Subject: New Publication: Russia's Power Ministries[: Coercion and Commerce]
Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2007
From: "Brian D Taylor" <bdtaylor@maxwell.syr.edu>
I would like to call your attention, and that of JRL readers, to the recent publication of my new monograph, Russia's Power Ministries: Coercion and Commerce. [http://insct.syr.edu/Research and Events/Taylor_Russia Power Ministries.pdf]
This monograph provides an overview of Russia's power ministries and their political and economic role. Russian President Vladimir Putin has increased the power and resources of Russia's power ministries - military, security, and law enforcement agencies. He also has empowered many political allies with backgrounds in these structures, placing them in important positions throughout the state, and in state-owned businesses. At the same time, there remain important divisions between these agencies and among these officials; they are not a unified group. As "Operation Successor," the effort to elect a Putin loyalist as president, moves into its active phase for December 2007 parliamentary elections and March 2008 presidential elections, it is important to understand how the power and capabilities of these agencies have changed under Putin, and how they might influence Russian development under the next president.
I argue that the prominent political role given to the power ministries has contributed to increasing authoritarianism under Putin. It has not, however, achieved Putin's stated goal of building a strong and effective Russian state. This is because these very same power ministries are themselves corrupt, and thus the personal enrichment of state officials often takes priority over accomplishing state goals. Both the coercive and commercial behavior of Russia's power ministries have important implications for U.S. foreign and security policy.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW OF THE POWER MINISTRIES
The Ministry of Defense and its Successors
The KGB and its Successors
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)
Other Power Ministries and Law Enforcement Agencies
Power Ministry Budgets: Reversal of Fortune
Power Ministry Leaders: Stability in Cadres
CHAPTER TWO: THE SILOVIKI: COHORT, CLAN, AND CORPORATE ACTORS
The Siloviki Cohort
Siloviki Clans
Siloviki Corporate Actors
CHAPTER THREE: POWER AS A WEAPON: THE RETURN OF AUTHORITARIANISM
The Power Ministries and the Struggle for Power: Crises and Conspiracies
The Power Ministries and the Building of "Vertical Power"
Strengthening the State: Putin's Mixed Record
CHAPTER FOUR: POWER AS A RESOURCE: GUNS AND MONEY
The Downside of Putin's Approach to State-Building: Corruption and the Weak Rule
of Law
The Commercialization of the Power Ministries
Siloviki Clans and Big Business
Popular Perceptions of the State: Lack of Trust
CONCLUSIONS: PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Implications for U.S. Policy
Policy Recommendations: A New Framework for Engaging the Power Ministries
A PDF version of the monograph can be downloaded at:
http://insct.syr.edu/Research and Events/Taylor_Russia Power Ministries.pdf.