February 18, 1998   
This Date's Issues: 2067  •2068 

Johnson's Russia List
#2066
17 February 1998
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
Those who wish to receive the full text of Anne Williamson's
chapter on privatization in Russia (Crime of the Century) should
contact me. This lengthy item was previously only distributed to
List Two recipients.
1. Reuters: Yeltsin Calls for Budget Changes, Tax Code.
2. Reuters: Yeltsin Lauds Russian Diplomacy, Tough on Iraq.
3. Reuters: Many of Past Speech Promises Unfulfilled.
4. Ludmila Foster: Review of Solzhenitsyn.
5. RIA Novosti: YELTSIN: "ESSENCE OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IS 
ITS MORE NOTICEABLE ROLE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS."
6. Izvestia: TWENTY-FIVE MILLION RUSSIANS TO SUBMIT INCOME 
DECLARATIONS.
7. Transition: Vladimir Shlapentokh reviews Alexander Korzhakov's,
"Boris Yeltsin: Ot Rasveta Do Zakata, Interbuk, 1997."
8. Gary Kern: Lend-Lease Love.
9. Obshchaya Gazeta: Margarita Popova and Yelena Skvortsova,
"A Blabbermouth Is Once Again a Boon to a Spy: A List of State Secrets 
Has Been Approved by the President, and the Minister Has Assigned a 
Secret Classification to the Work of the MVD."
10. RFE/RL NEWSLINE: YELTSIN URGES PARLIAMENT TO RATIFY START-2,
WANTS BANKS TO INVEST IN INDUSTRY, ZYUGANOV UNIMPRESSED BY PRESIDENTIAL 
ADDRESS, and MAJOR NETWORKS INDIFFERENT TO SPEECH.]

*******

#1
Yeltsin Calls for Budget Changes, Tax Code
Reuters 
17 February 1998

MOSCOW -- Russian President Boris Yeltsin said on
Tuesday that the 1998 draft budget, due to face its fourth and
final reading in the lower house of parliament shortly, needed
amendments to make it realistic. 
"I demand the government makes
sure the budget for the current year is realistic," a fit-looking
Yeltsin said in his annual speech to a joint meeting of the
Duma and Federation Council in the Kremlin. 
"Even though the budget debate is in progress, even if it
requires amendments, the budget should be made
realistic." 
Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov said Yeltsin might veto
the budget if the State Duma did not accept a series of
amendments to be presented to it. 
Yeltsin also urged parliamentarians to adopt a realistic tax
code this year. The draft budget and tax code are the two
main economic foundations upon which the government
hopes to create real economic growth this year and
beyond. 
"The tax code has to be passed this year - it cannot be put
off any more," he said. 
Low tax collection was the main reason for a gaping budget
deficit in 1997. Yeltsin called for a balanced primary budget
-- reflecting revenues and spending before expenditure on
debt servicing -- as early as next year. 
"In 1999, we absolutely need to have a zero primary
budget deficit," he said in a written address for legislators
released just before the speech was delivered. 
Yeltsin warned his Cabinet that there would be more
changes ahead if they failed to resolve strategic economic
problems. 
"If the government is not able to solve these strategic tasks,
then we will have another government," he said. 
He recently indicated he would keep liberals Anatoly
Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, both first deputy prime
ministers, until the end of his four-year term in the year
2000. 
But the government is due to report to Yeltsin on Feb. 26
on its record during 1997 and the 67-year-old president
has made clear he is looking for proof that Russia is finally
strong economic growth after years of steep
declines. 
The Russian economy officially grew by 0.4 percent in
1997, while industrial output rose 1.9 percent. 
Yeltsin had called for growth of between 2 percent and 4
percent in 1998, although the impact of the Asian financial
crisis on Russia could reduce that sharply, other
government officials have said. 
The president said Russia needed strong, sustainable
economic growth rather than just low inflation and a stable
ruble. Currency and price rises were brought largely under
control last year. 
"We need stable and proper economic growth, a supported
inflow of investment." 
In the written address, which is being watched closely by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for signs of
commitment to reform and budget discipline, Yeltsin
cautioned against holding up economic reforms. 
"We must all learn the lesson -- sluggish reforms result in
damage, time lost has its price," the text read. 
IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus was due to
arrive in Moscow later on Tuesday. 
The written address said that Russia hoped the IMF's
current $9.2 billion loan package would be its last, as it
started on the path of economic independence. 
It also called for lower tariffs charged by the "natural
monopolies" -- the huge Soviet-era companies in charge of
gas, electricity, oil transportation and railways. 
"The state is not going to fight natural monopolies, but it will
strengthen its control over their activities," the text said.

*******

#2
Yeltsin Lauds Russian Diplomacy, Tough on Iraq 
Reuters
17 February 1998

MOSCOW -- President Boris Yeltsin on Tuesday lauded
Russia's active role in world diplomacy and repeated his
against the use of force to resolve the Iraq
crisis. 
In his annual state-of-the-nation address to parliament,
Yeltsin focused mainly on the domestic economy but he
stressed that Russia's voice was being heard clearly in the
wider world. 
"Today it is clear to all -- without Russia it is impossible to
reach productive decisions on thorny international issues,
be it the Bosnian problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict or the
Middle East situation," he said in the printed version of his
address. 
His remarks clearly reflected Moscow's search for a new
role in world diplomacy after losing its superpower status. 
Yeltsin, who has made a series of foreign trips in the past
year and enjoys playing the role of world statesman, made
clear that Moscow still opposed any military strikes against
Baghdad. 
"It is necessary to use all diplomatic possibilities (in the
standoff between Iraq and the United Nations). The use of
force is the last and the most dangerous way," Yeltsin said. 
Russia has been at the forefront of world diplomatic efforts
to persuade Iraq to allow U.N. arms inspectors unfettered
access to suspected sites of biological and chemical
weapons. 
But Moscow's vocal opposition to U.S. threats to use force if
Iraq fails to comply has not been strong enough for some
Russian parliamentarians. 
Seconds after Yeltsin took his seat on the podium on
Tuesday after delivering his speech, ultra-nationalist leader
Vladimir Zhirinovsky shouted to him to harden his Iraq
stance. 
"Boris Nikolayevich, only you can stop it. Russia has
enough authority to do so," yelled Zhirinovsky, who has just
returned to Moscow from a trip to Baghdad during which he
fully sided with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. 
"You have enough moral weight which you can use to
prevent a war. Otherwise it will start. All deputies are
pleading with you," Zhirinovsky said. 
The Kremlin leader, clearly taken by surprise, replied in a
strained and agitated voice: "There is no person in this hall
who is more concerned with Iraq than me." 
Yeltsin said Russia's relations with the West were still
overshadowed by NATO's eastward expansion. 
Moscow has reluctantly accepted the membership of three
Soviet-era allies -- Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic -- in the Atlantic alliance and knows it cannot stop
other Central and Eastern European countries from joining
in the future. 
But it has drawn a firm line against the three Baltic
republics, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, signing up for full
NATO membership, as they have said they will do. 
"Our position is extremely clear on this point: such a
development (the Baltic states' accession to NATO) would
be taken in Russia as a threat to national security and
would mean a reassessment of our relations with NATO,"
the address said. 
Yeltsin hailed Russia's new membership of the
Asian-Pacific Economic Forum and of the Group of Seven
wealthy countries. 
Moscow now calls the forum the G8 and Yeltsin will join the
leaders of the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain,
France, Italy and Canada at their annual summit in May as
an equal. 
Yeltsin said Russia had forged stronger ties with China and
Japan and but acknowledged that closer to home, in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that replaced
the old Soviet Union, the picture was far from bright. 
"The weak dynamism of the CIS's development has
become even more noticeable (over the past year)," he
said. Some commentators have speculated whether the
CIS has any future. 
Yeltsin said Russia's foreign policy must be more firmly
grounded in the country's economic interests. He noted
that the European Union still discriminated against Russian
products because Russia was not officially classed as a
market economy. 
"We should seek a repeal of discriminatory measures with
regard to the problems of our firms," he said. 
"Our diplomats will have to work hard," Yeltsin added.

*******

#3
Many of Past Speech Promises Unfulfilled 
Reuters
17 February 1998

MOSCOW -- Russian President Boris Yeltsin returned to
many of the same themes of previous state-of-the- nation
speeches on Tuesday, calling for intensified reforms to
spur economic growth. 
If past experience is any guide, many of these promises will
go unfulfilled or fall short of their goals. 
Yeltsin started making annual state of the nation speeches
in 1994, months after he attacked the old Soviet-era
parliament with tanks and ushered in a new constitution
that called for an annual address to both houses of the new
parliament. 
Outsiders have often watched the speeches to garner
clues about the state of Boris Yeltsin, whose health
problems have limited his public appearances. Typically he
has performed well, appearing decisive but humorless. 
This year, just a week after a trip to Italy in which he
appeared generally healthy, Yeltsin had less to prove in
terms of health, and gave a speech focused on the
economy. 
"We must all learn the lesson -- sluggish reforms result in
damage, time lost has its price," he said. "We need a new
policy, that of economic growth." 
A glance back at his past addresses shows a series of
unfulfilled promises in areas such as economic growth and
the fight against crime and corruption. 
"I will resolutely punish those who break the constitution
and laws," Yeltsin said last year. "There is corruption at
every level of power." 
Flash back to 1994 and the language is quite similar on the
issue that Yeltsin acknowledged on Tuesday remains a
problem: "A strong state is essential to curb crime, this is
the most important task of the year." 
Ushering in economic growth has been another staple of
Yeltsin's state of the nation addresses. 
"The task of 1995 is to create the starting conditions and
the potential for economic growth," he said that year. 
But Russia's economy continued to shrink until 1997, when
gross national product eked out a 0.4 percent gain -- short
of the 2 percent growth Yeltsin projected in his 1997
speech. 
The president's 1997 call for a fairer tax system remains
unfulfilled to this day. 
But Yeltsin did follow last year's promise to implement
sweeping changes in the government. "Energetic and
competent people will come...and I will announce these
changes in the coming days," he said. 
The next day he brought reformer Anatoly Chubais back
into the government as first deputy prime minister. Then, in
a surprise move 10 days later, he also made Boris
Nemtsov, then a regional governor, a first deputy prime
minister. 
On Tuesday, Yeltsin said failure to bring economic growth
could prompt more changes in the government. 
Such a statement, as in past addresses, gave Yeltsin the
chance to try to project himself as a populist fighting for the
little guy -- the image that helped his rise to power. 
"We called on people for a long time to tighten their belts,
and people did this, but their patience is exhausted," he
said in 1996 less than four months before presidential
elections. 
A year before he too said their patience was exhausted. 
Another theme repeated in each address since 1994 has
been Yeltsin's opposition to expansion of the NATO
alliance -- which has continued unimpeded by Russian
objections. 
This year as in the past Yeltsin has lamented the slow pace
of military reform, after calling 1995 a "year of military
reform." Yet the armed forces remain a bloated force,
poorly matched to the defense needs of the country going
into the 21st century. 

*******

#4
Date: Tue, 17 Feb 1998 
From: "Ludmila A. Foster" <ludmila@erols.com>
Subject: Review of Solzhenitsyn

Thanks for publishing the review by Norman Stone from the London TIMES
(February 15) of the new biography of Solzhenitsyn. Apparently, the
biography - "Alexander Solzhenitsyn: A Century in His Life"- was written by
a D. M. Thomas and published by Little Brown. But that is all we learn from
the "review:" the rest is an unprofessional, biased, low-life diatribe by
this Mr. Stone who is announced as a Professor of International Relations
at Bilkent University in Ankara. I feel sorry for his students! Some of the
facts of Solzhenitsyn's life that he quotes in his desire to diminish the
man are actually wrong and incorrect.
Also, before I read this "review" I used to think that the London TIMES
was a first-class newspaper. I could not believe my eyes that they have
actually published such trash about a writer who changed the Twentieth
Century and was awarded a Nobel Price. 
Mr. Stone is fortunate that Dr. Freud is not around anymore; he would
have diagnosed Mr. Stone with his famous "penis envy."

*******

#5
RIA Novosti
February 17, 1998


YELTSIN: "ESSENCE OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IS ITS
MORE NOTICEABLE ROLE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS"
By RIA Novosti political news analyst Valentin KUNIN 

The essence of Russia's foreign policy is to firmly uphold
its national interests, raise Moscow's role in global affairs
in the interests of enhancing stability and cooperation in
international relations, and promote the model of a multi-polar
world, said President Boris Yeltsin of Russia in delivering his
annual address to the Federal Assembly. 
One weighty proof of Russia's growing authority, he
stressed, is the eventual formation in 1997 of the Big Eight
global powers with Russia's full membership. 
Boris Yeltsin's evaluation of the dynamics of Russia's
relations with the CIS states last year was controversial. One
positive result was the conclusion of the treaty of the union
of Russia and Belarus and the signing of the treaty of
friendship, cooperation and partnership between Russia and
Ukraine. At the same time, the CIS as a whole is developing far
too slowly. The burden of outstanding matters in bilateral and
multilateral relations is growing. The mutual trade turnover is
on the decrease. 
The traditionally energetic European direction of Russia's
foreign policy brought tangible fruit in 1997, Yeltsin said.
Russia became a member of the Paris Club of creditor nations
and concluded an important agreement with the London Club. The
agreement on partnership and cooperation with the European
Union is in force. Brisk interaction on the most topical issues
of bilateral relations and international affairs was continued
with the leadership of Britain, Germany, France, Italy and
other European states. 
The matter of European security is in the focus. Yeltsin
stressed that Moscow views the drafting of a European security
charter, a code of conduct of sorts for the new Europe, as a
key objective of its foreign policy in 1998. 
The Russian President reiterated that the concept of
"NATO-centrism" per se and the enlargement of the alliance in
particular, were still unacceptable for Russia. The Kremlin
intends to continue to oppose such plans without sliding down
to confrontation. Yeltsin seems to pin great hopes on the 1997
Russia-NATO founding act as well as the standing Russia-NATO
council, an important instrument of interrelationship, on the
key matter of transforming the North Atlantic alliance
included. 
Yeltsin said that the increasingly more frequent
statements by some Western and Baltic politicians on the
"inevitability" of Baltija's membership of NATO were evoking
growing concerns. The Kremlin's stance on the matter is
absolutely clearcut: such a turn of events would be taken in
Russia as endangering its national security and would entail a
revision of the whole range of its relations with NATO. Russia
suggests that the Baltija states should stop seeking false
threats and focus, instead, on building relations of true
neighbourliness and mutually advantageous partnership. 
Positive dynamics was preserved in relations between
Russia and the US, Yeltsin pointed out. Trade and economic
cooperation is on the rise on the whole. The package of
agreements to identify the strategic and non-strategic ABM
systems is instrumental for the continuing strategic stability.
Now is the time to consider, indepth, the format of a START-3
treaty. 
Yeltsin said that Russia's membership of the Asian-Pacific
Economic Cooperation, or APEC, was a true breakthrough in the
Asian direction of Russia's foreign policy. It is a graphic
proof of Russia's unique role as a Eurasian power. 
Relations between Russia and China are confidently
developing along the lines of intimate partnership aimed into
the 21st century. 
Scaled trade and economic cooperation, the essence of last
year's Yeltsin-Hashimoto plan, should become the firm
foundation of Russian-Japanese relations, the President
believes. 
Russia's foreign political initiatives and moves, those of
a truly great power, embrace all topical international affairs
and effectively the whole planet geographically, Yeltsin
pointed out. These days, it has become clear to each and
everyone that no urgent international issue - be it the Bosnia
controversy, the Arab-Israeli settlement or the situation in
Southwest Asia - can be tackled without Russia, the President
stressed. 
In the past year, Russia's national interests were
unchanged, Yeltsin said. What did change was the dynamism of
the effort to uphold them and the scale of practical results.
The main objective for the day is to create beneficial external
conditions for Russia's economic growth and progress. 

*******

#6
>From RIA Novosti
Izvestia
February 17, 1998
TWENTY-FIVE MILLION RUSSIANS TO SUBMIT INCOME DECLARATIONS
By Dmitry DOKUCHAYEV

"Pay taxes and sleep well," appeal commercials broadcast
daily on various TV channels. So far, some 260,000 Russian
citizens have won the right to "sleep well".
About 260,000 income declarations for the past year had
been filed to tax agencies by early February, said Max Sokol,
chief of the department dealing with taxes on private
individuals of Russia's State Taxation Service (GNS).
Meanwhile, by GNS forecasts, the total number of taxpayers
obliged to file such declarations must be no less than 6
million this year.
Tax agents do not seem to be anxious about the difference
between these two figures: 6 million expected and 260,000 filed
declarations. As Izvestia was told at the GNS, several million
taxpayers have already taken the declarations to fill them in
but will probably file them only in March - the last month when
they are still accepted. Along with the declaration, every
visitor to the tax inspectorate will get specil instructions
on how to fill it in.
By Sokol's data, 3.9 million declarations were filed by
private individuals last year, which is nearly 1.5 times more
than in 1996. Out of this number, 3.3 million were filed
voluntarily, and the rest - under compulsion, after the set
deadline.
This year, the GNS expects a considerable growth in the
number of declarations filed and the amounts of tax receipts
to the budget.
Next year, domestic taxpayers will see a number of
innovations. First, a new, more liberal taxation scale will be
introduced, thus easing the tax burden. All people who have two
or more sources of income, irrespective of the amounts of such
incomes, will have to file their declarations. And there are
about 20-25 million such people in the country. To embrace all
of them, all enterprises and organisations will have to submit
information about their employees (recorded on computer disks)
to tax agencies before March 1, 1999.

*******

#7 
Date: Tue, 17 Feb 1998 
From: Vladimir Shlapentokh <shlapent@pilot.msu.edu>
Subject: Alexander Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot Rasveta Do Zakata, Interbuk,
1997

>From Transition
Alexander Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: Ot Rasveta Do Zakata, Interbuk, 1997
A Review
By Vladimir Shlapentokh

Despite the Kremlin's efforts, Korzhakov's book, Ot Rasveta Do Zakata (From
Dawn to Dusk), became a sensation in Russia. There has not been a
publication in the last seven years which has drawn so much public
attention. Among several other things, Korzhakov, a one time presidential
body guard, describes how the Russian Political elite view democracy.
The Russian audience is divided into three categories. The first group is
comprised of those who solemnly declared their disinterest in the book and
vowed not to read it. 
The second group, while confessing that they read the book, deeply
criticize its contents. They castigate the text for its overwhelmingly
negative evaluation of Russian politics. This logic reflects the famous
principle: "the messenger is guilty" and erroneously holds Korzhakov
accountable for what he delineates--the filth floating around in the
Kremlin. Interestingly enough, Korzhakov's manuscript (unlike most
publications of this sort) completely avoids such savory and marketable
topics as "sex in the Kremlin" and "cash flow in Yeltsin's family". 
Among the third category, there are readers who take Korzhakov's work quite
seriously. However, very few Russian liberal authors dare to discuss the
book as a significant basis for understanding the Russian ruling elite
(among those who do, Vitalii Tretiakov, the editor of Nezavisimaia Gazeta,
August 21, 1997). Conversely, the oppositional media (Sovietskaia Rossia
and Zavtra) has abundantly cited Korzhakov with sadistic pleasure.
Remarkably, pracatically no one has accused the author of inventing or
distorting the major facts. Even Korzhakov's most furious critics have not
come forward to accuse the author of publishing libelous falsehoods. Future
historians will undoubtedly consider Korzhakov's book an outstanding source
of information about the Boris Yeltsin era. 
This book can not be dismissed with "argumentum ad hominem". The fact that
the author lacks a strong education and cultural foundation goes without
saying, but this, however, does not undermine (though it is clear that his
critics wish it would) the truth. In fact, Korzhakov's limited intellectual
ability works rather well in favor of the reader as it allows for an
unembellished portrait of life in the Kremlin.
Korzhakov portrays himself (certainly by inadvertence) as being servile and
having an almost complete lack of self respect. For example, he accepted
being forced into an unnecessary surgery on his nose merely to show Yeltsin
that his surgeons were able to do the same with the Presidential nose. He
demonstrated his obsequious demeanor on another occasion when Yeltsin,
slightly imbibed and very angry with Korzhakov's attempt at moderating his
indecent behavior, tore Korzhakov's tie from his neck in public. 
Like almost all of the heros in this book, Korzhakov is obsessed with
material enrichment, good food and excessive drinking.
Politically, the author is extremely cynical. At the same time, his
individual ideology smacks of a deeply ingrained belief in the despotic
state. He and his close friend, Mikhail Barsukov, are evidently
anti-Semites. Korzhakov cited himself as suggesting that people with Jewish
features should not appear on Television during the Presidential campaign in
1996 so as not to "push away potential votes for the president".
In short, Korzhakov has an ugly personality. However, personality can not
be used for evaluating the credibility of information. Iniquitous
personalities, in fact, have a long tradition of receiving credibility.
American and Italian courts, for instance, have put their trust in some of
the most infamous characters in the Mafia (those who break the "omerta" and
testify against mob bosses). 
The most important contribution of this book is its description of the
anti-democratic mentality inside the Kremlin. Korzhakov explains the
severely negative outlook of Yeltsin, and the ruling elite as a whole,
toward democratic institutions. Korzhakov recounts certain developments
(never before documented) in March, 1993, when the Russian parliament was
only inches away from impeaching the president. Aware of this danger,
Yeltsin ordered his retinue to prepare the arrest of all deputies in the
case of impeachment. What is more, he had planned to use chemical gases in
order to "smoke" the deputies from the building. Fortunately for the
deputies, impeachment did not occur. 
Korzhakov's treatment of events following the presidential election in 1996
is undoubtably an object of intellectual inveiglement. In this year, as
well as in 1993, Yeltsin had no intention of leaving the Kremlin and was
prepared to take any actions to insure his continued stay. Yeltsin felt
free to express his contemptuous feelings toward democratic principles in
Korzhakov's presence. Some episodes the author relates are resonant of the
Nixon years and the recently published "Watergate" tapes. According to
Korzhakov, in the summer of 1996, Yeltsin and his premier minister, Victor
Chernomyrdin debated the very serious possibility of canceling the
presidential election.
Among the various developments of this period, one, in particular, deserves
special attention. On Sunday, March 17, special police units seized the
parliament building in what was, by all accounts, part of the plan to cancel
the presidential election, a plan which was later abandoned. Korzhakov only
briefly mentioned this very important event (disregarded by the West), but
promised to tell more about it elsewhere, seemingly to explain why this plan
was dropped.
Korzhakov adds several significant details which confirm the view that the
Kremlin violated many democratic rules during the presidential election
campaign in 1996. He fully explains, with much elaboration, the story about
how Anatolii Chubais' people tried to illegally take 500 thousand dollars
from the Kremlin. There is no doubt that Korzhakov's and not Chubais'
version of this story is correct.
Democratic institutions such as the parliament and the courts play an
extremely limited role in the life of the Kremlin and have no influence over
the decision making process. Instead, Yeltsin's family emerges, in
Korzhakov's book, as a leading political institution in Russia. Korzhakov
concludes, "when it came to making decisions, Yeltsin was motivated not by
the interest of the state, but by his own family clan". As the author
contends, the Kremlin was run by various unconventional leaders such as body
guards like Korzhakov, himself. In his book, Korzhakov confessed that he
and Barsukov (another member of Yeltsin's guard) "governed the country for
three years".
Korzhakov also paints an interesting portrait of the people around Yeltsin,
few of which are more elevated in moral virtue and intellect than the
author. Korzhakov describes the atmosphere surrounding Yeltsin as thick
with unbridled favoritism, a fertile ground for unrelenting and perfidious
intrigues among those struggling for the president's ear. It is indeed
intriguing how much the idea of murder hangs over the Kremlin. The requests
and promises of people in the Kremlin to murder their political rivals are
interspersed throughout the book. For example, Boris Berezovskii, a huge
financial mogul, asked Korzhakov to murder Vladimir Gusinsky, another
financial tycoon. Meanwhile, Korzhakov, himself, had vowed to kill
Berezovskii. At the same time, General Alexander Lebed threatened to shoot
Korzhakov who only reversed the same threat upon Lebed. Korzhakov also
contends that during his State Duma election campaign (in the aftermath of
his ousting from the Kremlin in June 1996), his political adversaries wanted
to kill his rival in the parliamentary election in Tula in order to deem the
election invalid.
The sections of Korzhakov's memoir devoted to the explication of Yeltsin's
personality are less interesting. There are no surprises in his
characterization of Yeltsin as: "prone toward alcoholism", "egotistical",
"despotic", "greedy", "vain", "a liar" and "craven". This only confirms the
old adage, "there are no heros for servants and wives." However, one
episode is indeed horrifying. During a trip on the Volga river, in 1996,
Viacheslav Kostikov, then Yeltsin's press secretary, had been heavily
inebriated and pestering Yeltsin with jokes and other annoyances. At the
time, Yeltsin had been trying to speak with someone else and finally became
enraged by Kostikov's disturbances. Subsequently, Yeltsin ordered his aids
to throw the poor guy overboard, a deed which neither Russian tsars after
Peter the Great, nor General secretaries could do. Miraculously, Kostikov
was not hurt. Equally remarkable is the fact that he did not resign and it
was not until months later that Yeltsin fired him, personally.
Whatever the extent of Korzhakov's irksome personality, his book
nonetheless should be considered an important source of information about
the Russian political elite, especially in relation to how they view
democracy. This publication brings new light to the extent of the Russian
transformation to democracy and confirms that the attainment of such a goal
is still a long way off.

********

#8

Date: Fri, 13 Feb 1998 
From: Gary Kern <gkern@alumni.Princeton.EDU>
Subject: Lend-Lease Love

Now that we have a consensus on who saved whom in WWII (the USA
saved the USSR), I would like to address another aspect of the
question. Mikhail Alexandrov asserted in JRL #2044 that "the US helped
Russia, not because they liked Russia and Russians, but to ensure their
own survival." That assertion passed without criticism and even found
support in the discussion that followed. Actually, it's wrong.

Lend-Lease was the brainchild of President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt. He committed America to support the Soviet Union
immediately after the start of Barbarossa. As W. Averell Harriman
remarked at the time, American policy would be to "give and give
and give, with no expectation of any return, with no thought of a
quid pro quo."

FDR extended millions of dollars in credits and loans to the USSR,
steered a lend-lease bill for the Soviets through Congress and sent
his right-hand man, Harry Hopkins, to Moscow to meet with Stalin
and find out if the dictator had the resolve to fight through the
war. Hopkins returned with a rave review, describing Stalin as "an
austere, rugged, determined figure" and even as "a football coach's
dream of a tackle." (Look up the American Magazine of Dec. 1941 if
you want to get sick.)

Hopkins was so pro-Soviet that the NKVD regarded him as a voluntary
foreign agent. (Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The
Inside Story... 286-290) He ran the Lend-Lease program as FDR's
special advisor. Nominal director was Edward R. Stettinius, so
much in tune with the pro-Soviet line that when he found out that
the OSS had acquired an NKVD code book, he protested to FDR, who
agreed that it was shameful, and the OSS had to give it back to
the Soviets.

In Moscow America's special Lend-Lease representative was Colonel
Philip Faymonville. He was so partial to the Soviets that his
fellow officers nicknamed him "the Bolshevik." Faymonville trusted
his NKVD friends more than his fellow countrymen. In a report to
Hopkins of November 1941, he recommended not sending American
personnel to the Soviet Union to oversee Lend-Lease aid because
they could not be trusted and might sabotage the operation.

FDR's advisor on Soviet matters was the former (second) Ambassador,
Joseph E. Davies. He told a crowd of 20,000 at a 1942 Russian Aid
Rally in Chicago: "By the testimony of performance and in my
opinion, the word of honor of the Soviet Government is as safe as
the Bible." His trust in Stalin & Co. had no limits. "If I were
lost in the wilderness and badly injured," he affirmed, "I would as soon
have Stalin, Litvinov or Voroshilov for my companion as any other man in
the world, because I would know that they would stand by me and see
me through safely if it were in their power to do so." (Reported in
the Feb. 1942 Daily Worker)

FDR's Vice President was Henry Wallace, another admirer of the
Soviet system, who believed that it had something to teach America
about "economic democracy." (The Century of the Common Man, 1943) 
He ran in the 1948 Presidential campaign on a pro-Soviet platform,
one plank of which was to give Stalin the bomb.

FDR himself was quite fond of Stalin--or "Uncle Joe," as he
preferred to call him. Returning from the Tehran conference in
Dec. 1943, he reported to the American public: "He is a man who
combines a tremendous, relentless determination with a stalwart
good humor. I believe he is truly representative of the heart and
soul of Russia, and I believe that we are going to get along very
well with him and the Russian people--very well indeed." A month
later he told Congress: "We have learned the simple truth, as
Emerson said, that `the only way to have a friend is to be one.'"

FDR's classic statement of trust in Stalin was made to the disenchanted
former (first) Ambassador, William C. Bullitt: "Bill, I don't
dispute your facts; they are accurate. I don't dispute the logic
of your reasoning. I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that
kind of man. Harry [Hopkins] says he's not and that he doesn't
want anything but security for his country, and I think if I give
him everything I possibly can and ask for nothing in return,
noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with
me for a world of democracy and peace."

Guided by his unfounded hunch and his pro-Soviet advisors, FDR
bestowed top-priority status on Lend-lease. British requests and
the needs of the US military took second place to orders from
Moscow. Factories filled Soviet demands in advance of American. 
Even after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and America's direct
engagement in the war, Soviet requisitions took precedence over the
US Army and Navy. Protests from the War Department and the War
Production Board were overruled by the President.

The Soviets nurtured no illusions of trust or love for the
Americans; they used the Lend-Lease program to practice espionage,
exploiting unprecedented access to American factories, facilities
and patent offices during the war to fill uninspected airplanes
with documents, patents, materials. As the defector Victor Krav-
chenko reported, they liked to call it "super Lend-Lease." The
program continued after the war until finally stopped by Truman. 
Some machines and vehicles sent to the USSR served as prototypes
for their own production.

Yes, there were practical reasons for America to aid the Soviet
Union against Germany, but the motivating force was the pro-Soviet
policy of the FDR administration. There was no lack of love.

*********

#9
Expansion of 'State Secrets' List Observed 

Obshchaya Gazeta, No. 4
January 29-February 4, 1998
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Margarita Popova and Yelena Skvortsova: "A Blabbermouth Is
Once Again a Boon to a Spy: A List of State Secrets Has Been Approved by
the President, and the Minister Has Assigned a Secret Classification to the
Work of the MVD"

As a matter of fact, this list is not new&mdash;competent organs
continually look into its conformity to the current time. For example, the
appearance in recent times of new technologies and communications means, of
course, required a new paragraph in the law. Something has also changed in
the relations of various states that were at one time completely fraternal
and are now practically independent. All this, of course, must be taken
into account in so serious a document for any state. 
For a whole day after the appearance of the fresh list of state
secrets, we tried to get at least a brief comment from its developers.
However, the services of the President's Administration referred to the
staff of the government as the main developer of the document, but there,
in turn, they said: Whose signature is on it? So go there. So we sat down
with the papers, trying to compare the new version with the previous one,
which was adopted in 1995.
We will say right off that we are law-abiding people, and we did not
even suspect a lot of what is prohibited. For example, it turned out that
not only are our beloved metro and the water supply system classified as a
state secret, but also information about the cost of natural diamonds,
silver, platinum, and various other rare metals. In general, everything
that concerns natural reserves is a big secret, which is proper. After all,
you never know what our competitors will think up, at least regarding oil
and gold. Not to mention military secrets&mdash;although, it seems, it is
doubtful that anything could constitute news for our strategic rivals since
the appearance of space reconnaissance and achievements in computer
technology. But the developers know best.
Of the 87 paragraphs in the new list, only several underwent
substantial changes. For example, instead of a specific formulation about
reports that disclose "projects for the emission of noncoupon short-term
pledges before official publication," now a taboo is placed on all reports
"concerning financial and (or) money-credit activity, whose premature
dissemination could damage the security of the state." But it can only be
surmised what the department&mdash;the Russian Federation Ministry of
Finance&mdash;will insert in this article that is critical for fulfillment.
In the military sphere, an addition regarding data about maintaining
previously implemented work in the sphere of weapons of mass destruction is
vital: To all appearances it was clearly evoked by recent publications in
the press and the decisive actions of the Greens, as a result of which
several judicial scandals broke out. But concerning the investigation of
criminal matters of state importance, it will not be possible for us to
learn anything now or ever. To my question as to what these affairs were
and who was conducting them in such a class, investigator acquaintances
simply shrugged their shoulders.
Various strategic reports and facilities, and the personnel that guard
them, will remain under the protection of the state: intelligence, customs,
border services, and also comrades who report confidential information of
various kinds to the organs. This is probably good, otherwise who will
confide in them without protection? Especially in a situation when more and
more attention is being paid to fiscal services. True, the new entry
regarding the prohibition of reports disclosing methods and means of
protecting information that contains knowledge constituting a state secret
raises doubts: Does what we are telling you about the edict, according to
which we must in principle live, not fall under its action? In any case,
the FSB, to which we turned for clarification, asked us sternly: Where did
you get this document?
As became known to Obshchaya Gazeta, the minister of internal affairs
of Russia made a contribution to the creation of a curtain of secrecy. In
the middle of January, Anatoliy Kulikov published an order that prohibited
reporting statistical data in the open periodical press concerning how much
crime was being committed in Russia and how many people were at odds with
the law. That is, so-called moral statistics are henceforth closed to
citizens.
The order is rather shocking and, naturally, secret. Actually, it is
difficult to openly sign the kind of directive that directly contradicts a
minimum of two federal laws and three edicts, in which it is indicated in
detail what specifically to consider a state secret.
The piquancy of the situation is that practically on the eve of
signing the order, Kulikov personally shared the "disgraceful" statistics
with journalists. His example was soon followed by General Shalenkov, chief
of the GUEP [Main Administration for Combating Economic Crime], and very
likely this is exactly the way the minister marked the beginning of the
epoch of secrets.
Meanwhile a decision like this, even if you forget about its
illegality, will first and foremost hit the law enforcers themselves. In
concealing the results of its work from citizens, the MVD somehow forgets
that a certain subordination and hierarchy exists in the law and order
organs. The Procuracy General and the Ministry of Justice have similar
information, and it all converges and is processed in one place&mdash;the
GITs [Main Information Center] of the MVD. What will happen with the moral
statistics of these departments? In addition, open publication of the data
makes it possible for criminologists to turn society's attention to a
specific problem in a specific region in a timely fashion.

********

#10
RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol 2, No. 32, Part I, 17 February 1998

YELTSIN URGES PARLIAMENT TO RATIFY START-2... During his 17 February
address, Yeltsin described ratification of the START-2 arms control treaty
as an "urgent task" for the parliament, ITAR-TASS reported. The Duma is not
scheduled to debate that treaty during the first half of the year. In his
speech, Yeltsin also said Russian policy toward NATO remains unchanged:
Moscow opposes the eastward expansion of the Western military alliance and
will review its relations with NATO if the alliance offers membership to
the Baltic States. With regard to relations with CIS states, Yeltsin said
that Russia will pursue greater cooperation within the CIS but will not
sacrifice its own national interests for the sake of such cooperation. LB

...WANTS BANKS TO INVEST IN INDUSTRY. Yeltsin also expressed the hope that
large Russian banks will increase their investments in Russian industry
this year, ITAR-TASS reported on 17 February, citing a text of the address
that was circulated to State Duma and Federation Council deputies. In that
text, the president said Russia "can count on the investment activities of
banks, above all large banks, that bought important industrial enterprises
during the course of privatization. To this end, the state promoted the
concentration of financial and industrial resources. Now society has the
right to count on reimbursement." While Yeltsin acknowledged the need to
attract foreign investment in Russian industry, he said government policy
should not be based on attracting "speculative foreign investment" in the
markets. LB

ZYUGANOV UNIMPRESSED BY PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS. Communist Party leader
Gennadii Zyuganov told RFE/RL's Moscow bureau on 17 February that Yeltsin's
address was an "empty" and "uninteresting" speech that contained no
priorities, tactics, or strategy. The government's proposed amendments to
the draft 1998 budget are expected to cut projected spending. Planned
expenditures were increased largely at the insistence of the Communist-led
opposition during negotiations between government and parliamentary
representatives last fall. LB

MAJOR NETWORKS INDIFFERENT TO SPEECH. In the days preceding Yeltsin's
address to the parliament, the Russian press was replete with speculation
about what the president would say and rumors about how drafts of the
speech had been revised. However, only one of Russia's three major
television networks--fully state-owned Russian Television--carried
Yeltsin's speech live on 17 February. Russian Public Television, which is
51 percent state-owned, showed footage of the Olympic Games instead, while
the private network NTV broadcast a game show. LB

*******