predicts Duma Will Adopt Kiriyenko As Russian PM 

MOSCOW, March 31 (Interfax) - Acting First Deputy Prime Minister *Boris
Nemtsov* said he was confident Sergei Kiriyenko would eventually overcome
tough opposition in the Duma to be approved for the post of prime minister. 
"It won't be a simple discussion, but I hope sooner or later the State
Duma will adopt the candidate proposed by Yeltsin. Kiriyenko is a very
talented, honest and active person. I have known him for many years and I
am confident that he will succeed in forming an able, competent, dynamic
and decent government," Nemtsov told journalists Tuesday in Moscow. 
"Many people simply do not know him, which is why all kinds of thoughts
and suspicions surface. This single drawback will be corrected in the near
future," he said. 
Asked about compromising material on Kiriyenko, notably his alleged
involvement in the Hubbard-College sect, Nemtsov said he "expected
something of the kind." 
"Given Kiriyenko's current position, this kind of information is likely
to appear. He is probably expecting it and won't be surprised," he said. 
Regarding former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's decision to run
for president during the 2000 elections, Nemtsov said it "was quite
reasonable and should not be presented as a sensation." 
Nemtsov said there was nothing else left for Chernomyrdin to do but
participate in the presidential elections. 

Nemtsov expressed regret over the election of Andrei Klimentiev, a
businessmen with a criminal record, as mayor of Nizhny Novgorod. Nemtsov,
who formerly served as governor of Nizhny Novgorod region, said the
election was "a big mistake, mainly on the part of the regional authorities." 
"This mistake should be corrected in accordance with the law;
lawlessness even in this instance must not be tolerated," he said. Nemtsov
said he "hoped wisdom will prevail and my home town will sleep in peace." 
Nemtsov said he had "served as Nizhny Novgorod governor for five years,
and during that time no criminal would dare show his head near the
government." 

*******

#5
>From RIA Novosti
Segodnya
March 31, 1998
'THERE'S MORE TO KIRIYENKO THAN MEETS THE EYE
Insignificant Technocrat May Make a Significant Politician
By Nikolai IVANOV

Kiriyenko is likely to be endorsed for the premiership by
the Duma, although probably not at the first go. The result is
what counts. And getting the result is what Sergei Kiriyenko is
good at. That the candidate for the premiership evokes
objections only because he is too young and said to be
inexperienced is his trump card. 
Kiriyenko has no enemies and no irritating connections. He
is open, good-looking and well educated. He is obviously loyal
to the president in whose shadow he prefers to stay. He is apt
to tell you of his technocratic nature.
But it's all gonna change, with time. 
That he refuses to elaborate on his economic programme or
personnel policy gives him a room for manoeuvre that is
unprecedentedly large in Russian history. All the legislators
can do is make guesses. In the situation, their only
consolation is the thought that Kiriyenko will be merely
executing the president's will. 
What Kiriyenko needs today is to dispel suspicions that he
is too independent, has knowledge and understanding of the
state of things. Let them think he is a technocrat, a pawn in
the president's hands. 
But he is no pawn, and he will never put up with the role.
Simply, he finds it easier to make believe he is. He is too
clever to show his spots - for the time being. 
Once approved for the premiership, Kiriyenko intends to do
good for the nation: streamline the state revenues and
expenditures and generally take a shot at what his predecessors
have failed at. And he is likely to succeed, for his strength
is the knack of breaking complex tasks down into simpler
objectives and to score successes therein. 
He may continue to make believe he is a loyal technocrat.
Something else is important: the real power in the country will
slowly, yet inevitably be shifting into the hands of the
premier.
Yeltsin will retain an honourable role to stay the
president and to guard the Constitutional rear. 
Can it be that Yeltsin is as deluded about Kiriyenko's
real strength as effectively everybody else is? Probably. But
the opposite is more probable. 
It looks as if Yeltsin appreciates the grit his young
protege has - for he has travelled the road himself. Slowly
yielding the power to the young premier may be the safest and

most comfortable way to go. 
Yeltsin seems to be deliberately moulding a strong
political figure in order to go down in History, rather than be
merely mentioned in history books, to ensure his quiet
retirement and ameliorate his concerns about the future.
But then, there is always the chance that the above
scenario will never come true.

*********

#6
>From RIA Novosti
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
March 31, 1998
DUMA SOURCE COMES UP WITH NEW VERSION OF CHERNOMYRDIN'S RESIGNATION
Duma Does Not Exclude the Possibility of a Coalition Government
By Vladislav KUZMICHEV

A source in the State Duma in a conversation with this
correspondent offered a rather interesting version of the
Chernomyrdin government's dismissal last week. Viktor
Chernomyrdin's resignation may eventually prove to be a well
played tactical move aimed to clear his launching pad for the
next presidential elections.
The same source claims that the economic problems are so
serious that in the next year and a half to two years the
government will have to carry through a number of social
reforms which will be painful for the majority of Russians.
If this version is correct, it would be wrong for
Chernomyrdin, who is a contender to the 2000 presidency, to
remain the prime minister and be a target of the growing
displeasure of the electorate.
Sergei Kiriyenko's sudden nomination as the acting prime
minister fits in pretty well with such a version. Kiriyenko is
a hard-working technocrat having little interest in politics.
Kiriyenko will have to shoulder, if he is approved by the State
Duma of course, the duty of paying wage arrears and dealing
with the aftermaths of the world reduction of oil and gas
prices.
Theoretically, the main expert in unpopular reforms,
Anatoly Chubais, could have been left in the government.
However, his candidacy to premiership would have not only been
rejected by Duma deputies but would also have become an
insurmountable obstacle for another candidate if Chubais had
retained any other post in the Cabinet.
The same source said that Kiriyenko has a chance to be
approved by the Duma, despite the readiness of leading factions
for early parliamentary elections. The voting on Kiriyenko will
be secret, and, regardless of what the faction leaders might
say, his candidacy is likely to be approved of.
It is worth recalling that the President threatened to
disband the Duma if it three times in a row votes against his
candidate to premiership. Nonetheless, he may after all replace
Kiriyenko before the third voting and offer a candidate who
will be absolutely unacceptable for parliament. In that case,
disbandment will be the only end of story for the Duma. For all
the pluck of their leaders, ordinary faction members are not
ready for it.
According to another scenario, the President may take into
consideration the opinion of Duma factions leaders and create a
coalition government. But Boris Yeltsin may dismiss that
government, too, in six months, because it is more likely than
not that it will not cope with its tasks due to its motley

composition.
Regardless of scenario, Chernomyrdin stands to gain
anyway. In case of the former it would only avoid undesirable
reproaches of being inconsiderate to people, and the latter
would even improve his image: as the prime minister he talked
little but did a lot: under his premiership the reforms were
going on, even if slowly.
The second scenario appears to be less probable. Anyway,
Kiriyenko has been offered to head the Cabinet. One of the main
claims to him from the law-makers is that he keeps secret the
list of future ministers and vice-premiers. So, deputies will
have in fact to vote for an unknown Cabinet, which makes it
hard to count on their positive decision.
It is difficult to say in advance who will be in
Kiriyenko's government. Though a few suppositions can be made.
Knowing the acting prime minister's emphasis on
professionalism, there is the ground to presume that Yevgeny
Primakov, Igor Sergeyev and Mikhail Zadornov are likely to
resume their posts. What is more, rumours have it that Zadornov
may even be promoted to vice-premiership.
Yakov Urinson may also survive. Some thought that he may
be replaced by NDR faction leader Alexander Shokhin. But if 
the above mentioned version of Chernomyrdin's resignation is
really true, Shokhin's membership in the government would be
harmful.
Only one replacement continues to be rumoured. According
to the same source, Gennady Kulik, the present deputy chairman
of the State Duma budget committee, may again become the
Agriculture minister.

*********

#7
For more articles from The Moscow Times, check out their website at


www.moscowtimes.ru

Moscow Times
March 31, 1998 
CONFESSIONS OF A RUSSOPHILE: Don't Blame 'Dark Masses' 
By Jean MacKenzie 

Bydlo. It's one of my favorite Russian words. It sits in the mouth like 
a lump of cold kasha, and, properly uttered, conveys a depth of disdain 
and despair more eloquent than a kilo of Dostoevsky. 
For the uninitiated, I will translate: Bydlo means, literally, "cattle," 
but it is used almost exclusively as a term of disparagement by Russians 
to describe the dumb, plodding, silent masses. To describe almost 
everyone except themselves, in fact. 
"After 70 years of Soviet rule, all that's left is bydlo," hissed a 
friend of mine recently. 
"Do you consider yourself bydlo?" I asked, somewhat timidly. This was, 
after all, a friend. She gave me a withering glance. "Of course not. But 
there are not many of us left." 
"So, who exactly fits the category?" I persisted. She just sighed and 
changed the subject. I guess it's one of those things that foreigners 
just can't understand. 
Every Russian I meet seems to be the last survivor of the non-bydlo 
category. They lead their lives, go to work every day, adapt as best 
they can to difficult and changing circumstances, and, when they are not 
citing magnetic storms or the Powers That Be for the general mess in the 
country, they blame the chaos on -- you guessed it -- the bydlo. 
The thinking goes something like this: The cream of the nation -- the 
intellectuals and aristocracy -- either emigrated or were killed during 

the Revolution. This left a vacuum into which poured the great unwashed, 
who generally fouled things up for the rest of the century. 
This point of view has a certain appeal, unless you come from a country 
-- America, for example -- that was made up largely of those same great 
unwashed. It has never occurred to me to look around at my fellow 
countrymen and mutter "bydlo." Lots of other epithets, perhaps, but 
"bydlo," never. 
Now, I have never met any bydlo in Russia, either. I confess that the 
word creeps slyly into my mind when, say, I'm fighting the crowds in the 
metro in the morning, being elbowed by a babushka, stepped on by a 
20-year-old spike-heeled blonde, or breathed on by a man who apparently 
has spent the night indulging in vodka and papirosy. But then I catch 
sight of my own reflection in the window -- the set jaw, the purposely 
expressionless face, the empty gaze, and realize that I'm probably part 
of the bydlo for them, too. 
So I suppose the term is just another facet of the Russians' seemingly 
inexhaustible capacity for beating themselves up. 
While they may shout from the rooftops about the moral superiority of 
suffering or the spiritual depth of the Russian people, many of my 
acquaintances are secretly convinced that their country is a dark, wild 
one, and that all the good things in life are somewhere else. 
Russians still, with an air of wry amusement, refer to the West as "the 
civilized world," and anything from a traffic jam to the latest tax 
commercial on television can send them into paroxysms of self-abuse. 
"This isn't Europe, it's Asia," muttered a cabby recently, as we wove 
our way through the bumper-car world of the Ring Road at rush hour. "In 
the West, there is order. There are rules. People drive normally. But 
here -- bah!" he spat in disgust. 
I was nodding sympathetically, although, as a native Bostonian, bad 
driving is part of my genetic makeup. I didn't think it worthwhile 
pointing out to my distraught driver that negotiating the narrow alleys 
of Florence at breakneck speed, or, for even more fun, the circle around 
Paris' Arc de Triomphe, would make even Moscow look like a dose of 
sanity. Let him keep his illusions. Everybody needs something to believe 
in. And what's wrong with Asia, anyway? 
But, to paraphrase Rabelais, let's get back to our bydlo. It would be 
presumptuous of me to take on the role of champion for Russia's silent 
majority. I have neither the skill nor the strength for such a task. 
But I will say that, with a few notable exceptions, the Russians I have 
met, from stage actors to cleaning ladies, have been walking, talking 
founts of philosophy, with a well-defined world view and a more or less 
coherent plan of action. Their philosophy may not always appeal -- in 
fact, there are many Russians whose attitudes I find completely 
incomprehensible. Try talking feminism with a Russian woman sometime. 
So, I am on a campaign to lose the word "bydlo." Or will be until I hit 
the metro tomorrow morning. 

*********


#8
Zhirinovskiy Courts Gay Voters in St. Petersburg 

NTV 
March 26, 1998
[translation for personal use only]
Video report including recorded remarks by Vladimir
Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democraitc Party of Russia; from
the "Segodnya" newscast

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy has had a great time out in St. Petersburg.
[Correspondent] The Liberal Democrat leader decided to agitate for his
party in the northern capital [St. Petersburg]. Vladimir Volfovich
[Zhirinovskiy] thinks members of the sexual minorities could provide the
main support for him and his comrades. Having talked about everything live
on one of the local television channels, Zhirinovskiy went off to St.
Petersburg's biggest gay club.
[Zhirinovskiy] I came to have a look. It is normal. It is part of
the city's cultural life, and that's why I came here.
[Correspondent] The clubgoers were very pleased to see the Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] leader. The gays especially liked
Vladimir Volfovich's position on the relationships of sexual minorities.
[Zhirinovskiy] Children are not born from relations between boys, but
it is part of erotic culture.
[Correspondent] Vladimir Volfovich got to know the club's rooms with
interest. He was especially delighted by an intimate room that women were
categorically forbidden to enter.
[Unidentified voice] Actually, there is a special room [words
indistinct]
[Zhirinovskiy] Let's go, open it up, open it up [laughter]. Where are
the customers? I can't see any customers.
[Correspondent] The LDPR leader liked the club so much that he
extended his meeting with the sexual minorities for two hours. Leaving his
autograph on a poster, Zhirinovskiy left for Pskov in a good mood. [video
shows Zhirinovskiy talking to cameras, hugging and holding male clubgoers
and generally enjoying himself]

********

#9
Russia sees U.N. as key player in post-Cold War game
By Philippa Fletcher 

MOSCOW, March 30 (Reuters) - U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan got an
especially warm welcome on Monday in Russia, which sees him as a lever to help
balance the diplomatic weight of the United States in the post Cold War world.
The Kremlin said talks between Annan and Russian President Boris Yeltsin
had
been ``exceptionally frank and warm'' and both sides praised one another for
overcoming a standoff with Iraq over weapons inspections. 
``I am particularly impressed how you and I played out the Iraqi game
together,'' Yeltsin told Annan in televised remarks from their meeting. 
The United States and Britain backed air strikes against Iraq after Baghdad
declared eight so-called ``presidential sites'' out of bounds to weapons
inspectors. 
Moscow opposed the use of force throughout and urged the U.N. leader to
broker
a settlement. 
Annan finally went to Baghdad last month and clinched a deal with Iraqi
leader
Saddam Hussein to allow the inspections to proceed and avoid strikes. On
Monday he said he had thanked Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov
for their roles. 
``Their efforts laid the foundations of our common achievement,'' Annan
later
told the State Duma lower house of parliament. 

Iraq was one of several issues discussed during Annan's talks in
Moscow, part
of a tour of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council. The others are the United States, France, China and Britain. 
Moscow is also at odds with the United States and some other Western
countries
over the crisis in Kosovo, refusing to back their efforts to impose sanctions
against Yugoslavia over clashes between police and ethnic Albanians in the
separatist Serbian province. 
Annan said he had discussed Kosovo with Primakov, but, in a briefing for
reporters, neither side gave details, restricting their comments to warm words
about one another and issues such as the Middle East on which they both
expressed agreement. 
Yeltsin and Primakov both stressed Annan's part in the formation of a
``multi-
polar world'' -- Moscow's diplomatic code for not allowing the United States
too much diplomatic weight. 
``The United Nations has a big role in our world, which is going through a
transition from confrontation to the creation of a multi-polar structure based
on a democratic world order,'' Primakov told reporters after meeting Annan. 
``The United Nations Secretary General is now becoming a great authority
determining the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of various obligations, opening
the road to the settlement of the most complex conflicts,'' Primakov later
told the Duma. 
Moscow, smarting from the loss of its superpower status with the
collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991, resents the power and influence of the United
States, the only remaining superpower. 
Primakov criticised articles in the U.S. media alleging Russia is
cooperating
with arch-U.S. foe Iran to develop nuclear weapons, saying they were directed
against him. 
``Russia stood and will stand firmly against the spread of nuclear
weapons,''
Primakov said. 

*********

#10
Yeltsin Antics Among Summit 'Surprises' 

Moskovskiy Komsomolets
27 March 1998
[translation for personal use only]
Report by Inara Filatova: "Chic Little Girl For Yeltsin. B.N.
Divides Globe Between Three"

It is a riddle why the Bor residence near Moscow should have been
chosen as the venue for the trilateral meeting between Yeltsin, French
President Chirac, and German President [as published] Kohl. On closer
inspection, this Presidential Staff health-and-work complex looked like
none other than a provincial Soviet guest house with the mandatory strip
carpets and imitation cut-glass chandeliers. From Vnukovo airport, Kohl
and Chirac were taken to Bor in cars. "Riding on our roads...." could be
bad for their health, journalists worried.
Yeltsin preferred to take a helicopter from Gorki-9. The Russian
president arrived in Bor yesterday morning, thus making the visitors pass
the night on their own.
The meeting of friends began with a tea party. It is said that the
German side wanted to draw the line at that and only supplement the tea
drinking with philosophical conversations. But that kind of meeting of
friends allegedly did not suit Yeltsin. In addition to conversing about
things eternal, home and family, B.N. [Yeltsin] also intended to solve

several state problems. In particular, to tell his friends straight that
it is about time to recognize Russia as a country with market economy
rather than one in some sort of a "transition period." This demand was
addressed directly to "friend Jacques," whose country, the Kremlin
complains, is "sabotaging" everything in sight.
For their part, Kohl and Chirac certainly asked "friend Boris" why he
fired the government. What Yeltsin told them in reply is unknown. The
past week was not an easy one for the Kremlin entourage and even affected
the appearance of those around [Yeltsin]. The president's men were
wandering about Bor like ghosts in contrast with their buoyant Western
counterparts. But they were in for more trials and tribulations....
A "rare trio" was how B.N. described the moment when the official
photographs of himself in the circle of his foreign counterparts were being
taken. The solemnity of the moment must have taken such a hold of the
president that he could no longer keep track of the sequence of events. 
Thus, before the start of the official talks with the leaders of France and
Germany he suddenly uttered, addressing the journalists: "As the host [and
with] consent from the heads of state, I will begin our news conference....
There will be talks shortly. I would like to soak up your ideas." 
Feverishly leafing through the summit schedule, the journalists became very
surprised: the news briefing was scheduled to start some two hours later. 
Press Secretary Yastrzhembskiy fidgeted in his seat and, seizing the
moment, whispered something to the president, following which the latter
all of a sudden decided against giving a news conference and promised to
"bare the soul at the time assigned in the program."
The Kremlin press service commented as follows on the irrepressible
desire of B.N. to talk to correspondents: "He has not seen you for a long
time and availed himself of the very first opportunity." Only why did Kohl
and Chirac have such impassive faces at that moment?
The president's ad-lib proved one of those surprises Yastrzhembskiy
promised shortly before the meeting. The other touching moments of the
summit, however, were planned well and imaginatively. For example, the
visitors were entertained before breakfast by the singer Pelageya,
described in Kremlin corridors as no less than a chic little girl with a
fantastic voice. The ears of Chirac, Kohl, and Yeltsin were charmed by six
songs including Pelageya's own hit: the Olympic Song written for the Youth
Games in Moscow.
But this did not exhaust the imagination of the organizers of the
event. Prior to the ill-fated "news conference" a kind of intricate
structure materialized on the table of the heads of state: a dish with a
pin in the middle holding in place three dippers crowned with a miniature
globe of the world. The glittering gold and silver structure was called
"Russian Tradition." According to the scenario, B.N. was supposed to
unscrew the globe, remove the dippers, and share them out among himself,
Kohl, and Chirac. How the share-out went was not yet known at press time.


**********

#11
New York Times
March 31, 1998
[for personal use only]
FOREIGN AFFAIRS / By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Gulf of Tonkin II

Despite all the predictions that NATO expansion would sail through the
Senate like a slam-dunk, the Senate is likely to adjourn this week without
a ratification vote. True, the delay is largely due to the refusal by the
majority leader, Trent Lott, to let NATO expansion come up for a vote while
Democrats were filibustering a Republican education bill. But it is also
true that the more the Senate debates the NATO issue, the more senators
actually focus on it, and the more they ask the central question to which
the Clinton team has never given a satisfactory answer: "Why are we doing
this now?" 
Senators, you're not alone. Why are we doing this now? 
If you ask conservative supporters of NATO expansion, they are at least
honest about their ends. They want to expand NATO because they are
anti-Russian and they want to contain Russia every bit as much as they
wanted to contain the Soviet Union. For them there is no real difference.
The conservatives believe that the U.S. won the cold war and is entitled to
reap the fruits, which means expanding NATO all the way from its present
borders up to the Russian border, including the three Baltic States:
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. 
Personally, I thought we fought the cold war not to contain Russia but
to change Russia -- so Moscow could really work with the U.S. in reducing
both countries' nuclear arsenals, stemming weapons proliferation and
confronting rogue states. I thought the real fruit of the cold war would be
to have a Russia that cooperates with us on our post-cold-war agenda. That
would require investing in Russian democracy. But conservatives would
rather enjoy the psychic pleasure of having the Czechs -- who have no air
force because they traded their 10 MIG-29's to Poland for Polish
helicopters -- in NATO, rather than the real advantages that could come
from a transformed Russia. 
But where conservatives are not being straightforward is about their
means. They want NATO to go all the way to the Baltic-Russian border, but
America's European allies are dead against that, because they know it would
be a provocation to Moscow. So either the conservatives will push ahead
with Baltic membership, and split NATO, or they will leave things where
they are and abandon the Balts after promising them membership, or they
will expand NATO to the Balts and trigger a crisis with Russia. But it will
be one of those three. 
As for the liberal expansionists, they are dishonest about their ends
and their means. NATO expansion isn't anti-Russian, they aver. The alliance
is being expanded simply to consolidate democracy in Europe and to enable
NATO to better confront post-cold-war threats. Oh, really? You mean like
Saddam Hussein? He's the epitome of the new post-cold-war threat, and when
it came time to confront him, one NATO ally -- one -- Britain, was ready to
fight with the U.S. The others sent nurses and gas masks. Thanks a lot. 
The liberals also say they care about democracy in Russia, but they
prefer to give higher priority to consolidating democracy in Hungary, which
is solid, instead of democracy in Russia, which is still shaky. That's why
liberal senators confide: "I know this isn't a great idea, so I'll just
vote for expanding NATO to Poland, Hungary and the Czechs and we'll cross
the bridge with the others later." 
But this is the biggest fallacy of all. 

"NATO expansion is the equivalent of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that
authorized the war in Vietnam," says the John Hopkins foreign policy expert
Michael Mandelbaum. "Like that commitment to Vietnam, if NATO expansion is
launched we will be unable to go backward, because we can't expel these
countries; unable to go forward, because the Europeans are not ready to
expand NATO to the Russian border; and unable to stay where we are, because
we have vowed to expand NATO to the Russian border and not to do so would
be to draw a new dividing line in Europe." 
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who knows a bad idea when he sees one,
says the Gulf of Tonkin analogy is apt. Like that resolution, "NATO
expansion involves undefined commitments that tie the hands of future
Presidents." 
One can only hope that more senators will see this too. Because if they
vote for NATO expansion, there is no bridge to cross later, there is no
cost-free rest stop along the way. There is only a car with no brakes on a
slippery slope to trouble. 

********

#12
Moscow Tribune
Mar. 31, 1998
[for personal use only]
Tax-dodging palace builders face new threat 
By Dmitry Polikarpov 

Despite recent promises from Aleksander Pochinok, head of Russia's Tax
Inspectorate, to force Russia's business elite to pay special real estate
taxes, the nation's fat cats can sleep easy. In the good old Russian
tradition of one law for the rich and another for the poor, this is a
matter involving the interests of many high-ranking state officials. 
Pochinok said last month that residents of luxury villas and country
houses in the well-known Odintsovo region near Moscow will have to pay up
to 2 per cent of their houses' market price in real estate taxes. 
"Speaking of the palaces erected near Rublevo-Uspenskoye shosse, I can
say that their owners will pay considerable real estate taxes, which may
bring in more revenue (for this tax) than in the rest of Russia," said
Pochinok. 
Real estate owners all over Russia currently pay the tax in accordance
with state prices, which are often several times lower than real market
figures. 
The Tax Inspectorate reportedly possesses photos of the Odintsovo area
taken from an aeroplane, which may help inspectors to evaluate the value of
such exclusive property, but this process may take up to two years
according to the inspectorate's press service. 
"It will be a difficult process. Sure, we'll face strong resistance," a
spokeswoman for the Russian Tax Inspectorate told The Moscow Tribune. 
The spokeswoman, who preferred to remain anonymous, said that the
measure was totally just, adding that "before erecting a house one should
think of whether he or she will be able to pay realty taxes in future." 
The measure will not target owners of ordinary dachas, who will continue
to pay real estate tax based on artificially low state prices. 
Several high-ranking state officials have private luxury houses in the
area. Pochinok himself purchased a house in the Uspenskoye neighborhood in
the Odintsovo area for 443 million rubles ($80,000) last year. If the new
tax regulation is approved in the area Pochinok will have to pay an annual
tax of $1,600 for his Odintsovo dacha. 
Prices for a plot of land in Uspenskoye or Zhukovka neighborhoods close
to Rublevo-Uspenskoye shosse range from $5,000 to $10,000 per sotka (10 by
10 meters), while market prices for several villas are around $3 million. 

Pochinok's plan caused little enthusiasm among local elite residents. 
"I don't know who Pochinok is," said Alexei, who lives in a three-story
house in Zhukovka neighborhood. "But if they levy such taxes I will simply
sell this house and move abroad." 
But many analysts were skeptical about the measure, saying that state
officials will not approve legislation which affects themselves. 
"This is a purely symbolic move," said Sergei Don, member of the Duma
budget committee. 
"Instead of spending money in such costly actions, the government should
think of a new and more realistic tax scale for individuals," Don said. 
Those who earned over 48 million rubles in 1997 will pay the maximum
income tax rate, which includes a fixed minimum of 10 million rubles and 35
per cent of the amount over 48 million. The government's draft tax code,
which is currently being debated by the Duma, reportedly offers to raise
the income threshold for maximum taxation (35 per cent) to 100,000
denominated rubles, but the increase may be rejected by the legislators. 
Tax evaders risk serious fines which exceed several times the initial
sum of the income tax. Those involved with regular tax evasion may spend
from two to five years in jail. The Russian economy has been blighted by
massive tax evasion since 1997. According to official statistics, only 60
per cent of expected tax receipts were collected in February. The Tax
Inspectorate plan to impose special taxation on "New Russians" may also be
undermined by the possibility of challenging the so-called "market price"
of property in court. 
"If the measure is approved in current form, real estate owners may
protest the figures calculated by tax inspectors, presenting calculations
by independent experts," said Irina Dobroselskaya, member of the
Interregional Board of Barristers. 
********

#13
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 1998 
From: Vladimir Shlapentokh <shlapent@pilot.msu.edu>
Subject: Go to Moscow Kenneth Starr! The Russians Need You

Go to Moscow Kenneth Starr!
The Russians Need You
By Vladimir Shlapentokh

As the scandal in Washington materialized, the absolute majority (89%) of
Russians sided with President Clinton, considering the allegations leveled
against him ludicrous and frivolous. In Russian culture, sexual activity
between bosses and subordinates has never been looked upon as a serious
moral infraction. This is especially true of present day Russia as covert
party intrusion in the private lives of the people has disappeared (an
especially joyous phenomenon for Russian males). Russians are immersed in
the challenges of surviving in post communist society: the longstanding
nonpayment of salaries, the escalation of unemployment, fervent corruption,
and unbridled criminality. In light of these challenges, they are stupefied
by the whole of American society (from the United States Congress to the
average citizen) which has fashioned Clinton's relations with women into a
major national issue.
When the problems facing Russia are compared to "Monica-Gate," a popular
retort often emerges in Russian conversations: "I wish I had your problems,
Mr. America." Even the first deputy of the premier, Anatolii Chubais,

offered a similar reflection. In an interview with Nezavisimaia Gazeta in
March 1998, he juxtaposed Russia's serious political, economic and social
plights to the conditions in the United States, "where the major problem is
sexual harassment." 
The tribulations of the American president are used as a pretext for
Russians to display their deep contempt for their own president (Yeltsin's
support rating is five percent, a stark contrast to Clinton's two-thirds
endorsement by the American people). In a survey conducted by Moskovskii
Komsomolets, one of the most popular newspapers in the country, a woman
responded with a statement which typifies Russian attitudes: "My God," she
lamented, "if Yeltsin could rightfully say that our economy is growing,
taxes are being cut, people are receiving their salaries and pensions on
time, and crime is on the decline, he could have sex with (she used a
stronger term) every female secretary in the Kremlin and still I would
proclaim, 'long live our president.'" The popular Russian TV program,
"Puppets," also capitalized on Clinton's adversities, using his hardship as
an opportunity to direct detrimental attention upon Yeltsin (they denounced
him as a bull and a liar who despises his people as well as the Russian
Constitution and is ready to use tanks in order to stifle a challenge of his
authority). Even the impression of Clinton's male stamina has become a
source of humiliation for Russians when they compare it to the frail
condition of their president who regularly produces gaffes in his speeches
and conversations. 
While intriguing, Russian perceptions of the scandal are quite superficial.
Most do not realize that the focus of the uproar in Washington is not
marital infidelity, but the observation of justice. The real question,
which Russians overlook, is whether or not the participants of the scandal
obstructed justice or committed perjury. They see the scandal merely as a
case of adultery because law and the question of justice are almost
completely disregarded by everyone in society (from the humblest of Russian
citizens to the highest ranked officials in the Kremlin). Russians consider
it "normal" for politicians to systematically lie to the public and receive
pardons for their iniquities. Russians are already habituated to unfair
elections and the dominance of the executive power over the courts and the
Duma. They simply can not conceptualize the intricacies of the American
judicial system. For example, the heated debates on topics of executive
privilege and the lawyer client privilege are beyond their imagination.
However, while the Russian people are acclimated to an environment of
lawlessness, they do realize that crime and corruption are major obstacles
to Russian prosperity. In a recent poll (February 1998), "crime and
corruption" were identified among "the most dangerous problems facing Russia."
If Russians had a clear understanding of the developments in Washington
they would admire the conduct of the American judicial system, particularly
its ability to create an independent councel. Taking into account the
effects of Yeltsin's absolute immunity, the Russian people would be

delighted to live in a society in which no one, not even the president, is
above the law. It is indeed remarkable that Yuri Boldyrev, one of the few
very respected Russian politicians, noted in an interview with Novaia Gazeta
(March 30, 1998), amidst of the current political crisis in Moscow, that in
order to combat the abuse of power in Moscow "we can not do without the
institution of independent prosecutor like the independent council in the
USA" 
However, the underlying principles which allow for a check on authority and
the protection of individual rights are precisely what the Russian judicial
system lacks. A recent poll conducted by the Foundation of Public Opinion
revealed that 54% of the Russian population do not believe the courts have
the power to make fair decisions. No more than one-third consider it
reasonable to rely on the courts for the protection of their rights. Very
few people believe in the real independence of the Constitutional or Supreme
Courts. The independence of local courts is regarded as even more dubious.
What is more, the mounting evidence of corruption and the complete absence
of judicial enforcement substantiates their assessments. During the entire
period of Yeltsin's regime there has not been a single public trial of a
highly ranked official suspected of corruption. In February 1998, Arkadii
Udaltsov (editor of Literaturnaia Gazeta) brooded about the deplorable state
of the Russian judicial system: "The Russian people have not lived long
enough to witness a just court system."
The stumbling blocks of Russian society, as well as many other societies
claiming to be democratic, illuminate one of the central precepts of
democracy: without a strong and independent judicial system, democracy can
not work (a concept often slighted by American politicians and experts who
are fixated on the election process as the primary indicator of democracy).
This conjecture becomes frighteningly clear when considering how different
the country would be if, at the time of transition, Russia had established a
legitimate judicial system. For example, effective courts would have had an
enormous impact on the validity of elections. Yeltsin's blatant violations
of democratic procedures during his election campaign in 1996 would have
been disallowed. Incumbent governors like Egor Stroiev would have also
found it much more difficult to get reelected (October 1997). Egor
Stroiev's gubernatorial reelection campaign in Orel was carried out with
almost Soviet-like regulation. Serious rival candidates were not permitted
in the election. In the Soviet tradition, Stroiev received 97 percent of
the vote. The election of the local Duma in Moscow (also in December 1997)
would not have gone so "smoothly" had it not been for the despotic behavior
of the Moscow mayor, Yuri Luzhkov. All of the candidates who supported
Luzhkov were victorious in the election. None of the candidates who were
even remotely critical of the mayor were elected. A number of Russian
politicians called for an investigation, but to no avail.
As a thought experiment, lets remove Kenneth Starr from his toils in

Washington and send him, along with his Grand Jury, to Russia. Imagine,
independent councel Kenneth Starr is now in Moscow running an objective
investigation of the most important cases (according to Russian public
opinion) which, as of yet, have gone untouched. 
Starr's first task is to investigate the cause of the Chechen war which
claimed the lives of over 30,000 Russian citizens without solving a single
problem. Starr calls upon President Boris Yeltsin, Premier Minister Victor
Chernomyrdin, former Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev and several other
dignitaries to give their depositions under oath to the Grand Jury. Having
finished this business, Starr begins to investigate the alleged corruption
which took place during the privatization of large state enterprises. Many
of the highest Russian officials and most powerful entrepreneurs are brought
to trial within the framework of a legitimate, independent court system.
Starr, undoubtably exhausted by his tremendous workload, moves on to the
unsolved murder cases of several Russian journalists and businessmen. Starr
pays special attention to those cases which, according to public opinion,
involve Kremlin officials, or at least those cases which the Kremlin did not
want resolved. 
Russian newspapers are now filled with articles about the convictions of
highly ranked officials, corrupt businesspeople and leaders of organized
crime syndicates. Television programs broadcast in-depth stories on Starr's
scrupulous track record in court and hail him as a champion of justice. 
The Russian people are enthralled and delighted! The country has shown
remarkable improvements. Foreign and domestic businesspeople are investing
more and more in the now reliable Russian economy. The once stagnate
conditions of small and mid-sized business have lifted, while growth and
prosperity rule in the absence of corrupt officials and organized crime.
Finally, the Russian democratic system, itself, has developed on all levels,
from free and fair elections to legitimate court decisions. 
Heading back to reality, it is important to underscore the fact that the
legality of some of Kenneth Starr's endeavors as well as the effects of his
activities on the morals of America have been questioned. However, there is
no doubt that Russians, despite their renown patience for unfavorable living
conditions, would eagerly greet someone with the power to straighten up
society. If Russia had its own Kenneth Starr, who could perform such a
task, he or she would certainly be the best solution. However, the chances
are very slim for the development of a legal milieu which would allow for a
Kenneth Starr in Russia.
Many Russians (77%, according to data from the Fund of Public Opinion,
1997) are certain that crime and corruption will persist for many years to
come. However, there is a substantial group which believes that such a
situation could never last. The optimists among this group hope for the
advancement of Starr-like individuals who, under pressure from the public,
will eradicate crime and corruption and set Russia on a course toward real
democracy and a market economy. Pessimists, however, think that something

further from democracy and closer to Russia's past is likely to emerge. As
Victor Loshak, the editor of the Moscow News, wrote (March 1998), the
refusal of the present political establishment to empower truly independent
prosecutors to investigate crime, corruption and the origins of new wealth
and power in Russia will lead to a dictator in the Kremlin. Such a dictator
will employ illegal and demagogic methods in the fight against corruption.
As a result, many of the achievements of Russia's difficult road to
democracy will be destroyed.
Let us hope that, in the not so distant future, the optimists' conjecture
prevails and Russians begin to enjoy the benefits of a genuinely independent
judicial system. Perhaps then, Russians will debate, as vehemently as
Americans, the achievements and mistakes of their true combatants of crime
and corruption.

*********