Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2008
From: Andrei Liakhov <gaffriloff@yahoo.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Debate on the US-Czech agreement
I would like to provide some background information about what options Russia has to neutralise what it sees as a clear and present danger posed by the missile interceptor system (radar-satellite-interceptor missiles) which the US plans to install in Eastern Europe.
Such system must incorporate a warning system capable of detecting the missiles as early in their trajectory as possible, preferably the launch itself. The missiles must be intercepted at the boost (first 5 minutes or so) stage for the maximum effect as at this stage their flight is what in the industry is called "ballistic" - i.e. the missiles are not capable of any meaningful manouvre and fly at much lower speeds until they reach their cruising speed. Once they are cruising the intercept becomes much more difficult.
The communications link between the warning system and the interceptor station must be as short as possible to allow interceptors to do their job at as early launch stage as possible to achieve maximum result. The proposed US triad makes the link quite long, thus delaying the point of launch and reducing to a critical level the effectviness of interceptor launch.
On the other hand, all of Central Russia all the way to the Urals is within the radar's direct envelope (range of vision) and makes this system ideal for intercepion of missiles launched from European Russia. Thus, irrespective of what the US claims, technically the Czech/Polish combo is designed primarily for intercepts of launches in the Urals area. And control of Western Russia's airspace, as this is the territory potential threat from which is in line of direct radar vision which excludes satellite component from target detection phase.
Based on the above, IF the Americans really have Iran in mind Azerbaidjan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Dagestan, Krasnodar Oblast, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are ideal locations for installation of the radar-interceptor system.
If the Russians make good on their threat to install short range nukes in Kaliningrad (a much cheaper exercise than the US East European plan) that makes the US interceptor complex redundant simply because (a) the Russian missiles are too close for the US to be able to react; (b) they will be outside the announced radar coverage sector; and (c) the flight trajectories of the short and medium range Russian missiles are below the announced radar vertical envelope.
Deployment of tactical nukes in Kaliningrad will inevitably mean though that they are targted at Polish and Czech territory...... (as well as the NATO and US C&CC in Belgium and England respectively). If this is combined with the rather simple electronic radar jamming device, the whole system becomes one huge useless Cold War Fantasy monument.
The downside is that the expence burden on the respective military budgets is incomparable - while US$50 bln for the US DoD is relatively small change (plus running costs), some US$5 bln for the Russians (plus running costs) wll mean closure of other high tech defence programs which (like the 5 generation fighter or the Jury Dolgoruky class subs or Bulava) would be, otherwise, much more useful for the Russian military.