RAS Issue No. 43 • September 2008 • JRL 2008-164
Editor: Stephen D. Shenfield, sshenfield@verizon.net
RAS archive: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/jrl-ras.php
The Research and Analytical Supplement (RAS) to Johnson’s Russia List is produced and edited by Stephen D. Shenfield. He is the author of all parts of the content that are not attributed to any other author.
THE CAUCASUS
1. Israel and the war in Georgia
2. Significance of the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
3. New book on the Northwest Caucasus
POLITICS
4. The debate about “Surkovism”
5. Vladimir Sirotin. A left program for today’s Russia
HISTORY
6. Empire of the periphery
7. Statisticians under Stalin
8. Jewish opposition to the Jewish oligarchs
REMINISCENCE
9. Learning to read between the lines
THE CAUCASUS
1. ISRAEL AND THE WAR IN GEORGIA
The debate over whether a new Cold War with Russia is in the offing has been
overtaken by events. No one can doubt that a new Cold War exists. Nevertheless,
the new Cold War is not going to bear any close resemblance to the old one.
Among other things, it will not shape the global interstate system as a whole.
Of course, it is bound to have a certain effect on various world regions even
outside Russia’s primary sphere of interest. Here I focus on the Middle East
in particular, on the joint efforts of Israel and Russia to insulate their
increasingly close relationship from tensions between Russia and the West.
Israeli arms and training played a significant role in the war in Georgia:
“Israeli companies are reported to have supplied the Georgians with pilotless
drones, night-vision equipment, anti-aircraft equipment, shells, rockets and
various electronic systems. Even more important may have been advanced tactical
training and consultancy.” (1)
Saakashvili tried to create the impression of a close relationship between
Georgia and Israel, and these facts helped him do so. The impression, however,
is false. Saakashvili created a close relationship not with the State of Israel
as such, but with a private network of Israeli mercenaries. This network
included some highly placed figures, such as retired generals Israel Ziv and Gal
Hirsh (known for losing the latest war in Lebanon) and Roni Milo, former mayor
of Tel Aviv, making it influential enough to secure defense ministry approval
for various arms deals. But it was by no means influential enough to shape
Israel’s foreign policy, and in fact the foreign ministry and much of the
country’s establishment regarded its activity with serious misgivings.
With a view to building such a network, Saakashvili filled two key positions in
his government with Georgian Jews who had lived for a long time in Israel and
spoke fluent Hebrew: Davit Kezerashvili was made defense minister and Temur
Yakobashvili state minister for territorial integration, responsible for
negotiations over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Saakashvili was recently reported
as “enthusing” that “both war and peace are in the hands of Israeli Jews” (2)
as though he himself had nothing to do with questions of war and peace. In
medieval terms, they were “the king’s Jews” but he was the “king.” Not that I
seek to play down Kezerashvili’s share of criminal liability for destroying
Tskhinval, including the city’s ancient Jewish quarter. (3)
Over the Putin years, cultivating good relations between Russia and Israel has
become a well-established element in the foreign policy of both countries.
Medvedev and PM Olmert have taken care to prevent events in Georgia from
damaging Russian Israeli relations, staying in personal contact by phone for
this purpose. (4) Israel has adopted a low-profile, “balanced” posture on the
conflict: it has halted arms sales to Georgia, abstained from public criticism
of either side, and offered humanitarian aid to North Ossetia as well as
Georgia. It will not recognize South Ossetia or Abkhazia or, apparently,
Kosovo. (5) There are signs that as a quid pro quo Russia will exercise
restraint in selling arms to Syria and may support further sanctions against
Iran.
Netanyahu visited Moscow recently; a visit by Olmert himself is in the offing.
In mid-September an agreement comes into force that abolishes visa requirements
for Russians visiting Israel and Israelis visiting Russia. (6)
There is a certain amount of opposition in Israel to official policy on Russia.
The Likud have criticized Kadima (Olmert’s party) for establishing ties with
United Russia. (7) The Jerusalem Post’s Evelyn Gordon has difficulty making up
her mind: she starts off by denouncing Kadima for sacrificing, betraying, and
abandoning “a loyal ally,” but ends up concluding that this “betrayal” was “the
correct realpolitik choice.” (8)
How do the million or so “Russian” Israelis fit into the picture? Putin has
courted them as an important section of the Russian diaspora. Many still have
strong links with Russia and a correspondingly strong interest in good relations
with Russia (visa-free travel, for instance). Many still lack good Hebrew (or
English) and rely on Russian TV for their view of world events. Israeli
politicians who speak Russian (including Barak and Sharon) have got themselves
interviewed on Russian TV as a way of reaching this part of their electorate.
As Russia and the West readjust to confrontation mode, Israel will find itself
increasingly in a dilemma. It is hard to see how Israel can indefinitely remain
neutral in the confrontation with Russia while retaining its valued status as a
close U.S. ally. It is also hard to envision Israel giving up a partnership as
valuable as the one it has been developing with Russia, even if this makes it
possible for a wedge to be driven between Israel and the U.S. It is always
unwise to have all your eggs in one basket, especially when the basket in
question is in such a bad shape.
NOTES
(1) Tony Karon, Time, 8/28/08
(2) Ibid.
(3) Before this war Tskhinval still had a Jewish community of 20 families. (In
the 1910s 42 percent of the then population of 5,000 were Jews.) Only one family
remains. Some Tskhinval Jews have survived as refugees in North Ossetia.
(4) Jerusalem Post, 8/21/08
(5) Jerusalem Post, 8/28/08
(6) Jerusalem Post, 8/25/08
(7) Jerusalem Post, 8/22/08
(8) Jerusalem Post, 8/21/08
THE CAUCASUS
2. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RECOGNITION OF ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA
It will take us some time to grasp and assimilate the full significance of
recent events in Georgia. Among many other repercussions, they are bound to have
a major impact on the NORTH Caucasus.
As happened last time round, the large flow of refugees from South to North
Ossetia is likely to intensity Osset nationalist feeling and reignite the Osset—Ingush
conflict.
It must be kept in mind that both the Ossets and the Abkhaz have their closest
ethnic and cultural connections with the peoples of the North Caucasus, with
whom (for instance) they share the Nart sagas.
Thus the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia, followed by
various other countries including Venezuela, is being celebrated not only in
Abkhazia (1) but also in the North Caucasus and among the numerous North
Caucasus diaspora, especially in Turkey (the descendants of 19th century
deportees). About 1,000 Turkish Abkhaz and Circassians gathered in the village
of Arap Ciftligi on August 31 to celebrate the independence of Abkhazia. (2)
For the Circassians, whose links with the Abkhaz are especially close, the
independence of Abkhazia is an important step on the road to an independent
state of their own in the Northwest Caucasus. The potential threat to Russia’s
territorial integrity prompted some Russian analysts to advise their government
against recognizing Abkhazia. The Russian leaders have taken this step
nonetheless, evidently viewing the prospect of Georgia joining NATO as a more
urgent threat.
The recognition by some countries but not by others of Kosovo, Abkhazia, and
South Ossetia marks the end of the international consensus on how to handle
issues of secession. This consensus was maintained throughout the long first
Cold War with the Soviet Union, but has collapsed right at the start of the
second Cold War with Russia, opening up a whole new sphere of instability and
rivalry the competitive endeavor to foster the disintegration of states on
“the other side.”
The previous consensus was very much disposed against secession and aimed to
make it as difficult as possible, but was prepared to accept breakaway states
that had clearly and irreversibly accomplished secession and established
effective control over their territory (as in the cases of Bangladesh and
Eritrea). Under the terms of this consensus, Georgia embroiled in the civil
war between Gamsakhurdia and his opponents within a few months of declaring
independence from the USSR would hardly have qualified for international
recognition.
The disintegration of the USSR, and before that of Yugoslavia, led to the
emergence of a new norm for deciding which fragments of a collapsed multi-ethnic
state should receive recognition. The norm was that the only territories to be
recognized would be those that corresponded exactly to first-level
administrative subdivisions of the old state (the Union Republics in the Soviet
case). This was an arbitrary norm in many respects. It was at variance with the
disaggregation of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires in the post-WWI
settlement, which did not treat internal administrative boundaries as
sacrosanct. Its main advantage was its simplicity: it kept a lid on the number
of successor states and avoided the complicated business of considering
historical rights and wrongs. In any case, you can argue that any norm is better
than none.
The West, having itself invented and imposed this “first-level subdivisions”
norm, has now undermined it by recognizing the independence of Kosovo, which was
subordinate to Serbia within Yugoslavia i.e., a second-level subdivision. (3)
To restore international consensus we need a new norm, a new general rule that
applies a single standard to all situations without reference to “our side” and
“the other side.” What general rule will justify the secession of Kosovo from
Serbia while condemning the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from
Georgia? Or vice versa? There should be big prize money for anyone who provides
a plausible answer to this question.
NOTES
(1) I haven’t seen reports of celebrations in South Ossetia. It is doubtful
whether anyone there feels like celebrating quite yet.
(2) Turkish Daily News, September 2
(3) I am talking about the diplomatic formality of recognizing independence. How
independent any of these mini-states are in real terms is another matter
entirely. Kosovo, in particular, is being run by officials from the European
Union.
NEW ESSAY ONLINE
I recently posted a new essay on THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE GEORGIAN
ABKHAZ CONFLICT at the following URL:
http://www.circassianworld.com/Geo_Abk_conflict.html
Some people may find it useful background reading.
THE CAUCASUS
3. NEW BOOK ON THE NORTHWEST CAUCASUS
Walter Richmond. The Northwest Caucasus: Past, Present, Future (London and New
York: Routledge, 2008)
The part of the Caucasus that has received the least attention from scholars and
analysts is the northwest. This book is the first sustained account of the
history of the Northwest Caucasus, from ancient times to the 21st century, and
will serve as a starting point for many future researchers.
RAS 42 was devoted to the deportation of the Circassians following conquest by
Russia in the 18th 19th century, and this is a major theme of Professor
Richmond’s work. But he fills in for us the history that preceded these events,
which includes a lengthy period in the 16th 17th centuries during which the
Circassians were ALLIED to Russia (against the Crimean Khanate). With the aid of
some excellent maps, he clarifies the rather confusing tribal composition of
pre-conquest Circassia and the evolving social structures within each tribe, and
also brings the other indigenous peoples into the picture: the Karachai-Balkars
and the Abaza.
I learned a lot from the chapters about what happened to the indigenous people
who remained after the deportations, in the late tsarist and early Soviet
periods. One astonishing revelation concerns the campaign initiated by the
Soviet authorities in the mid-1920s to destroy the traditional veneration of
elders by labeling the elderly an enemy class and sending them off en masse to
the camps.
POLITICS
4. THE DEBATE ABOUT “SURKOVISM”
Source. Russkaya politicheskaya kul’tura. Vzglyad iz utopii. Lektsiya Vladislava
Surkova. Materialy obsuzhdeniya v “Nezavisimoi gazete” [Russian Political
Culture: The View from Utopia. A lecture by Vladislav Surkov and discussion
material from Nezavisimaya Gazeta] (Moscow: Izd-vo NG, 2007)
Vladislav Surkov is (since 1999) a deputy head of the presidential
administration with special responsibility for development of Russia’s political
system. He has often been called Putin’s “chief strategist” or “main ideologist”
or “gray cardinal”; the last two of these epithets imply that his role is
similar to that of Mikhail Suslov under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. In the 1990s he
was head of advertising and PR in the business empires of Khodorkovsky and
Fridman. He also writes songs, e.g. for the rock group Agata Kristi.
In June 2007 Surkov delivered a lecture at the building of the presidium of the
Russian Academy of Sciences. The influential newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
currently owned and edited by former government adviser Konstantin Remchukov,
published the lecture and a series of responses to it by more or less prominent
readers. This source brings together the lecture and a dozen selected responses
in book form.
Surkov’s major theme is as follows. There is no abstract universal democracy.
Democracy takes different forms in different countries, depending on their
national traditions, psychology, and political culture. Attempts to create
democracy without taking these factors into account inevitably fail. This is
what happened in Russia under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, but the “sovereign
democracy” (a term that Surkov invented) emerging under Putin is a true
reflection of Russia’s historical uniqueness.
What are the connections between specific national characteristics and
traditions and specific features of “sovereign democracy”? Here, critics
complain, Surkov is vague. For instance, he makes approving reference to the
definition of the typically Russian outlook given by the now fashionable émigré
philosopher Ivan Ilyin: “contemplation of the whole.” (1) What political
implications can be drawn from this formula? The argument seems to be that the
Russian craving for wholeness or unity can only be satisfied by a centralization
of power like that undertaken by Putin.
The centralization of power is certainly part of Russian political tradition,
but the forms it took under the tsars and the Bolsheviks were far from
democratic. Yet Surkov is trying to convey a conception of democracy, albeit of
a special Russian kind. It would help if he explained what he means by
democracy, but he never does. Perhaps Putin’s Russia is to be considered a
democracy by definition. Surkov implicitly appeals to the tradition of
autocracy, but he also mentions the semi-democratic institutions that arose
under Alexander II (the zemstvos in regional government) and after 1905 (the
Dumas). So presumably he wants a system of strong presidential rule modified by
certain democratic elements.
Toward the end of Surkov’s lecture a minor theme emerges: the need to look
beyond the past and focus on the likely needs of future development. Like so
many before him, he bemoans Russians’ lack of initiative and technological
backwardness. But, as one critic remarks, he fails to reconcile the forward
orientation of his minor theme with the backward orientation of his major theme.
It is as though by the time he reaches the end of the lecture he has forgotten
what he said at the beginning!
The 12 responses selected for publication in the book fall into three groups:
Four are mostly or wholly supportive of Surkov. Here we find:
-- Boris Gryzlov, leader of United Russia. This article is useful because it
spells out official positions in clearer policy terms, without Surkov’s amateur
philosophizing.
-- Sergei Stepashin, currently chairman of the Audit Chamber
-- Dmitrii Orlov, director of the Agency for Political and Economic
Communications
-- LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who remarks that he and his party have been
saying the same things as Surkov all along.
Five responses are sharply critical of Surkov’s arguments:
-- Mikhail Barshchevsky, chairman of the Supreme Council of Civic Force (Grazhdanskaya
sila)
-- Nikita Belykh, leader of the Union of Right Forces (SPS)
-- Andrei Bogdanov, chairman of the Central Committee of the Democratic Party of
Russia
-- the veteran publicist Anatoly Strelyanov
-- Alexei Malashenko from the Moscow Carnegie Center
Strelyanov challenges official hypocrisy by proposing (tongue in cheek?) to drop
democratic pretenses and adopt laws that codify real power relationships.
Malashenko offers some amusing comparisons between Surkov and Suslov. (2) He
sees Surkov as a transitional figure who tries to reconcile democracy with
authoritarianism. He prophesies that Surkov will be followed by and fall
victim to more consistent authoritarians.
Among the sharply critical writers we find two divergent approaches to the
question of tradition. Some (e.g., Barshchevsky) view the Russian political
tradition as anti-democratic and argue that Russia needs to break free of it.
Others stress the complexity and diversity of Russia’s political traditions,
which make possible a discriminating approach to the past. Belykh points, in
particular, to the strong liberal tradition in Russia’s regions. He accuses
Surkov of deliberately ignoring this tradition because it does not suit his
political purposes.
The remaining three responses may be described as mildly critical. They are
mild, above all, in their carefully respectful language; in substantive terms
much of the criticism is quite penetrating. Here we have the political scientist
Georgy Bovt; the former PM Academician Yevgeny Primakov, now president of the
Chamber of Trade and Industry; and NG editor Remchukov himself.
The most interesting of the mild critics is perhaps Primakov. While expressing
great admiration for Putin as a leader, he objects to Surkov’s attempt to
construct a state ideology around Putin’s person. He suggests that Putin adopted
centralizing measures not under the inspiration of historical tradition but in
order to solve practical problems that had arisen in the 1990s. Now that those
problems have been resolved, it is possible to proceed cautiously to a measure
of decentralization, especially in the economic field.
In Primakov’s opinion, Surkov exaggerates the importance of the national factor.
In Soviet times, he recalls, we had to look at everything through a “class
prism”; are we now going to be required to look at everything through a
“national prism”? He also dislikes the term “sovereign democracy”: it has no
scientific value and is open to propaganda exploitation by Russia’s adversaries.
One of Surkov’s “theses” is that political parties must unite and not divide the
nation. This means that interparty competition must be confined to the middle of
the political spectrum. Gryzlov and Zhirinovsky (also posing as a “centrist”)
chime in on the same note. Permissible differences between parties are likened
to “nuances” or to preferences for different architectural styles or for
single-breasted versus double-breasted suits.
I am struck by the fact that none of the responses published express even a
moderate left-wing view. This may not be a coincidence. Gryzlov and Zhirinovsky
dwell much more on the evils of left than of right extremism. In particular, the
advocacy of “class struggle” is not to be tolerated. The main purpose of
official “anti-extremist” policy appears to be to ward off potential threats
from the left (in all its old and new varieties).
NOTES
(1) As Belykh points out, Ilyin was no democrat. At a certain period he was even
an admirer of Hitler. Probably aware of this, Surkov and Gryzlov both dilute
their references to Ilyin by also citing several other Russian thinkers whose
legacy allegedly inspires them (especially Berdiaev). The choice of appropriate
names is something of a problem: they must be neither too liberal nor too
reactionary.
(2) He praises Surkov as more interesting than Suslov, recalling that people
dozed off during Suslov’s speeches and did not read his works. However, does
this comparison really work in Surkov’s favor? If no one read or listened to
Suslov, that limited the harm he could do as an ideologist, at any rate.
POLITICS
5. A LEFT PROGRAM FOR TODAY’S RUSSIA
Vladimir Sirotin
Introductory note: This is my translation of a text sent by a colleague in
Russia, entitled “On the question of a program for the left in today’s Russia”
[K voprosu o programme levykh v sovremennoi Rossii].
What is the possible content of a positive program for Russia’s democratic left
today?
First of all, it is necessary to define completely clear positions on many
realities, whether or not these positions are to anyone’s liking. And for this
it is necessary to dispel a whole series of absurd and extremely dangerous myths
that do enormous harm.
For example, the myth of “socialism” in the USSR and the so-called “socialist”
countries. The myth that our so-called “communists,” including the CPRF, are on
the left. There is no such thing, there can be no such thing as leftists who are
traditionalists, chauvinists, xenophobes, anti-Semites, racists, or
nationalists. Certain things are absolutely and fundamentally incompatible.
It is necessary to dispel the myth of the “strong hand” that can allegedly bring
the country out of crisis and impose order. On the contrary, we must introduce
into the public mind the idea of the unacceptability of any kind of dictatorial
regime, of dictatorship in any form.
Until we establish the unconditional priority of democracy, freedom, human
rights, and inviolability of the personality, we shall not drag ourselves out of
barbarism and become a normal country. The task of the left is to make the fight
for human rights all-encompassing in character. Human rights in general,
political, civil, and socioeconomic rights, the rights of women, young people,
children, and students, the rights of all cultures, of ethnic and sexual
minorities all this is very important and necessary. Democracy must be
extended to all spheres of life from politics to the school and the family.
Freedom, pluralism, respect for the rights of others! There will be no
guarantees against obscurantism and extreme reaction until this is understood by
the broad masses.
We must understand that whether or not human rights are observed is not the
internal affair of each country. In cases of serious violations of human rights
and of repressive dictatorships, outside interference is not just permissible
but desirable, even obligatory. Diplomatic protests, economic sanctions,
blockade, reduction in the level of diplomatic relations (or even their rupture)
various measures, depending on the situation. Naturally, human rights
organizations and democratic media must be involved.
Not a single dictatorship should feel at ease in the international arena!
We must finish with the mythology of repression. By means of a stricter punitive
policy it is supposedly possible to eliminate or sharply reduce crime.
Historical and world practice demonstrates just the opposite.
Not only must we stop emphasizing the mythical “virtue” of Russia’s colonial
expansion. We must acknowledge, clearly and unambiguously, that the Russian
Empire was an empire that arose as a result of the predatory conquests of the
metropolis, that Russian imperialism and colonialism are not a whit better than
any other. Official apologies should be made to peoples that have suffered from
conquest, genocide, and oppression (in particular, to the Chechens). Germany has
apologized to the peoples that experienced occupation and genocide; many Germans
feel repentance and have overcome chauvinism. In 1992 the King of Spain sought
the forgiveness of the Jewish people for events that happened 500 years ago. So
precedents exist.
And what about us Russians? Does our national conceit not permit it?
However, it must be said that under the current regime nothing of the sort is
conceivable. To make forward movement possible, this regime must be removed by
revolutionary-democratic action from below.
The slogans of the left must be concrete. For a high, progressive tax on the
rich and on big business, in order to raise the level of social welfare.
Introduce a 35-hour working week without delay. Protect immigrants in need of
refuge. The unconditional right of all ethnic territories to self-determination
up to the point of secession (with obligatory observance of all democratic
rights and freedoms). End the war in Chechnya immediately, withdraw Russian
troops, and grant Chechnya independence (if desired) on a democratic basis and
under international supervision.
Human rights, humanism in everything these are the fundamental values of
genuine leftists. An end to all discrimination against racism, xenophobia,
sexism, ageism, homophobia. For education financed in full by the state, by
society. Far-reaching humanization of education and upbringing. A sharp
reduction in the load on students, their participation in decision making,
development of the creative capabilities of the personality. The complete
dismantling of hierarchical-patriarchal structures in all areas of life above
all, in the family and the school. Reform of the prison system, its humanization
and contraction (through a broad amnesty). Against privatization of healthcare,
for a universal healthcare system fully financed by the state. Raise pensions
and make them index-linked. Raise the minimum wage.
Sharply reduce housing prices and initiate a broad program of housing
construction, end homelessness, ameliorate and solve housing problems. Expand
the rights of trade unions. Fight environmental pollution. Nationalize oil and
gas.
Real chances of accomplishing all this will come after the democratic
revolution!
HISTORY
6. EMPIRE OF THE PERIPHERY
Source. Boris Kagarlitsky, Empire of the Periphery: Russia and the World System.
Translated by Renfrey Clarke. London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2008
Do we need yet another history of Russia? Perhaps we do, if the approach is
really distinctive and stimulating.
This is not a factual account. It is assumed that the reader already knows the
basic facts of Russian history. The focus is on explaining key developments by
reference to economic factors, with a special emphasis on economic relations
between Russia and other countries.
In broad terms, then, the approach is Marxian. More specifically, Kagarlitsky
(1) takes as his starting point the work of Mikhail Pokrovsky (1868 1932) and
his school of historical scholarship, which was suppressed by Stalin and has not
been revived until now. He is equally influenced by the “world systems” theory
of Immanuel Wallerstein. (2) His view of the evolution of capitalism is
influenced by the theory of “long cycles” of Russian economist Nikolai
Kondratiev (1892 1938).
Besides Pokrovsky, the author draws extensively on primary sources, such as old
chronicles and archival material, and also on archeological evidence, although
only in respect of those periods which he studies most intensively. He avoids
reliance on the “classical” 19th-century Russian historians, considering them
biased by their engagement in the dispute between Westernizers and Slavophiles.
For Kagarlitsky both sides in this dispute, which is by no means over even
today, are confined within the framework of certain erroneous assumptions about
Russia. His book can be read as a sustained polemic against Westernism AND
Slavophilism.
What are these shared assumptions that Kagarlitsky challenges?
First, that Russia is and has always been ESSENTIALLY different from Western
Europe or “the West” different in some deeper sense than that in which France
is different from Germany, say, or Britain from Italy. For example, Kagarlitsky
disputes the view that Russia had a special kind of absolutist monarchy unknown
in Western Europe (France, say).
Second, this essential difference is attributed to the supposed isolation of
Russia from the West not at all times, but over long periods. For Kagarlitsky
isolation from the outside world has been the exception rather than the rule in
Russia’s history. In particular, he stresses that Peter the Great was not, as he
is often presented, the first tsar to establish close ties with Western Europe:
that honor belongs to Ivan the Terrible, whose relations with Britain were so
close that he was known as “the English tsar.”
Third, that Russia’s supposed essential difference and isolation from the West
have been reflected in persistent economic backwardness vis-à-vis the West. The
Slavophiles considered Russia superior to the West in culture, morality, and
religion, but they did not deny that Russia lagged behind in material terms.
For Kagarlitsky, by contrast, Russia’s backwardness dates only from the
beginning of the rise of the capitalist world system in the 17th century. In the
late middle ages Russia and Western Europe were on roughly the same level of
development, while in the early middle ages Kievan Rus was actually far in
advance of Western Europe. (3) Moreover, Russia’s development in the early
modern period was held back not because the country was isolated (it wasn’t) but
because it was integrated into the rising world market in a certain mode as a
“periphery” exporting raw materials such as furs, wax (4) and ship’s timbers,
and later iron and grain.
The serfdom of the 18th and first half of the 19th century is usually viewed as
an archaic survival that went along with backwardness and isolation. Kagarlitsky
makes a sharp distinction between the old medieval serfdom, which was part of
the natural economy of feudalism, and the serfdom of the early modern period,
which served to extract grain for export and thereby pay for goods imported for
upper class consumption. In other words, Russian serfdom, like slavery in the
Americas at the same period, was an element in the formation of the capitalist
world system.
The author suggests that Russia had a chance to break out of its peripheral
niche and embark on the path of autonomous industrial development after the
Napoleonic wars and that the Decembrists, whose conspiracy he considers
“serious,” might have taken the country in this direction. In the event, it was
the Bolsheviks and above all Stalin who eventually established Russia as an
independent industrial power. Russia has now returned to its traditional place
on the periphery of the world system.
Kagarlitsky’s book has some weak sections (for instance, the discussion of the
1917 21 period), but taken as a whole it is an impressive achievement. In
contrast to many writers on Russia, Kagarlitsky knows not only Russian but also
world history, and this enables him to view Russia in context as part of the
world, not as a world apart. In conclusion he responds to the “accursed
question” whether Russia should seek to join the West (in its present
incarnation) or keep its distance by rejecting both the alternatives offered:
“The fate of Russia is inseparable from the fate of humanity, and we can
struggle for a better world for ourselves only through trying to build a better
world for everyone. And this, of course, can also be said of any country.”
NOTES
(1) Kagarlitsky was a key figure in the “new left” dissident group “Left Turn”
in 1978 82 and in the “informal” movement during perestroika (Moscow People’s
Front). He is currently director of the Institute of Globalization and Social
Movements. Several of his books have appeared in English.
(2) However, Kagarlitsky is willing to take issue with Wallerstein and Pokrovsky
on important points. He is not the sort of “Marxist” who argues that if Marx or
anyone else said something it must be right.
(3) At this period not just Rus but other Eastern lands -- Byzantium, Persia,
China -- were more developed than Western Europe.
(4) Wax was a very important commodity at a time when people relied on candles
for lighting.
HISTORY
7. STATISTICIANS UNDER STALIN
Source. Alen Blium and Martina Mespule, Biurokraticheskaia anarkhiia: Statistika
i vlast’ pri Staline [Bureaucratic Anarchy: Statistics and Power under Stalin]
(Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006). Translated from French: Alain Blum et Martine Mespoulet,
L’Anarchie Bureaucratique: Statistique et pouvoir sous Staline (Paris: Editions
la Decouverte, 2003)
Blum and Mespoulet have provided us with a splendid study of the fate of
statistics and statisticians under Stalin. (1) The Soviet regime inherited from
the late tsarist period the very strong and sophisticated legacy of zemstvo
statistics. The statistical departments of the zemstvos provincial organs of
self-government established by the reforming tsar Alexander II employed staff
of many different political persuasions, including Bolsheviks, but they all came
to share a culture of professional integrity.
The Bolshevik leadership made persistent efforts to bring the work of the
Central Statistical Administration (CSA) under their full control first by
placing “reliable” outside officials in leading positions at the CSA (they “went
native”) and eventually, from 1937, by means of repression. And yet the
professional culture of the statisticians demonstrated astonishing resilience in
face of this onslaught.
There was always a tension between the need of the regime for accurate
statistics as a basis for planning and administration and its demand for
statistics consistent with the current ideological representation of reality.
You might think this would lead to a sort of double bookkeeping: one set of
statistics for internal use, another for propaganda. But evidently this did not
occur. At the time of the post-collectivization famine, for example, Stalin and
his colleagues were reluctant to believe the mortality figures that the CSA was
reporting to them. They responded by instructing that the figures be checked in
selected regions with the participation of officials from the Workers’ and
Peasants’ Inspection, whom they supposed to be more party-minded. But the
results that came back were even worse than the first time.
The book contains a number of fascinating (to me, anyway) case studies
pertaining to specific statistical issues, such as the definition of social and
ethnic categories and the use of sampling.
NOTE
(1) Alain Blum is director of the Center for Russian, Caucasian, and Central
European Studies in Paris. Martine Mespoulet is currently on the faculty of the
University of Poitiers.
HISTORY
8. JEWISH OPPOSITION TO THE JEWISH OLIGARCHS (1)
Under Yeltsin a number of financial “oligarchs,” most of them of Jewish origin,
acquired great wealth and power by highly predatory means. The period came to be
known in Russian folklore as “the rule of the seven bankers” (semibankirshchina)
an allusion to the “rule of the seven boyars” (semiboyarshchina) during the
Time of Troubles in the 17th century. These oligarchs (2) were targets of
widespread popular hatred. Often, though far from always, this hatred took on
anti-Semitic forms.
With the rise of Putin and the subsequent exile or imprisonment of three of the
Jewish bankers (Berezovsky, Gusinsky, and Khodorkovsky), the oligarchs became
both less “Jewish” and less powerful relative to the state. Strictly speaking,
there are no longer any oligarchs. Therefore I place this item under the heading
of history rather than current politics.
One aspect of the situation in the 1990s that did not attract much attention was
the fact that very many Russian Jews themselves hated the oligarchs. They hated
them for the same reasons as everyone else, but in addition for a specifically
“Jewish” reason they held them largely responsible for the rise of
anti-Semitism.
The danger that popular hatred of Jewish oligarchs would be extended to Jews in
general depended, inter alia, on the extent to which the Jewish oligarchs
appeared as symbols, representatives, or leaders of Russian Jews as an ethnic or
religious community. There was reason to fear that, as Sergei Pogorelsky put it,
the ugly image of the post-Soviet Jewish banker was displacing the benign images
of the Soviet Jewish scientist, musician, or physician:
“Who in the ‘Jewish family’ today are its ‘elder brothers’? Not the composer
Shostakovich or the aircraft designer Mil. They represented the Jewish family in
Soviet times, but their time has passed. Today the ‘elder brothers’ are the
bankers.” (3)
In fact, most of the Jewish oligarchs did not seem to attach much significance
to being of Jewish origin. Like the great majority of Jews in Russia, they were
highly Russified, and their identity as Jews was weak. They were not religious.
(Berezovsky ostensibly converted to Orthodox Christianity.) They showed little
or no interest in Jewish causes. In short, they pursued no specifically Jewish
goals, only their own aggrandizement.
This generalization did not, however, apply to one of the Jewish oligarchs,
Gusinsky, who created and financed his own Jewish organization, the Russian
Jewish Congress. A widely based Russian Jewish organization, the Va’ad (whose
name means “council” in Hebrew), had already been in existence for several
years. The Va’ad, an umbrella organization bringing together Jewish communities
from across Russia and Jewish groups of varying orientation, was the creation of
Mikhail Chlenov. As a researcher at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology
of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chlenov was the only professional
ethnologist specializing in the study of Jewish culture and customs at a time
when such a choice of specialization required a certain moral courage. The Va’ad
had a much more valid claim to represent Russian Jews than any other
organization.
When Chlenov objected to the attempt of the Russian Jewish Congress to usurp the
status of the representative body for Russian Jewry, Gusinsky summoned him to a
meeting and offered him the choice between “cooperating” and “being destroyed.”
After that, when Russian or Western journalists wanted quotes from a
“representative of Russian Jews,” it was Gusinsky whom they interviewed.
The power of the repulsive image of the new “elder brother” was reduced somewhat
through the efforts of Russian Jews who as leftists or “patriots” took a public
stand against the oligarchs. An important example was that of Yevgeny Primakov,
who was known to be of Jewish origin. During his brief tenure as prime minister
in 1998 99, he defiantly excluded the oligarchs from policy making, even
instructing that they should not be permitted to enter the building where he had
his office.
That anti-oligarchic Jews may have had some modest success in holding
anti-Semitism in check was suggested by responses to their public statements
that appeared in the Russian nationalist press. Thus, in 1998 Yuri Mukhin,
editor of the Russian nationalist journal Duel, opened a debate on
Russian—Jewish relations in its pages. A number of Jews as well as Russians
contributed to this debate. Summing up, Mukhin concluded that “good Jews” do
exist, albeit not many of them, and he invited them to “stand side by side” with
their Russian fellow patriots. The Russian nationalist philosopher Alexander
Dugin and leader of the National-Bolshevik Party Eduard Limonov likewise revised
their Eurasianist ideology to allow for the existence of pro-Russian “Eurasian”
Jews. True, even in the process of making such concessions these people
continued to sound like anti-Semites, but the virulence of their anti-Semitism
was blunted.
It is true that Jews were and no doubt still are on average less likely than
Russians to adopt “patriotic” positions. They are more likely to have relatives
abroad, and the experience of sometimes feeling rejected as different naturally
generates a sense of alienation from Russia. A survey conducted by sociologist
Dmitry Furman in 1991 confirmed that Jews were the most Western-oriented of
Russia’s ethnic groups. Only 13 percent of ethnic Russians but 52 percent of
Russian Jews agreed with the statement: “The best of possible societies has been
created in the West, and we must imitate the West.” (4)
Such relative differences, however, should not be absolutized. After all,
Furman’s survey also showed that almost half of Russian Jews were NOT so clearly
oriented toward the West. There were many political activists of Jewish origin
whose loyalties lay with the leftist and/or “patriotic” sectors of Russia’s
political spectrum. Many such individuals had a strong dual identity as both
Russians and Jews, so that they felt offended equally on encountering
russophobia and anti-Semitism. (5)
Some of these points were nicely illustrated in an exchange that took place in
1998 between Berezovsky and Eduard Topol, a popular Russian-Jewish writer known
mainly for his detective fiction. Topol interviewed Berezovsky in connection
with a book he was writing about Russia at the end of the 20th century. Topol
then made excerpts from the conversation public as part of an “open letter to
Berezovsky, Gusinsky, Smolensky, Khodorkovsky, and the other [Jewish] oligarchs”
that appeared in the magazine “Argumenty i fakty” (no. 938, Sep. 16, 1998) under
the title “Love Russia, Boris Abramovich!”
Topol, by his own account, confronts Berezovsky in the following terms:
“For the first time in the thousand years since Jews settled in Russia, we have
acquired real power in this country… How do you intend to use it? What do you
intend to do with this country? … And do you feel responsibility to our people
[i.e., Jews—SS] for your actions?”
Topol’s confusion is evident here in his switch from the first to the second
person. He says “WE have acquired power” but asks “How do YOU intend to use it?”
He imagines that he, too, shares in some sort of Jewish power, but then suddenly
realizes how absurd it would be to ask Berezovsky, as though they were equals:
“How shall WE use it?” The power in question, after all, belongs to Berezovsky,
not to Topol.
Berezovsky replies by regretting the “disproportion” between the numbers of
Jewish and of Russian bankers and pondering why it should exist. There are, he
opines, Russians with the requisite talent, but they lack the necessary strength
of will. He admits that the question of “responsibility to our people” is not
one that he or the other Jewish bankers have considered. The question of what
Berezovsky “intends to do with Russia” remains unanswered.
The leading Russian nationalist newspaper Zavtra (no. 40, Oct. 1998) published a
reaction to Topol’s open letter from the Russian “native-soil” writer Vladimir
Bondarenko, who expressed regret only that Topol had rebuked the Jewish
oligarchs more out of fear of the anti-Jewish pogroms that they might provoke
than out of sympathy for the Russians whom they had reduced to penury.
Thus, the conflict between the oligarchs and their opponents was basically a
political and not an ethnic conflict. However, the Jewish origin of many
oligarchs inevitably had the effect of giving the conflict the appearance of an
ethnic conflict between Russians and Jews. The strength of this effect depended
on various circumstances. In particular, any claim of the Jewish oligarchs to
lead or represent Russian Jewry greatly strengthened the effect, while the
public activity of anti-oligarchic Jews tended to erase the ethnic coloration of
the conflict.
NOTES
(1) This item draws on material that first appeared in my essay: “Foreign
Assistance as Genocide: The Crisis in Russia, the IMF, and Interethnic
Relations,” originally published as Chapter 7 in Milton J. Esman and Ronald J.
Herring, eds. “Carrots, Sticks, and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking Development
Assistance” (The University of Michigan Press, 2003). I reuse the material with
the kind permission of the publishers. My excuse is that the original source is
not widely known among Russia specialists.
COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Copyright belongs to the University of Michigan 2001. All rights reserved. No
part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise,
without the written permission of the publisher.
(2) The term “oligarchs” was sometimes used in a narrow sense to refer only to
the seven bankers, sometimes in a broader sense to include other powerful
figures, notably the oil and gas “barons” (mostly not of Jewish origin). Here I
use the word in its narrow sense.
(3) Sergei Pogorelsky, “Russkie i evrei: Shans dialoga” (Moscow: Informpechat,
1999), p. 53. Shostakovich was actually of Polish origin.
(4) Pogorelsky, p. 57.
(5) Dmitry Shlapentokh, Washington Quarterly, Fall 1998, no. 4, pp. 107—126.
Back to Table of Contents
REMINISCENCE
9. LEARNING TO READ BETWEEN THE LINES (1)
As a teenager I first acquired an interest in Soviet politics reading the
newspaper columns of the brilliant Sovietologist Victor Zorza. (2) I found his
complicated analyses of the conflicts between different power factions
fascinating. But one thing annoyed me: he never let slip a clue about how he
knew all this stuff. Not citing sources broke all the rules of proper scientific
inquiry. How could anyone check up on him? You either believed him or you
didn’t.
I soon discovered that this was a problem with all Sovietologists. They might
offer evidence of a kind: who stood where on the May Day review stand, subtle
distinctions between the phraseology used by different leaders but the
momentous conclusions they sometimes drew from such evidence seemed out of all
proportion to its apparent weight. No wonder that Sovietology was so often a
target of ridicule!
Only much later did I come to understand why Sovietology was like this. Even
after going into Soviet Studies at the University of Birmingham’s Centre for
Russian and East European Studies in 1979, it took me quite a while to
understand. There was one person above all who helped me understand: the Soviet
journalist, political scientist, ideological innovator, and reformer Fyodor
Burlatsky.
Burlatsky visited England in 1983 and spent two or three days at our university.
I was asked whether I would like to act as his guide, interpreter, and assistant
while he was at Birmingham. I accepted with alacrity. I heard that a recent
article of Burlatsky’s in Novy Mir was creating a big stir, so I read it in
preparation for his arrival. It was a long article entitled Mezhdutsarstvie
(Interregnum), ostensibly all about the post-Mao transition in China.
The afternoon of his arrival, Burlatsky gave a seminar at our center. We were
all very impressed, especially by his openness and by the reasonableness of his
tone. I for one was not just impressed. I was astonished and mesmerized. After
the seminar I showed him round the campus. Raising the subject of his article in
Novy Mir, I said that we had a shared interest in China, or something of the
kind.
“You know, it isn’t about China.”
“Ah,” I replied cautiously. “I realized that it might not be ONLY about China.”
“It isn’t about China AT ALL.”
I recall Burlatsky showing me a paper he had written (it had been published in
English by UNESCO) about “the absolute value of peace.” He explained that the
ideas in the paper, though not presented as such, were part of a Soviet
ideological dispute between the “class approach” and the “panhuman approach.”
These conversations with Burlatsky sensitized me to the importance of reading
between the lines of Soviet sources and gave me confidence in my ability to
decode their almost-concealed meanings. Now I could detect all sorts of
differences between texts that to the uninitiated seemed to be repeating
standardized propaganda clichés. An apparently minor variation or omission might
be highly significant. I set out my conclusions in a series of articles on
Soviet approaches to nuclear winter, the militarization of space, international
crisis, etc., and in my book-length study of the “new thinking”: The Nuclear
Predicament: Explorations in Soviet Ideology (RKP, 1987). This book owed quite a
lot to my conversations with Burlatsky, but I knew not to mention them. Some
reviewers, and no doubt many readers, reacted to the book as I had once reacted
to Zorza: the conclusions I was drawing were more far-reaching than the evidence
justified. I could not explain why I knew I was right.
Burlatsky was taking a big risk in being so open. In fact, he was in trouble
when he returned from this visit to England because he had been reported as
saying something that the party bosses found objectionable. He had intended to
IMPLY what was reported, but had taken care NOT to say it so many words. The
journalist should have reported the exact words Burlatsky used and then
interpreted them on his own responsibility, so that if necessary Burlatsky could
claim that he had been misinterpreted. The journalist either did not understand
the situation or did not care if he compromised Burlatsky.
People often thought Burlatsky was putting on airs when he boasted about his
influence on Soviet leaders, but there is good reason to think that he did have
an indirect influence on Khrushchev and a direct influence on Andropov. Through
Kuusinen he was involved in initiating proposals for important ideological
changes that Khrushchev agreed to adopt in particular, the redefinition of the
Soviet state as a “state of the whole people” instead of the “dictatorship of
the proletariat” of Lenin and Stalin. (4) He also belonged to the small personal
“brains trust” that Andropov first convened when he was head of the Central
Committee department for liaison with socialist countries (1957 67). So when I
met Burlatsky, during Andropov’s short reign as Gen Sec, he probably was a
person of influence.
Even as a foreigner mixing with Soviet people, you had to be careful about how
you talked not so much to protect yourself as to protect Soviet friends. The
worst thing likely to happen to you was not to get any more entry visas,
possibly forcing you to leave the field of Soviet Studies, but you might well
come to regard that as a positive outcome in terms of mental health. When I was
on a Russian language course in Leningrad I made friends with a young woman who
told me that her friends had advised her to have nothing further to do with me.
From the way I had been talking they suspected that I had connections with left
opposition groups in the city. I was flabbergasted first, because I had not
even been aware that such groups still existed; second, because I had fondly
imagined that I WAS talking carefully. Carefully perhaps, but evidently not
carefully enough to be sure I was not endangering anyone.
NOTES
(1) This piece concludes a series of reminiscences about my early encounters
with Soviet reality. See, in particular: RAS 25 no. 15 (on my visits to
Esperanto clubs), RAS 27 no. 9 (on my first experience of doing academic
research in the USSR), and RAS 31 no. 6 (on a visit to relatives).
(2) Zorza, who died in 1996, was not only a Sovietologist. In the early 1990s,
he introduced (reintroduced?) into Russia the institution of hospices for the
dying. His biography (Michael Wright, Victor Zorza: A Life Amid Loss) was
recently published by Observatory Publications.
(3) I did not support the “let my people go” campaign because it seemed to me
that it had more to do with Israeli demographic politics (increasing the share
of Jews, and of European Jews in particular, in the population) than with human
rights.
(4) For Burlatsky’s own account, the title of which does somewhat exaggerate his
role vis-à-vis Khrushchev, see: Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era
of Khrushchev Through the Eyes of his Adviser (Scribner, 1992).