:: Russia - New OSW's analysis: Russia’s position on the modification of US missile defence programme

The JRL readers might be interested in the newest analyse by the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW): "Russia's position on the modification of US missile defence programme " by Marcin Kaczmarski.

Russia's position, both in Europe and in its dialogue with the United States, has been considerably strengthened as a result of the adjustment to the USA's policy. At the same time, Moscow seems unwilling to make concessions on the Iranian issue, which is of key importance for the United States; however, some concessions may be possible in negotiations concerning the new treaty on nuclear arms control. While the USA's decision alleviates one of the most contentious issues in bilateral relations, a permanent improvement in relations between the Russian Federation and the United States should not be expected, especially as US activity in the CIS area will continue to generate tension.

Russia’s position on the modification of US missile defence programme Russia seems unwilling to make concessions to the United States in return for that latter’s decision not to deploy a missile shield in Central Europe
By Marcin Kaczmarski

The USA’s withdrawal from its earlier plans to deploy elements of the missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, which President Barack Obama announced on 17 September, was welcomed in Moscow as a great success for Russia’s foreign policy. It was seen as proof that Washington has recognised Russia as a major international player. At the same time, Russian politicians implied that they did not feel obliged to take Washington’s expectations concerning other issues into consideration in return.

Russia’s position, both in Europe and in its dialogue with the United States, has been considerably strengthened as a result of the adjustment to the USA’s policy. At the same time, Moscow seems unwilling to make concessions on the Iranian issue, which is of key importance for the United States; however, some concessions may be possible in negotiations concerning the new treaty on nuclear arms control. While the USA’s decision alleviates one of the most contentious issues in bilateral relations, a permanent improvement in relations between the Russian Federation and the United States should not be expected, especially as US activity in the CIS area will continue to generate tension.

Moscow has welcomed the USA’s decision not to deploy the missile shield in Central Europe as a step towards improving Russian-US relations, but at the same time it has demonstrated its unwillingness to make concessions to the USA; the Kremlin has taken President Obama’s decision to be simply a correction of the error made by the George W. Bush administration, and it is now expecting further concessions from Washington.

Russian politicians have pointed out that the US administration’s decision was the result of the following factors: Russia’s uncompromising stance; a more realistic assessment of the situation surrounding Iran; a generally more pragmatic approach to foreign affairs, and cuts in US arms spending. At the same time, Moscow has emphasised the need to analyse new U.S. plans cautiously, as they could also prove to be unfavourable for Russia’s interests; Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s representative to NATO, already spoke to this effect on 17 September.

President Dmitry Medvedev has said that conditions are now in place for deeper co-operation between Russia and the United States, but he has rejected the possibility of “primitive compromises or tradeoffs”. He has also pointed out that improvement is needed in all spheres of mutual relations, and should not be limited to nuclear armaments. Medvedev also expects further modifications to US policy with regard to NATO enlargement and the CIS. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has spoken positively about the USA’s decision and said that he expected further steps to be taken by the United States, including the abolition of restrictions on the sale of high technologies to Russia, and an acceleration in the process of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan’s accession to the WTO.

Representatives of the Russian armed forces initially suggested that, in response to the US decision, Russia would refrain from deploying the Iskander short range missiles in the Kaliningrad oblast. The planned deployment had been represented as requital for the missile shield deployment, but in fact it is part of the Russian armed forces’ modernization plan by 2015. In the following days, the decision concerning the Iskanders was made dependent on further developments in US missile defence programme. Nikolai Makarov, the chief of the General Staff, announced that Russia would continue to object to the missile defence system unless the USA decided to build such a system together with Russia.

Russian experts have voiced cautious optimism, pointing out that the US decision did not mean the United States was giving up the missile defence programme altogether. The media emphasised that the decision weakened the position of the Central European countries.

The benefits that Russia will derive from Washington’s decision clearly outweigh the potential risk involved in developing a new version of the USA’s missile defence programme. Russia had opposed the deployment of the shield elements in Poland and the Czech Republic for several reasons; Moscow feared that its airspace would be penetrated as far as the Ural by the radar located in the Czech Republic, that the system would be extended in the future, and that the United States would establish a permanent military presence in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact where Russia would rather see a kind of partly neutral zone. In its effort to rebuild its influence in the area, Moscow seeks to obtain real and legally binding commitments from Western states concerning the non-deployment of armed forces or major military installations in the area.

From this point of view, Russia has succeeded, especially in terms of its own prestige. It has managed to demonstrate that decisions concerning European security, especially with regard to Central Europe, cannot be taken regardless of Russia’s objections. Moscow has also made gains in its strategic dialogue with the United States; the prospect of an asymmetry emerging in the nuclear potentials of the two sides has been averted (at least temporarily).

At the same time, Russia is still concerned that the future missile defence system may again take an unfavourable form. The new system is supposed to comprise more mobile components which might be deployed close to the Russian Federation’s borders. The USA is also still capable of extending the system on a global scale.

The USA’s decision concerning the missile shield does not seem to have the potential to greatly alleviate the existing tension between Moscow and Washington. For the United States, the most important objective is to gain Russia’s support for measures to prevent Iran continuing its nuclear programme. Russia, however, is not prepared to make concessions in this regard, such as genuinely stepping up pressure on Iran and imposing more severe sanctions. Good relations with Tehran are regarded as an important asset in Russia’s foreign policy, and friction between Iran and the West benefits Russia’s interests, especially in the energy sphere. As regards the treaty to replace the START, it is not clear what position Russia will take. Moscow may either make some concessions (such as with regard to the calculation methods for warheads and delivery vehicles), or adopt a more rigid position. Russia will presumably seek to include provisions on missile defence in the new treaty that will impede the implementation of US programme. The proposed co-operation in the field of missile defence, if it ever takes place at all, will probably be limited to consultations. Any closer collaboration would require the two sides to have much more confidence in each other than they currently have.

It should be expected that the further course of Russia’s policy towards the United States will depend primarily on the USA’s approach to the post-Soviet area, which Russia still treats as a sphere of its own special interests. Russian-American relations will remain tense until Washington chooses to recognise Russia’s dominant position in the region, which the USA is unlikely to do.

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