RIA Novosti
December 17, 2007
Collective security: dusting off old cliches
MOSCOW. (Alexander Khramchikhin for RIA Novosti) - As the rhetoric about basic treaties signed at the end of the Cold War (START 1, INF, CFE) intensifies, it is becoming clear that collective security in Europe and the world needs new approaches and perhaps a complete overhaul.
The present conflict is based on the mistaken view of Russia adopted by the West in the early 1990s.
Russia as it emerged in late 1991 was in effect a political and ideological negation of the Soviet Union. Only certain political, economic and military circumstances forced it to act as a successor to the U.S.S.R. (mostly at the West's request).
The Russian people themselves dumped the Communist regime. They made their free choice. Unlike the German people, who had to repudiate the Nazi regime only as a result of their military defeat and foreign occupation.
However, the West began regarding Russia as an ideological and political heir to the U.S.S.R. and as the country that lost the Cold War, must surrender and be dictated new conditions.
It totally ignored Russia's internal and external political interests, and the fact that they could be out of tune with Western ones. It chose to speak to Russia in a lecturing tone (which was quite unwarranted).
NATO began expanding to the East without any real political or military reasons. The interests of Brussels bureaucrats, who are still at a loss to find arguments for their existence now that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are gone, have prevailed over the political and military interests of Western countries.
Today it is practically impossible to hide the fact that NATO's expansion has only weakened the bloc, politically and especially militarily, and the process seems to have become self-perpetuating.
As a result, Russia-NATO relations soured considerably in the second half of the 1990s, and during NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia nearly hit rock bottom. Later on, the relations improved a little only to worsen again.
Another negative factor was the aggressive foreign policy adopted by America under President George W. Bush. The United States began acting like a bull in a china shop, not caring for Russia or even its Western allies. It started breaking treaties for tactical gains, giving no thought to the long-term strategic results of such behavior. Such was the case with the ABM Treaty and such could be the case with START-1.
Russia is puzzled by NATO's enlargement and the deployment of a missile defense shield in Europe.
The explanations emerging from Brussels and Washington are either muddled or demagogic, purposely ignoring Russia's concerns and interests. They also ignore the postulate that "the military react to opportunities, not intentions," making Western peace assurances look weak.
Cold War veterans in Moscow have been quick to seize upon such a situation. So have the propaganda-mongers of the current Kremlin regime.
The West's behavior allows them to revert to the customary Soviet rhetoric about the "imperialist threat." This strengthens the position of the more hawkish factions in Moscow, and rallies the population in face of the "external threat."
In turn, the West sees Moscow's harsh new rhetoric as an expression of its "traditional aggressiveness."
These two propaganda cliches (about "NATO's aggressive designs" and the "Russian menace") are a far cry from reality, but very large sections of the population and political elites in Russia and the West take them seriously.
What is more, these cliches feed one another, turning the deterioration in relations into a self-sustaining downward spiral.
There is also something paradoxical about the current treaties. Having been signed in the era of the nearly finished but still continuing Cold War, they are based on the premise of East-West confrontation. The preservation of these treaties only fuels this confrontation, and their breaking hence breeds new suspicions. There is nothing to replace them, and the mentality of the sides remains the same.
It is clear that the main problem is mentality. The sides must stop thinking in last century cliches. Russia must no longer regard the West as a "global spy ring" nurturing plots against Russia and seeking its natural resources.
The West must recognize that Russia has interests beyond its borders and stop seeing in it a brute aggressive force bent on subjugating the surrounding countries and nations.
And vice versa. A country opposed to Russia should not be viewed as a "lighthouse of democracy", deserving to be supported at all costs.
If this shift in attitudes could be accomplished, the need for arms restricting treaties would simply fade away. But mentality is the hardest thing of all to change - especially if the two sides not only lack the will to get rid of their ideological cliches, but, on the contrary, seek to refurbish and renew them.
What is more, the ruling regimes in Russia and some East European and CIS countries make effective use of such cliches to buttress their hold on power.
In such circumstances, the wisest course would be to review all existing treaties in line with the new realities.
Moscow and Washington have already made a very reasonable proposal - to apply the INF treaty, on intermediate range nuclear weapons, to all countries.
As for the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), a new agreement is in order here, one that would set a ceiling on arms and military equipment for NATO, regardless of the number of its signatories.
A good idea would be to lower the quotas for all countries, whether or not they are signatories to the original or adapted version of the CFE.
Considering that none of the CFE signatories (aside from Azerbaijan) reach their quotas, their reduction is unlikely to be a problem.
Alexander Khramchikhin is head of analysis at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis.