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#37 - JRL 2007-38 - JRL Home
From: "Tedo Japaridze" <tedojaparidze@hotmail.com>
Subject: Crunch Time in the South Caucasus
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2007

Crunch Time in the South Caucasus
Georgian Ambassador Tedo Japaridze
43rd MUNICH CONFERENCE ON SECURITY POLICY
FEBRUARY 9-11, 2007
A ROAD TO RELEVANCE.

The South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), one of the most dynamic components of the Wider Black Sea Region, sits on the edge of three strategic equations: the European, the Middle Eastern and the huge Eurasian land mass.

A very important Region where many strategic vectors from different parts of the world meet, intersect; though the Region itself has its own strategic dynamics, attraction and vibrancy.

The South Caucasus is the only corridor connecting NATO territory with Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran. In the context of a “long war” against terrorism the Euro-Atlantic community will presumably be engaged in the foreseeable future, preserving strategic access to the entire Caucasus specifically should be an important strategic priority for the West. And in the wake of September 11th, the Euro-Atlantic community has identified more precisely and concretely these strategic interests.

Besides that strategic option, the South Caucasus could be one of the few regions in the world where Western countries could co-exist and cooperate with Russia efficiently and productively, first of all regarding the conflict-resolution process, energy transportation and some other regional hard/”soft” security issues.

While, for example, Central Asia is the immediate (though presumably with the perspectives of a long-term engagement) Western focus, given ongoing operations in Afghanistan, the South Caucasus lies in the strategic considerations of multiple oil and gas transportation as well as an optional access routs and links to different strategic nearby equations.

Alongside with this strategic line, the West supports the policy of democratization and human rights in the area though sometimes in a simplistic, unbalanced and, I would say, even messianic way.

I would also argue that efforts to promote democracy in the Region, however noble and well-intentioned, must take into account that the South Caucasus Region is still in a period of turbulent transition/transformation phase.

More specifically, the state-building and democracy promotion efforts must occur simultaneously and on a parallel track as opposed to one coming before or after the other, as we witness almost in all regional countries on the both sides of the Caucasian mountains.

And change cannot be expected overnight. Western euphoria over “colored revolutions” in the broader Black Sea region, including the South Caucasus, aside, we need to recognize that the most difficult reforms typically come in the wake of these regime-changes, long after the flashbulbs of the news cameras have faded.

Aftermath of the Cold War and tumultuous adjustment to the new realities of the world order, the temptations of strategic withdrawal and regional neglect are often too great for any state to ignore. Whether triumphant in victory or damaged and exhausted in defeat, the idea of remaining strategically engaged­regionally or globally­can pose burdens too great for any state to bear. However tempting, it should be noted that the costs of strategic withdrawal are real and potentially devastating, as the history of interwar Europe and the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have shown.

The South Caucasus, a Region of great importance during the Cold War, remains, as I noted above, a Region of major strategic relevance and demands the continued attention and engagement of the world’s leading powers.

Without this engagement the South Caucasus runs the risk of reversing whatever gains have been made since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and stoking simmering regional conflicts.

In a most basic sense, the South Caucasus is, and always will be, strategically important simply because of geography. With the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union (EU) on January 1, 2007, the Wider Black Sea Region, including the South Caucasus, has become the EU’s “near abroad” and the Black Sea itself has become the EU’s body water. The region has now been transformed into the southeastern corner of Europe, complicating traditional strategic considerations in the East-West corridor.

One more point we need to keep in our mind: As we know, Turkey has been already deeply immersed in the EU accession process and its gigantic internal transformation, connected with the EU integration, will impact dramatically and in more than a positive manner on the lives of peoples within the entire South Caucasian neighborhood, being our (as well as Russia) natural/geographic neighbor.

So the Turkish stakes to promote stability and economic prosperity throughout the South Caucasus Region, based on shared values and strategic interests, would become one of the basic elements of Turkey’s internal stability and security.

The proper (and this initially could be just partial) engagement of the South Caucasian countries into Turkey’s EU integration process, through the synchronization of the activities in the areas of mutual interest, would facilitate the process of transformation in the Region, including the resolution of many existing problems.

In addition to the South Caucasus Region’s physical/geographic position as a strategic corridor, one should not forget the importance of the commodities-both welcome and unwelcome-that pass through it.

On the positive side, the South Caucasus and the entire Wider Black Sea Region, is a major conduit for the transfer of energy, particularly on the Black Sea and further to Europe, through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, and natural gas transportation from the “Shah Deniz” gas field in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea.

Along with energy resources, the Region is host to a variety of potential economic and commercial development projects and opportunities, elaborated, for example, within the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Organization (BSEC), the only full-fledged regional international organization, and beyond it.

But the Region is also a major conduit for illicit goods­specifically small arms, ammunitions, narcotics, and human beings. But despite this obvious fact, global strategic considerations in the Region are often defined too narrowly. The world’s great powers must engage the Region in a way that moves beyond simply securing the safe transport of energy and disrupting the transfer of illicit goods.

Today, a deeper appreciation of regional complexities and how they impact the formation and implementation of policies of strategic engagement is needed.

One more point. If the world’s leading powers continue to narrowly define their interests in the region­or ignore it altogether­there is the risk that political reforms made since the collapse of communism in 1991 will be reversed and latent regional “frozen” conflicts will come to a head.

Despite the fact that current conflicts in the Region are of the low-intensity variety (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South-Ossetia in particular), the potential sources of escalation are many, especially if the world’s major powers adopt policies of neglect and disinterest.

A Couple of words about the so-called "frozen conflicts.”

They are a macrocosm of the intertwined and interconnected hard and "soft" security as well as of commercial and economic issues, in general. Experts admit that out of twelve currently existing conflicts in the world, three, as noted above, are in the South Caucasus.

However, and it has to be noted that the UN and OSCE have not come up with a fully satisfying definition. These conflicts are in fact simmering, draining the resources and energy of all South Caucasian countries and perpetuating the existence of uncontrolled and lawless territories. These enclaves have become safe havens for the terrorists, criminals, all sort of illicit trafficking and are significant breeding ground of the international terrorism.

These de-facto entities are heavily armed, criminalized and authoritarian and have preserved intact the old Soviet era capacity to produce weapons, military equipment and have in addition developed a capacity to produce counterfeit money.

With more than loose border controls or customs mechanisms in the Region, this "strategic corridor" makes an ideal gateway to reach the most distant and secure areas in Europe, America or even in Asia.

A couple of months ago, as a result of two successful joint operations, US and Georgian law-enforcement agencies arrested in Baltimore a network of well-organized criminals from Georgia, the conflict zone in South Ossetia, Georgia, as well as Israeli and American citizens charged with circulating counterfeit 100 bills in at least in four American cities.

Another case that has just recently become public is connected with an attempt to smuggle enriched uranium from the Russian territory via Georgia to unidentified customers in the Wider Black Sea Region. According the New York Times interviews (January 24, 2007) with Georgian and American officials, along with a review of confidential government documents, provided a glimpse into a world of smugglers who slip across poorly policed border.

This latest uranium seizure (earlier one took place in 2003), said the American Ambassador in Georgia, John F. Tefft, "highlights how smuggling and loose border control, associated with Georgia's separatist conflicts, pose a threat "not just to Georgia but to all the international community”.

Abovementioned could be an evidence of how globalized and well-equipped these criminal organizations are. However, these are just the concrete examples of their illicit activities within the so called “conflict” zones. But there are still a lot of unresolved tensions and disputes in the Region and one can easily understand that these grey zones or "black holes" or lawless enclaves are ideal venues for criminals and terrorists to accomplish their goals.

In general, regional stability and prosperity are two interconnected and indivisible things and if any country succeeds to block the South Caucasian Region, it will be in full control of all accesses and links to the Western markets not only for the entire Caucasus area but for the countries of Central Asia, a double-locked region, for which the only gateway/link to the West is through the Georgian sea ports on the Black Sea shore.

So, as I noted above, the best possible way to avoid such a scenario is through a strategy of positive engagement in the South Caucasian Region, with conflict resolution training and capacity building activities for regional actors serving as the center piece of that strategy.

Any deviation from this scenario or escalation of conflicts, tensions or even disputes among the neighboring states may disrupt the implementation of these noble plans.

Let me briefly in this regard and, as an illustration what I have said above, share with you my personal observations on the current state of Georgian-Russian relations and the perspectives of their development and how these developments may impact stability within the South Caucasian Region and beyond.

CAUCASIAN CHALK CIRCLE: WALKING BACK FROM AN ABYSS.

Let me briefly in this regard and, as an illustration what I have said above, share with you my personal observations on the current state of Georgian-Russian relations and the perspectives of their development and how these developments may impact stability within the South Caucasian Region and beyond. I would start with just couple of general considerations.

It is axiomatic that relations between two countries in general, regardless of their warmth or absence thereof, are usually governed by a strategic core that happens to be definitive in identifying of the strategic interests of sides and existence of which at the same time serves to soften the impact of occasional and vibrant rhetorical exchanges.

However, in the case recent state of relations between Georgia and Russia, it seems that this strategic core has either severely crumbled or disappeared at all, or the relationship has quite simply imploded and strategic vacuum has taken its place.

Therefore, despite the reemergence of relatively balanced rhetoric within couple of weeks, relations between Georgia and Russia still lie inert in this vacuum.

There are none of the usual pegs or handholds that we can use to pull them back up either to normalcy, or at the very least bring this discourse back to a zero level.

If in fact, there are any pegs at all for this bilateral relationship, they are of a purely negative character - the “frozen” conflicts, Russia’s own interpretation of the concept of energy security, and of course, the personal factor of the deeply strained relations between the two Presidents.

Because of this we constantly hear talk of the two sides’ “unpredictabity” or “unwillingness to dialogue” or absence of “trustworthiness” in the bilateral relations.

In addition, this state of affairs, as we noted above, is usually accompanied by hysterical and neurotic claims and counter claims.

Thus, these relations are either already influencing or may negatively impact both the US-Russian and Russo-European dialogue, if ever the discourse between the sides comes up to the “Georgian issues”.

Of course, I acknowledge that the Georgian-Russian relations are not determining factor in either abovementioned dialogue.

However, their current vibrancy injects negative elements/charge into the discourse between the United States Government and Russia, Russia and the EU and thus narrowing the possibilities of the Western partners of Georgia to exert a positive influence on the quality of the Russo-Georgian ties.

Moreover, both Russia and America are entering the season of electoral campaigns, a period when both sides will concentrate mainly on their internal affairs. These periods are always particularly delicate and sensitive-by all means domestically though as well externally.

They usually-and this has historically been the case in particular with America-do not have the time to focus on foreign policy issues but if the foreign policy becomes an issue of the up-coming US election campaign, by all means it will be first of all about Iraq and problems issuing there from.

The situation will be even more complex in Russia, where the change of Presidential power, and possibly of a President, will be accompanied with the highly sensitive processes of reinforcing the outgoing regime’s political and financial resources, and their adaptation to new power realities and structures.

In Russia (as in any country) the struggle among different political groupings for such so-called “vital interests” tends to be tough, rough and sometimes even brutal, and from these perspectives, it may have some dramatic impact on the Russia’s neighborhood as well.

In their struggle to guarantee the “vital interests”, the Russian power elites (among them those who happen to be antagonistic towards the current regime in Moscow) may well look for the weakest link, either within the country or in Russia’s near abroad.

And the current state of Georgian-Russian relations, engagement of other world powers with their domestic issues or the resolution of their immediate security problems, like Iraq, may incite these forces in Russia to play among many political cards a “Georgian” one just to accomplish their internal goals.

From these perspectives, Western powers and the United States in particular, have immense stakes in the relationship between Russia and Georgia. If the current state of affairs between Russia and Georgia continues to degenerate, any diplomatic spat could turn into a shooting war.

At a time when the U.S. needs Russia’s engagement with North Korea, Iran, and the larger issue of the Middle East or fight against terrorism, disagreements and concerns between the two sides over Russia’s relationship with Georgia could supersede and distract the two powers( by the way, including Europeans as well) from larger issues in desperate need of international cooperation.

Russia the nominal partner would quickly turn into Russia the big problem.

To prevent this, Russia and Georgia must stop demonizing one another and return to statesmanship. This requires both Presidents end the ugly campaigns of suspicion and hate and rediscover the vast positive heritage of Georgian-Russian relations; not out of nostalgia, but for hard-headed pragmatism.

A failure to normalize relations now would further economic and political damage to both countries, hindering relations even more between the two peoples who traditionally share sympathy for one another.

There are some avenues for encouragement. More than three months after the seizure of Russian military personnel in Tbilisi and Moscow’s severance of all economic ties with Georgia, both sides moved to reestablish at least a formal modicum of normalcy.

President Putin publicly supported Georgia’s territorial integrity, refused to recognize the recent independence referendum in South Ossetia and made decision to return the Russian Ambassador to Tbilisi.

President Saakashvili, meanwhile, replaced some hawkish hotheads in his government who had vowed to bring South Ossetia back to the fold before the end of 2006 and opened broadly the venue for the extensive bilateral dialogue, especially in the economic sector.

But is it enough and what else could be done in this direction?

The Russian government needs to drop the de facto economic sanctions against Georgia, which have missed their prime objective: they bolstered President Saakashvili instead of undermining him.

For its part, Georgia needs to realize that good relations with Russia have value and domestic reform and economic development should take precedence over its plans to regain control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Georgian leader also would do right if he shows some dignified deference to his Russian peer and recognizes certain Russia’s regional interests without damaging or impacting Georgia’s strategic goals.

President Putin would do his duty if he publicly condemns the outrages committed against Georgians, many of them Russian citizens, during the recent campaign.

As a confidence-building gesture, Georgia could announce a reduction of its forces in Abkhazia’s Kodori Gorge which is controlled by Tbilisi. With a winter season upon us, it is also the appropriate thing to do.

In accordance with the mutual interests of both sides, to stop Russia’s de facto trade and transportation boycott of Georgia and Georgia’s objections to Russia’s WTO entry. As the recent example of Moldova demonstrates, this knot can be untied more or less independently of other issues. Surely Moscow does not want to be shut out of the world trade body by Tbilisi.

Still, despite some initial positive trends, I admitted above, neither leader trusts the other and relations between Georgia and Russia continue to be in a danger zone.

Moscow and Tbilisi first must rid themselves of some dangerous notions to establish a modicum of trust.

President Putin may claim victory and take a longer view. If he wants to claim the legacy of a peacemaker, the Caucasus is where he has to perform. Russia’s leadership in resolving these conflicts would buttress stability and build prosperity on both sides of the Caucasus range. The commitment to start a true negotiating process aimed at settling the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be good news for all those concerned with European and Euro-Atlantic security.

But if the current situation is allowed to fester, the ensuing crisis would have most negative repercussions for the Caucasus both south and north, and for Russia’s relations with the West.

It’s time Messrs. Putin and Saakashvili led their nations away from the abyss that opened last September and focus on much needed bridge-building.

An even more important step toward building confidence would be Moscow’s coming to terms with the political realities in Georgia. The notion of a regime change in Georgia should be abolished as a chimera. It looks that in the next two years Mr. Putin will have to deal with Mr. Saakashvili, and even when presidents change on either or both sides, Georgia will be unlikely to change its political universe.

In the foreseeable future, for the bulk of the Georgian elite, the sun will be rising in the west rather than the north.

This raises the issue of Georgia’s NATO bid. The next Atlantic Alliance summit which can decide on the matter is less than two years away. Georgia may or may not be brought into NATO alongside with the three Balkans states. Russia will be unable to block Georgia’s membership by simply opposing it. To make a more powerful statement, it would have to rake the embers of the conflicts and basically threaten war to keep NATO at bay. This would be playing with fire.

A more enlightened way would be for Russia to change its overall approach to the “frozen” conflicts. Instead of clinging to the status quo in the zones of conflict in Georgia, Moscow needs to exercise leadership in helping resolve those conflicts, without prejudice to their outcome. As a result, Russia would also acquire a much friendlier neighborhood along its southern border.

As the Georgian elites marvel about the West, they, too, need to realize that Russia continues to be their biggest neighbor. Brinkmanship is a poor policy recipe generally, and a wholly disastrous one to reintegrate the lands lost.

On the contrary, focusing on domestic development, economic or social, would bring Georgia respect and recognition in the neighborhood and beyond. Tbilisi has made a few steps in that direction, but it needs to do much, much more.

2006 has been the worst year in modern Russo-Georgian relations. Messrs. Putin and Saakashvili might spend some time to reflect on the painful lessons of the near-collision and make a resolution to banish that risk in 2007.