Russia Profile
May 28, 2008
Improvised Policy
The Quarrel over Sevastopol Gives Ukraine More Reason to Prevent Russia from Joining the WTO
Comment by Georgy Bovt
A recent Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) survey regarding the affiliation of Sevastopol was very impressive, primarily in the bold way the question was phrased. Russian people were asked whether they think the “city of Russian seamen” should belong to Russia. Of course, two thirds of respondents gave an affirmative answer, and about one third stated that for this, they are willing to sacrifice even the good relationship with Ukraine. There is nothing surprising about these results. The opinion that Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov recently expressed in a provokingly harsh manner (provokingly – because it was done on the territory of the sovereign neighboring state) is truly shared by the majority of Russians who believe, and, incidentally, likewise believed this in the Soviet times (although nobody conducted any surveys on this topic back then), that Nikita Khrushchev having given Crimea as a “gift” to Ukraine in the 1950s was very unfair, and cannot be justified from any point of view.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its support for mayor Luzhkov in a special statement, issued after Ukrainian authorities banned him from entering their country’s territory. The foreign policy department did not repeat the Moscow mayor’s postulate word for word, but it did refer to the opinion of “the majority of Russian citizens.” It is clear that the aforementioned survey was meant to coincide with this new Russian-Ukrainian squabble, which still continues to develop according to a scandalous scenario: in reply to Ukraine’s banning Luzhkov from entering the country, Moscow announced that it also has a corresponding list of Ukrainian politicians who, from now on, will be banned from entering Russia. The most high-ranking official on this list (which has not been made public in full) turned out to be the deputy minister of internal affairs.
The escalation of the conflict did not stop at this. Kiev, in the person of President Victor Yushchenko, actually announced the start of the process of eliminating the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Ukrainian president does not rule out the possibility that this process will be concluded before the year 2017, when the lease agreement is due to expire; but it will definitely be done after 2017. It is now obvious that one of the instruments of pressuring Russia will be the intention of Ukraine, which recently joined the World Trade Organization, to initiate a bilateral negotiation with Russia about its entry into the organization. This negotiation will obviously become no less complicated and politicized than the continuing wrangle with Georgia. It can be expected that Ukraine will tie its consent to Russia’s joining the WTO with everything it can be tied to, starting with gas prices and conditions for gas transit from Russia to Europe, and on to withdrawing the Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol.
Russian WTO negotiators now pretend that this turn of events is completely unexpected– since there was a corresponding mutual commitment (taken on during the era of Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov) not to stand in each other’s way of WTO negotiations, if one of the countries joins it first. However, there was also a commitment to denounce the “practice of declaration,” and it is already ceased functioning today.
If today’s statements, made by Russian negotiators and other politicians regarding the “unexpectedness” of Ukraine’s position, are sincere, then they signify at least a complete inability to forecast the situation a few steps ahead.
A significant and consolidated part of the Ukrainian elite has long been demonstrating a consistency and firmness of purpose in the country’s foreign policy. This policy is mainly based on two founding principles. The first one is integration into European economic, political and military structures, including NATO and, in the distant future, the European Union. The second one is the certainty that these goals can be achieved on the basis of consistent distancing from Russia, and emphasizing of Ukraine’s own sovereign identity. Even if this periodically leads to certain complications in relations with Moscow, and even if these complications cause certain short-term economic expenses for Ukraine. Thus, we can still see a general vector of movement behind certain statements and actions of Ukraine’s political elite representatives, with all their seeming state of chaos and sometimes even crudity.
And what vector of movement can we see behind the similar actions of Russian elite representatives? What consequences, what development of the situation are presumed by certain political actions? After all, if no continuation is presumed at all, then these actions simply “hang in the air” and ultimately discredit and devaluate any similar future statements in advance.
For example, what continuation should and might have the widely publicized results of the VTsIOM survey about the “illegitimate” national affiliation of Sevastopol? Or what continuation is presumed by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement about the fact that Luzhkov is actually right? Or the analogous statements made by the State Duma? Probably none at all.
What consequences followed the statements that Russian leaders made on the eve of Kosovo’s independence recognition, regarding Moscow’s intent to take “adequate measures” with respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the self-proclaimed republics in Georgia? Does Russian diplomacy clearly recognize the further direction of movement, after some rather obvious and distinct steps toward expanding connections with Abkhazia and abandoning the sanctions against the separatist regime? What is the future of Abkhazia, for example, that would be desirable for Russia? Becoming part of the Russian state (especially since over 80 percent of its residents already hold Russian passports)? Proclaiming an independent state that Moscow will recognize? Reaching a compromise with Georgia, with Russia acting as a mediator, and subsequent reconciliation with Tbilisi?
So far there is no impression that Moscow has clear answers to all of these questions. There is an impression of an improvisation—a momentary tactic response to a changing situation, both in relations with Georgia and with Ukraine.
Meanwhile, even the logics of purely “street relations” include a strict principle: if you’ve lifted your arm, go ahead and punch. If you’re not planning to punch, don’t lift your arm. Because if all you do is wave your arms around, in the end people will simply stop taking you seriously.