Russia Profile
July 17, 2008
The Putin Leadership Puzzle
Putin chose Medvedev out of an instinct for self-preservation, rather than out of a move towards liberalism
By Yelena Biberman
Over two months into Dmitry Medvedev's presidency, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin continues to puzzle most Russia observers about his real "plan." Some believe that Putin is just buying time before making his Kremlin comeback. Others see him as someone who is actually looking forward to his retirement from big politics, provided that Medvedev carries on his vision. Given past experience, one thing that we know for sure is that Putin will remain as unpredictable as ever.
“Putin remains powerful. He is seen by most Russians as the leader who overcame the humiliation and chaos of the 1990s… Conceivably he has assigned himself a review role over the performance of his successor; it is possible that he is keeping open the option of running in a future presidential election,” former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in Washington Post after visiting President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in mid-June.
Kissinger was puzzled about why Putin “would choose the complicated and uncertain route of becoming prime minister,” especially since “his popularity would have allowed him to amend the constitution and extend his presidency.” But he concluded that, whatever were its underlying motives, Putin’s move marks Russia’s transition “from a phase of consolidation to a period of modernization,” which may also “appear to be the beginning of an evolution toward a form of checks and balances.”
Whether Kissinger’s optimistic assessment of Russia’s democratic direction proves to be correct still largely depends on Putin. One big question is how much of it really still depends on him and his enigmatic “plan.”
The power of popularity
Kissinger clearly links Putin’s power to his popularity. But, the relationship between power and popularity, especially in the political environment of today’s Russia, is not as clear-cut as it may appear at first glance. Because Russia is not completely undemocratic, a leader’s popularity is still a key ingredient for power. It still matters what most people think because these most people can vote. But, conversely, power may serve as an explanatory variable of popularity. What most people think is also largely determined by the media and, consequently, those who “control” the media outlets. Plus, without elite consensus, or, at least, support from some prominent elites, Putin would not have gained his public reputation in the first place and would unlikely be able to retain it in the long run. Putin’s de facto power, therefore, helps to explain his popularity.
Is Putin’s popularity, then, an accurate reflection of his power? In a country where public opinion, media coverage and elite attitudes are so closely intertwined, and transparency is scarce, it serves as one of the best measuring tools.
One way to assess Putin’s popularity – and, hence, his role in Russian politics – is to examine his appearance in the Russia media. As Levada Center sociologist Oleg Soveliev pointed out, media popularity and public opinion in Russia are highly correlated. The more frequently one is mentioned in the media in a positive light, the higher is his public rating.
Medialogia, a Moscow-based private media research firm, has tracked Putin and Medvedev’s appearances in the Russian media. The results reveal that, most of the time, Putin outperforms Medvedev in terms of his media popularity, though not as dramatically as many experts have assumed. During the first six months of this year, Putin was mentioned in the media only 1.3 times more than was Medvedev; and Medvedev’s direct speech was featured less frequently less than one percent of the total time. At the same time, the number of positive references to Medvedev was strikingly (2.7 times) higher than the number of positive references to Putin; conversely, the number of negative references of Medvedev was significantly lower (1.6 times).
When we narrow in on the national television channels, we see the same pattern, with the only exception being that Medvedev’s direct speech was actually featured 1.2 times more on national television than was Putin’s.
If we dissect the findings by month, we see that Medvedev appeared in the Russian media more frequently than Putin around the time of the election, but, on about March 10, the number decreased more than three-fold. After Medvedev’s inauguration, however, he gained steam in the media and, by around May 19, once again, somewhat surpassed Putin. By the end of June, Putin and Medvedev were mentioned with alomost equal frequency in the Russian media, but, by mid-July, Medvedev surpassed Putin once again, though not significantly.
Meanwhile, over the past month, references to Medvedev on the national television channels nearly consistently exceeded those to Putin roughly two to three-fold.
The dynamics of references to Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev in the Russian media [DJ: Chart not here'
So, while it would be an exaggeration to say that Putin “dominates” the Russian media, it would also be erroneous to claim that Medvedev has become the new media darling. Putin is clearly not out of the picture.
How did media popularity translate into public opinion?
The June poll conducted by the Levada Center showed that, nearly two months into his term as prime minister, Putin continues to outdo Medvedev in terms of popularity. While nearly three-quarters of the Russian population said that it approves of Medvedev and his work, Putin’s approval rating reached its all-time high – 83 percent – in June. Conversely, Putin’s disapproval rating fell to its record low, 13 percent.
Soveliev cautioned that, statistically speaking, these numbers are not sensational, as Putin’s ratings were always high. But, he also pointed out that Medvedev’s current public approval rating is roughly the same as was Putin’s when he started off back in 2000.
A world-class leader
Putin is popular not just at home, but also abroad. A WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 20 nations, which combined comprise 60 percent of the world’s population, revealed that, while no one individual clearly stands out in terms of his global leadership, Putin outperforms high-profile national leaders such as U.S. President George W. Bush and French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The polling in Russia was conducted in late January, while Putin was still president. Still, the upward trend in Putin’s popularity is clear.
But, while Putin is becoming more popular around the world, he is also becoming more divisive. The WorldPublicOpinion.org report noted that the “upward trend [in Putin’s popularity] is the product of a balance between countries that have had large increases in positive views – such as China, where Putin’s ratings are up 17 points – and those with large increases in negative views – such as the United States, where his ratings are down 21 points.” Interestingly, China was “the most upbeat country”; 75 percent of Chinese trust Putin “to do the right thing regarding world affairs.”
Putin does not strike as a divisive figure at home, however. He is certainly nowhere near as controversial as was his late mentor Anatoly Sobchak by the end of his term as St. Petersburg mayor. But, that may be changing. A Public Opinion and Effective Politics Foundations’ joint study comparing Putin’s first and second-wave voters (i.e. those who voted for Putin in 2000 vs. 2004) found that Putin supporters are not a static bunch. The inflow/outflow of Putin’s electorate exceeded 25 percent in 2004-2005. Paradoxically, it was not the youth to which Putin should have paid closer attention.
The study revealed that Putin supporters are rapidly becoming younger. In other words, Putin is winning the young, but losing the old. In 2005, already over one-third of his supporters were not older than 35 years of age. At the same time, the older generation was abandoning Putin at a notable speed. Between 2004 and 2005 alone Putin lost 7 percent of 35-50 year olds and 5 percent of those who were 50 years or older.
Thus, Putin’s upward trend in domestic popularity appears to be a product of a balance between younger voters that have had large increases in positive views of Putin and the older voters, who demonstrate relatively large increases in negative views of Putin. And it was not simply that the older voters were pulled in by other political leaders. The study also found that those who stopped supporting Putin did not prefer any one of the existing (albeit, very limited) alternatives, but, it concluded, they can still be lured back by “a new, presently unknown figure that will completely meet their preferences.”
Sticking to the script
So, in choosing to leave his office and promoting Medvedev, Putin may have acted more out of an instinct for political self-preservation than a move towards liberalism. In picking a younger alternative, he may have sought to hold on to the conservative young core of his supporters, while, at the same time, maintain support of members of the older generations who wanted to see some change take place.
One of the organizations that carried out the study was founded by Gleb Pavlovsky, a pro-Kremlin political scientist and Kremlin advisor; it is not inconceivable that Putin was familiarized with its findings (available in as early as 2005).
Even if Putin, as some experts have suggested, would rather not become president once again, he must still keep the option open, just in case his successor fails to stick to the original script. But, whether Putin can actually maintain his popularity and power long enough to be able to return to the Kremlin is another question.
“Putin was clearly the dominant figure when he was president by a wide margin over any other political figure. As such, he controlled most of the threads of power in the Russian political system,” explained Thomas Graham, senior director at Kissinger Associates who also served as Special Assistant to the (U.S.) President and Senior Director for Russian Affairs. “Putin remains the leading figure – just look at the public opinion polls, television coverage, elite comments – but the extent of his political power and authority has diminished, simply by the fact that he has stepped down as president.”
Graham underscores the fluidity of the situation. “What the division of power and authority will look like in practice is something that will evolve with time. It will depend not only on Medvedev and Putin’s actions and behavior, but also on the actions and behavior of other senior officials, on the coherence of the Presidential Administration and the Government, and on the treatment foreign official’s accord to Medvedev and Putin,” he said. “The first real test of relative political strength will come with the first real crisis in Medvedev’s presidency. Who will be perceived as the person in charge, and who in fact will be in charge, Medvedev of Putin?”
There are those who are convinced that Putin will continue to be in charge no matter what (real or artificial) exogenous or endogenous shocks may appear. “Judging by what Medvedev says and what the Kremlin does, there is almost perfect continuity, indicating that Putin is in control of all key domestic and foreign policies (or that ‘Putinism’ remains the dominant economic, political and foreign policy philosophy),” explained Leon Aron, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “One exception might be a certain relaxation of the government’s ownership of justice.”
Alexander Rahr, program director for Russia/Eurasia at the German Council on Foreign Relations, agrees with Aron that Putin dominates Russian politics. But, he is not convinced that the best case scenario of the plan involves Putin replacing Medvedev in 2012. “He [Putin] will distance himself from power after a while, when he is sure that Medvedev will continue to follow his course,” he said.
Karen Dawisha, director of the Havighurst Center for Russian and Post-Soviet Studies at Miami University, agrees with Rahr’s assessment. “Probably Putin himself does not know yet whether such a replacement will be necessary. Why would he need to replace Medvedev if Medvedev behaves? After all, no domestic or foreign observers understood what the real ‘Putin plan’ was even three months before it was unveiled,” she said. “However, if he wants to replace Medvedev, he’s in the perfect position from a strict constitutional point of view; and Medvedev knows this too, which will constrain his freedom of movement.”
It is now over two eventful months into Medvedev’s presidency. Still, most Russia observers hesitate to offer their forecasts about the Putin plan, proving, once again, that the most predictable thing about Putin is his unpredictability.