Kennan Institute
www.wilsoncenter.org/kennan
May 6, 2008
event summary
The Everyday Life of the State: Russian Officialdom from Alexander III to Putin
Kennan Institute U.S. Alumni Series
Bureaucracies as we understand them are the products of political systems and foreign influences, said Don Rowney, professor, Department of History and senior research fellow, Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State University at a 6 May 2008 Kennan Institute lecture. There is no ideal type of bureaucracy, and bureaucratic systems are not interchangeable between states. Their functions are best explained through “historical institutionalism” to explain how they formed and changed over time. Therefore, it is perfectly natural that Russia’s officialdom is different from that in other states.
Eugene Huskey, professor, Department of Political Science and director of Russian Studies, Stetson University, and former Title VIII-Supported short-term scholar, Kennan Institute, stated that in 1991, international influences were evident in the debates about state administration as well as the economy. Where neo-liberalism helped to shape early postcommunist economic reforms, the New Public Management (NPM) movement encouraged Russian officials to modernize the civil service and make it more responsive. There were positive outcomes from the reforms, such as the “one window” reform designed to replace multiple bureaucratic authorizations required of businesses with a single registration window. Yet by and large, the NPM approach failed to work in Russia as the real result was the partial privatization of state agencies to serve large business or bureaucratic interests.
Rowney and Huskey questioned whether the Russian civil service works for the public or whether it functions as a system of patronage. Noting that bureaucratic organizations in Europe and North America are generally merit based, they contended that in the Russian system competitive hiring has been the exception. According to a survey, 47 percent of contemporary Russian bureaucrats know their bosses before being hired. Fully 76 percent of Russians, and 46 percent of Russian officials, believe that Russian bureaucrats are a “separate caste.” The Russian bureaucracy runs according to informal practices, rather than institutional professionalism, they added. This is evident in practices ranging from the primacy of personal contacts and loyalties above rules to the usage of “administrative resources” in elections.
In this system, bureaucrats are only answerable to other bureaucrats. Rowney and Huskey suggested that Russia does not have true politicians, since politicians are thoroughly entrenched in the bureaucracy. This aspect of Russian governance is a long-standing feature of the Russian political system dating back to the tsarist era. Russian leaders, from the tsarist to the post-Soviet era, abhor constraints on their power and therefore empower the bureaucracy as a tool to project state power. Yet the unwillingness of leaders to have constraints on their power, and the resulting power granted the bureaucracy, weakens the overall state capacity because of the lack of accountability and discipline.
Rowney and Huskey described how Vladimir Putin attempted to strengthen state capacity and reverse the devolution of state power by introducing legislation that seemed to promise serious civil service reforms. He instituted a unified federal and regional civil service ranking system, and over time brought the federal and regional legal codes into harmonization. He moved to increase funding and prestige for officials, while at the same time decreasing the discretionary perks and bonuses that served to foster personal loyalty to bosses within the system. Yet the tendency of staffing the bureaucracy with individuals with Moscow or St. Petersburg connections worsened under Putin.
Rowney and Huskey concluded by suggesting several explanations for why reforming a civil service is so difficult. First, such reform is complicated in any society and involves tremendous financial and human resources. Second, reform of officialdom was not a high priority early on in post-Soviet Russia, and only at the end of the 1990s did the leadership recognize that state reform was necessary to continue economic success. Third, the reform tactics employed were often misguided: they sought, for example, to lessen corruption through law enforcement campaigns rather than by changing incentives. Moreover, bureaucrats are masters at subverting reforms via loopholes and informal practices. Most importantly, they stressed, top-down directed reforms are unlikely to succeed; successful reforms require social mobilization.