January 9, 1998  
This Date's Issues: 2008  •2009  2010 2011

Johnson's Russia List
#2009
9 January 1998
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Victoria Pope: Room in Moscow.
2. John Danzer: Pipes article.
3. UPI: Yeltsin to meet Britain's Blair, pope.
4. Reuters: Lenin Embalmers Turn to Mob Victims to Raise Cash.
5. Los Angeles Times: Carol Williams, As a Picture of Health, 
Yeltsin Is Presenting a Blurry Image.
6. Rossiiskiye Vesti: WORDS SECRET WEAPON OF POWERS THAT BE.
7. Stephanie Baker (RFE/RL): Chernomyrdin Applauds Economic 
Recovery.
8. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: FOOT DRAGGING IN OPENING 
RUSSIA'S SKIES. 
9. Izvestia: "LUZHKOV'S ECONOMY" ENSURED MOSCOW INDUSTRIAL 
GROWTH.
10. Izvestia: DOMESTIC FOODSTUFFS MORE POPULAR BUT IMPORTED FOOD 
CHEAPER.
11. Atlantic Unbound: Jeffrey Tayler, The Moscow Rave. PART III: 
Writhing in Dry-Ice Fog.
12. The Electronic Telegraph (UK): Alan Philps, Chernobyl cover 
'near to collapse.'
13. THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION PRISM: RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY: THE 
CONCEPT.
14. The Holland Sentinel (Michigan): Vicky Buck, Zeeland duo sees Russian 
woes. Doctor, respiratory therapist assess the human cost of lagging medical 
techniques.]

*********

#1
From: "Victoria Pope" <vpope@njdc.com>
Subject: favor
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 1998 14:27:20 -0500

David, I have a friend who will be spending February and March in the
Russian archives, and she is looking for a room to rent with a family or a
B&B situation in Moscow. I am wondering if you would be willing to post
this request. (I quite understand if you decide it is too personal -- but
thought i would ask)
My friend doesn't have e-mail, but if any Russia List subscribers have
an idea for her, they could send me an e-mail, vpope@njdc.com. thanks.
victoria 

********

#2
From: John Danzer <Telos4@aol.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 1998 12:48:32 EST
Subject: Pipes Article

I seldom directly attack any person's ideas especially since I am
an amateur Russian watcher. However, Pipes recent article makes me
wonder whether he can still present a coherent argument for his views?
His intent is stated at the beginning of the article. He feels
that Western Media is too negative about the events in Russia.
So, logically you would expect Pipes to report the good news. The
"good news" according to Pipes is that it will take a mere one or
maybe two generations for Russia to overcome the burden of its
past. So, what does he think goes on in the mean time? 
Pipes also informs us that the wealthy Russians are waiting for a
fiscally responsible government before they bring "their"(?) billions
back home. Does he realize who these "wealthy Russians" really
are? Aren't we talking about a former communist country where
there weren't supposed to be billionaires? Where did these
"wealthy Russians" get their billions so quickly? And why should
wealthy Russians "wait" for a "fiscally responsible" government? 
The thieves of Russia's collective wealth have exactly the kind of
government that made them wealthy and keeps them wealthy. In fact
the wealthy ARE the government.
Pipes tells us that "remedies are being considered". Of course
remedies are being considered. Right! Remedies that will take two
generations! That should be long enough for Russia's billionaires
to enjoy their wealth. Pipes must not realize that the man in the
street knows the simple procedure for getting the thieves to bring
"the people's" money back home. A dictator (Lebed?) would quickly make the
thieves an offer they couldn't refuse.
Another sign of progress is the Interior Ministry's official
declaration that crime is down 20% from last year. Why do I find
it hard to believe Kulikov's statistics? Even if the 20% figure is
accurate you have to wonder if you can attribute the drop in crime
to "economic improvement" as Pipes asserts. Have the criminals
finally defined their spheres of operation? Or maybe getting a
death sentence of TB is just too high a risk for getting thrown in
jail? 
To prove his point that the political situation has improved, Pipes
says "Gone are the days when a buffoon like Vladimir Zhirinovski
could win a massive vote". It's hard to take such a statement
seriously when a buffoon like Boris Yeltsin is the president. 
Perhaps Pipes spent too much time watching Ballet and never rubbed
shoulders with the masses at the circus. Russians love the circus,
especially the clowns.
Finally, Pipes admits to the bad news! People are in poverty. 
People are dying. But don't worry about that because everything is
moving forward and Russia is joining "humankind". WOW! What were
they before?

*******

#3
Yeltsin to meet Britain's Blair, pope

MOSCOW, Jan. 9 (UPI) _ Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who is on vacation
in northwest Russia, has held a 20-minute telephone conversation with
British Prime Minister Tony Blair. 
The two leaders discussed holding a summit meeting in the next few
months, either on a bilateral basis or as part of a wider Russia-Europe
summit. 
Britain is chairing the European Union for the next six months as part
of a regular rotation of the 15-member block, and a Russia-EU summit is
planned in the next few months. 
Blair, who is in Japan on an official visit, reportedly told Yeltsin
Britain's Foreign Secretary Robin Cook would meet his Russian counterpart
Yevgeny Primakov (``yehv-GAY-nee pree-muh-KAWF'') shortly to work on
details of the summit agenda. 
Russia is hoping to receive additional economic aid from Europe and will
use the summit to propose a lifting of some trade restrictions. 
Meanwhile, the Kremlin says preparations for a Yeltsin meeting with Pope
John Paul II in the Vatican in February are in an advanced stage. 
Yeltsin, who will travel to Rome for the signing of a multibillion
dollar investment deal involving Italian car giant Fiat, is also expected
to meet the pope to improve relations with the Vatican. 
Russian Orthodox Church sources tell United Press International Yeltsin
and the pope will discuss the new Russian law on religion passed last year. 
The law was redrafted after an appeal from the Vatican to amend it. The
controversial law, which had full backing from the Russian Orthodox Church,
in its original form would have discriminated against Roman Catholics in
Russia. 
The final text of the law included Christianity as a recognized religion
in Russia, although it still could be used to pressure Christian groups in
Russia. 

*******

#4
Lenin Embalmers Turn to Mob Victims to Raise Cash 
Reuters
8 January 1998

MOSCOW -- Cash-starved embalmers looking after Vladimir Lenin's mummified
body have resorted to preserving the corpses of wealthy Russians killed in
gangland wars in a bid to make ends meet, Interfax news agency said on
Thursday. 
It quoted Yury Romakov, deputy head of the Moscow-based Scientific
Center of Biological Structures, as saying many of his employees,
especially young people, were using their embalming skills in their spare
time to earn money. 
"It is a terrible lack of money that drives them to this," he said. 
Romakov said the bodies of people killed in contract killings, blasts or
car crashes were often unrecognizable and needed reconstruction before they
could be identified. 
"Preserving the bodies does not only mean more time to identify them,
but also gives time for relatives to bid their final farewells," Romakov
said. 
He said the bodies could be preserved for up to several months using the
embalming techniques. 
Clashes between rival criminal gangs claim scores of lives every month.
The usual victims are wealthy bankers and businessmen who have prospered in
the cut-throat capitalism of post-Soviet Russia. 
Romakov said the Russian government had long ceased financing his
laboratory and Lenin's body was being maintained partly by a charitable
organization called the Mausoleum Fund and partly at the expense of his
center's other projects. 
The fate of the embalmed body of the Bolshevik leader who founded the
Soviet state in 1917 is the subject of fierce contention between liberals
and communists. 
President Boris Yeltsin has periodically suggested removing it from its
mausoleum and burying it but the communist-dominated parliament is fiercely
opposed. (Reuters) 

*********

#5
Los Angeles Times
9 January 1998
[for personal use only]
As a Picture of Health, Yeltsin Is Presenting a Blurry Image 
By CAROL J. WILLIAMS
   
MOSCOW--A despondent government worker set himself on fire in front
of a presidential administration building earlier this week to demand his
unpaid wages. The man, whom police doused and took to a mental hospital,
apparently was unaware that President Boris N. Yeltsin had not set foot
there for weeks. 
     A viral infection sidelined the 66-year-old leader for two weeks in
mid-December, and since then he is known to have journeyed into central
Moscow from his constellation of country houses only twice. 
     When aides earlier this week cleared Yeltsin's public events calendar
for the rest of the month, canceling a Jan. 19 visit to India and a meeting
with other former Soviet republic presidents four days later, Kremlin
watchers became concerned anew that Yeltsin may be more ill than his
handlers are conceding. 
     A taped television address to the nation aired on the eve of
Wednesday's Orthodox Christmas observance showed a pale Yeltsin struggling
to articulate his simple message celebrating Russia's newfound freedom of
conscience. At least six splices were obvious in the five-minute tape. 
     The head of the Kremlin press service, Alexei Gromov, declined to say
when or where the Christmas address was recorded. 
     Yeltsin has been on vacation since Sunday at the northwestern forest
retreat of Valdai, where daily reports emanate from his press service
describing the Russian leader as physically active and engaged in the
affairs of state. 
     Unlike the White House, which allows small groups of journalists to
observe President Clinton's vacation activities for a few minutes each day,
the Kremlin bars all independent press access to Yeltsin. 
     "Yeltsin is continuing his event-filled vacation at Valdai Lake,"
effused a press statement issued by the presidential administration to the
Interfax news agency, saying Yeltsin was spending his time ice fishing,
swimming and snowmobiling. 
     That not-to-worry spin by Kremlin image-makers is familiar to
Russians. A year ago, when Yeltsin was hospitalized with double pneumonia
only two months after undergoing quintuple bypass surgery, Kremlin
spokesman Sergei V. Yastrzhembsky insisted throughout his absence that the
president was running the country. 
     Before that, when Yeltsin suffered a third heart attack in little more
than a year in July 1996, then-Press Secretary Sergei K. Medvedev
distributed a photo purporting to show Yeltsin at work at his desk in a
short-sleeved sport shirt. The photo was quickly identified as a file shot
that was more than a year old. 
     Still, the dubious reports from afar about the leader's health appear
successful in keeping the general public unruffled. Russian stocks surged
this week when trading resumed after the four-day New Year's break, and
currency reform that many had feared would trigger consumer panic has
transpired with little fluster or fanfare. 
     The sheer weight of Russia's economic woes may explain why few
Russians are wringing their hands over Yeltsin's absence: Millions of
government workers have not been paid their December wages, feeding a
popular sentiment that any change in leadership could hardly be worse. 
     Who would succeed Yeltsin if he were unable to complete his
presidential term that runs through 2000 is still this country's most
perplexing question. 
     "He's not at full speed, and I doubt we will see him there again,"
Andrei V. Kortunov, head of the Russian Science Foundation, said of
Yeltsin. "But it doesn't seem to influence how the country is running." 

*********

#6
>From RIA Novosti
Rossiiskiye Vesti
January 9, 1998
WORDS SECRET WEAPON OF POWERS THAT BE

Deputy premier and interior minister Anatoly
KULIKOV: "We have the right to deliver preemptive
blows at bandit bases wherever they are, including
the territory of the Chechen Republic. Such is my
point of view. Life itself prompts that bandits
understand no other language; they have to be
annihilated."

Moscow Mayor Yuri LUZHKOV: "I have a positive
vision of Kulikov's statement. Bandit sallies, the
type of the recent attack at the army unit in
Buinaksk, should be countered. Don't you dare come
to our territory. Deliver a blow and wait for
retribution."

Security Council secretary Ivan RYBKIN: "Some
people in the corridors of power would want to
tackle Chechnya's affairs in line with an old
Bolshevist principle: all and now. Their logic is:
hit first, there will be enough time to think
later."

RF premier Viktor CHERNOMYRDIN: "The Cabinet
ministers should consider the consequences of our
words and make their public statements more stable.
There should be less hasty personal statements: they
should be more universal, stately. The Cabinet's
style is an element of the people's trust in the
authorities."

RV Commentary:
Yes, the statement deputy premier Anatoly Kulikov has
made is tough. 
On the one hand, one is apt to ask: Why does not the
interior minister stage a successful operation against
insolent terrorists? After all, the governments of Turkey and
Israel have been known to resort to preemptive blows at
fighter bases even in the territories of other countries. In
this country, all duels are verbal. 
On the other hand, is not Kulikov's statement but a reply
salvo at the incessant attempts to practice verbal terror on
the part of Chechnya's leaders, politicians and field
commanders, who address overt threats to Russia's leadership,
Russia's military stationed around Chechnya, and peaceful
civilians who may fall victim to the militants' terrorist
acts?
Chernomyrdin's call to think of "consequences" has good
reasons behind it. Many members of his Cabinet are outspoken
and are effectively newsmakers. One can argue whether making
news is a part of the official responsibilities of the deputy
premiers and the ministers. 
One thing is clear. Some hasty statements by ranking
officials the type of the December victorious report by Boris
Nemtsov to the effect that the centre has paid its debts to
Russian public sector workers do not add respect to the
government. 
Smaller-calibre officials in both the government and the
Kremlin staff stick to the rule they have got from above: any
information they provide to the media has to be checked with
the boss first. Understandably, the premier cannot make
officials in high places stick to this rule, even if
unwritten. 
Therefore, Chernomyrdin simply reminded of the connection
between the words, the authority of the Cabinet and the
people's trust in the authorities. Understandably, the Cabinet
members will not take his words for an order to shut up.

********

#7
Russia: Chernomyrdin Applauds Economic Recovery
By Stephanie Baker

Moscow, 9 January 1998 (RFE/RL) -- Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin says
the economy is firmly on the road to recovery in 1998, pointing to
promising year-end figures capping Russia's first year of economic growth
since reforms began. 
In remarks broadcast on Russian television yesterday, Chernomyrdin told
a cabinet meeting that gross domestic product grew by 1.2 percent in
December 1997 compared to last year, while industrial production rose 3.2
percent. 
GDP was up 0.4 percent for the year, according to preliminary figures,
said an official from the State Statistics Committee, Goskomstat. Officials
declined to provide annual figures for industrial production. 
It is the first time Russia has posted economic growth since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1996, GDP fell 6 percent following several
years of sharp decline. 
Many economists have noted that the economy is indeed recovering. Al
Breach from the Russian-European Center for Economic Policy says: "The
economy is picking up and is picking up quite fast in certain sectors... it
will grow faster than it did last year." 
The cabinet will meet with President Boris Yeltsin on February 26 to
account for the results of 1997 and outline plans for this year. The
meeting, at which many expected a cabinet shakeup, had been scheduled for
last month but was delayed when Yeltsin came down with what his aides said
was a severe cold. 
Chernomyrdin gave the cabinet until mid-February to finalize a
restructuring plan to promote economic growth next year. He said the
government is forecasting growth of 2 percent and inflation of 5 to 8
percent in 1998. The government already pushed down inflation in 1997 to 11
percent, below its targets for the year and less than half the rate in 1996. 
Despite these encouraging signs, Chernomyrdin said the figures fell
short of expectations. The government had been targeting 2 percent growth
in 1997. 
Chernomyrdin blamed budgetary problems, particularly low tax collection,
for putting a brake on growth. Improved tax collection will be the top
priority for 1998, he said, adding that a new version of the tax code will
be submitted to the State Duma, parliament's lower house, by the end of the
month. 
But the fate of tax reform, considered crucial to sorting out Russia's
budget problems, remains uncertain. The government's original tax code
proposal got bogged down in the Duma last year as deputies put forward some
4,000 amendments to the draft. 
Hampered by dismal tax collection rates, Russian authorities scrambled
during the last few weeks of December to fulfill a promise to pay off all
wage arrears by the end of the year. The government started 1998 with a
clean slate, Chernomyrdin said, having transferred 15 trillion rubles ($2.5
billion dollars) to regional authorities to eliminate the wage backlog at
the end of the year. The government did not need to borrow to raise the
cash, he said, because tax collection in December was up. 
The prime minister said the Central Bank and the government had
successfully defended the ruble during the recent turmoil on world markets.
But he said the government would aim to return rates on treasury bills to
pre-crisis levels by April or May. T-bill rates jumped to more than 40
percent late last year from around 18 percent before the market upheaval.
Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov said earlier this week that the
government aimed to reduce rates to 15 to 18 percent in 1998 in an effort
to encourage lending to the economy. As he put it: "With yields of 30
percent, no one will invest in the real sector or in the economy," he said. 
The rise in rates has essentially increased the government's cost of
borrowing. Many economists say that unless rates come down, the 1998 budget
will run into trouble as the government is forced to find extra funds or
sequester spending to cover higher debt servicing costs. 
Nemtsov has said economic growth in 1998 hinged on "major structural
transformations," citing the need to slash taxes and introduce a
means-tested system of social benefits. He said the government is targeting
4 percent growth in industrial production in 1998. 

*********

#8
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
9 January 1998

FOOT DRAGGING IN OPENING RUSSIA'S SKIES. After decades of Soviet-era
security paranoia, many Russians remain far more sensitive to matters of
espionage -- suspected or real -- than do most Europeans. The arrest of
Richard Bliss (see preceding item) is a case in point. The case against
Bliss seems to rest on the fact that he was using a hand-held satellite
positioning device to help determine his exact position as he worked on
installation of a cellular phone system in the Rostov region. While the
initiative taken by Bliss might be praised in the West, some in Russia
evidently suspect he was more interested in providing accurate targeting
data for nuclear missiles than in improving Russian phone service.

Similar suspicions seem to be holding up Russian ratification of the 1992
Open Skies Treaty. Originally negotiated by the then members of NATO and the
Warsaw Pact, the treaty now has a total of 27 state parties. More than the
required 20 countries have ratified it, but the treaty cannot enter into
force until all 10 of the largest signatories approve it. Of this group,
Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine continue to drag their heels. 

In today's world of satellites, the treaty is a benign one. It provides for
relatively short notice aerial inspections anywhere on a participant's
territory, but the types of sensors allowed are not very sophisticated and
the "observed" country can, if it wishes, even provide the airplane and
equipment to be used during the overflight. No electronic surveillance --
such as recording radar signals or radio or telephone communications -- is
allowed. 

While waiting for the treaty to enter into force, a number of the
signatories have made "practice" flights over each other's territory. Last
July, Russia conducted its first test over the U.S., and the following month
the Americans used a Russian plane in a test over Russia. Russians have made
similar reciprocal gestures with Belgium, Germany, and Turkey. On the whole,
the Russian military seems reasonably comfortable with the treaty. The same,
however, cannot be said for some former officers. Retired Gen. Albert
Makashov -- now in the State Duma -- last September demanded that lawmakers
conduct an investigation to find out why "U.S. aircraft [were] already
flying over Russia." (Russian media, September 19, 1997). The Open Skies
Treaty has also been a hostage in the NATO-enlargement debate, with Russian
opponents including it among the several arms control measures that would be
put on hold should NATO expand. 

Many Russian hard-liners feel that the treaty was disadvantageous for Russia
from the beginning. Some are also not above stretching the truth to make
their arguments more convincing. Thus, last month's issue of
Megapolis-Continent contained a diatribe against the treaty which charged
that Russia would not be able to conduct surveillance flights "on the
territories of NATO member-states that did not sign the Treaty," while NATO
could take a look at "all the military objects on Russian territory." In
fact, all 16 NATO members have signed and ratified the treaty, as have the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Hinting that NATO would also use treaty
flights for industrial espionage, the author concluded that "Russia is
clearly not ready for such openness." Sadly, that assessment is probably an
accurate one.

*********

#9
>From RIA Novosti
Izvestia
January 9, 1998
"LUZHKOV'S ECONOMY" ENSURED MOSCOW INDUSTRIAL GROWTH 
By Sergei MITIN, Izvestia

On January 8 Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and the members of the
Moscow government reported to journalists about the fulfilment
of the city authorities' programme in 1997 and disclosed the
main objectives for 1998.
* * *
The statistics for last year produced two sensations.
First, a decline of crime was registered in Moscow for the
first time in the 1990s. The number of grave crimes plummeted
by 20 per cent. According to Luzhkov, in 1997 the authorities
reaped the fruits of the many-year efforts of different
agencies. For instance, the introduction of street light in
the far-off areas enabled the criminogenic situation to be
improved in the city as a whole.
Second, a growth of industrial output has been registered
in Moscow, ranging from 2 to 5 per cent in different
industries. The AMO ZIL manufactured three times, and the AZLK
- five times more of automobiles than a year ago. The only
shortage which is felt in the capital is that of labour force.
Yuri Luzhkov said that at present there are 60,000 vacant jobs
in Moscow. In 1998 unemployment will not exceed one per cent
of the employed population. Furthermore, the Mayor's Office
intends to introduce quotas for employment of young people.
Luzhkov voiced the optimistic view that the incomes of the
working people will increase by 18 per cent, compared to the
growth of consumer prices by 10-12 per cent. Like in 1997, 40
per cent of the Moscow budget revenues for 1998 will be spent
on social programmes. The city does not plan to increase the
utility fares, and it is only the price of gas that may go up.
The additional payments to non-working pensioners and
non-married mothers, free meals for schoolchildren, free use
of urban transport by pensioners, and all transport privileges
for schoolchildren and students will be preserved.
The Mayor has said that last year the capital transferred
2.6 trillion roubles of taxes to the federal budget, which
makes up one-third of the sum remitted by all the regions in
the aggregate.

********

#10
>From RIA Novosti
Izvestia
January 9, 1998
DOMESTIC FOODSTUFFS MORE POPULAR BUT IMPORTED FOOD CHEAPER
By Alexander DZYUBLO, Izvestia

According to forecasts, this year will not see any
cardinal changes in the agrarian sector of the Russian
economy. Assessing the prospects for the immediate future,
Vice-Premier and Minister of Agriculture and Food of the
Russian Federation Viktor Khlystun stated that "points of
growth" have become visible in the sector so far, while a real
shift, primarily in the output of livestock products, is a
matter of the remote future. At present, in many parameters
the Russian farm workers are unable to replace the foreign
suppliers if the latter withdraw from the Russian field. For
this reason, the government will not run the risk of
deterioration of the people's consumer basket.
According to the forecasts of the Trade and Foreign
Economic Relations Ministry, this year Russia will increase
the import of poultry meat, as well as butter because Russian
production can meet only sixty per cent of the need in the
latter. However, a diametrically opposite tendency - a
decrease by six per cent on average - is expected for the
first time in the import of meat products, including sausage
which is a "yardstick of people's well-being." On the whole,
in 1998 the proportion of import foodstuffs will remain at the
level of last year.

********

#11
Atlantic Unbound
The Moscow Rave

PART III: Writhing in Dry-Ice Fog
by Jeffrey Tayler
January 7, 1998
Jeffrey Tayler is a freelance writer and traveler based in Moscow. He 
has recently written on Moscow, Transylvania, Siberia, and Zaire for The 
Atlantic Monthly. He contributes regularly to Atlantic Abroad.

Excess occupies no small place in Russia's collective psyche. Russians 
consider one of its manifestations -- shirota dushi, or "breadth of 
soul" -- a pillar of their identity. Shirota dushi denotes the Russian 
zest for life, the ability to do things in a way -- a Russian way -- as 
grand and extreme as the immense, extreme-riddled motherland.
Shirota dushi permeates night life in Moscow. It flows through Russian 
veins like an empowering ichor, more potent even than vodka, and mixes 
with fast cash and a carpe diem profligacy -- or, better said, carpe 
noctem -- that derives much from a fear well-rooted in history. In a 
land still recovering from a heritage of serfdom and autocracy, from 
Bolshevik repression, from purges that swept away whole strata of 
society, from a world war that killed twenty million, from a cold war 
that sowed distrust of anything Western, from the collapse of a 
paternalistic state and empire, it is easy to believe that doomsday is 
nigh. With its clash of titans the current political scene reinforces 
the notion that Judgment is at hand: Boris Yeltsin's arch-rival, General 
Lebed (one of the most popular politicians in Russia) promises to impose 
law and order on a country that has almost corrupted itself out of 
existence. Indeed, newspaper headlines on any given day proclaim what 
look like the portents of national apocalypse: Russia's key economic 
indices continue to plummet; average life expectancy for Russian males 
drops to fifty-seven years; top defense officials declare that the 
country's nuclear weapons may no longer be under their control. Thus the 
fear that lurks behind carpe noctem for young Russians, bandity and 
businessmen and students all: sooner or later another wave of history 
will crash down on them and carry away their new freedom, their new 
money, and even their lives.
In Russia, Valentine's Day is a recent, non-Soviet accretion to the 
holiday calendar. As such it has been seized upon as cause for some of 
the grandest bashes of the year -- an occasion, thus, for carpe noctem 
recklessness and the expression of unbridled shirota dushi. Olya 
promised to take me to a club in Moscow famed for New Russian excess: 
the Titanik. Our date falls on Valentine's Day.
At the Titanik's entrance I stand waiting for Olya and her friend, 
Natasha -- an affluent, London-educated interior designer who will use 
her membership to get us in on the director's list (the club will be 
filled to capacity). The Titanik at first glance seems an unlikely venue 
for New Russian extravagance. Located in the former Stadium of Young 
Pioneers, from the outside it resembles a bunker or a Quonset-hut. But 
over the box office hangs a sign reading SINKING PRICE -- 250,000 RUBLES 
(forty dollars), and an alarm light flashes red alert above the 
portholed entrance. BMWs and Mercedes, all blue-gray-black and casting 
halogenous fog lights into the snow, rumble to the door to disgorge 
their feathery, powdered, perfumed charges, then pass into the slush 
trenches of the parking lot. At least a thousand young people are 
clamoring for admission.
I hear the rum-rum of a powerful engine and a skid: down the driveway 
roars a black, low-slung sports car with cobalt-tinted windows. It stops 
in front of me. Natasha jumps out with her boyfriend, Igor, then Olya. 
Natasha is tanned, dressed in black designer jeans and a black-leather 
bomber jacket. She picks her way across the icy sidewalk near the 
porthole and elbows her way toward the front of the line; looking back, 
she shouts that she will put us on the "boarding list."
Olya and I stand apart from the line. Midnight comes and goes. The crowd 
grows. The ethereal finesse of many of the women (models, Olya says) 
contrasts wildly with the Zileri- and Armani-clad bandity in black, 
their apish mugs set below mini-craniums and capped by crew cuts, their 
gorilla arms hanging from hunched shoulders, their fingers fidgeting 
with wads of hundred-dollar bills. Some of these are middle-tier thugs; 
a few must be high-ranking bosses; all spew pure mat -- the foulest of 
oaths -- into their talk of deals and figures, and address one another 
by nicknames such as "Bull" and "Rambo." Others are not thugs at all, 
but the crème de la crème of the New Russia, who, like Olya, dine at the 
Ekipazh and doubt the surety of tomorrow.
We discover that the listed glitterati exceed those who would pay the 
sinking price. It is two in the morning by the time we pass through the 
metal detectors, suffer a drugs search by machine-gun-toting Interior 
Ministry troops, and get within sight of the single, list-waving bouncer 
standing at what looks to be the portal to Armageddon; through it, 
chthonian figures leap and gambol in a gaseous, ultrasonically pounding 
gloom that flickers with red and blue and strobe-white lightning.
Once we make it into the hold, through the porthole windows we see 
purple bubbles rising amid lolling drifts of seaweed. Wild-eyed patrons 
hurl themselves through clouds of dry-ice fog; a second-floor-balcony 
reveler releases her crystal-chaliced vodka in a silvered arc onto the 
crowd below. I lose Olya immediately and find myself repelling from one 
throng to another, trying to make my way toward the dance floor's edge. 
Just when I am breaking free someone grabs my hand and a deliberate, 
piercing burn scorches my wrist. I jerk my hand but a woman is gripping 
it tight; she has stabbed me with her lit cigarette. She presses her 
lips into my ear -- "I didn't mean to do that!" she shouts, and pulls me 
into the dancers. Three apes in black suits move toward me. I yank my 
hand loose and make for the steps. 
I find Natasha and Igor sitting on the balcony.
"This hell is Titanik! This is rave!" Natasha shouts, waving her arms 
over the masses below. Rave. A panorama of beings writhing in dry-ice 
fog spreads to the limits of the hold; a red-green laser roves the room, 
probing one raver, then another, its touch galvanizing the fatigued into 
further oscillations. Everyone on the dance floor is drugged, Natasha 
says. "Ecstasy. They're all on ecstasy."
I move on, and run into Olya. There is a corridor. We enter. Bodies 
cover the sofas. Some people seem to be sleeping with their eyes open. 
There are no drinks; those taking ecstasy shun alcohol.
Back in the main hold Jamaican acrobats somersault across the stage, a 
nearly naked Russian male-female-male ensemble imitates menage-à-trois. 
The music -- pounding techno-pop -- harries and disorients. Again I lose 
Olya. Following the wall, almost blind in the crush of perfumed bodies 
and clouds of dry-ice, I reach a succession of side rooms. In the first 
one is a teenage girl gyrating herself out of a hot-pink bikini in front 
of a gaping huddle of thugs; in the next room a covey of young men and 
women squirm under an inch-thick layer of pink carnations. Blue bottles 
of mineral water litter the tables. Ecstasy.
I bump into a sloe-eyed blonde in alligator bootlets and ask her to 
dance. We peal out into the midst of the ravers, to Titanik's ground 
zero. The crowd around us, stomping frantically, pupils dilated wide as 
black saucers, gyrates stageward, whence cooling blasts of fog blow, 
split and probed by the roving laser. On key, eyes close, ravers raise 
their arms as if in supplication; some people drop to their knees, 
others shimmy together, all with their eyes on the laser, which takes on 
the aspect of a dawning sun. My partner disappears; I, too, raise my 
hands to the light.
Five-thirty in the morning finds me collapsed on a sofa by the back 
wall. Even in fatigue my heart pounds with the ineluctable rhythm of the 
place. The rave wanes: above me dancers circumvolve and wamble in the 
mists of closure. At six, when I grab my coat and slip through the exit, 
dawn hasn't paled the murk, the red light on the roof still spins silent 
alarm into the rippling curtains of descending snow.
I start off toward Leningradsky Prospekt to find a taxi. Kiosks are 
already plastered with newspapers and the portents of apocalypse. 
Looking back at the club, it occurs to me that Russia, lurching from 
liberation to judgment, free-falling, waiting for impact, is rave; 
plundered wealth courses through its arteries like torrents of ecstasy. 
A Lada crunches its way through the snow and stops for me, and I climb 
in.

********

#12
The Electronic Telegraph (UK)
9 January 1998
[for personal use only]
Chernobyl cover 'near to collapse'
By Alan Philps in Moscow 

THE steel and concrete "sarcophagus" covering the Chernobyl power 
plant's fourth reactor, which blew up in 1986 and contaminated large 
parts of Europe, is weakening and could be close to collapse, officials 
at the plant warned yesterday.
Valentin Kupny, deputy director in charge of the stricken reactor, told 
a local news agency that a collapse was becoming "more and more likely". 
The beams holding up the roof were in "catastrophic" condition, he said. 
Another official expressed fears about the foundations of the 
sarcophagus, which was hastily built around the exploded reactor to 
contain radioactive contamination. 
The chief fear is that the flimsy structure will collapse on the 
reactor, spreading tons of radioactive dust across Europe. In the 
capital, Kiev, about 70 miles south of Chernobyl, there was no sense of 
panic, as people have become used to living in the shadow of a 
time-bomb. While there is no question that the sarcophagus needs 
replacing, there is a suspicion among diplomats that the Ukrainian 
authorities are highlighting the dangers in order to raise money from 
reluctant donors. 
Ukraine and major western countries agree that they need $750 million 
(£440 million) to stabilise the existing structure and make the whole 
area safe. So far little more than half that sum has been raised. "We do 
not know the state of many parts of the construction as the 
radioactivity level is too high to go near them," said the plant's 
spokesman, Valery Idelson. No one can say if the sarcophagus will last 
for a few more years or - God forbid - collapse in the very near future. 
This would have terrible ecological consequences.
"No one is in a position to say when this might happen, and it could be 
quite unexpected."
The only working reactor at the plant, No 3, is currently shut for 
repairs. Work to stabilise the sarcophagus is expected to begin in 
April. It is not clear where the remaining money for the repair will 
come from, and the plant spokesman said he was "rather pessimistic" 
about the international community delivering.

********

#13
Excerpt
THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION
PRISM
A BI-WEEKLY ON THE POST-SOVIET STATES
Vol.IV No.1 Part 1
9 January 1998

RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY: THE CONCEPT
Russian diplomatic activity slowed considerably over the holiday season,
but the period was nevertheless noteworthy for the approval by Boris Yeltsin
in late December of a set of guidelines for Russian security policy. The
"National Security Concept" is a lengthy document intended to orient Russian
policy-makers under the new conditions of the post-Cold War period. It
outlines the major threats to the country's security and establishes a set
of domestic and foreign policy goals aimed at strengthening Russia's
geopolitical position. Drafting of the security concept began in the late
Soviet period, but its completion foundered both on rapid changes in the
international environment and on the political upheavals -- and the related
political infighting between competing interest groups -- that have been a
regular feature of the Russian political scene. The long failure by the
country's political elite to reach a consensus on the security concept
complicated efforts to draft a series of other documents, including Russia's
military doctrine, that in principle needed to follow from the concept.

In substantive terms, the National Security Concept highlights a series of
key, and inter-related assertions: namely, that Russia faces no immediate
danger of large-scale aggression, and that, because the country is beset
with a myriad of debilitating domestic problems, the greatest threat to
Russia's security is now an internal one. The document focuses in particular
on the dangers posed by Russia's economic woes, which are described frankly
and at length. It also points to internal political, ethnic, and cultural
tensions that threaten to undermine both the viability and the territorial
integrity of the Russian state. The concept clearly suggests that today's
relatively benign international climate affords Russia the opportunity to
direct resources away from the defense sector and toward the rebuilding of
the Russian economy. In general, it places this rebuilding effort in the
context of continued democratization and marketization.

A POST-COLD WAR RUSSIA
With regard to military policy, the National Security Concept serves as a
post-facto justification for the down-sizing of Russia's armed forces that
has occurred since the Soviet Union's dissolution, and for the continued
restructuring envisioned in the Kremlin's still evolving military reform
program. By emphasizing domestic rather than foreign threats to Russia's
security, it would seem also to justify the rapid strengthening of the
country's internal security forces relative to the regular army over the
past ten years, even if current defense reform plans aim to moderate that
policy somewhat. In a related fashion, the document describes an alleged
threat to Russian economic interests posed by foreign competitors, and
underscores the importance of the role played by Russia's intelligence
services in countering it. 

The concept reiterates Moscow's opposition to NATO enlargement and its call
for multilateral organizations such as the U.N. and the OSCE to play a
greater role in the ensuring of international security. In this general
context, the concept highlights the importance of Russian participation in
international peacekeeping missions as a means of maintaining Moscow's
influence abroad. The document also emphasizes the overriding importance of
Russia's strategic forces to the country's security, and, again disavowing
the no first-use pledge made during the Gorbachev period, states that:
"Russia reserves the right to use all the forces and systems at its
disposal, including nuclear weapons, if the unleashing of armed aggression
results in a threat to the actual existence of the Russian Federation as an
independent sovereign state." With regard to conventional weapons, the
concept proclaims a policy of "realistic deterrence" in discarding
officially any effort to maintain parity with the armed forces of the
world's leading states. 

In more purely diplomatic terms, the National Security Concept also states
formally what has long been a cornerstone of Russian foreign policy: i.e.,
that the rebuilding of Russia is best served not by a passive diplomatic
posture, but rather by an aggressive and multi-faceted diplomacy aimed at
winning membership, or increasing Moscow's influence, in various
international organizations, while simultaneously striving to make Russia a
player of import around the globe. 

RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL ASCENDANT?
In institutional terms, the National Security Concept and the decree
accompanying it appear to signify the reemergence of the Russian Security
Council as the country's premier agency in the formulation and
implementation of national security policies, and a parallel rise in the
political authority of its secretary, Ivan Rybkin. If so, the change would
bring to a close an approximately 18-month period -- which began with a
Kremlin move to limit the power of then Security Council secretary Aleksandr
Lebed -- during which the Council found itself relegated primarily to
dealing with Kremlin policy toward Chechnya. What remains unclear, however,
is whether Rybkin possesses the political clout to exercise the many
political prerogatives now assigned to him, and whether the concept itself
will actually bring coherence to Russian security policy rather than being
just another empty statement of intentions. 

********

#14
The Holland Sentinel (Michigan)
December 30, 1997
[for personal use only]
Zeeland duo sees Russian woes
Doctor, respiratory therapist assess the human cost of lagging medical 
techniques
By VICKY BUCK
Special to the Sentinel

ZEELAND -- A woman with cancer spreading throughout her body, but no 
pain medication. A boy misdiagnosed with Down syndrome and no second 
medical opinions.
Russian medicine, two Zeeland Community Hospital staff members learned, 
has a long way to go.
This fall respiratory therapist Sharon Langejans and Dr. Gene Westveer, 
an emergency room physician, took a month off from Zeeland to join a 
mission group bound for Russia. 
They took along their expertise and some heavy baggage -- 20 suitcases 
of medicine to supplement the sparse supplies in Russia.
The two were among 20 individuals, sponsored by the Church of Nazarene 
in Chicago, who traveled to Russia to do medical work and construction.
The two co-workers, along with the rest of their group, arrived in 
Moscow Sept. 12. The medical team remained in Moscow, while the 
construction crew headed to the countryside to repair and renovate 
Russian summer homes.
During their two-week stay in Russia, the co-workers treated patients, 
taught basic CPR classes, and held discussions that focused on medical 
techniques and procedures.
Langejans and Westveer soon discovered medical practices in Russia 
dramatically lag behind those used in the United States. 
"There is no difference between the two countries in the amount of 
compassion and care that's given," Langejans said. "They're doing the 
best they can."
Doing the best they can may result in disastrous consequences for some 
Russian patients. There are no second opinions in Russia. 
Once a patient diagnosis is made, it stands.
"That was one of the things we ran into -- incorrect diagnoses," said 
Westveer. "It doesn't matter if it's wrong, they're stuck with it. There 
was one boy who was improperly diagnosed with Down syndrome. The boy 
will never be allowed to attend school because of that."
Another startling difference is Russians will not tell patients when 
they have cancer. Russian doctors agree that people who are given a 
terminal diagnosis will give up all hope, Langejans said. 
"They (the Russians) couldn't imagine why Americans would even want to 
know they were dying," Langejans said.
While in Russia, Westveer saw a woman who had breast cancer.
"It had very obviously spread throughout her body. She was in a lot of 
pain, but they wouldn't give her pain medicine because she didn't have 
the proper diagnosis," he said. "They did tell her she needed surgery 
and chemotherapy, but they wouldn't tell her why."
Langejans had received a recent update on the woman. She had just run 
out of the pain medicine the mission team had left for her.
"And they don't have anything to give her," Langejans said quietly.
Langejans shared her techniques with a group of Russian nurses.
"They kept saying, '911, 911.' They had all watched the '911' television 
show and wanted to learn the Heimlich maneuver. They had seen it on TV 
and wanted me to teach them how to do it."
She and Westveer participated in a "practitioner for a day" program. 
Langejans was apprehensive about being considered a practitioner until 
she discovered she had more of a medical background than most of the 
Russian doctors. Together they saw 71 patients in a 7-hour period.
It became painfully aware to the doctor-nurse team that not all the 
changes occurring in Russia are for the good. 
Along with the emergence of capitalism comes an incredible rate of 
inflation. Though it seems to be stabilizing, most of Russia's 
population needs to have two to three jobs to meet their financial 
obligations. In a country where the average doctor makes $60 a month and 
nurses are paid $40 monthly, people do what they have to to make ends 
meet, they said.
The doors have been opened to allow groups, such as the one Westveer and 
Langejans accompanied, to enter Russia and share resources, talents, and 
technology. 
"We planted seeds while we were there," said Langejans. "It was a 
once-in-a-lifetime experience." 

********