| JRL HOME | SUPPORT | SUBSCRIBE | RESEARCH & ANALYTICAL SUPPLEMENT | |
Old Saint Basil's Cathedral in MoscowJohnson's Russia List title and scenes of Saint Petersburg
Excerpts from the JRL E-Mail Community :: Founded and Edited by David Johnson

#36 - JRL 2007-27 - JRL Home
Russia Profile
February 5, 2007
The Return
Moscow Sends its Ambassador Back to Tbilisi
By Molly Corso
Molly Corso is a freelance journalist based in Tbilisi.

TBILISI. Officially, both Russia and Georgia have heralded the return of the Russian ambassador to Tbilisi as a breakthrough in their strained relationship. However, in Georgia, questions linger about why Moscow decided to restore diplomatic ties and if the move will really lead to a detente between the two neighbors.

On Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin underscored that it was Russia – not Georgia – that took the initiative toward normalizing relations. During a press conference with Russian and international journalists in Moscow, Putin repeated that the decision to send Vyacheslav Kovalenko back to Tbilisi is just the “first step,” implying that the next step depended on Georgia.

“As planned, we returned the ambassador and we hope this is the first step toward resolving all of our problems,” he said. However, Putin noted that while Russia is taking the high road and working to reestablish ties with Tbilisi, Georgia seems content just to point fingers. “When, in the Georgian press, we see the beating of the drums: look, the ambassador returned, we won…well, okay. Let them feel that way…the most important thing is that this assists the normalization [of Russian-Georgian relations].”

In Tbilisi, while officials have greeted the ambassador’s return as a good beginning, there is little doubt that now they are expecting Moscow to do more. In an interview with Ekho Moskvy on January 27, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili pointed out there is little Georgia can do to reciprocate: Tbilisi never recalled its ambassador, and Georgia never initiated economic sanctions against Russia.

“Frankly speaking, I do not fully understand how Georgia can respond, because this decision [to return the ambassador] was Russia’s internal affair – this ambassador was not expelled by us and we can only welcome that he is now back in Tbilisi,” he said. “We have not recalled our ambassador from Russia, so we have nothing to respond with to this decision of Russia’s.”

Saakashvili added that Georgia is willing to maintain a dialogue with Russia.

According to Vasili Tchkoidze, the chief of staff at the parliamentary committee for foreign affairs, Russia has still not given Georgia a “clear signal” of what it is expecting in return.

“We don’t know what Russia considers [to be] a compromise from our side. Sometimes we make a compromise, but Russia is again angry,” he said. “It is difficult to understand what they want.”

Relations between the two countries were strained throughout 2006, but went into a tailspin in September after Georgia briefly detained, and then deported, four Russian military officers allegedly involved in espionage. Although Tbilisi maintains the officers were just the latest in a long line of deported Russian spies and it followed the internationally accepted protocol by deporting them, Moscow took offense and severed all ties with its southern neighbor. In addition to the earlier ban on Georgian wine, mineral water and agricultural goods, Russia recalled its ambassador, stopped issuing visas and ended all transportation and postal services.

At the height of the scandal, nearly 1,000 ethnic Georgians were deported from Russia and Georgian owned businesses were temporarily shut down. Prominent ethnic Georgians living in Russia complained of harassment and three Georgians reportedly died during the deportation process.

While Kovalenko has repeatedly stated Russia’s desire to improve the strained relations, to date he has not publicly offered Georgia anything concrete. On Feb. 5-7, talks are planned between the Georgian and Russian aviation services, but there has been no mention of when visas will be issued, or the embargo lifted.

In addition, Georgia is still working on a legal case against Russia’s treatment of ethnic Georgians during the autumn crisis. The Georgian Ministry of Justice refuses to release information about the pending case, but the Georgian parliament created a special commission to look into the deportation process and there are plans to take the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

Georgian analysts have speculated that Putin’s decision to reestablish diplomatic ties with Tbilisi is more about gaining leverage for World Trade Organization talks than any real desire to make peace. According to Archil Gegeshidze, senior fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, once it became obvious that the sanctions were not working – and Russia’s international image was suffering – Moscow had to make a concession.

“Russia has two strategic objectives during this year: the first objective is to accede to the World Trade Organization and … Russia would like to secure Georgia’s yes,” he said. “Second is to do its best to keep existing formats of negotiations and peacekeeping operations in the conflict zones in Georgia.”

Gegeshidze noted that returning the ambassador was an easy way for Moscow to position itself for both: it proved to the international community that it was initiating a solution to the crisis and gave itself additional bargaining leverage for WTO negotiations with Tbilisi.

Publicly, the Georgian government maintains that the single requirement for Russia to receive its WTO vote remains the same regardless of Kovalenko’s return, but Gegeshidze believes a compromise is likely.

Tbilisi is demanding that Russia uphold a 2004 agreement to legalize the two unofficial border crossings it shares with the de facto territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While the request may seem straightforward, in fact, the implications are far reaching. By legalizing these two borders, Georgia will be able to place its customs officials deep within the separatist territories and reestablish at least nominative administrative control over part of the two conflict zones.

However, Gegeshidze added that WTO negotiations notwithstanding, the reestablishment of diplomatic ties is not sufficient to restore normal relations between Georgia and Russia because the two countries are each engaged in mutually exclusive policies.

“These fundamental causes of conflict remain,” he said. “Georgia will [maintain] its course toward the West and Russia will…[maintain] its course to keep Georgia ineligible for this process…[The return of the ambassador] is a tactical move. One pawn was displaced on the chess board.”