Russia Profile
May 30, 2008
Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel:
Medvedev’s Trip to China – A Signal to the West?
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
Contributors: Stephen Blank, Ethan Burger, James Jatras, Eugene Kolesnikov, Eric Kraus, Edward Lozansky
Russia’s new President Dmitry Medvedev undertook his first overseas trip since taking office by going East – to Kazakhstan and then to China. The trip is meant to send a subtle political message of Russia’s evolving foreign policy priorities.
A stopover in Kazakhstan was clearly intended as a sign of Russia seeking to preserve its clout in the energy-rich Central Asian region, while an official visit to China, de facto Medvedev’s first serious foreign policy event, has been structured around the themes of Russia and China opposing U.S. policies.
Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a joint statement in Beijing, condemning the United States’ plans to set up a missile defense system.
“Both sides believe that creating a global missile defense system, including deploying such systems in certain regions of the world, or plans for such cooperation, do not help to support strategic balance and stability, and harm international efforts to control arms and the non-proliferation process,” Russia and China said in a joint statement.
Earlier, in an interview for Chinese TV, Medvedev expressed Russia’s growing frustration with the U.S. stance on missile defense, arguing that Russia’s proposals for a cooperative joint missile defense system have been ignored. Medvedev and Hu Jintao also found common ground on human rights, which both countries frequently claim that the United States uses as political leverage to criticize them.
“Both sides are concerned about the universal nature of the principle of respecting human rights, but believe that every state has a right to encourage and protect them based on its own specific features and characteristics…we should oppose politicizing the issue and using double standards, and should oppose using human rights to interfere with other countries’ affairs,” the statement said.
In a major policy speech at Beijing University, Medvedev stated that Russia and China will continue strengthening their strategic cooperation even though “someone might not like it.”
Medvedev emphasized that the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership has become a key factor of international security, without which no major international decision could be made, much to the chagrin of certain states. Medvedev also stressed the role of energy cooperation in strengthening the ties between Russia and China, with Russian energy exports to China growing from a mere $0.5 billion in 2001 to $6.7 billion in 2007.
Medvedev’s choice of China as the main destination of his first foreign trip is highly symbolic. When his predecessor, Vladimir Putin, went abroad for the first time as president in 2000, he traveled to London with a message that Russia wanted closer ties to the West.
Is Medvedev signaling that China has become Russia’s most important international relationship? Is it a shift in foreign policy priorities, or is Medvedev’s trip intended simply to unnerve the West, thus strengthening Russia’s bargaining position on a host of issues, including missile defense? Are Russia’s relations with China developing into a strategic alliance with long-term security implications, as Medvedev seemed to indicate in his speech in Beijing, or is it still more of a figure of speech for both nations, while real priorities lie elsewhere (China’s trade with Russia last year reached $48 billion, a mere two percent of China’s global trade, and eight times less than that country’s trade with the United States)? Who is bluffing, Russia or China? What is the real story behind Russia’s energy relationship with China, with talks on strategic Russian gas exports to China stalled over the Chinese demands for lower gas prices? Are Russia and China in a strategic competition for the energy reserves of Central Asia?
Eric Kraus, Nikitsky Russia/CIS Growth Opportunities Fund, Moscow:
If intelligent life were to eventually develop here on Earth, future historians would undoubtedly try hard to understand why the Western Alliance, so obviously threatened by a rising China, did everything in its power to drive Russia into the Chinese camp – surely a Neocon’s worst nightmare!
When I first warned of this threat almost a decade ago, I was met with derision. “Russia is far too afraid of China, and will either submit to Washington’s diktat, or face total isolation,” was the stock reply. A few years later, following the swift resolution of all outstanding border disputes, there is a growing military alliance, political alignment in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the UN Security Council, burgeoning trade flows, and repeated major diplomatic initiatives.
The secular rise of China will fundamentally alter the geopolitical makeup of the 21st century world. Never in the history of mankind has a major world power arisen without substantial friction with the existing hegemony; it is most unlikely that this time will be the exception. Lesser powers will be increasingly obliged to take sides. Rich in energy, mineral resources, agriculture, and with a vital role in Central Asia, Russia should be seen as one of the greatest prizes.
While Russia has traditionally viewed China with some mixture of fear and contempt, it was not alone in so doing. The unprecedented transformation of the Asian colossus will increasingly shake the cozy self-assurance of the Atlantic Alliance. Though Western policy makers have been surprisingly tactful in regard to China, towards Russia they have been needlessly hectoring and aggressive, making little secret of their desire to isolate and contain it in the European space. While NATO armchair generals are gearing up to re-fight the last war, Chinese diplomacy has been a model of tact, supporting Russian interests wherever possible, refraining from unsolicited advice regarding domestic issues, and generally treating Russia with all due respect. Thus, while the threat from NATO seems immediate and pressing, any Chinese threat would appear vague, hypothetical and distant. And China is not an ally to be scorned.
It would be puerile to imagine that the alignment between China and Russia is anything other than a marriage of convenience - great powers have not friends but interests. Yet, except perhaps for Russia's fear of Chinese expansionism, there are no obvious strategic conflicts; and the notion of wars of territorial aggrandizement between nuclear-armed states seems almost quaint.
To some extent, the two giants can be seen as strategic competitors in Central Asia, but even here they have adopted a largely collaborative approach. Having resolved the question of oil export pipelines in favor of China rather than Japan, they are now engaged in a long hesitation waltz regarding gas deliveries. Since Russia is not starved for cash, while China is hungry for energy, one would expect the gas pricing issue to be eventually resolved in Russia's favor. In the meantime, there is ample scope for expansion of energy cooperation in hydrocarbons and nuclear energy.
The 21st century will be characterized by the struggle for resources and the dislocations caused by the rise of the Asian powers with, at least in relative terms, a decline of the West. The notion that Russia - bridging Europe and Asia – could be "isolated," flies in the face of the most elementary geographic logic. Though the West has won some minor battles in the CIS, each successful battle brings it that much closer to losing the war.
We have long relinquished any hope of seeing Washington and Brussels take Russia’s vital interests into account. Perhaps there remains some small hope that they may yet decide to advance their own. Whether or not the Russian style of governance is agreeable to the West is irrelevant – its ability to influence domestic policy is essentially nil. The Atlantic powers must realize the potentially huge cost of pushing Russia into the Chinese camp – both in terms of lost opportunities and of new threats. Radically rethinking the relations with the Kremlin is vital, and showing respect for Russian geopolitical concerns would be an important first step. Indeed, the West could do far worse than to copy Chinese diplomacy in regard to Russia.
Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, the Netherlands:
All talk about Russia reorienting itself to the East is ungrounded in reality. Russia is inseparably linked to Europe, and thus to the West at large, by a multitude of ethnic, religious, historic, cultural and economic ties. Russia is a part of Europe, although a very distinctive part.
It should be realized, however, that throughout its history, Russia has been a power center that derived its vitality and, indeed, its survival as a nation, from “samostiynost,” which can be roughly translated into English as combined meanings of the words self-direction, self-sufficiency and independence.
Russian and Soviet empires exemplified this “samostiynost” to the fullest extent. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ensuing interregnum of the 1990s brought Russia to the brink of collapse and oblivion as a self-directed, self-sufficient, and independent nation.
Russia has regained some of its former strength during the last eight years, but it has not been able to regain the unquestionable independence that it enjoyed as an empire. Russian leadership thus considers the American “grand strategy” of the Western domination and subjugation of Russia as a vital threat to its “samostiynost” and survival.
This vital threat brings about Russia's strategy of the double headed eagleclose integration with Europe and the West in general on one hand, and paying dues to and making geopolitical deals with China on the other. Russia's and China's geopolitical interests converge in resisting Western domination. Energy, economic and political deals between Russia and China are based on these converging interests. This includes cooperation in Central Asia, a common position on many thorny issues in the UN Security Council, rejection of the U.S. global missile defense, etc.
By making his first big international visit to China, president Medvedev sends a signal to the West that Russia will pursue its “samostiynost,” using China as an ally in building a multi-polar world. This visit also sends a signal of respect and recognition to China as an emerging superpower. If Russia is to remain independent, it has to embrace China's rise and forge a mutually beneficial strategic partnership. Russia is uniquely positioned for such a partnership, as it is the only G8 country that resists Western domination. China therefore needs Russia's support on this issue as much as Russia needs China.
James George Jatras, Principal, Squire Sanders Public Advocacy, LLC, Director, American Council for Kosovo, Washington, DC:
President Medvedev having chosen Beijing as a venue for his maiden voyage into foreign summitry is significant in terms of bilateral Russo-Chinese ties, both in its symbolism and in its promotion of increased economic and political cooperation between the two countries. Symbolically, it demonstrates that Russia has options other than America and Europe. Moscow's limitless prospects for bilateral cooperation with Beijing include expansion of arms sales and energy exports, to meet China's insatiable needs.
But the real importance of the Medvedev visit should be seen in the multilateral context of Russia's and China's growing role as the pillars of a broad international counterweight to almost two decades of virtually unopposed American hegemony. Such a counterweight is imperative to help reassert the essential principles of national sovereignty and respect for established rules of international behavior, so brazenly violated by the George Bush and Bill Clinton administrations.
Medvedev’s visit to China follows the recent foreign ministerial meeting in Yekaterinburg of the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). With the exception of China, BRIC is a group of democratic countries, three of them nuclear powers. To varying degrees, they can boast impressive demographic weight (reversing its population decline must become one of Russia's top priorities), growing economic clout and political influence, especially outside of Europe. Compared to "old" powers, such as Britain, France, Germany, and even the United States, the BRIC countries' future status as respectable regional, if not world powers, should be assumed.
While BRIC is not a formal structure, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is. An essentially Sino-Russian group, with the junior participation of four former Soviet Central Asian republics, the SCO is unlikely to ever become an actual alliance comparable to NATO. But especially in light of India's participation as the most important observer country, the SCO provides a platform for asserting opposition to some of Washington's more problematic agenda items. These include the illegal and stillborn U.S.-led attempt to detach Kosovo from Serbia, the planned NATO missile deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland, further NATO expansion, and shameless Western meddling in other countries' domestic affairs under the guise of "promoting democracy," as seen in the "color revolutions" in the former Soviet Union and in Serbia's recent parliamentary elections.
As an American, I regard the emergence of a multilateral counterweight to the U.S. unipolar hegemony as an opportunity for my country to take a step back from the more self-destructive of tendencies we have exhibited during our post-Cold War hegemonic binge. Instead of trying to establish American dominance in what has been called the Broader Middle East, which includes both Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington should be open to the advantages of other powers' taking the leading role in areas far removed from American shores. Any remaining NATO presence in the region, from Afghanistan and Central Asia to the Caucasus and the Balkans, should be on the explicit basis of formal cooperation with the SCO, with the aim of combating jihad terrorism, separatism, and organized crime. For Washington, this would mean ceasing our continuing flirtation with Islamic radicalism ("promoting democracy in the Islamic world") and a complete reversal of our Balkans policy.
Unfortunately, whoever will take the helm in Washington in January 2009, it is likely that the new Administration will repeat the mistakes of the Bush and Clinton eras, when it comes to perpetuating our increasingly nonviable hegemony. Whoever wins the White House in November, a redoubled hostility to any possible source of opposition, especially Russia, seems certain. Whether in the guise of Sen. John McCain's proposed "League of Democracies," or a "Concert of Democracies" suggested by some of Sen. Barack Obama's advisers, a stepped-up anti-Moscow policy seems sure to be accompanied by a desire to humble Beijing. If the latter's hold on the American debt bubble doesn't instill any restraint, let's hope the reluctance of democracies like India and Japan, who have too much common sense to get involved in such a reckless scheme as the "League/Concert," will.
Edward Lozansky, President, American University in Moscow:
There is no doubt that Medvedev's choice of going to China and Kazakhstan on his first overseas trip is a strong signal to the West. Embittered by the West's rejection and its non-stop lecturing and moralizing, Russia is obviously trying to find some consolation in the East, but will it find it? Yes, there were several important agreements signed, and the words pronounced by Kazakh and Chinese leaders were pleasant to the Russian president’s ear, but both of the Eastern giants are playing their own geopolitical games, and as long as the United States remains strong, they will not sacrifice their relationship with the world's only superpower just to make their northern neighbor happy.
At the same time, Russia's continuous population decline provides fertile ground for China's strategists, who think in terms of centuries, and not years, to keep casting longing glances at the nearly empty territories to their north. Kazakhstan rulers are also not very pleased when they hear some Russian politicians, even marginal ones, claiming its northern territories, heavily populated by ethnic Russians, and they also need huge U.S. investments in their economy.
From the Kremlin's point of view, the temptation to show America the middle finger is obviously very high. The end of George Bush's presidency is quickly approaching, and if he is replaced by John McCain, Moscow expects nothing but trouble ahead. Personal warm feelings between Bush and Putin helped to prevent an open confrontation despite such unpleasant issues as Kosovo, missile defense, and NATO expansion. While pushing his missionary democracy crusade, Bush also understood the importance of Russia in the global strategic configuration, and was not ready to cross the line. However, judging from McCain's foreign policy agenda, he is prepared to do just that. I do not believe all those who say that we should take McCain's rhetoric with a grain of salt, and that once he is settled in the White House, reality will force him to moderate his views. Perhaps this will happen eventually, but I am afraid that before we see it, the U.S. - Russian relationship will sink into deep and dangerous waters.
Unfortunately, the world's major power leadership’s strategic thinking is still hopelessly stuck in the geopolitical paradigms of the past century. The global challenges of the 21st century, like declining energy supplies and soaring energy prices, climate change, a food crisis, international terrorism going nuclear or biological, and natural disasters, cannot be solved by the outdated diplomacy methods and maneuvering.
The United States or Russia playing "the China card" against each other will not solve any of the above-mentioned problems. All three countries are now too interdependent in economic and security issues to keep playing the same old game. The world is now a global village, and one needs new thinking and new ideas.
I agree with those who say that the UN has become a monstrous bureaucracy, and that it has to be modernized or replaced with a more efficient structure. However, this structure is certainly not McCain's imaginary "League of Democracies," explicitly directed against Russia and China. Are we in a position to turn down their help, to prevent nuclear proliferation or avert a terrorist attack, to develop new sources of energy or to reduce global warming? Can we rely in these matters only on countries with perfect records of democracy? As the Russian literary classic Alexander Griboedov once pronounced, “Who are the judges”?
Ethan S. Burger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, & Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C. :
President Medvedev’s (prime minister Putin’s) foreign policy advisors have made wise choices of the first two foreign countries for the former to visit. I believe, however, it would be wrong to emphasize the military aspects of the trip. In the near-term, in light of the current state of U.S. military technology, the concept of global missile defense remains in the realm of science fiction. The ever-present external threat might make for good rhetoric for speech writers with limited imagination, but it is not a prominent reason for president Medvedev to travel east.
Medvedev and his handlers want to be able to characterize his initial visit abroad as a “success.” He can be confident that he will receive a warm welcome from the Kazahstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the Chinese President Hu Jintao, and their colleagues. Russia remains a critical political ally and a key partner to both countries. His hosts share an intolerance of what they view as political interference in their sovereign political affairs. Generally, it is easier to have stable international relations with states where there are fewer actors in the foreign policy process.
There are numerous additional reasons for selecting Kazakhstan and China at this time. Russian relations with the countries to the west are formal (at best), not cordial. President Nazarbayev needs Russian political and economic support to validate many of the choices he has made in the international economic sphere and domestically, in dealing with political opposition (i.e. in a heavy handed-manner, but probably no worse than the leaders of most countries).
Despite the recent changes in its taxation of oil companies, Russia needs extensive investment in its energy sector. China cannot be the sole supplier of the needed capital--if it provides the funds, it will have less money to prop up the U.S. economy, while perhaps further quenching its thirst for energy. In addition, China has been relatively successful in promoting economic growth without sanctioning political reform (despite recent rumblings and actions taken to placate those who see the Olympics as an opportunity to promote human and worker rights in the country); to many in the Russian leadership, this is an attractive model.
Furthermore, president Medvedev may consciously or unconsciously try to prevent the United States and others from using China against Russia in the future, as a strategic means of applying pressure on the Kremlin. At the same time, given the Chinese humanitarian crisis resulting from the recent floods, Russia can offer assistance in this area – which will probably be regarded as a positive gesture by the Chinese people.
Finally, the visit allowed the two countries to discuss energy and strategic issues of common concern – particularly in Central Asia. Both states have to deal with their own Moslem minority in a manner least likely to provoke a crisis. I doubt that the Western leadership has lost much sleep over the trip, as they may have if Medvedev were to return to Moscow via Delhi or Teheran, but they should have their engineers working overtime on making electric cars a reality.
Professor Stephen Blank, the U.S. Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA:
The Sino-Russian relationship is clearly a viable strategic partnership. But it is a partnership “against,” rather than “for.” What is common to both sides is their dislike of American policy, power, and rhetoric, if not of democracy promotion means.
What they do not share is a common vision of the future in regard to global or regional security issues throughout Asia. They demand inclusion and a veto power over major issues of world politics, but there is no sign in their rhetoric of a positive vision for East or Central Asia, or for nonproliferation.
Moreover, as fundamentally mercantilist economies directed by the state, especially in regard to energy, their interests clash, and cannot be easily reconciled. Neither can Russian trade satisfy China, because for the most part, Russian goods are not competitive on global markets, and Russia is also failing to take full advantage of the revolution in information technology to build a flourishing high-tech sector.
The energy rivalry alluded to by Frolov is also inherent in the nature of their state systems, with China demanding preference and Russia demanding higher prices, but being forced, for political reasons, to supply China with oil by train--an inherently wasteful and sub-optimal solution.
The inbuilt corruption and innate inefficiency of Russia's energy industry has also played a major part in precluding the satisfaction of Asian, not just Chinese, demands for a pipeline to the Pacific Ocean. For now, both sides need each other, and may continue to manifest a robust opposition to American power, but this will not solve their economic problems, or the problem of Russia being reluctant to sell China its military crown jewels, prototypes and designs for new weapons. Medvedev's visit was an attempt to emphasize the positive, but there is no sign that the issues that create friction were resolved.
So it largely seems that Russia was the one "bluffing," to use Frolov’s term. Yet it takes this bluff seriously. Everything coming out of Moscow suggests an unwillingness to take America into account, especially in view of America's own transition, as well as a desire to reinforce and dominate the Caspian energy sector, along with Kazakhstan, and firm up the alliance or partnership with China. Even as it does so, Moscow is also cozying up to Japan, to remind China that it has options in Asia. This is an old Russian game, and we must wait to see how it plays out, even though it has rarely succeeded in the past.