Russia Profile
www.russiaprofile.org
November 23, 2007
Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel:
The Putin Movement
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
Contributors: Stephen Blank, Ethan S. Burger, Eugene Kolesnikov, Andrei Tsygankov
Last week hundreds of delegates from across Russia gathered in the city of Tver to set up an All-Russian Public Movement in Support of Vladimir Putin.
In the two months following Putin's surprise announcement on October 1 that he would lead the slate of United Russia candidates in the December 2 parliamentary election, we have seen public demonstrations and rallies in support of the president spread across the country.
The rallies nearly unanimously call upon Vladimir Putin to continue leading the nation after his presidential term expires in 2008. And quite recently people have started calling for Putin to be awarded a special status - that of the Leader of the Nation - that would allow him to supervise the activities of the next president and his government.
The election campaign for the next Duma has essentially lost any meaningful political agenda. No specific issues that would shape the country's future are being discussed, other than the question of how to retain Putin in a leadership role one way or another.
Keeping Putin in charge appears to be the nation's only hope for everything to turn out well. Putin's Plan is being accepted as an article of faith without dwelling into its substance, and attempts to critically analyze or improve it are being met with derision and even hostility.
Putin himself has stated that he is dissatisfied with the Russian political parties, and had agreed to lead United Russia only "because we have nothing better." But he also made clear why he needs the popular mandate at the Duma elections- to acquire the moral right to hold Russia's future rulers accountable in following Putin's Plan.
Rumor has it that the Kremlin is looking for ways to design what is euphemistically called "a new configuration of power in Russia," where Putin would be able to retain his unquestioned leadership in a new position not based on constitutional strictures, but rather drawing its legitimacy from overwhelming popular support. Hence the need for Putin to lead United Russia during elections, and the need to back his candidacy up with the Putin Movement.
At the same time, there are rumors that Putin might abdicate the presidency after being elected to the Duma on United Russia's ticket. He would have every legal right to do so. However, this would allow United Russia to nominate him as the party's candidate in the presidential election held in accordance with the Russian Constitution on November 23. It is somewhat unclear whether this would make Putin eligible to run, since there is a provision in Russian law that disqualifies the candidate whose actions have forced an early election. But this time the presidential election would be held on time and presumably resigning the presidency after being elected to the Duma does not disqualify Putin's run for a new term. United Russia's television ads - "Vote for Putin! Vote for United Russia!" - might be an indication that perhaps we are already in the midst of Putin's third presidential campaign?
Things are getting tricky. Why would Putin need to keep the ambiguity until the very last moment? Why does he need such public displays of admiration and support? Is he really seeking a presidency by public demand or is he searching for a leadership role that would not be linked to any formal government position? Does he risk compromising his legitimacy? Is Putin a Russian Peron leading a Peronista Movement? Will his staying in charge benefit Russia in the long term?
Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, the Netherlands
In the opinion of a Kremlin ideologue Vladislav Surkov, idealization, personification and centralization are the characteristics of power in Russia. Few would argue that these are indeed intrinsic, centuries-long features of the Russian society, polity and culture. The role of a national leader in Russian history is so important that this history can be meaningfully presented as a succession of the tsars, general secretaries and presidents. Will this core facet of the Russian psyche and society fade away, and will a new, more decentralized format of power take its place in the public perception? This is impossible to predict. For such a fundamental change to happen, Russia as we know it should either disappear or undergo a long, multi-generational transition. This realization is paramount in understanding the limits of social engineering in Russia and in interpreting contemporary Russian politics.
If this view is accepted, it's not surprising that there is a genuine conscious and subconscious anxiety among all strata of the Russian society that Putin's departure may bring an end to the nascent and precarious Russian revival. In addition, Putin's rejection of the third presidential term reveals his personal commitment to a continued gradual democratization of Russia. This commitment, however, rests on a dangerously thin base in the ruling and broader Russian elites. Such fragile support for Putin's democratic vision further fuels the anxiety. All pro-Putin movements are thus based on sentiments shared by the elites and the population at large.
All this does not mean that there is no orchestration of the pro-Putin movements. So why do they do it? Why boost Putin's popularity and play with the idea of a national leader, the father of the nation? One of the explanations considered in the West and Russia is that Putin is still searching for a proper place, weighing the options and pondering a supra-constitutional role. I do not buy it. I believe that Putin has made up his mind.
The president has demonstrated this by agreeing to lead United Russia in the Duma campaign, and he is likely to head the party for many years to come. This appears to be the best way to ensure the continuity of reforms, while at the same time taking further steps in the development of a sovereign (i.e. independent and culturally appropriate) democracy, to which Putin is apparently committed.
In my view, the pro-Putin movements that feed on the genuine popular support and anxiety are used as a means for channeling all strands of Putin's popularity, for the purpose of achieving a conclusive success of United Russia in the parliamentary elections, and providing Putin with a popular national mandate for his future role.
As long as Putin remains silent about what his role is going to be, everyone can imagine this role in accordance with his or her own vision and preferences. This broadens the base for his support and, consequently, backing for United Russia. It is a simple gain maximization strategy as far as United Russia is concerned. This strategy also helps Putin keep his options open for any contingency. Given the continuing hype about Putin's future, this strategy is working quite well.
Andrei Tsygankov, Professor of International Relations, The San-Francisco State University, San-Fancisco, CA
I very much doubt that Putin is seeking to be re-elected for a third term, let alone willing to assume the position of the Leader of the Nation if it ever becomes formally established. The former would be against the spirit of the Constitution, which Putin has vigorously defended until now. The Leader of the Nation designated as a new tsar is even less likely. For all his occasional paranoia, Putin would not want to serve as a non-elected ruler.
A more likely explanation for setting up the For Putin movement has to do with the desire to establish Putin's own network of supporters independently of United Russia. This may be designed as short-term insurance against possible bureaucratic infighting within United Russia, or against some other unpleasant surprises that may result from formal association with a party such as this one.
In the longer run, if United Russia proves to be a solid organization, the For Putin Movement may be merged with it. What is really significant here is that, one way or another, a movement in support of the current policy course is in the making. Looking ahead ten years or so, such a movement may become a channel of upward mobility, creating a new political elite and serving as an important check against the country's political destabilization.
Whatever Putin chooses for himself after March 2008 - the position of the Duma Speaker, prime minister or head of the Security Council - he needs more than his personal charm and popular support to have the capacity to influence a future president, should that ever become necessary. Having a powerful network of supporters makes sense as both short and long-term strategy.
Ethan S. Burger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C.
The political situation in Russia seems to change every day, so I would be foolish to attempt to respond to the specific, albeit important, questions that have been raised. Despite following events in the Soviet Union and Russia for more than 25 years, I have no special insight into the short-term future with respect to this "black box" phenomenon. Making predictions about the long-term may be easier since certain problems in the country will need to be confronted eventually, and I may not be alive to see whether my assessment is correct.
I would be remiss in not stating that I am troubled by the events that led to the decision on the part of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) not to send election observers to monitor the Russian Duma elections. I think this decision was entirely justified. Frankly, I do not understand the behavior of the Russian government. It is simply not credible that the OSCE's applications were improperly filled out - such problems can easily be rectified when there is a will to do so, which was clearly not the case.
President Putin's creation of the powerful political vertical (at the expense of regional power that one might expect in a federal state) combined with the weakness of the parliament has produced a situation in Russia where there are no obvious political successors with the support of large segments of the electorate. Thus, it leaves the outgoing leader to pick his successor.
Putin has benefited from high energy prices, incompetent U.S. foreign policy, and having a predecessor who was disappointingly ineffective. The president enjoys high approval ratings and understands the country's psychological needs. It is not clear, however, whether during his time in office the lives of the Russian population have improved - the conditions with respect to education, health, housing, and job security are disgraceful for a country with a government flushed with money. Yes, there is an elite with an extraordinary amount of wealth and a growing middle class - but the same can be said of many countries far less endowed than Russia.
President Putin has come to recognize the need to improve the country's infrastructure. I hope that his remarks on this topic are not a political ploy but represent a real priority. I hope that either he or his successors successfully fulfill the program in this area. It would be fortunate if the future leaders don't think that the country's population can be bought off with consumer goods and better food products, while depriving them of their human rights. It would also be nice if the authorities observed the rule of law and did not use it as a tool for self-enrichment, while the law enforcement system really punished those who abuse their office, regardless of political connections.
The Russian political system is a form of elected authoritarianism. This is understandable, given the country's history. First, we had the tsars ruling the country, only to be followed by a system of rule by either a dictator or a collection of individuals with one person being recognized as the most important figure. Mikhail Gorbachev tried to transform the system, but he was not up to the task - and it isn't clear that anyone else could ever be.
Frankly, given that I have my doubts as to whether the U.S. political system is functioning, I will not criticize the intrigues in Moscow. I only hope that whoever ultimately calls the shots will treat the individuals who inhabit the Russian Federation as citizens whose needs should be addressed with an efficient allocation of the wealth/taxes generated by a state endowed with tremendous natural and human resources.
Professor Stephen Blank, The US Army War College, Carlyle Barracks PA
Peron is a good analogy here. It is clear that Putin's drive for power is a major part, both of this charade of an election and the orchestrated public demands for a savior. Just as Peronism was theater and populism that turned out to be a sham, so is this manufactured cult of personality and attempt to revert to outright dictatorship in Russia. Putin's efforts to insist that his successors, if there are any, must follow his system indicate the utter lack of any respect for legality or rule of law in Russia. They also demonstrate an overwhelming desire of the elites to hold onto power and wealth, while trying to counter their utter distrust of each other.
This whole campaign charade demonstrates that parties in Russia remain nothing more than personality vehicles for their leaders and that the regime has reverted to the tsarist paradigm, fusing power and wealth in the state's ownership of the country.
As for the ambiguity involved, it strongly suggests that there has been no strategy, but only tactical improvisations. Whereas Putin repeatedly indicated that he would leave to stabilize the system and respect the constitution, he has been forced by his own ambition, the flattery of his entourage of sycophants, the rivalries of the clans around him, and ultimately the logic of the tsarist system to make a mockery of the supposedly stable system created during Putin's tenure.
We should be under no illusion that a third term for Putin is a life term because his entourage will not become better by the further exercise of untrammeled power, quite the opposite. In 2012, neither of the factions then in existence will be able to accept the replacement of Putin by anyone lest they be ousted, so he will have to serve again and again.
In other words, the political system, judged by its own logic, has reached a dead end and is heading back to the specter of the Assemblies of the Land, the theatricality of Ivan the IV's appeals to the people against his alleged enemies and a neo-mediaeval "national leader." Plachit, Plachit Rossiya.