Date: Fri, 23 May 2008
From: Vladimir Shlapentokh <shlapent@msu.edu>
Subject: How the new Russian President could start a new Perestroika with friendly trips to the capitals of neighboring countries
The number of Russians who believe that the new president will liberalize the regime is small. It is true that many people think that Medvedev is a liberal. His speech on the eve of the presidential election in Krasnoyarsk (February 15), which praised “freedom” as the highest value, reflected his Weltanschauung. Those who wish to believe in Medvedev’s liberal credentials (among them the famous journalist Vladimir Pozner) note that he had been active in Perestroika in 1989-1990, when his boss still wore the uniform of a KGB officer. Some people see a sign of Medvedev’s liberal orientation in the fact that he recognizes the universal character of democracy. Liberals note that he likes humanistic writers such as Chekhov, Bunin and Remarque. However, even those who believe in Medvedev’s liberal intentions are very skeptical about the chances for a new Perestroika. In April 2008, 80 percent of the Russians, according to a survey by Levada’s public opinion firm, were sure that everything will be the same with Medvedev as president.
Some of the pessimists, such as Lilia Shevtsova, a well-known political analyst, and Moscow journalist Kirill Rogov, are certain that Medvedev will never be able to free himself from Putin’s embrace. They believe that, even with the magic of the presidential armchair, Putin’s heir will not be able to change anything in the policy that has dominated Moscow for eight years. They pointed to his interview with the /Financial Times/ in March 2008, which was perceived by Russian journalists as empty and without any promise for a new policy. The election of Putin as the chairman of the party “Unity of Russia,” which dominates the parliament, only strengthens the view of people, such as the famous Russian liberal Vladimir Ryzhkov, who predict that Medvedev is doomed to be a puppet president. Some experts, such as Vladimir Milov, predict a protracted fight between the two centers of power in Moscowthat is, between officials who remain loyal to Putin and those who have placed a stake in the new president.
However, those with a more sanguine view of the future argue that nobody knows what will happen with the relations between the two leaders in the next months and years. Some experts, such as the prominent journalist Evgenii Kisilev, assume that Medvedev will soon be able to fully exploit the most powerful position in the country.
However, many believe that, even if he had the full power of the president, Medvedev would not be able to challenge the existing regime, which is deeply corrupt. Very few people in Russia believe that the new council for fighting corruption, started by Medvedev in May, will be effective. Most people do not take seriously Medvedev’s recommendation to “create an anticorruption standard of behavior,” or to make the judiciary system honest. The ruling elite (both national and local) would do anything to protect their wealth, including an adamant struggle against democratization. People from the “power ministries” (the FSB and the army) would be the fiercest enemies of change. For this reason, the second argument of the pessimistsabout the vested interests of the dominant classsounds gloomier than the speculation about Medvedev’s weak character.
Even accepting this strong obstacle to democratization, there are still some chances for Perestroika. They lie in the foreign (not domestic) policy of the Kremlin. To start the democratization of society, the author of a new Perestroika must try to liberate Russia from “the imperial trap.” He should attack the domestic imperial ideology and radically change the attitudes of the Russians toward the external world. The changes in this area will create the necessary conditions for a return of Russia to the democratic path.
Indeed, maintaining the image of the world as an enemy of Russia is a crucial way to legitimize current regime, along with the political stability in the country. The imperial ideology exploits the nostalgia of many Russians for the great empire and abets nationalism. It pits the population against foreign countries, treating them as hostile toward Russia and its integrity, and as working against the restoration of the country’s previous geopolitical role. In order to maintain a climate of patriotic agitation and divert the people from the country’s real problems, Russian politicians and journalists talk incessantly about “great Russia,” “Russia’s great past,” and “the great victory in 1945.” It is remarkable that, on the official site of the Russian president (2000-2007), the adjective “great” was mentioned more than 3000 times. The practicality of the imperial ideology is seen in the fact that up to 85 percent of the population, according to a survey by the BBC at the beginning of 2008, responded positively, in one way or another, to the xenophobic propaganda of the Kremlin and its foreign policy. In fact, the ruling elite do not possess other ideological ways to influence the minds of most Russians. Alternative ideological fundamentals, such as private property and the market economy (in April 2008, Medvedev underscored their importance for Russia), are not attractive at all to the majority of the population, which hates the corrupt bureaucrats and their illegal fortunes. Only 10 percent of the population, according to a survey by Levada’s polling firm conducted in November 2007, declared that they “respect people who became rich in the last 10-15 years.”
Only the imperial ideology allowed the Kremlin to pursue its deeply antidemocratic domestic policy and disregard the growing social inequality in the country. This ideology justifies the supremacy of the “national leader” and the mistreatment of democratic institutions. It presents the members of the opposition as almost foreign agents and makes it impossible for Western organizations, such as the British Council, to function in Russia. It justifies the rude intervention of the state in the activities of foreign companies, such as British Petroleum, which cannot protect their interests against Russian competitors. It helps persecute the Protestant Church in Russia as an American agent. The imperial ideology also treats Stalin as its main hero and maintains his positive image by silencing the media’s coverage of the mass terror in Soviet times.
In fact, the imperial ideology is only meant for a domestic audience and its influence on the relations with foreign countries is rather limited. The case involving the USA is typical. During the parliamentary (December 2007) and presidential (March 2008) elections, the volume of anti-American propaganda was extremely high. However, this propaganda did relatively little to deteriorate the relations between the two countries and in no way prevented the cordial meeting between Bush and Putin in Sochi where they, like a loving couple, went to see the sunset on the Black Sea on March 27.
In order to restart Russia’s move toward democracy, it is vitally important to break the spine of the imperial ideology. Germany and Japan, after the war, would not have been able to take the road toward democracy without a resolute and consistent rejection of the ideology of supremacy, militarism and expansionism.
The most peculiar fact is that a radical change of foreign policy is much easier than doing the same in domestic affairs. This is exactly what should be on Medvedev’s mind, if he wishes to be a liberal and not one of Putin’s clones. Medvedev seemingly understands the danger of using “greatness” as the central postulate of the official ideology. In April 2008, Nikolai Svanidze, a known Russian journalist, asked Medvedev, “What does great Russia mean to you?” Putin’s heir answered, “Russia, without doubt, is a great country.” However, he then called upon the Russians “not to be intoxicated” with the idea of “greatness” and to look soberly at the real position of Russia in the world.
Many liberals are waiting for the release from prison of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, an oligarch jailed by Putin for his political ambitions. However, Medvedev would have a more difficult time releasing Khodorkovsky than attacking the imperial ideology. As a matter of fact, liberalizations in post-Stalin Russia began in this area. Even before Khrushchev’s famous speech about Stalin’s atrocities at the Twentieth Party Congress, he proclaimed a policy of peaceful coexistence and undertook a number of actions that radically changed Soviet foreign policy. He was instrumental in the achievement of the armistice in Korea in 1953 and the peace in Indochina in 1954. Then, in 1955, he made a trip to Yugoslavia and apologized for Stalin’s policy toward this country and its leader Josip Tito. Then (still in 1955 and before “the thaw”) he reduced the Soviet army.
Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign deeds also preceded his domestic liberal policy. Before the Soviet people and the world understood Gorbachev’s democratic intentions, which did not become clear until 1987, the new Soviet leader met with Reagan in November 1985, only a few months after his ascension to power. This meeting marked the beginning of the warming of relations between the two superpowers. It was followed by a new meeting with the American president in the next year in Reykjavik. By 1987, the USSR and USA prepared a treaty on the elimination of short- and middle-range missiles.
The experiences of Khrushchev and Gorbachev might serve as a playbook for the new president, if he had the guts to turn toward the democratic road. In fact, the major obstacle to democratization is the Kremlin’s support for the imperial and nationalist ideology.
Ironically, the key element of the imperial ideology and Russian foreign policy that should be attacked by a new reformer is not the animosity against the West, the USA or Europe. The hatred of Russia’s neighboring countries (the former Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia, and former satellites such as Poland) plays a much more important role today. For instance, in AprilMay 2008, Russian media talked much more about the perfidious Georgia than England, which now, after the Litvinenko case, is also treated as a committed enemy of Russia. What is more, the media talked about Georgia almost as much as it did about NATO, which is seen as another one of the country’s fierce enemies. Indeed, between April 21 and May 22 , Georgia was mentioned almost 590 in 50 major Russian newspapers; England was mentioned 420 times and NATO 425 . The Kremlin’s aggressiveness toward the neighboring countries is a major source of friction between it and the West, which became apparent at the Bucharest meeting of NATO in April 2008.
Many experts in Russia and the West believe that the imperial ideology is deeply rooted in the Russian mind. Of course, the traditions of the country’s political culture, with its authoritarianism and xenophobia, are quite strong. However, the impact of the media on the Russians is much stronger. Khrushchev easily and almost instantly transformed public attitudes toward Tito’s Yugoslavia, a “fascist country,” from deep hostility to friendliness. President Reagan was vilified by the Soviet media in all possible ways from the moment of his inauguration in January 1981. However, when he came to Moscow as Gorbachev’s guest in May 1988 (I was there and watched it myself), he was greeted by ordinary people and intellectuals with great joy.
It would be easier for the Kremlin to redirect the media away from its hostility toward the Ukraine and Georgia than make the judicial system honest and independent. If president Medvedev decided to “reboot” the Russian political process, he would have to go on friendly visits to the capitals of all neighboring countries, starting with Kiev and Tbilisi. These visits would be as historically important as Khrushchev’s trip to Belgrade in 1955. He also must remove (which would be even easier) the main hawks on TV, including Maxim Shevchenko and Mikhail Leontiev, who sow the hatred of the external world on an everyday basis by inventing the most absurd theories about the subversive activities of the United States and the Ukraine against Russia.
Whether and when Medvedev will choose this scenario is highly uncertain. Many subjective and objective factors are in the game. So far, all signals coming from Moscow indicate that Medvedev, as Putin promised, will stick to the imperial ideology. He had no objection against the military parade on the Red Square on May 9, which was clearly addressed not to foreign governments in order to scare them, but only to the domestic audience in order to fuel the imperial spirit in the country. In his speech at the parade, Medvedev talked about some enemies who present threats to the motherland. In his capacity as president, Medvedev deemed it necessary to visit the base of strategic missiles in order to “enjoy,” as reported by a Moscow newspapers, “the might of Russian weapons.” The new president also hailed Russian TV, an open bulwark of the imperial ideology, and the antidemocratic policy as “one of the best in the world.” Instead of Tbilisi and Kiev, Medvedev chose as the place of his first visits Astana (the capital of Kazakhstan) and Beijing (the capital of China). Both visits, as Moscow newspapers wrote, demonstrated the continuity of Putin’s foreign policy. However, these first steps did not doom the idea of a future perestroika. Mikhail Gorbachev, in the first year of his tenure, verbally attacked imperialism and considered the improvement of the Soviet military forces as his main task.
However, it is almost certain that a return to democracy in Russia lies in the capitals of Ukraine and Georgia. Friendly relations with its neighboring countries are important to Russia because any hatred of them damages the Russian people. Whoever becomes the next American president, he or she should pay special attention to the relations between Russia and its neighbors. Without an improvement of these relationships, Russia will not be a stable partner in solving the world’s major problems.