#15 - JRL 2007-27 - JRL Home
Russia Profile
February 2, 2007
Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Successors on Display
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
Contributors: Stephen Blank, Donald Jensen, Andrei Seregin, Sergei Shishkarev, Ira Straus, Andrei Zagorski

This week the world had a rare opportunity to examine three Russian leaders who, as rumor has it, are potential successors to President Putin.

The World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland served as a platform for presenting First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Matviyenko.

Both are believed to be candidates for the presidential post in 2008, although Medvedev is the clear front-runner at this point. He manages the ambitious portfolio of National Projects, has established a lead in the polls and enjoys favorable media coverage. While Matviyenko is more of a dark-horse candidate, many Kremlin-watchers believe she is being groomed for succession as a candidate the Kremlin clans can agree on if all other options prove to be too divisive. As a sign of her changing status, Matviyenko’s media coverage has risen sharply in the last couple of months, along with her international exposure ­ last week she accompanied the president’s wife on trip to France for the celebration of the Russian Language Week.

Meanwhile, Putin’s other plausible successor, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, was also on international display last week, accompanying the president on a high-profile visit to India.

However, for almost three days, Medvedev stole the scene at Davos, delivering a major policy speech that gave the international audiences a taste of the policies he would pursue if elected president. Naturally, there was a lot of what an audience of international business leaders and political heavyweights wanted to hear.

Medvedev outlined a vision of Russia as an “effective democracy” ­ distancing himself from the concept of “sovereign democracy” promoted by Vladislav Surkov ­ that would be based on market economics, the rule of law, and governmental accountability to its citizens.

Medvedev predicted that Russia will overtake Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer this year, and promised to make Russia the world’s sixth largest economy in just two years (bypassing France and the UK). He also promised equal treatment for foreign investors, although he said that Russia would soon pass a law regulating foreign investment in the strategic sectors of the Russian economy.

In short, Medvedev presented a very liberal view of Russia’s economic and political future, emphasizing at one point: “freedom is always better than non-freedom.”

Matviyenko presented herself as the “foreign investor friendly” governor, boasting of attracting Toyota and Nissan to build large auto assembly plants in St. Petersburg and reinvigorating the city’s economy ­ a trend accompanied by skyrocketing real estate prices.

How important is this international display of Putin’s successors? What does it tell the West about future Russian leaders and their policies? Does it help improve Russia’s image? What impact will their international credentials have on their electoral fortunes in Russia? How different is this from the way the Chinese leadership marketed Chairman Hu Jintao before his ascension to the leadership post? What else needs to be done to make Putin’s successors “marketable commodities” in the eyes of Western public opinion?

Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA (Dr. Blank’s views as contributed to Russia Profile do not represent the position of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government)

I believe this kind of display is important mainly to the Russian elite. They, including the candidates themselves, wish to see how well potential leaders stand up to international scrutiny. It also is important because Russia has historically been sensitive to what Western elites think of it. So, it becomes important for potential aspirants to the highest positions in Russia to show that they can carry on an effective dialogue with Western leaders and defend or even advance Russia's interests. But in actuality, for the West, these occasions are not so important. Rather, they are like photo opportunities.

Nor do these occasions seriously improve Russia's image. For all the optimism and boastfulness of Medvedev's speech, his words cannot disguise the reality of Russia's day-to-day conduct, which belies the image of a progressive capitalistic democracy. The systematic rigging of the elections, the equally systematic and long-standing efforts to use energy cutoffs as a strategic weapon across the CIS, Russia's unwillingness to explain nuclear smuggling into Georgia, the manifestations of political murders and an accompanying media suppression, all count for more than a single speech, no matter how good it sounds.

Indeed, it is very unlikely that Medvedev's speech reflects the true nature of things in Russia. Government controls are spreading not just across the energy sector, but to all defense-related industries and even the metal and automotive sector. Some officials also are talking about reintroducing state planning. While such policies reflect past policy failures, they also reflect the continuation of a tsarist-like despotism where elites at the top are motivated more by their personal greed to acquire the rents accruing from these industries than from any real sense of national interest. Meanwhile, the state is all too happy to give them the opportunities to acquire these rents in return for unquestioning service.

Despite Medvedev's rhetoric, Russia is steadily regressing ever further from democracy; all the adjectives in the world, such as "effective" or sovereign," cannot conceal that fact. Neither is it very likely that Russia will bypass the UK or France by 2009 except possibly in terms of GDP, and that is heavily dependent upon the country’s ability to remain an oil and gas producer, but not a competitive industrial or high-tech economy. Neither is that indicator a very useful sign of the overall direction of the economy.

In Russia's case, such accomplishments do not appear to accompany major advances in overcoming critical socio-economic issues like demography, public health, and the diffusion of innovative technologies. Like the highly vulnerable late tsarist and even Soviet economy, Russia depends on the value of notoriously unreliable primary products in the world market for its economic health. Under the circumstances, Medvedev's speech reflects words rather than deeds, and a sense of what his audience wants to hear rather than an accurate picture of contemporary Russian realities.

Sergei Shishkarev, Deputy Chairman, State Duma Committee on Energy, Transportation and Communications:

It is clear that Medvedev is emerging as the frontrunner in the presidential race. Putin gave his blessing for Medvedev’s presentation in Davos; in fact, Putin insisted on Medvedev leading the Russian delegation. Medvedev’s role in Davos indicates that both Putin and Medvedev want to project the image of Russia as an open and democratic state ready to engage the West in mutually advantageous projects.

It is also clear that Medvedev is emerging as the presidential candidate the Russian and international business community will embrace. In Davos, he publicly staked out positions that are very business friendly and outlined a vision for Russia as an investment opportunity not to be missed. In this regard, Medvedev presented himself as a spokesman for the liberal camp within the Russian leadership. His statement that all successful states have been democracies because freedom is better than non-freedom is quite telling ­ this is not a pose to please Western audiences, but rather a conviction that Medvedev, a child of the post Soviet transition ­ genuinely shares.

But Medvedev also projected an image of toughness ­ he emphasized that no one would be allowed to do harm to Russia, and that the country will be reasserting its rights to the international mandates vacated temporarily by the Soviet Union. This is staking a claim to Russia’s future international role as a responsible great power. Medvedev made it clear that Russia will never recognize anyone’s right to claim the universal truth, including the right to impose one’s version of democracy ­ a swipe at the United States.

Presenting presidential candidates to international audiences is not a uniquely Russian feature. U.S. presidential candidates routinely make major foreign trips to prove their foreign policy mettle and impress American allies. Mikhail Gorbachev’s trip to Great Britain in 1983, where he secured Margaret Thatcher’s ultimate compliment as the Soviet leader with which the West could do business, helped him secure the grip on power in the Kremlin. In that respect, Medvedev’s choice of Davos as the venue for his international presentation makes a lot of sense ­ at least a year from now nobody would be asking the Trudy Rubin question ­ Who is Mr. Medvedev?

Andrei Zagorski, Associate Professor, MGIMO-University, Moscow:

Those who may have intended to boost the international marketing of eventual successors to Putin from the “liberal” camp through the World Economic Forum should be astonished. Russia was far from being a prominent theme of the media coverage of this year’s gathering in Davos. This is not because Russia has lost its attractiveness altogether but, rather, because other themes are much higher on the agenda of global politics and economy, and Russia has little to do with them.

With a total of 17 panels, climate change was the top theme in Davos; Reviving the Doha Round of world trade negotiations, agreed to by 30 trade ministers present, is widely believed to be the major outcome of the forum. Against the background of a further expansion of the “global village,” global businesses pushed towards further development of global standards in numerous fields. In that context, world banking security standards were discussed at length this year. Combating corruption seemed to be another important theme, and emerging markets were warned that, in order to sustain or boost growth, they need to attract more foreign investment.

Moscow’s agenda for Davos obviously has fallen too short. In many instances, Russian politics seem to move in the opposite direction when compared with the mainstream of the forum. When Moscow promises to grant foreign investors equal treatment, it sounds like something that should have been done a long, long time ago. Had it promised foreign companies equal treatment with domestic businesses, such as Gazprom, some potential investors would probably listen. However, if, in speaking of equal treatment, Medvedev meant the forthcoming law to regulate foreign investment in several dozens of key sectors of the Russian economy, his message surely had a discouraging effect.

This year’s forum demonstrated that getting Russia back on the mainstream agenda will take more than just sending to Davos a bunch of ministers and CEOs considered to be liberal while, at the same time, throwing conservative Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov into the succession debate at home. Instead, Moscow will have to realign its policy with the mainstream of the global economic agenda.

Should any one of the eventual successors to Putin develop a respectable profile in the West, he or she should solidify it with bold opposition to further concentration of the Russian economy in the hands of the businesses closely affiliated with the Kremlin.

Ira Straus, U.S. Committee for Russia in NATO, Washington DC:

The West is not paying much attention to Putin's potential successors. It assumes he will make the final pick and retain much of the power anyway. What will impress the West is if there is political change after 2008: if space is reopened for large-scale independent media, TV journalists recover greater freedom, liberal and international NGOs cease to feel pressure, and the parties that espouse these basics of democracy are not excluded from races or cheated by miscounts.

This could occur no matter who becomes the successor, if the regime feels safer once it has completed its exercise of control over the succession process. A sense of definitive final control from a loyal domestic power center over Russia's future destiny seems to be what the regime means by "sovereign democracy." It has been particularly anxious to control the 2008 succession, positing a Color Revolution as the alternative. Since it credits that alternative to the account of Western power and manipulation ­ and here it gives the West too much credit ­ it deduces that such a revolution would mean the end of Russian sovereignty.

In the name of ensuring Russian control the regime has instead justified further shrinkage of the political space. It is hoped among Russian liberals that all this will end after the 2008 succession and political space will be reopened. However, the desire for "sovereignty" qua control over destiny, rather than the plain legal fact of Russia's sovereignty, is something that can never be satisfied in human existence; "success" in 2008 could logically allow only a temporarily relaxation. One analysis connected Putin's anxiety over sovereignty with that of German political theorist Carl Schmitt, seeing in both a formalistic emptiness and an unquenchable thirst for control over a reality that is always felt to be slipping out of control. It could matter, then, if Putin's successor drops the term.

Davos was not the first time Medvedev questioned the formulation "sovereign democracy." His comment earlier ­ that democracy should not have qualifying adjectives attached to it ­ was potentially significant. Decades ago, when the largest Italian parties spoke for "Socialist Democracy" and "Christian Democracy", the Italian Republican Party won great respect by calling for "democracy without adjectives." It was a way of identifying with democracy per se ­ not democracy without values to be sure, but with the values shared by all modern democracies and implicitly put in question by parties that inserted other value-qualifiers before the word "democracy."

However, the Italian Republican Party was led by known independent personalities; Medvedev is created by the regime ­ thus the suspicions that the regime is using him as a liberal pole in its balancing act and a facade for its image abroad. Too much distrust has been built up to be dispelled by words alone; it will have to be by deeds that a successor proves himself in Western eyes. There is always a high price for overcoming the distrust left by a secretive regime. That price was paid under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. After Putin, sadly, Russia may have to pay some of it again.

Andrei Seregin, Senior Policy Analyst, National Laboratory for Foreign Policy, Moscow:

There is no doubt the international display of Putin’s successors will have some impact on Western policymakers. Moreover, making sure the West gets to know the policies of Russia’s presidential frontrunners is almost essential to ensure the smooth transition of power in this country. Bearing in mind the current high level of frictions between Russia and the West, the successor should not be presented as a complete surprise to the West.

In his recent Wall Street Journal piece “A Covert Fight for Putin's Job,” Alan Cullison, who is widely considered to be a reporter seasoned in Russian affairs, presented no serious analysis, preferring to elaborate on the obvious ­ listing the short CV of the possible contenders. But at least he was quite right to note that there is little public information today concerning the competition among the potential successors to Putin.

Unlike the electoral campaign rush in the United States, the situation in Russia’s policy circles remains mostly a behind-the-scenes struggle, and many western observers prefer to interpret it using traditional media cliches.

Keeping the foreign policy views of Russia’s potential presidential successors secret is a self-defeating policy. Recent media opportunities for Medvedev, Ivanov and Matviyenko are welcome signs. Still, no candidate has ever elaborated on the future of Russian foreign policy, or presented his or her view of Russia’s positioning abroad.

Surely no candidate, however well coached, can elaborate on all the diversity of foreign policy themes. It would be extremely helpful in terms of normalizing Russia’s troubled partnership with the West if possible successors put forward their proxies ­ affiliated think tanks and experts, clearing up the details of the candidate’s future foreign policy stances, enabling our Western partners to begin a mutually useful adaptation process, influencing the candidates’ platforms from the very start.

At least this is how it works in the United States and other sovereign democracies.

Donald Jensen, Director of Communications, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Washington, D.C.:

Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, one of the leading contenders to succeed President Putin in 2008, received glowing coverage at home for his leadership of the Russian delegation to the annual World Economic Forum in Davos Switzerland last week. His prominent role was barely noted in Washington, however, where perceptions of the Kremlin are marked by frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral relations, concern about a drift toward authoritarianism inside Russia, and growing alarm at Moscow's apparent willingness to use its vast energy resources to bully its neighbors.

Russian commentators widely interpreted Medvedev's prominence as a sign that Vladimir Putin had chosen him as his successor (Putin denied he had chosen an heir in his annual press conference on February ). In his public remarks, moreover, Medvedev took pains to come across as a leader who strongly favored free market economics. He also called for the establishment of democratic principles in Russia as a key element in the transformation of the country into a prosperous economy.

Medvedev's high profile was largely ignored in the United States. The major American media, especially the New York Times and Washington Post, gave more prominence to the Litvinenko investigation and Russia's policy toward Iran. In official circles, the major discussion about Russia took place in the bipartisan Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, where one Senator described Russia as a "growing threat." One prominent Russia expert noted that the Davos Forum in general is a "mid-1990s institution whose time has passed."