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CDI Library > Johnson's Russia List

Johnson's Russia List
 

 

February  25, 1998  
This Date's Issues:    2078   • 20792080 

<x-rich>Johnson's Russia List [List Two]

#2080

25 February 1998

davidjohnson@erols.com


*******


>From United States Information Agency

Foreign Media Reaction

<center>February 24, 1998

<bold>RUSSIA: OPPOSING U.S. ON IRAQ WHILE PROMOTING MOSCOW'S GOALS

</bold>

Coverage overseas in the past few weeks of Russia's foreign policy
initiatives and its relationship with the U.S. hinged largely on their
disagreements over Iraq. Now that the crisis apparently has been resolved
through the diplomatic intervention of the UN secretary general, however,
satisfaction in the Russian press with the perceived wisdom of the
Kremlin's policy of opposition to the U.S. military threat has been low
key and not triumphalistic--thus far. One explanation for this muted
reaction might be found in Moscow's reformist
<underline>Izvestia</underline>. It said that remarks made by President
Yeltsin in his address before the federal assembly last week indicated
that "Moscow does not want to quarrel with America over Saddam Hussein,"
despite the Feb. 12 "violent verbal clash" between Defense Secretary
Cohen and his Russian counterpart, Marshal Igor Sergeyev. These were
other significant points raised in commentary:


PRO-IRAQ? ANTI-U.S.?--A survey of recent Russian press views did not
reveal a consistently pro-Iraq and anti-U.S. stance, as some reports in
the U.S. press have indicated regarding Moscow's journalists. Moscow
dailies disagreed over whether Saddam Hussein is a threat, whether the
U.S. was overreacting and whether Russian politicians were simply
anti-American or protecting their country's interests. Reformist,
business-oriented <underline>Kommersant Daily</underline> charged that
the U.S. was trying to "discredit" Russia, fearing Moscow's approach to
the crisis would harm U.S. plans for the Middle East. These U.S. plans,
claimed reformist weekly <underline>Obshchaya Gazeta</underline>, consist
of securing "(U.S.) economic and political interests" by controlling that
"oil-rich region." But reformist <underline>Russkiy Telegraf</underline>
argued that Russian support for Saddam Hussein was a simple case of "pure
anti-Americanism," which is so much in fashion that Moscow's youths "are
sporting it like Versace neckties." Reformist
<underline>Segodnya</underline>, in turn, held that Russia was
conveniently hiding behind U.S. military might, safe in the knowledge
that it could criticize Washington while counting on it to take care of a
"scary" leader Moscow itself cannot tame.


WHAT'S IN IT FOR RUSSIA--Commentators in Russia and other countries
agreed that the Iraq crisis provided an opportunity for the Kremlin to
enhance its prestige in the Arab world and its influence--at the U.S.'
expense--in the resource-rich countries to its south. "If Russia
persuades Iraq," Istanbul's mass-appeal <underline>Sabah</underline>
pointed out, "it will be a winner in the region." Brussels's independent
Catholic <underline>De Standaard</underline> judged that it is "of vital
interest to Moscow that the U.S. does not 'advance' any further in the
southern part of the (Caspian) oil region." Others were even more
suspicious of Russia's championing of Iraq. Referring to reports that
Moscow might have sold Iraq equipment that could be used to develop
biological weapons, London's conservative <underline>Times</underline>
wondered whether the Kremlin's diplomatic drive "may be motivated more by
a wish to avoid exposure as collaborators." A few onlookers concluded,
too, that no matter what happened with Iraq, Russia would emerge a
winner. Liberal <underline>El Pais</underline> of Madrid said, "If there
is no war, Russia will say it was thanks to her, but if there is, she
will say that she did everything she could to avoid it." Centrist
<underline>Nezavisimaya Gazeta</underline> of Moscow maintained that the
crisis would allow Russia "to return to the world arena as a truly great
power."


This survey is based on 65 reports from 18 countries, Feb. 6-24.


EDITOR: Mildred Sola Neely



EUROPE


<bold>RUSSIA: </bold> <bold>"Russian Leadership Claims Credit For
Averting War" 

</bold>


Vladimir Dunayev wrote in reformist <underline>Russkiy
Telegraf</underline> (2/24): "Moscow has called the Kofi Annan mission a
'diplomatic success.' Russian leadership claims credit for averting a
global war. Russian diplomats probably know a bit more than their foreign
counterparts." 


<bold>"Yeltsin Cautious" 

</bold>

Sergei Guly observed in reformist <underline>Noviye Izvestia</underline>
(2/24): "Yeltsin's improvised comment [on the Annan mission], sounding
pretty awkward, lacked the key word 'victory.' Just that 'the question
has practically been decided.' From the president, the word 'practically'
was equivalent to maximum caution. No mention was made of the determining
role of Russian diplomacy. The Foreign Ministry, too, remains silent,
evidently waiting for a Security Council session and the Americans'
reaction."


<bold>"Conflict Could Grow Into Cold War" 

</bold>

Centrist <underline>Nezavisimaya Gazeta</underline> (2/24) printed an
article by the former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev: "With the kind
of danger Hussein poses today, I don't suppose the United States'
reaction is justified. Nor do I think that the situation in Iraq merits
being in the focus of the most powerful and influential forces in world
politics. U.S. officials, talking about the motives behind their
decisions, invariably refer to 'the national interests.' But referring to
one's 'national interests' does not at all mean that somebody else's
national interests can be disregarded. The way America has been acting in
the Iraq case in many respects contradicts the role it can play in the
contemporary world. Were the Americans to have it their way in the
absence of a Security Council decision or in violation of such, they
would cause irreparable damage to what has been accomplished in a
worldwide peace process. It would be a return to the state of
international affairs characteristic of Cold War times." 


<bold>"Primakov Gave Place To Annan"

</bold>

Elza Dober said in reformist <underline>Russkiy Telegraf</underline>
(2/24): "The weathered champion of a multipolar world (Yevgeny Primakov)
gave place to Kofi Annan as the chief peacemaker, realizing that Moscow
deserved little trust in that area."



<bold>"U.S. Would Not Like Russia To Grab All Peacemaking Laurels" 

</bold>

Leonid Gankin mused in reformist, business-oriented <underline>Kommersant
Daily</underline> (2/20): "Washington would not like Russia to grab all
laurels for peacemaking. It would much rather that they go to the United
States for toughness and to the United Nations for mediation. Under the
circumstances, much depends on whether Russia thinks that she should go
into the shadow when the time comes. If she does, this will mean that she
values an end to the conflict more than the laurels of a winner." 


<bold>"Russia Can Win This Time" 

</bold>

Centrist <underline>Nezavisimaya Gazeta</underline> (2/20) published this
article by Aleksei Pushkov: "For Russia Iraq, virtually, is a winning
game, strike or no strike. It is a chance to make up, if partly, for
previous defeats and to return to the world arena as a truly great power,
a status many have stopped associating with the name of Russia. It may be
the first time recently that we face the Americans in a game that we can
win, let alone draw." 


<bold>"Being Jealous Of Uncle Sam" 

</bold>

Leonid Radzikhovsky held in reformist <underline>Segodnya</underline>
(2/14): "A great many Russian politicians are absolutely selfless--they
selflessly hate the United States. This is a well-known inferiority
complex, and Russia is not the only country afflicted by it. Evidently,
the Texan brazenness typical of the Americans acting in the world as if
it were a big ranch and they were its owners causes jealousy and
frustration among those who do not see themselves that way. Yet those
emotions are particularly strong in Russia. Russian politicians love to
visit the United States just as much as they love to do or at least to
say nasty things about it. As long as the rich and rustic Uncle Sam is
unloved by many, Russia has a chance to become popular in a global
'anti-American club.' It can capitalize on that, war or no war. The
world's 'gendarme' America dislikes Russia, and Russia hates 'the
gendarme.' But were it not for 'the gendarme,' Russia would have had it
really bad. You may, of course, hug Saddam to spite the United States.
But living next to this unpredictable and aggressive Islamic leader is
scary. Had we not known that the 'gendarme' can tame him, we would
probably have had to play the gendarme ourselves, something we can't
afford now, being very weak. So, how great it is to have the brash United
States! How great it is to be able to criticize it, sitting behind its
back! How great it is that it pays no attention to our criticism! How
great."


<bold>"Moscow Distances Itself From Baghdad" 

</bold>

Konstantin Eggert concluded in reformist <underline>Izvestia</underline>
(2/19): "Moscow's disillusionment with trying to influence Iraq in the
past few weeks is beginning to show. According to a high-ranking official
in the U.S. State Department, Russian diplomats privately agree that
attempts to influence Baghdad politically will be more effective, if
backed militarily. The Kremlin has gradually been distancing itself from
Saddam Hussein in the hope to stay in the shadow were the West to strike
a blow." 


<bold>"U.S. Uses UNSCOM As Cat's Paw" 

</bold>

Oleg Vladykin, citing experts in possession of 'enough information and a
clear idea of what Saddam Hussein really has in his arsenals,' wrote in
reformist weekly <underline>Obshchaya Gazeta</underline> (# 7, 2/19):
"All that hullabaloo over Iraq's chemical and bacteriological weapons
only serves to make out that country as a monster threatening the whole
world. The UNSCOM has long since completed its mission and, whether its
members like it or not, is now being turned into a cat's paw for the
United States to bring pressure to bear on Iraq. The Americans would like
to control that oil-rich region in order to secure their own economic and
political interests." 


<bold>"Scrap START II" 

</bold>

Neo-communist <underline>Pravda-Five</underline> (2/19) ran this piece by
Aleksandr Orlov: "There are no opponents that do not make mistakes.
Clinton made one by raising the question of a 'nuclear punishment' for
Iraq. By merely mentioning such a possibility, he gave Russia time to
think. So we can't afford to waste it. For Russia a nuclear threat
against Hussein is an internal, rather than external, matter. We need to
take urgent measures. First of all, we must bury START II and review our
attitude toward other military accords with the United States. A country
that links the use of nuclear weapons to its president's private...
concerns is a global risk."


<bold>"Moscow Unwilling To Quarrel With U.S. Over Iraq" 

</bold>

Konstantin Eggert observed in reformist <underline>Izvestia</underline>
(2/18): "Addressing the federal assembly, Boris Yeltsin stated that Iraq
should undeviatingly follow all UN resolutions. The president said he did
not consider diplomatic possibilities exhausted and referred to a
military solution as 'the last and most dangerous resort.' The key word
'last' evidently means that Moscow does not want to quarrel with America
over Saddam Hussein." 


<bold>"CIA Out to Discredit Russia's Policy" 

</bold>

Reformist, business-oriented <underline>Kommersant Daily</underline>
(2/18) cited on page one an unnamed adviser to the Russian government:
"The third world war mentioned by the Russian president is not yet to be,
but a war between special services is already on. Washington seeks to
split Iraq. Russia's policy may thwart that plan. Hence attempts to
discredit it, including via allegations that Moscow is engaged in a
secret game to protect Saddam. The Americans fear that settling the
crisis may balk at their geopolitical project to reform the Middle East." 


<bold>"America Possessed Of Its Messianic Mission" 

</bold>

Aleksandr Konovalov, president of an institute of strategic assessments,
had this to say in centrist <underline>Nezavisimaya Gazeta</underline>
(2/17): "There has been more evidence lately that America is possessed
and lacks the necessary self-control. Previously, the Americans had to
control themselves, owing to circumstances. With the USSR's nuclear
potential, ideological confrontation and all, how could they venture a
military action in the Gulf? Today the United States seems to believe
seriously in its Messianic mission--to bring happiness, American-style,
to humankind. We have been through that sickness, and all we can say now
is that the USSR fell apart largely because it sought to make the world
happy in its own, communist, sort of way. Trusting in one's own
messiahship is ruinous. No doubt, the world community needs to force
Saddam to comply with its will. But in doing so, it needs to use the
means adequate to its ends. There's an expression 'to cut off one's nose
to spite one's face.' It will be sad if the U.S.-planned operation
becomes an illustration of those words." 


<bold>"Western Oil Companies Want Iraq Isolated" 

</bold>

Vyacheslav Shiryayev asserted on page one of reformist <underline>Noviye
Izvestia</underline> (2/17): "Economic motives are a major factor
contributing to the current crisis over Iraq. Leading oil corporations in
the West are interested in the continued isolation of that country. Their
political influence is boundless. Suffice it to recall America's Chevron,
which easily secured the administration's permission for the export of
Kazakhstan oil to Iran. Oil is omnipotent." 


<bold>"Anti-Americanism In Vogue In Russia" 

</bold>

Vladimir Abarinov queried in reformist <underline>Russkiy
Telegraf</underline> (2/17): "Why does Yeltsin so intensely support
Saddam? In the Serbia case, it could be Slav-Orthodox brotherhood,
far-fetched as it is. With Iraq, it is pure anti-Americanism.
Anti-Americanism is very much in fashion today. Extras in Moscow's
political saloons, young people with immaculate haircuts, are sporting it
like Versace neckties." 


<bold>"America Seeks Control Over Oil Sources" 

</bold>

Dmirty Kulik in Damascus wrote for reformist, youth-oriented
<underline>Komsomolskaya Pravda</underline> (2/14): "Amidst the prewar
bustle, people tend to forget that, with the break-up of the USSR, the
process of redividing the world, far from over, has intensified. The
Americans and their allies, including the Turks, would very much like to
gain control over oil-rich Iraq. Also, by bringing Iraq under submission,
the Americans hope to deny Russia a chance to retrieve what that country
owes it. Besides, Russian oil companies that have signed multimillion
contracts with the Iraqis would lose that lucrative market. Russia's
prestige in the Middle East will wane if it fails to prevent a war.
Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, too, will have a hard time, with his
'well-wishers' accusing him of weak diplomacy." 


<bold>"Iraq Discussion: Total Fiasco" 

</bold>

According to Viktor Litovkin in reformist <underline>Izvestia</underline>
(2/14): "The discussion of the Iraq issue 


between the Russian and American defense ministers was a total fiasco.
There is one area, though, in which the Russian and U.S. militaries have
no differences. It is nuclear arms safety." 


<bold>"Moscow Shoved Iraq Down Cohen's Throat" 

</bold>

Marina Kalashnikova said in reformist, business-oriented
<underline>Kommersant Daily</underline> (2/14): "All those days Secretary
Cohen tried to evade the Iraq issue. All in vain--Moscow shoved that
subject down his throat." 


<bold>"Russia Threatens To Freeze Ties With U.S." 

</bold>

Igor Korotchenko pointed out on page one of centrist
<underline>Nezavisimaya Gazeta</underline> (2/14): "It was made quite
clear to the U.S. defense secretary that an armed action against Baghdad
will have the most adverse effect on Russo-American military ties and
prospects for START II ratification in Russia." 


<bold>"Differences Remain" 

</bold>

Aleksandr Zorin wrote in reformist <underline>Noviye Izvestia</underline>
(2/14): "Secretary Cohen hardly expected a very warm reception in
Moscow--the two countries are sharply divided on ways to settle the Iraq
problem, so there was no hope that so great a rift could be narrowed
suddenly during talks with Defense Minister Sergeyev, Defense Council
Secretary Kokoshin, and Foreign Minister Primakov. The sides firmly stood
their ground, each its own. Sergeyev called the U.S. position orthodox
and inflexible, offending some of the Western media and giving them cause
to state that the Russian army chief publicly lectured the Defense
Secretary. Cohen simply brushed aside Sergeyev's recriminations, though
he agreed that the Iraq problem concerned the whole world, not Washington
and Baghdad alone. The Americans are still determined to 'show the
Iraqis,' and we are still helpless to do anything about that." 


<bold>"Chilly Welcome For Cohen" 

</bold>

Under this headline, centrist <underline>Nezavisimaya
Gazeta</underline>'s Andrei Korbut stressed (2/13): "Cohen endeavored to
implement the objectives that had been announced earlier, avoiding
debates on the situation in the Persian Gulf. That gave reason for
sources in the Russian Defense Ministry to suggest that, for the
Americans, the use of force against Iraq is a decided matter. While the
American defense secretary focused on START II ratification, the safety
of nuclear arsenals and Russia's policy for European countries, the
Russian leaders kept changing the subject to dwell on Iraq. There was a
clear misunderstanding between the sides on the aims of the current stage
of the Russo-American dialogue." 


<bold>"Stalemate" 

</bold>

Oleg Odnokolenko commented in reformist <underline>Segodnya</underline>
(2/13): "It all came to a stalemate. The Russians failed to get the
Americans to accept a compromise, and the Americans failed to secure the
Russians' support. But then, the Americans did not seem to have expected
anything. William Cohen's visit is just a sign of courtesy with regard to
a nation whose political weight rests entirely on its nuclear arsenal." 


<bold>"Italy Privileged Partner" 

</bold>

Aleksei Bukalov said in reformist <underline>Segodnya</underline> (2/12):
"Including Italy among the Kremlin's privileged partners is the main
political result of President Yeltsin's stay on the Tiber. For Italy,
which has U.S. air bases on its territory, to join Russia on the Iraq
issue was a hard decision. But the Italian government feels stronger on
that issue now, after a recent lift crash at Cavalese." 



<bold>"Yeltsin's Policy All His Own" 

</bold>

Aleksei Pushkov opined in centrist <underline>Nezavisimaya
Gazeta</underline> (2/12): "It seems that Yeltsin is pursuing some kind
of virtual foreign policy all his own; that for him a phrase said for
effect is more important than the balanced subtle game of diplomacy; that
he values Russia's perceived grandeur more than her true--undoubtedly,
big--potential. So he has nobody but himself to blame for setting him
up." 


<bold>"Russia's Policy With Zhirinovsky Accent" 

</bold>

Konstantin Eggert commented in reformist <underline>Izvestia</underline>
(2/12) on the Zhirinovsky mission to Iraq: "That the government can't or
does not want to put an end to Zhirinovsky's antics or at least to stop
pandering to them is stunning, indeed. The Foreign Ministry cannot but
see that the scandal does not help the talks and gives Moscow a bad image
in the West. The so-called national consensus on Iraq which can briefly
be described as 'About Baghdad, speak either good things or nothing at
all,' is a bonanza for political scandal-mongers." 


<bold>GERMANY: "Yeltsin's Speech: Nothing New" 

</bold>

Werner Adam said on the front page of right-of-center
<underline>Frankfurter Allgemeine</underline> (2/18) regarding Yeltsin's
address to the nation, "What Yeltsin had to tell his people regarding his
immediate neighborhood was not anything new. However, it will not help
build up confidence if he incessantly repeats that NATO's enlargement was
a bad move and should never include the Baltic states. This is why
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia see their suspicions confirmed that Russia
continues to consider the Baltic states its sphere of influence and
continues to reject their close links with Europe. Just like a czar,
Yeltsin also has the tendency to criticize his own government while
remaining oblivious that it is he who determines with an imperial and
presidential omnipotence the direction and the goals of the government's
policy." 


<bold>"U.S.-Russia Honeymoon Is Over"

</bold>

Washington correspondent Yvonne Esterhazy filed editorially for business
<underline>Handelsblatt</underline> of Duesseldorf (2/15), "The Iraq
crisis is taxing U.S.-Russian relations.... The honeymoon between
Washington and Moscow is over. However, it is very unlikely that this
will automatically lead to a divorce.... It would be wrong to
overestimate this minor crisis in Russian-American relations....
Nevertheless, the sharp tones from Moscow cannot leave the U.S.
government indifferent. Russia...is still no consolidated democracy, but
a country that shaken by crises, a country that still has to find its own
way. It is also a nuclear power whose government is apparently unable to
exercise full control over its nuclear weapons. In addition, it is
unpleasant for the U.S. government to see that the Russian government
today is less cooperative in the Iraq conflict than Mikhail Gorbachev was
in the first Iraq conflict." 


<bold>"Russia's 'Interests' In Europe"

</bold>

Carl Gustaf Stroehm's editorial in right-of-center <underline>Die
Welt</underline> of Berlin stresssed (2/10), "It was foreseeable that
Russia would not like U.S. activities in the Baltics. But all those who
saw a new harmony develop between Moscow and the Western world are
surprised at the harsh and inexorable answer from President Yeltsin. In
an interview with an Italian daily, Yeltsin used brutal clarity and
spelled out the spheres of interests of the Russian empire.... (In the
interview) Yeltsin did not say what are Russia's 'rights' and 'interests'
in the Baltic region...but they are easy to guess: These are the ones
which Czar Peter the Great took in the 18th century.... If today's Russia
insisted on the indirect restoration of the borders of Czar Peter, a
conflict would be unavoidable--with the United States, as long as it does
not leave the Baltic peoples to their fate, and eventually with Europe. 


"Yeltsin's announcement that Russia wants to join all European
integration efforts (including 

the EU) to counter the 'monopolist hegemony' of the United States can
only mean that the Russian bear will shape the 'European house'...to such
an extent that it will turn this house into an anti-American union under
Moscow's leadership, or at least under considerable Russian influence."


<bold>BRITAIN: "Cohen Gave As Good As He Got"</bold> 


The conservative <underline>Times</underline> (2/13) noted regarding the
Cohen-Sergeyev encounter: "The row, the most serious of its kind since
the start of the latest Gulf crisis, was started by the Russian, who
lectured his guest on the dangers of war.... The American defense
secretary gave as good as he got.... The UN's discovery of apparent
Russian dealings with Iraq has raised questions in Washington about
whether Moscow's recent diplomatic drive to help to resolve the crisis
over UN weapons inspections may be motivated more by a wish to avoid
exposure as collaborators than a desire to avert a military strike....
Iraq and Russia have jointly demanded wider participation by Russians on
the weapon commission.... American officials have few doubts why Tariq
Aziz, the Iraqi deputy prime minister, has been insisting that Russians
approved by Moscow be appointed as chief inspectors for the teams: They
are the only individuals who know in advance where an inspection will
occur." 


<bold>FRANCE: "Russia's Determination To Recoup Influence In Arab 
World"

</bold>

Jean-Pierre Perrin observed in left-of-center
<underline>Liberation</underline> (2/13): "The Russian government has
denied the United States the 'right' to intervene militarily.... The
Russian defense minister has warned Washington, claiming that Russian
'vital interests' are at stake in the Iraqi issue.... The Russian
declaration illustrates Russia's determination to find some of its lost
influence in the Arab world." 


<bold>"Understood?"

</bold>

RTL radio aired this by Jerome Godefroi (2/13), "The direct approach used
by the Russian minister...may not have been friendly, but at least it had
the advantage of being clear." 


<bold>ITALY: "Most Violent Verbal Clash Of The Last 10 Years"

</bold>

Alberto Pasolini Zanelli judged from Washington in leading rightist
opposition <underline>Il Giornale</underline> (2/13): "Scenes and words
typical of the Cold War.... Unfortunately it is reality: Yesterday, the
defense ministers of Russia and the United States had the most violent
verbal clash of the last 10 years, bringing the clock back, at least
apparently, to the most tense moments which preceded the beginning of the
dialogue between Gorbachev and Reagan." 


<bold>"Qualitative Improvement In Russo-Italian Relations"

</bold>

A report in leading business <underline>Il Sole-24 Ore</underline>
remarked (2/11): "Behind this ailing president, intense work has been
going on that is producing a qualitative improvement in Russian-Italian
relations. 'The level of bilateral relations is unprecedented,' said
Yeltsin; 'it is extraordinary.' And Prodi reciprocated by saying: 'I
consider Russia not only a friendly nation, but an integral part of the
European reality.'"


<bold>"The Moscow-Italy Axis"

</bold>

A commentary by Maddalena Tulanti in PDS (leading government party)
<underline>L'Unita</underline> concluded (2/10): "Moscow is a precious
ally for Rome and it will be even more so after this trip, the first
after the dissolution of the USSR. For totally different reasons and
histories both capitals are seeking an international role in the
international arena. Both have something to gain if they support each
other. The 'action plan' that will be signed today...involves stable
cooperation, including at the political level.... The Italians have
agreed to sign the 'plan' because they're 


strongly lured by the idea of achieving international autonomy...while
paying attention not to bite off more than they can chew so as to avoid
irritating the old ally-master on the other side of the ocean. Even with
the usual caution, this time Italy showed more courage than in the past.
They did not talk solely about business...but also of the new world
order. It is not customary for us. And we did it with the dying lion,
with the sick czar. A good sign of trust, indeed." 


<bold>"This Russia Wants To Make Its Voice Heard Again" 

</bold>

Prominent foreign affairs commentator Franco Venturini wrote in centrist,
top-circulation <underline>Corriere della Sera</underline> (2/9): "Today
Boris Yeltsin is bringing to Rome a message we can no longer ignore: This
Russia, still in a transition phase, wants to make its voice heard again
on the international scene. No to U.S. hegemony in the world, Yeltsin
told our newspaper (in an interview Saturday). And just before that the
Kremlin chief had thundered against an anti-Saddam military
intervention.... Let's not jump to the wrong conclusions, however: Moscow
has neither the means nor the prestige to really oppose Clinton and to
restore its past role as a global superpower. But it has what is needed,
and this is real goal of Czar Boris, to start all over again beginning
with Europe, to become the privileged interlocutor of a Euro-area which
sooner or later will have to proceed towards political integration as
well.... Boris Yeltsin is preparing to sign with the Italian government a
'plan of action' which is not matched by any other agreement in Europe in
that it is so rich from an economic, political and cultural point of
view. How can we fail to realize that in this Europe without walls big
East-West politics is coming back in new forms?" 


<bold>"Russian Bear Rediscovers American Enemy"

</bold>

An analysis by Moscow correspondent Giulietto Chiesa in centrist,
influential <underline>La Stampa</underline> read (2/9): "This is a
really precious opportunity for Yeltsin: to express his 'cahier de
doleances' before an European audience that is already very responsive
and seems to be in agreement with a position critical of the United
States. Even the visit to the Vatican and the meeting with a pope who is
just back from Cuba, where he voiced explicit and tough disagreement
regarding the U.S. embargo, will end up strengthening the anti-U.S.
hegemony aspect of this Yeltsin 1998 version. Fate has decided that the
stage for Yeltsin's appearance in Europe should be Italy. The country
which more than any other insisted on a European role for Russia; the
country which is among the least marked by suspicion of wanting to
exploit the present Russian geo-political weakness for its own
objectives; in sum, the best possible partner among the many last-minute,
not completely reliable, friends, in which to try a European 'entrance'
in grand style." 


<bold>ARMENIA: "The Zhirinovsky Experience" 

</bold>

Armenian media gave substantial coverage to the unanticipated Yerevan
stopover of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who was on his way to Baghdad with a
planeload of Duma members, reporters and medical supplies.
<underline>Komsomolskaya Pravda</underline> (2/11) summed up current
treatment of the visit: It showed a flock of Russian parliamentarians
drinking cognac in the Hotel Armenia under the banner headline "Who's
paying?" A cartoon featuring a flock of birds with a feathered
Zhirinovsky leading the flight showed him saying, "Don't worry. If we
don't get to Baghdad, we can stop off in Yerevan for some fun." 


<bold>"Do We Need Protection?"

</bold>

Independent <underline>Molorak</underline> front-paged this view (2/11),
"The Hotel Armenia looks like a fortress these days.... I haven't seen so
much security for any official meetings ever before. But it is still
unclear to me whether they are protecting Zhirinovsky from us, or we from
Zhirinovsky."



<bold>BELGIUM: "What Russia Wants"

</bold>

Freddy de Pauw offered this analysis of Russia's actions on Iran in
independent Catholic <underline>De Standaard</underline> (2/13), "Russia
wants to use this opportunity as much as it can to return to its position
as a country to be reckoned with.... Through the current Iraq crisis,
Russia hopes to regain some influence in the region.... Moscow hopes to
convert the Arab world's hesitations about an attack on Iraq into
diplomatic victory. There is also indication that Moscow has been
negotiating secret deals with Iraq for some time and is broadening its
influence in this country. 




"But there are other reasons why Iraq is of 'vital interest' to Moscow.
Iraqi oil wells are after all not so far away from the Caspian region,
which Russia considers as a 'very close neighbor' but about which it has
hardly any say. Russia must deal with serious competition in the
Caspian-Caucasian region, namely from the United States which is tying
solid links in what was formerly the 'southern dump' of the Soviet Union.
It is thus, indeed, of vital interest to Moscow that the United States
does not 'advance' any further in the southern part of this oil 
region."




<bold>BULGARIA: "Kremlin Looking For Revenge On U.S. In Baghdad"

</bold>



Under the headline above, center-right <underline>Standart</underline>
(2/16) observed, "Moscow is aware that history has written it off as a
superpower. Yet it is still hard for Russia to reconcile itself to this
emotionally. The Iraqi crisis is a good opportunity for Russia to prove
to itself that it can still oppose the world's only superpower--the
United States. If its effort to avoid the military attack succeeds,
Moscow will show the world who is the peacekeeper, and who is the war
monger. Hence, Russia hopes that this will bring it dividends mainly of
Arab origin."




<bold>HUNGARY: "Moscow Building New-Old Bridges"

</bold>



An editorial in influential <underline>Magyar Hírlap</underline> (2/20)
stressed, "A Russian economic daily writes that Foreign Minister Primakov
visited only one country, Hungary, out of the three NATO candidates and
he does not plan further visits to Prague or to Warsaw, either. It means,
according to the author, that Budapest, unlike the other two would-be
members, respects Russia's interest to a greater degree. This opinion is
thought-provoking, since the Russian press keeps reporting on stalled
Russian-Polish and Russian-Czech relations, while forms a more positive
opinion about Hungary. But all this does not mean that Budapest is that
keen to seek great favors of Moscow. It is rather about the mutual
ambition of both Moscow and Budapest to warm up the earlier cooled
political and economic relations.... It must be admitted that it is not
in the interest of Hungary to let doors shut in front of the country
again. Approaching the new century, Boris Yeltsin is seeking stable
partners and not new allies in Central-Eastern Europe. And it should not
be ashamed."




<bold>THE NETHERLANDS: "Iraq Policy Undermines Credibility Of Russian
Diplomacy"

</bold>



Influential, independent <underline>NRC</underline>'s editorial noted
(2/13), "We will probably not get a world war but the gap between the
United States and Russia about the correct position towards Saddam
Hussein seems to be becoming too deep.... The Russian resistance against
the U.S. willingness to use force if necessary undermines the credibility
of Russian diplomacy. The suspicion that Russia violated the UN embargo
against Iraq and that it supplied Saddam with materials for the
production of mass destruction weapons cannot be refuted with one simple
denial. As a permanent member of the UNSC, the Russians share the
responsibility for maintaining peace. If this peace is jeopardized, then
action should be taken. Diplomatic missions could have some impact,
however, only if the other party wants to listen. It is highly uncertain
whether Saddam will listen." 




<bold>POLAND: "Yeltsin's Conclusion Is Wrong" 

</bold>



Centrist <underline>Rzeczpospolita</underline> held (2/24) in a piece by
Ryszard Malik, "This time, diplomacy won in 




Iraq. But it is wrong to conclude, as Russia's president rushed to do,
that this agreement is final. Boris Yeltsin forgets that last November
Saddam Hussein also agreed to the inspection of military objects [in
Iraq]. As everybody knows, this inspection wound up in another crisis."




<bold>"Russia's Problem Is Not Iraq, It's U.S."

</bold>



Slawomir Popowski wrote for centrist
<underline>Rzeczpospolita</underline> (2/19), "From the very beginning of
the Iraqi crisis, Russia has opposed the American plans to resolve the
conflict by force and make Saddam Hussein comply with the resolutions of
the UN Security Council.... Now Russia tries to demonstrate that it is a
world superpower without which no global problem can be solved.... Last
year in November, pressured by Moscow, Hussein gave in and a diplomatic
solution was found to resolve the conflict over the UN inspectors....
This time, however, it is more difficult not only because Washington's
determination is greater, but also because of Baghdad's hard-line
position.... Ironically, it is Moscow which should be blamed for this
[situation].... It is as if their basic problem in the Middle East is not
Iraq and its dictator but the United States itself." 




<bold>PORTUGAL: "The New Cold War" 

</bold>



Weekly columnist Celso Filipe said in moderate, leading financial
<underline>Diário Económico</underline> (2/6) regarding Yeltsin's warning
of a third world war: "The Cold War is back. The United States and Russia
are facing off against each other, 12 years later, with Iraq as
backdrop.... These drastic positions demonstrate that Russia wants to
recover its worldwide influence, which was temporarily lost. Yeltsin has
created an additional problem for the U.S. president, who thought about
using Iraq as a training ground for new weaponry as well as to divert
attention from his extra-marital affairs. Yeltsin's harsh
stance--radically against any military intervention in Iraq--demonstrates
that the United States is not the single ruler of the world. And that the
ex-Bolshevik republic, transformed into Russia, continues to exercise a
definitive position in determining world stability."




<bold>SPAIN: "More Than Enough" 

</bold>



Luis Matias Lopez mused in liberal <underline>El Pais</underline> (2/16):
"If there is no war, Russia will say it was thanks to her, but if there
is, she will say that she did everything she could to avoid it. For a
country that today aspires to be a focus point in a multi-polar world,
that is more than enough." 




<bold>TURKEY: "U.S. And Russia Play, And Turkey Watches"

</bold>



Mehmet Ali Birand told readers of mass-appeal
<underline>Sabah</underline> (2/9): "The Gulf crisis puts Saddam and
Clinton up front. However, the real struggle is between the United States
and Russia, which is back in the action. Due to America's harsh policies
against Iran, Iraq and Syria, Russia is now enjoying getting its 'old
customers' back. Russia is selling arms to all of them. If Russia
persuades Iraq, it will be a winner in the region. If this does not
happen and end with U.S. strike, then Russia is going to be the first
country which Baghdad might ask for help.... The developments in Armenia
also shows that Russia works hard to be influential again in the Middle
East and the Caucasus. The real motive of the ongoing crisis is the
question of controlling oil reserves. If the United States manages to
bend Saddam, it will increase its influence in the region remarkably."




MIDDLE EAST




<bold>IRAQ: "Leaked Story Aimed At Thwarting Russia's Efforts"

</bold>



Baghdad's Iraq Television Network broadcast this in Arabic (2/12): "The
U.S. newspaper, the <underline>Washington Post</underline> today alleged
that (UNSCOM) inspectors...have found documents showing that Russia has
supplied Iraq with equipment to manufacture biological materials in
violation of 




the sanctions system imposed on Iraq. An official spokesman for the
Culture and Information Ministry today made the following statement to
the Iraqi News Agency: 'By leaking this news to the <underline>Washington
Post</underline>, the U.S. administration wants to harm the persistent
efforts Russia has been exerting within the framework of international
endeavors to reach a diplomatic solution to the current problem between
Iraq on the one hand, and UNSCOM and the United States on the other.'"




<bold>ISRAEL: "Respecting Russia" 

</bold>



The independent <underline>Jerusalem Post</underline>'s lead editorial
commented (2/15): "The West should take care not to cast Russia in the
role of 'bad guy' over Iraq, nor over any other issue. The fact that
Russia has different views on Iraq is not necessarily sinister.... Moscow
is owed billions of dollars by Iraq since the Soviet days, therefore a
country with an economy as fragile as Russia's just might be interested
in having UN sanctions lifted so it can get some of its money back....
Russia is an important, independent, diverse and cultured nation. One day
it will restore its recently-lost global clout. Respect and understanding
from the West now, and less bossiness, will yield some dividends when
that day comes." 




EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC




<bold>HONG KONG: "China, Russia See Washington As Common Foe" 

</bold>



The independent, English-language <underline>Hong Kong
Standard</underline> featured this comment (2/24) by Cary Huang: "The
impending showdown between Iraq and the United States is forging a
Sino-Russian alliance that aims at putting the brakes to Washington's
domination of global affairs and its self-proclaimed role as the world's
sole superpower policeman.... The simple truth as to why China and Russia
have such a high profile on the issue is that both are in no position to
intervene militarily in the Middle East.... The Gulf has additional
value. If Washington is not able to control the transit area between
Europe and Asia or if it falls into hostile hands, the United States'
strategic outlook would be seriously impeded.... (This is) just what
other adversaries such as China and Russia want to see as a check on the
U.S. military and strategically.... Both nations also have economic,
political and strategic stakes in the region." 




LATIN AMERICA




<bold>ARGENTINA: "Who Won And Who Lost In This Crisis" 

</bold>



Claudio Uriarte, international columnist for left-of-center
<underline>Pagina 12</underline>, opined (2/24): "As a result of the deep
repugnance of the American public to any overseas military losses...the
ground option was not even considered. As a result, the American
operation lost its credibility, opening the path to intermediate options
proposed by France and Russia, to an action that was foreseen as useless
butchery. It was impossible to avoid those options: In fact, what Saddam
achieved with his acceptance of the UN accord was that any kind of
American insistence on attacking Iraq would be turned into a diplomatic
war within the Security Council, with Russia and France on one side and
the United States and Great Britain on the other--that is to say, a
fracture that would have been too expensive to the West." 




<bold>For more information, please contact:

</bold>



<bold>U.S. Information Agency

</bold>

<bold>Office of Public Liaison

</bold>

<bold>Telephone: (202) 619-4355

</bold>



<bold> 2/24/98 

</bold>



<bold> # # #

</bold></center>

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