Subject: Comment on the elections
Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008
From: "Vlad Sobell" <Vlad.Sobell@dir.co.uk>
Russia’s presidential elections: an affirmation of evolving democracy
· Russia’s presidential elections have been a predictable affair. However, this does not mean it was undemocratic. The purpose of elections is the formation of effective and legitimate government, not public entertainment.
· The regime has successfully entrenched stability, continuity and its democratic legitimacy in the face of difficult tasks ahead. Russia’s modernisation is only in its early phase.
· It should also not be missed that this is the first instance in Russia’s history of a peaceful change of leadership in accordance with the law. A historic milestone has been reached.
· Putin has provided some ammunition to the “autocratic interpretation” of his regime, by hinting that he intends to remain on the scene the full political cycle and as a very strong prime minister. However, his remarks have again been misinterpreted
· We argue that Putin would be confirmed as an autocrat only if, in the eventuality of a clash between him and the future President Medvedev, he engineers the president’s impeachment. The likelihood of such a scenario materialising is extremely remote.
Elections proceeding according to plan
It has long been assumed that – barring any unforeseeable events – Russia’s presidential elections on 2nd March would be a calm and seamless transfer of power. Given his popularity, it was always certain that whomever President Putin supported would duly win the contest.
Up until December there was still some uncertainty over whether Putin would, indeed, comply with the constitution (as he had repeatedly promised) and withdraw as Russia’s president. Equally, it was not known behind whom he would decide to throw his considerable political weight. The issue was finally settled when in December the United Russia party nominated the First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev as its presidential candidate, with Putin swiftly approving the move. Medvedev subsequently became unbeatable by inviting Putin to be his prospective prime minister.
Western commentary has focused on the wrong issues
True to form, most Western commentary has focused on the supposed democratic shortcomings of the elections, such as the lack of animated public debate among the candidates, instances of alleged harassment of the opposition, the overwhelmingly dominant coverage in the media and press of Medvedev and, above all, the evident predictability of the entire process. Indeed, although there are other candidates – Gennady Zyuganov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Andrei Bogdanov – it has long been clear that the issue of who will be Russia’s new president has been settled.
While these characteristics of a thriving democracy have, indeed, been lacking, it would be unwise to place too much store on the deficiency. Ultimately, the purpose of democratic elections is not to generate public entertainment, but to create conditions for the formation of effective and legitimate government. On this score, the Russian presidential elections have been very successful indeed.
Both Putin and Medvedev have been busy publicising the priorities they would pursue if given the mandate. The message that has emerged can be summarised as follows: We have stabilised the politics and revived the economy, allowing Russia to take its rightful place the international affairs. But our job is far from finished. The country’s reconstruction and modernisation is only just beginning and we need another long period of stability and continuity to ensure that it succeeds. If you give us your support, we promise to work as an effective team to turn Russia into a free, law-based and pleasant country to live in.
Western commentators have also generally played down the fact that these are the first regular elections in Russian history in which the country’s supreme leader is replaced exactly in line with the letter of the constitution. (Putin himself was elected in March 2000 after being first appointed acting president by his predecessor Boris Yeltsin.) Given Russia’s troubled history and the persisting worries about its future course, this is no small achievement.
Putin the “eternal autocrat”?
Adhering to its interpretation of Putin’s regime as signalling the restoration of authoritarianism, the Western commentary’s other favourite theme has been that Russia actually is not undergoing a leadership transition, but a further entrenchment of Putin’s autocratic rule. While some have noted apparent signs of independence on Medvedev’s part – such as his pronouncements on the importance of freedom, the sanctity of private property and the need to curtail the role of state in the economy – the overwhelming verdict has been negative. He tends to be depicted essentially as a Putin clone, destined to faithfully serve his master, come what may. Putin may well be withdrawing from the presidency, but he will take the supreme power with him and will continue to wield it from his new post, according to many Western commentators.
Indeed, in his annual marathon press conference on 14th February Putin supplied some ammunition in support of this interpretation. Apart from indicating that he intends to stay as prime minister for the full political cycle (and, on a less serious note, that he has no intention to hang the portrait of the new president on the wall in his office), he also appeared to be backtracking on his long-standing commitment that he would not seek a re-distribution of executive powers in his favour.
Challenged on the prospects of his imminent sub-ordination to the new president, Putin responded as follows:
The constitution gives the government many opportunities. The government is responsible for forming the budget and presenting it to the parliament. It is responsible for the budget report and for forming the foundations of monetary and credit policy. The government is in charge of resolving social, healthcare, education and environmental issues, creating the conditions for ensuring our country’s defence and security and carrying out our economic and trade policies abroad.
The president is the guarantor of the constitution, sets the main guidelines of domestic and foreign policy and acts as the head of state. But the highest executive power in the country rests in the government of the Russian Federation headed by the prime minister.
Putin then continued by saying that “there are enough powers to go around” and that he and Medvedev would divide them between themselves and build up good personal relations.
Predictably, this response has been seized upon as proof that Putin intends to stay on indefinitely as the wielder of supreme power and change the system accordingly if needs be.
While Putin’s comments could, indeed, be interpreted in this manner, the fact remains that presenting them as a confirmation of the “autocracy template”, is misleading. Putin did not say he considered the future president to be his subordinate; merely, that he considered the government and its head to be the weightiest executive body in terms of the day-to-day functions, as, indeed, happens to be the case. His emphasis was on the nitty-gritty government functions in terms of their scope, rather than on the line of executive authority.
In this context, it is significant to note that Putin appears eager to get to the “coal-face” of Russia politics and get his “hands dirty”, rather than supervise the process from the Kremlin. Given Russia’s persistent serious problems, such as government ineffectiveness, the weak rule of law and all-pervasive corruption, Putin’s determination to get closely involved is good news.
Stability is the key at present, but adherence to the constitution matters in the long run
The running theme of Medevev and Putin’s pre-election speeches and interviews has been that Russia has a historic opportunity to overcome the consequences of its past and that this opportunity must not be missed. Against this backdrop, the Western commentary’s preoccupation with “Putin, the autocrat” is entirely misplaced. Given the serious political risks that the failure of the Medvedev-Putin tandem would entail, we argue that the delivery of tangible results is more important than the precise method in which these results are delivered.
Nevertheless, Russia’s image as a state moving towards genuine democracy also matters and in this context the eventual distribution of power between both leaders is significant. It is imperative that, should their relationship sour or the future Prime Minister Putin be found responsible for serious policy failures, the future President Medvedev is able to remove him, just like his predecessors (Yeltsin and Putin) replaced their prime ministers. It certainly cannot be the other way round, as the Russian president is elected in a nationwide vote, with the electorate serving as the ultimate authority.
Thus, autocracy in Russia would materialise only in the extremely improbable event of the future Prime Minister Putin somehow engineering the impeachment of the president and returning to the supreme post himself. It is difficult to see how this could be done and why Putin would want to resort to such a destabilising course.